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
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## DISPATCHES AND GENERAL ORDERS

OF


FIELD MARSHAL

### THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH.



LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

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REVOLUTION

THE HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION

1789-1793

BY THE REV. JOHN GARDNER

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THE HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION

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## P R E F A C E .


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THE Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington have been published ; but the expense of the work has placed it beyond the reach of many persons anxious to possess it. The compiler has, in consequence, made a selection from them, that may extend to a larger sphere of readers.

The military Dispatches, many important letters on other subjects, and those passages which, in the original publication, have excited so much interest, accompanied by his Grace's General Orders of detail and discipline, are accordingly now presented to the public in a single volume.

J. GURWOOD.

*The Tower of London,  
April, 1841.*



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\* The figures refer to the number of the *Selection*, and not to the *Page*, except in the **GENERAL ORDERS** where the figures refer to the *Page*, and not to the *Selection*.

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PRÉCIS

OF THE

COMMISSIONS, SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONORS

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Born . . . . .	1 May, 1769
Ensign . . . . .	7 Mar. 1787
Lieutenant . . . . .	25 Dec. 1791
Captain . . . . .	30 June, 1791
Major . . . . .	30 April, 1793
Lieutenant Colonel . . . . .	30 Sept. 1793
Colonel . . . . .	3 May, 1796
Major General . . . . .	29 April, 1802
Lieutenant General . . . . .	25 April, 1808
General, in Spain and Portugal . . . . .	31 July, 1811
Field Marshal . . . . .	21 June, 1813

1794.

Embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regt. to join the Duke of York's army in the Netherlands, and arrived at Ostend . . . . .	June.
Re-embarked and proceeded by the Scheldt to Antwerp . . . . .	July.

1795.

As senior officer commanded 3 battalions on the retreat of the army through Holland . . . . .	Jan.
Early in the Spring, on the breaking up of the ice, the army, including the 33rd regt., re-embarked at Bremen for England.	
Embarked in the command of the 33rd regt. for the West Indies, on board the fleet commanded by Admiral Christian . . . . .	Oct.

1796.

But owing to the heavy equinoctial gales, after being 6 weeks at sea, returned to port	19 Jan.
Destination of the 33rd regt. changed for India . . . . .	12 April.
Joined the 33rd regt. at the Cape of Good Hope . . . . .	Sept.

1797.

Arrived in Bengal . . . . .	Feb.
Formed part of an expedition to Manilla, but recalled on arrival at Penang . . . . .	Aug.
Returned to Calcutta . . . . .	Nov.



1798.

Proceeded on a visit to Madras . . . . .	Jan.
Returned to Calcutta . . . . .	Mar.
The 33rd regt. placed on the Madras establishment . . . . .	Sept.

1799.

Appointed to command the subsidiary force of the Nizam, the 33rd regt. being attached to it . . . . .	Feb.
Advance of the army on Seringapatam; Colonel Wellesley moving on the right flank, attacked and harassed by the enemy . . . . .	10 Mar.
Tippoo Sultaun in position at Mallavelly; the attack and defeat of his right flank by the division under Colonel Wellesley, and the cavalry under Major General Floyd . . . . .	27 Mar.
Arrival of the British army before Seringapatam . . . . .	3 Apr.
The army before the west face of that fortress: first attack on the Sultaunpettah Tope by the 33rd regt and 2nd Bengal Native regt., under Col. Wellesley . . . . .	5 Apr.
Second attack with an increased force, the Scotch Brigade (94th regt.), 2 battalions of Sepoys, and 4 guns . . . . .	6 Apr.
Siege of Seringapatam, until . . . . .	3 May.
Assault and capture: Col. Wellesley commanding the reserve in the trenches . . . . .	4 May.
Colonel Wellesley appointed Governor of Seringapatam . . . . .	6 May.
A Commission, consisting of Lieut. General Harris, Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, the Hon. H. Wellesley, and Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick, appointed by the Governor General for the settlement of the Mysore territories . . . . .	4 June.
Commission dissolved . . . . .	8 July.
Colonel Wellesley appointed to the command of Seringapatam and Mysore . . . . .	9 July.

1800.

Colonel Wellesley named to command an expedition against Batavia, in conjunction with Admiral Rainier; but declined the service, from the greater importance of his command in Mysore . . . . .	May.
The tranquillity of Mysore troubled by Dhoondiah Waugh, a Marhatta freebooter; Colonel Wellesley takes the field against him . . . . .	July.
Defeat and death of Dhoondiah, and end of the warfare . . . . .	10 Sept.
Recalled from Mysore to command a force assembling at Trincomalee . . . . .	Oct.
Appointed to command this force, to be employed at Mauritius, or in the Red Sea, in the event of orders from Europe to that effect; or to be ready to act against any hostile attempt upon India . . . . .	15 Nov.

1801.

A dispatch, overland, received by the Governor General, with orders, dated 6th Oct., 1800, to send 3000 men to Egypt . . . . .	6 Feb.
The expedition being ready at Trincomalee, the Governor General directed the whole force to proceed to the Red Sea; and appointed General Baird to command in chief, and Colonel Wellesley to be second in command . . . . .	11 Feb.
In the mean time Colonel Wellesley, having received from the Governors of Bombay and Madras, copies of the overland dispatch from Mr. Dundas, sailed from Trincomalee for Bombay in command of the troops . . . . .	15 Feb.
Colonel Wellesley, on his way to Bombay, informed of the appointment of Major General Baird to the chief command . . . . .	21 Feb.
Prevented, by illness, from proceeding on the expedition to Egypt; Colonel Wellesley ordered to resume the government of Mysore . . . . .	28 Apr.

1803.

Appointed to command a force assembled at Hurryhur to march into the Marhatta territory . . . . .	27 Feb.
Advance from Hurryhur . . . . .	9 Mar.
Arrival at Poonah . . . . .	20 Apr.
The Peshwah replaced on the musnud . . . . .	13 May.
Empowered to exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British government in the territories of the Nizam, the Peshwah, and of the Marhatta States in the Deccan; similar authority being given to General Lake in Hindustan . . . . .	26 June.
The Marhatta War commenced . . . . .	6 Aug.
Siege and capture of Ahmednuggur . . . . .	11 Aug.
Siege and capture of Baroach . . . . .	29 Aug.
Battle of Assye . . . . .	23 Sept.
Siege and capture of Asseerghur . . . . .	21 Oct.
Battle of Argaum . . . . .	29 Nov.
Siege and capture of Gawilghur . . . . .	15 Dec.
Treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar . . . . .	17 Dec.
————— with Dowlut Rao Scindiah . . . . .	30 Dec.

1804.

Surprise of a body of predatory Marhattas, who were routed and destroyed, after an extraordinary forced march, near Munkaiseer . . . . .	6 Feb.
A sword of the value of £1000 voted to Major General Wellesley by the British inhabitants of Calcutta . . . . .	21 Feb.
Visited Bombay . . . . .	} 4 Mar. to 16 May.
Fêtes and address by the garrison and inhabitants . . . . .	
A golden vase voted to Major General Wellesley, by the officers of his division; afterwards changed to a service of plate, embossed with "Assye" . . . . .	26 Feb.
Returned to the army near Poonah . . . . .	17 May.
Resigned the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor General	24 June.
Left the army for Seringapatam . . . . .	28 June.
Address voted to Major General Wellesley, on his return from the army, by the native inhabitants of Seringapatam . . . . .	6 July.
Arrived at Calcutta to assist in military deliberations . . . . .	12 Aug.
Appointed a Knight Companion of the Bath . . . . .	1 Sept.
The civil and military powers vested in him on the 26th June, 1803, and resigned on the 24th June, 1804, renewed by the Governor General . . . . .	9 Nov.
Returned to Seringapatam by Madras . . . . .	30 Nov.

1805.

Resigned the political and military powers in the Deccan, and proposes to embark for Europe. . . . .	24 Feb.
Addresses on quitting India :	
From the Officers of the division lately under his command. . . . .	27 Feb.
Answer . . . . .	8 Mar.
From the Officers of the 33rd regt. . . . .	28 Feb.
Answer . . . . .	Mar.
From the native inhabitants of Seringapatam . . . . .	4 Mar.
Answer . . . . .	4 Mar.
Grand entertainment given to him at the Pantheon at Madras, by the civil and military Officers of the Presidency . . . . .	5 Mar.

Appointed Colonel Wallace, Major Barclay, and Captain Bellingham to superintend the prize affairs of the army of the Deccan . . . . .	6 Mar.
The Thanks of the King and Parliament for his services in the command of the army of the Deccan, communicated in General Orders by the Governor General . . . . .	8 Mar.
Embarked in H.M.S. Trident for England . . . . .	Mar.
Arrival in the Downs . . . . .	10 Sept.
Appointed to the Staff, Kent district . . . . .	30 Oct.
Commanded a brigade, in an expedition to Hanover, under Lord Cathcart . . . . .	30 Nov.

## 1806.

Appointed Colonel of the 33rd regt. <i>vice</i> Marquis Cornwallis, deceased . . . . .	30 Jan.
On the return of the expedition from Hanover, appointed to command a brigade of infantry in the Sussex district. . . . .	25 Feb.
Returned to serve in Parliament . . . . .	12 April.

## 1807.

Sworn of His Majesty's Privy Council . . . . .	8 April.
Appointed Secretary to Ireland (the Duke of Richmond being Lord Lieutenant). . . . .	19 April.
Appointed to a command in the army under Lord Cathcart, in the expedition against Copenhagen . . . . .	13 June.
Affair at Kioge . . . . .	29 Aug.
Appointed to negotiate the capitulation of Copenhagen. . . . .	5 Sept.

## 1808.

Received the Thanks of Parliament for his conduct at Copenhagen, in his place in the House of Commons, and replies to the Speaker . . . . .	1 Feb.
Returned to Dublin . . . . .	17 April.
Appointed to command an expedition assembled at Cork . . . . .	14 June.
The expedition sailed for Coruña and Oporto . . . . .	12 July.
Finally landed at the mouth of the river Mondego, in Portugal . . . . .	1 to 3 Aug.
Affair at Obidos . . . . .	15 Aug.
at Roliça . . . . .	17 Aug.
Battle of Vimeiro. . . . .	21 Aug.
Superseded in the command of the army by Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard . . . . .	21 Aug.
By the desire of Lieut. General Sir H. Dalrymple, the Commander of the Forces, he signed the armistice with Lieut. Gen. Kellermann, which led to the Convention of Cintra . . . . .	22 Aug.
A piece of plate, commemorating the battle of Vimeiro, voted to Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Wellesley, by the General and Field Officers who served at it . . . . .	22 Aug.
Commanded a division of the army under Sir H. Dalrymple . . . . .	22 Aug.
Convention of Cintra . . . . .	30 Aug.
Returned to England. . . . .	4 Oct.
Court of Inquiry on the Convention of Cintra . . . . .	17 Nov.
His evidence before it. . . . .	22 Nov.
Returned to Dublin . . . . .	21 Dec.

## 1809.

Received the Thanks of Parliament for Vimeiro, in his place in the House of Commons, and replied to the Speaker . . . . .	27 Jan.
Appointed to command the Army in Portugal . . . . .	2 April.
Resigned the office of Chief Secretary in Ireland . . . . .	14 April.
Arrived in Lisbon, and assumed the command . . . . .	22 April.



The passage of the Douro, and battle of Oporto . . . . .	12 May.
By a decree of the Prince Regent of Portugal, appointed Marshal General of the Portuguese army . . . . .	6 July.
Battle of Talavera de la Reyna . . . . .	27 and 28 July.
Created a peer, by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellealey, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera . . . . .	26 Aug.
Visited Marquis Wellesley at Seville and Cadiz . . . . .	2 Nov.

1810.

Thanks of Parliament voted for Talavera . . . . .	1 Feb
Pension of £2000 per annum voted to Lord Wellington and his two succeeding heirs male. . . . .	16 Feb.
Appointed a member of the Regency in Portugal, in conjunction with Lord Stuart de Rothesay, then Mr. Stuart, His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon . . . . .	Aug.
Battle of Busaco . . . . .	27 Sept.
Took up a position to cover Lisbon in the Lines, from Alhandra on the Tagus, to Torres Vedras and the Sea . . . . .	10 Oct.
Followed the retreat of the French army, under Marshal Massena, to Santarem . . . . .	16 Nov.

1811.

Again followed the retreat of the French army to Condeixa, and from thence along the line of the Mondego to Celorico, Sabugal, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	5 Mar. to 10 April.
Affairs with the French army on its retreat :	
at Pombal . . . . .	11 Mar.
at Redinha . . . . .	12 Mar.
at Casal Novo . . . . .	14 Mar.
at the Passage of the Ceira, at Foz d'Arouce . . . . .	15 Mar.
at Sabugal . . . . .	3 April.
Thanks of Parliament for the liberation of Portugal . . . . .	26 April.
Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro . . . . .	3 and 5 May.
Fall of Almeida . . . . .	11 May.
Battle of Albuera . . . . .	16 May.
Siege of Badajoz raised . . . . .	10 June.
Concentration of the army on the Caya . . . . .	19 June.
Marched the army to the north . . . . .	1 Aug.
Affair at El Bodon . . . . .	25 Sept.
at Aldea da Ponte. . . . .	27 Sept.
Licence granted in the name of the King, by the Prince Regent, to accept the title of Conde do Vimeiro, and the insignia of Knight Grand Cross of the Tower and Sword, from the Prince Regent of Portugal. . . . .	26 Oct.
General Hill's surprise of General Girard, at Arroyo Molinos . . . . .	28 Oct.

1812.

Storm of Fort Renaud, near Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	8 Jan.
Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	19 Jan.
Created by the Regency a Grandee of Spain, with the title of Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	
Thanks of Parliament for Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	10 Feb.
Advanced in the British peerage by the title of Earl of Wellington . . . . .	18 Feb.
Vote of Parliament of £2000 per annum, in addition to the title . . . . .	21 Feb.
Siege and capture of Badajoz . . . . .	6 April.
Thanks of Parliament for Badajoz . . . . .	27 April.
Forts at Almaraz taken by General Hill . . . . .	19 May.
Siege and capture of the fortified convents at Salamanca . . . . .	27 June.

Battle of Salamanca . . . . .	22 July.
Charge of cavalry at La Serna . . . . .	23 July.
The Order of the Golden Fleece conferred by the Regency of Spain . . . . .	
Entered Madrid . . . . .	12 Aug.
Appointed Generalissimo of the Spanish armies . . . . .	
Advanced in the British Peerage by the title of Marquis of Wellington . . . . .	18 Aug.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal, to the title of Marquez de Torres Vedras . . . . .	
Marched towards Burgos . . . . .	4 Sept.
Siege and failure of Burgos . . . . .	22 Oct.
Retreat to the frontier of Portugal, to the . . . . .	19 Nov.
Thanks of Parliament voted for Salamanca . . . . .	3 Dec.
A grant of £100,000 from Parliament, to be laid out in the purchase of lands to that value, as a reward for his services, and to enable him to support the dignity of his peerage. . . . .	7 Dec.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Duque da Victoria . . . . .	18 Dec.
Visited Cadiz, where he was received by a deputation of the Cortes . . . . .	24 Dec.

## 1813.

Appointed Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards . . . . .	1 Jan.
Returned to Portugal by Lisbon, where he was received by the whole population . . . . .	16 Jan.
Fêtes given by the Regency, and at San Carlos . . . . .	20 Jan.
Letter on quitting the 33rd regt. as Colonel . . . . .	2 Feb.
Elected a Knight of the Garter . . . . .	4 Mar.
Advance into Spain in two columns; the left column, under Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, by the north bank of the Douro; the right column to Salamanca . . . . .	6 May.
Quitted Freneda for Salamanca . . . . .	22 May.
Affair near Salamanca . . . . .	25 May.
Proceeded to the left column, at Miranda de Duero . . . . .	29 May.
Affair of the Hussar brigade at Morales de Toro . . . . .	2 June.
Junction of the two columns at Toro, and advance of the army on Valladolid and Burgos . . . . .	4 June.
The castle of Burgos blown up . . . . .	12 June.
The Ebro turned at San Martin and Rocamundo . . . . .	14 June.
Affair at San Millan . . . . .	18 June.
Battle of Vitoria . . . . .	21 June.
Promoted to Field Marshal (Gazette, 3rd July) . . . . .	21 June.
Pursuit of the French army to France by Pamplona, and the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya in the Pyrenees; and by Tolosa, San Sebastian, and Irun . . . . .	
Thanks of Parliament for Vitoria . . . . .	8 July.
Siege of San Sebastian . . . . .	17 July.
The Regency of Spain, on the proposition of the Cortes, bestowed on the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo the estate of the Soto de Roma in Granada, 'in the name of the Spanish nation, in testimony of its sincere gratitude' . . . . .	22 July.
First assault and failure at San Sebastian . . . . .	25 July.
Advance of the French army under Marshal Soult, by Maya and Roncesvalles; } the right and centre divisions of the army concentrating near Pamplona. }	24 to 27 July.
Battle of Sorauren . . . . .	28 July.
Retreat of the French army into France . . . . .	30 July.
Affair at the Puerto de Echalar . . . . .	1 Aug.
Re-occupation of the positions on the Pyrenees by the Allied Armies . . . . .	2 Aug.
Second assault and fall of San Sebastian . . . . .	31 Aug.
Affairs on the Bidasoa and San Marcial . . . . .	31 Aug.
Castle of San Sebastian capitulated . . . . .	8 Sept.
Passage of the Bidasoa, and entrance into France . . . . .	7 Oct.



Surrender of Pamplona . . . . .	31 Oct.
Thanks of Parliament for San Sebastian, and the operations subsequent to Vitoria . . . . .	8 Oct.
The whole of the army descended into France; passage and battle of the Nivelle . . . . .	10 Nov.
Passage of the Nive . . . . .	9 Dec.
Marshal Soult attacked the left and right of the British army, and was successively } defeated . . . . .	10 to 13 Dec.

1814.

Affair at Hellette . . . . .	14 Feb.
Leaving two divisions to blockade Bayonne, followed Marshal Soult with the remainder of the army . . . . .	21 Feb.
Battle of Orthez . . . . .	27 Feb.
Passage of the Adour at St. Sever . . . . .	1 Mar.
Affair at Aire . . . . .	2 Mar.
The permission of the Prince Regent granted to the Marquis of Wellington to accept and wear the insignia of the following Orders . . . . .	4 Mar.
Grand Cross of the Imperial Military Order of Maria Teresa. the Imperial Russian Military Order of St. George. the Royal Prussian Military Order of the Black Eagle. the Royal Swedish Military Order of the Sword.	
Detached two divisions to Bordeaux . . . . .	8 Mar.
Affair at Tarbes . . . . .	20 Mar.
Thanks of the Prince Regent and the Parliament for Orthez . . . . .	24 Mar.
Passage of the Garonne . . . . .	4 April.
Battle of Toulouse . . . . .	10 April.
Advanced in the British peerage by the titles of Marquis of Douro and Duke of Wellington . . . . .	3 May.
Visited Paris . . . . .	4 May.
Visited Madrid. King Ferdinand confirmed all the honors and rewards conferred upon him in His Majesty's name by the Regency and the Cortes . . . . .	24 May.
A grant of £400,000 voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants . . . . .	June.
Arrived in England . . . . .	23 June.
Proceeded to pay his respects to the Prince Regent, then at Portsmouth with the Allied Monarchs . . . . .	24 June.
His reception in the House of Peers on taking his seat as Baron, Viscount, Earl, Marquis, and Duke . . . . .	28 June.
Returned thanks at the bar of the House of Commons, and addressed by the Speaker . . . . .	30 June.
Appointed Ambassador to the Court of France . . . . .	5 July.
Banquet given by the Corporation of London . . . . .	9 July.
Heraldic honors bestowed . . . . .	25 Aug.

1815.

Quitted Paris for Vienna to assist at the Congress . . . . .	24 Jan.
On the arrival of Buonaparte in France, appointed Commander of the British Forces on the Continent of Europe, and from Vienna joined the army at Bruxelles . . . . .	11 April.
Put himself in communication with Prince Blücher, in command of the Prussian army on the Meuse . . . . .	2 May.
Moved the Allied army towards Nivelle, the French army, under Buonaparte, having crossed the frontier at Charleroi . . . . .	15 June.
Battle of Quatre Bras . . . . .	16 June.
Retired to a position to cover Bruxelles, on the border of the forest of Soignies . . . . .	17 June.
Battle of Waterloo . . . . .	18 June.

Thanks of the Prince Regent and Parliament for Waterloo . . . . .	22 June.
Pursuit of the fugitive remains of the French army to Paris . . . . .	
Surrender of Cambrai . . . . .	25 June.
of Peronne. . . . .	26 June.
Paris capitulated . . . . .	3 July.
By his interference, prevented the column in the Place Vendôme and the Bridge of Jena being destroyed . . . . .	6 July.
A grant of £200,000 voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants . . .	July.
Created Prince of Waterloo by the King of the Netherlands . . . . .	18 July.
Appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies of Occupation in France . . .	22 Oct.

## 1818.

Assisted at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle . . . . .	26 Oct.
Appointed Field Marshal in the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Armies. . . . .	15 Nov.
The evacuation of France by the Allied Armies . . . . .	21 Nov.
Appointed Master General of the Ordnance. . . . .	26 Dec.

## 1819.

Appointed Governor of Plymouth . . . . .	9 Dec.
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## 1820.

Appointed Colonel in Chief of the Rifle Brigade . . . . .	19 Feb.
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## 1821.

Attended George IV. King of England to the field of Waterloo . . . . .	1 Oct.
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## 1822.

Assisted at the Congress of Verona . . . . .	22 Oct.
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## 1826.

Proceeded on an especial embassy to St. Petersburg . . . . .	8 Feb.
Removed from the Government of Plymouth to be Constable of the Tower of London . . . . .	29 Dec.

## 1827.

Appointed Colonel of the Grenadier Guards . . . . .	22 Jan.
Appointed Commander in Chief . . . . .	22 Jan.
Resigned . . . . .	5 May.
Re-appointed . . . . .	27 Aug.

## 1828.

Resigned the command of the army, the King having called upon him to serve in the office of First Lord of the Treasury . . . . .	14 Feb.
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## 1829.

Appointed Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports . . . . .	20 Jan.
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## 1830.

Resigned the office of First Lord of the Treasury . . . . .	16 Nov.
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## 1834.

Elected Chancellor of the University of Oxford. . . . .	29 Jan.
Intrusted by the King with the whole charge of the Government and the seals of the three Secretaries of State . . . . .	15 Nov.
Continued Secretary of Foreign Affairs . . . . .	9 Dec.

## 1835.

Resigned . . . . .	8 April.
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# SELECTIONS

FROM THE

## DISPATCHES AND GENERAL ORDERS

OF

### THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

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1.

To J. Webbe, Esq., Sec. to Gov.

Camp at Cuddapa, 29th May, 1800.

‘I have received a letter from Lord Mornington, in which he offers me the command of the troops intended against Batavia, provided Lord Clive can spare me from this country. I have written to Lord Clive upon the subject a letter which he will probably communicate to you; and I have left to him to accept for me Lord Mornington’s offer or not, accordingly as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period at which he would propose to depart from the coast upon this service.

The probable advantages and credit to be gained are great; but I am determined that nothing shall induce me to desire to quit this country, until its tranquillity is ensured. The general want of troops, however, at the present moment, and the season, may induce the Admiral to be desirous to postpone the expedition till late in the year. In that case it may be convenient that I should accompany him; but I beg, if you have any conversation with Lord Clive, you will assure him, that if it should be in the smallest degree otherwise, I shall be very sorry to go.

\* \* \* \* \*

You will perceive that I have decided upon the offer in the manner that Lord Clive would wish. Lord Mornington, in his letter to me, seems to think that it will be advantageous to me, and from the importance of the object, in England, one from which I may derive some credit; but I feel all that entirely out of the question, and I leave to Lord Clive to decide according to his sense of the public convenience.’

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2.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Cuddapa, 29th May, 1800.

‘I have just received a letter from Lord Mornington, by which he offers me the military command of certain troops intended to be sent on an expedition against Batavia, provided your Lordship can spare me from this country.

I am fully aware of the advantages which may attend, and of the credit which may be gained by the attainment of the object proposed in sending troops to that place; but, under the present circumstances of this country, I cannot express a wish to quit it.

From the information which your Lordship will have of the time at which Admiral Rainier would prepare to go to Batavia, you will be enabled to judge whether it may possibly be convenient to the public service that I should accompany him. I beg, therefore, that your Lordship will give Lord Mornington an answer, whether I am to be employed on this service or not, according to your Lordship's view of the public interest and convenience, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period of his departure from the coast.'

## 3.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp at Cuddapa, 30th May, 1800.

'I received last night a letter from Lord Mornington regarding the offer of the command of the troops intended for Batavia. He seems to think it an advantage to me, and that some credit will be gained by it, as the object is a great one in England; but I have written to Lord Clive to desire that he will accept of it for me, or not, according as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period of his departure from the coast. A letter received this day from Madras, with instructions to enter the Marhatta country, has determined me not to accept of it in any event.'

## 4.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Cheyloor, 31st May, 1800.

'Since I wrote to you on the 29th, I have received your Lordship's instructions of the 25th, which I am proceeding to put in execution; and I beg leave to decline to accept the command of the troops destined to sail with the squadron under Admiral Rainier.

When I wrote to your Lordship on the 29th, I imagined that under the present circumstances it might have been desirable to postpone to send troops on this service until a late period of the year, when it might possibly have been convenient that I could accompany them; but as it appears that the Admiral will be prepared to sail in 3 weeks, I cannot think of relinquishing the command with which your Lordship has intrusted me at this interesting period, for any object of advantage or credit to be gained in another place.'

## 5.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp at Sera, 2nd June, 1800.

'My opinion of this correspondence is just this; that I ought to put \_\_\_\_\_ in arrest, as soon as I shall have received Colonel Stevenson's answer to my letter of this day, and then forward the whole correspondence to head quarters. As a trial will be the consequence of this measure, it may be doubted, as the issue is always uncertain, and as \_\_\_\_\_'s letter, however indecent, is so worded as in some parts to have two meanings, whether I ought to put him in arrest, and whether I ought not to confine myself to the transmission of the papers to General Braithwaite; but the persons to whom I have shown \_\_\_\_\_'s letter are clearly of opinion that no Court Martial can pass it over, and, therefore, I am afraid that, if I report him without putting him in arrest, I shall receive from head quarters a censure for not supporting my own authority.

No man is a competent judge in his own cause, and I shall, therefore, be obliged to you for your opinion upon this subject, if you will send it to me together with the enclosed papers, and either the original letter, written by —— to Mr. Cochrane, or a certified copy, as soon as possible.'

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## 6.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Chittledroog, 8th June, 1800.

'I told you in my letter of yesterday that I had sent Captain West to ——, to inform him that I conceived his letter to be highly disrespectful and improper; as such, that I called upon him to withdraw it, and acknowledge his sense of its impropriety in a form which I sent him. He had one hour to consider of this proposition; he declined to do as he was required, and he was in consequence put in arrest.

I sent by this post all the papers, and a statement of the case to the Adjutant General. Since I arrived here a gentleman has come on the part of ——, to say that he was willing to withdraw his letter. I desired him to inform —— that he was now in arrest; that he had had an opportunity of withdrawing his letter and acknowledging his error, which he had not taken, and therefore that all he had to say upon the subject must go to the Commander in Chief.'

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## 7.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Chittledroog, 11th June, 1800.

'I have received your letter of the 8th; and you will have perceived by mine of the same date what steps I have taken with ——. He is in arrest, and all the papers upon the subject, among others Colonel Stevenson's opinion, are gone before the Commander in Chief. I have heard from Cuppage regarding his success against his neighbouring musselmen.

I have the power of ordering a General Court Martial, and I will order one if you think it will answer, which can try all fellows of this kind found in correspondence with a man against whom there is at present an army in the field.

Two or three questions occur to me upon this occasion, upon which I beg to have your opinion.

Is the Court Martial to be composed of European or Native officers? If of Native officers, which is the most regular composition when Natives are to be tried, it is to be feared that they will not pass the sentence which the criminals deserve, and the expectation of which alone induces us to wish for a trial by a General Court Martial. They will not pass this sentence certainly, if they have not the assistance of a very good Judge Advocate; and the question is, is there a person in the Nundydroog district, or one who could be sent there at present, properly qualified for this service? Cuppage I believe is; but it may be doubted whether it will be proper that he should act in that situation. I believe there are a sufficient number of Native officers in the Nundydroog district to compose a General Court Martial.

If all these objections to a Native Court Martial operate to create a preference for one composed of European officers, it will be necessary that the criminals should be removed to Seringapatam, or to the army, to be tried, as there are not a sufficient number of officers in any other part of Mysore



to compose one. There must besides be a good Judge Advocate; and, I think, I shall find no difficulty in procuring one at Seringapatam.

The inconvenience to be apprehended from the removal of the prisoners either to Seringapatam or to the army, is, that their punishment will not be so speedy as it ought, or so notorious as might be wished in the country in which they have resided hitherto, and in which they have all their relations, friends, and accomplices.'

## 8.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Hurryhur, 18th June, 1800.

'I have been more concerned than I can express at the receipt of your letter of the 15th. The misconduct of these gentlemen undoubtedly gives you, as well as me, a great deal of trouble; but I declare that it gives me more anxiety than any thing in which I have any concern.

If I had heard of the circumstance which you mentioned to me at Seringapatam previous to the appointment of the gentleman in question to his command, he certainly never should have been appointed; and he never should have gone to it, if, in the conversation which I had with him at Nagamunglum, he had not expressed himself much like a gentleman, and stated a determination to adhere to what had been settled by——. I acquainted him with every circumstance which you told me, and at the same time informed him of my determination to remove him from his command, if I should hear the smallest complaint of his dubash. He promised that he would not have one; and I acknowledge I little expected to hear that there were grounds of complaints still stronger than they would have been if the dubash had been at——.

He is a gentleman, a man of the world, and one who appears to look to his character. I write to him by this post, and you may depend upon it that he must either act as he ought, or he shall be removed from his command.

I acknowledge that, both as an officer and as a gentleman, I should be glad to see all those commands abolished; nothing can be more prejudicial to discipline, and nothing more disgraceful to the character and feelings of a gentleman, than what goes on almost daily; but, as long as they are even more than tolerated by Government, it is difficult for any man in a subordinate situation to draw a line, and these kind of unpleasant circumstances must certainly arise: but, from what you say, I hope ere long to see some arrangement made which will really abolish the whole.

The disputes between the officers and the amildars are equally irksome, and, I believe, owe their origin to the same circumstance. There is not, at this moment, a post by which I do not receive letters of complaint from some man or other. To enter into a detailed inquiry upon the subject is impossible, and to decide without inquiry would be unjust; and one is, therefore, reduced to an impotent expostulation to be upon good terms with the officers of the Rajah's Government. We have never been hitherto accustomed to a native Government; we cannot readily bear the disappointments and delays which are usual in all their transactions, prejudices are entertained against them, and all their actions are misconstrued, and we mistrust them. I see instances of this daily in the best of our officers, and

I cannot but acknowledge that, from the delays of the natives, they have sometimes reason to complain; but they have none to ill-use any man.'

## 9.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

'It is difficult to give an opinion regarding the new territory, of which I have but little knowledge; but as your Lordship has desired it, I shall proceed to state what has occurred to me upon the subject.

The question which your Lordship has put to me involves considerations affecting the whole of our military system in this country. When the country proposed to be ceded to the Company is likewise to be defended, its inhabitants to be kept in tranquillity, and its revenue to be realized by means of the troops, it is impossible to expect to be able to effect these objects on the system of weak and dispersed garrisons, on which we have been acting hitherto. This must be changed; neither the new territory nor the old can be kept in awe by troops dispersed in forts, which they cannot quit with safety; and, therefore, the system which I should recommend would be to garrison those posts only which are absolutely necessary to us, and to have at all times in the field, and in motion, 2 or 3 regiments of Europeans, all the cavalry, and as large a body of native infantry as can be got together. This will be a real security, not only to the new territory and to Mysore, but to the Carnatic, Malabar, and Canara, and nothing else ever will. It will appear more clearly that this system is necessary in the new territory, when the nature of its inhabitants, and the governments to which they have been accustomed, are considered.'

## 10.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, left of the Toombuddra, 25th June, 1800.

'I am glad to find that there is a prospect that the Court Martial will go on. It does not appear to me that 9 members are necessary.

The Court is one held under a civil authority, and is therefore the civil court, in which the forms usual in military courts are to be observed, and which is composed of military men; but it is not necessary that it should be composed of the number of members required by the articles of war: provided that the forms of a military process are observed as required by Government, it is a matter of indifference what number of judges there may be. If there should be any further difficulty upon the subject, I must proceed by a court of inquiry, and give orders that the criminals shall be executed after the facts shall have been clearly ascertained by an examination of witnesses on each side.'

## 11.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Rannee Bednore, 30th June, 1800.

'What a pity it is that I cannot move on for want of grain! My troops are in high health, order, and spirits; but the unfortunate defect of arrangement in the poor man at Chittledroog, previous to my arrival, has ruined every thing.

I had at one time nearly 4000 loads in camp; if I had been able to reach the river one day sooner I should have been across before it filled. The delay in crossing was one of about 10 days; during that time we were feeding upon the brinjarries, as we did not draw a grain from the country, which reduced the full bags in camp to about 2000, and about as many more they say on the road. Then comes the delay in filling, travelling, passing the river, &c.; and it becomes absolutely impossible to say at what time we shall have a sufficiency to cross the Werdah, although all the brinjarries swear that there are large quantities of rice coming on to us.

All this delay would have been avoided, if, when I wrote on the 10th May, measures had been taken to make them all fill, and to collect them together; but instead of that, until I wrote on the 5th June to know what had been done, no steps were taken, and I was 4 days at Chittledroog before I could even see one of the naigs. How true it is that in military operations time is every thing!'

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 12.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp right of the Werdah, 6th July, 1800.

'I have received, from Colonel Cuppage, the proceedings of the Court Martial. Sheik Fereed is found guilty of treason, and is sentenced to be imprisoned to the end of the war! Hyder Beg is acquitted. I cannot approve of, although I have confirmed these sentences, and I have desired Colonel Cuppage to keep Hyder Beg in confinement.

In future I must proceed by a court of inquiry, which shall deliver an opinion whether the prisoner is guilty or not, as I find it is impossible to impress officers with an accurate notion of the extent and consequences of the crime of treason, and of the punishment which it deserves and meets in all civilized societies.'

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 13.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp right of the Werdah, 8th July, 1800.

'I received your packet of the 4th last night. A man came to me some time ago, and made me an offer similar to that which has been made at Hyderabad. These arrangements answer well there; but I think them unbecoming in an officer at the head of a body of troops, and I, therefore, declined to have any thing more to do with the business than to hold out a general encouragement. The proposer said, that there was a sirdar at the head of a body of horse, to whom if I would give a cowle he would come away. I gave the cowle, but I do not expect, either that the sirdar will come off with his troops, or that the proposed deed will be put in execution. Government have authorized me to offer a reward for him, and I propose to avail myself of this authority as soon as he is at all pressed, and I find that his people begin to drop off from him. This will be, in my opinion, the fittest period.

To offer a public reward by proclamation for a man's life, and to make a secret bargain to have it taken away, are very different things; the one is to be done, the other, in my opinion, cannot, by an officer at the head of the troops.



I have made my arrangements for crossing the river, and I hope that I shall have every thing over in a day or two. I have made a bridge which answers perfectly for foot passengers, and will answer equally for horses and cattle, when I shall have given it rather a better footing. I propose to leave this bridge here, and a number of boats which I have besides. For the care of these and of every thing which will come up, I shall establish a post immediately on the river side, and I am now constructing a redoubt for their security.'

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 14.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Sirhitty, 16th July, 1800.

'I hope to be able (with the assistance of Bowser, who will by that time be pretty close on his rear) to run down this fellow completely. At all events, by this expedition, I have gained some objects of importance; I have established my superiority in the opinions of my own people, of his, and of the country. I have cut off one of his garrisons, and have taken from him one place of consequence, and I have raised the siege of another; and if the chiefs of Goklah's force attend to my requisitions, which, as their horses are starving at Hullihall, I hope they will, I shall be joined by that body of cavalry which will at least enable me to move with all my baggage, and will probably enable me to cut the fellow off completely.'

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 15.

To Major Munro.

Camp at Kittoor, 7th August, 1800.

'I hope now, that, before we shall have done in this country, (if we do not take it for ourselves,) we shall establish in it a strong government—one which can keep the relations of amity and peace. At all events, we have already established a respect for ourselves; we have gained a knowledge of, and have had a friendly intercourse with, the principal people; and it is not probable that they will hereafter be very forward to encourage any disturbance in our country. They see plainly that it is in our power to retaliate; and from what I have seen of their country, and their mode of management, I am of opinion, that at present our robbers would get more than theirs; or, in other words, that they have more to lose than we have. I have had some conversation with them all upon the subject: they promise fairly that nothing of the kind shall happen in future; and I acknowledge that, if we are not to take possession entirely of the country, I rather prefer to trust to what they say, than to the desultory operations of amildars and peons.'

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 16.

To Major Munro.

Camp at Hoobly, 20th August, 1800.

'My ideas of the nature of the Indian governments, of their decline and fall, agree fully with yours; and I acknowledge that I think it probable that we shall not be able to establish a strong government on this frontier. Scindiah's influence at Poonah is too great for us; and I see plainly, that, if Colonel Palmer remains there, we shall not be able to curb him without going to war. There was never such an opportunity for it as the present moment; and probably by bringing forward, and by establishing in their ancient possessions, the Bhow's family under our protection, we should

counterbalance Scindiah, and secure our own tranquillity for a great length of time. But I despair of it; and I am afraid that we shall be reduced to the alternative of allowing Scindiah to be our neighbour upon our old frontier; or of taking this country ourselves.

If we allow Scindiah to be our neighbour; or if the country goes to any other through his influence, we must expect worse than what has passed—thieves of all kinds, new Dhoondiahs, and probably Dhoondiah himself again. If we take the country ourselves, I do not expect much tranquillity.

In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and the description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo, and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves at the expense of the Marhattas, we increase this evil. We throw out of employment, and of means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies: at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government, and of defending ourselves, are proportionably decreased.

Upon all questions of increase of territory, these considerations have much weight with me, and I am, in general, inclined to decide that we have enough; as much, at least, if not more than we can defend.

I agree with you that we ought to settle this Marhatta business, and the Malabar Rajahs, before the French return to India; but I am afraid that to extend ourselves will rather tend to delay, than accelerate the settlements; and that we shall thereby increase, rather than diminish, the number of our enemies.

As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this country, I put them out of the question. They are the only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with,—if indifference constitutes that character.'


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 17.

To the Adjutant General.

Camp at Yepulpurry, 10th Sept., 1800.

' After I had crossed the Malpoorba at Jellahall, I marched on the 3rd instant, and entered the Nizam's territories at Hunmunsagar on the 5th. As Colonel Stevenson was obliged to cross the Malpoorba in boats, he was not able to advance from that river till the 4th. It appeared to me probable, that when Dhoondiah should be pressed by the whole of our force on the northern side of the Dooab, he would return into Savanore by Kanagherry and Copaul, and would thus impede our communication; or, if favored by the Patans of Kurnool, and the polygars on the right bank of the Toombuddra, he would pass that river, and would enter the territories of the Rajah of Mysore. I therefore determined to bring my detachment to the southward, and to prevent the execution of either of those designs, if he had them; and afterwards to push him to the eastward, and to take such advantage of his movements as I might be able; while Colonel Stevenson should move by Moodgul and Moosky, at the distance of between 12 and 20 miles from the Kistna, and the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry collected in one body between his corps and mine.



I arrived at Kanagherry on the 7th; and on the 8th moved with the cavalry to Buswapoor, and on the 9th, to this place; the infantry being on those days at Hutty and Chinnoor, about 15 miles in my rear. On the 9th, in the morning, Dhoondiah moved from Mudgherry, a place about 25 miles from Raichore, at which he had been encamped for some days, towards the Kistna; but on his road having seen Colonel Stevenson's camp, he returned and encamped about 9 miles in my front, between me and Bunnoo. It was clear that he did not know that I was so near him; and I have reason to know that he believed that I was at Chinnoor.

I moved forward this evening, and met his army at a place called Conahgull, about 6 miles from hence. He was on his march, and to the westward; apparently with the design of passing between the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry and my detachment, which he supposed to be at Chinnoor. He had only a large body of cavalry, apparently 5000, which I immediately attacked with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and 1st and 2nd regts. of cavalry.

The enemy was strongly posted, with his rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, and stood for some time with apparent firmness; but such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by those 4 regiments, which I was obliged to form in one line, in order at all to equalize in length that of the enemy, that the whole gave way, and were pursued by my cavalry for many miles. Many, among others, Dhoondiah, were killed; and the whole body dispersed, and were scattered in small parties over the face of the country.

Part of the enemy's baggage was still remaining in his camp about 3 miles from Conahgull. I returned thither, and got possession of elephants, camels, and every thing he had.\*

The complete defeat and dispersion of the enemy's force, and, above all, the death of Dhoondiah, put an end to this warfare; and I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of expressing my sense of the conduct of the troops. Upon this last occasion, their determined valor and discipline were conspicuous; and their conduct and that of their commanding officers, Colonel Pater, Major Paterson, Major Blaquiere, Captain Doveton, and Captain Price, have deserved my most particular approbation. At the same time I must inform you, that all the troops have undergone, with the greatest patience and perseverance, a series of fatiguing services.

It is also proper that I should inform you how much reason I have to be pleased with the gentlemen charged with the business of procuring supplies for the troops. Notwithstanding the distance of the scene of my operations from the usual sources of supplies, and rapidity of my marches; and the necessity, from the species of warfare carried on, of perpetually altering their direction, I have always been well supplied with every thing which the troops could want.

\* Among the baggage was found Salabut Khan, a son of Dhoondiah, an infant of about 4 years old. He was taken to Colonel Wellesley's tent, and was afterwards most kindly and liberally taken care of by him. Sir Arthur, on his departure from India, left some hundred pounds for the use of the boy in the hands of Colonel John Hely Symons, the judge and collector at Seringatam. When Colonel Symons retired from service, the Hon. A. Cole, the Resident at the Court of Mysore, took charge of him, and had him placed in the Rajah's service. He was a fine, handsome, intelligent youth. Salabut Khan died of cholera in 1822.



The Marhatta and Mogul cavalry are now employed in the pursuit of the fugitives; and I propose to draw off towards the frontier of the Rajah of Mysore in a few days.'

## 18.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Dummul, 27th Sept., 1800.

'My force is very respectable, and passes for much more than it is; I have, besides, called upon Kirkpatrick to leave Bowser under my orders, if it is not intended that the whole of the subsidiary force and of the Nizam's army should co-operate on the north side of the Kistna. No answer yet from that quarter.

My fingers itch to begin; I should break that detachment to pieces which has been pushed across the Kistna; should by that means gain a powerful body of allies, which I reckon upon only as so many taken out of the opposite scale, and should have the whole game in my hands immediately. If the Kistna falls, that detachment will escape to the northward; and Scindiah, if he has spirit, will collect there, and endeavor to make a stand.

I look upon myself to be fully equal to all he can collect, if I can keep together my allies. They are of use in protecting my rear, my baggage, and my camp. If I had not had them, my cavalry would have been much distressed; and yet they would not have kept off the Pindarry horse half so well as the Marhattas did in the late service. Scindiah has not got a very large body of country horse; but he will, of course, have some, and they would distress me much if I should have none.'

## 19.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Nalloody, 2nd Oct., 1800.

'There are two circumstances which induce me to wish not to begin, as you propose, by advancing to the Gutpurba, under the pretence of seeing how matters stand with my friends the polygars, to the northward of that river. In the first place, when I do advance to the Kistna, I must look forward to the further operation intended, and must make my arrangements accordingly. One of the most important of these is to get possession of Darwar. If I go forward, upon the pretence under consideration, I cannot take possession of Darwar in the name of the Peshwah; indeed I do not see in what manner I could demand that place, without declaring war against the whole Marhatta race. If I go forward, without having possession of Darwar, I must either return to take it, or I must make up my mind still to go forward without having it in my possession. Either would, in my opinion, be attended with infinite disadvantage to the operations which are intended hereafter.

Secondly, the reason for not making the conduct of Scindiah towards my friends, north of the Gutpurba, the pretence for moving to that river, is, that I find that Scindiah is strictly right in having taken possession of their places. They are dependent upon the jaghire of Meritch and Tasgaum, which has been granted to him by the Peshwah; and although it would have been more generous to desist from taking possession of their countries till another opportunity, he had a right to them, and must eventually

have taken them. Under these circumstances I am afraid, that to pretend to move to their assistance will have the effect which Government are most anxious I should avoid. It will give to the Peshwah's friends doubts, whether our intentions are to assist him, or to reinstate in their former power the family of Pursheram Bhow. For these reasons, which I think will also be conclusive with you, I deem it better not to advance till the crisis arrives, which is expected. It may certainly fairly be said, that when a man's capital is in the possession of the troops of another, all his friends imprisoned, and his own person only not under restraint, he is under the power of that other. But the danger of acting upon the state of affairs, as they are now at Poonah, arises from the indecision, the weakness, and duplicity of the Peshwah's own character. To these bad qualities I attribute the strictness of the orders which I have received; viz., to advance only in case he should be in confinement, or should fly. Suppose him not to be in confinement, and that I were to adopt the measures proposed by Government, were to take possession in his name of all the countries south of the Kistna, and to place garrisons in those situations most convenient to my operations; and that he were to fly off, and to declare that I had no authority from him; that I was an enemy, and was to be treated as such, Government or I would be in a scrape, from which it would be difficult to extricate either of us. In truth, if the Peshwah is not in confinement he has the power to call for our assistance; and if he does not call for it, we have no right to force it upon him. By the same reasoning, if, as long as he has the power, he omits to conclude with us that treaty so advantageous to him, and so often offered, we ought to suspect his sincerity, and ought not to interfere in his affairs till the last extremity. From all these reasons then, in my opinion, I ought not to move till the crisis is certain.'

## 20.

To Lord Clive.

Camp at Hoobly, 9th Oct., 1800.

'I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 2nd instant, and I am prepared to proceed to whatever point your Lordship may order me, or to make such detachments as you may think proper. The acquaintance which I have obtained in the late war of the characters and views of the Marhatta chiefs in this part of the empire, renders it my duty to state to your Lordship the effects which are to be apprehended from weakening, to any degree, this body of the troops, by whose exertions we hope to accomplish all that is wished at Poonah.

The object appears to be to establish the legal power of the Peshwah over the Marhatta empire. In order to effect this, Scindiah must be removed to his own territories. It is not to be supposed that he will relinquish all that he has been endeavoring to obtain for the last 4 or 5 years without a contest; and all the chiefs of the Marhatta empire look to the event of this expected contest with the utmost anxiety. They will join the one party or the other, according to their own ideas of their relative strength, and of the chances of ultimate success: and in case of our interference, which is not expected, the question with them will be, whether our force employed is sufficient to get the better of that which will be brought against us by Scindiah.

It therefore appears necessary that, at least at first, the interference of the Company should be by the means of a powerful body of troops, such as will convince the whole Marhatta empire of our firm determination to attain our object, and to establish the Peshwah in the enjoyment of the whole of his legal authority. The force which I have at present under my command in the field consists of 690 European dragoons, 975 native cavalry, 142 British artillery, 1160 British infantry, 3538 native infantry, including sick, present and absent, of which there are but few. This force, with the assistance which may be expected from the subsidiary troops at Hyderabad, will be fully sufficient; but any diminution of it, or any detachment made to other parts of the Company's territories, will occasion doubts of our intentions to adhere steadily to our object till it is accomplished.

The assistance of the chiefs of this part of the Marhatta empire is necessary to us for several reasons.

First; they give protection to our convoys of provisions which must come from Mysore. If we could suppose that they would remain neuter in this contest, we should still experience great difficulty and inconvenience from the necessity of detaching our own troops from this small force for the protection of our convoys. But they will not remain neuter. If they do not join the enemy, they will, under various pretences, render the communication with Mysore so difficult, as to be almost impracticable.

Secondly; by having them with me, the country in my rear will certainly be in tranquillity, and I shall draw from it all the resources which it can afford. The whole of the Marhatta empire is divided in jaghire among the Marhatta chiefs or polygars, as I heretofore represented to your Lordship; and each of these chiefs can command the resources of his own jaghire. The jaghiredar or polygar who will doubt of our success, and will wish well to the cause of the enemy, will of course impede our progress by the various means in his power. This I experienced in the late contest in several instances; and it is probable I should experience it in many more in a contest, the object of which will be, in whose hands the power of the empire should be placed hereafter.

Thirdly; by having the Marhatta chiefs with me, I keep so many out of the opposite scale.

I may therefore conclude that, if this object is to be attained with celerity, we must have on our side the largest proportion of the Marhatta chiefs in this part of the empire; they will not come forward unless they are clearly convinced, by the efforts which we shall make, that it is our firm determination to attain our object.

Under these circumstances it has occurred to me to consider of the means of collecting a body of troops from Mysore for the Ceded countries, which will be at least equal in size to that which I should conceive myself authorized by your Lordship's orders to detach.

In consequence of your Lordship's orders to halt the 2nd batt. 5th regt. in order that it might join the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and as I foresaw that there would be some difficulty in collecting a force for the districts to be ceded by the treaty, which augments the subsidiary force, I ordered the 5 companies of the 12th also to halt at Seringapatam, in order to form a part of the detachment to take possession of the Ceded countries.



I have reason to believe that the 88th regt. is coming to Malabar, and the 12th will be no longer necessary in that province. There are 8 companies of a battalion of Bombay sepoys at Nuggur, which I would propose to relieve by a small detachment from the province of Canara, and to move the former to Chittledroog, when they should join the 5 companies of the 12th, and the 2nd batt. of the 5th. I would also propose to add to this detachment 7 companies of the 33rd, leaving at Seringapatam only 3 companies of that corps. There is a detachment in the field in the Nundydroog district, which might be moved forward into Gurrumconda, and would still cover the Rajah's territories. Thus there would be 12 companies of Europeans, and 8 companies of natives, besides the detachment in the Nundydroog district, and guns, which could enter the Ceded districts immediately, if your Lordship should approve of that arrangement.

If the Resident at Hyderabad would consider one of the corps of this army as belonging to the subsidiary force, the 2nd of the 5th might likewise remain in the Ceded countries.

I shall propose to your Lordship that this force should be kept collected in one body, to be thrown on any point when their exertions might be necessary; and that until more troops can be spared from other services, a body of peons should be retained in the Company's service, by whose means the Collector will be able to take possession of the country, and to make his arrangements.

There are many objections to weakening Seringapatam at this moment, but the arrangements which may be made at that place will, I hope, keep it in perfect security.

If your Lordship approves of this plan, rather than that I should weaken the body of the troops in the field in this country, I shall give orders to have it carried into execution without loss of time.'

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21.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Misserycotta, 1st Nov., 1800.

'I do not propose to enter the Ceded districts by Mysore; but I assure you that my numerous followers are in such order that I might venture to produce them any where. We were a month at Hoobly; and the grain fields in the middle of the camp were not touched, and the people in the neighbouring villages sent to tell me that the safeguards, which I had given them upon my arrival there, were no longer necessary.'

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22.

To the Governor of Ceylon.

Pointe de Galle, 18th Feb., 1801.

'I have received your letters of the 17th instant; and as I am so unfortunate as to differ in opinion with you, regarding the propriety of going to Bombay, and as you have recorded your opinion, and the communication of it to me, it is necessary that I should trouble you at some length, as well to justify myself in your eyes, as that those who will have to judge hereafter of the propriety of my decision upon this occasion, may know the real grounds upon which I formed it.

First; I learn from Captain Malcolm that the passage from hence to the

Red Sea will not be materially retarded by going to Bombay; that the fleet must proceed along the coast as far as the Vingorla rocks, to the northward of Goa, before it crosses; and in some cases, that it may be necessary to go still farther north.

Secondly; Supposing the delay by going to Bombay were likely to be greater than it appears at present, it is impossible to think of going to the Red Sea until the ships and troops are provided with many articles which are at present deficient.

This deficiency has been occasioned by the necessity of using at Trincomalee what was intended to be used upon the voyage. On the 1st of this month, there were on board the fleet about 4 months' provisions for the whole armament: at this moment this quantity will last  $3\frac{1}{2}$  months; and supposing my passage to Mocha should be much better than even you suppose it would, I should reach that station with a sufficiency of provision to last the troops  $2\frac{1}{2}$  months; and my first thoughts must be directed to taking measures for procuring a further supply.

You propose that I should send my indent to you for the articles which are deficient; and from the kindness and attention which I have already experienced, I should certainly have every inclination to do so. But I must observe, that you have neither the means of supplying all my wants, nor those of transporting to me the articles which you could supply. You then propose that they should be supplied from the Malabar province, which I beg to inform you is equally destitute of what I want as the territories under your government.

But you propose that I should proceed without the articles which I have requested the Governor of Bombay to prepare, and you have no doubt but that he, or the Governor of Fort St. George, will send them after me.

Articles of provision are not to be trifled with, or left to chance; and there is nothing more clear than that the subsistence of the troops must be certain upon the proposed service, or the service must be relinquished.

If there is a chance that by going to Bombay with the fleet we shall be late, is it not more probable that the provisions for which shipping must be prepared at Bombay will be late; and is there not a chance that the provisions will miss the fleet entirely, and that the troops will be in want? If the provisions are to be supplied from Madras or Calcutta, the probability of want is greater in proportion to the greater length of the voyage.

Upon the whole, then, as far as regards supplies wanted for the fleet, I conceive that I act with propriety, and that I do that which will tend most to insure the object of the armament, by proceeding to Bombay to receive provisions on board the ships in which the troops are embarked.

I have taken every measure which I can think of to make it certain that these articles and certain refreshments, of which the troops who have been at Trincomalee are greatly in want, may be prepared by the time I reach Bombay: and if they are so, I shall certainly be in time for every thing. If they are not, and if I am detained at Bombay, I have seen letters from Admiral Blanquet, which lead me to be of opinion, that I shall not be too late for one of the objects proposed even in the end of April; and as for the other, it is possible to reach it at all seasons.

Thirdly: I am very anxious to receive the orders of the Governor General

regarding the armament, and I can receive them only by going to Bombay. The orders of Mr. Secretary Dundas confine the demand upon India to one regiment of Europeans and 2 battalions of sepoy; and it may probably be the intention of his Lordship to employ upon another service the Europeans which I have under my command, which are above the number demanded. It is surely my duty to afford his Lordship an opportunity of giving me his orders, particularly as I am strongly urged to take the steps which will put me in the way of receiving them, by the motives which I have above stated, and which affect so nearly the final success of the service proposed; when I learn from the best authority that the fleet will not be materially delayed by taking those steps; and when I have reason to believe, from another excellent authority, that even after the greatest delay which can possibly be expected, I shall still be in good time.'

## 23.

To the Governor of Ceylon.

Pointe de Galle, 18th Feb., 1801.

'I have received your letter upon the subject of my proceeding to Bombay, to which an answer will accompany this letter.

I am concerned that you, or General Macdowall\* should have thought it necessary to write a public letter upon this subject, as I hope that I have always shown myself ready to attend to your wishes in whatever manner they may have been made known to me. The existence of your public letter upon the records of your government increases considerably my responsibility upon this occasion.

However, notwithstanding that, I conceive the grounds upon which I have determined to go to Bombay are so strong, and the urgency of the measure is so great, and will appear so much so to all those who will have to judge of my conduct, that I persist, and I still hope that it will meet with your approbation and that of General Macdowall.'

## 24.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 23rd March, 1801.

1. The letters which I have received since my arrival at this place, give me reason to apprehend, that neither my departure from Ceylon, nor my coming here, has been approved by your Excellency.

2. Although my address of the 9th February, with its enclosures, stated the outlines of the reasons which induced me to take those steps, without waiting for your Excellency's orders, I am induced to enter again into further detail of them, in order, if possible, to remove an impression which has given me great uneasiness; or at least, to prove that I acted upon the most mature deliberation, and did what I thought best for the service, and most likely to be agreeable to you.

3. I always considered that your Excellency's intentions were, that I should attend to the intelligence which I should receive from Bombay, of a call from Europe for the co-operation of a force from this country in an attack upon the French in the Red Sea, which you foresaw would be made; and even that the expedition upon which you ordered that I should proceed

\* Commanding the forces at Ceylon: he was lost at sea, 8 or 9 years later, in returning to Europe.



at the end of December, was to be relinquished in case intelligence came of a call for co-operation in the Red Sea.

4. Upon this point I must observe, that the government of Fort St. George conceived that I ought to proceed towards the rendezvous pointed out by Mr. Secretary Dundas, when they sent me the copies of the despatches, as appears by their Secretary's letter of the 1st February, a copy of which has been already laid before your Excellency; that the government of Bombay expected that I should proceed towards it, and therefore did not send the troops which they had in preparation; and that the Governor of Ceylon conceived that I ought to proceed towards it, and urged me repeatedly, in the strongest manner, to lose no time previous to my departure.

5. I received the dispatches of the Secretary of State on the 7th February, and I knew that your Excellency could not receive them till about the same day. If I had waited at Trincomalee, and you had written me your orders immediately, I should not have received them by post till the 3rd or 4th March, and at that time the stock of provisions for the troops would have been reduced to one, for 3 months.

6. I consulted with Captain Malcolm regarding the passage to the Red Sea, the season, and the line which it would be most proper to follow. He was of opinion that no time ought to be lost; that it would be necessary to proceed up the coast as far as the Vingorla rocks, before the fleet could go to the westward; and that to go to Bombay would not create a material delay. Upon this opinion I formed my plan, and determined to sail as soon as a vessel loaded with military stores, then expected, should arrive from Madras.

7. The only doubt I had upon my mind, was whether I should take from Ceylon more than one regiment of Europeans and the battalion of sepoys, and trust to the preparations at Bombay for the remainder of the equipment. But although the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay had been ordered to have troops in readiness in case I should want them, I was ignorant of the resources of the latter, and I did not believe that they would be able to furnish the troops which have been sent to the Red Sea; and, therefore, I took with me the whole of the force for which I had tonnage, knowing, that if your Excellency should wish that some of the troops should be employed upon another service, and should return to Ceylon, they would be there in good time.

8. I determined to go to Bombay, because, when I sailed from Trincomalee, I had provisions for only  $3\frac{1}{2}$  months; and I knew by your letter of the 1st December, 1800, that it was your opinion that the troops ought not to go to the Red Sea with a smaller quantity than for 6 months. I was very anxious to receive your Excellency's orders, which would reach me at Bombay; and as I have above stated, I was informed by Captain Malcolm, that as the fleet would be obliged to go as far north as the Vingorla rocks, the passage to Mocha was not likely to be materially delayed, by putting into Bombay to receive the supply of provisions, which I had requested Mr. Duncan to prepare.

9. I have thus laid before your Excellency the grounds upon which I conceived myself obliged to come to a decision, when I received the dispatches of the Secretary of State; and those upon which I determined to sail immediately with all the troops for which I had tonnage, and to go to Bom-

bay; and I now proceed to state the reasons for which I have persisted in that determination, notwithstanding the receipt of subsequent advices from you and Mr. Duncan.

10. When I was off Cape Comorin, I received your Excellency's orders of the 24th January, in which you inform me that you have appointed Major General Baird to the command of the troops, and that you intended to send them on an expedition to Batavia. I was certain that you had not received the dispatches of the Secretary of State when you wrote that letter; I knew that you must depend for the expedition to the Red Sea upon some of the troops which had been, till then, under my orders; and as I did not know what might be your wishes after you should have received the dispatches, I determined to proceed according to my original plan; and I dispatched a letter to Major General Baird to Trincomalee, to apprise him of my motions. If your Excellency had determined to carry on both expeditions, the troops for that for Batavia would have been at Ceylon, before the season for sailing would have come round; and if you determined to carry on only that to the Red Sea, they would be at Bombay collected for that purpose.

11. I received a letter from Mr. Duncan on the 16th instant, in which he enclosed a copy of a letter from Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick, dated the 7th February, and informed me that General Baird was to command the expedition to the Red Sea. Notwithstanding the contents of the enclosure, I did not know till then of the intention to dispatch from Bengal any of the vessels loaded with provisions mentioned by Mr. Secretary Barlow. At that time I was so near Bombay, that I was induced to adhere to my original plan. The intelligence received from Mr. Duncan did not state what your Excellency's intentions were regarding the proposed expedition to Batavia; although Mr. Duncan informed me that Major General Baird was appointed to command the expedition to the Red Sea. It was therefore necessary that I should come here to receive your orders. The fleet was in want of water, which could not be procured at any port to the southward of the Vingorla rocks, on account of the want of conveniences for that purpose, without losing more time than was likely to elapse while it was coming to Bombay; and the troops, in general, wanted refreshments. The 10th regt. in particular had become sickly from having been so long on board ship, living on salt provisions, and has lost men. Upon the whole, therefore, I determined to come on to Bombay.

12. Since my arrival here, I have perused your Lordship's instructions to Major General Baird, and your dispatches to the Governor of Bombay; and I perceive that I have anticipated your wishes in bringing from Ceylon all the troops for which I had tonnage. I imagine that I should have incurred your disapprobation in a great degree, if I had not taken steps to insure the receipt of your Excellency's orders before the final departure of the troops for Mocha; and I certainly could not have received them; the ships would have gone ill supplied with water, and the troops in want of refreshments, which no other place can afford, if I had not come on to Bombay.

13. Having thus explained all the motives which urged me to depart from Ceylon, and to come here, I beg to observe, that notwithstanding the unexpected length of the passage hitherto, it is probable that the fleet will be at Mocha sooner than it would have been had I waited at Trincomalee for your

Excellency's orders, and certainly better refreshed and supplied with water and provisions. But whatever may be your Excellency's determination upon my conduct, I hope that you will give me credit for having maturely considered the points upon which I had to decide; and for having had an earnest and zealous desire to forward the service in view, and to give it the full benefit of your Excellency's foresight in collecting the troops in Ceylon.

14. The whole of the fleet is not yet come in; but as the ships arrive, I will take care that they shall be dispatched as soon as they receive their water. All the arrangements are made for putting the provisions into the ships, and your Lordship may depend upon it that not a moment shall be lost.'

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 25.

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.\*

Bombay, 23rd March, 1801.

'I have received your note of the 3rd March, but none of your other letters which you say that you have written to me. I hope that you received those which I wrote to you while you were in England, giving an account of how we were going on in this country. I enclosed them to the Doctor,† and desired him to destroy those which should arrive subsequent to your departure, on your return to this country; so that some of them written lately you will probably never see. I was very anxious about you, as you must have come from the Cape in the track of the French privateers homeward bound; and you were longer on your passage than we had reason to expect you would be.

I have written a long letter to Government this day, about my departure from Ceylon, which I hope will explain every thing. Whether it does or not, I shall always consider these expeditions as the most unfortunate circumstances for me, in every point of view, that could have occurred; and, as such, I shall always lament them.

I was at the top of the tree in this country; the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, which I had served, placed unlimited confidence in me, and I had received from both strong and repeated marks of their approbation. Before I quitted the Mysore country, I arranged the plan for taking possession of the Ceded Districts, which was done without striking a blow; and another plan for conquering Wynaad and re-conquering Malabar, which I am informed has succeeded without loss on our side. But this supercession has ruined all my prospects, founded upon any service that I may have rendered. Upon this point I must refer you to the letters written to me and to the Governor of Fort St. George in May last, when an expedition to Batavia was in contemplation; and to those written to the governments of Fort St. George, Bombay, and Ceylon; and to the Admiral, Colonel Champagne, and myself, when the troops were assembled in Ceylon. I then ask you, has there been any change whatever of circumstances that was not expected when I was appointed to the command? If there has not, (and no one can say there has, without doing injustice to the Governor General's foresight,) my supercession must have been occasioned, either by my own misconduct, or by an alteration of the sentiments of the Governor General.

\* Now Lord Cowley, G.C.B.

† The Hon. Dr. Gerald Wellesley, now a Prebend of Durham Cathedral.



I have not been guilty of robbery or murder, and he has certainly changed his mind; but the world, which is always good-natured towards those whose affairs do not exactly prosper, will not, or rather does not, fail to suspect that both, or worse, have been the occasion of my being banished, like General Kray, to my estate in Hungary. I did not look, and did not wish, for the appointment which was given to me; and I say that it would probably have been more proper to give it to somebody else; but when it was given to me, and a circular written to the governments upon the subject, it would have been fair to allow me to hold it till I did something to deserve to lose it.

I put private considerations out of the question, as they ought and have had no weight in causing either my original appointment or my supercession. I am not quite satisfied with the manner in which I have been treated by Government upon the occasion. However, I have lost neither my health, spirits, nor temper in consequence thereof. But it is useless to write any more upon a subject of which I wish to retain no remembrance whatever.

I enclose a memorandum upon the subject of Trincomalee, which will point out to you the inconveniences of that port as one of rendezvous or equipment. You will find it of use in the next expedition. Remember, also, that it is difficult for ships to get round Ceylon in the south-west monsoon after the middle of March.'

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 26.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

Bombay, 25th March, 1801.

'Letters arrived last night from Muscat, by which I learn that it is probable that Sir R. Abercromby has commenced his operations. If the expedition from India against Egypt means any thing, it is to encourage the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt to rise against the French, and to create a diversion in favor of Sir R. Abercromby. This must be done immediately, or as soon as possible, or it will be useless.

General Baird is not come. They tell me that he will find it difficult to get round Ceylon, and the Lord knows when he will arrive. I therefore intend to go off immediately, and to commence the operations in the Red Sea with the troops now there, if General Baird should not be on board any of the ships now in the offing.

My former letters will have shown you how much this will annoy me; but I have never had much value for the public spirit of any man who does not sacrifice his private views and convenience, when it is necessary. As all my baggage, &c. are on board one of the transports not yet come in, I go as bare as is possible.

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 27.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

Bombay, 31st March, 1801.

'When I wrote to you on the 25th, I was in hopes that I should be able to sail the next day; but on that night I was seized with a fever, which has lasted ever since, and of which I have not yet recovered. It is of the inter-mittent kind.

General Baird has arrived. I am quite distressed about my officers who followed me through the Mysore country. However, I have seen enough already to be certain, that if I do not go, matters will be uncomfortable; and

if I well can, I will go. I have the satisfaction of finding that there is not a man here who would have come, had he known what was likely to happen to me, if he had the power of refusal. Indeed, in this respect the feelings of the greater part of the army agree with mine. Mr. Stokes is not yet come.

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 28.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

Bombay, 8th April, 1801.

‘ My fever has left me, but I am still weak, and I have got another disorder, of which it appears the medical men here do not know the nature, and which, I think it probable, will oblige me to go to a cold climate. This circumstance, and the great probability held out by the late dispatches from Europe, that Sir R. Abercromby’s attack upon Lower Egypt will be postponed, or rather will never take place, and, therefore, that the operations proposed in the Red Sea will likewise be relinquished, have induced me to determine not to go. I shall write to the Governor General upon this subject as soon as I am able.

In the mean time, it is but justice to General Baird to say, that his conduct towards me has by no means occasioned this determination, but that it has been perfectly satisfactory. He offered Colonel Colman to appoint him Deputy Quartermaster General, which the latter declined.

I hope that if the service goes on, matters will be conducted satisfactorily. I have been a slave to it till this moment, notwithstanding I was sick; and now they have only to take care of what they have got, till the operations on shore commence. I have given the General my opinion fully in writing upon this part of the subject.’

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 29.

To Major General Baird.

Bombay, 9th April, 1801.

‘ The first circumstance I have to detail to you is the state of my health, which is indeed the cause of this letter. I have had no fever since I saw you, but I am sorry to say that the breaking out of which I complained is worse than it was; and has become so bad as to induce Mr. Scott to order me to begin a course of nitrous baths. This remedy, exclusive of the disease itself, is sufficient to induce me to be desirous to wait, at least rather longer than the *Susannah* will; if not to give over all thoughts of joining you.

I do this, I assure you, with reluctance, notwithstanding I think it very probable that I shall soon hear of your being recalled: however, considering that circumstance, and the bad state of my body, and the remedy which I am obliged to use, I should be mad if I were to think of going at this moment.

As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me; and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived, regarding going upon the expedition, were directly the reverse of what they are at this moment.

I need not enter further upon this subject than to entreat you will not attribute my stay to any other motive than that to which I have above assigned

it ; and to inform you, that as I know what has been said and expected by the world in general, I propose, as well for my own credit as for yours, to make known to my friends and to yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have behaved towards me, but the causes which have prevented my demonstrating my gratitude, by giving you every assistance in the arduous service which you have to conduct.

I shall stay here as long as the season will permit, and then I propose to go round to Madras ; and if I cannot get well, I believe I must try a cold climate.

MEMORANDUM ON THE OPERATIONS IN THE RED SEA.

[Enclosed by Colonel Wellesley to Major General Baird.]

‘ The objects proposed by Mr. Dundas, and by the Governor General, in the expedition to the Red Sea, are—

1st ; To get possession of the forts and ports which the French may have on its shores.

2ndly ; To urge and encourage the natives of Upper Egypt (Mamelukes and Arabs) to commence operations against them.

3rdly ; To assist the operations of the natives by giving them arms and ammunition ; or by a junction with them, either of a part or of the whole of the force.

The advanced state of the season renders it probable that it will be so difficult to reach Suez, that the object is not attainable. It is possible, however, that the force which left Bombay in December last, under the orders of Admiral Blanquet, may have succeeded in effecting the objects in view, when it was fitted out, as far as they relate to Suez. Cossier will then be the first object of attention, and the operations of the army ought to be directed, in the first instance, to gain possession of that place.

The General is already acquainted with the measures which have been taken to facilitate these operations, and it is needless to enumerate them here ; and I shall now proceed to the second object of the expedition, viz., to encourage the natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the French yoke and to act on our side. The success of this measure, it is evident, will operate most forcibly in favor of Sir R. Abercromby, and it appears to me to be the principal object of the expedition.

From the intelligence lately received from the Red Sea, I am induced to believe that after the Turkish army was beaten by General Kleber, in March last, and after Colonel Murray had evacuated Suez, Morad Bey made peace with the French, and that the latter ceded to him all Upper Egypt. He is now stationed there, and from the accounts and distribution of the French force in Egypt, which I have occasionally seen, I am induced to believe that they have no troops in Upper Egypt, excepting such as are necessary to watch Morad Bey, who are encamped with him, and such as are necessary to keep up the communication with their post at Cossier. It is probable that when Sir R. Abercromby commences his operations, they will draw to Lower Egypt all the troops not absolutely necessary for their safety in Upper Egypt ; and thus they will leave to Morad Bey the power of acting as his sense of his own interests may point out.

I have always understood this man to be the head of the Mamelukes ; and



certainly, until the French made peace with him, he was supposed to be a friend of the English; and showed his power of doing injury to the French, by keeping in constant employment a large part of their army under General Dessaix, in pursuit of him.

It is very probable that he does not deem his tenure in Upper Egypt very secure. He must be aware that, as soon as the French gain quiet possession of Lower Egypt, they will have the power to break their engagement with him; and from his own experience of their fidelity in adhering to treaties, he must expect that they will use that power to his disadvantage. Indeed the fact that the French have found it necessary to have a body of their troops encamped with Morad Bey's army, is a clear proof that they do not place much faith in him; and as he must know that he is suspected and watched, he has still stronger reason to expect that, as soon as the French have the power, they will not fail to exert it to get rid of a neighbour and an ally in whom they have so little confidence.

Without being too sanguine, we may expect then that, as soon as Morad Bey shall perceive a prospect of driving the French from Egypt, he will co-operate and join with those employed in that object. For this reason the very first opportunity ought to be taken to open a communication with him: his situation and his prospects, if the French should remain in Egypt, ought to be clearly pointed out to him; and he ought to be urged in the strongest manner to exert himself to shake off the yoke. The power of the armies employed on the side of Lower Egypt ought to be made known to him: their prospects of success, founded as well on their own strength, as on the impossibility that the French should receive assistance, ought to be stated to him: and, finally, an offer ought to be made to supply him with arms and ammunition, and even to join him with a part or the whole of the army in the Red Sea, in order to ensure the speedy success of the objects which he, as well as the English, must have in view.

The possession of the port of Cossier, and of the navigation of the Red Sea, will be a strong inducement to Morad Bey, as the Governor of Upper Egypt, to be favorable to the English.

The trade in corn is carried on by this port to Jedda in Arabia; and this trade is such an object both to Upper Egypt and Arabia, and to Mecca in particular, that it may be expected that the Governor of Upper Egypt will not be disinclined towards those who will have it so much in their power to annoy him. Having now stated the reasons which induce me to believe that it will not be difficult to urge the head of the Mamelukes to shake off the French yoke, I proceed to the consideration of the third object of the expedition, viz., to assist the natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them with a part or the whole of the army.

The first question which I shall consider, and which will lay the grounds for a consideration of, and decision upon others, is, whether it would be practicable, or even desirable, to cross the Desert from Cossier at all, if that operation is not performed in concert and co-operation with a body of the natives posted upon the Nile.

It is needless to enter into a statement of the difficulties to be apprehended in crossing the Desert: they are certainly great, but I imagine not insurmountable. But, if it is not certain that the army, or detachment

which may cross the Desert, will partake of the plenty of the banks of the Nile, when they reach them; if they should be certain of having water only, and such forage as their cattle should be able to pick up, I apprehend that the difficulty will become so great, that the operation ought not to be attempted.

It is impossible that the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt can be neutral in the contest in contemplation; they must take part with the French or with us. If they take part with the French, the army will be in the situation in which I have above described it, enjoying no advantage from having reached the banks of the Nile, excepting water, and probably no forage: and it is needless to point out that, if the Desert is to be crossed under these circumstances, care must be taken not only to send with the body of troops which may cross a very large proportion of provisions, but means must be adopted to add to them, until the operations of this body shall have given them such a hold of the country, as to leave no doubt of their steady supply of provisions. It is obvious that this will require a great number of cattle; a number much greater than the government of India, with all the zealous exercise of their power and means, can supply; but there is another consideration connected with this subject besides the supply of cattle, and that is the means of feeding them when landed from the ships.

Upon this point, I need only call to the General's recollection the difficulties to which he has been a witness in moving large supplies of stores and provisions, even in fertile, cultivated, and inhabited countries, well supplied with well-water, and every other advantage of arrangement in the supply, distribution, care, and food of the cattle; and draw a comparison between such difficulties, and those to be expected in a march through a desert. But this is not the worst that is to be apprehended: the cattle will of course land in weak condition, in a desert; and it must be expected that even those which survive the voyage will starve, or at least be in such a state before they commence their march, as to render it very probable that they will not carry their loads to the end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be made to cross the Desert.

This opinion, the General will observe, is by no means founded on the impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it can be done; but it is founded upon the danger that the troops will starve, if they do not return immediately; and upon the inutility of the measure, if they do.

It may be imagined, that supposing the Mamelukes to be wavering, if an attempt is not made to cross the Desert, the advantage of their co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe, that a knowledge of our strength, not of our weakness, will induce them to come forward; and that it might be expected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned by our march over the Desert without concert with them, might induce them to take advantage of it, and to join the French.

But those who will urge this consideration must suppose it possible that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment; and this their history from the beginning of time, particularly since the French invasion, will show to be impossible.

I come now to consider the propriety and mode of crossing the Desert, supposing that the Mamelukes should be inclined to shake off the French yoke and to co-operate with us.

The first point for the General to ascertain is their sincerity in the cause, of which, as I have above stated, there is every probability. As soon as he shall have ascertained this, it will be necessary that he should make arrangements with them for posting a supply of water on that part of the Desert where it is most wanted; and for having a supply of provisions ready on the Nile, that he might cross over a part of his army immediately. The first object on his arrival on the Nile should be to establish a post at Ghennah; and, if possible, another in the Desert, between that place and Cossier, in order to ensure his communication between the sea and the Nile. At Ghennah he should make the depôt of his stores, &c., which might be brought across the Desert by degrees; and then he might commence his operations against the enemy.

On the consideration of the question regarding the crossing the Desert, I have omitted to mention the interruption which may be given to that operation by the enemy; because it is entirely distinct from the difficulties which are peculiar to the operation itself. It is obvious, however, that if the Mamelukes are not on our side, and if they should not have driven out of Upper Egypt the small French force supposed to be in that country, before the operation is attempted, that force, however small, will greatly increase the distress of the British troops who may cross the Desert.

I have not adverted to the supply of arms and ammunition to be given to the natives. As long as their co-operation is doubtful, these supplies ought to be withheld, but promised; when they have shown their sincerity in our cause, the arms may be given to almost any extent.

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30.

To Lord Clive.

Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

‘I have to inform you that I have had a fever since I arrived here, which has prevented me from accompanying the armament to the Red Sea, although I have recovered all but my strength. I therefore purpose, with your Lordship’s permission, to proceed to join my command.

I judge by the Governor General’s private letters to me, that he would have had no objection to this, even if my health had not obliged me to give over all thoughts of going to the Red Sea; but, under the present circumstances, he must approve of it.

I acknowledge that although I expected to return to put myself under your Lordship’s orders, more worthy of your favors than I have been hitherto, I shall even now return with the greatest satisfaction. I have not forgot the confidence which was placed in me, nor the favor with which all my endeavors to serve the public were viewed, by your Lordship’s government; and if your Lordship should think proper to employ me again in the same situation, an adherence to the same line of conduct which has heretofore gained your approbation will, I hope, gain it again.’

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## 31.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

' You will be glad to hear that I propose to leave this place for Malabar in a day or two. The Governor General consented to my return to Mysore if I wished it; at the same time that he said he should regret my quitting the army employed on the expedition. Upon the whole, therefore, I determined to go on, notwithstanding that I was superseded in the command.

When upon the point of carrying into execution this *laudable* but highly disagreeable intention, I was seized by a fever, which kept me in bed for some days; and although I have now recovered, I am still weak, and am taking a remedy which prevents me from going to sea. It has, therefore, been impossible for me to go on the expedition, and I return to my old situation, with a pleasure more than equal to the regret which I had on quitting it.

I enclose a letter to my friend Quin, to desire that he will send my elephants, bullocks and some coolies to meet me at Cannanore; and if he should be out of the way, I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that these means of conveying my baggage, &c., may be sent to meet me.'

## 32.

To Colonel Champagné.

Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

' I take the opportunity of the departure of Colonel Ramsay to write you a few lines.

I am entirely ignorant of the circumstances which have caused my removal from the command of the troops; but I conclude that the Governor General found that he could not resist the claims that General Baird had to be employed. I believe you know that I always thought that General Baird had not been well used, when I was called to the command. But I do not think it was proper that I should be disappointed more than he was, in order that he might have no reason to complain. However, this is a matter of little consequence to any body but myself, therefore I say no more on the subject.

Lord Wellesley allowed me to return to my old situation, but said that he should regret my doing so; and for this reason, and because I saw in the General the most laudable intention to allow me to render him the services I could, I determined to proceed upon the expedition. I was, however, seized with a fever, and a breaking out all over my body; and here I am under a course of nitrous baths for a cure. When I shall be well, God knows! but, in the mean time, I cannot join the armament.

I see clearly the evil consequences of all this to my reputation and future views; but it cannot be helped, and to things of that nature I generally contrive to make up my mind.

I heard you were ill, but I hope not seriously. I thought it probable that you would not like to go one step beyond this, and that you would take advantage of your illness to go home. However, as you are well, you are in the right to go on.

## 33.

## MEMORANDUM UPON SERINGAPATAM.

1. In consequence of the possibility that it may be necessary to alter the arrangements for the government in Mysore after the peace expected in Europe, it has been proposed to destroy the fortifications of Seringapatam; not only as a measure of precaution to prevent a fortress so difficult of access from falling into the hands of our enemies, but as one advisable, even if it were certain that the arrangements for the government of Mysore would remain as they are.

2. If there is a prospect that Great Britain will be obliged to make a peace so bad, as that Mysore will come again into the hands of our enemies, there is no doubt whatever but that the destruction of Seringapatam would be for many years a considerable drawback upon them. It would be so, however, only till the place could be rebuilt; the position, which is the great strength of Seringapatam, would still remain, on which a new and a stronger fort might in time be raised.

3. Admitting, however, the propriety of the measure, connecting it with a bad peace in Europe, there are several considerations which lead me to be of opinion that it would be an improper one, if the present arrangements for the government of Mysore are likely to continue.

4. Seringapatam has long been the capital of an extensive and powerful empire, the whole of which is now in the possession, or under the government, or under the immediate influence of the Company's government of Fort St. George. The conquest of Seringapatam, which, it is true, was accompanied by the fall of Tippoo, and the possession of his principal arsenal, gave the Company the possession and the power of disposing of this vast empire.

5. Whatever may be the real state of the case regarding the power of Seringapatam, resulting from its strength and its position in Mysore, there is no doubt whatever but that the natives look to it as the seat of power, and that they consider themselves under the government of that power in India which has possession of that fortress.

6. There is a double government in Mysore, the operations of which are now conducted in such a manner, as that there can be no occasion for exerting the influence and power in the hands of the Company from the possession of the fort of Seringapatam. But however well the person, in whose hands the conduct of that government is at present, may establish his system, can it be certain that it will last? Is it known who will succeed to him? Who will be the native successor of the present Dewan? If the French are to return to India, and particularly if they are to be allowed to have any but commercial establishments, is it known the effect that such a change may have upon the system of government in Mysore?

7. The treaty with the Rajah provides, that under certain circumstances, the country may be resumed by the Governor General in Council. It is to be supposed that whenever the Governor General shall be desirous of resuming the country, it will be in consequence of the difficulties in which the general government will be involved by the pressure of an extensive warfare. It is hardly possible to suppose any other case in which the

resumption would be justifiable, or could be attempted. In this case, however, it will not be possible to spare troops to force the execution of the treaty, if the Rajah should be inclined to resist it. Will Bangalore or Chittledroog give the power and influence over the country which will be necessary under such circumstances, and which doubtless Seringapatam has?

8. Seringapatam has been found by experience to possess means for equipping an army, which no other place in the Company's territories or under their influence has, Madras excepted. It is supposed, however, that these means are to be attributed to its being the ancient seat of empire, to its large garrison, and to the residence of many of the Rajah's servants in the fort, and on the island. It is also supposed that this effect of its being the ancient seat of the empire will soon be done away by the emigration of the people who depended upon the former government; that the means which are the consequence of the size of the garrison will exist whenever there may be an equal number of troops; and that those which are the consequence of the residence of the Rajah's principal servants will remove with them to Mysore.

9. Admitting that any other garrison of equal strength would draw to it the same number of people that have been brought to Seringapatam by the troops, and that the removal of the Rajah's servants to Mysore will occasion a diminution of the population of Seringapatam, I cannot admit that the fall of the empire of Tippoo has diminished, or will diminish, its population in the least. In fact, the place is more populous now than it ever was, if the armies that Tippoo had are struck out of the calculation; and supposing that those who were attached to his government and person should be inclined to leave it, which they are not, they would find it difficult to pitch upon a place in the peninsula in which they would not live under a British government.

10. But I attribute the facility which has been found in equipping an army at Seringapatam, the great means which that place affords, to its being a British possession, as well as to the other causes to which have been attributed those excellent effects. Bangalore, Chittledroog, Sera, Nuggur, Colar, are nearly, if not equally populous with Seringapatam: some of them are places of great trade and riches, and all of them might afford, and doubtless afforded to Tippoo the means of bringing his troops into the field.

11. When I took the field last year, the Rajah's government had the strongest interest in my success, and I do them no more than justice in saying that they did every thing in their power to forward it; yet, notwithstanding their exertions, and those of the officers in command of the different forts, I did not get a bullock, or a man, or any thing which could enable the troops to remain in the field from any place excepting Seringapatam.

12. At Chittledroog, there was a numerous, if not a more numerous garrison at that time, than at Seringapatam; but still, the followers of the corps at the former were brought from the latter; which fact may be adduced as a proof that the means of Seringapatam are not to be attributed exclusively to the size of its garrison; and that even those means which depend upon its garrison might possibly not be removed with it. When the troops were ordered into the field, one regiment of cavalry was brought from Bangalore, the followers and equipments of which were sent from Seringapatam.



13. It may be said that, although the fort of Seringapatam may be destroyed, and its garrison and depôt of stores removed to another place, the island will still belong to the Company; and that the population and means of equipment which it affords will still be in our power, and in the Mysore country. But admitting that to be true, I contend for it, that we shall not enjoy the same advantages from them which we have hitherto; we shall not be able to apply them with the same readiness to the service, if it should be possible to procure them for it at all.

14. We have experience of the benefit of equipping an army at Seringapatam; we know that those means still exist; and we have reason to believe that they will continue as long as the garrison and depôt of stores are at that place. We do not know that they would exist at Seringapatam if the fort were destroyed and the garrison removed; and we have reason to know from experience, that they would not exist at Chittledroog, even if the garrison and stores were removed thither; and I believe that they would not exist at Bangalore, if they were removed to that place.

15. But not only have we experience of the singular advantage of Seringapatam as a place of equipment, but we know it is acknowledged by all parties as the most convenient depôt in point of locality for service in the province of Malabar: I might also add, in the province of Canara. In truth, next to the opinion which universally prevails of the power attached to the possession of this fort, this is the point of view in which to have possession of it appears to me to be the most important.

16. From Goa to Cochin there is not a single post which could be held by any body of troops for a moment. The works of Cannanore have been erected at vast expense, but the garrison could not remain in that fort opposed to the fire of a man of war anchored in the roads. The works are commanded in such manner as to render the situation of the besieged very disadvantageous, if the fort should be attacked on the land side; and the fort is so small as to be incapable of holding even the quantity of stores which are necessary for the desultory service in the Malabar province. Besides, it is falling down, as appears by the reports made to the military board. The stores in Canara are now in the open town of Mangalore.

17. The state of the seasons on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar operates as a strong reason for preserving the fort of Seringapatam, and making it the depôt of the troops in those provinces. The vessels which could be employed to convey stores could keep up the communication only in the months of January, February, March, April, and part of May; and even during those months with considerable difficulty and delay. In the latter part of May, in June, July, August, and September, it is impossible for vessels to approach the Malabar coast; and in October, November, and December, it is equally so to approach Madras. It is more easy to communicate between Bombay and the coast. But the consequence of supplying the troops in those provinces with stores either from Madras or Bombay is, that a fort must be constructed, and arsenals must be built for their preservation. The question is, therefore, whether it is better to keep Seringapatam with all its supposed inconveniences, or to build a fort in one of the provinces below the ghauts to the westward.

18. Many objections might be urged against building a fort in those provinces, the expenses of which are sufficiently obvious; but there is one

objection, to which particular attention is requested, as it may bear upon the general question in other respects.

19. A fort situated upon the sea coast is liable to particular objections. An enemy, although of inferior strength, has the power of attacking it, and unless it is of great strength, would possess himself of it before assistance could be sent to it. This would certainly be the case, if the supposed enemy were stronger at sea; which, it is true, we have no reason to expect at the present moment. But it might be the case if we were stronger at sea.

20. The extent of the seas under the Admiral in this part of the world renders it impossible for him to provide for the protection of every part; and the difficulty, in all seasons, of going to all parts of both coasts, must for ever render the situation of a fort on the sea coast in some degree dangerous.

21. If such a fort should fall, the enemy has immediately an establishment on the coast, to deprive him of which would require an army, and the equipment for a siege; whereas, his landing under any other circumstances would be an event, the bad consequences of which might be defeated as soon as the body of troops in the western provinces, supported by those above the ghauts, could be collected.

22. In regard to the insurgents in Malabar, the war against them cannot be carried on at all without assistance, either from Seringapatam, or from Bombay, or Surat. Stores, ordnance, and grain, might be sent round from Madras, or from Bombay; but a fort must be built to receive them, and then there are no means of moving them in those provinces independent of the assistance above mentioned. In point of economy, there is no doubt whatever but that it is more expedient to supply these means from Seringapatam, than from Bombay or Surat.

23. Having thus stated the grounds which I have for believing that Seringapatam is the most convenient depôt for the coast of Malabar, I proceed to consider that place in the same point of view in reference to the line of frontier to the northward. I must first beg that the principles of European warfare may not be applied to this country in arguing this question, to a greater degree than they are applied to the service when that is to be carried on.

24. It would be convenient that a depôt of stores for a service intended in any particular country should be as near the scene of operations as possible. In European warfare it is absolutely necessary that the expense magazines, &c., should be on the spot, and they are usually moved forward in proportion as the army is enabled to advance. But in this country, in which armies take the field with such formidable equipments, with arsenals and magazines, in fact, which they always carry with them, it is not necessary, however convenient it would be, that the depôt which is to supply those equipments, and the wants of the service, should be immediately in the neighbourhood of the scene of action.

25. My experience of service in this country proves the truth of that observation. In General Harris's war, notwithstanding the number of posts in advance, in which depôts had been formed, every article of provisions and stores and ordnance was brought from Madras; and, in fact, if the cattle could have been fed in that neighbourhood, and if there had not been a

necessity of forming a corps of observation at Arcot, for the speedy support of which it was necessary to provide, General Harris would have gained time by collecting his army at Madras, and marching at once from thence, instead of collecting at Vellore. In the last campaign in the same manner, although Chittledroog was not unprovided with stores, every article was brought from Seringapatam. In neither case was there either delay or inconvenience; and in both cases the armies would have been as well provided, and equally secure, if there had not been a gun or an article of military stores or grain in any of the advanced posts.

26. I do not contend that in the one case it would not have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Madras at Vellore or Kistnagherry; or, in the other, that it would not have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Seringapatam at Chittledroog; but I contend for it, that it was not inconvenient to have them otherwise; and that the service, in either case, did not suffer from the distance of the depôts, as it would have done if the same warfare had been carried on in Europe, without moving forward the magazines.

27. This circumstance arises as well from the nature of the service in India, in which immense equipments always accompany the troops, as from the manner in which those troops are usually posted in times of peace. Considerable time must elapse before a body of troops can be collected on the frontier for service, and the stores required for such service would be on the frontier from Seringapatam, as they were in the last campaign, before all the troops for the service could be collected.

28. I am aware that the consequence of this reasoning goes the length of giving up Chittledroog: upon which I have to observe, that if I am to choose between Seringapatam and Chittledroog, for a general depôt for all possible services, I should certainly prefer Seringapatam, and that I have no desire to keep the stores in Chittledroog, even for service in the Marhatta territory. I prefer by far the fort of Hullahall in Soonda, on the one hand, and that of Hurryhur on the other, and in these I should desire to have no stores or grain, excepting such as I might find it convenient to lodge in them at the time the service should be going on.

29. With a view to service on the frontier, there is but little difference in the distance of Seringapatam and of Bangalore from the scene of action. Bangalore is 85 miles distant from Sera, Seringapatam is 104. It is true that those articles of ordnance and stores, which must come from the presidency by going to Seringapatam, must thus go 80 miles more than they would if the depôt were fixed at Bangalore. But in the first place it is to be considered, that if the resources of the Mysore country are fairly called into action, but few articles will be required from the presidency. In the next place it is to be recollected, that a large proportion of those articles which might be wanted from the presidency will be required in the western provinces, if it should be determined, according to my system, that the corps serving in those provinces should be provided from this country; and, therefore, that they will not suffer by being transported at once to Seringapatam. But supposing the circuitous route to the frontier by Seringapatam should be an objection to that place, of such weight as to occasion a preference to Bangalore, let the other advantages of Seringapatam be taken into consider-



ation, the general opinion of its power, the means which experience has proved it possesses of equipping an army, its superior convenience as a depôt for the Malabar coast, which will more than compensate for the trifling disadvantage of being obliged to go 80 miles of distance to reach it.

30. But there are other objections to Seringapatam which, if well founded, would be decisive of the question. In the first place it is supposed that Seringapatam requires a garrison, even in times of peace, of one regiment of Europeans, 3 battalions of sepoys, and a large proportion of artillery. Seringapatam is full of Moorish inhabitants, and as it contains a large arsenal, it is not deemed safe to trust this arsenal without a large garrison, till these inhabitants are removed from the fort. But measures are now taking to remove these inhabitants to the pettah, and when they and the Rajah's servants shall have left the fort, there will be no reason to have any apprehension for the arsenal. The works of Seringapatam are in ruins, because they have never been repaired since the siege; and the weather and river have done them damage to a much greater degree than they would if they had been in good repair, and they are accessible in many places. The communication between one part and another of these works is not complete, and it is therefore necessary that the guns which may be required for the works should be always in their places. These two inconveniences, which the repair of the fortifications would remedy, create a necessity for larger guards, and a greater number of them on the works than would otherwise be necessary. The garrison of Seringapatam furnishes the Rajah's guard, and that of the Resident. It is the seat of the head quarters of the division, which necessarily causes the employment of a number of men on duty; it furnishes the guards for the public elephants and cattle, and other small detachments; and as the paymaster, the treasure, and the stores are at Seringapatam, the detachment with the treasure and stores for the out stations are furnished from its garrison. These circumstances naturally create a want of troops; but the removal of the Moorish inhabitants, and the repair and completion of the fortifications, would enable us to provide for those duties, and to keep the arsenal in safety, with as small a body of men at Seringapatam as at any other place in the country. In time of war, and in case of a siege, Seringapatam would require as small, if not a smaller garrison for its defence, than any other place that has been proposed as a great depôt. An army which should besiege Seringapatam must determine at once to attack it from the north, or from the south side of the river, or from the island. No army could be brought there sufficiently numerous to form three divisions, or even two divisions large enough to make two or three attacks upon the place, because these divisions would be effectually separated from each other, and each must be strong enough to defend itself against the army which would be employed to raise the siege. In providing a garrison for the defence of Seringapatam, if such a measure should ever be necessary, no more men will be required than would be necessary to defend it on one point of attack. But looking to Seringapatam as a place liable to be attacked, it has a singular advantage over every other fort in India, viz., that from the month of June to the month of December in every year it is impossible to approach it.

31. It is also said that Seringapatam is unwholesome, and that art can-

not remedy that defect; but that Bangalore is otherwise. Seringapatam certainly has been found to be unwholesome to the European troops; and indeed in the last year the same objection applied to all parts of the upper country. I apprehend, however, that Seringapatam is not really more unwholesome than Bangalore, and upon that point I should be glad to have the opinion of Mr. Anderson. I apprehend that a great part of the sickness at Seringapatam is to be attributed to the nature of the buildings which the officers and the troops have occupied. Open choultries and buildings which do not keep out the weather cannot be supposed to answer in this country, and have been equally fatal in all parts above the ghauts. Since the buildings have been improved, the health of the troops has improved; and in this season we have not had any sick officers, or more sick men than there have been in other garrisons.

32. It is also said that the position of Seringapatam is bad, not only in reference to a depôt for service on the frontier, but as a fortress to cover the country and stop the enemy. In this respect Seringapatam is not worse than we know Chittledroog to have been. Pursheram Bhow passed in sight of that fortress more than once, and it appears to have been no impediment to his operations in the northern parts of Mysore. But, in fact, no fortress is an impediment to the operations of an hostile army in this country, excepting it lies immediately in the line on which the army must necessarily march; or excepting it is provided with a garrison of such strength and activity as to afford detachments to operate upon the line of communication of the hostile army with its own country. In case the Company should be involved in hostilities of such extent as that they should be obliged to stand on the defensive in this country, when at war with a foreign power, it is not probable that the Government will be able to give garrisons to the fortresses in this country, of the strength sufficient to afford detachments to operate upon the enemy's line of communication with his own country; and all the fortresses which have been proposed as depôts would be equally incapable, from situation, of stopping an enemy.

33. The advantage of the possession of them, therefore, would be the power which each would have over the country, and their relative advantage would be in proportion to the power of each. I have already pointed out the power which, in my opinion, is attached to the possession of Seringapatam; and the history of this country has pointed out more than one instance in which the Mysore country has been overrun by a victorious army, which, however, has been obliged to quit it, because it had not possession of Seringapatam.

34. An objection has been made to Seringapatam, on account of the expense of the repairs which will be necessary to that place. These repairs will not cost one-third of the sum at which they have been estimated; but it is said that, at all events, they will be more expensive than the repairs of Bangalore. When the buildings required for Bangalore are completed, I should much doubt it. But it is forgotten that Seringapatam affords cover for one regiment of Europeans at least, and that it will afford cover for 2 regiments when the family of the Sultaun shall have been removed from the place. The buildings at Seringapatam will also give an hospital, some quarters for officers, &c. In comparing the expense of the repair of Seringapa-



tam with that of Bangalore, and the establishment of the depôt at that place or at Chittledroog, the expenses of the cantonment, arsenal, hospital, &c., to be built, ought to be added to the latter. Besides, I have above shown the necessity of building a fort on the Malabar coast in case Seringapatam is destroyed, the expense of which ought likewise to be added to that of establishing the depôt at Bangalore or at Chittledroog.

35. There is no doubt but that Seringapatam is better provided with timber than almost any other place in the peninsula: that article is cheaper in the bazaar at Seringapatam than it is at Madras. Provisions and every other article are cheap; firewood alone is dear, but not dearer than at Chittledroog, or than it would be at Bangalore, if Bangalore were equally populous. The dearness of firewood is a necessary, although a great inconvenient consequence of large populations in almost every part of India.

36. In regard to the inconvenience of the river, it is trifling. The communication has seldom been interrupted, and never for more than 2, or at most, 3 days at a time, and even then not entirely. Six iron 18-pounders, four 12 pounders and howitzers, with all their equipments, were sent to the northward in the year 1799, when the river was full, with but little inconvenience; and in the last year (1800) the army in the Marhatta country received regular supplies of every thing from Seringapatam, not only across the Cauvery, but across the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba, by means of basket boats, without any inconvenience.'

## 34.

## MEMORANDUM UPON OPERATIONS IN THE MARHATTA TERRITORY.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Seringapatam, 6th Sept. 1801.

'As before long we may look to war with the Marhattas, it is proper to consider of the means of carrying it on. The experience which has been acquired in the late contest with Dhoondiah Waugh, of the seasons, the nature of the country, its roads, its produce, and its means of defence, will be of use in pointing them out. I shall detail my observations upon each of these points, for the benefit of those in whose hands may be placed the conduct of the operations of the army in case of such a war, as I have above supposed we may expect. The season at which it is most convenient to commence a campaign with the Marhattas, is that at which the rivers, which take their rise in the western ghauts, fill. This happens generally in the month of June. In this year, the Toombuddra was not fordable after the 14th June, the day before the army reached Hurryhur; and in other seasons, I understand that that river fills nearly at the same time.

The reasons why I think that the most favorable season for operations against the Marhatta nation, are as follow:

First; 'The Marhatta army is principally composed of cavalry, and their plan of operations against a British army would be to endeavor to cut off its communication with its rear, and to impede the junction of its supplies from the Mysore country. As the rivers are not fordable, as there are no bridges, and no means of passing them excepting by basket boats, which it is difficult, and might be rendered impossible to procure, the fulness of the rivers operates as a barrier. It is certain that the enemy cannot pass them in large numbers, and it is probable that they would not venture to throw



across a small body, or rather, that they would not be able to prevail upon a small body to remain on a different side from the main body of their army.

The inconvenience and delay which the British army experience in crossing the rivers by means of boats, when they are full, is trifling; and in fact they would experience no inconvenience or delay, if good pontoons were provided, and a bridge were thrown across each river for the passage of the army. The communication might afterwards be kept up by means of the common basket boats. If the army should be thus equipped with a bridge, the Marhattas would never dare to detach a body across any river, for the purpose of annoying our communications. Thus, then, we should enjoy all the advantage of a river not fordable, to shorten the line of our communication, which river our enemy could not pass with a large body of troops, and over which he would not dare to detach a small body; and we should have it in our power to pass it with as much ease, and with as little inconvenience and delay, as we should experience if the river were fordable.

Secondly; The Marhatta country in general is but ill supplied with water. The rains which fill these rivers, although not heavy at the beginning of the rainy season, are sufficient to fill many nullahs; and an army has at this time some chance of being supplied with water, of which, in the dry season, it is certain it would never find much, and frequently none. The inconvenience to be apprehended from the rains is trifling. It is true, that heavy rain would ruin the cattle of the army, and would put the roads in such a state as to render them impracticable for wheel carriages. But heavy rain for any long continuance is not to be expected in the Marhatta territory; and particularly not early in the season. During the last season, which was extraordinarily severe upon the coast, we had only 2 days of distressing rain; but we had some rain nearly on every day.

The Marhatta country is in general a fine black soil, very fertile and highly cultivated. The roads are all excellent, excepting when the rain is heavy. At that time the black cotton mould becomes a swamp, through which it is scarcely practicable for a man to move; the wheels of the carriages sink to their axletrees, are clogged with mud, and it is impossible for the cattle to draw them.

The produce of this fertile country is jowarry principally, and other dry grains, but no rice. This is the great difficulty with which our army would have to contend. The rice which must be procured for them must be brought from the distant rice countries in Mysore or from Canara, with which country, in the rainy season, it is impossible to keep up a communication.

The army also might depend upon procuring some sheep and bullocks in the Marhatta territory; but if its European force should be large, it will certainly require supplies of the former from Mysore, and in any case supplies from thence of the latter.

It is well known that jowarry straw is the best kind of forage for horses and cattle, and of this there is an abundance every where; and besides this forage, it seldom happens that green forage cannot be found.

The means of defending this country are trifling; and it must depend upon the strength of the army which is in it, compared with that of the British army. All the strong places are liable to be carried by assault,

excepting, perhaps, Darwar or Kooshgul; and it is doubtful whether these last might not be thus taken if attacked by resolute troops.

Having thus detailed my observations on the Marhatta territory, with a view to operations within it, I come to state those which I would recommend, and the preparatory steps to be taken in order to have the means of carrying them on with vigor, celerity, and effect. The first object in any Marhatta war, commenced in the season which I think most favorable to the British army, would be to push the enemy across the Kistna, and to establish ourselves firmly on that river as a barrier, from which we could advance to their capital, or to suit other ulterior objects as might be held out.

I would propose, then, to assemble the troops at Chittledroog; but they must be provided with every necessary before they arrive there, as nothing at all useful to military operations can be procured at that place.

The army ought to be provided with pontoons and other materials for building a bridge. On account of the difficulty of procuring rice and arrack in the Marhatta territory, a large store ought to be collected and kept at Chittledroog, and another at Hurryhur. This last place ought to be repaired, and put in a defensible state for a small garrison, as well for a point of communication with the Mysore country for the army when it should be advanced into the Marhatta territory, as for a post to guard the basket boats, &c., which must be made use of to convey over the Toombuddra the supplies which must follow the army. The fort at Hullihall, in Soonda, ought also to be put in repair. Granaries and storehouses for arrack and for military stores ought to be built at this station. Large stores of rice and arrack for the supply of the army, when it should be advanced into the Marhatta territory, and certain military stores, ought to be collected at Hullihall. This post, if strengthened, would be an excellent depôt, and would be supplied at all times without difficulty, from Bombay by Goa.

The army being assembled at Chittledroog, should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur. Its first object should be to drive the enemy across the river Werdah, and to establish itself between those two rivers. After this shall be effected, it might cross the Werdah. The best place for this will be between Deogerry and Savanore. It must be recollected, that although the army will cross this river by its bridge, it will still be necessary that it should be provided with basket boats, in order that its supplies may cross the river likewise. These, or materials to make them, cannot be procured at or near Deogerry, and the boats must therefore be brought from the Mysore country. The boatmen must likewise come from the Mysore country.

It will be necessary to establish a post upon the Werdah as a guard for the boats, which otherwise it would be in the power of the enemy to seize or destroy, as a link in the communication with Mysore, and in order effectually to establish the British power in the country between that river and the Toombuddra.

The next object would be to get possession of Darwar. The straight road to that place, by Savanore and Hoobly, is the best. If the rains should have been heavy, the road to Darwar should be from Savanore to Bindigherry, and along the Soonda hills. The soil near these hills is red, and the roads are practicable, even in rainy weather.

In my opinion, Darwar can be taken by a *coup de main*. The attack

ought to be made on the south-west side. Means might be adopted for keeping down the fire of the besieged, by one of cannon from two hills, on which the Bhow's and the British batteries were erected in the former war, and by an enfilading fire from a height about a tank on the north-west angle.

The assailants might move under cover of the back of that tank to the foot of the glacis, where they would be covered from the fire of the besieged. They might move along the foot of the glacis till they should come opposite the hills above mentioned. They ought then to possess themselves of a square and a roundwork in the glacis, by turning them by the covert way. They ought to be provided with fascines to fill a part of the ditch, and they might escalate the outer wall, taking care to carry over some ladders for the purpose of escalating the inner wall.

After having got within the outer wall, they should turn to their left, and proceed to a tank between the two walls. Along the back of this tank, it is said there is a passage over the inner ditch to a gateway. At this gateway the wall is not more than 20 feet high, and might easily be escalated. This passage is represented as being an aqueduct from the tank outside, on the north-west angle of the fort, into the body of the place. There is a passage for water from this tank through the glacis, and it is probable that it leads over both the ditches. At the same time that this attack should be made, another ought to be directed against the gateway, which is on the south-east face.

There are other gates. The party which should proceed on this attack might also get under the glacis, by the back of the tank above mentioned; only it should proceed along the northern face and round to the gateway by that route. After blowing open the gates in the outer wall, it is said that the inner wall, near its gate, is not more than 20 feet high. This party ought also to be provided with scaling ladders.

If the attack should fail, or if, from any reason, it should be thought advisable to attack the place regularly, and to effect a breach in the walls, the only mode of doing this is, by erecting the breaching battery on the crest of the glacis. The face to be attacked will be the same.

The troops would establish themselves under the glacis, and in the round and square works within it, as I have above recommended. These works would be excellent flanks to the trenches under the glacis. The troops would have to work back to the hills above mentioned, on which the Bhow's batteries were erected in the last war; and at which would, of course, be collected the reserve for the trenches.

Having by one of these modes got possession of Darwar, but particularly if by assault, all the other places in the country would fall of course. The first object would be to establish a garrison and the depôts in that place.

The garrison, &c., might be moved forward from Hullihall, which ought still to be held by a small force, as a post of communication with the sea coast. The enemy should then be driven across the Malpoorba, and the country between the rivers should be cleared entirely.

Boats should be made and prepared, and the army should cross the Malpoorba between Doodwar and Moorgoor. A post should be established on the river for the care of the boats.



The river Malpoorba is more rapid than the Werdah or the Toombuddra, is more liable to rise and fall suddenly, and therefore the enemy would be more likely to return from the country between that river and the Gutpurba, than from that between the Malpoorba and the Werdah. The only place which on this route is worthy of attention is Belgaum; this place has a wet ditch, but I am informed that it is dry in parts, and that the place is otherwise liable to be taken by assault. Belgaum lies to the westward of the high road to the Kistna, and is situated in a rice country. It might be possible to draw supplies from this country; and, with this view, it might be desirable to have a garrison of British troops in Belgaum, otherwise it will be useless.

The fort of Badamy, which is esteemed of some strength, lies north of the Malpoorba, but about 70 or 80 miles from the road to the Kistna. Unless it was found that the enemy hung about this fort, it would be better not to lose any time in going to attack it, until they are all driven across the Kistna. If they hang about Badamy, it must be attacked. Badamy ought, more properly, to be called two forts than one. There are two forts on two separate hills, and a fortified pettah between them. It appears to me that the hill forts might be taken by storm, by approaching them from the westward.

After the enemy should have been driven across the Gutpurba, this river ought to be crossed in the same manner as the Malpoorba, somewhere near Gokauk, and a post ought to be established upon it.

*Jan., 1802.*—Since the commencement of this memorandum was written the Company have got possession of the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra, which river has become their northern boundary; and it may, perhaps, be thought that the plan of operations, in case of a war with the Marhattas, ought to be altered. There are several reasons, however, for which they should continue to be the same.

1st. The treaty by which the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra have been ceded to the Company, has allied it more closely with the Nizam, whose interests now appear to be inseparable from those of the Company. The quarrel of the Company, therefore, with the Marhattas, which may create a necessity for any military operations, will equally involve the Nizam; and it will be necessary that measures should be taken, either by himself or by the Company, to defend the Dooab from the incursions of the Marhattas.

2ndly. The defence of the Dooab will provide for that of the Ceded districts, which that country covers entirely. If the Nizam's army is collected at Copaul, and Moodgul is occupied with strength, it would be impossible for the Marhatta army to make any impression of consequence on the Dooab, or to penetrate the Ceded countries in any strength. It may be a question whether, when the British army should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, the army of the Nizam should not immediately cross the Kistna, and guard his Highness' frontier to the northward of that river, if they should not operate offensively upon the enemy. At all events, they ought to cross the Kistna as soon as the Marhattas begin to retire from the countries to the southward of the rivers which fall into the Kistna. But it may be said, as the Company have now got possession of extensive countries imme-

diately to the southward of the Toombuddra, and in the neighbourhood of the Marhatta territory, they ought to carry on their operations from thence, and leave Mysore to its own defence.

There are several objections to this measure, which I will detail.

1st. Mysore is very defenceless towards the Marhatta territory; a body of Marhatta horse would overrun the whole of the rich province of Bednore, would plunder Bednore itself, and might push their devastations to within 60 miles of Seringapatam, without the chance of danger or molestation.

2ndly. They would immediately connect themselves, and act in co-operation with the polygars along the range of the western ghauts, as far as Koorg; and probably the provinces of Malabar and Canara would be the scene of their intrigues, and the Company's dependants in those provinces would take arms.

3rdly. The countries into which they would thus push themselves are those from which supplies of rice for the army must be drawn, when it enters the Marhatta territory; and thus rice must come by the road of which the enemy would have possession.

4thly. The first step to be taken, after crossing the Toombuddra (suppose at Anagoondy), would be to clear out the countries beyond the Werdah of the detachments of the enemy, which would have entered them, and thus much valuable time would be lost. Therefore, there is no doubt but that it would be best to assemble the troops at once at Chittledroog, and to cross them quickly over the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, by which measure a stop will be immediately put to the operations of the enemy in that quarter.

In case it should be determined to enter the enemy's country by Anagoondy and Copaul, either with the whole British army, leaving Mysore defenceless, or with the Nizam's army in co-operation with the British troops collected in Mysore, the first place of consequence which will be met with is Dummul. This is a stone fort, the walls of which are about 35 feet high, with a dry ditch of unequal depth. On the south and west sides there is a flank of a tank, and some rough ground and buildings which give cover to the near approach of a body of troops. In the centre nearly of the south side there is an old gateway, now blocked up, where the place may be escalated with ease. There is a trench cut across the road that used to lead to the gate, which, however, may be easily passed. The gateway also, on the north face leading to the pettah, may be attacked with advantage.

The road from Dummul to Hoobly and Darwar is good in dry weather: but during the heavy rains it is impassable, as there are about 20 miles of the black cotton soil which I have above mentioned.

If the rains should be heavy, the best road for a body of troops, marching from Dummul to Darwar, would be by Sirhitty, Luckmaisir, and Savanore, and along the Soonda hills.

Kooshgul lies not far from the direct road from Dummul, by Hoobly, to Darwar. This place is strong from its situation and its works. It is situated in the middle of a plain of cotton ground. There is no water within several miles of it for the supply of an army; and it is surrounded by two walls, two ditches, a covert way and glacis. The ditches, however, though deep, are very narrow, and might easily be filled up, particularly that one in the glacis. On the east side of the south face, there is a dam of



some water across the outer ditch, over which it would be very practicable to pass; and it appeared to me that it would be most easy to assault the inner fort on the same side. It is to be recollected, however, that after having passed the outer ditch in the glacis, the assailants would have to pass into the covert way, an inner ditch, the outer wall, and afterwards the inner wall, to parts of which there is no ditch.

It is clear that this place can be taken by a *coup de main*, and probably in no other manner; but I strongly recommend that it should be avoided if possible, and that its fall should be considered as dependent upon that of Darwar.'

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 35.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Seringapatam, 1st Jan. 1803.

'Webbe has desired me to write to you upon the subject of our operations to the northward; and although it is difficult to form an opinion on the subject of any military operations without knowing precisely their object, I comply with pleasure with his wishes, and I shall be happy if what I may write shall prove at all serviceable.

I shall suppose our object to be to march the army to Poonah, there to re-establish the Peshwah's authority. At this season of the year, I do not know of any natural obstacle to impede our progress, excepting the great distance. The principal obstacle of art is the fort of Darwar, which I conclude that the Peshwah will have ordered the killadar to deliver up to us. If his Highness should not have given these orders, or if the killadar should not think it proper, we must make ourselves masters of that fortress. I am of opinion that it is to be taken by a *coup de main*, and I should certainly attempt it. It may not, however, be thought proper to attack the place in this manner; but at all events, I do not conceive that it will stop the British army more than a few days. It will also take 3 or 4 days to arrange our garrison in the place, and to remove thither our stores, grain, &c., from Hullihall in Soondah.

After Darwar shall be in our possession, I do not know of any place that will stop the British army for a moment.

I will suppose that the army shall have arrived upon the Toombuddra, and that General Stuart will be prepared to advance from Hurryhur on the 1st March. I do not think it possible that he could be there sooner; he has a very large and heavy equipment, which he brings from Madras; he has Carnatic cattle to move it; and he meets with the old disappointments in procuring them. He does not quit Madras till the 15th of this month; his troops and stores about the 12th; he has then 400 miles to march to Hurryhur, which will take him more than 6 weeks.

After quitting Hurryhur, he will have 8 marches to Darwar, and from thence, 22 to Poonah, by Padshappoor, Chickoree, Meritch, and Tasgaum; and one more, if he should go by Shahpoor and Belgaum to Meritch. I should recommend the latter road, because I believe that it will be convenient, if not necessary to us, to have possession of Belgaum; and that by that road we shall be more certain of finding water than by the other.

According to this account, I do not think that you ought to look out for us at Poonah before the end of April.



In this estimate of the time which will elapse before we arrive at Poonah, I have concluded that we shall meet with no impediments on our progress, occasioned by the efforts of the enemy. I am far from thinking, however, that we shall not meet with such impediments; and if we do, our progress must be considerably slower than I have supposed that it will be, and the period of our arrival at Poonah be considerably delayed.

I have not yet had any satisfactory communication from the Putwurdun family of their intentions upon the present occasion: it appears that they and Rastia's family are leagued against Goklah, whose troops they are driving from the Kistna towards the Toombuddra. It is possible, that when they shall see our army in the field, they may be induced to join our standard, but at present I very much doubt their intentions. It will not be very practicable to make great progress through the southern Marhatta territories with such a heavy equipment as General Stuart has proposed, if the chiefs of this family and Rastia are united against us.

At all events, at present, owing to the confusion at Poonah, and the delay in assembling our troops on the frontier, the countries on the other side of the Toombuddra are in a sad state of disorder. The heads of districts and of villages have seized the supreme authority, and have raised troops, and are carrying on against each other a petty warfare, which will be as destructive to our supplies and our communications from Mysore, as it is to the country itself. Unless, therefore, the Putwurdun, and all the chiefs in this part of the empire, join cordially with us, and take advantage of our presence to settle the country, it is very obvious that we shall lose our communication with Mysore on the day we shall quit the Toombuddra.

These circumstances have made me turn my mind seriously to a project which the great distance between Mysore and Poonah had induced me before to take into consideration; viz., to establish a depôt, by means of the Bombay government, either at Panwell or Bassein, or some other place on the coast opposite to the island of Bombay, or Salsette, of not very difficult access from the ghauts: this post to be occupied by the Bombay troops, and to be filled with rice, arrack, salt provisions, and military stores for a field train, if we should have fought an action. By this arrangement we should carry on the war at Poonah with an army provided with cattle, &c., from the eastern side of the peninsula, and with the resources of Bombay; and we should shorten our line of communication many hundred miles.

I propose this plan to General Stuart, and if he should adopt it, I shall write a detail upon the subject to Mr. Duncan. In the mean time, it will be well if you turn it in your mind, and if you should agree in opinion with me of its propriety, and should think it practicable, fix upon a place upon the coast which the Peshwah must be requested to give up to us.

I cannot conclude this letter without letting you know how amply Mysore has contributed to the supply and equipment of the army to be assembled on its frontier, and how readily our little friend Purneah has come into all my plans for the service.

First; I have raised here 8000 bullocks before they had got one at Madras; besides the bullocks for the cavalry gram.

Secondly; At the end of the gram harvest, one month before the new grain comes in, the cavalry Gram Agent General is supplied with 7000 loads;

and the cavalry are brought upon the frontier with 500 loads each regiment, where they find 6000 loads to supply their consumption while they remain there.

Thirdly; A depôt is formed of 7000 loads of rice at Hurryhur.

Fourthly; Mysore alone gives 32,000 brinjarry bullocks loaded, which will meet the General at the back of the Chittledroog hills, at the end of this month.

Fifthly; 60,000 sheep assembled in different flocks between Sera and Chittledroog; and

Sixthly; A body of silladar horse, amounting to above 5000.'

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36.

To ———.

Seringapatam, 20th Jan. 1803.

' You inform me that the Rajah or Dessaye of Kittoor has expressed a wish to be taken under the protection of the British government, and has offered to pay a tribute to the Company and to give you a bribe of 4000 pagodas, and me one of 10,000 pagodas, provided this point is arranged, according to his wishes.

I cannot conceive what can have induced the Rajah of Kittoor to imagine that I was capable of receiving that or any other sum of money, as an inducement to do that which he must think improper, or he would not have offered it. But I shall advert to that point more particularly presently.

The Rajah of Kittoor is a tributary of the Marhatta government, the head of which is an ally, by treaty, of the Honorable Company. It would be therefore to the full as proper, that any officer in command of a post within the Company's territories should listen to, and enter into a plan for seizing part of the Marhatta territories, as it is for you to listen and encourage an offer from the Rajah of Kittoor to accept the protection of and transfer his allegiance and tribute to the Honorable Company's government. In case you should hear any thing further upon this subject from the Rajah of Kittoor or in future from any of the chiefs of the Marhattas on the frontier, I desire that you will tell them what is the fact, that you have no authority whatever to listen to such proposals, that you have orders only to keep up with them the usual intercourse of civility and friendship, and that if they have any proposals of that kind to make, they must be made in a proper manner to our superiors. You may, at the same time, inform them, that you have my authority to say, that the British Government is very little likely to take advantage of the misfortunes of its ally, to deprive him either of his territories, or of the allegiance or tribute due to him by his tributaries.

In respect to the bribe offered to you and myself, I am surprised that any man in the character of a British officer should not have given the Rajah to understand that the offer would be considered as an insult; and that he should not rather have forbidden its renewal, than that he should have encouraged it, and even offered to receive a quarter of the sum proposed to be given to him for prompt payment. I can attribute your conduct, on this occasion, to nothing excepting the most inconsiderate indiscretion, and to a desire to benefit yourself, which got the better of your prudence. I desire, however, that you will refrain from the subject with the Rajah of Kittoor at all; and that if he should renew it, you will inform him, that I and all British officers, consider such offers as insults on the part of those by whom they are made.'



## 37.

To J. Duncan, Esq., Governor of Bombay.

Seringapatam, 20th Jan. 1803.

‘ General Stuart will have informed you that, adverting to the probability of the march of the army to Poonah, and the possibility that our communication with Mysore and the seats of the resources of the army on this side of India might be precarious, and at all events would be difficult, on account of its length, I had proposed to him a plan for the formation of a depôt at Panwell or Bassein, or some other place on the coast opposite to the islands of Bombay or Salsette, by means of the Government of Bombay. He has been pleased to approve of this plan, and has desired me to write to you upon the subject in detail. You may recollect that I before hinted the subject to you, and I should have written to you upon it more particularly, before now, if I had seen clearly the object which General Stuart proposed for the campaign. It is clear now that our object must be Poonah, and to re-establish the government of the Peshwah in that city; and we must provide for our subsistence while in that neighbourhood, supposing that the object of our enemy should be to cut off our communication with the source of our supplies, or that, from its length and difficulty, our subsistence should become precarious.

The first point for consideration is the situation for the proposed depôt. It should be somewhere on the coast, within reach of water carriage from Bombay, both that the depôt may be formed without difficulty or great expense, and that it may be in the power of the government of Bombay to provide for its defence with ease, supposing that the enemy should have a design to attack it. It should be at no great distance, and of easy access, from the ghaut leading to Poonah. It should have two gates at least, if not more, all of easy access to cattle; and it should be of such strength as to render it probable that a small body of troops could keep it till reinforcements could be sent from Bombay. I say nothing of the buildings which the fort ought to have, in order to hold the articles which I am about to detail as a list of our probable wants, for I know that temporary buildings can be constructed with great celerity every where, particularly when Bombay can furnish such quantities of materials and workmen.

From this description of the kind of place wanted, and of the situation in which it ought to be, you will be the best judge on what place upon the coast to fix; and you will of course communicate your wishes upon that subject to Lieut. Colonel Close.

The articles of which we shall be principally in want, are food for our Europeans, for our native troops and followers, and for our horses, military stores, medical stores, and money.

First; For the Europeans we ought to have 10,000 gallons of arrack, in kegs of 6 gallons each, well fortified with iron hoops. It will not be possible for you, I should imagine, to procure the number of kegs that will be necessary to hold all this arrack; but the greater the number you can procure the better: that part for which kegs cannot be procured might be sent in casks of 50 or 60 gallons each, for which the General might send his carts, if the state of the roads would permit it; and if not, there will be a proportion of kegs with the army.

For the European troops, 90,000lbs. of salted meat will be required.



also packed in kegs well fortified, 45 lbs. in each keg, besides pickle, &c. ; and the same quantity of biscuits in round baskets, containing 60 lbs. each ; these baskets to be covered with waxed cloth. Slaughter cattle for 3000 Europeans for one month, would likewise be useful ; but these might remain in a situation in which it would be probable they might get some food, and would be attended to till the army should be prepared to send for them.

Secondly ; For the natives, all that we shall require is 600 garces of rice. Each garce contains 4800 pucca seers, each seer 2 lbs.

It would be desirable that encouragement should be given to some of the traders at Bombay to have ready for those of our camp, ghee, turmerick, doll, and other bazaar articles : but in the formation of a depôt of this kind, it is impossible to enumerate these, or for the Government to lay them in.

Salt, however, is an article of necessary consumption, both to the European and the native troops ; and of this article it is desirable that there should be in the depôt 60 garces.

Thirdly ; We shall want military stores only in case we should have fought an action previously to our arrival at Poonah ; but it would be as well that they should be prepared for us : the expense of them is not great, and if we do not want them, they will be available hereafter in the arsenal of Bombay.

Enclosed I have the honor to send an account of the ordnance we shall have with us, for which a quarter equipment ought to be prepared according to the Madras regulations ; or, if that book should not be at Bombay, according to those of the Bombay government.

Fourthly ; In respect to food for our horses, I am afraid that that which they use is not procurable at Bombay, viz., coulthee ; but if coulthee is procurable, there ought to be 150 garces of that grain in the depôt ; if not, an equal quantity of chenna.

Fifthly ; Medical stores—we ought to have 3 months' consumption of these for 3000 Europeans and 15,000 native troops, particularly bark, Madeira wine, mercurial ointment, calomel, and not forgetting nitrous acid.

Sixthly ; In respect to money, I conclude that General Stuart will write to you particularly. I have not the means of estimating our expenses ; but I think you ought to be prepared to send us 16 lacs of rupees.

The next point to which I beg to draw your attention, is the mode of taking care of this depôt, and in which its contents are to be delivered to those whom General Stuart will send for them.

The provision stores for the Europeans will not be very bulky, and not very difficult to be counted and delivered from the charge of one person to that of another ; it will not be necessary therefore to employ many persons in the charge of these stores, and they might be under the superintendance of the person who will have charge of the rice.

It is not probable that the rice will remain any length of time in store, and therefore there does not appear any necessity for its being in bags ; particularly as every head of cattle which will be sent from the army to carry it away will have its bags. It is essentially necessary, however, for the sake of regularity and expedition, that there should be a great number of

conicopolies, measuring men, and servers, attached to this grain, and that it should be stored in buildings in different parts of the fort, all of easy access from the gates. One gentleman should be appointed to superintend this department, that of the provisions for the Europeans, and that of the grain for the horses; for the care, measuring, and delivering of which, the same measures ought to be taken as for the rice.

The medical and military stores ought each to be under charge of an officer of the departments to which they belong, with a proper number of servants for their care and delivery. The treasure might remain at Bombay till the General should call for it.

It has occurred to me, that you may find some difficulty in procuring the large quantity of rice for which I have called as above; but I have provided for this difficulty, and I wish I could do so for all the others in which you may be involved by this call upon your resources. I have written by desire of General Stuart to the collectors in Canara, and have apprised them of the possibility of your wanting a large store of rice; and I have requested them to stop the exportation from that province till they should hear from you whether you would want it or not. If you should want any, they could send you any quantity that you could require; if you should not want it, I beg you to desire your secretary to apprise them of it, in order that they may take off the embargo which I conclude they will lay on in consequence of my request.

G. O.

7th Feb. 1803.

‘Major General Wellesley requests that every man not on public duty may march with his corps in line. There is no occasion whatever for guards among the baggage, and the use of them is positively forbid.’

The sick and convalescents who may be able to walk, but cannot march with their corps, are to move on the reverse flank of the column of march, and those of each corps are to be kept together as much as possible.’

G. O.

9th Feb. 1803.

‘Major General Wellesley requests that orders may be given to the drivers not to allow the draught bullocks to run. The commanding officer of artillery also is requested to give orders to the officers and non-commissioned officers of the artillery detached with brigades, or attached to the park, not to suffer the drivers to allow the bullocks to get into a trot.’

Whether, in consequence of this order, Major General Wellesley shall be able to prevent the cattle from being driven in this manner or not, he positively forbids commanding officers of corps from following the guns beyond the rate at which the troops can march with ease to themselves. The commanding officer of each corps is to lead his battalion at a steady even pace, and the commanding officer of each company his company at the same pace. When the badness of the road or an obstacle may occasion a halt, and a consequent break in the line, the corps or company which may have halted is not to run to regain its distance.

Commanding officers of corps and companies are responsible that this order is strictly attended to, as most essential to their men. They will not be able to bear the fatigue of the marches which they will be required to perform, if they are to be forced to move at a pace at all beyond that at which they can march with ease.’

G. O.

10th Feb. 1803.

‘Commanding officers of native corps will place sentinels over all grain fields, or stacks of grain which may be within or near to their lines, with orders to prevent cattle from grazing on the former, or the followers from carrying away the latter; the attendants on cattle or the followers who may attempt to carry away the grain are to be made prisoners, and sent to head quarters.’

G. O.

16th Feb. 1803.

‘When the cavalry are ordered for the advance, they will always move from their lines in such time as to be in the high road on the marching flank, and ready to move off exactly at assembly beating.’

I believe that I have now adverted to all the points which I had to detail to you; but if I should not have done so, and should recollect any thing further, I am sure that you will excuse my troubling you again upon this subject.

I have omitted in this letter to mention draught and carriage bullocks to you, because General Stuart tells me that he has already drawn your attention to this part of our equipments. I beg leave, however, to call to your recollection the necessity that every carriage bullock with which you will supply the army should have a saddle. I conclude that you will not be able to procure any cattle for hire at Bombay, as we do in this part of India; and that all those with which you will supply us will be in Company's property, and their drivers in the Company's service.

Wheat is not an article for depôt in general; but it is one very necessary for the consumption of the European officers and soldiers of the army, and ought not, if possible, to be left to chance. It would therefore be very desirable that there should be 4 or 5 garces of wheat in the depôt.

It is likewise desirable that the traders of Bombay should be encouraged to have ready to be purchased by the dealers of our camp, sheep, or slaughter cattle.'

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 38.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp at Hoonelly, 3rd March, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose a memorandum and certain other papers, upon the subject on which you have desired my sentiments, of which I hope you will approve.

It may appear extraordinary that it should be necessary that this detachment should be so much stronger than that which is advancing from Hyderabad; but it must be recollected, first; that the latter will not advance beyond the Nizam's frontier, till the former shall be at hand to join it; and that the supposed enemy will be much disinclined to pass that frontier to attack it. Secondly; that this detachment must be not only of sufficient strength to defend itself, but also to give confidence to, and keep together the Peshwah's party in the state.

It is not so strong in the essential points, cavalry and European infantry, as that which I commanded in the country heretofore; but I think it is respectable, and I know it is so well equipped, that it will answer all the objects in view.

If you should take the command of it yourself, I hope you will do me the favor to allow me to accompany you in any capacity whatever. All that is known of that country and its inhabitants, in a military point of view, was learned when I was in it, and I shall do every thing in my power to make myself useful to you. If you should not think proper to take the command of this detachment yourself, and in consideration of the information which I have had opportunities of gaining of that country and its inhabitants, and the communications which I have constantly held with its chiefs, you should be pleased to intrust it to me, I shall be infinitely gratified, and shall do every thing in my power to forward your views.

Although I have in this letter adverted to the command of the detachment



to be sent forward, I am by no means desirous to press you to make known your sentiments upon it till the proper time.'

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO LIEUT. GENERAL STUART.

'It appears now to be intended that a detachment from the army upon the frontier shall enter the Marhatta territory, and that the main body shall remain within the territories of the Company.

Upon this subject several questions are to be considered, upon which I shall enter into detail.

The first of these is the number and description of the troops and equipments that would be required to form a detachment which could with safety be trusted within the Marhatta frontier, until a junction should be formed with the detachment from Hyderabad.

Secondly; the quantity of provisions which this detachment ought to have with it.

Thirdly; the mode according to which this detachment is to subsist in the Marhatta territories.

Fourthly; the situation in which it would be most convenient for the main body of the army to be placed, with a view to the subsistence of the advanced detachment, and giving it support and countenance, and to the general defence of the frontier.

Fifthly; the manner in which the main body of the army is to be fed in this position.

1st. It is my opinion that a detachment, consisting of either the 25th dragoons and the 1st and 4th regts. of cavalry, or the 19th dragoons and the 2nd, 5th, and 7th regts. of cavalry, with the 5 companies of the 33rd regt., another regiment of European infantry, (the 73rd would answer best, as that corps has been in that country before,) 150 artillery, 6 battalions of native infantry, one corps of pioneers, 4 iron 12 pounders, 2 brass 12 pounders, sixteen 6 pounders for the line, and as many guns drawn by horses as could be fitted out, would be, with the Rajah's and Marhatta horse, such a detachment as could be sent with safety into the Marhatta territory. The Seringapatam equipment, having 10 lacs of musket ammunition, would be sufficient for this detachment.

2ndly. It ought to carry with it 2 months' arrack at full allowance; and provisions for 1500 European troops, and 2000 loads of rice in the grain department.

3rdly. The Mysore brinjarries, amounting at present to 26,000, ought to be sent with it, at full. What will remain of the depôt collected at Hurryhur, as well as that at Hullihall, ought to be allotted to it, as well as all the resources which the Mysore country can afford. Besides these, the bullocks attached to the Mysore bazaar will be able to supply the camp with the resources of the country in which the detachment may be situated.

4thly. With a view that this advanced detachment may have the full advantage of the resources of provisions above stated, it would be necessary that the army should move out of Mysore as soon as the arrangements for the advance of the detachment shall be made.

Under present circumstances, the best defensive position which the army could take would be in the Ceded districts on the Toombuddra, in advance

of Bellary, and probably of Anagoondy, with Purneah's army in Mysore, on the Toombuddra, near Hoonelly. They would then be able to move forward to the support of the advanced detachment; they would protect the Ceded districts, if the enemy should attempt to penetrate into those countries, or by a movement to their left, Mysore, if he should attempt to penetrate into that country.

5thly. The army might be fed in this position: first; by the 22,000 brinjaries belonging to the Ceded districts: secondly; by 14,000 brinjaries belonging to the Baramahl, and which are now on their march to join the army: thirdly; by the depôt formed at Bellary, which can be increased to any extent that may be thought proper: and fourthly; by the resources of the Ceded districts. The 5000 loads of rice also, brought up in the grain department from the Carnatic, are not disposed of in this memorandum, and would be applicable to the subsistence of the main body.

The annexed papers will show the detail of every thing excepting money, medicines, and gram, that will be required by the advanced detachment of the strength supposed. I have no means of calculating the two former, and the quantity of the latter to be sent must depend upon the number of horses of which the detachment of cavalry will be composed.'

## 39.

To the Governor General.

Karisgy on the Werdah, 13th March, 1803.

'You will be anxious to hear from me as soon as possible, after I have entered the Marhatta territory, and I lose no time in writing to you.

G. O.

12th March, 1803.

'When there may be any considerable breach in the line, or any accident may have happened likely to occasion one, which obliges a corps to halt, the officer commanding the corps in front of which the breach is, or which may be obliged to halt, will order a drummer to beat the long roll, which is to be repeated by all corps in front of that in front of which there may be a breach, but not by those in the rear. The officer commanding the corps which may have beat the long roll will acquaint the officer commanding the brigade to which he belongs of the cause: when the long roll shall be beat, all the corps in front of that which shall have beat it will halt.

When a corps in front of which there may have been a breach in the column shall be at the distance of 200 yards from that which proceeds it in column, a drummer is to pass the taps, which are to be repeated by all the corps in front in the column, and the whole are to move forward immediately.

As however the cattle with this detachment are good, and it is possible without hurrying either them or the troops (a practice which is again positively forbid) to close up any small interval which may occur without a general halt of the column, Major General Wellesley requests that officers commanding corps will not pass the long roll unless it should be absolutely necessary that the men should halt, to enable their corps to regain their situation.'

G. A. O.

12th March, 1803.

'In consequence of complaints of the rioting of soldiers in the bazaar and villages in the neighbourhood—General Wellesley desires:

1st. That no soldier be allowed to leave his lines unless dressed as a soldier ought to be, with his side arms, excepting to go to bathe, to play at long bullets, or any other game, in front of the lines.

2nd. No soldiers are to be allowed to go into the villages, excepting the dragoons with their foragers, but those dragoons must be dressed in their uniform when on this duty.

Guards of native infantry are sent to each of the regiments of European infantry, to go out with their foragers, purposely that the Europeans may not be sent into the villages on that service.

Commanding officers of regiments are requested to give orders to their regimental sentries upon this subject; and the guards in camp will, in general, have orders to stop all soldiers found out of their lines not properly dressed, who shall be punished for disobedience of orders.'



I crossed the Toombuddra at Havanoor yesterday, and marched to this river, and made another march towards Savanore this day. We have been well received by the inhabitants of the country; the villages are all full, and the camp is well supplied with forage and provisions: I have no doubt whatever but that I shall be able to bring forward, for the service of the Peshwah all the jaghiredars in the southern part of the empire, and I think that all your plans will be carried into execution.

This detachment of the army is well supplied with provisions, and every thing it can want: and excepting in forage, for which every large body of troops must depend upon the country which is to be the seat of its operations, is nearly independent of the resources of this country. We owe this state of our supplies to the flourishing resources of Mysore, and to the ease with which they are brought forward for the use of the British armies. But any change in the system of government in that country will be immediately felt, and particularly by that body of troops which will be in advance.

I draw your attention to this subject, because I have learned from General Stuart that Lord Clive is going to England immediately in the *United Kingdom*; and I suspect that the person who may succeed to him in the government of Fort St. George is not likely to preserve matters in Mysore in the state in which they are at present. It is impossible to suppose otherwise than that, after a residence there for 4 years, I have acquired considerable influence in that country, which has lately been exerted to bring forward its resources for the use of the armies, and will have the effect of keeping this body of troops well supplied; but this influence depends upon my retaining the command in Mysore, of which, I think it probable, that the new Government of Madras will wish to deprive me.

I had an explanation with General Stuart upon this subject some time ago, and he declared that he was determined that I should exercise the command in Mysore, while in advance with the army, which he then imagined that he should lead into the Marhatta territory. When leaving him on the 8th of this month, I spoke to him upon it, and he desired me to make such arrangements as I might think proper, to enable me to exercise the command in Mysore, while in the Marhatta territory. I have submitted to him these arrangements, and he has approved of them; but still I fear the new government of Madras; one of whose objects, I believe, is to overturn the existing system in Mysore, of which I have hitherto been the principal support.

I am willing to resign the command of Mysore as soon as this campaign is over; but I am anxious that this detachment should be in a state of efficiency and well equipped. It can be well supplied only by the resources of Mysore, and I am certain of having the use of them, only by keeping the command in Mysore in my own hands. I wish, therefore, if it should be possible, that the new Government of Fort St. George may be prevented appointing a person to fill my situation in Mysore while I am absent.

I should not have written to you on this subject, as I know that you are unwilling to interfere in matters that concern the subordinate governments, only that the risk of this detachment is great; and that if the change is intended, advantage may be taken of General Stuart's absence from Madras to,



effect it. If he should be consulted, or should have time to give his opinion, I know that he will object to the measure.

Malcolm had not, yesterday, reached General Stuart's camp at Hurryhur.

I hear nothing of any of Holkar's troops, and I do not know that we have an enemy in this country.'

## 40.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp at Kandegy, 16th March, 1803.

'I have the pleasure to inform you that I am getting on as well as I could wish. On account of the want of water on the direct road from Hurryhur to Savanore, I have been obliged to come by a circuitous route, which has detained me longer than I should otherwise have been; but I expect to be at or near Darwar on the 21st or 22nd, at Belgaum on the 27th, and at Meritch on the 5th April. From thence, even if obliged to go by Punderpoor, to join Colonel Stevenson, I shall be at Poonah before the time at which I told you, in my letter of the 1st January, that I thought it probable that General Stuart would arrive there with his army.

My cattle are in good order; I get plenty of forage, and I have little doubt of bringing up my detachment in good style, at least as far as the Kistna. Our cattle afterwards will depend upon the state of the country for forage, of which, particularly in the neighbourhood of Poonah, I have but bad accounts.

I have sent the Peshwah's letters to the sirdars to whom they were addressed, with a short letter from myself, stating that I had entered the country with my army, and was anxious to be joined by them. I also enclosed them a copy of my proclamation on entering the country. To these letters sufficient time has not yet elapsed for me to receive answers; but by the accounts which I have received from Govind Rao of the disposition of all the chiefs in this part of the empire, and from the letters which I have from Goklah, the Putwurdun, and others of inferior note, I have little doubt that all will come forward in the Peshwah's service in this crisis. You shall hear from me as soon as I receive any answers to my letters.

The people of the country have received me well; my communication is perfectly free and secure, and the camp is supplied with all that the country affords. I believe that my passport is the only safe conduct through the country at the present moment. I enclose a copy of my proclamation, also a copy of a memorandum from Appah Saheb, and one from Goklah, with my answers. You will have observed in my instructions, that General Stuart has desired me not to attempt to take Darwar. I think that place of great importance in a military point of view; but as this expedition of mine partakes as much of politics as of military operations, I am of opinion that it is best I should not meddle with Darwar; particularly as in case of accident, or if the killadar should misbehave, or attempt to use the means given him by the position of his fort to annoy my communication with Mysore, General Stuart will be at hand to take his fort from him. I observe that the copy of the letter from the Peshwah to Ball Kischen Gungurdhur which I have got does not contain the orders to deliver the fort to the British commander. They may, however, be in the sealed letters which I have sent to that chief.

The fort of Darwar gives such a hold of this country, that the possession of it by us, in any manner, would create great jealousy of our views in the minds of all the chiefs; but it would do this particularly if we were to take possession without communication with Ball Kischen Gungurdhur, who is I do not know where, and without the Peshwah's orders to him to deliver it.

Govind Rao has communicated with Bappojee Scindiah, who said he heard that we intended to attack his fort; that if we wanted it, we had only to ask for it, and that he would withdraw with his family, and deliver possession of it. Govind Rao says also that the garrison is very weak and ill paid. I look upon it, however, to be not so certain that Bappojee Scindiah will deliver the fort, when asked for it: if it is asked for and refused, it must be attacked; and then force commences, which the Governor General deprecates, and from which he has ordered us to desist as long as possible. If, along with this, we consider that the possession of the fort, in whatever manner it is obtained, will create jealousy, and that, in consequence of General Stuart's position upon the frontier, it is not absolutely necessary, even in a military point of view, there appears every reason for my refraining from interfering with it at all.

Ram Rao, our agent at Darwar, wrote me word that Bappojee Scindiah was much alarmed in consequence of the report that we intended to attack his fort: upon receiving this letter, I desired Ram Rao to tell him that I had no instructions to attack his fort, and that I did not intend to molest any body that did not interfere with me. I, at the same time, hinted that the Peshwah's orders must be obeyed; and I did this, lest it should be necessary hereafter for any body of British troops to attack this fort, in order to put the Peshwah's officer in possession of it. I propose now to proceed in regard to Darwar as follows: I shall send Govind Rao to Bappojee Scindiah tomorrow, to tell him that I am marching near his fort, and that I have no intention to interfere with it; that I require from him an engagement of fidelity to the Peshwah, and an assurance that he will not interfere with my communications.

I shall desire Govind Rao to hint to him that we have orders to put Gungurdhur in possession of the fort, with which I doubt not he is acquainted already, and that General Stuart is at hand to carry into execution that measure, if I should receive any thing from the fort of Darwar but assistance. I shall also instruct Govind Rao not to make a direct proposition of it, but to urge him to satisfy me of his intentions by sending his son to my camp. I am nearly indifferent whether he sends him or not, as I know that his fears of General Stuart, and his hopes of future favor, will be more likely to keep him in order than any thing else; but to have his son in my camp will have a good appearance.

The Peshwah will not be pleased that the fort is not taken possession of immediately for Gungurdhur; but he must recollect that that chief is not

G. O.

17th March, 1803.

'On marching days officers commanding corps will report their arrival in writing to the officer in command of the brigade, within one hour after the line comes to its ground: should any men be absent, they shall be confined as soon as they come up, and reported through the Adjutant of the corps to which they belong to the Brigade Major.'



upon the spot, and not to be found at present. You shall hear the result of this negotiation at Darwar.

I omitted to mention that I intend to desire Bappojee Scindiah to desist from annoying the Rajah of Kittoor, from whom I shall receive the greatest assistance in grain, &c., while in his neighbourhood.

## 41.

To the Governor General.

Poonah, 21st April, 1803.

‘Supposing, therefore, that you should be blamed for adopting a course of measures in which there is a distant risk that you may have a contest with the Marhatta powers, you have the satisfaction of reflecting, that in consequence of those measures, the scene of action must be at a distance from the Company’s territories; and that you are in such a state of preparation as to insure its speedy success: at all events, it is probable that, if you had not adopted those measures, either the Company or their ally must have suffered all the evils of war, without having the same means of averting them, or limiting their duration.

In all great actions there is risk, which the little minds of those who will form their judgment of your’s will readily perceive in that which I am now considering; but their remarks ought not to give you a moment’s uneasiness; and I have in this letter made you acquainted with a fact which must silence every objection to your measures, and which I shall take care to send, in an official form, through the channel which I believe to be the source of the croaking which I hear.’

## 42.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803.

‘In respect to that letter in which you have copied an extract from one which you have received from the Resident, I have to observe, that whatever may be the Resident’s private opinion, it would be as well that he should refrain from a communication of it. The fact is—here I am at Poonah, unopposed, and in strength; and the Resident knows, or ought to know, that those chiefs, who are supposed to intend to combine against us, have not yet made peace, and cannot have settled any plan of operations. It is true that, as we have taken into our hands the bone for which they have been contending for some years, not one of them is very well pleased, and each gives out that the whole will combine against us. But there are many considerations which must be maturely weighed, by at least two of the parties, Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, before they will venture upon a war with the English; particularly when we are prepared, and they are not.

It may be asked, why they give out that they intend to combine? I answer, because they know that some of us are, like other men, to be frightened by their threats; that, particularly, they have their effect at the Nizam’s durbar, in which they are daily brought forward; and for this reason it is that our Resident at that durbar, instead of listening to the fears of that court, and propagating them, ought, above all other men, to inculcate the improbability of this combination; or its certain failure, if it should ever be attempted.’



## 43.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp at Panowullah, 7th May, 1803.

‘ For many reasons, but principally because it will save time, and will contribute much to our military reputation in this country, I should prefer to attack this fort without breaching its walls: but I must observe that those attacks are not certain in their issue, unless they can be made at more than one point at the same time; and unless you can cover the advance of the troops for the assault by a heavy fire of musketry on the defences, and if possible by an enfilade of the part attacked.

You will keep these observations in your recollection, in coming to a determination upon the mode in which you will attack the place; but if the ground should be at all favorable, you have such a fine body of European troops, that I have no doubt but that they will take the place by escalade.’

## 44.

To Lord Hobart.

Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803.

‘ In consequence of orders from his Excellency the Governor General, of which I enclose a copy, I transmit to your Lordship an account of the proceedings of the British troops under my command to this date.

You will have heard from the Government that I was detached in the month of March from the army assembled on the frontiers of Mysore, with about 9000 men, to effect a junction with the Company’s troops subsidised by the Nizam, and his Highness’ army assembled on the western frontier; and then to proceed to Poonah, in order to assist in the restoration of the Peshwah to the exercise of the power of his government. I marched nearly 600 miles through the territories of the Marhattas, not only unopposed by them, but receiving all the assistance which their country could afford. As the country, however, through which I marched since I crossed the river Kistna, had been the scene of the horrid depredations of Jeswunt Rao Holkar’s troops, I could not draw much from it.

I was joined on my march by several of the jaghiredars in the southern districts, principally those who served with the British troops under my command in 1800, and by the Peshwah’s officers who had quitted his Highness, by his desire, when he fled from Mhar, after the defeat of his army by Jeswhunt Rao Holkar, in the neighbourhood of Poonah. At length I formed a junction with the subsidiary force and the Nizam’s army, to the northward of Punderpoor, on the 15th April.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar quitted Poonah in the end of March, and went towards Chandore, a fortress in his possession to the northward of the river Godavery. His detachments, which had been as far to the southward as the neighbourhood of Meritch and that of Beejapoor, fell back as I advanced, and at length went off to the northward when I formed the junction with the Nizam’s army. I was thus enabled to make a disposition of the troops which would provide for the security of the Nizam’s frontier, and for that of the march of the Peshwah from Bassein to his capital.

Accordingly, having reinforced the subsidiary force by a regiment of European infantry, I broke up immediately again, and moved upon Poonah with my own division and the Marhattas, where I arrived on the 20th April, and I left the Nizam’s troops upon his Highness’ frontier.

From thence, in the neighbourhood of Gardoon, our line extended to the western ghauts, and the troops could subsist with ease, and could assemble at any point at a short notice. After I had made this disposition, I learned that Jeswunt Rao Holkar had entered the Nizam's territories in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad; that he had surrounded that city with his troops, and had demanded large sums of money from the inhabitants.

The Peshwah was not arrived at Poonah; but as he was attended by a detachment of the Bombay army, consisting of the 78th regt., 5 companies of the 84th, and a battalion of native infantry, with artillery, under Colonel Murray, there was every appearance that his march to his capital would be uninterrupted.

On the 28th April I ordered Colonel Stevenson, the commanding officer of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, to move to the northward with that force and the Nizam's army. I expected that Jeswunt Rao Holkar, whom I apprised of these orders, would draw off, as soon as he should find that Colonel Stevenson was approaching him, and he has done so. Colonel Stevenson is now posted upon the river Seenah, about 50 miles to the northward of Gardoon; from which place he can protect the Nizam's frontier as far as Aurungabad, or he can move towards Hyderabad, or can join with my division, as may appear advisable.

The Peshwah arrived at Chinchore, about 8 miles from Poonah, on the 7th instant, and his Highness proposes to make his entry into his capital on the 13th instant. By that time the detachment from the Bombay army under Colonel Murray will have got possession of the fort of Carnallah, in the Konkan, the killadar of which refused to deliver the fort to his Highness the Peshwah; and I shall then move towards the frontier of the Nizam.

It is impossible to obey the orders conveyed in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the enclosed copy of a letter from his Excellency the Governor General, for reasons connected with certain political events which have occurred since the probable date of his Excellency's dispatches to your Lordship. At that period the Governor General must have received the accounts from the Resident in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; from which there was every reason to believe, from his own declarations, that that prince was satisfied in his own mind that the treaty of Bassein contained no stipulations injurious to his interests, and that he would not endeavor to prevent the parties from carrying it into execution.

But by dispatches written to the Governor General by the Resident with Scindiah, on the 25th April and the 1st and 2nd instant, copies of which I have perused, it appears that the disposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Nizam is not so friendly as might have been expected, and that that prince intended to march from Burhampoor on the 4th instant. I am doubtful of the direction of his march; but it is reported that he intends to approach the Nizam's frontier to meet there the Rajah of Berar.

Your Lordship will observe that I have already taken measures for the defence of the territories of his Highness the Nizam; and that I propose to march to that quarter with my own division, as soon as the Peshwah shall have entered Poonah; leaving at that city such a detachment of the Bombay troops as may be deemed sufficient for the protection of his Highness' person.



These measures, as they must preclude all hopes of forming an establishment within the Nizam's frontier, or of any very lucrative plunder, in the short space of time between this and the period at which the rivers will fill, that rise in the western ghauts, may probably prevent the supposed march into the Nizam's territories. At all events, it is my opinion that neither Dowlut Rao Scindiah, nor the Rajah of Berar, nor Jeswunt Rao Holkar will venture to remain within our reach, where their operations will be confined by the rivers. Therefore the invasion of the Nizam's territories, if it should be made, will be confined to his frontiers.

Upon the whole, considering the slight hopes of advantage which these chiefs can have in this invasion, and the certain loss to which two of them at least must be liable, from a state of hostility with the British Government, with which your Lordship must be well acquainted, I cannot believe that they will venture upon a course of measures so hopeless; and it is probable that the reports of the march of the Rajah of Berar, and of the direction of the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Nizam's territories, have been circulated with a view to intimidate the Peshwah and the Nizam. But until the views of these princes are decided, it is impossible to recommend that the army in this quarter should be broken up. In the mean time, the Peshwah's government is settling fast; and his Highness appears to be decided to adhere to the treaty with the Company, and to forward all the objects of the alliance.

If, contrary to my expectations, the northern chiefs should be determined upon hostilities with the British Government, the military position which we have obtained by the treaty of Bassein, and by the rapid march of the division under my command, and the advanced state of our military preparations, affords means of protecting the territories of the Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

It is unfortunate that the territories of the Nizam should have suffered by the irruption of a freebooter at Aurungabad, and that they should be threatened again by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. But scarcely a year has passed in which his Highness has not suffered or apprehended a similar misfortune; and there is no doubt but that he must have suffered in a greater degree in this year, if the treaty of Bassein has not been concluded.

The certain consequences of the establishment of the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar at Poonah must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territory, if only for the subsistence of the troops. It would not have been possible to draw subsistence for those numerous bodies of horse, for another year, from the countries between the Godavery and the Kistna, through which I have marched; and they must have sought for it either in the Nizam's territories or in the countries to the southward of the Kistna. In either case the Nizam's territories would have been invaded; and in the latter those of the Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

Although it is by no means certain that endeavors will be made by any of the Marhatta chiefs to interrupt the execution of the treaty of Bassein; yet as appearances are doubtful, and the reports which are in circulation may reach your Lordship, I have thought it proper to avail myself of the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, to make you acquainted with the real state of the public affairs in this quarter; and with the means



which we have of resisting this interruption, and of defending the Company's ally, the Nizam.'

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## 45.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Poonah, 26th May, 1803.

'Captain Mackay is an honest and zealous servant of the public, and he conducts his own important department in such a manner as always to have the cattle under his charge in a most efficient state for work; but he is the most unaccommodating public officer that I have met with. He has never failed to contrive to quarrel with the head of every other department with which he has been concerned; and I have always had the greatest difficulty in keeping matters between him and others in such a state, as that the service should not be impeded by their disputes.

I imagine that the difficulties between Captain Mackay and Major Symons, to which you have alluded, are to be attributed to the state of Captain Mackay's temper; and possibly, in some degree, to a want of accommodation on the part of Major Symons. I make no doubt but that you will have observed that this officer also, although an excellent man, has more of the oak than the willow in his disposition.'

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## 46.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp, 26th May, 1803.

'I have received your letter, and I am concerned that you did not speak to me upon the subject to which it relates, when I apprised you of the arrangements of which you now complain. It appears, however, that your complaint is not grounded upon your being left here in command of the troops, but upon the composition of the detachment to be under your command, and upon the state of uncertainty in which you are, respecting your prospect of commanding the corps to be stationed here in future.

In regard to the detachment to be left here, I intend that it shall be composed of those troops; and that it shall have such equipments as will enable it to perform the service which I expect will be required from it: and in forming this detachment, as well as the division which will march from hence under my command, I have exercised a discretion for which I am aware that I am responsible to my superiors. But I do not see any necessity for altering these arrangements; and I should certainly deem it very improper to alter them, only that I might have an opportunity of gratifying the private feelings of the officer whom I should leave in command here, by giving him a better description of troops than I think will be required for the service.

In general, I imagine that it is not intended by the Commander in Chief that an officer shall keep his leave of absence in his pocket, in order to avail himself of it at any moment that he may think proper, however inconvenient to the service. But I am aware that there is no use in detaining an officer in an employment to which he has a dislike; and therefore you will avail yourself of your leave when you may think proper; only I request you to give me timely notice of your intention.'

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47.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp, 30th May, 1803.

'In Major Symons' letter of the 8th May, he calls for an additional voucher of the payments made in this department, which was not ordered by the Military Auditor General. This voucher may be a very necessary one, and it may be very proper to introduce it into the department: but it must be introduced by an order from superior authority; and at all events, I believe that every day's experience of the service shows that the business of every department of the army has become so complicated from the multiplicity and variety of checks and vouchers, that it is scarcely possible to carry on the duties of any one department exactly in the mode pointed out by the regulations. It is therefore better not to increase these vouchers in a department, which has constantly proved itself to be more efficient than any other in the service.

From a perusal of these papers, I am convinced that if these gentlemen chose to accommodate, the business would be very well carried on, without giving you further trouble; but, at all events, it must be carried on according to your orders.

As it appears by the papers which I have enclosed, that Captain Mackay wished that Major Symons should carry on the duties of the gun bullock department in any manner he might think proper, and as I was partly the cause of this error respecting the mode of settling the accounts of the hired bullocks, I did not inform him that it was your intention to dismiss him from his office. But he has since desired leave to resign it.

I have refused to allow him leave to resign it: because if you should still think proper that he should be punished, I do not wish that he should evade that punishment by resigning the office, by which means he would certainly avoid the disgrace that would attend his dismissal.'

48.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

'It ought, however, to be a lesson to us to beware not to involve ourselves in engagements either with, or in concert with, or on behalf of people who have no faith, or no principle of honor or of honesty, or such as usually among us guide the conduct of gentlemen, unless duly and formally authorised by our government.'

49.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Poonah, 2nd June, 1803.

'If the owners of the hired cattle cannot be prevailed upon to agree to go farther than Poonah, of course they must not be forced to do so; but the only mode of inducing them, by degrees, to agree to a proposition which I consider as beneficial to the troops under my command, will be to hire them

G. O.

1st June, 1803.

'A field hospital will be established at Poonah previous to the march of the detachment. Mr. Gilmour will settle with the regimental surgeon, &c., the men who must be left in the hospital, and he will have the clothing and medicines required for them ready to be delivered over to the surgeon, who shall be left in charge.

Commanding officers of corps will have all the accounts of their sick settled, and the requisite rolls and certificates ready to be delivered over with them at the shortest notice.'



by the month, to accustom them to regular payments and strict justice, which ought to prevail in all the Company's transactions with the natives of this country. Accordingly, to stop their pay if they delay unreasonably on the road; and then they will find it more advantageous for them to work their cattle in the upper country between Poonah and the army, than in the lower between Panwell and Poonah; as in the former they will be less exposed to the violence of the rains.'

## 50.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp at Angah, 18th June, 1803.

'If the garrison should refuse to give up the fort on any grounds, you must attack it, and get possession of it by force; but I request you to give strict orders that the place may not be plundered, and that no disorder may be committed by our troops who may be employed on this service.'

## 51.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp at Rony, 19th June, 1803.

'I have experienced these difficulties before, and have surmounted them; and I shall surmount those which we at present feel, if I can get any assistance from Poonah; or if the Peshwah will only send a man to take charge of the government of the country; or will give the smallest sign of our being friends, and here upon his business and with his knowledge and consent. Under existing arrangements, there is no government in the country; the heads of villages do as they please: I can find nobody to communicate with, and, of course, cannot command its resources.'

G. O.

Camp at Poonah, 3rd June, 1803.

'The detachment to march tomorrow by the left, baggage on the left; the *general* to beat at 4 and the assembly at 5 o'clock; the cavalry to form the advance, followed by the new piquets; the park and the wheel carriages, and the provision department, to follow the line; the piquets now on duty to form the rear guard. The 78th regt. is to be in the 4th brigade.

While rice continues at the high price which it bears at present in the bazaar at Poonah, Colonel Murray is authorised to issue to each native officer, noncommissioned officer, drummer, fifer, and rank and file, one half of a pucca seer, *per diem, gratis*, and in this allowance gun lascars are included, but not store lascars. When rice shall fall in price, Colonel Murray is ordered to apprise Major General Wellesley thereof, and he shall then receive further orders.

In consequence of the representation made to the Commander in Chief of the great scarcity of green grass, and the dearness of dry hay upon the arrival of the troops at Poonah, his Excellency has been pleased to give his consent to a charge being made, upon honor, for the extra forage purchased for the troop horses when the corps were under those circumstances of difficulty, which is not to exceed a fanam and a half for each horse daily.

The forage purchased on the 20th and 21st April has been already paid for; that purchased from the 22nd to the 28th April, inclusive, shall now be paid for according to the principle above stated. After the 28th, as the followers of the army generally procure forage without difficulty, the grass cutters of the army ought to have provided what was requisite for the horses. Officers commanding troops to make out an account, to be countersigned by commanding officers of regiments, and it is then to be paid by the general agent cavalry supplies.'

G. O.

13th June, 1803.

'The detachment will halt tomorrow. The field officer of the day will be pleased to post men of the companies of native infantry on piquet in the rear of the encampment every evening. The companies will encamp on the principal roads or commanding grounds, and detach small guards so as to cover the whole rear; they are to prevent any person or persons from coming into or going out of camp during the night without the parole and countersign, unless they may be known to belong to camp, or are bringing letters.

The advance piquet to cover the front, and the standard and quarter guards of corps on the right and left of the flanks of the encampment in the same manner.'



I do not know how the Peshwah manages his concerns; but we have not yet had the smallest assistance from Poonah of any kind. Notwithstanding my repeated requisitions to Colonel Close, and his request to the government, none of the sirdars have joined us, and as late as the 16th, had not quitted Poonah.

The Peshwah's servants are very profuse in promises, but very sparing in performance; and we have enjoyed so little of the resources of the country, which it is so obviously the advantage of the inhabitants to supply us, that I am almost induced to suspect counteraction on the part of the government. I shall be convinced of it, if the Peshwah omits much longer to write to Scindiah, of which I apprised you of the intention, but he has not yet written. If there are not now counteractions on the part of the Peshwah, certainly his government must be the weakest, and his people the most extraordinary existing in India. It is his interest that this force should be enabled to keep the field; and that of his people to sell those of the resources of the country which are to enable us to do it. Yet we cannot get them; and I think it very probable that I shall be obliged to cross the Beemah to be able to subsist upon the stores which I have collected at Poonah.

I have written to all quarters for assistance in cattle, and I am doing every thing I can in this country. I have also inquired of Colonel Stevenson, whether he can afford to share with me his supplies of rice. I shall struggle hard to avoid this movement; but I think it proper to apprise you of the possibility of it, and of the circumstances which may occasion it.

The troops are healthy, notwithstanding the rain to which they have been exposed, and the cavalry horses are in good order; but our great difficulty at the present moment is, to find grain for them: there is plenty in the country, but it is all hid in holes; and, notwithstanding the price we pay, we get none that we do not dig up; in short, we should be better off in an enemy's country, and so I have told Colonel Close.'

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52.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 20th June, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 18th, with the memorandum enclosed, and I agree almost entirely in the opinions which you have given.

Till the question with the confederacy is decided, we must stick to our ground in this country, otherwise the Nizam, and we, eventually, must suffer; and even supposing that by withdrawing now, we could stop the hostilities, which I doubt, we should only defer them to a period at which, probably, we should be less prepared than we are at the present moment. But as soon as there shall be no threats of the confederacy, either by the withdrawing of Scindiah, or from the success of the war, it is my opinion that we ought either entirely to new model the alliance, or to withdraw from it. You are well acquainted with my opinions on this subject.

The greater experience I gain of Marhatta affairs, the more convinced I am that we have been mistaken entirely regarding the constitution of the Marhatta empire. In fact, the Peshwah never has had exclusive power in the state: it is true, that all treaties have been negotiated under his authority, and have been concluded in his name; but the chiefs of the empire have consented to them; and the want of this consent on the part of any

one of them in this case, or of power in the head of the empire, independent of these chiefs, is the difficulty of this case at the present moment. I put out of the question the consent of the Putwurduns, Goklah, &c., because I have always considered, and it must appear to every body to be one which proceeds from causes entirely independent of the treaty, and of the circumstances which occasioned it, and of the Peshwah himself. These chiefs act under the treaty, because they had a previous acquaintance with us; and because they saw some prospect of being relieved from their difficulties by our interference, and of becoming in some degree independent under our protection. Had it not been for this hope, not one of them would have been with us, and we should have had a treaty with a cipher, bearing the name of Peshwah, without a particle of power.

Whatever may be the result of the present crisis, we shall gain nothing by the treaty. Scindiah, Holkar, the Rajah of Berar, and possibly others, will be separate and independent powers in India, very probably leagued for the present in a defensive alliance. We must look to that, and must not reduce our military establishments.

Is the peace of India secured? I doubt it, as far as we are concerned. Supposing there should be no war with the confederates, the first consequence of the alliance must be, to re-establish the government of the Peshwah in the northern countries, then to settle the Kolapoor question, &c.; and supposing that we have another war with the French, there is no doubt but that we shall have a war with the Marhattas.

One bad consequence of these subsidiary treaties is, that they entirely annihilate the military power of the governments which we contract with them; and their reliance for their defence is exclusively upon us.

This treaty with the Peshwah has certainly given us a good military position; but the question is whether, in case the nation should be involved in a war with the French, which, in my opinion, is the hypothesis upon which all Indian politics should turn, the military position is so good, that it cannot be forced; and whether we do not lose more by the risk of having all the powerful Marhattas against us, at such a time, than we should gain by having the Peshwah certainly on our side, and by the goodness of our military position.

Upon this point, I have to observe, that the more I see of the Marhattas, the more convinced I am that they never could have any alliance with the French. The French, on their arrival, would want equipments, which would cost money, or money to procure them; and there is not a Marhatta in the whole country, from the Peshwah down to the lowest horseman, who has a shilling, or who would not require assistance from them.

In what manner then ought the alliance to be modelled? In my opinion, we ought to withdraw from Poonah, and leave some chance that the principal chiefs may have the power of the state in their hands; we ought to keep up our connexion with the Peshwah, so as that he might not be trampled upon; at the same time, we ought to increase our influence over the chiefs of the empire, in order that it may preponderate in all possible cases in which the state should be called upon to decide. In short, I would preserve the existence of the state; and guide its actions by the weight of British influence, rather than annihilate it, and establish new powers in India by the subsidiary treaty.



In this consideration of the subject, I have not touched upon the disinclination of the Peshwah to the alliance, of which I have scarcely a doubt, and, at all events, upon his inability to perform the conditions to which he has bound himself. But he has not even performed those conditions which must be in his power. Has he not now daily communications with Scindiah's durbar, and even with Holkar, of which the British Resident has no knowledge whatever? His very letter to Scindiah, which has been extorted from him, almost by force, contains a breach of treaty. In it, he desires that Chief to remain where he is, pointedly; whereas, he knows that the requisition of the Governor General, and the only event which can secure peace, is Scindiah's re-crossing the Nerbudda.'

53.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp, 21st June, 1803.

'I have no objection to your march to Roshungaum. From the account I have given you above of the state of affairs, you see that there is no chance of your being opposed or attacked by the whole confederacy; and I look upon you to be fully equal to any part, particularly considering the superior state of your cattle and equipments compared with theirs. You must, however, confine yourself to the defensive, till I can come to your support. By defensive, I do not mean that you should wait in any particular place till you shall be attacked, but that you should attack any party that may come within the Nizam's territories and your reach. I mean only that you should not commence an operation which may take you to a great distance from Aurungabad, or from me, before I can cross the Godavery and give you support.

Till we have really a war, you must be cautious also regarding the places said to belong to the Nizam. His territories, and those of the Marhattas, are much intermixed; nay, some districts are the joint property of both powers. That very place Badowly belongs partly to the Nizam, and partly to a Marhatta. Oomrawooty and Mulcapoor are in the same state. But, notwithstanding that this state of these countries is acknowledged by the Nizam's durbar, his officers would willingly seize them, and probably occasion in this manner a war which it may yet be possible to avoid.'

54.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp, 23rd June, 1803.

'If I return across the Beemah, I shall subsist; and if I can keep alive my cattle, I have no doubt but that I should fit myself out again, and soon be in a situation to act with vigor. But a retrograde movement is always bad in this country; and it may be attended by the worst consequences in the present situation of our affairs.

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But it is useless to search for proofs of the Peshwah's dissimulation to us, or of his unwillingness to come forward to our assistance in a contest in which we are likely to be involved from our interference in his favor. We must look for a remedy for these evils; and I acknowledge that I see none that are not of a nature more violent than are likely to be adopted.

The difficulties, however, in which this corps is likely to be involved, will be an useful lesson to governments and to us all: first, to avoid entering into a treaty with a prince, the only principle of whose character that is known is insincerity; and next, to avoid, if possible, to enter upon a campaign at the distance of 700 miles from our own resources; not only not



having the government of the country on our side, but, in the shape of a friend, our worst enemy.'

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 55.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp, 25th June, 1803.

'I cannot but feel that if we are to have a war under these circumstances, it will be one much more complicated than that expected to be the result of the course of action pointed out by the Governor General's instructions; but one to which our resources are, I trust, fully equal. It is a duty, however, that we owe to our country to avoid it if we can, with honor; and I should hope that, if timely measures are taken, it might be avoided.'

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 56.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp, 26th June, 1803.

'I am getting a few bullocks, and have many means employed to procure more. I think that I am now in a better state than I was a few days ago, and I hope to be able to hold my position.

You will observe by my letter of the 23rd, that I am fully aware of the necessity of strengthening Colonel Stevenson, if I should be obliged to draw off. Indeed, that measure is obviously so necessary, that I considered of the propriety of joining Colonel Stevenson myself with the whole corps; but the objection to that measure was the danger of increasing his consumption, so far as to distress him for provisions, at the moment when we might be called upon to act. The detachments which you propose to add to him, you will observe are nearly equal in strength, and will consume nearly as much as the whole of this body of troops: and as they would not have with them the excellent bazaars and means that I have of drawing subsistence from any country in which it can be found, they would fall still more upon Colonel Stevenson's regular modes of supply for their consumption, and probably would distress him more than even the whole of this body of troops would.

It is true, that you propose that further supplies should be brought forward from Hyderabad: but I have to observe, from the account I have received from Colonel Stevenson of the state of his supplies, that it is necessary that further measures should be taken for his subsistence without the smallest loss of time, even supposing that he should not be reinforced: and I strongly suspect, that when he comes to count bags as I have done, he will find the quantity of rice to be much smaller than he imagined it.

Another objection to reinforcing Colonel Stevenson at all, and that applies still more strongly to sending the large detachment from this corps which you have proposed, is the risk that, in consequence thereof, this corps may never be of sufficient strength, or so composed as to be able to march forward from Poonah; supposing that there should be a war. We should then be obliged to have recourse to one of two measures: to turn Colonel Stevenson's attention to protecting and forming a junction with his corps; or, to break up General Stuart's army to make this corps so strong as to be again independent. Considering the call for Goa, the probability of the arrival of the French troops at Pondicherry, and the prospect of the renewal

of the French war, the question is, would that be prudent? Would General Stuart consent to that measure?

We must certainly keep Colonel Stevenson in such strength as to insure his safety in his advanced position; but in deciding upon the degree of strength I must give him, and the nature of the troops I must send him, I must consider the circumstances above alluded to: the strength of the enemy, their present state, their probable future state, and their immediate designs. However, as I told you before, my prospects have improved so much within these last two days, that I have strong hopes that I shall be able to retain my position; and if any of my modes of procuring bullocks succeed, I shall entirely recover.'

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57.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp, 28th June, 1803.

'Your situation is a most delicate one, and therefore I particularly caution you. It will be our duty to carry on the war with activity, when it shall begin; but it is equally so to avoid hostilities, if we possibly can; and by no means to take any step which can occasion them, or give a pretence for Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar to commence them.'

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58.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp, 3rd July, 1803.

'In exercising the power given to me by Government, in regard to the subsidiary force at Poonah, I shall consider it a duty, and it certainly is my inclination, to select those officers for the situations which are to be filled, who may be agreeable to you. The gentleman you now have recommended to me is one, for whom I have a respect, and in whose advancement and welfare I am materially interested; as he has been frequently recommended to me in the strongest terms by his relation General Mackenzie, a very old friend of mine.

But both you and I, my dear Colonel, must attend to claims of a superior nature to those brought forward, either in consequence of our private feelings of friendship or of recommendation. Of this nature are the claims founded upon service.

Mr. Gilmour, the staff Surgeon with this division of the army, quitted a situation of emolument at Seringapatam, in order to take the field with the troops, when it was determined that the detachment should march to Poonah under my command, and when Mr. Anderson joined the head quarters. Mr. Gilmour was selected to be at the head of the medical department of that detachment, and his allowances were, by order of the Commander in Chief, fixed on the same scale with those of the Staff Surgeon with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam. Since that time, Mr. Gilmour has done all the duty of the Staff Surgeon greatly to my satisfaction and the general good; and when the subsidiary force comes to be established at Poonah, I think that I could not disappoint the expectation which he has had a right to form, that he should be its permanent Staff Surgeon, without doing him great injustice, and, in his person, violating a principle which ought always to guide those who have the disposal of military patronage, viz.,



that those who do the duty of the army ought to be promoted, and also ought to enjoy its benefits and advantages.'

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59.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp, 4th July, 1803.

' I certainly do not expect much benefit from the pontoons in this campaign, for many reasons; but I consider a bridge to be a very necessary part of the equipment of a corps stationed on this frontier, the operations of which, as connected with other corps, are so liable to be cramped during a great part of the year by rivers not fordable: therefore, though I may not have the use of the bridge, it is very proper that it should be brought up, that we should examine it and its equipments, in how far they are calculated to answer the purpose intended, and how the equipments, carriages, &c., can be improved. This can be only done in the rainy season; and persons, who have been in the habit of seeing carriages moved in all situations, must be considered the most competent judges on these points, and I must employ some of those in my camp to examine this equipment. Therefore, although I am not in a hurry about the bridge under present circumstances, I should not like to forego all prospect of getting it up; excepting that the coolies employed in that work may be employed in bringing up rice, which, after all, I think I shall not be able to move away.'

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60.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp, 7th July, 1803.

' I regret most exceedingly the necessity of your abandoning the excellent position which you had taken at Moodgul. It was that which gave us all strength and security, and provided effectually for the tranquillity of Hyderabad and the Nizam's territories, notwithstanding the absence of the army and the expectation of the Nizam's death; and also for that of Poonah and the Marhatta territories, notwithstanding the weakness and the wavering conduct of the Peshwah. It threatened Meritch, by which the Putwurdun family and all the southern chiefs are kept at least in a state of neutrality; and it provided effectually for the security and tranquillity of the territories of the Company and the Rajah of Mysore.

All these benefits, which are not attributed entirely, as they ought to be, to your position, will be lost when you shall recross the Toombuddra; and then, if we should have a war, our situation in this country will be uncomfortable. I should still hope, however, that Government will take this subject into their consideration, and will allot something like a corps of reserve for the security of the objects for which your commanding position at Moodgul has hitherto so well provided.'

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61.

To Lieut. Colonel Collins.

Camp, 14th July, 1803.

' But it may be asked, for what reason should these chiefs endeavor to deceive the British Government, if their intentions are hostile? To this I answer, that their measures are not prepared; they have not yet brought Holkar into them; the British troops are prepared for action, and they are not; some valuable points in Scindiah's territories are exposed to the attacks



of the British troops; and the British territories, and those of their allies, are defended at present at all points.

By the delay of the commencement of hostilities, they hope to have matters better prepared; the rivers will fall, and Scindiah will have it in his power to make better arrangements for the defence of his territories; and, on the other hand, those belonging to the Company and their allies will lose the protection which all the forces give them at the present moment. Therefore I conclude that the advantage of delay is theirs; that they have made their pacific declarations in order to gain time; and that their real intentions are to be known only from their actions.

If there had been no hostile declarations from Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, common prudence would have prevented us from viewing with indifference the assembly of their armies upon the Nizam's frontier, and the British Government must have insisted upon their withdrawing. Pacific declarations would not, in that case, have been deemed sufficient security for the Nizam; nor can they in that at present under consideration, particularly as I have above pointed out the great advantages which those chiefs will derive from the delay to commence hostilities.

I am therefore decidedly of opinion, that if the Rajah of Berar does not withdraw to Nagpoor, and if Scindiah does not remove his army to stations usually occupied by his troops, north of the river Nerbudda, their intentions must be considered hostile, and we ought to take advantage of our position to attack them without loss of time. Accordingly, I have written a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I enclose, together with a translation of it.'

## 62.

To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Camp, 14th July, 1803.

'But if unfortunately I should have learnt that, after the receipt of this letter, you have advanced towards the territories of the Nizam, or if I find that you do not commence the march of your troops towards their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, I must consider your intentions to be hostile, notwithstanding your professions, as there can be no use in keeping your armies in the country, excepting for the purposes of hostility; and I shall immediately carry on those operations against you which are in my power, in consequence of the advantageous position of the Company's armies.'

## 63.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp at Sangwee, 17th July, 1803.

'I have not fixed when he should withdraw: First, because I wish to keep in my own breast the period at which hostilities shall be commenced; by which advantage it becomes more probable that I shall strike the first blow, if I should find hostile operations to be necessary.'

## 64.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp, 18th July, 1803.

'The troops serving in the territories of the Guickwar are included among those placed under my command; and I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give directions that I may receive from Bombay returns of the strength and state of the equipment of those forces. their

present distribution, an account of the state of defence of the posts which they occupy, and the names of the officers who command them.

I am also desirous of having a sketch of the territories of the Guickwar, which it is intended that the troops should defend; and any general topographical account of the country from which I may be able to form a judgment respecting its great communications, as well with the sea coast as with the territories of the Holkar family, of Scindiah, &c., and with those lately ceded to the Company by the Peshwah. With the assistance of these documents, I hope to be able to form a system for the defence of those territories which will tend to their security. It is accordingly desirable that the officer in command in the Company's territories should communicate with me, and with the officer in command in the territories of the Guickwar.'

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65.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp, 20th July, 1803.

'What has passed in Guzerat is disgusting to a degree. The English name is disgraced, and the worst of it is, that endeavors are made to conceal the disgrace, under an hypocritical cant about humanity: and those feelings which are brought forward so repeatedly respecting the garrison of Parneira, are entirely forgotten in respect to the unfortunate British soldiers of the 75th and 84th regts., who, unlike the gentlemen submitting to be humbugged by a parcel of blackguards, are suffering in the rains.'

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66.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 24th July, 1803.

'The chiefs of the Marhatta empire have been accustomed to look at a confederacy of the greater powers among them as a force which nothing could withstand. They recollect its success against the British Government in former times, and they anticipate the same success in the expected contest. They do not compare the strength of the British Government at this time with its former weakness; nor do they consider the difficulties under which the British Government labored at the time of the former contest; nor do they compare their own strength at that time with their weakness at the present moment.

The southern Chiefs, and all those connected with Amrut Rao, wish well to the British Government, and see clearly that the only chance of security they have, is in the establishment of the power of the Peshwah under British protection. But they dread the power of the confederated Chiefs, and fear to venture into the contest, till they shall see which side is likely to be successful. The first success in the contest will bring those forward who may not be rebels to the Peshwah's government; and will preserve Amrut Rao and his adherents in a state of neutrality, till they can make terms for themselves.

But if the confederates should withdraw, the southern Chiefs will be convinced that the northern Chiefs have no confidence in their own strength, opposed to the British Government; and in case of any future contest, they will not be unwilling to come forward in the support of a power to which

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G. O.

23rd July, 1803.

'Major General Wellesley directs that it may be particularly explained to all corps that men sent as safeguards to villages are not entitled to demand or receive any thing whatever as a reward for their trouble, or as batta.'



they will attribute many of the advantages which they might enjoy. The Peshwah's government, also, as it will have more strength, will have more power to enforce obedience to its orders than it has at the present moment; and they will be more fearful of the consequences of disobedience. The confederates are well aware of this wavering disposition of the southern Chiefs, and it is a strong inducement to them to go to war.'

67.

To General Lake.

Camp at Sangwee, 29th July, 1803.

'My plan of operations, in case of hostilities, is to attack Ahmednuggur with my own corps, by the possession of which place I shall secure the communication with Poonah and Bombay, and keep the Nizam's army upon the defensive upon his Highness' frontier. When I shall have finished that operation, and have crossed the Godavery, I shall then, if possible, bring the enemy to action.'

68.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp, 30th July, 1803.

'I have again to return you my thanks for your great kindness and attention to me in the arrangement which you propose to make, in case I should find it necessary to make a requisition upon General Campbell: but, at all events, I am convinced that the General and I shall carry on the service together with the harmony which you would wish; and I shall certainly pay him every attention in my power. I conclude, however, that you intend that I should continue to keep you regularly informed of every thing that occurs here, although you have moved into the Carnatic.'

69.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Roore, on the Seenah, 31st July, 1803.

'9. If you should be of opinion that he is not under my command, I beg leave to recommend to you to have an inquiry into his conduct.

10. I advert to this circumstance particularly, because it has been reported in a manner very disadvantageous to the credit and honor of the British arms in this country; and I considered it of so much importance, that I took the trouble of tracing the report to its source, and was on the point of bringing to trial the officer who had reported, as I supposed, without foundation, so disgraceful an occurrence.'

70.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp at Walkee, 2nd August, 1803.

'Lieut. ———'s letter is a curious production; and I beg that you will do

G. O.

30th July, 1803.

'Inlying piquets of the infantry to mount at sunset this evening, and in future at the same time as the quarter guards mount, consisting of a company of each regiment and battalion, under the command of a subaltern officer. A captain of the day to mount in each brigade of infantry, who will have the immediate command of the inlying piquets of his brigade, under the orders of the field officer of the day. He will make himself acquainted with the particular situation of the company of each corps on this duty.

The officer commanding the companies will turn them out frequently during the day and night, to see that they are at all times present and accoutred. The captain of the day in each brigade will do the same at least once during his tour of duty, and the field officer of the day is requested to inspect them. A brigade of 6 pounders, with its compliment of artillery men, gun lascars, and bullocks, to be held in readiness in the park to join the inlying piquets when called for by the field officer of the day.

Major General Wellesley requests that the followers of the camp may not be sent near to Ahmednuggur for forage.'



me the favor to inform him, that for reasons which I thought valid, but which I do not think it necessary to communicate to him, I thought it proper to bring the prisoners, Hurry Sing and Hurry Rao, to trial for the crime of desertion only; and that, in future, I beg that he will do me the favor to confine his attention to his own business, and leave my duty to be done by myself and the officers appointed to assist me.'

## 71.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Walkee, 2nd August, 1803.

' 15. In all parts of India, particularly in those territories which have belonged to the Marhattas, there is a numerous class of people, whose only occupation and only mode of procuring subsistence has been the military service. This class is usually entirely deprived of subsistence by the transfer of the government of those countries to the Company; and they are driven to seek for it either in rebellion at those moments when the British troops are engaged in foreign wars, or in the armies of our enemies: these they are ready to lead into our districts, with all the knowledge derived from long residence and service within them, and they become in fact our most dangerous enemies.

16. The employment of these people, therefore, at such time as sebandy is advantageous, not only as it saves the regular troops, and gives a larger body of troops for field service, and prevents the loss of their discipline, but because it lessens the number of idle and discontented at the time of general invasion and confusion, and that of our most dangerous enemies.

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34. I cannot conclude this letter without requesting that you will urge the gentlemen at Surat to keep on terms with the Bheels: these appear to be a race of the same description with those who inhabit the hills in all parts of India. By conciliation, and refraining from an interference with their concerns, they will prove our best friends, and a contrary line of conduct will make them our worst enemies: it must not be expected that we should involve ourselves in the affairs of these Bheels, or press them for tribute.

The number of troops I have above detailed will be sufficient for the protection of the valuable territory of which you have got possession: they will not be sufficient for the subjection even of one of their rajahs; and from what I have seen of the service in other parts of India, I have no hesitation in declaring my opinion, that, as a measure of economy, it would be better to give up all claims of tribute that the Company might have upon any of these rajahs, than to receive it at the risk of the expense of being obliged to enforce its payment at some future day.'

## 72.

To Ramchunder Pursheram.

3rd August, 1803.

' But that consideration is trifling in comparison with the evils which your interests must sustain from a breach of the solemn promises you have made to me. A performance of these would insure to you, at all times, the powerful protection of the Company's Government: your interests would

G. O.

Camp at Walkee, 2nd Aug. 1803.

' Major General Wellesley requests that the officers will not ride out much beyond the piquets in the direction of Ahmednuggur, as their going near the fort or pettah may be disagreeable to the killadar, and they may meet with interruption from his men stationed in the intermediate villages.'

always be considered as their own, and as their friend in this state, you must have risen to the honors which your ancestors enjoyed. But the crooked policy which you appear disposed to adopt must preclude all hope of those advantages; and, on the other hand, you are much mistaken if you suppose that it can lead to your advantage, under any contingency.

Therefore for your own sake, I most anxiously entreat you to review your situation; to consider well your own interests and future prospects; and adopt at once a decided line of conduct and join this army.

I write to you as a friend who knows your interests well, and also has an anxious desire to see your affairs prosper.'

## 73.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp, 5th August, 1803.

'The constitution and customs of two governments cannot be more different than those of Poonah and Hyderabad are; and they differ materially in the circumstances which ought to guide our decision upon this question.

In the Nizam's durbar the minister has all the power; and it must be a matter of indifference to us what passes in the interior, provided the result of the exercise of that power is favorable to our views. The minister is pensioned to produce that result; and the Nizam has been told that that pension is the sum which the minister would have received from the southern districts, if they had not been ceded to the Company.

The Nizam also, it is to be supposed, is so well satisfied with the administration of the government by his minister, and with the tranquillity which he enjoys, that entertains no jealousy on account of the receipt of this pension.

But how is it with the Peshwah? He has no minister; no person has influence over him, and he is only guided by his own caprices. He cannot be paid in order that he may conduct his government according to our views; and it would be useless to pay his ministers for that object, because they can render no corresponding service. But although they cannot conduct him and his government, they can let you know in what manner he conducts it, and for that they ought to be paid. That for which they ought to be paid, is for making you acquainted with every thing that passes that comes to their knowledge; in order that you may have an opportunity of forming a judgment whether the Peshwah adheres to the alliance or not, and of checking him by remonstrances, if his actions should tend to a breach of its stipulations. But, if they are to be paid with his knowledge, it is obvious that he will keep secret from them all that he wishes you should not know; and that he will in fact have two sets of ministers, one set to deceive the British Resident, and another to conduct the real business of his government.

Upon the whole, I am convinced that it is absolutely necessary that you should have an accurate knowledge of all that passes in the Peshwah's durbar; that it is not possible that you should have that knowledge without paying for it; that you will not obtain it if you pay for it with the consent of the Peshwah; and that you ought forthwith to pay Ragonaut Rao.

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If you should send this letter to the Governor General, I recommend that it should be by a private channel, as the subject to which it relates is not a very proper one to meet the public eye, however necessary it may be to consider it.'



## 74.

To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

6th August, 1803.

' You will recollect that the British Government did not threaten to commence hostilities against you, but you threatened to commence hostilities against the British Government and its allies; and when called upon to explain your intentions, you declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war; and, in conformity with your threats, and your declared doubts, you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to the Nizam's frontier.

On this ground I called upon you to withdraw that army to its usual stations, if your subsequent pacific declarations were sincere; but, instead of complying with this reasonable requisition, you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against your designs, and that you and the Rajah of Berar should be suffered to remain with your troops assembled, in readiness to take advantage of their absence.

This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible, and you must stand the consequences of the measures which I find myself obliged to adopt, in order to repel your aggressions.

I offered you peace on terms of equality, and honorable to all parties: you have chosen war, and are responsible for all consequences.'

## 75.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 12th August, 1803.

' The weather cleared up so much on the 7th instant, as to allow me to march to this place on the 8th. I had in the morning dispatched a messenger to the killadar of Ahmednuggur, to require him to surrender his fort; and, on my arrival in the neighbourhood of the pettah, I offered cowle to the inhabitants. This was refused, as the pettah was held by a body of

G. O.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 9th Aug. 1803.

' The outlying piquets to return to their companies at sunset this evening; they are to be discontinued till further orders.

Quarter guards of corps to be moved well forward, and the rear guards to be placed in the rear of the camp, so as to protect the rear entirely.

The inlying piquets to continue as usual. Captain Noble will pay 3 single fanams for every cannon ball brought to him at the park.'

G. O.

12th Aug. 1803.

' Major General Wellesley congratulates the troops upon the result of the operations carried on against the fort of Ahmednuggur. His thanks are particularly due to the troops who made the brisk and gallant attack upon the city on the 8th instant; to Lieut. Colonels Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, commanding brigades, Captain Beauman of the artillery, Captain Johnson of the engineers, and Captain Heitland of the pioneers.

A Royal salute to be fired immediately upon the occasion of taking possession of the fort of Ahmednuggur, and upon the receipt of this order, in all the garrisons and detachments of troops under the command of Major General Wellesley in the territories of the Company, the Rajah of Mysore, his Highness the Nizam, and the Marhattas.

(A committee of 3 artillery officers ordered to survey and fix a valuation on all the ordnance and military stores in the fort and city.)

(Another to survey and value the grain and provisions.)

(The engineers to survey and report upon the buildings.)

One of the terms on which the killadar capitulated was, that he and his garrison should have their private property. Major General Wellesley is convinced that there is no good soldier in this detachment who would infringe this capitulation, and he is determined that it shall not be infringed, and that he will punish with the utmost severity any person that may be found plundering in the fort of Ahmednuggur.'



Arabs, who were supported by a battalion of Scindiah's regular infantry, and a body of horse encamped in an open space between the pettah and the fort.

I immediately attacked the pettah with the piquets of the infantry, reinforced by the flank companies of the 78th regt., under the command of Lieut. Colonel Harness; in another place with the 74th regt. and 1st batt. 8th, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Wallace; and in a third with the flank companies of the 74th, and the 1st batt. 3rd regt., under the command of Captain Vesey. The pettah wall was very lofty, and defended by towers, and had no rampart; so that, when the troops had ascended to the attack, they had no ground on which they could stand; and the Arabs who occupied the towers defended their posts with the utmost obstinacy.

At length they were obliged to quit the wall, and fled to the houses, from which they continued a destructive fire upon the troops. Scindiah's regular infantry also attacked our troops after they had entered the pettah. In a short time, however, after a brisk and gallant contest, we were completely masters of it; but with the loss of some brave officers and soldiers, as your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return. The enemy's loss was, from the nature of the contest, necessarily much greater than ours; and on the night of the 8th, all that part of their force which was not required for the defence of the fort, went off to the northward; including all the Arabs who survived the contest in the pettah, excepting a small number who attended one of their wounded chiefs, who could not be removed farther than the fort.

On the 9th I reconnoitred the ground in the neighbourhood of the fort; and on that evening Lieut. Colonel Wallace, with 5 companies of the 74th regt. and the 2nd batt. 12th. regt., seized a position within 400 yards of it; on which, in the course of that night, a battery was constructed for 4 guns, to take off the defences on the side of which I proposed to make my attack. This opened at daylight on the 10th; and it was so advantageously placed, and fired with such effect, as to induce the killadar to desire that I should cease firing, in order that he might send a person to treat for his surrender. In my answer I told him, that I should not cease firing till I should have taken the fort, or he should have surrendered it; but that I would listen to whatever he was desirous to communicate. Yesterday morning he sent out two vakeels to propose to surrender the fort, on condition that he should be allowed to depart with his garrison, and that he should have his private property.

Although I consented to this proposal, it was 5 in the evening before the hostages arrived in camp, without whose presence I refused to stop the fire from the British batteries. According to his engagement, however, the killadar marched out of the fort this morning, with a garrison consisting of 1400 men, and the troops under my command took possession of it.

In this manner has this fort fallen into our hands: our loss since the 8th has been trifling, which I attribute much to the spirit with which our attacks on that day were carried on.

I have to draw your Excellency's notice towards the conduct of the troops particularly on that occasion, and towards Lieut. Colonels Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, who commanded in the trenches, Captain Beauman, com-

manding the artillery, Captain Johnson of the engineers, and Captain Heitland of the pioneers, in the short subsequent siege.

Your Excellency must be well acquainted with the advantageous situation of the fort of Ahmednuggur on the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, covering Poonah, and as an important point of support to all our future operations to the northward. It is considered in this country as one of the strongest forts; and, excepting Vellore, in the Carnatic, is the strongest country fort that I have seen. It is in excellent repair, excepting in the part exposed to the fire of the British troops.

I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency an account of the ordnance, stores, and grain which it contains.

I propose to cross the Godavery immediately, and I shall in a future dispatch lay before your Excellency the measures which I have in contemplation for getting Scindiah's possessions south of that river, depending upon Ahmednuggur, and for securing their resources for the use of British troops.'

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76.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 13th August, 1803.

' 4. The service cannot be carried on in this manner; the troops must have regular supplies of provisions at command, or misfortune and disgrace will be the result.'

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77.

To Lieut. Colonel Collins.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 15th August, 1803.

' The Marhattas have long boasted that they would carry on a predatory war against us: they will find that mode of warfare not very practicable at the present moment. At all events, supposing that they can carry their design into execution, unless they find the British officers and soldiers to be in the same corrupted, enervated state in which their predecessors found the Mussulman in the last century, they cannot expect much success from it. A system of predatory war must have some foundation in strength of some kind or other. But when the Chiefs avow that they cannot meet us in the field; when they are obliged to send the principal strength of their armies, upon which the remainder depend, to a distance, lest it should fall into our hands, they must have little knowledge of human nature if they suppose that their lighter bodies will act; and still less of the British officers, if they imagine that, with impunity, they can do the smallest injury, provided only that the allies, who are to be first exposed to their attacks, are true to their own interests.'

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78.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th August, 1803.

' We must get the upper hand, and if once we have that, we shall keep it with ease, and shall certainly succeed. But if we begin by a long defensive warfare, and go looking after convoys which are scattered over the face of the earth, and do not attack briskly, we shall soon be in distress.'

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79.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug. 1803.

' In my opinion, the best thing you can do is, to move forward yourself



with the Company's cavalry, and all the Nizam's, and a battalion, and dash at the first party that comes into your neighbourhood. You will either cut them up or drive them off; and in either case, you will provide more effectually for the security of your convoys, than by detaching your troops to bring them in. Keep the infantry collected in a central situation, and let all your supplies collect upon them.

If you adopt this plan, and succeed in cutting up, or in driving to a distance, one good party, the campaign will be our own. A long defensive war will ruin us, and will answer no purpose whatever. By any other plan than that above proposed, we shall lose our supplies, do what we will. The cavalry will reach the river this day. I shall march with the infantry to-morrow; and shall be at Toka before they will have crossed, and with you a few days afterwards.'

## 80.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp, 19th Aug. 1803.

'But as far as I am concerned, I do not conceive that I want more troops. I only wish that those in Guzerat were complete in numbers, that the army there was properly organised, well equipped, and supplied with provisions in a regular manner from certain sources; and I should feel very easy, not only regarding the fate of that province, but the result of the war itself.

Under these circumstances, I can give no opinion respecting the proposed alteration, particularly as the Governor General has positively ordered that the Bombay army should not be increased; and indeed, after all, I do not conceive that the army would gain much in point of numbers by the alteration of the Fencible battalion into a regular one. What we want in Guzerat is organization, equipment, and regular sources of supplies. If we should be able to arrange that, and Holkar should enter into the war, I shall lay that corps upon the back of Indore and Ougein, in such a manner as probably will induce the gentry to turn their thoughts to the defence of their own territories, instead of the annoyance of ours.'

## 81.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp north of the Godavery, 26th Aug. 1803.

'Major Walker's intelligence is much exaggerated, much of it false, and

G. O.

24th Aug. 1803.

'Major General Wellesley has observed several instances of a delay, and in some cases an entire omission to obey orders, from their not being communicated to those whom they concern. In future the following regulations are to be attended to:—

1st. All the orders given out are to be entered in the regimental orderly books, and the commanding officer of every regiment, battalion, or detachment, is responsible that they are made known to the officers and men under his command.

2nd. When a pass order is sent round, the receipt of it is to be signed by the Brigade Major on the back of the order. It is to be communicated immediately by the Brigade Majors to those concerned, who are to sign a receipt for it; and afterwards, as soon as possible, to all the corps in the brigade. The Adjutants, when they receive it, are likewise to sign receipts for it.

3rd. There must be in each brigade an Adjutant of the day, and when the Brigade Major has occasion to quit his tent, he must leave there an orderly to take all orders, reports, &c. to the Adjutant of the day of the brigade, whose duty it will be to sign receipts for the orders, and to circulate them as above directed.

4th. In like manner the orderly officer in each corps must do the duty of the Adjutant when he may be absent from his lines. When an order is received, there must be no delay in obeying it, and for this the commanding officers of corps are responsible.'



in many instances contradictory. He knows that well, and argues frequently against the probability of the story which he transmits to Bombay. Yet he continues to send out these same hircarrahs, and it does not appear that they are punished for bringing false intelligence, or rewarded for telling the truth. I shall give Colonel Murray a hint upon the subject of the nature of this intelligence.'

## 82.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp, 29th Aug. 1803.

'3. It appeared to me, from your letter of the 12th, that you approved of that plan; and you desired that I would recommend Colonel Murray for the situation which I proposed he should fill, if you should adopt it; but I learn, by your letter of the 23rd, that you disapprove of it, and you lay it upon my responsibility to carry it into execution.

4. I certainly am ready, and willing, to be responsible for any measure which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the public service. But the measures in question are of a general nature, and have been recommended as being applicable to our military situation in the Attavesy and Guzerat. You, who must have a better knowledge of the local circumstances of those districts, are of opinion that they are not, and you object to them in principle as well as in detail. I should be presumptuous, indeed, if, after such an opinion, I were to persist in ordering the adoption of these measures, and I should well deserve to incur the severest responsibility for any misfortune that might happen.

5. At the same time I have to observe to you, that the communication between me and the troops in those provinces is necessarily very long; that circumstances may render it longer, and may prevent it entirely; and therefore I request that you will be so kind as to desire the military authorities in Guzerat and Attavesy to act for the public service, without any reference to me.

6. In case the circumstances of the war should hereafter enable me to approach nearer those provinces, I shall apprise the authorities there of the manner in which I may be of opinion that they can co-operate with me in forwarding the public service.'

## 83.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp at Aurungabad, 29th Aug. 1803.

'It is my decided opinion that Guzerat, and even Surat itself, cannot be

G. O.

Bulgaum, 30th Aug. 1803.

'It may be necessary for Major General Wellesley to order the cavalry, and the 2nd batt. 12th regt. of native infantry, and 100 pioneers, in advance; and, therefore, till further orders, the following arrangements to be made daily for the march:—

1st. Each of the troopers of the native cavalry, and each dragoon, will carry with him one day's feed of chinna or jowarry.

2nd. The gram agent general, or the quarter masters of regiments, will have as many bullocks laden with half loads of chinna and jowarry as may be empty.

3rd. Two arrack carts, each drawn by 6 of the best bullocks, are to follow the cavalry.

4th. The tents of the dragoons are to be carried on the camels attached to the 78th regt., 2 on each camel; those of the 78th regt. on the elephants and on bullocks.

5th. General Wellesley's hircarrahs camels are to be laden, each with 4 casks of salt provisions for the use of the dragoons, and Captain Young will prepare 20 bullocks with half loads of rice. A conicopoly must attend this provision.

saved, unless there is an efficient military organization of the troops in those districts,—unless there is one general authority to control the whole and combine the movements of all the troops to one object,—and unless regular and substantial means of supply are established. Mr. Duncan talks highly of the merits of the committee of Surat, because they have taken possession of a province ceded to them by treaty without opposition. I hope he will allow equal merit to my peons, who have taken possession of all Scindiah's and Ragojee Bhoonslah's territories south of, and bordering on, the Godavery.

After having objected to my plan, in principle as well as in detail, he has called upon me to order its adoption, and has thrown upon me all the responsibility for its consequences. I am not afraid of responsibility, God knows! and I am ready to incur any personal risk for the public service; but, under such circumstances, I should be mad if I were to order this plan to be carried into execution. I have therefore requested Mr. Duncan to desire the public authorities in Guzerat and Attavesy to act as they may think best for the public service, without reference to me; and I propose not to have any thing to do with the troops in those provinces.

I am concerned that you should have been disappointed, particularly after having gone from Poonah, to which situation you will probably wish to return. But I am convinced you will agree in opinion with me that, under all the circumstances of this case, I could not order the execution of my plans; and that, at this distance from the scene of action, and under the difficulties of the communication, I could not pretend to conduct so disjointed a piece of machinery as the military duties at Guzerat and the Attavesy.'

I have no objection to your seeing all the correspondence upon this subject if you can; and if you do not see it at Bombay, I will take an opportunity of showing it to you, but it is very voluminous, and too troublesome to copy in these busy times.'

## 84.

To Major Shawe.

Camp near Unterwarry, 31st Aug. 1803.

'I am sorry to tell you that I have been obliged to relinquish the command in Guzerat. After Mr. Duncan had acquiesced in my plan for the

6th. The officers of the cavalry, and those of the 2nd batt. 12th regt., are to make their arrangements to move out from the line as lightly equipped as possible, in case Major General Wellesley should find an opportunity of ordering it with advantage. In such an event only one half of the tents of the dragoons, all the doolies, excepting such as contain sick men—the provision and arrack above ordered, grain in half loads, the guns and tumbrils of the 2nd batt. 12th regt., and spare ammunition will be the only public stores to accompany the detachment.

7th. Accordingly, the public stores above mentioned, and such a proportion of tents for the native troops as commanding officers of corps may think proper; and such private baggage as the officers of the cavalry, and of the 2nd batt. 12th regt. may choose to take with them (and which it is very desirable should be as little as possible), and the horse keepers and grass cutters of the cavalry, and such parts of the regimental bazaars of the cavalry as commanding officers may think will be useful, will move in advance with the baggage flag of the cavalry, which is blue.

8th. Officers and heads of departments will be very particular in giving orders that the other baggage may keep with the baggage flag of either of the brigades of infantry.'



organization of the troops, and the system to be adopted for the defence of those territories, he has written to me to say that acquiescence is not approbation; and he had objected to the principle, as well as to the detail, of the measures which I had recommended. But he says that, if I choose to be responsible for the consequences, they shall be carried into execution. I do not exactly see the distinction between the acquiescence in, and approbation of, a system for the defence of the provinces under his government by a governor.

I should have no objection to taking upon myself to be answerable for any measures that I have recommended, provided I was certain that they would be carried into execution. But I know that these would be impeded; and I should doubly incur blame when I should not deserve it: first, on account of the failure of a system not properly carried into execution; and secondly, for persisting in ordering the adoption of that system, when I knew that it was contrary to the sentiments and inclinations of the Governor. I have therefore thought it best to request Mr. Duncan to desire the military authorities in Guzerat and the Attavey to act as they might think best for the public service, without reference to me; and I have had less scruple in taking this step, because, at this distance from the scene of action, and under all the difficulties of the communications, I am entirely incapable of directing the operations of a piece of machinery so disjointed as the separate commands of the Committee of Surat and the Resident at Baroda.

I should send you all the papers upon this subject, only that they are very voluminous; and I know that the Governor General will receive a letter from Mr. Duncan, with numerous accompaniments regarding it.'

G. O.

Camp, 1st Sept. 1803.

The detachment, with the exception of the 2nd batt. 11th regt., with its guns, and the details hereafter specified, to march to-morrow morning by the right (the remainder as usual).

Lieut. Colonel Chalmers will take up a position on this ground of encampment to-morrow morning, which Captain Johnson will point out to him, with the 2nd batt. 18th regt., 100 pioneers, a proportion of ordnance and artillery, respecting which Captain Beauman will receive instructions.

The military stores and store department, respecting which Captain Noble will receive instructions.

A proportion of the grain and provision department, respecting which Captain Young will receive instructions.

A proportion of the grain department, respecting which Lieut. Monteith will receive instructions; and all the baggage, followers, and bazaars.

Half the number of tents usually allowed to European troops will accompany the detachment on the march, and one tent per troop or company for each native corps.

The remainder of the tents to be left here, in charge of the convalescents of the corps to which they belong.

Captain Mackay (agent for public cattle) will take care to arrange that there may be a carriage left behind for the tents belonging to the European troops. The sick, convalescents, and weakly men, are to be left behind, and doolies for those men who require them to be moved, and a surgeon from each brigade to take care of the sick; the remainder of the doolies to accompany the troops.

Officers are requested to take with them as little baggage and as few tents as possible.

A quarter master serjeant from each brigade, and a non-commissioned officer, to remain in charge of the baggage of each corps. The line serjeant to remain in charge of the camp equipage and baggage of head quarters.

Those quarter master serjeants and non-commissioned officers must have a note from their commanding officers to Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, to point them out to that officer, whose orders they must obey in every particular.

Carriage must be left for every thing that stays behind, as it is possible the baggage may be ordered to march, and that the troops may not return to it.

Each



To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 6th September, 1803.

‘As I have before me such active operations you will be glad to hear that I never was in such marching trim. I marched the other day 23 miles in 7½ hours; and all our marches are now made at the rate of 3 miles an hour.

You will have seen by my letter to Mr. Duncan, that I have relinquished the command in Guzerat. Mr. Duncan *acquiesced* in my arrangement, and although he stated some objections to it in his private letters, I concluded that he *approved* of it; for it never occurred to me that it was possible for a Governor to *acquiesce* in a proposed system of military operations, for the defence of provinces under his government, of which he did not *approve*. However, he afterwards informed me that he did not approve of my propositions, and he entered into detailed arguments against the principle, as well as the execution of them; but he told me that I might order that they might be carried into execution if I should think proper. Without flying in his face, and being guilty of the greatest presumption, I could not give such orders; and at this distance from Guzerat, and with such imper-

Each man who marches to have about him 60 rounds of musket ammunition, for the deficiency of which officers commanding corps will send indents this day. They are to be complied with, without waiting for Major General Wellesley's signature.

The forage guard for European corps, and for the park and provision departments, are struck off.

The 2nd batt. 18th regt. must send a havildar's guard to the park; 1 naig and 4 sepoy to the grain agent, and 1 naig and 4 sepoy to the Provost, at *general* beating tomorrow morning, to relieve the guards with those departments, which will immediately join their corps, and Lieut. Colonel Chalmers will allot such guards for them afterwards as he may think necessary.

Captain Noble is authorised to increase his establishment, as assistant commissary of stores, to the proportion allowed for 40 pieces of ordnance.'

G. A. O.

1st Sept. 1803.

‘The whole detachment will march tomorrow by the right in the usual order.

200 pioneers to be sent in at daybreak to destroy the redoubts constructed for the battalion intended to have remained, and 2 companies of the 1st batt. 3rd regt. to be left to cover those pioneers: the whole to follow the line as soon as the work is performed.’

G. O.

Camp, 6th Sept. 1803.

‘Major General Wellesley requests that gentlemen will refrain from shooting on the line of march, or in the neighbourhood of the camp, till further orders.’

G. A. O.

6th Sept. 1803.

‘It may be necessary to march with a part of the troops during the night. In which case a long roll will be beat at the Dep. Adj. General's tent (without any previous taps), which must be passed by the orderly drummers of the Brigade Majors and Adjutants. In one hour afterwards, another long roll will beat, which must be passed as above, when all the corps will be paraded, and must wait the orders to move.

The camp is to be struck, and the baggage, &c., laden, between the drums, and to be ready to move to a place which will be occupied by two battalions for its defence.

Corps are to move without tents, and no baggage, excepting what each soldier carries for himself, and 4 casks of arrack and biscuit for the Europeans, sent on by the commissary. Cavalry to carry 1 day's feed of grain.

Each corps will have its proportion of guns, tumbrils, and spare ammunition; and Captain Noble will send 100 bullock loads of spare ammunition on the best bullocks in the camp. Doolies, except such as are occupied by sick men, to accompany corps.

Two corps will be named on the parade for the protection of the camp, &c. Their details now on picket will join them. The details of the other corps will form a rear guard. The new pickets and pioneers will parade in front of the park immediately after the first long roll, whence the details which march will be sent to the marching flank.

One half of the pioneers will remain behind to fortify the camp tomorrow.

fect, and so long communication, I could not take upon me to conduct a machine so complicated and disjointed as the military commands of the Committee of Surat, and the Resident of Baroda, and I therefore resigned the whole concern. I was much annoyed, for several reasons, at finding myself obliged to take this step; but I found that to keep the command would have involved me in constant hot water, would have taken my attention away from other objects here, and would have answered no good public end whatever.'

## 86.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp at Kurcah, 8th Sept. 1803.

'It is impossible for troops to be in better order than those under my command. My marches are made at the rate of 3 miles an hour; and a few days ago I marched  $22\frac{1}{2}$  miles in  $7\frac{1}{2}$  hours; and I want only to be joined by Major Hill's and Lieut. Griffiths' companies.'

Mem.

7th Sept.,  $\frac{1}{4}$  past 4 A.M.

The beats of the drum for the usual march are deferred for some time. The detachment to remain in readiness.

Mem.

Halt.'

 $\frac{1}{4}$  past 6 A.M.

G. O.

Camp at Kurcah, 8th Sept. 1803.

'As it may be necessary at times to move at a very short notice, and, at all events, it is necessary to prevent the enemy from having intelligence of the intended marches of this division, the following arrangements are to be made:—

1. The intention, whether to march or to halt, will never be announced in the orders of the day.

2. The piquets of the infantry are at all times to parade at *reveill e* beating in front of the park.

3. All departments which require any preparations to be made, previous to the beating of the *general*, on a marching day are to make them every morning at such hour as they may think necessary: in case of a halt, notice will be sent to such departments.

4. If there should be a march, the *general* will be beat at half past 4, and the assembly at half past 5. The piquets will, in that case, parade as soon as possible in front of the park. Notice will be sent to them, and to the officers commanding brigades of cavalry and infantry, to inform them by which flank the troops will march.

5. If there should be a halt, early notice will be given thereof in a pass order.

6. It may at times be necessary to march suddenly, either in the day or night without baggage—and it may not be possible, or may be improper, to give notice thereof to the troops, &c. In such a case, the long roll will be beat, when preparations are to be made as ordered for the march on the night of the 6th instant; and in an hour and a half afterwards another long roll, when the troops are to be prepared to march off.

The following orders to be observed by the inlying piquets, whenever there is an alarm in camp:—

1. The inlying piquets, as well of cavalry as of infantry, are to turn out.

2. When the inlying piquets are turned out upon the occasion of an alarm, the remainder of troops are to commence to get in readiness, viz.: the cavalry to saddle their horses, and the infantry to put on their clothes and accoutrements—and the whole to be in readiness to fall into their ranks at a moment's notice.'

G. O.

9th Sept. 1803.

'It appears from the evidence produced at the above Court Martial that some soldiers purchased the arrack from the conicopoly. The troops well understand that if the native servants employed about the arrack are tempted to sell part of it, they will certainly endeavor to make up the deficiency in the quantity by putting water in the casks and adulterate the liquor: and in such case the troops are not to expect that the liquor so adulterated will be allowed to be condemned or thrown away: on the contrary, the quantity that ought to be in store by the commissary's books shall be served out.

Mem.

11th Sept. 1803.

As it appears that some of the enemy's pindarries are in the neighbourhood, Major General Wellesley desires that cattle may not be sent far out to graze.'



## 87.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp, 14th Sept. 1803.

‘ I have long observed that the subjects which have come under the consideration of General Courts Martial in this country are in general referrible to private quarrels and differences, with which the public have no concern whatever. The character of the officers of the army is undoubtedly a public concern ; but in many instances it would be much more proper and more creditable for both parties to settle these differences by mutual concession, than to take up the time of the public by making them the subject of investigation before a General Court Martial.

This period appears to me to be one in which it is probable that the exertions and abilities of every officer in the army will be required for the protection of the rights and interests of their country ; and I cannot think it will be the most proper time to take up the attention of officers with the investigation and discussion of subjects which have been submitted to, and have been decided upon, by a General Court Martial, or for the gratification of any private pique.

If these gentlemen should insist upon being brought to trial, you will be so kind as to send them away from the detachment in the field, and from Surat, Baroda, or any other garrison or post which may be liable to be attacked by the enemy ; and they are to remain at the place at which you will order them, till it shall suit the public convenience to assemble a General Court Martial for their trial.’

## 88.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp, 16th Sept. 1803.

‘ These Courts Martial are distressing indeed at present. I wrote you a long letter upon the subject the other day, and I shall not repeat now what I said then. We must endeavor to stop these trifling disputes, and turn the attention of the officers of the army to public matters, rather than to their private concerns.

It occurs to me that there is much party in the army in your quarter ; this must be put an end to. And there is only one mode of effecting this, and that is for the Commanding Officer to be of no side excepting that of the public ; to employ indiscriminately those who can best serve the public, be they who they may, or in whatever service. The consequence will be that the service will go on ; all parties will join in forwarding it, and in respecting him ; there will be an end to their petty disputes about trifles ; and the Commanding Officer will be at the head of an army instead of a party.’

G. A. O.

Heedgaom, 12th Sept. 1803.

‘ Until further orders, a company of native infantry, under an European officer, to go out every day with the public elephants and camels for forage. When the drum has beat indicating a halt, the company to proceed to the elephant karkhana at daylight ; and on marching days it is to proceed thither one hour after coming to the new ground. A sepoy with his musket is to be mounted on every elephant. When the agent for public cattle finds that he can forage within the camp, he will send notice in writing to the corps detailed to furnish the company, which on such occasions need not proceed to the karkhana.’

G. O.

Heedgaom, 14th Sept. 1803.

‘ As the long roll has been made a general signal from head quarters, it is recommended to those corps who use it as a regimental beat to discontinue it regimentally during the present service.’



To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

Camp, 20 miles N. of the Godavery, 17th Sept. 1803.

‘ I have not written to you since I was at Poonah, in the month of May, because, in fact, till I took Ahmednuggur in the last month, I had nothing to tell you at all deserving your attention. As you will see the Governor General’s dispatches, it is useless to enter much into detail of the course of events which ended in Colonel Collins’s withdrawing from Scindiah’s camp in the beginning of August. But I shall give you an outline of them.

When I wrote to you in May, Holkar had withdrawn from Aurungabad, in compliance with my request; he drew off gradually to the northward, crossed the river Taptee in the beginning of June, when it filled, and was a sufficient barrier between his army and Scindiah’s; and he has remained between the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee ever since, having detached across the Nerbudda and Taptee the troops which were necessary to take possession of the territories belonging to his family.

Scindiah marched from Burhampoor on the Taptee in the beginning of May, and he joined the Rajah of Berar towards the end of that month, at Mulcapoor, a place not far from the Nizam’s frontier, about 40 miles south of the Taptee. The object of the junction of the armies of those chiefs, as declared by their friends and adherents in all parts of India, and by the ministers at the Nizam’s durbar, was to attack the British Government and its allies. But it was first necessary to reconcile the differences existing between Holkar and Scindiah; and in order to obtain time to effect this object, it was necessary to conceal their hostile intentions, by pacific and amicable declarations, and by every species of dissimulation, at the same time that large armies were assembled in the neighbourhood of the frontier of our ally the Nizam.

In the end of May, Colonel Collins received the Governor General’s order to demand an explanation of the views and intentions of Scindiah in assembling his army and joining with the Rajah of Berar, in the neighbourhood of the Nizam’s frontier; and to require him to retire with his troops across the Nerbudda, if his intentions were pacific. At first Scindiah told him that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war; afterwards he and the Rajah of Berar found it probable that Collins would quit Scindiah’s camp, and that we should attack them, at a season at which they could not escape, and before they should have made their peace with Holkar; and they wrote a letter to the Governor General, on the 8th July, in which they declared they had no intentions to attack the British Government or their allies, or to impede the treaty of Bassein, provided the British Government did not interfere with their treaties with the Peshwah.

The object of this letter was to gain 6 weeks’ more time; they imagined that it would have been referred to the Governor General, and that time would have elapsed before his answers could have arrived. In the mean time, however, I received full powers and instructions from the Governor General to bring the negotiation to a conclusion. I wrote letters to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in which I pointed out to those Chiefs the necessity there was that they should withdraw their armies from the neighbourhood of the Nizam’s frontier, if they were sincere in their pacific

declarations, contained in their letter to the Governor General of the 8th July, and I promised that I would withdraw the British troops, as soon as I should find that they had commenced to withdraw their troops. In answer to this letter, after much delay and evasion, they made an impudent proposition that I should withdraw first, and fix the day on which the British troops should arrive at Seringapatam, Madras, and Bombay; and they promised that they would arrive at Burhampoor, 40 miles from their stations, on the same day. I then commenced hostilities.

Their object throughout the negotiation was to gain time to negotiate the peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and to pass over the rainy season, which was the least favorable for the commencement of their operations. Our object ought to have been to press them to a decision, whether they would retire or not, at a period when they had not had time to make peace with Holkar, and in the commencement of the rainy season, in the course of which we should have made ourselves masters of almost all their valuable posts. A perusal of the correspondence will show you which party succeeded best in the negotiation, and I now proceed to give you an account of our military operations.

On the 4th June, I marched from Poonah towards the Nizam's frontier; on the same day Colonel Stevenson crossed the Godavery, and proceeded towards Aurungabad. I remained on the Nizam's frontier, south of the Godavery, waiting the result of Colonel Collins's negotiations, till the beginning of August. On the 8th I attacked and carried by storm the pettah of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's fort of Ahmednuggur. On the 9th, at night, I broke ground before the fort, and on the 12th got possession of it by capitulation. This is a place of great note, had been frequently attacked, but never taken. It is, in fact, the strongest country fort I have ever seen, excepting Vellore in the Carnatic, has an excellent ditch, and cannot be surprised. It covers Poonah and the Nizam's western frontier south of the Godavery: the possession of it gives us an excellent depôt, cuts Scindiah off from all connexion with the southern chiefs, and has given us all his territories south of the Godavery.

Colonel Stevenson prevented Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar from entering the Nizam's territories till the 24th August; they entered on that day, however, with large bodies of horse, and marched to the south eastward, apparently with an intention of crossing the Godavery, and of proceeding towards Hyderabad. I crossed the Godavery on the 24th, after taking possession of the Ahmednuggur territories, and stopped their progress to the southward; and since that they have retired gradually towards the ghauts by which they entered. They have kept at a distance from me, but Colonel Stevenson has had two or three skirmishes with them. I shall move forward to attack them in a day or two, as soon as I have been joined by my supplies of money and provisions coming from the southward.

The troops in Guzerat took the fort of Baroach, on the 29th August. A detachment marched against Cuttack from Ganjam on the 1st September; and General Lake was likely to attack M. Peron, at Coel, about the end of August.

I have made a treaty with Amrut Rao, by which I have engaged that he shall have 7 lacs of rupees per annum from the Peshwah, provided he joins me.

I also think it possible that Holkar will not join the other confederates,



as it is certain that he has no confidence in Scindiah; and since he has known that Colonel Collins has withdrawn from Scindiah's camp, he has sent for an agent of mine, who had been waiting in Amrut Rao's camp for passports to go to him. This man had not joined him a week ago. None of his troops had joined Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar.

I have not with me any of the great southern Marhatta chiefs, and only about 4000 of the Peshwah's troops, under two sirdars of no very great note. But the greater chiefs are neutral in the contest, and if we continue to be as successful as we have been hitherto, they will continue neutral, if they do not join me.

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The weakness of the Peshwah's character, and of his government, are partly the causes through which I have not been supported by the southern Chiefs. But I think I may attribute the want of their services in some degree also to their desire to see which party will be the strongest, before they join either. They have a high idea of Scindiah's strength, and they will hardly believe that we are equal to him. If they should remain quiet, if General Lake should be tolerably successful, or if I can bring the enemy opposed to me to a general action, the war will be of short duration.

The rains have been very severe, and I have lost large numbers of cattle; but I am well equipped at present, and the troops are in high health and spirits.'

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91.

To Major General Campbell.

Golah Pangree, 20th Sept. 1803.

8. All the southern Chiefs have written me friendly letters in answer to those that I wrote, in which I informed them of the commencement of the war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and of its causes. Their situation in relation to Dowlut Rao Scindiah is much altered since the fall of Ahmednuggur, and at all events, I believe they are aware that they have no chance of retaining their possessions, excepting under the English protection. Their actions have hitherto been in conformity with their professions, as supplies for my camp have been suffered to pass through their countries since the commencement of the war.

9. These Chiefs, however, are all either declared or concealed enemies of the Peshwah. I know, also, that they have been strongly urged by the confederates to join in the contest. We cannot conceal from ourselves that our cause in this war is very unpopular among those who generally guide the councils and conduct of these Chiefs; and that each individual of them is strongly urged by every motive of national and family pride to oppose the British Government in a war which will certainly destroy the national power of the Marhattas.

10. These facts and arguments are laid before them upon all occasions; and although they see that their personal interests depend in a great measure upon the success of the British Government, and they are aware that there is every reason to believe that the British Government will be successful in this contest, I doubt much whether they would not enter into the war, if they did not see your corps encamped at their gates ready to fall upon and destroy them the moment they should appear as enemies; at all events, supposing that their hatred of the Peshwah, the solicitations of the confederates,



and their notions of family and national honor, which I have above noticed, should have no effect upon their minds, and that they are sensible that their interests are involved in the success of the British Government, the position of your corps at least affords them a plausible excuse for declining to join their countrymen in the war.

11. The greatest difficulties with which we shall have to contend throughout this war, will be the want of power and authority by the allied governments of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan. Every killadar, and the head of almost every village and district, acts as he thinks proper, and this conduct may have very unpleasant consequences: your division, the position of which is well known, tends to check this disposition.

12. Upon the whole, I am decidedly of opinion, that a body of troops in the position occupied by the division under your command is absolutely necessary for the security of the Company's territories; that they render probable the continuance of the neutrality of a class of people who might do us much mischief, and that they check the dispositions of the officers of the government of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan to assume independence.

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92.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Saalgaum, 21st Sept. 1803.

1. I have perused the papers sent from the Resident, enclosed with your letter of the 14th instant, and I beg leave to offer the following suggestions upon the subject of Futty Sing Rao and his mother, to which they relate. They may be of service, if not received at too late a period. If the question should be decided before this letter should be received, they will not be worthy the consideration of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

2. It is my decided opinion, that the offer of Futty Sing Rao and his mother to come to Baroda, provided a ransom is paid for their release, is sincere. I formed this opinion upon the fact that they have entered the Company's territories attended but by a small party of horse. If their intentions were hostile, or if they had any intention excepting that of being released from the hands of the Patans, they would have brought with them a much larger body of troops; and the conduct of this body of troops would have been very different from that observed by those troops at present with Futty Sing Rao.

3. Upon a perusal of the papers transmitted by Major Walker, I do not see the slightest ground for a belief that the intentions of Futty Sing and his mother are different from those which they have declared that they entertain.

4. But whether it be true or not that Futty Sing Rao and his mother have evil intentions, in my opinion, it is necessary first to determine whether it is worth 50,000 rupees to have possession of their persons. If that should be determined in the negative, those persons and the Patans ought to be desired forthwith to withdraw from the Company's territories; and they ought to be driven out, if they should refuse to comply with this desire.

5. If it should be determined that the ransom ought to be paid, respecting which, in my opinion, there can be no doubt, the money ought to be prepared without loss of time, and sent in charge of a sufficient body of troops to meet the Patans. Futty Sing Rao and his mother should then be called

upon to deliver themselves over to the British troops, and the money ought to be paid upon their arrival in the British camp. If they should decline to deliver themselves over, or there should be any difficulties on the part of the Patans, or if they should refuse to retire after having delivered over the persons of Futy Sing Rao and his mother, they ought to be attacked and driven out.

6. In my opinion, however, every attempt to procure the release of Futy Sing Rao and his mother, without paying the demanded ransom, or after paying a part of it, is inconsistent with the scrupulous good faith which ought to direct all our transactions with the natives. It is true that the Guickwar government did not consent in terms to pay the 50,000 rupees for the release of Futy Sing Rao and his mother: but when that ransom was demanded, and the government were informed that these persons were coming down the ghauts with 500 Patans, and the government admitted them into the country, they virtually consented to pay the ransom for which they came; and every attempt to get possession of the persons of Futy Sing Rao and his mother, without paying any ransom, or after paying only a part, is a direct breach of faith. If the government did not intend to pay the ransom, they ought not to have admitted the Patans into the country.

7. While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid expressing my approbation of the prudent conduct of Lieut. Colonel Watson at Barreah.'

G. O.

Pangree, 22nd Sept. 1803.

'Major General Wellesley requests that officers and heads of departments will cause their servants to load their baggage and departments, so as to have the whole in motion before assembly beating.'

G. M. O.

Camp near Assye, 24th Sept. 1803.

'Returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the battle of the 23rd, to be sent to the Dep. Adj. General, by corps as soon as the commanding officers can conveniently do so.'

As the enemy's gun bullocks taken yesterday are absolutely necessary for the public service, Major General Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will have an account taken immediately of the numbers received by the people belonging to the corps respectively, and send a report thereof to the Dep. Adj. General. The people in whose possession they are at present, to be directed to take care of them till tomorrow, when orders will be issued respecting them, and they will be paid for every bullock which may be found fit for the service, and taken from them.'

G. O.

24th Sept., 1803.

'Major General Wellesley returns his thanks to the troops for their conduct in the action of yesterday, the result of which is so honorable to them, and likely to be so advantageous to the public interest. He requests Lieut. Colonel Harness and Lieut. Colonel Wallace, in particular, will accept his acknowledgments for the manner in which they conducted their respective brigades.'

Major General Wellesley has also every reason to applaud the conduct of the cavalry, particularly that of the 19th dragoons, and to express the deep regret he feels at the loss of Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, who led them on.

The whole of the 1st batt. of the 2nd regt., with a proportion of European and native officers, to parade as a working party in front of the park at 6 o'clock tomorrow morning, to be employed under Captain Beauman's directions in bringing the captured guns into the lines.'

G. A. O.

'The field officer of the day will order such details of the native inlying piquets to occupy parts in rear of the camp this evening as he may think proper, in lieu of the companies of the outlying piquets usually detached on that duty.'

Memorandum.

Fifty bags of rice to be issued at the Moodee Khana tonight, at 5 seers per rupee, which will be divided as follows: 2½ bags to each regimental bazaar, and the remainder to the head-quarter bazaar; the 74th cutwahl receives for that regiment and the 78th; this rice must be retailed at 4½ seers per rupee.'



## 93.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Assye, 24th Sept. 1803.

' I was joined by Major Hill with the last of the convoys expected from the river Kistna on the 18th; and on the 20th was enabled to move forwards towards the enemy, who had been joined in the course of the last 7 or 8 days by the infantry under Colonel Pohlman, by that belonging to Begum Sumroo, and by another brigade of infantry, the name of whose commander\* I have not ascertained. The enemy's army was collected about Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffierabad.

I was near Colonel Stevenson's corps on the 21st, and had a conference with that officer, in which we concerted a plan to attack the enemy's army with the divisions under our command on the 24th in the morning; and we marched on the 22nd, Colonel Stevenson by the western route, and I by the eastern route, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna. On the 23rd I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp at the distance of about 6 miles from the ground on which I had intended to encamp. It was obvious that the attack was no longer to be delayed; and, having provided for the security of my baggage and stores at Naulniah, I marched on to attack the enemy.

I found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna river, nearly on the ground which I had been informed that they occupied. Their right, which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and extended to their corps of infantry, which were encamped in the neighbourhood of Assye. Although I came first in front of their right, I determined to attack their left, as the defeat of their corps of infantry was most likely to be effectual; accordingly I marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the column of infantry by the British cavalry in the rear, and by the Marhatta and Mysore cavalry on the right flank.

We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two lines, with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between that river and a nullah running parallel to it. The Marhatta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna on our left flank, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry which had followed our march from the right of their own position.

The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to our attack; it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna; but extended from that river across to the village of Assye upon the nullah, which was upon our right. We attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was terrible. The piquets of the infantry and the 74th regt., which were on the right of the first and second lines, suffered particularly, from the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry also made an attempt to charge the 74th regt. at the moment when they were most exposed to this fire, but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that

\* M. Dupont.



moment. At length the enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry cut in among the broken infantry; but some of their corps went off in good order, and a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns from which the enemy had been first driven, by individuals who had been passed by the line under the supposition that they were dead.

Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, with the British cavalry, charged one large body of infantry, which had retired and was formed again, in which operation he was killed; and some time elapsed before we could put an end to the straggling fire, which was kept up by individuals from the guns from which the enemy were driven. The enemy's cavalry also, which had been hovering round us throughout the action, were still near us. At length, when the last formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, and left in our hands 90 pieces of cannon:

The victory, which was certainly complete, has however cost us dear. Your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return, that our loss in officers and men has been very great, and, in that of Lieut. Colonel Maxwell and other officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to be regretted.

I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops; they advanced in the best order, and with the greatest steadiness, under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far superior in number, who appeared determined to contend with them to the last, and who were driven from their guns only by the bayonet; and notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's cavalry, and the repeated demonstrations they made of an intention to charge, they were kept at a distance by our infantry.

I am particularly indebted to Lieut. Colonel Harness and Lieut. Colonel Wallace, for the manner in which they conducted their brigades; and to all the officers of the staff for the assistance I received from them. The officers commanding brigades, nearly all those of the staff, and the mounted officers of the infantry, had their horses shot under them.

I have also to draw your Excellency's notice to the conduct of the cavalry conducted by Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th dragoons.

The enemy are gone off towards the Adjuntee ghaut, and I propose to follow them, as soon as I can place my captured guns and wounded in security.

Colonel Stevenson arrived this morning at Bokerdun, and I imagine that he will be here this evening.'

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94.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp at Assye, 24th Sept. 1803.

'I marched on the 20th from the ground which I had occupied in the neighbourhood, waiting for the junction of Major Hill; and on the 21st I was near to, and had a conference with, Colonel Stevenson, in which I arranged that we should attack the enemy this day. But on my arrival on my ground yesterday, I received accounts that the enemy's cavalry had marched off, that their infantry were preparing to follow, and that the latter were only 6 miles from my proposed camp.

It was so important to our interests at this moment to strike a blow, that I thought there was no time to be lost; accordingly, I determined to march on to attack them, and I sent notice of this determination to Colonel Stevenson.

I found the whole army encamped, and made my arrangements to attack their infantry, which was upon their left flank. The fire from their cannon was the hottest that has been known in this country, and we lost a great number of officers and men in advancing to the attack: Colonel Maxwell, among others, killed. At length we drove them off, and have taken about 60 pieces of cannon, nearly all brass, of the largest calibres. Their infantry, of which there were 3 campoos, fought well, and stood by their guns to the last. Their execution, however, was principally by their cannon. Colonel Wallace, Colonel Harness, and I, had horses killed under us. I lost 2 horses, one shot and the other piked; and the staff officers have lost one or two each.

I believe the enemy did not get away more than 2 guns, and I am doubtful whether they even have that number, as the number that we have taken agrees with that which my hircarrahs have reported that they had previous to the action.

Their cavalry did us but little mischief. A body made an attempt to charge the 74th, and were cut up by the 19th dragoons. As soon as I can get accurate accounts of the killed and wounded, I shall send you all the details of the action.'

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 95.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Assye, 24th Sept. 1803.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BATTLE OF ASSYE.

1. The information which we obtain regarding the position of an enemy whom we intend to attack is in general very imperfect. We cannot send out natives in the Company's service, who, from long habit, might be able to give an accurate account, because they, being inhabitants of the Carnatic, or Mysore, are as well known in this part of the country as if they were Europeans; and we cannot view their positions ourselves till we can bring up the main body of our armies, because the enemy are always surrounded by immense bodies of horse. The consequence is, that we are obliged to employ, as hircarrahs, the natives of the country, and to trust to their reports.

2. All the hircarrahs reported, that the enemy's camp, which I had concerted with Colonel Stevenson to attack, was at Bokerdun. I was to attack their left, where we knew the infantry was posted; and Colonel Stevenson their right. Their camp, however, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right to that village, and extended above 6 miles to Assye, where was its left; it was all in the district of Bokerdun, which was the cause of the mistake.

3. My march of the 23rd was so directed, as that I should be within 12 or 14 miles of the enemy's camp on that day, which I supposed to be at Bokerdun. Instead of that, by the extension of their line to the eastward, I found myself within 6 miles of them. I there received intelligence that they were going off; at all events, whether they were about to go or to stay, I must have reconnaitred. I could not have reconnaitred without taking the whole of my small force; and when I got near them, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to retire in front of their numerous cavalry. But



I determined to attack them, as I really believed the intelligence I received at Naulniah to be true.

4. When I found the intelligence I received at Naulniah was false, that I had their whole army in my front, and that they had a most formidable position, three or four times my number of infantry only, and a vast quantity of cannon, I deliberated whether I should withdraw, and attack on the following morning according to the plan.

5. The consequence of my withdrawing would have been, that I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and possibly should have found it difficult to get there. They would have harassed me all that day; and as I had only ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost a part of it during the attack on the following morning; and, at all events, I should have been obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it. During the attack of the 23rd, the enemy did not know where the baggage was; and, although it was so close to them, they never went near it.

6. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Colonel Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night. I therefore determined to make the attack.

7. The plan concerted, you will observe, failed, from the deficiency of our information regarding the enemy's position, and, consequently, my coming too near them on the 23rd with my camp, baggage, &c.

8. The enemy's first position was as shown in the plan. The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages every where, excepting at Peepulgaon and Warroor. I determined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, to attack the enemy's left flank and rear, and to cross the river at Peepulgaon. I intended at that time to throw my right up to Assye.

9. For a length of time they did not see my infantry, or discover my design. When they did discover it, they altered their position, and threw their left up to Assye, and formed across the ground between the Kaitna and Assye; but in more than one line. Luckily, they did not occupy the ford at Peepulgaon: if they had, I must have gone lower down; and possibly I should have been obliged to make a road across the river, which would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day enough for the attack.

10. When I saw that they had got their left to Assye, I altered my plan; and determined to manœuvre by my left, and push the enemy upon the nullah, knowing that the village of Assye must fall when the right should be beat. Orders were given accordingly.

11. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which frequently happen, the officer commanding the piquets, which were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of Assye: the 74th regt., which was on the right of the second line, and was ordered to support the piquets, followed them. There was a large break in our line between these corps and those on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible cannonade from Assye, and were charged by the cavalry belonging to the campos; consequently, in the piquets and the 74th regt. we sustained the greatest part of our loss. One



company of the piquets, of 1 officer and 50 rank and file, lost 1 officer and 44 rank and file. This company belonged to the battalion left at Naulniah.

12. Another bad consequence resulting from this mistake was, the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period. I had ordered it to watch the motions of the enemy's cavalry hanging upon our right; and luckily it charged in time to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets. It was thus brought into the cannonade; horses and men were lost: it charged among broken infantry, and separated; the unity of the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as I had intended when I placed it in the third line, to pursue and cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus make the victory still more complete than it was.

13. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assye was not defeated till worked upon by the centre and left of our line, notwithstanding the movement of the piquets, the 74th, and the cavalry; and then it went off directly, and was cut off.

14. The annexed plan\* is correct, excepting in the following instances: 1st; we came upon the enemy farther to the westward—it ought to be where I have marked in pencil. 2ndly; the formation of the Marhatta and Mysore horse ought to be as I have marked in pencil. 3rdly; our left, when we formed and advanced, was nearer the Kaitna; and the 74th was not in an échelon, as represented in the plan. 4thly; the enemy had more than one line of infantry.

N.B. The Juah river, or nullah, has steep banks, impassable for carriages, scarcely passable for horses.'

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96.

To Lieut. Colonel Munro.†

Camp at Cheesekair, 1st Nov. 1803.

'As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter of the 19th Oct., in which I think I shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction without a sufficient knowledge of the facts.

Before you will receive this, you will most probably have seen my public letter to the Governor General regarding the action, a copy of which was sent to General Campbell. That letter will give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection to the action is, that I detached Colonel Stevenson. The fact is, I did not detach Colonel Stevenson. His was a separate corps, equally strong, if not stronger than mine. We were desirous to engage the enemy at the same time, and settled a plan accordingly for an attack on the

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G. M. O.

Camp at Assye, 25th Sept. 1803.

'The agent for public cattle will purchase all the draught bullocks at 3 o'clock this afternoon, which have been secured by commanding officers of corps, agreeably to the orders of yesterday, at the rate of 6 star pagodas each; they are to be sent down to the karkhana at the above hour; and all such cattle as may be found hereafter with Scindiah's mark upon them will be seized and applied to the public service without payment.'

G. A. O.

'Half allowance of salt to be issued to the Europeans till further orders, and money to be paid in lieu of the other.

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\* The plan, corrected agreeably to this suggestion is to be found in the Appendix to the Marhatta war.

† This letter is inserted out of order of date, as relating chiefly to the battle of Assye.

morning of the 24th. We separated on the 22nd, he to march by the western, I by the eastern road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna: and I have to observe that this separation was necessary,—first, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day; secondly, because it was to be apprehended, that, if we left open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have passed to the southward, while we were going to the northward, and then the action would have been delayed, or probably avoided altogether. Colonel Stevenson and I were never more than 12 miles distant from each other; and when I moved forward to the action of the 23rd we were not much more than 8 miles.

As usual, we depended for our intelligence of the enemy's position on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their horse were so numerous, that without an army their position could not be reconnoitred by an European officer; and even the hircarrahs in our own service, who were accustomed to examine and report positions, cannot be employed here, as, being natives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an European. The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at Bokerdun. Their right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their position, and gave the name to the district in which they were encamped; but their left, in which was their infantry, which I was to attack, was at Assye, about 6 or 8 miles from Bokerdun.

I directed my march so as to be within 12 or 14 miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I thought, on the 23rd. But when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found I was not more than 5 or 6 miles from it. I was then informed that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry were about to follow, but were still on the ground: at all events, it was necessary to ascertain these points; and I could not venture to reconnoitre without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true, and I determined to attack the infantry, if they remained still upon the ground. I apprised Colonel Stevenson of this determination, and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on, I found not only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in a most formidable position, which, by the by, it would have been impossible for me to attack, if, when the infantry changed their front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was across the Kaitna.

When I found their whole army, and contemplated their position, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately, or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon the immediate attack, because I saw clearly, that, if I attempted to return to my camp at Naulniah, I should have been followed thither by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and I might have suffered some loss; instead of attacking, I might have been attacked there in the morning; and, at all events, I should have found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any place so near the enemy's camp, in which they should know it was: I therefore determined upon the attack immediately. It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. Our bullocks, and the people who were employed to draw them, were shot, and they could not all be drawn on; but some were; and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of any use.

Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded one half of its present amount if it had not been for a mistake in the officer who led the



piquets which were on the right of the first line. When the enemy changed their position, they threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I directed the officer commanding the piquets to keep out of shot from that village; instead of that, he led directly upon it: the 74th, which were on the right of the first line, followed the piquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two bodies.

Another evil which resulted from this mistake was the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action long before it was time; by which that corps lost many men, and its unity and efficiency, that I intended to bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day. But it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was, that we had then no reserve left, and a party of stragglers cut up our wounded; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon our backs.

After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there, till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken from our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated; and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made.

However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer who led the piquets. I lament the consequences of his mistake, but I must acknowledge that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the piquets on that day against Assye.

After the action there was no pursuit, because our cavalry was not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle. Colonel Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as he heard that I was about to move forward, and he also moved upon Bokerdun. He did not receive my letter till evening. He got entangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at Bokerdun, about 8 miles from me to the westward, at 8 in the morning of the 24th.

The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about 12 miles from the field of battle, 12 from the Adjutee ghaut, and 8 from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard that Colonel Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, they set off, and never stopped till they had got down the ghaut, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23rd, Colonel Stevenson was in no state to follow them, and did not do so until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till that day was, that I might have the benefit of the assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of the necessary number of medical men.

I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizam's sirdars, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the Nizam's forts; and I could not allow them to depart until I had settled that point. Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed the ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, could make no difference.

Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur. I have defended the Nizam's territories. They first threatened them through

the Casserbarry ghaut, and I moved to the southward, to the neighbourhood of Aurungabad; I then saw clearly that they intended to attempt the siege of Asseerghur, and I moved up to the northward, and descended the Adjunttee ghaut, and stopped Scindiah.

Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st; I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rajah of Berar had come to the south with an army.

I ascended the ghaut on the 25th, and have marched 120 miles since, in 8 days, by which I have saved all our convoys and the Nizam's territories. I have been near the Rajah of Berar 2 days, in the course of which he has marched 5 times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, finding that he can do nothing in this. If that is the case, I shall soon begin an offensive operation there.

But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet, if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have any thing to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray exert yourself for Bistnapah Pundit.'

## 97.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp at Assye, 28th Sept. 1803.

'Lord Wellesley has taken up the question of paying the Peshwah's ministers upon a great scale. The Peshwah is certainly sincere in his intentions to adhere to the alliance; but there is a crookedness in his policy, and the feelings of his mind are so far different from those which guide our conduct, that with the best intentions it must be expected we shall frequently clash. Besides, under the instructions from the Governor General, we have adopted measures in respect to Amrut Rao and Holkar, which must be highly disagreeable to him, and might occasion a desire to alter the alliance.

The Peshwah has no minister. He is every thing himself, and every thing is little. In my opinion, therefore, we ought to pay those who are supposed to be and are called his ministers, not to keep the machine of government in motion, in consistence with the objects of the alliance, as we do at Hyderabad, but to have intelligence of what passes in the Peshwah's secret councils, in order that we may check him in time when it may be necessary.

The defeat of the enemy is most complete. Not half of their army is yet collected. They had not above 200 infantry when they marched yesterday

G. O.

26th Sept. 1803.

'A salute of 21 guns to be fired in the park this evening on account of the Dessarah feast.'

± O.

Camp at Assye, 27th Sept. 1803.

1. Officers commanding corps will prepare, as soon as circumstances will permit them, returns of their wounded men whom it is desirable to send to a field hospital.

2. How many of that number require dooley carriage, how many can go in carts, how many upon elephants, how many upon horses or bullocks, and how many can walk.

3. Numbers of wounded men who may be kept with the army, without detriment to them.

Major General Wellesley wishes to have this return as soon as possible, in order that no time may be lost in making arrangements to send off the wounded men; and he requests that officers commanding native corps will let Mr. Gilmour (superintending surgeon) have a note of the carriages they have got, so that it may be seen what quantity is available for the service.'



morning from the bottom of the ghaut towards Burhampoor. They had 1200 men killed here, and the wounded and dying are in all parts of the country. I have 100 guns, and many more are on the road between this and Adjuntee, which I have ordered Colonel Stevenson to destroy.

I am still much distressed for dry grains. The Nizam's aumils behave very ill, and his killadar of Dowlutabad refuses to receive our wounded; so that I have been obliged either to leave my brave fellows exposed in an open town, or to send them to Ahmednuggur, and to wait till I can get my doolies, &c., back again. Thus are all our best plans thwarted, and yet these are the best of our allies!!!

98.

To Lieut. Colonel Munro.

Camp, 1st Oct. 1803.

'I enclose a memorandum which I have received from Bistnapah Pundit, the commander of the Rajah of Mysore's horse, serving with me, relative to a claim which he has upon the Rajah of Harponelly. It appears that the Rajah gave him a village in enaum, which he has now taken from him; Mr. Cochrane knew that the grant had been made, and confirmed it; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will inquire into the circumstances, and let Bistnapah keep his village, if possible.

I entirely agree in the opinions expressed in your letter, upon the subject of offensive and defensive war; however, I think that you are mistaken respecting the possibility of checking, by defensive measures, a predatory war, carried on by horse only; indeed, I have done it already in this campaign. The fact is, that a predatory war is not to be carried on now as it was formerly. All the principal villages in the country are fortified (excepting in our happy country, in which our wise men have found out that fortifications are of no use;) a few peons keep the horse out; and it is consequently necessary that they should have a camp and a bazaar to resort to for subsistence, in which every thing they got is very dear; besides, this necessity

G. O.

29th Sept. 1803.

'Returns of the horses belonging to the field and staff officers, exclusive of cavalry officers, which were killed at the battle of Assye on the 23rd instant, to be sent in by Brigadiers to the Dep. Adj. General this afternoon.

A field hospital to be established at Adjuntee. The superintending surgeon will allot the doolies in camp to carry 297 wounded men on the day after tomorrow, in the morning. The men to be sent must be those to whom the least injury will be done by being moved. One bandy belonging to the 4th native cavalry, 3 belonging to the 1st batt. 8th regt., and 4 to the 1st batt. 10th regt., will carry away as many wounded men belonging to their corps respectively as they can take. Three bandies belonging to the 1st batt. 2nd regt. will carry away as many wounded men as they can take of the 2nd batt. 12th regt.; 22 bullocks belonging to the 1st batt. 10th regt. are to carry 22 men of the 1st batt. 8th regt.; 20 bullocks of the 2nd batt. 12th regt. to carry 20 men of that corps; 10 bullocks of the 1st batt. 4th regt. to carry 10 men of that corps; and 8 bullocks of the pioneers to carry 8 men of that corps. All the wounded men of the different corps who can walk are to accompany the first detachment.

Money to be taken upon receipts from the paymaster, and all the wounded men to be paid up for this month in the course of tomorrow; and the requisite rolls of them by corps and certificates to be prepared and held in readiness to be sent to the officer who is to take charge of the wounded men.'

G. M. O.

30th Sept. 1803.

'The carpenters, smiths, and bellows boys, belonging to the corps of infantry in camp, to be sent to the park immediately with their tools, to be employed in making yokes and repairing them, &c., for the captured guns.'

of seeking subsistence in the camp prevents them from extending their excursions so far as they ought, to do any material injury.

The camp, on the resources of which an army of this kind must subsist, must be rather heavy; besides, there are great personages in it. They must have tents, elephants, and other sewary; and must have with them a sufficient body of troops to guard their persons. The number of cavalry retained in such a camp must consequently be very large.

Large bodies move slowly, and it is not difficult to gain intelligence of their motions. A few rapid and well contrived movements, made not directly upon them, but with a view to prevent the execution of any favorite design, or its mischievous consequences, soon bring them to their bearings; they stop, look about them, begin to feel restless, and are obliged to go off. In this manner I lately stopped the march of the enemy upon Hyderabad, which they certainly intended; they were obliged to return, and bring up and join their infantry: and you will have heard that, in a most furious action which I had with their whole army, with one division only, on the 23rd September, I completely defeated them, taking about 100 pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, &c. They fled in the greatest confusion to Burhampoor. Take my word for it, that a body of light troops will not act, unless supported by a heavy body that will fight; and what is more, they cannot act, because they cannot subsist in the greater part of India at the present day.'

## 99.

To General Lake.

Camp at Waukory, 7th Oct. 1803.

'I have been much embarrassed by the difficulties of establishing an hos-

G. O.

30th Sept. 1803.

'The 1st batt. 10th regt. and 2nd batt. 12th regt. are to furnish each a dresser for the field hospital.

The staff surgeon is to furnish servants, European medicines, wine, and clothing, as far as the state of his stores will admit; he is also authorised to purchase 10 dozens of Madeira wine at the public expense; 20 pioneers to be employed under the surgeon with the field hospital.

The native troops who will be sent to the field hospital are to continue to receive  $\frac{1}{2}$  seer of rice per diem each man, in the same manner as those in the field. The commissary of grain is to send down to Adjuttee 200 bags of rice for this purpose; he is also to send 200 bags of rice, 1600 sheep, 300 measures of salt, 400 gallons of arrack, into Adjuttee, to be handed over to the surgeon in charge for the use of the European sick. The men who are to set out for the field hospital to-morrow, under the orders of yesterday, are to march at daylight under an escort of 5 companies of the 2nd batt. 11th regt. with their guns.

Each corps is to send tents for its sick into the field hospital, in the proportion of 1 tent for every 10 men.

Officers commanding European corps will take care to give notice to the agent for public cattle of the number of elephants and camels they will require for this purpose.

The captured guns will be moved to-morrow, according to instructions which the commanding officer of artillery and commissary of stores have received. The commissary of stores will communicate with the agent for public cattle respecting the number of bullocks required to move them. 2 companies 2nd batt. 11th regt. will march to-morrow morning, according to instructions which the commanding officer will receive. Two parties, of 50 pioneers each, to be in readiness to march tomorrow with the captured guns.

A guard of 1 native commissioned officer and a detail of 40 N. I. to accompany the cattle when they go to graze daily until further orders, when an order is beat indicating a halt; the guard to proceed to the karkhana at daybreak; and on marching days it is to proceed thither an hour after coming to the new ground.'

G. O.

Camp at Assye, 1st Oct., 1803.

'Officers commanding corps of infantry are requested to cause inquiry to be made throughout their lines for accoutrements, arms, or horses' appointments belonging to the cavalry, and to send such as may be found to head quarters.'



pital for my wounded men. The Nizam's officers will not admit us into the forts which have any strength; and at last I have been obliged to place them at Adjuntee, a place of inferior strength, and upon the extreme frontier. However, I think they will be in security; the last of them have gone in this day, and I am now at liberty to resume my operations.'

G. M. O.

Camp at Adjuntee, 8th Oct. 1803.

'Major General Wellesley requests that officers, excepting those commanding corps and those whose duty it may be, will not go into the hospital, as the crowds that go there only tend to disturb the wounded men. Orders have been given at the gates that no soldiers or sepoy may be admitted in the hospital, excepting those of the latter sent in to work, and such men that may have passes from the commanding officer.

Commanding officers will therefore give passes to such men as may be desirous of seeing their relations, or as they may wish to send into the hospital.

The wounded men are much distressed by the sun in the buildings which they occupy, and Major General Wellesley will be much obliged to commanding officers of corps if they will order as many shades as possible to be made by the men of their corps with the boughs of trees, &c. &c.; they should be of the size of 12 feet square. Officers commanding native corps will send into the hospital 1 careful non-commissioned officer or steady man, and under his command each corps of infantry 12, each corps of cavalry, 6 seapoy boys. They are to assist the native troops in drawing their provisions, &c., and otherwise attend to and take care of them.'

G. O.

8th Oct. 1803.

'The general invaliding, pensioning, and discharging committee for this division will assemble as soon as the regimental committees have finished their proceedings; commanding officers are therefore requested to hold their committees today while the men in hospital may be examined.'

G. M. O.

10th Oct. 1803.

'As there is plenty of other forage on the ground, Major General Wellesley requests that none of the straw which is stacked or cut and laid on the ground may be taken; and commanding officers are requested to post sentries over such grain as may be in or near their lines.'

G. O.

Binkenholey, 10th Oct. 1803.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley has received a report from Captain O'Donnell of the 1st regt. of cavalry, from which it appears that being on his march from Ahmednuggur to join the division of the army under the command of Major General Campbell, with a company of the 1st batt. 12th regt., under Lieut. Morgan and the supernumerary non-commissioned officers, heretofore belonging to the corps in camp, and lately drafted into the extra battalions, he was attacked by a body of horse and of peons, of such numbers as to induce Captain O'Donnell to think it necessary to take post in the village of Korget Coraygaum. Here the attack was renewed upon this party with additional violence, and Captain O'Donnell finding that his post was a bad one, and at all events too large for his party, barricaded and otherwise strengthened such parts of it as he was of opinion he could defend. He there remained with his small party without throwing away his ammunition, excepting when he could do it with effect in judicious sallies, in three of which he killed a number of the enemy, far exceeding that of his party, which remained in security till it was relieved from Ahmednuggur, at the distance of about 40 miles.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley returns his thanks to Captain O'Donnell and Lieut. Bryant of the 1st regt. of cavalry, and to Lieut. Morgan and the company of the 1st batt. 12th regt. under his command, for their conduct upon this occasion. He has been particular in detailing the circumstances of this affair in General Orders, in order that all officers may know the advantage which, with a small party of men, they may take, even of the most ruinous village, to protect themselves and the parties of troops under their command.

To the divisions of the army under his command it was scarcely necessary for Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to point out, that a small body of infantry that keeps its order, and reserves its fire, has but little to fear from cavalry. But in case any Officer, in charge of a party, should be obliged from circumstances to take post, he may see, in the example set by Captain O'Donnell, the advantage he can take of the numerous fortified villages in this country, the credit he can gain, and the service he can render, by thus defending himself.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley will not fail to report to the Commander in Chief his sense of the conduct of Captain O'Donnell, and of the party under his command.'

## 100.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 12th Oct. 1803.

' I have reason to believe that the enemy have not come through the ghaut ; and it is possible that they will now return to attack you, with all the force they can bring.

Your first object will of course be to beat the campoos, before the cavalry under Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar can join ; or to drive them across the Taptee, and to such a distance, as that they cannot come back so quickly as to join with the cavalry in an attack upon you before I can reinforce you. If, however, they should be able to join before you can attack the campoos, you must decide what line you will adopt.

There are three lines of operation to be adopted : to attack the enemy, to stand his attack, or to draw off towards me.

In respect to the first, it is impossible to say what quantity of cannon they may have collected at Burhampoor ; or what their real force may now be. I recommend that you should adopt this with caution, and only in case of necessity.

In respect to the second, it may possibly be worse than the first ; as, unless you intrench your position, which I should recommend, if you adopt this line, your inferiority of cannon will tell against you still more than it would in the case of your attacking the enemy.

In regard to the third, it might be attended with risk, and even loss, excepting in this case. When I shall descend the ghaut, which I shall on the 4th, after leaving this, you might make two marches towards me, which would bring us within one march of each other. Till they are prepared for their attack, which, as they are very slow, will take some time, they will not stay nearer to you than at the distance of two marches ; and supposing them to be able to make two in one day, I shall have joined you before they can do you any mischief.

Supposing that you determine to have a brush with them, I recommend what follows to your consideration. Do not attack their position, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access ; for which the banks of the numerous rivers and nullahs afford them every facility. Do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well you may have intrenched it ; but when you shall hear that they are on their march to attack you, secure your baggage and move out of your camp. You will find them in the common disorder of march ; they will not have time to form, which, being but half disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they will not have chosen for the battle ; a part of

G. O.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 11th Oct. 1803.

' It is to be considered as a standing order that no corn which has been cut down is to be taken by the troops for forage, unless in cases of necessity, which are to be first reported, and guards are to be placed over what may be in or near the camp, by the nearest corps, immediately on coming to the ground.

Lieut. Colonel Griffin having failed to perform his part of the contract for the carriage of the sick of the battalions which have been under his command since this division of the army marched from Seringapatam in February last, the allowance granted by government for the carriage of the sick of the 2nd batt. 18th regt., at present commanded by that officer, is to cease from the day on which that corps arrived at Poonah.'



their troops only will be engaged ; and it is possible that you will gain an easy victory. Indeed, according to this mode, you might choose the field of battle yourself some days before, and might meet them upon that very ground.

There is another mode of avoiding an action, which is, to keep constantly in motion ; but unless you come towards me, that would not answer. For my part, I am of opinion, that after the beating they received on the 23rd September, they are not likely to stand for a second ; and they will all retire with precipitation. But the natives of this country are rashness personified ; and I acknowledge that I should not like to see again such a loss as I sustained on the 23rd September, even if attended by such a gain. Therefore, I suggest to you what occurs to me on the subject of the different modes, either of bringing on, or declining the action which it is possible, although by no means probable, that they intend to fight. I shall march the moment I hear that they have moved to the northward.'

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 101.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 13th Oct. 1803.

' All I can now say on the subject is, that as far as it is possible for one man to answer for another, I will answer for Captain Mackay, that the money laid out on account of the Government of Bombay was honestly and fairly laid out for the public service, and that Captain Mackay derived from it no benefit whatever.'

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 102.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 13th Oct. 1803.

' I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 26th September, and I am glad to find that you are getting on in a manner so satisfactory to yourself.

I certainly approved of your instructions, as involving all the material points at issue between the government at Bombay and me ; and I believe you will experience no inconvenience from the paragraphs to which you particularly object. In fact, it is necessary that the political agents at the durbars of the native princes should be supposed to have a considerable degree of power. In this part of the world there is no power excepting that of the sword ; and it follows that if these political agents have no authority over the military, they have no power whatever.

The natives would soon find out this state of weakness, and the Residents would lose their influence over their councils. It may be argued, if that is the case, the military Commanding officer ought to be the Resident, or political agent. In answer to this argument, I say, that the same reasoning applies to every part of the executive government ; and that, upon this ground, the whole ought to be in the hands of the military. In short, the only conclusion to be drawn from all reflection and reasoning upon this subject is, that the British Government in India is a phenomenon ; and that it will not answer to apply to it, in its present state, either the rules which guide other governments, or the reasoning upon which these rules are founded.

There is nothing in the instructions to you which does not exist at this moment at Hyderabad, and would not have existed at Poonah, if the subsidiary force had ever been established at that place; and, as far as I am acquainted with Major Walker, I will venture to say that he will act with you cordially for the good of the service.

I am glad that you intend to attack Canojee. Move upon him with the utmost celerity as soon as you can, and attack him whatever may be his numbers. We must get rid of that domestic war in Guzerat, before we can expect to derive any advantage to the general cause from the troops in that province. If you had not Canojee upon your hands, I should long before now have requested you to move upon Ougein.

Take care that, in establishing your frontier, you do not interfere with Holkar. He has not hitherto committed hostilities against us, and I have cautiously avoided to touch upon him. I wish you to bear this in mind.

I ought to have written you an account of our action on the 23rd September; but I really had not time, and I knew that Major Walker or you would receive the particulars from Mr. Duncan. It was the most severe battle that I have ever seen, or that, I believe, has been fought in India. The enemy's cannonade was terrible, but the result shows what a small number of British troops can do. The best of it is, that if it had not been for a mistake of the piquets, by which the 74th were led into a scrape, we should have gained the victory with half the loss; and I should not have introduced the cavalry into the action at all, till all the infantry had been broken; and the cavalry would not have been exposed to the cannonade, but would have been fresh for a pursuit. In this manner also we should have destroyed many more of the enemy than we did.

We took either 98 or 101 pieces of cannon on the field of battle, besides others lost on the road by the enemy, and, I believe, all their ammunition. Since the action they have fled to Burhampoor, where they left the remains of the defeated infantry. They brought out two or three fresh corps of infantry, with guns, and made first a march or two to the westward, along the Taptee; they then turned to the southward, and threatened to pass to the southward through the Casserbarry ghaut.

I consequently moved to Phoolmurry to meet them again, and I have sent Colonel Stevenson to Burhampoor. I think that he will drive the defeated infantry into Hindustan; and possibly the cavalry, with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, will follow them; at all events, these movements must stop their southern trip.

You must be the best judge what ought to be done for the defence of Surat. I should be afraid that these detached redoubts would be weak, and that the men in them might be exposed to the want of water, &c. If the castle is in a commanding situation, by far the best mode would be to repair it, and raise a second for the defence of the town wall. If the Company have these places, and are at war, they must incur the expense of defending them.

In one of Mr. Duncan's letters I think he said that there was a position near Surat for a small body of troops, which defended the only avenue to the place. If that is the case I would recommend that the position should be



strengthened, and that the town should have nothing in it except the sepoy. However, at present there is little probability of Surat being molested.

You must have many depôts of provisions besides Baroach and Surat. Mr. Duncan misunderstood that part of my letter to him respecting the depôts. He thought that the places mentioned were to be supplied with provisions only for their garrisons; whereas I intended that they should be depôts for the corps in the field, to be used in case the line of operations should take them towards these places.'

## 103.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 15th Oct. 1803.

'Another circumstance mentioned to me by Colonel Murray is, that the Rajah, the minister, and the Resident, have more than half of their guards running after them on foot when they go out, whether in a palanquin or on horseback. It is very obvious that the consequence of this is, that all respect for troops used in this manner must be at an end; and that those troops must lose all respect for themselves. It is therefore very desirable that this practice, which does not prevail elsewhere, should be stopped at Baroda.

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I believe I have intrusted you with a more difficult negotiation than you have ever had in your diplomatic career; but I am convinced that you will see the necessity of putting an end to this practice, and this appears a favorable opportunity to attempt it.'

G. O.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 15th Oct. 1803.

'The sentences passed on Mahomed Isack and Sheek David, sepoy in the 1st batt. 10th regt., and Mahomed Reza, sepoy in the 1st batt. 2nd regt., published in the orders of yesterday, are to be carried into execution this afternoon.

The line to be under arms at  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 5 o'clock, the cavalry mounted and formed on the right of the infantry. A guard of a subaltern officer and 20 men from each corps of infantry in camp (except the 74th) under a captain, will parade at the tent where the prisoners are confined, at 4 o'clock, when the provost will deliver them over to the guard, and the captain of it will march them from the right of the cavalry to the left of the infantry in slow time, and back again to the place appointed for the execution of Sheek David, in front of the 1st batt. 10th regt.

The music and drummers and fifers of corps will play the dead march as the prisoners will pass.

The provost serjeant will accompany the prisoners with his guard. An execution party, consisting of 1 havildar, 1 naig, and 4 sepoy of the 1st batt. 10th regt., and 2 sepoy from each of the other native corps in camp, to parade at the place of execution at 4 o'clock this afternoon.

As soon as the prisoners shall arrive at the place of execution, a gun will be fired from the park as a signal for the time when commanding officers of corps will give orders that the extract from general orders containing the sentences awarded to the prisoners, and this order, may be read to their corps.

A second gun will be fired when the captain of the guard will deliver the prisoner Sheek David over to the serjeant, and he will carry the sentence awarded to him into execution, according to orders which he will receive through the Dep. Adj. General. During the execution of Sheek David, the prisoners Mahomed Isack and Mahomed Reza are to remain in charge of the captain of the guard; they are afterwards to be sent to their respective corps in charge of the details from them composing a part of that guard; when the commanding officers of those corps will cause the sentences passed upon them to be put into execution.

Upon firing a third gun, all the other corps and the captain's guard will be dismissed.'

104.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd Oct. 1803.

'If I find it to be really the case that Colonel Stevenson has taken Asseerghur, I shall re-ascend the ghaut, as I see that the enemy's infantry cannot recover from the effects of the battle of Assye; and as for their cavalry, they are very incapable of doing any of us much mischief. I think it possible that when the Rajah of Berar shall hear of the capture of Asseerghur, he will endeavor to reach his own country by marching to the southward of Aurungabad, particularly if he should have come through the Chandore ghaut.'

105.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd Oct. 1803.

'In regard to your revenue concerns, I approve entirely of your settling the country as you go on, as I know that it is the only mode of securing and of having a tranquil rear.'

106.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp, 23rd Oct. 1803.

'If we could establish any thing like a cordial communication or a solid community of interest with the Peshwah which would be apparent to the world, or if we could even know what the Peshwah is about, or what is going on at his durbar, in the first case, there would be an end of these intrigues; and in the second, they would give us no anxiety, and we should be able with one word to calm that of our friends. But we know more of what passes in the durbar of the enemy than we do of what passes in that of the Peshwah.

There is no doubt whatever of the communication between the enemy and the southern Chiefs, and that the former are moving heaven and earth to prevail upon the latter to act against us. Our victories and successes and the disposition of our troops to the southward have kept them in check hitherto, and they will continue to have that effect. But would it not be advisable to employ agents to observe the councils and intentions of these chiefs, and to spend money and exert ourselves for this purpose?

The Marhattas have been famous for corruption, but we have never touched them upon that point.'

G. O.

Ferdapoor, 23rd Oct. 1803.

'Until further orders, whenever the *general* or long roll beats, the paymaster's guard is to be reinforced by a havildar, naig, and 12 sepoys, who will be employed in guarding the treasure carried on bullocks; and as soon as this treasure shall be laid down at the Pay-Office after a march, this reinforcement of the guard will again join its corps.'

G. A. O.

Camp at Ferdapoor, 24th Oct. 1803.

'The detachment to march tomorrow morning by the right, the new piquets of infantry to form the advance.

The brigades of infantry to follow with their guns, and each corps of native infantry will have 2 companies at such places in the pass, as Captain Beauman will point out, to assist the park and wheel carriages with the store and provision department.

The cavalry and old piquets of infantry will not strike their tents until the line of infantry, the park, magazine and grain departments are through the pass, when they will follow in the above order. The Mysore cavalry and the Marhatta cavalry are to march by the Ferdapoor pass.'



107.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Adjutee, 25th Oct. 1803.

3. The war in which the British Government is engaged is in support of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. The immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the Marhatta Chiefs to remove from his Highness' territories the large armies which they had collected for the purpose of invading them. The remote cause may be supposed to be the treaty of Bassein; but however desirable in other respects to the British Government that treaty might have been, the completion of it was a most essential object with a view to the security of the Nizam, and his Highness derives the advantage of that treaty at this moment.

4. In the war thus entered into for his Highness' interests, in which the greatest exertions have been made by the British Government, and the most complete success has attended them, his Highness calculated how far the terms of his treaty with the British Government are to lead him. I do not recollect the terms of the treaty, but the principle and spirit of it is, protection on the part of the British Government, which his Highness has received, and co-operation and assistance to the fullest extent on that of his Highness. Without quibbling upon words, it would not be difficult to show that, in such a war as this, the admittance into his Highness' forts of our small detachments and convoys is an essential assistance, which his Highness is bound even by the terms of the treaty to give.

5. However, considering the coolness which exists between his Highness and his minister, and the declared sentiments of his Highness at the time at which he was partially reconciled to him, it is my opinion, that it will be useless to make any representation to his Highness at present upon the subject, either of his declaration upon that occasion, or of his erroneous conception of his engagement under the treaty of defensive alliance. For the same reason, I think that it would be prudent to defer to come to any explanation with his Highness upon the subject to which I drew your attention in my letter of the 18th and 24th instant.

6. It appears to me, that his Highness' mind is irritated, and that he has no notion of his real situation, or his true interests. The agitation of the topics above alluded to, however desirable, will only increase this irritation, may be the cause of the adoption of some violent step respecting the Minister, and will certainly answer no good purpose. In time, his Highness will perceive the candor and honor of the British Government in all its transactions; and the delivery of the territory depending upon Asseerghur and Burhampoor to the officers of his Highness' government will be a striking proof of those qualities, as well as of the benefits which he derives from his alliance with the British Government.

7. I must endeavor to work through the war without the assistance of his magazines; and, in case of negotiations for peace, to bring them to a successful conclusion, notwithstanding the intrigues which I anticipate.'

Mem.

25th Oct. 1803.

'Mrs. Maxwell having made it a particular request that the prayer book of the late Lieut. Colonel Maxwell might be preserved for her, Major Kennedy will be very happy to have it restored by any person who may have purchased it at Lieut. Colonel Maxwell's sale.'

108.

To Colonel Stevenson.

25th Oct. 1803.

'The march of the Rajah of Berar to the southward, and the fear that I may be detained to the southward for some time, during which all their country would be exposed to Scindiah, make it necessary that we should revise our plan in some degree.

Accordingly, I wish you for the present to watch Scindiah, and to prevent him from undertaking any thing of consequence, or doing any material mischief, till I can give the other a turn to the northward, when all will be safe.

You may, in the mean time, make all your arrangements for the Berar expedition, all your inquiries respecting roads, distances, &c. &c., upon which you shall certainly go as soon as I shall have brought up the Rajah; this I may possibly do in a few days.'

109.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Pahlood, 26th Oct. 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 4th, and Sydenham's report of the campaign to the northward, up to the 17th September. Every thing appears to prosper, and I hope we shall soon bring the war to a conclusion.

Since the battle of Assye, I have been like a man who fights with one hand and defends himself with the other. With Colonel Stevenson's corps I have acted offensively, and have taken Asseerghur; and with my own, I have covered his operations, and defended the territories of the Nizam and the Peshwah. In doing this, I have made some terrible marches, but I have been remarkably fortunate: first, in stopping the enemy when they intended to pass to the southward, through the Casserbarry ghaut; and afterwards, by a rapid march to the northward, in stopping Scindiah, when he was moving to interrupt Colonel Stevenson's operations against Asseerghur; in which he would otherwise have undoubtedly succeeded. I moved up the ghaut as soon as Colonel Stevenson got possession of Asseerghur;

G. O.

26th Oct. 1803.

'Major General Wellesley has received information from H. E. the Commander in Chief, that the R. H. the Governor in council of Fort St. George has been pleased on H. E.'s recommendation, to order, till the conclusion of the war with the Marhatta confederates, the continuance of the payments on family certificates to the families of the native officers, non-commissioned officers, and sepoys, who have gloriously fallen or may hereafter fall in battle, or who may have died or may hereafter die of their wounds, rolls of the names and rank of those native officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, who have fallen in battle or died of their wounds, are to be made out forthwith, signed by the adjutant and countersigned by the commanding officers, and to be sent to the Adjutant General's office with the monthly returns, and in duplicate to the office of the military secretary of the Governor of Fort St. George.

Major General Wellesley requests that officers commanding corps will explain this order particularly to the troops under their command, and that they will take this opportunity of again pointing out to the native troops the anxious concern of the government which they are serving, and of their superiors, to adopt every measure which can alleviate the distress of their families.

In order to insure the early advantage of this attention on the part of government to the objects of it, Major General Wellesley desires that officers commanding troops of native cavalry companies, of native infantry, gun lascars, and pioneers, and officers in charge of hospitals, will, on this day, send to paymasters to whom such officers may have given notice of casualties, such as are described in the first paragraph, a copy of this order certified by himself, together with a list of the names of the officers or men of his troop or company, or under his charge, who were killed in action or died of their wounds, having opposite the name of each the name of the person to whom the payment is to be continued, under the orders of the R. H. the Governor in council.'



and I think that, in a day or two, I shall turn Ragojee Bhoonslah, who has passed through to the southward. At all events, I am in time to prevent him doing any mischief.

I think that we are in great style to be able to act on the offensive at all in this quarter; but it is only done by the celerity of our movements, and by acting on the offensive or defensive with either corps, according to their situation, and that of the enemy.

\* \* \* \* \*

How unfortunate it is that we have not Guzerat in style! If we had, I should immediately have a corps from that province on the back either of Scindiah's troops on the Taptee, or of his brigade in the Rajpoot countries; and thus put an end to the war by one blow.'

110.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 28th Oct. 1803.

'It is unpleasant that we cannot take all the advantage I could wish of our success; but the fact is, that offensive operations are not expected from us in this quarter; and although I am willing, and have undertaken them already, I must take care not to risk, by attempting too much, that for which I am sent here, and the failure of the service expected from me: viz., the defence of the Nizam's and Peshwah's territories. Besides, I have to tell you, between ourselves, that matters are not as they should be at \_\_\_\_\_, and they cannot well be worse than they are at \_\_\_\_\_; it is therefore peculiarly incumbent on me to act with caution.

I think that in a day or two I shall drive off Ragojee Bhoonslah. I shall give you notice of every thing that passes; and as soon as ever I make it certain that he is out of the country, you may begin your march towards Gawilghur.

We may eventually invade Hindustan, but I think that before we do that, we ought to secure our right flank by taking Gawilghur, and, if possible, forcing Ragojee to a peace.'

111.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 31st Oct. 1803.

'1. I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 19th instant with its enclosure, being the copy of one from Messrs. Forbes and Co., and Messrs. Bruce, Faucett, and Co.

2. As far as I am concerned in the property captured at Baroach, I am of opinion that the proposition of those gentlemen is very reasonable, and that it ought to be complied with.

3. In respect to the letter from those gentlemen, it might probably have been as well to have omitted all the injurious expressions and reflections which it contains.

4. I have not by me at present any papers or documents to which I can refer, and I write solely from memory. But as well as I can recollect, His

G. O.

Camp at Chicultana, 29th Oct. 1803.

'If the drum beats for marching tomorrow, Major General Wellesley requests that commanding officers will see that their musket ammunition is marched on the flank of their corps; and that heads of departments and others will see that the departments and baggage are laden and sent off early.'

Majesty has reserved to himself the disposal of the property in all forts captured in India, in the operations against which his troops may be employed with those of the Company, excepting military stores, half of which are by charter granted to the Company.

5. His Majesty has been graciously pleased, from time to time, to grant this property to the troops employed in the capture of the fort in which it might be found, and occasionally the Supreme British authority in India has taken upon itself to anticipate His Majesty's intention, and to give the property to the troops; and this is the claim which the troops have to prize property.

6. The question respecting the property belonging to British merchants found at Baroach is, whether it is included in that reserved by His Majesty in his Royal Charter. Those concerned in the capture, I conclude, think it is; the merchants think it is not. But surely there is no occasion for interference or acrimony of expression, on reflection, in urging the claim of either party.

7. Whatever may be the fate of the property hereafter, it is certain that, if it had not been for the gallantry of the troops who took Baroach, it would never have come into the hands of the British merchants; and it might be as well, possibly, to refrain from accusing of injustice and unjustifiable measures, those to whom such benefits are to be attributed, only because they state their doubts respecting the real ownership of the property, which, according to the writers of the same paper that contains these accusations, is a question involving points of a peculiar and delicate nature.'

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112.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp at Naundair Barry, 31st Oct. 1803.

'I have marched every day since the 25th, and arrived here this morning. I was tantalised all the morning with the sight of the enemy's camp, pitched at the distance of 20 miles. But when I arrived within 6 or 7 miles of them, they went off in a southerly direction. They have hitherto done no mischief, excepting to the small villages.'

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113.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp, 4th Nov. 1803.

'I enclose the translation of a letter that Captain Young has received, from which, as well as from reports that have reached me, I am afraid that the Governor is not pleased with my having appointed an officer to fill the office of bullock agent, when Captain Mackay was killed. The fact is, that nothing could keep that important establishment together at that time, excepting to appoint some person to take charge of it. Many bullocks and drivers were killed in the action of the day before; and the people were so much terrified and shocked by the death of Captain Mackay, to whom they were much attached, that I am convinced that they would have all gone off, if I had delayed to place any body at their head; or if the situation had been given to an officer with whom they were unacquainted. Your experience of the people of this country, and of the importance of this department to the very existence of a body of troops, will, I am sure, convince you of the necessity of making this arrangement; and will, I hope, induce you to remove



from the mind of the Governor any unfavorable impression which he may have received in consequence of it.

If it is not intended that Captain Young should retain the situation, it would have been better for him to have remained in that which he held before; and if he is to remain in it, or whatever may be the arrangement determined on, it is best that the accounts of the department should be settled by, and pass through the hands of only one person, in the manner in practice ever since the bullock establishment has been in the Company's service.'

## 114.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 5th Nov. 1803.

11. \* \* \* 'I have but little doubt the Company would have been richer, and I am convinced that the military reputation of the British nation would have stood higher, and that the power of Government would have been greater, if all tribute payable by hill polygars and rajahs had been originally remitted.

12. In this part of India, in particular, the policy of Government should be cautiously to avoid involving themselves in hostilities such as those above described: their operations are very difficult and uncertain; they require large bodies of the best troops; numbers of men are generally lost, no credit is gained by success, and failure is disgraceful. The Government have no troops to spare in Guzerat to fight the battles which must eventually be the consequence of the demand of the tribute. They have not a sufficient army even to guard their own territory and that of their allies against the inroads of a foreign enemy, without the assistance of these Bheel rajahs; and it may be depended upon, that a failure in a contest with one of them for tribute, an event which, as it has happened in other parts of India, may also be expected in Guzerat, will occasion the loss of our reputation, which I believe will be found to be the strongest support of the British power in that quarter of India.'

## 115.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 6th Nov. 1803.

'I now proceed to give your Excellency a detailed account of Colonel Stevenson's operations against Asseerghur.

On the 16th October he advanced to Asseerghur, and encamped 3 miles south of the fort. The remains of the enemy's infantry had fled towards the Nerbudda on the preceding day, in the state in which I reported them to be, in my letter of the 24th October; and Colonel Stevenson therefore determined to attack Asseerghur.

On the 18th he reconnoitred the fort, attended by a squadron of cavalry, and the piquets of the Native infantry; and, having seen a favorable opportunity, attacked the pettah and carried it, and made a lodgment within 150 yards of the lower wall of the fort. In the evening he reinforced the troops in the pettah by a battalion.

On the 19th all the preparations were made for carrying on the siege; and 2 batteries were ready to open at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th; one to breach the upper wall, and another, of 4 brass 12 pounders, to destroy the defences of the lower wall.

On the 18th Colonel Stevenson had sent a flag of truce to the killadar to

summon him to surrender the fort, to which message he did not receive a decided answer. The communication was continued; but Colonel Stevenson did not relax his operations against the fort, as there was reason to believe that the negotiation was carried on only to give time to Dowlut Rao Scindiah to come to its relief. Before opening his batteries, Colonel Stevenson apprised the killadar of the terms on which he should surrender the fort; which were, that the garrison should march out with their private property, and be allowed to go where they might think proper, and that their arrears should be paid to the amount of 20,000 rupees.

After the batteries had opened about an hour, a white flag was shown from the walls of the fort, which was the signal which had been agreed upon in case the terms should be accepted; hostages were sent down, and an engagement made that the fort should be delivered up on the following morning. It was accordingly evacuated; the garrison carried off their property in security, and received the sum agreed to be paid to them.

Colonel Stevenson mentions in high terms the conduct of the officers and troops under his command; and I cannot omit to take this opportunity of expressing to your Excellency my sense of the merits of Colonel Stevenson, and of the body of troops under his command. Upon every occasion I have received from the Colonel the most cordial and zealous assistance; and the troops under his command are in the highest state of discipline and order, and fit for any service in which they can be employed.

On the 16th, 9 officers, 4 serjeants, and 1 matross, formerly in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, delivered themselves up to Colonel Stevenson, under your Excellency's proclamation of the 29th August.

I have the honor to enclose a list of their names, and a copy of the order issued by Colonel Stevenson to provide for their subsistence. Lieut. Stuart also delivered himself up at Poonah in the end of the last month. I have called for accounts of the regulated pay allowances which these persons received in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency.

I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the troops under the command of Colonel Stevenson, during the operations against Asseerghur. Hereafter I shall have the honor of transmitting returns of the ordnance, stores, grain, and other property captured in that fort.'

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116.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 7th Nov. 1803.

1. I have had the honor to receive your dispatch of the 28th October, on the subject of cavalry to be raised under the government of Bombay.

2. The memorandum from the Adjutant General appears to me to contain all the principal arrangements for that object, and the tables of pay, &c., are, I believe, correct; if not so, it will be easy to correct them, by a reference to the pay tables of the government of Fort St. George, if the cavalry establishment under that government is to be taken as the model of that to be formed at Bombay.

3. I have, however, objections to some of the arrangements proposed in the Adjutant General's memorandum, which I shall now proceed to specify.



4. In the 4th paragraph it appears to be intended that the followers, viz., the horsekeepers, shall be under the commanding officer of the regiment. Every man must be under the commanding officer of the regiment, and must be considered liable to be moved from one troop to another, and to do what may be ordered. But the horsekeepers and followers must be posted to troops, and must not be removed from one troop to another, excepting by a formal regimental order. When in a troop, they must be mustered in it; the roll must be made out by the commanding officer of the troop, and he must draw their pay, and they must be paid by him.

5. The mode of supplying forage and gram, as proposed in the 6th paragraph, will not answer. The principle of it has been exploded for years under the government of Fort St. George; and the mode proposed is far worse than the old mode under the government of Fort St. George. That mode was a contract with the commanding officer to supply gram for the horses of his regiment, at certain rates. No individual without public assistance could perform the contract. The same objection exists to the mode proposed, with this addition, that the officer in command of the regiment is to send a bill, upon honor, for the expense incurred.

6. These bills upon honor should not be multiplied. The expenses of the military establishment should be brought under regular heads of account, and there should be a regular mode of supplying everything for which there is a regular demand. A bill upon honor ought never to be admitted, excepting for an extraordinary service or demand which could not have been foreseen, and for which no provision can have been made by any previous order or regulation.

7. Besides, the commanding officer of a regiment of cavalry has, or ought to have, too much to do to be able to attend to a concern so complicated as that of supplying the horses of the corps under his command with gram, particularly when the supply of forage is to be added thereto. When his corps shall take the field, the carriage of a month's gram for the number of horses proposed will require 1000 bullocks, which alone is as much as he could well manage.

8. I therefore recommend, that either for the whole of the cavalry, or for each regiment, an agent may be appointed for the special purpose of supplying the horses with gram and forage, whose bills of purchases will of course be checked by the usual vouchers; and that the commanding officer should have nothing to do with the feed of the horses, excepting to see that they get it.

9. It is unfortunate that the grass cutters will not answer in the countries in which the Bombay cavalry are likely to be employed, as I consider that by far the cheapest, the best, and the most efficient mode of procuring forage for the horses.

10. On the subject of the 9th paragraph of the memorandum, my opinion is as follows:—In the service of the cavalry there are many minute details, which are of no great difficulty to acquire, but without the knowledge of which a body of regular cavalry cannot exist. Under the government of Bombay I do not believe there is an officer who has served in the cavalry, and therefore none can have acquired the necessary knowledge. An establishment of this kind, in which all would be learners, and where there would be no teacher, cannot get on; and the attempt to make the cavalry a regular body

at first, will tend only to delay the period at which it will be of use, and to increase the expense of the establishment.

11. I should therefore recommend to government to purchase the number of horses they may require, and to hire a description of persons well known by the name of Bargeers to ride them; to give them the establishment of European officers, &c.; to arm them, and to clothe them in the red jacket, made according to the Hindustanee fashion.

12. These people will be useful immediately. By degrees those who will submit to discipline will be disciplined; and those who will not, ought to be discharged when their services shall not be required, and their places filled by young men of the description and caste proposed by the Adjutant General in the 9th paragraph. The officers will also learn their duty.

13. By this mode of proceeding, the government of Bombay will immediately have the service of a good body of horse, under European officers; and they will have a regular regiment of cavalry, at least as soon as they might expect one in any other manner.

14. I recommend that the person proposed to be appointed Adjutant, and some of the officers who it is intended should be removed to the cavalry corps, should be sent, with the permission of the Right Honorable the Governor and Commander in Chief of Fort St. George, to do duty with the cavalry under the government of Fort St. George.

15. In respect to the 15th paragraph, I strongly recommend that government should send to England for the saddles they will require for the cavalry.'

## 117.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 7th Nov. 1803.

' 1. I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 24th October, relative to the garrison of Surat.

2. The unhealthy state of the troops that have been at Surat for a length of time past is a most lamentable circumstance, and I am of opinion that as nothing is so useful to the Company as a healthy soldier, and nothing

G. A. O.

7th Nov. 1803.

' As the European soldiers have taken to plunder in the neighbouring villages, and more irregularities have been proved against one man of the artillery, one of the 74th regt., and one of the 78th regt., Major General Wellesley directs that the rolls may be called in those corps every hour. Four drummers of the 78th regt. to attend immediately with their cats at the provost serjeant's tent to inflict 200 lashes on ——— of the 4th company 78th regt., with whom one of the plundered cattle has been found.

Major General Wellesley gives notice that he will punish with death any man found guilty hereafter of plundering.'

G. O.

Chitchooly, 8th Nov. 1803.

' A squadron of native cavalry of the inlying piquets to parade at Major General Wellesley's tent this afternoon at 4 o'clock, to proceed with him to meet Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, vakeel, from Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

A flank company of European infantry from the 4th brigade to parade at Major General Wellesley's tent at half past 4 o'clock this afternoon, on the vakeel advancing to the tent; the company will receive him with presented arms and drums beating. A salute of 13 guns to be fired this afternoon on the vakeel's alighting at Major General Wellesley's tent. The commanding officer of artillery will place sentries to ascertain the time and pass the signals.

Major General Wellesley will be glad to see any officers who are off duty, and may be inclined to accompany him when he goes out to meet Jeswunt Rao Goorparah.

Mem.

4 o'clock is an unlucky hour, the squadron of cavalry to be at head quarters at 5, and the company of Europeans at half past 5 o'clock.'



so useless, expensive, and burthensome, as one in hospital, any measure which can be adopted to improve the state of health of those whom necessity obliges the Government to detain at Surat, is one of the greatest public utility and wise economy.

3. In respect to the defence of Surat, there appears to be but one opinion upon that subject, and that is that Surat is by no means in a state of security. The wisdom and the policy, and even the justice of Government appear to me to require that some decided steps should be taken to defend that important city.

4. In the present state of the Company's power, I have been long induced to doubt the policy of building forts on the sea coast, or in situations in which they may be liable to an attack from a power at sea; but it is very certain that if necessity should oblige the Government to build one in such a situation, it ought to be a fort of the first order, of which our European enemies could not get possession, excepting by a very long siege.

5. This general principle will apply to building a fort at Surat. However, its soundness depends upon many local circumstances, with which I am not acquainted: viz., the possibility of bringing a large fleet to Surat, and of remaining there in safety; the number of months in the year in which that is possible; and the generally prevailing winds in the offing. I have also to observe, that the Hon. the Governor of Bombay has orders from the Court of Directors not to undertake a work of this magnitude; and therefore, even if it should be decided to be necessary and proper, he could not undertake the work; and in the mean time the question respecting the propriety of building a fort can be well canvassed and considered.

6. But whether a fort is to be built or not, some measures must be taken to secure the wealth and people of Surat from our native enemies. The town wall is acknowledged to be in an indefensible state, and the castle not much better; and the former to be so extensive, that even the number of troops now allotted for its defence are not sufficient. In my opinion it will be proper to keep the town wall in repair, and to repair the castle in such a manner, that at least no native enemy could attack it with hopes of success.

7. If the castle were in such a state as to stand the attack of a native power, I should think the property of the town very secure from any attempt they could make upon it.

8. The intrenched camp proposed for the troops intended for the defence of Surat appears a good measure; but if a wholesome situation can be found nearer than 11 miles distant, I should recommend it in preference to that proposed. Indeed it appears to me to be desirable that, if possible, the camp should not be at a greater distance than half that proposed.'

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118.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp at Chitchooly, 9th Nov. 1803.

'His Highness may mean well, but it is impossible for a person with the very worst intentions to act in a manner more contrary to the letter and spirit of his treaty with the Company than he has, or to do us more injury by his actions. Therefore, in my opinion, the principle of all our actions towards the Peshwah ought to be our own convenience, and the benefit of the British Government.'

## 119.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Jaum, 9th Nov. 1803.

7. While writing upon the subject of dooley bearers, I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 26th October, which contained the copy of a letter from Colonel Woodington upon the subject of camp followers. Upon this subject I have only to observe, that I might have hoped that a fact which I reported might have been considered as true, without the necessity of referring to Lieut. Colonel Woodington for an opinion regarding its probability.

8. I have also to acknowledge the receipt from Lieut. Colonel Colman of a letter from the Government of Bombay on the 29th August, with various depositions of deserted bullock drivers, against Captain Mackay, taken by the Superintendent of Police at Bombay.

9. Unfortunately for the service, the gentleman against whom these accusations have been made was killed at the battle of Assye, otherwise I should not now be obliged to write in his defence. This officer was notoriously the most humane and gentle towards the natives of any I have yet seen in this army; indeed, this virtue was carried to an excess in his character, that might almost be termed a fault.

10. At my particular desire, and contrary to his own inclinations, he took charge of that part of the Bombay bullock establishment which was to serve with the troops under my command; and, as it was by no means in order, 2000 out of 3000 bullocks being entirely unfit for service, it was necessary to introduce some regulations to provide for the food and care of the cattle. This Captain Mackay certainly did, but neither harshly nor suddenly; and for having done his duty in this instance, those who have deserted this service have been allowed to libel and defame his character, through the medium of the police; and, by going through the offices of government, these libels are placed upon record.

11. As the officer is killed, his character cannot be entirely cleared from the stigma recorded respecting it, on the authority of the lowest and vilest men in society. But I can safely say, that as far as I can answer for another man, these depositions do not contain one word of truth, excepting that the deponents deserted from the service.'

## 120.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 11th Nov. 1803

4. I take the liberty, however, to recommend as a general rule, that between those public officers by whom business can be done verbally, correspondence should be forbidden, as having a great tendency to prevent disputes upon trifling subjects, and to save the time of the public officers who are obliged, some to peruse and consider, and others to copy, those voluminous documents about nothing.'

## 121.

To the Governor General.

11th Nov. 1803.

'On the 6th October I had the honor to apprise your Excellency that propositions, tending to negotiations for peace between the British Govern-



ment and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, had been made to me in various channels, one of which was through the medium of Siddajee Rao Nimbilkur, commonly called Appah Dessaye, who is serving with this division of the army, in the command of a body of the troops belonging to the Peshwah. The result of his communications has been, that a vakeel has been sent here by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to treat for peace.

The name of this person is Jeswunt Rao Goorparah. He is the nephew of the late Morari Rao Goorparah. The usual visits of ceremony have taken place, and I have had one conference with him. In this conference nothing of any consequence passed. He appeared anxious to prove that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been desirous to remain at peace with the British Government, and that if Colonel Collins had not quitted his camp upon receiving the letter addressed to me, which immediately preceded the commencement of hostilities, the war would not have taken place.

His arguments upon this subject were overturned by a narrative of what passed at Ragojee Bhoonslah's tent immediately previous to the dispatch of the letters in question, as related in Colonel Collins's dispatch to me of the 30th July. The principal subject of this conference was occasioned by my calling upon Jeswunt Rao Goorparah to produce his full powers when I showed him in my hand the paper containing those with which your Excellency had intrusted me, of which I explained the nature.

In answer, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah said that it was not customary to send a letter by a sirdar of high rank, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had particular objections to write a letter to me, because I had omitted to answer that which he had written and transmitted in Colonel Collins's dispatch of the 6th August. I explained that I had written an answer to that letter, and a long conversation ensued upon that subject, in which he positively denied that the answer had ever been received.

I then pointed out that it was the common practice throughout the world, and more particularly in the Marhatta empire, that no agent ever was employed in the transaction of the most trifling business, who did not possess some powers from his employers which he could produce; and I stated the inconvenience which would result in transactions between states, if this practice was departed from. I said that I was convinced that a man of his name and high rank would not attempt to deceive me, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah would not venture to deny that he had employed him as a vakeel; but on this ground, and as Appah Dessaye had a letter from Scindiah saying that he was his vakeel, I should suffer him to remain in camp, and should listen to what he had to say. But that I insisted upon his producing full

G. O.

Camp at Jaum, 11th Nov. 1803.

'When publishing the sentence of the General Court Martial on the trial of Captain ——, Major General Wellesley thinks it proper to explain to the troops that there is much difference in the situations and cases in which an officer is permitted to exercise his discretion.

It may frequently happen that an order may be given to an officer which, from circumstances not known to the person who gave it at the time he issued it, would be impossible to execute, or the difficulty or risk of the execution of it would be so great as to amount to a moral impossibility.

In a case of this kind Major General Wellesley is by no means disposed to check officers detached in the exercise of their discretion, but Captain ——'s case is not of this description: he could have and had no information which the officer had not who gave him orders, and it was his duty to obey.'

powers to treat for his employer as soon as a messenger could return from Scindiah's camp. In answer, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah acknowledged the truth and justice of my observations, and said that he should produce the usual powers as required.

I have given your Excellency only an outline of the conversation which passed upon this subject. A memorandum has been taken of this conference, a copy of which shall be transmitted as soon as it can be made.

I cannot account for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah coming unprovided with the usual powers. In proportion, however, as I gain experience of the Marhattas, I have more reason to be astonished at the low and unaccountable tricks which even the highest classes of them practise, with a view, however remote, to forward their own interest.

As Jeswunt Rao Goorparah is a man of high family, and in his manner and appearance rather superior to the Marhatta chiefs whom I have seen in general; and as there is no doubt but that Dowlut Rao Scindiah is reduced to great distress, it is probable that his mission is intended to obtain peace.

It is only lately that Dowlut Rao Scindiah has heard of the brilliant successes of his Excellency the Commander in Chief in the neighbourhood of Delhi, and it is probable that the first accounts he will receive of that of the 10th October near Agra will be from this camp, when he will of course be more anxious to obtain peace.

I have, therefore, no doubt that the proper powers will be transmitted to his vakeel within the time specified; and if they are not, I shall request Jeswunt Rao Goorparah to withdraw from the camp.

As I apprised your Excellency early in the month of October of the probability that I should soon have propositions for peace, and I transmitted the letters I had received from Ballojee Koonger and Mahomed Meer Khan, I think it possible that I may receive your Excellency's instructions applicable to the state of affairs at the period at which you will have received my dispatch of the 6th October; but lest I should not, I proceed to state to your Excellency the demands which I propose to make to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, according to your Excellency's instructions of the 27th June.

First, I shall demand from him the cession of all his territories north of those of the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur.

Secondly; The cession of the fort of Baroach, and a territory depending thereon, amounting to —; and the fort of Ahmednuggur, and a territory depending thereon, amounting to —.

Thirdly; The cession of all his territories situated southward and eastward of the hills called the Adjunttee hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapoor, and all districts in which he may have a joint right with the Soubah of the Deccan, and collects the revenues.

Fourthly; A renunciation of all claims of choute, and all other claims, of whatever denomination, upon the Soubah of the Deccan, and all the allies of the British Government.

Fifthly; An acknowledgment of the independence of the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur.

Sixthly; A renunciation of all claims upon the Rajah of Gohud, who is in future to be dependent upon the British Government.



Seventhly ; An engagement never to entertain in his service any Europeans belonging to a country which may be at war with Great Britain.

Eighthly ; That His Majesty is to be under the protection of the British Government.

Ninthly ; That he shall not molest the chiefs who may have assisted the British Government in the war, of whom I shall include the names of as many as I can procure.

I propose, also, to settle some plan for ascertaining what districts in Candeish and Malwa belong to the Peshwah, and what to Scindiah.

According to this plan for a peace, Scindiah will gain his province of Ahmednuggur, excepting the fort ; his territory subject to Baroach ; the fort of Powanghur, and all his territory in Guzerat : the fort of Asseerghur, all the city of Burhampoor, with all the territory depending on them in Candeish.

This plan appears to provide for all the material objects of your Excellency's instructions of the 27th June, and I shall now state my reasons for not making demands to the full extent of those instructions,

The only objects which I could obtain in addition to those which I propose to demand, are the fort of Asseerghur and the city of Burhampoor, and the territory depending on them in Candeish ; the territory depending on Ahmednuggur ; that in Guzerat depending upon Baroach ; and the fort of Powanghur and its dependency and territory.

The fort of Asseerghur, if ceded by Scindiah, would belong to the Soubah of the Deccan ; and from what I have seen and experienced of his Highness' government, I think there are weighty objections to the increase of his Highness' territories on his northern frontier.

His Highness depends entirely for their defence upon the exertions of the British Government. The system of operations on this frontier must be fundamentally defensive, from the nature of His Highness' government, from the deficiency of his means of defending his country, and the probable strength of the corps which the British Government can allot in case of war to give him assistance.

But in proportion as the distance of the frontier is increased, the difficulty of defending it will increase likewise. The fort of Asseerghur will give no strength to it ; and as for the city of Burhampoor, it would be an additional weak point on the extreme frontier, for the defence of which it would be necessary to provide as for Aurungabad, in the present war, out of the means provided by the treaties with the British Government for carrying on operations in the field.

Another reason for ceding these territories to Scindiah is, that unless they are given to him, he has no motive for making peace. This reason is likewise applicable to the cession of the territories depending upon Ahmednuggur, and those in Guzerat.

I have also to observe, that as Jeswunt Rao Holkar has kept himself hitherto entirely out of the war, and as he will not be weakened in proportion as Dowlut Rao Scindiah has been by its operations, and as he will be by its result, under the proposed peace, it may be thought necessary by your Excellency to preserve a part of Scindiah's strength to enable him to support himself against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

On this ground, and as I think it most desirable to detach Scindiah from the confederacy, by which the peace of Mysore, and of the Company's territories on the Toombuddra, will be in a great measure insured, I have it in contemplation to propose to Scindiah to give him a compensation in Berar for the territories which he will cede to the British Government in the north of Hindustan, provided that he will cede to the Company all the territory in Guzerat depending on Baroach, and will join in the war against the Rajah of Berar. This will make Scindiah more powerful against Holkar and the Rajah of Berar than he was before the war: it will probably induce him to conclude the peace immediately; at the same time that, relatively to the British Government, it will not alter the state of his power. However, I shall not make this offer, unless I should find great difficulty in obtaining the other objects.

If peace, according to the plan above proposed, should be made, it will remain to be determined in what manner the Soubah of the Deccan is to participate equally with the British Government in the advantages of the war. I believe there is no doubt but that his Highness has not performed all the conditions of the treaty of defensive alliance with the Company; but, upon the whole, your Excellency may think it more consistent with the liberal policy of your government to admit him to a share of the benefits of the peace.

However, before this is done, it is my opinion that advantage ought to be taken of his Highness' breach of his engagements, to improve the treaty of defensive alliance, and to provide some security in future for the due execution of its most material articles. The interests of the parties, it might be supposed, would alone provide a sufficient security for this object; but the Soubah's government are well acquainted with the interest the British Government have in their preservation; they will for ever depend upon that interest, and trust to the known honor of the British Government for their support, and will never make any exertion, the object of which is to provide for their own security, so long as they have the support of the British power. I would therefore recommend the following amendments to the treaty of defensive alliance, which will ensure the existence of some strength in the government of Hyderabad.

First; That the British Resident should have the power of mustering, at certain periods, the troops which his Highness is bound by the treaty to maintain. I believe that his Highness' government exercise this power in respect to the British troops, and no reasonable objection can be made to the exercise of it by the British Resident in respect to the troops of his Highness the Soubah.

Secondly; That for every horseman found absent at muster his Highness should pay 50 rupees per mensem; and for every foot soldier 20 rupees per mensem, till the numbers of each description should be complete.

Thirdly; That the British Resident should have the power of sending persons into the forts on his Highness' frontiers to inspect the state of their magazines, and see that they are filled with grain according to the tenor of his Highness' engagement with the Company.

Under these arrangements, the state of the Soubah of the Deccan will revive, and the government will have some strength to enforce obedience to



its orders, and to preserve tranquillity in the country, besides the Company's troops stationed at Hyderabad.

If these arrangements should be consented to, his Highness will have Jaulna and all the districts of which Dowlut Rao Scindiah has hitherto collected the revenue jointly with his Highness, situated to the southward and eastward of the Adjutee hills. I do not know the value of these districts, but I believe it is above 3 lacs of rupees *per annum*.

I take the liberty of recommending to your Excellency to take into consideration the question regarding the Peshwah's claim to choute on his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. If the result of the discussions on that subject should be to substantiate the claim of his Highness the Peshwah, the best mode of settling the claims of the Soubah of the Deccan, under the treaty of defensive alliance, would be to take upon the Company the satisfaction of claims of the Peshwah; and this might be done, either by restoring to his Highness the territories in the west of India, ceded to the Company by the treaty of Bassein, or by restoring to him a part of Bundelcund, ceded under a late arrangement made at Poonah to amend the treaty of Bassein, to the amount of his claims for choute upon his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

According to this plan, his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan will remain at the end of the war with a larger territory, freed from all the vexatious claims of the Marhattas.

If the result of the discussion upon the subject of choute should be, that his Highness the Peshwah has no claims upon the Soubah of the Deccan, the share of the latter in the conquests can be given to him in money, or in territory south of the Toombuddra, yielding a revenue equal in amount to that to which he will have a claim.

As well as I can recollect the treaty of Bassein, the Peshwah has no claim to participate in conquests; and if he had under the treaty, his breach of all its stipulations would free your Excellency from the necessity of giving him any thing. However, your Excellency may deem it proper that he should enjoy some of the advantages resulting from the war, and the cession of his territories in the Surat Attavesy would be full satisfaction for all his claims. But before this territory should be ceded to his Highness the Peshwah, he ought to be required to consent to the improvements of the defensive alliance which I have above recommended should be required from his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

I am of opinion that the fortress of Ahmednuggur ought to be kept in the hands of the British Government until all these arrangements shall have been completed, and your Excellency shall see in what manner the defensive alliances will work.'

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122.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp, 13th Nov. 1803.

'Lieut. Colonel Harness' letter upon the subject of Colonel —— was a public one, which I sent to you in a private form, in order that you might do with it what you might think proper. Colonel —— is certainly not a fit person to be at the head of a regiment, and so I have told him; and I can have no objection to your making use of my sentiments on this subject, in any manner that you may think proper. At the same time I am much

flattered by your desiring to have my sentiments upon the production of that letter to Government before you determined to do so.

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Wherever there is an army in the field there is risk, particularly in this country, in which we are liable to so many accidents of losses of cattle, &c. ; but, excepting from the want of money, I think I may now venture to say, that we are in such a state of equipment, and both our divisions are so well supplied with provisions, that we must bring the campaign to an honorable and successful close.'

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123.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 15th Nov. 1803.

'Time is every thing in military operations, particularly in conducting convoys. If these come on with celerity, they run no great risk; but if they are delayed long at any place, information is given of them, and they are attacked, and the success is always a matter of doubt.'

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124.

To Major Cuyler, 86th reg.

Camp, 15th Nov. 1803.

'Since that time I have received another letter from Mr. Duncan, enclosing one from the merchants claiming the property captured at Baroach, written in rather extraordinary terms, a copy of which and of my answer I enclose. I now proceed to give you my opinion upon the claim of the army to this property. I have no books nor any papers by me to assist me in forming this opinion, and I write only from memory.

As well as I recollect, Lord Rodney took the island of St. Eustatia, in the West Indies, from the Dutch, during the American war; at which island was found a vast quantity of British property, which was certainly contraband, and, moreover, was intended for the supply of the public enemies of the state. The captors claimed this property as prize; there was a long law-suit upon the subject, which was decided against them.

There can be no doubt whatever of the legality of the trade carried on by the British merchants at Baroach; and that there is nothing criminal in their property being found there, as was the case in respect to the property found at St. Eustatia. Their case, therefore, is better than that of the merchants whose property was taken at St. Eustatia, and it is probable that any law-suit upon the subject would be decided in their favor.

However, I do not wish the army to take my opinion on the subject as conclusive. The best thing they can do is to make out a fair and clear statement of the case, and refer it to a lawyer for his opinion. If he should advise them to prosecute the claim, they must do it, as they will observe, at the expense of a law-suit with the merchants. If he should advise them to give it up, I recommend them to do so.

I do not think the Government will give them any compensation for this claim. If the property is considered as private, and belonging to the merchants, of course Government will object to giving any remuneration out of the public purse for any claim upon it, however well founded.

I shall be happy to forward the views of the army in any thing they may think that I can be of service to them, and I have therefore given you my sentiments fully upon the subject on which you have written to me.'



125.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 18th Nov. 1803.

' Until I received this morning the Governor General's letter of the 27th, I was afraid that my dispatch of the 11th would have been deemed tame, and that the demands which I proposed to make were below what we were entitled to expect. But I find, by the notes contained in his letter, that there is but little difference between his plan and mine; and, in fact, I intended to amend my plan before I received your memorandum, according to that contained in the Governor General's notes.

The principal difference in the plan contained in my dispatch, and that in the memorandum, consists first in the article regarding Europeans. I took the restriction contained in my plan from the treaty of Bassein: but upon reflecting further on the subject, and upon recollecting that the Peshwah would have been restricted from taking into his service any Frenchmen, if we had not been at peace with France, I determined to alter the plan so far as to demand that Scindiah should never have any Frenchmen in his service, nor Dutchmen, nor Italians, nor Spaniards; and, in fact, that he should not have in his service the subjects of any European nation, the government of which should be at war with Great Britain.

It appears, however, that the Governor General is desirous that they should not have any Europeans at all. This prohibition will go to their having no infantry or artillery, and this is a point which I think deserves consideration.

Scindiah's armies had actually been brought to a very favorable state of discipline, and his power had become formidable by the exertions of the European officers in his service; but I think it is much to be doubted, whether his power, or rather that of the Marhatta nation, would not have been more formidable, at least to the British Government, if they had never had an European, as an infantry soldier, in their service; and had carried on their operations, in the manner of the original Marhattas, only by means of cavalry.

I have no doubt whatever but that the military spirit of the nation has been destroyed by their establishment of infantry and artillery, possibly, indeed, by other causes; at all events, it is certain that those establishments, however formidable, afford us a good object of attack in a war with the Marhattas, and that the destruction of them contributes to the success of the contest, and to the re-establishment of peace: because, having made them the principal object of their attention, (which they must do, in order to have

G. O.

Camp at Waukode, 19th Nov. 1803.

' The General has lately observed many sepoy straggling from their corps, some in driving bullocks, others in charge of officers' baggage, and several under the pretence of guarding ammunition, to attend which a sufficient number of lascars is allowed. Officers commanding corps will be pleased not to permit in future of any sepoy marching out of their lines on any of those pretences.'

G. O.

Camp at Nowley, 21st Nov. 1803.

' Repeated orders having been given to the agent for cavalry supplies to cause payment to be made on the spot for grain taken by his servants in the villages, and complaints having been made to day that grain so taken has not been paid for: Major General Wellesley is pleased to publish in G. O. a general regulation, that grain taken or bargained for in the villages, by any department belonging to the army, shall be paid for on the spot before the grain is removed; and he warns all persons concerned that any deviations from this rule will be submitted to a public inquiry.

them at all,) and that part of their strength on which they place most reliance, they become also the principal reliance of the army; and, therefore, when they are lost, the cavalry, as is the case in this war, will not act.

Two questions occur here,—one is, whether the Marhatta cavalry were ever better than they now are: if they were, whether they would regain their spirit, if the infantry establishment were to be destroyed? I believe they were formerly better than they now are. In regard to the second point, I have to observe, that if there were no infantry in a Marhatta army, their cavalry would commence those predatory operations for which they were formerly so famous; and although I am aware of the greater difficulties they would now have to encounter than their ancestors formerly had, from the practice which is universal in the Deccan, and I believe in Hindustan, of fortifying every village, (and I know that these are means of opposing them successfully,) I should still consider these operations to be more formidable to the British Government, than any that they can ever carry on by means of the best body of infantry that they can form. On this ground, therefore, I think that they should be encouraged to have infantry rather than otherwise. As, however, the Governor General has given a positive opinion upon this subject, I shall make a demand in conformity to his wishes: but this shall be the last of my demands, in hopes that I may hear further from you on the subject, before the peace shall be concluded.’

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 126.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Rajoora, 23rd Nov. 1803.

‘ My motives for agreeing to this suspension of hostilities are, First; that I have no power of injuring Scindiah any further. I have taken all he had in the Deccan; and the troops in Guzerat cannot advance upon Ougein, for the reasons stated in a late dispatch to the Governor General, of which I enclosed you a copy. His army now consists of horse only; and in order to distress that, it will be necessary to follow it to a greater distance from our sources of supply; which, considering the distance we are from them already, becomes a matter of some consequence; and from our operations upon the Rajah of Berar, which are most likely to bring about a peace.

Secondly; Scindiah’s horse might do us much mischief, and might derange our plans against the Rajah of Berar, supposing them to be at liberty to act. The Rajah of Berar’s infantry, and a corps of cavalry, both under Manoo Bappoo, are encamped not far from Gawilghur, the place which Colonel Stevenson has been ordered to attack. It is probable that both he and Scindiah would retire upon Colonel Stevenson’s advance; but they would attack Colonel Stevenson during the time that he might be employed at Gawilghur: or, possibly, Scindiah would make an irruption into the Soubah’s territories, to draw me off to a distance, and Manoo Bappoo would attack Colonel Stevenson.

Thirdly; Bappojee Scindiah has been sent into Hindustan to defend Ougein against our troops, supposed to be advancing from Guzerat. There is already at Ougein some infantry, which have not been engaged, and the defeated infantry are on the Nerbudda. On his arrival at Ougein, he will find Colonel Murray necessarily engaged with Canojee Rao Guickwar, and Dohud held only by one battalion, and he would naturally make an irruption



into Guzerat. This is prevented by the cessation from hostilities. Guzerat, instead of being our strongest, is by far our weakest point in every respect.

Fourthly; By leaving the Rajah of Berar out of the arrangement, Scindiah's interests become separate from his; all confidence in Scindiah, if such a thing ever existed, must be lost, and the confederacy becomes, *ipso facto*, dissolved.

I see no inconvenience that can result from the measure, particularly as I have the power of dissolving the agreement whenever I please. I acknowledge that this cessation of hostilities is against all the rules; but, in this instance, I think they are rules of which the breach is more likely to be beneficial to the public than the observance.

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I think it is probable that I shall succeed in making peace. I have had a good deal of conversation with the vakeels upon the subject of the demand for compensation, to which they appear to have made up their minds, and to be convinced of the necessity of peace to the affairs of their masters. They hinted last night that Scindiah intended, after the war, to place himself under the protection of the Company. They seem to have much confidence in me, which, at all events, is a point gained in the negotiation.'

127.

REMARKS UPON MAJOR MALCOLM'S MEMORANDUM ON A PROPOSED TREATY OF PEACE.

23rd Nov. 1803.

'I agree in the first parts of Major Malcolm's memorandum; and, as will appear by my letter to Major Shawe, I intend to amend my plan for the peace, nearly in the manner proposed by Major Malcolm.

In respect to the participation in the conquests at the end of the war, that is not a question referrible to me; but while writing upon the general subject of peace, I stated my ideas of the only practicable mode of settling that question, consistently with the engagements of the British Government.

Under the proposed peace with Scindiah only, the Nizam will have to receive nearly 50 lacs of rupees annually, that is supposing the Peshwah to receive nothing; Major Malcolm objects to the mode proposed by me of paying that sum, and has proposed others, though he has not specified them.

The first of the modes is to look to the territories of the Rajah of Berar. Upon the peace with the Rajah of Berar, the Company will gain the province of Cuttack; and besides will connect the northern Circars with Bundelcund. The Nizam must receive an equivalent upon his own frontier. If, besides this, he is to receive 50 lacs of rupees from the Rajah of Berar, the Rajah's state will be annihilated. That plan, therefore, is inconsistent with the Governor General's idea of preserving all these Marhatta states; and, at all events, is impracticable consistently with making peace at an early period.

The next plan is to increase the subsidiary force, and to keep a body of horse. My object in proposing a plan for obliging the government to have some force was, that I felt severely, in carrying on the war, the want of it; and I wished not to increase the dependence of the government upon the British power, but to create some force in the state which could carry it through ordinary events. Without such a force in the state all will look

well at Hyderabad and in a dispatch from the Resident to the Governor General, but really, and at bottom, all will continue to be weakness and confusion; and in the end the Nizam's government will fall to pieces.

If such a force is not established in the state, in my opinion the subsidiary force ought to be doubled; and there ought to be a body of horse besides: and moreover, the British Government will be involved in constant warfare and constant expense to support the Nizam's government in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Let Major Malcolm come into the country, and he will soon perceive the truth of this statement.

In respect to the Peshwah's claim of choute, it is one, as I understand, founded on treaties; and the British Government is bound, by treaty to both parties, to arbitrate and decide it according to the principles of justice, on the ground of the treaty of Mhar. There never was such an opportunity for a government to show its justice and its power; and surely that opportunity ought not to be lost. But the fact is, that choute is collected in all parts of the Nizam's territories at this moment; and when Major Malcolm shall come here he will know it. The strongest advocate for the Nizam ought, therefore, to wish that that question should be decided.

Major Malcolm says that the Nizam has claims upon the Peshwah for expenses incurred in restoring his government. That is a point for the justice of the British Government to decide, and is no argument at all against canvassing the question. He then says, that the Peshwah might be induced, by some concession or consideration, to give up his claim of choute upon the Nizam. In my opinion it would not be right to urge him to do so; as, if that is done, there will be no other mode of satisfying the claims of the Nizam under the peace. But supposing the Peshwah could be induced, by any concession, to give up his claims of choute upon the Nizam, the Governor General has to choose between the Attavesy and Bundelcund.

I shall deliver no opinion upon this subject, excepting that I consider the Attavesy as no object for the defence of Surat; and that I consider Bundelcund as a great object for the defence of Benares.

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128.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 24th Nov. 1803.

' Upon the whole, therefore, upon military principles, the cessation of hostilities with Scindiah was desirable to me; and I had made up my mind to grant it, as soon as I had reason to suspect that it would be asked. As a political measure, as it does not extend to the Rajah of Berar, and as Scindiah is kept within his territories, it has the effect of separating the interests of those Chiefs entirely. It is impossible that the Rajah of Berar can ever hereafter have any confidence in Scindiah, and it may be considered that the confederacy is dissolved.

If advantage should be taken of the cessation of hostilities to delay the negotiations for peace, your Excellency will observe that I have the power of putting an end to it when I please, and that, supposing I am obliged to put an end to it, on the day after I shall receive its ratification, I shall at least have gained so much time every where for my operations, and shall have succeeded in dividing the enemy entirely.

Such an agreement is certainly not usual, and in general impolitic; but



the circumstances of this case are also unusual, and, upon the whole, I am induced to hope that your Excellency will approve of the measure.'

## 129.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Parterly, 30th Nov. 1803.

'I have the honor to inform you that I attacked the armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar yesterday afternoon, on the plains of Argaum in this neighbourhood, with the divisions of the army under my immediate command, and the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, under Colonel Stevenson, and completely defeated the enemy, having taken from them their cannon, ammunition, &c., and destroyed vast numbers of them.

I have reason to believe that the loss which I have sustained upon this occasion has not been great. No officer has been killed, and but few wounded. I shall forward to your Excellency a detailed account of this action, as well as of the circumstances which led to it, as soon as I shall receive a return of the killed and wounded.'

## 130.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Parterly, 30th Nov. 1803.

'Having found that the Rajah of Berar was moving towards his own territories,—that the body of troops he had with him was but small, decreasing in numbers daily, and not likely to do much mischief to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, I descended the ghauts by Rajoora on the 25th, in order to support and cover Colonel Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur in Berar.

Colonel Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur for the siege of that fort, and had marched to Ballapoor, where he was joined on the 24th by the brinjaries, and other supplies which had been saved from the enemy by Captain Baynes' affair at UMBER; and he marched forward on the 26th.

Your Excellency has been informed, that on the 23rd I had consented to a suspension of hostilities with the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in this quarter and Guzerat. The condition on which this agreement depended, viz., "that Scindiah should occupy a position 20 coss to the east of Ellich-poor," had not been carried into execution; and Scindiah was encamped at Sersooly, about 4 miles from the camp of Manoo Bappoo, brother to the Rajah of Berar, which was at this place. The army of the former consisted only of cavalry; that of the latter, of cavalry, and a great part, if not the whole, of Ragojee Bhoonslah's regular infantry; and a large proportion of artillery.

In the course of the 28th, the vakeels from Dowlut Rao Scindiah urgently pressed me not to attack these troops; but I informed them repeatedly that there was no suspension of arms with Ragojee Bhoonslah; and none with Scindiah, till he should comply with the terms of his agreement; and that I should certainly attack the enemies of the Company wherever I should find them.

Colonel Stevenson's division and mine both marched to this place yesterday; the Colonel having with great prudence and propriety halted on the 28th at Huttee Andoorah, to enable me to co-operate in the attack of the

enemy. We found on our arrival that the armies of both Chiefs had decamped; and from a tower in Parterly I could perceive a confused mass, about 2 miles beyond Sersooly and Scindiah's old camp, which I concluded to be their armies in march. The troops had marched a great distance on a very hot day, and I therefore did not think it proper to pursue them; but shortly after our arrival here, bodies of horse appeared in our front, with which the Mysore cavalry skirmished during a part of the day; and when I went out to push forward the piquets of the infantry to support the Mysore cavalry, and to take up the ground of our encampment, I could perceive distinctly a long line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plains of Argaum, immediately in front of that village, and about 6 miles from this place, at which I intended to encamp.

Although late in the day, I immediately determined to attack this army. Accordingly, I marched on in one column, the British cavalry leading in a direction nearly parallel to that of the enemy's line; covering the rear and left by the Mogul and Mysore cavalry. The enemy's infantry and guns were in the left of their centre, with a body of cavalry on their left. Scindiah's army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was on the right, having upon its right a body of pindarries and other light troops. Their line extended above 5 miles, having in their rear the village and extensive gardens and enclosures of Argaum; and in their front a plain, which, however, was much cut by watercourses, &c.

I formed the army in two lines; the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second, and supporting the right; and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy; with the right rather advanced in order to press upon the enemy's left. Some little time elapsed before the lines could be formed, owing to a part of the infantry of my division which led the column having got into some confusion. When formed, the whole advanced in the greatest order; the 74th and 78th regts. were attacked by a large body, (supposed to be Persians,) and all these were destroyed. Scindiah's cavalry charged the 1st batt. 6th regt., which was on the left of our line, and were repulsed; and their whole line retired in disorder before our troops, leaving in our hands 38 pieces of cannon and all their ammunition.

The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels and much baggage. The Mogul and Mysore cavalry also pursued the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Some of the latter are still following them; and I have sent out this morning all of the Mysore, Mogul, and Marhatta cavalry, in order to secure as many advantages from this victory as can be gained, and complete the enemy's confusion.

For the reasons stated in the commencement of this letter, the action did not commence till late in the day; and unfortunately sufficient daylight did not remain to do all that I could have wished; but the cavalry continued their pursuit by moonlight, and all the troops were under arms till a late hour in the night.

I have the honor to enclose a return of our loss in this action. The troops conducted themselves with their usual bravery. The 74th and 78th regts. had a particular opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and have deserved and received my thanks. I am also much indebted to Colonel



Stevenson, for the advice and assistance I received from him; to the Hon. Lieut. Colonel St. Leger for the manner in which he led on the British cavalry; and to Lieut. Colonels Wallace, Adams, (who commanded Lieut. Colonel Harness' brigade, the latter being absent on account of severe indisposition,) Haliburton, Maclean, Pogson, and Major Huddleston, who commanded brigades of cavalry and infantry; to Major Campbell, commanding the 94th regt.; to Captain Beauman, commanding the artillery with the divisions under my immediate command; to Captain Burke, commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force; and to the officers of the staff with my division, and belonging to the subsidiary force.

I have also to inform your Excellency that the Mogul cavalry under Salabut Khan, and the Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, distinguished themselves. The former took a standard from Scindiah's troops. The Marhatta cavalry were not engaged, as the person who went to them with orders missed his road. Amrut Rao was not in the action, as he had encamped some distance in my rear on the 28th, and he could not march the whole distance to Parterly yesterday morning; but he sent for orders as soon as he heard that I intended to attack the enemy.

I propose to march tomorrow towards Gawilghur, and I shall lose no time in attacking that place.'

G. M. O.

Camp, near the plains of Argaum, 30th Nov. 1803.

'The 1st batt. 3rd regt. and 2nd batt. 11th regt. are to encamp at the entrance into the gardens where the action ended last night, and are to protect the captured guns and ammunition. The quarter masters of brigades to which those corps belong will see that their camp equipage, baggage, and bazaars are sent down to them.

Major General Wellesley congratulates the troops upon the success of yesterday, which he has every reason to hope was effected without any great loss.

The Major General's thanks are due upon this occasion to all the troops for the perseverance with which they went through the fatigues of the day, and for the steadiness they displayed during the action, but in particular to the 74th and 78th regts.

To Colonel Stevenson for the advice and assistance he received from him; to the Hon. Lieut. Colonel St. Leger for the manner in which he led the British cavalry; to Lieut. Colonel Pogson, Major Middleton, Lieut. Colonels Wallace and Adams (who commanded Lieut. Colonel Harness' brigade during his absence on account of severe indisposition), Haliburton and Maclean, commanding brigades of cavalry and infantry; and to the officers of the staff belonging to Major General Wellesley's division, and the subsidiary force. Major General Wellesley had also particular satisfaction in observing the order and steadiness with which the 94th regt., commanded by Major Campbell, advanced to the attack.

The artillery of both divisions was well served and brought up; and Major General Wellesley's thanks upon this occasion are due in a particular manner to Captain Beauman, commanding the artillery in the division under his immediate command, and to Captain Burke, commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force.

The paymaster of each division will pay 200 rupees to each corps of cavalry and infantry in their respective divisions as a zeafet, and 100 to the detachments of artillery for the same purpose.

Captain Bellingham will pay 200 rupees to the 1st batt. of pioneers, of which Captain Heitland will allot a proportion to the pioneers with the subsidiary force.'

G. O.

Camp near Argaum, 30th Nov. 1803.

'Major General Wellesley publishes to the troops under his command the copy of an agreement into which he had entered with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of suspending hostilities between the troops under his command, and those in the service of that Chief.

Major General Wellesley, on the part of the Hon. Company and their allies, and Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana on the part of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, having each communicated to the other their full powers, have made the following agreement:—

1. There shall be a cessation of hostilities between the troops commanded by Major General Wellesley in the Deccan and in Guzerat and those in the service of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

## 131.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Akote, 2nd Dec. 1803.

' I have but little to add to my letter of the 30th to the Governor General respecting the battle of Argaum. The number of the enemy destroyed is very great. Vittell Punt, who commanded the cavalry of the Rajah of Berar, was killed; and Gopal Bhow, who commanded Scindiah's cavalry that fought was wounded. If we had had daylight an hour more, not a man would have escaped. We should have had that time, if my native infantry had not been panic struck, and got into confusion when the cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly 3 entire battalions, who behaved so admirably in the battle of Assye, being broke and running off, when the cannonade commenced at Argaum, which was not to be compared to that at Assye? Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not been there, I am convinced we should have lost the day. But as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, that we had not daylight enough for every thing that we should certainly have performed. The troops were under arms, and I was on horseback, from 6 in the morning until 12 at night.

Nothing could have been more fortunate than my return to the northward. I just arrived in time. Colonel Stevenson was not delayed for me more than one day; and it is a curious circumstance, that, after having been so long separated, and such a distance between us, we should have joined at a moment so critical.

A vakeel has come in from the Rajah of Berar, but nothing very particular has occurred. I have demanded compensation from the Rajah; and

2. To prevent accidents, and in order to insure the execution of the 1st article, it is agreed that there shall be an interval of 20 coss between the different British and allied armies and that of the Maharajah: and the Maharajah will march with his army and take up a position 20 coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and he will forage still further to the eastward.

3. In case the operations of the British and allied armies against the other enemies of the British government should draw either of them nearer than 20 coss to the position which the Maharajah will have occupied, according to the 2nd article, previous notice of such operation will be given in order that the Maharajah may take timely measures always to preserve an interval of 20 coss between his army and the British and allied troops.

4. In Guzerat the British troops shall not advance beyond Dohud; those of the Maharajah on the side of Guzerat shall not approach nearer than 20 coss to Dohud.

5. Notice must be given in case either of the parties should be desirous of putting an end to this agreement.

6. This agreement is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and his ratification is to be given to Major General Wellesley in the space of 10 days from this time.

Mem.

Camp, 30th Nov. 1803.

The condition of this suspension was, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should go with his army to a position to the neighbourhood of which it was not probable that the operations of the British troops would carry them for some time.

This condition remained unexecuted on his part, and he was repeatedly informed that until it was executed, he was liable to be attacked as well as any other enemy of the British government wherever he should be found.

As this transaction, connected with the action of yesterday, may possibly become a matter of general conversation, Major General Wellesley adopts this mode of making the real facts public, that all persons may form their own judgment upon it.'

Mem.

30th Nov. 1803.

' A vakeel from Ragojee Bhoonslah is to wait on Major General Wellesley this afternoon. The General will be happy to see any officer who may wish to be present on this occasion.'



I have desired the vakeel to stay at Ellichpoor until he is authorised to grant it.

The powers to Scindiah's vakeels were not quite so perfect upon this point as I wished; and they shall go away tomorrow, unless they can produce them in a more perfect form. There is no dealing with these Marhattas, unless they are treated in this manner; and unless a regular document is brought forward upon every point that may occur.

The Rajah is much alarmed about Gawilghur, and I think he is sincere; indeed, I think Scindiah is so likewise. But every Marhatta chief is so haughty, and so prone to delay, that I suspect that both these Chiefs will be ruined, rather than submit to the conditions which I must require from them.'

## 132.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp, 2nd Dec. 1803.

'I am concerned to observe the state of your Marhatta cavalry, and the trouble they give you by plundering the country: there is no remedy for it, but I positively forbid it.

I recommend to you to have a conference upon this point with the Chief of the Guickwar troops, to tell him that this practice must be stopped, and that you are determined to punish, with the utmost severity, any that might be guilty of it.

If my Marhatta allies did not know that I should hang any one that might be found plundering, not only I should have starved long ago, but most probably my own coat would have been taken off my back.'

## 133.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp at Paundry, S. of Gawilghur, 3rd Dec. 1803.

'I have Gawilghur now in sight, and it does not appear to be so strong as many hill forts in Mysore taken by our troops. However, we shall see more of it in a few days.

You will have been surprised to have seen in my letter to the Governor General a report that part of our native infantry got into confusion. The fact was, that the 1st of the 10th, and 2nd of the 12th, and the native part of the piquets, broke and ran off, as soon as the cannonade commenced, although it was from a great distance, and not to be compared with that of Assye. I am convinced that if I had not been near them, to rally them and restore the battle, we should have lost the day. However, those of them whom I was able to collect and form again behaved steadily afterwards.

I am sorry to tell you that the iron axle-trees of 2 of the brass 12 pounders broke in less than a quarter of an hour's firing. You may recollect that I wrote to you on this subject formerly. There is no remedy for this incon-

Mem.

Camp, 1st Dec. 1803.

'All the elephants and camels captured from the enemy in the late action to be sent immediately to the head quarters of the subsidiary force, to be sold by public auction at 10 o'clock this forenoon.

G. A. O.

Camp, 1st Dec. 1803.

'Major General Wellesley is surprised to hear, by the report of the staff surgeon this evening, that the officers commanding corps who have the charge of carrying their sick, have provided themselves with so few hackeries, after the early notice given to them today, that they might have the hackeries by applying to Captain Beauman; and he desires that they will without delay provide themselves.'

venience, excepting to lengthen considerably the trail of the carriage, and by that means to prevent the stress of the recoil coming entirely upon the axle-tree. I recommended this matter to the Military Board, in respect to the 12 pounder gallopers made at Seringapatam, but it was not approved of: but at all events it is really worth a trial; and I therefore take the liberty of mentioning it to you. The axle-tree of one of the 12 pounders in Colonel Stevenson's corps broke likewise.

Scindiah has ratified the treaty for suspending hostilities; and his vakeels say that he is going to the east of Ellichpoor, according to the agreement. I have told them that I shall consider it as void on my part if he does not perform all the conditions. We have advanced no farther in the peace, than that the vakeels have brought forward a kind of consent to treat upon the basis of giving compensation to the Company.

Ragojee Bhoonslah has likewise sent a vakeel here. I have made the same demand from him. I have sent him to wait at Ellichpoor, till he receives an answer to it. They are most terribly alarmed for the loss of Gawilghur, &c. On this ground, I expect to conclude with Ragojee immediately. His vakeel pressed hard for a suspension of hostilities, which I positively refused.'

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 134.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Ellichpoor, 5th Dec. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd November, upon the subject of the conduct of the military at Surat. When the residence of officers who have been accused of improper and riotous behaviour has been described, names have in some instances been stated, and in all a description of their persons, and of their mode of conveyance, has been given, it is scarcely to be credited that the commanding officer had it not in his power to discover those who were accused. At all events, measures might, and ought to have been adopted by the commanding officer to put an end to these disgraceful proceedings, which it appears he entirely neglected.

2. Under these circumstances, I take the liberty of recommending, first; that the commanding officer of Surat may be removed from his situation: and secondly; that orders may be given to the civil magistrate to seize, and send to Bombay for trial in the court of the Recorder, any officer who may hereafter be accused of rioting in the streets or city of Surat. Of course the civil magistrate must do every thing in his power that the person of the officer of whom complaint may be made may be ascertained, and his name known; and in this respect I have to observe, that the civil magistrate does not appear to me to have done every thing that he could do.

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7. In conducting the extensive duties with which I am charged, it has been my constant wish to conform to existing rules and establishments, and to introduce no innovations; so that at the conclusion of the war, when my duties would cease, every thing might go on in its accustomed channel. For this reason, and for others not necessary at present to discuss, I have sent no orders to Colonel Murray, excepting two orders applicable to the general state of affairs, which have lately gone to him, but which were first submitted to the Governor for his approbation.

I do not comprehend, and cannot say that I admire the system according



to which the connexion with the Guickwar government is carried on; but this possibly proceeds from ignorance of the subject. At all events, I know that I am not able to suggest or order any measure that could remedy it; and if I were to interfere at all, I might order a measure which would be inconsistent with the existing system. I am therefore very desirous not to be called upon to take a more active part in the internal concerns of Guzerat than I have hitherto; and that matters should be conducted as usual, under the immediate orders of government. Whenever the Hon. the Governor in Council may think proper to call for my opinion upon any subject, I will give it him, to the best of my judgment and abilities; and I shall do so whenever I may think it necessary, in all matters which have a relation to our general situation. But I hope that he will not desire me to enter into the detail of Guzerat affairs, which I cannot be supposed to comprehend, and with which I am convinced it was never intended that I should be charged.'

## 135.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp, 6th Dec. 1803.

'I have promised to move to his assistance in case the Rajah should attack him. Thus I have succeeded in bringing upon that rascal the full measure of God's vengeance; and if I live a month longer, he shall either be at peace with the Company, or I shall be at Nagpoor, with all the armies either with me or about me. We shall take Gawilghur, I hope, with ease. The fort has been firing all day at my parties, which I have pushed to the foot of the hill.

Our late victory was grand; it has made a great impression throughout the country. Indeed, between the destruction there dealt out, and the consequent desertion of troops, the enemy have but few troops left; and I anxiously hope that they will come within reach to allow me to give them a parting blow with our cavalry only.'

## 136.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp at Ellichpoor, 6th Dec. 1803.

'I have read, with the utmost concern, the copy of a letter which you wrote to General Nicolls on the 12th November. This paper was hastily drawn and dispatched, to say no more of it; and I strongly recommend to you to desire to withdraw it. It contains some strong censures upon Mr. Duncan personally, and upon his government; and a hope is expressed in it, which I am convinced you could never entertain, that the day was not far distant when the Government, and of course the British interests, would be involved in difficulties.

G. O.

Camp, Ellichpoor, 6th Dec. 1803.

'Captain Young will send into Ellichpoor one month's allowance of arrack, salt, and rice, and 8 days' allowance of sheep for 150 Europeans.

In consequence of the great labor of the dooley bearers in the public service, and the important services they have performed in removing the wounded men to the hospitals after the late battles of Assye and in the plains of Argaum, Major General Wellesley desires that a donation of 2 star pagodas may be given to each maistry, and 1 star pagoda to each dooley bearer in the public service on the Madras establishment.

This donation is to be drawn for in a separate abstract and paid as soon as possible by the persons in charge of the public dooley bearers in the divisions under the command of Major General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson.'

An officer in the service of a government, let his rank be what it may, has no right to, and cannot with propriety, address such sentiments to that government; even supposing that they were merited, and had been excited in his mind by a long course of injurious treatment by such government. So far from that being the case, I must say that the occasion upon which you wrote did not warrant such opinions, and ought not to have excited your anger in any manner. On the contrary, I think that the letter written to Major General Nicolls, by the government of Bombay, promised the fullest support to your revenue arrangements at Godra, and that was all that you could expect. For my part, I did not expect it; and when I received the copy of their letter to Major General Nicolls, which I did when it was written, I was astonished that the subject should have been viewed in so liberal a manner.

I enclose you a copy of my letter to the government of Bombay upon this subject. Remember that I tell you that no person can approve of your having written the letter in question: you may depend upon it that the Governor General will take the most serious notice of it, and therefore I again most anxiously recommend you to withdraw it.'

G. O.

Camp near Gawilghur, 14th Dec. 1803.

'Colonel Stevenson's division is to storm the northern face of the fort of Gawilghur tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, and the following arrangements are to be made to facilitate and support that operation.

The 74th regt., 5 companies of the 78th, and the 1st batt. 8th regt. to be in readiness to march at 3 o'clock tomorrow morning, under the orders of Lieut. Colonel Wallace.

5 companies of the 78th, and the 1st batt. 10th regt., with a 6 pounder attached, are to be under the command of Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, and to be in readiness to march at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

A company of the 1st batt. 8th regt., under an European officer, to be left in the 12 pound battery, Barry, &c., for the security of all the stores, &c., there.

A company of the 1st batt. 10th regt., under an European officer, to be left in the camp for the security of any thing there.

A party of 70 pioneers, with crow's, pickaxes, hatchets, and a saw, to accompany each detachment.

Major General Wellesley desires that the soldiers and sepoys may not be allowed to quit their ranks without the special permission of Major General Wellesley or Colonel Stevenson, and the officers are made responsible for a due obedience of this order.'

G. O.

15th Dec. 1803.

'The breach having been reported practicable, the troops will advance to the attack at 10 o'clock.

Storming party to be commanded by Lieut. Colonel Kenny, and to be formed as follows:

The advance to consist of a serjeant and 12 volunteers of H.M. 94th regt.

First party, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Kenny, to be composed of 1 flank and 2 battalion companies of the 94th regt., and the flank companies of the 2nd brigade. Second party, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Desse, to consist of 1 flank and 2 battalion companies of H.M. 94th regt. and the flank companies of the 1st brigade. Third party, the remainder of H.M. 94th regt., under Major Campbell.

The 2nd brigade, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Haliburton, will follow the storming party advancing from the right.

The first party, after entering the breach, will turn to the right, and the second party to the left, to drive the enemy from the ramparts, while the 94th regt. and the 2nd brigade will advance and gain possession of the heights and of the enemy's guns.

A detail of artillery to accompany each party to take possession of the guns, and turn them upon the enemy.

The 1st brigade will form the reserve, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Maclean: it is to advance by the right and follow the 2nd brigade, and will enter the breach, if found necessary.

The whole of the troops will march down and form in situations which will be pointed out. One company of each native corps is to remain in camp for the protection of the lines.

Pioneers and scaling ladders will be allotted to each party.'



137.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Deogaum, 15th Dec. 1803.

‘After the battle of Argaum, I determined to lose no time in commencing the siege of Gawilghur. I accordingly marched on, and arrived at Ellichpoor on the 5th instant, with both divisions, and halted there the 6th, in order to establish an hospital for the wounded in the battle of Argaum.

The fort of Gawilghur is situated in a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee. It stands on a lofty mountain in this range, and consists of one complete inner fort which fronts to the south, where the rock is most steep; and an outer fort, which covers the inner to the north-west and north. This outer fort has a third wall, which covers the approach to it from the north by the village of Labada. All these walls are strongly built, and fortified by ramparts and towers.

The communications with the fort are through 3 gates; one to the south with the inner fort; one to the north-west with the outer fort; and one to the north with the third wall. The ascent to the first is very long and steep, and is practicable only for men; that to the second is by a road used for the

G. O.

15th Dec. 1803.

‘Major General Wellesley has great satisfaction in congratulating the troops under his command upon the brilliant success of this day.

In the course of this short, but active and laborious siege, Major General Wellesley has with pleasure observed in all a most anxious and zealous desire to forward the service, the most steady perseverance in the performance of laborious services, which would be thought impracticable by other troops, and that gallantry when opposed to the enemy which they have shown so frequently during the campaign, and which has carried them with honor through so many difficulties.

The most laborious and brilliant part of the siege of Gawilghur fell to the lot of the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan under the command of Colonel Stevenson; and Major General Wellesley adopts this mode of declaring that he never witnessed such laborious and persevering exertions as were made by this corps to bring their ordnance and stores to the point of attack.

The gallantry with which the attack was made by the detachment under the command of Lieut. Colonel Kenny has never been surpassed.

Major General Wellesley returns his thanks to all the officers and troops employed on this occasion, particularly to Colonel Stevenson for the manner in which he conducted the service intrusted to him, from the moment of his march from Ellichpoor to that of the capture of Gawilghur.

To Lieut. Colonel Kenny, who led the troops to the storm; to Captain Campbell of the 94th, who led the light infantry of the 94th to the escalade of the inner fort, by which the capture was finally insured; to Major Campbell of the 94th regt.; and to Lieut. Colonel Haliburton, who supported the attack with his brigade.

Major General Wellesley’s thanks are also due to Captain Burke, commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force, to Captain Heitland, of the Pioneers, and to Captain Johnson, of the Bombay Engineers.

Major General Wellesley takes this opportunity of bearing public testimony of the services rendered by Captain Johnson in the course of this campaign, in the important department under his charge.

Although the brilliant part of the service did not fall to the lot of the division under his immediate command, Major General Wellesley observed with satisfaction the exertions they made in the part allotted to them, and his thanks are particularly due to Captain Beaman, commanding the artillery, and to Lieut. Colonels Wallace and Chalmers, for the manner in which they conducted the attacks respectively entrusted to their commands.

Major General Wellesley desires that the officers who have taken charge and an account of the property captured at Ahmednuggur and Asseerghur, and upon different occasions during the campaign, will lose no time in taking charge and an account of that captured in Gawilghur, and forwarding all the accounts to Major General Wellesley, in order that he may lay them before his Excellency the Governor General, and request his orders for their distribution.

A Royal salute, &c. &c.’

common communications of the garrison with the countries to the southward ; but the road passes round the west side of the fort, and is exposed for a great distance to its fire : it is so narrow as to make it impracticable to approach regularly by it, and the rock is scarped on each side. This road also leads no farther than to the gate. The communication with the northern gate is direct from the village of Labada, and here the ground is level with that of the fort ; but the road to Labada leads through the mountains for about 30 miles from Ellichpoor ; and it was obvious that the difficulty and labor of moving ordnance and stores to Labada would be very great. However, after making inquiry at Ellichpoor, it appeared both to Colonel Stevenson and me, that this point of attack was, upon the whole, the most advantageous, and we accordingly adopted it.

Colonel Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur for the siege of Gawilghur, for which service it had long been destined ; and I therefore determined that he should make the principal attack by Labada, while I should cover his operations with my own division and all the cavalry ; and, if possible, assist them by other attacks to the southward and westward. On the 6th instant, the 1st batt. 2nd regt., under Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, and 2 companies of the 94th, and the 1st. batt. of the 6th under Captain Maitland, were detached ; the former to drive in the enemy from the ground which they occupied to the southward of the fort ; and the latter to seize the fortified village of Damergaum, which covers the entrance of the mountains by the road by which Colonel Stevenson was to pass towards Labada, and to protect the parties sent forward to reconnoitre and repair the roads in the mountains. Both these detachments succeeded.

On the 7th, both divisions marched from Ellichpoor : Colonel Stevenson, into the mountains by Damergaum, and my division towards the southern face of the fort of Gawilghur. From that day till the 12th, on which Colonel Stevenson broke ground near Labada, the troops in his division went through a series of laborious services, such as I never before witnessed, with the utmost cheerfulness and perseverance. The heavy ordnance and stores were dragged by hand over mountains, and through ravines, for nearly the whole distance, by roads which it had been previously necessary for the troops to make for themselves.

On the 12th, at night, Colonel Stevenson erected 2 batteries in front of the north face of the fort ; one consisting of 2 iron 18 pounders, and 3 iron 12 pounders, to breach the outer fort and third wall ; and one, consisting of 2 brass 12 pounders and two 5 inch howitzers, to clear and destroy the defences on the point of attack.

On the same night the troops of my division constructed a battery for 2 iron and 2 brass 12 pounders on the mountain under the southern gate, with a view, if possible, to breach the wall near that gate ; or, at all events, to draw the enemy's attention to that quarter. Unfortunately the iron guns could not be moved into the battery, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the troops ; and the fire of the brass guns produced but little effect.

The fire of all these batteries opened on the 13th, in the morning ; and on the 14th, at night, the breaches in the walls of the outer fort were practicable. All the arrangements were then made for storming on this day. Lieut. Colonel Kenny, of the 11th regt., commanded the party for the storm, con-



sisting of the flank companies of the 94th regt., and of the native corps in Colonel Stevenson's division, supported by the 94th regt., and Lieut. Colonel Haliburton's brigade, with Lieut. Colonel Maclean's brigade in reserve. At the same hour, I made two attacks from the southward to draw the enemy's attention to that quarter; one, under Lieut. Colonel Wallace, consisting of the 74th regt., 5 companies of the 78th and 1st batt. 8th regt., on the southern gate; and one under Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, consisting of 5 companies of the 78th and the 1st batt. 10th regt., on the north-west gate. These last attacks could be of no service, except to draw the enemy's attention from that from the north; unless they should succeed in blowing open the gates; and till they should communicate with detachments from Colonel Stevenson's corps, as they had no other means of entering the fort. All the troops advanced at about 10 in the morning. The detachment under Lieut. Colonel Chalmers arrived at the north-west gate at the moment when the enemy were endeavoring to escape through it, from the detachment of Colonel Stevenson's corps, which had been sent to communicate with Colonel Chalmers; and he entered without difficulty.

The wall of the inner fort, in which no breach had been made, was then to be carried. After some attempts upon the gate of communication between the inner and outer fort, a place was found at which it was possible to escalade the wall. Captain Campbell, with the light infantry of the 94th regt., fixed the ladders against this place, escaladed the wall, opened the gate for the storming party, and the fort was shortly in our possession.

The enemy's garrison was numerous. It consisted of Rajpoots, and of a great part of Beny Sing's regular infantry, which had escaped from the battle of Argaum, commanded by Beny Sing himself. They were all well armed with the Company's new muskets and bayonets. Vast numbers of them were killed, particularly at the different gates.

This service has been performed, I hope, with small loss on our side. No officer has been killed; and but few wounded, that I have heard of, excepting Lieut. Colonel Kenny of the 11th regt., and Lieut. Young of the 2nd of the 7th. In the performance of this service all the good qualities of British troops have been conspicuous to a degree which I have seldom witnessed. In bringing on their ordnance and stores to the point of attack, the troops of Colonel Stevenson's division performed the most laborious work with a zeal for the service, and patience and perseverance never surpassed; and when opposed to the enemy, their conduct showed the same gallant spirit that has carried the British troops through so many difficulties in the course of this war.

I am particularly indebted to Colonel Stevenson for the manner in which he conducted the service entrusted to him, from the moment of his march from Ellichpoor to that of the capture of Gawilghur; to Lieut. Colonel Kenny for the manner in which he led on the storming party; to Captain Campbell and the light infantry of the 94th regt., for the escalade of the inner fort; to Major Campbell and the 94th regt., and to Lieut. Colonel Haliburton and his brigade, which troops supported the attack.

Captain Burke, who commanded the artillery with the subsidiary force, Captain Heitland of the pioneers, and Captain Johnson of the Bombay engineers, are also entitled to my acknowledgments. The two latter were sent from my division to assist Colonel Stevenson. Upon the occasion of men-

tioning the name of Captain Johnson, I cannot omit to inform your Excellency that throughout this campaign that officer has performed the most important service in the department of the guides entrusted to his charge; and I have no doubt but that his surveys will be a valuable public acquisition.

Although the most laborious and the most brilliant part of this service did not fall to the lot of the troops of my division, I have to apprise your Excellency that they performed the part allotted to them in a manner perfectly satisfactory to me: and Lieut. Colonel Wallace, Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, and Captain Beaman, commanding the artillery, have received my thanks for the manner in which the two former led their divisions to the attack, and the latter exerted himself, to forward the service of his department.

I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency a list of the killed and wounded, and returns of the ordnance and property captured in the fort.'

## 138.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp at Ellichpoor, 17th Dec. 803.

'From circumstances which have occurred in the course of the negotiations, I am induced to believe that Ragojee is serious, and that he will ratify the peace, the terms of which have been for some time before him. But there is nothing so likely to produce this desirable result as the continuance of the pressure upon him. I propose, therefore, to continue my march to the eastward, but not with so much celerity as I should have done, if there had been no peace. I intend to halt here tomorrow and move on slowly afterwards towards the Wurda river, which is to be hereafter the Nizam's boundary, where I shall arrive about the day that Ragojee ought to send back the peace ratified.

In respect to your corps, the first thing to do after they shall have got a little rest, will be to repair your carriages, and to re-equip yourself for a siege, in case the continuance of the war with either of the confederates should make another necessary. The next thing to do will be to bring your division back into the plains; as I believe at all events, supposing even that you are to attack Nernulla, you must approach it by coming to the southward of the mountains.

\* \* \* \* \*

Captain Barclay informed me that while detained at one of the gates to

G. O.

Camp at Ellichpoor, 17th Dec. 1803.

'When Major General Wellesley issued his orders to the troops on the 15th instant, he was not aware that Lieut. Colonels Desse and Lang had such opportunities of personal distinction, of which they availed themselves, as appears from the report of Colonel Stevenson.

Major General Wellesley has more than once in the course of this campaign observed the zeal of those officers in the service on which they have been employed, and he requests them to accept his best thanks for their services in the storm of Gawilghur.'

G. A. O.

Camp at Dewulwarra, 20th Dec. 1803.

'The Parsee merchant has represented that native servants come to his shop and take away goods without paying for them or giving a receipt, and sometimes without leaving their master's name, by which conduct he is in danger of being ruined.

As the credit of the army, as well as its future convenience, is interested in preventing this, Major General Wellesley requests that when gentlemen send their servants to the Parsee's shop for goods, they will send ready money to pay for what they want, as the man has resolved not to allow any thing to be carried away by servants until paid for.'



allow the troops to pass out, he had amused himself with making some of them lay down their plunder. But for my part I have seen many places taken by storm, and I never saw one in which so little irregularity was committed, and which was so little plundered; and it is but doing justice to the corps to declare that in an hour after having stormed that large place, they marched out with as much regularity as if they had been only passing through it.'

## 139.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 21st Dec. 1803.

'In the present state of the war, it is, in my opinion, a matter of immaterial importance whether the Soubah's army is increased or not; but I

G. O.

Camp at Dewulwarra, 22nd Dec. 1803.

'The line to be under arms tomorrow morning at 7 o'clock, and prepared to move in three columns of brigades from their left, according to the orders which officers commanding brigades will receive.

Major General Wellesley requests that they will be at his tent with their staff at 7 o'clock to receive their orders. The guns, but not tumbrils, to accompany corps; corps to parade as strong as possible; the quarter and rear guards to stand fast.

When Amrut Rao approaches the right of the line, a salute of 19 guns is to be fired from the guns which Captain Beauman will appoint. Corps of cavalry to carry their swords, and infantry to present their arms, and officers to drop their swords by corps, as Amrut Rao will pass each. The music, trumpets, and drums to sound and beat a march as the corps carry swords and present arms.'

G. M. O.

Camp, 23rd Dec. 1803.

'The ratification of a treaty of peace concluded with Ragojee Bhoonslah, Rajah of Berar, is to be delivered to Major General Wellesley at 12 o'clock to day.

A Royal salute to be held in readiness in the park, to be fired on the delivery of the treaty.

A European flank company from the 4th brigade, and the band of H.M. 78th regt. to parade at head-quarters a quarter of an hour before 12 o'clock.

A troop of native cavalry to parade at head quarters a quarter before 2 this afternoon.

Major General Wellesley intends riding out to meet Vittel Punt, the Dewan of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; he will be glad to see any officers off duty, who may wish to be present at the delivery of the treaty, or to ride with him to meet the Dewan.

An extra dram to be issued to the Europeans today, on the occasion of the peace with the Rajah of Berar.'

G. O.

23rd Dec. 1803.

'A troop of the inlying piquet of native cavalry to parade at head quarters at a quarter before 5 o'clock this afternoon, to attend Major General Wellesley to the tent of Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, vakeel of the Rajah of Berar.

Major General Wellesley will be glad to see any officers who may be inclined to ride with him on the above occasion.

Amrut Rao has requested Major General Wellesley to allow the troops to accept of a zealot from him to day, as a testimony of the satisfaction he derived from their military appearance and performance this morning.

The Majors of Brigade, Adjutant of Artillery, and Commandant of Pioneers, will accordingly receive 300 rupees for each corps as a zealot from Amrut Rao, and will distribute the money immediately.'

G. O.

Camp at Khan Zemaumnagar, 26th Dec. 1803.

'As it is deemed expedient to give spirits to some of the native sick in the field hospital at Ellichpoor, Captain Young will send a quantity of arrack into that place for the purpose of complying with the daily indents which the surgeon will make upon him.

Captain Young will employ a conicopoly at Ellichpoor in the provision department, and another for the grain department.

Major General Wellesley's division and the subsidiary force are to march tomorrow morning by the right.

Major General Wellesley's division to lead from its right, followed by the subsidiary force from its right. The *general* to beat at 5, and the assembly at 6 o'clock.

The brigades of cavalry in both divisions to form the advance, and to march with their guns upon the high road, to be followed by the advanced piquets of Major General Wellesley's division.

consider it as one of very great importance, with a view to the future settlement and management of his territories. These objects cannot be attained without a large body of effective troops in the service of the state, or the assistance of the subsidiary force. If the latter are required for the support of the internal government upon all the occasions that must be expected to occur, there is no difficulty in foreseeing that its number must be doubled at least; the forts must be delivered over to the British Government, and the whole system of the connexion must be altered. This would certainly end in the annihilation of the Soubah of the Deccan.

If the Government are willing really to have in their service a body of effective troops, for the purpose of the support of the internal government in time of peace, and to act with the British troops in time of war, their own system in regard to their troops must be in some degree altered; the state must have troops paid by the public resources, through the medium of the public officers, without the intervention of the jaghiredars.

This last system appears to me to be most consistent with the Governor General's views and liberal policy; and I think it probable that he will be desirous of seeing the Soubah's army placed on a respectable footing.

If you should be of this opinion, I anxiously recommend to you to turn your attention to this subject: and as, from the disposition already manifested by his Highness, it is not probable that he will spontaneously adopt the

The guns and tumbrils attached to corps in Major General Wellesley's division to march upon the high road, each brigade escorted by a serjeant or havildar, and 13 rank and file of the corps to which they belong.

The guns, tumbrils, and other wheel carriages in the park and provision departments of that division to follow.

The guns, &c., attached to corps of infantry in the subsidiary force are then to follow upon the high road, and escorted as above, and the guns, tumbrils, and carts in the park, and provision department, and private carriages belonging to the subsidiary forces.

The corps of infantry of both divisions will march on the left of the high road.

The officers commanding brigades will take care to lead off their brigades on the left of the wheel carriages at once, and not cross them on the road.

The wheel carriages in the departments in Major General Wellesley's division are to be put in motion very early in the morning, so that there may be no delay in the march of the carriages of Colonel Stevenson's division.

The advanced guard of Colonel Stevenson's division to precede his own infantry—the rear guards of both divisions to follow Colonel Stevenson's corps.

A squadron of native cavalry to be sent to head quarters at assembly beating.'

G. O.

Camp at Surjee Anjengaum, 30th Dec. 1803.

'Colonel Stevenson being unable, on account of severe indisposition, to remain longer in the field, has permission to return to Hyderabad, and eventually to Fort St. George for the recovery of his health, without prejudice to his situation as commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, or his allowances. (The head surgeon ordered to attend the Colonel.)

Major General Wellesley is much concerned that Colonel Stevenson's state of health should oblige him to quit the field, and he accordingly hopes that it will soon be so far re-established as to give the public the advantage of his services.

Major General Wellesley has for some years had the assistance of Colonel Stevenson on the various services on which both have been employed by the Government of Fort St. George; and in the course of that time he has derived the greatest advantage from his great experience, his advice and opinions on all occasions, as well as a zealous and active discharge of all the duties of an officer in his situation in this last campaign. Under these circumstances, every public feeling for the benefit and advancement of the public service, and every private feeling for an officer with whom Major General Wellesley has been in the habit of friendly intercourse for some years, and from whom he has received the greatest assistance, unite to induce him to regret the want of Colonel Stevenson's services at this moment, the distressing disorder which occasions it, and to express his most anxious wishes for his speedy and perfect recovery.'



measures which are necessary in order to give him an army, I suggest for your consideration the propriety of continuing to press upon his ministers the breach of the treaty by his Highness, in not producing the requisite force, as a ground-work of an amendment of the treaty of defensive alliance in this point, before the territories ceded by the enemy at the peace are given over to him.'

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140.

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.

Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th Jan. 1804.

'It is impossible to frame a treaty of peace in such a manner as to find in it a decision of all questions which can arise between the parties concerned; particularly when the parties have frequently been at war, and have preserved a recollection of a variety of contradictory claims arising out of the events of their wars, which they are ready to bring forward on all occasions.

But there are certain principles which supply the defect of all instruments of this description, and enable us to decide upon the scope and meaning of the different articles of the treaty, and to apply them to cases not in contemplation when the treaty was made.

One of these principles is, that the meaning of an article of treaty shall not be construed in a sense directly the reverse of the principles and basis on which the treaty of peace was negotiated.

The basis of the negotiation of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar was, that he should give compensation to the Company and their allies for the injury he had done them by his aggression. It does not follow that, because he was to give a compensation to the Company and their allies, the Allied Powers were not to make any cession to him for the sake of peace, or for the general convenience of all parties; but the principle above stated requires that every such cession should be particularly specified in the treaty; and when such cession is not specified, there is strong reason to believe that the intention of the parties, at the time they were contracting the engagement, was, that the cession should not be made.

\* \* \* \*

Besides this general reasoning upon the subject, which in my opinion must be considered conclusive as to the intentions of both the parties interested in the negotiation of this treaty of peace, and the fact above mentioned regarding my own intentions, there are some facts relative to these districts which prove in the clearest manner, that the Rajah's ministers did not imagine that it was intended to cede them.'

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Mem.

5th Jan. 1804.

'Major General Wellesley is very desirous of having some dogs, which were found in Asseerghur, and also some of the fowling-pieces taken there; and he will be much obliged to any gentlemen who may be in possession of those dogs or fowling-pieces, if they will send them in to him. The full value shall be returned.'

G. M. O.

Camp at Manusgaum, 5th Jan. 1804.

'The ratification of a treaty of peace, concluded with the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, is to be delivered to Major General Wellesley at 10 o'clock this forenoon.

A Royal salute to be held in readiness in the park to be fired on the delivery of the treaty. Two European flank companies from the 5th brigade and the band of H. M. 78th regt. to parade at head quarters a quarter before 10 o'clock.

On the delivery of the treaty, these flank companies will present arms and beat a march, which is to be the signal for firing the salute. The music to play at the same time.

Major General Wellesley will be glad to see any officers off duty, who may wish to be present at the delivery of the treaty.'

141.

Mem. for Major Malcolm.

7th January, 1804.

'The consequence of Scindiah's discharging all his military establishments, an effect which will certainly be produced by the same cause, will be much more serious than those experienced by the Nizam's discharging his, however inconvenient. All the persons discharged must go into Holkar's service, in order to gain a livelihood, and thereby increase his means of annoying the other powers of India, every one of whom will be connected with the Company; and also render more urgent the necessity of using those means, in order to procure support for his numerous followers.

This is, in my opinion, a very serious consideration. The consequence of the extension of the Company's army has been to destroy the military power of their allies. But those armies, formerly in the service of the Peshwah and of the Nizam, must have gone somewhere; and there can be no doubt but they are at this moment in the service of Scindiah and Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar; and when this alliance shall be formed with Scindiah, they will have Holkar for their only resource, unless, in forming it, great pains should be taken to oblige Scindiah to preserve his military power.

I have also to observe upon this point, that Scindiah's government is in a state so unsettled, that if the Company's troops are to be introduced into his country, and we are to be employed in settling it, and he is not to be obliged to keep up his military establishment, and all means adopted to insure that object, the expense to the Company will be much greater than that estimated.

I have already shown that the presence of the military force at the seat of Scindiah's residence will not be necessary to support the British influence in his durbar; and I have stated a military objection to keeping the force at Ougein. I might possibly contend that no political influence can be produced at Scindiah's durbar from stationing the force in any other part of his country; but I think that, in the present situation of the British power in India, no advantage of that kind can compensate for the loss of his military power and its consequences, which must result from stationing the force in his country at all.

I will suppose even the worst that can happen: as it is probable that the alliance will have the effect of supporting Scindiah's government throughout the ensuing two years, and that it will have time to regain its strength, much will have been gained: and even if the alliance should be then broken, the Company will enjoy a greater advantage, and will have a better prospect of the continuance of peace, than it would have if Scindiah should allow his military establishment to fall.

In this state of the case, the question regarding the position of the subsidiary force becomes merely military; and where political considerations affect it, they operate against placing the subsidiary force in Scindiah's territories.

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In giving my opinion upon this subject, I am fully aware that I have departed from one of the principles adopted by the Governor General, in framing his instructions upon all these subsidiary allowances. But the circumstances of the case, and of the moment, are entirely different from those which have hitherto occurred. We are aware of a practical inconvenience in all the subsidiary alliances, and of the danger of its being caused



in Scindiah's government; and I think that the Governor General will authorise the deviation recommended from the original plan, when he shall consider the circumstances of this case. However, you are better acquainted with his sentiments upon this and every political subject than I am, and must know best how far the reasoning above detailed would have the effect of inducing him to alter the original plan. If you should think it would not, I beg you to insist upon the reception of the subsidiary force in Scindiah's territories as a *sine quâ non*.

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In the course of this memorandum, I have already adverted to the tendency which these subsidiary forces have to destroy the military establishments of the native powers; and I have pointed out the bad consequences which must result from the destruction of Scindiah's military establishment.

It is possible that if the subsidiary force is not stationed in his country, and if he cannot command its services upon all occasions for which he will require troops, he may be induced to keep up his military establishments. But whether the situations above proposed for the Company's troops have that effect or not, it will be necessary that the treaty should provide for his keeping up a respectable force.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have already pointed out that Scindiah's military resources are nearly destroyed; those of Holkar are unimpaired: Scindiah has no abilities himself, and has no person about him capable of managing his affairs; Holkar has the reputation of being an able man, and has certainly been a successful one.

The consequence of the existence of tranquillity for a year, or two years, will be, that Scindiah's government and his military resources will in some degree recover; and Holkar's will become worse than they are at present, as the certain consequence of tranquillity to an overgrown army, constituted as his is, must be its gradual dissolution. It is also probable, that, if the peace should be preserved for one or two years, the influence of the British Government with both Chiefs will be so much increased as to render it possible to prevent the war altogether.

I therefore most anxiously recommend this point to your attention.

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Of course you will do every thing in your power to obtain accurate intelligence of the remaining strength of Scindiah's armies, of his revenues, &c. &c. In my opinion, the best mode of acquiring this information is to keep up a constant personal intercourse with his ministers and those about his durbar; to have this intercourse a daily occurrence, and by no means a matter of state or parade; and by these means it is not possible that we can remain in ignorance of any thing that is going on, as in other places.'

142.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp at the Badowly ghaut, 10th Jan. 1804.

'I propose to appoint Colonel Wallace to command the subsidiary force,

G. O.

Camp at So-gaum 11th Jan. 1804.

'Major General Wellesley thinks it necessary to remind the officers that there is a large forage guard sent out daily, with which they may send their camels; and he has further to observe to them that the peace having occasioned the dismissal of a great many people from regular service with the native powers, the number of thieves has been thereby increased, and it becomes more necessary for the officers to send their cattle out under the protection of the guard.'

to whom, I understand from Malcolm, you have no objection. He is a brave soldier and an honorable gentleman, but he is little accustomed to transact political business. I shall, therefore, endeavor to place about him those officers who can be useful to him, but of course in doing this I must in some degree consult his own inclinations.'

## 143.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at the Badowly ghaut, 13th Jan. 1804.

'But I am much annoyed by the receipt of a letter from Sydenham, written by the Governor General's order, from which I perceive that some suspicion is entertained respecting the propriety of demanding the contribution at Burhampoor, the report of which had reached the Governor General through a private channel. Great pains are taken in Sydenham's letter to prove to me that no suspicion is entertained—that the questions upon the subject are asked merely for information; but those very pains prove the existence of the suspicion; and in fact, why is he in such a hurry to ask for information upon a subject upon which information must be given, unless some suspicion is entertained?

I have answered this letter, and have shown, that from the increase of my expenses, by measures not mine; by the total want of funds provided for this army; by my being left to chance; and by the Governor General having employed the frigate sent to Bengal for money; and by not paying my bills at Benares, and not furnishing money to pay them at Bombay, there was every reason to expect the loss of the campaign from the deficiency of funds to carry it on; and that, in fact, I could not have paid the troops in December, if it had not been for this very sum of money raised by contribution at Burhampoor, and the sales of goods captured at Asseerghur.

I have told the Governor General that if he disapproves of the measure, he may order the money to be restored; but I have warned him, that if he does give those orders, Scindiah will certainly put the money into his pocket.

In fact, if I had not exerted myself to keep in my hands a command of money, what would have become of the campaign? Where would have been the national honor or character, if the campaign had been lost?

## 144.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 13th Jan. 1804.

'When I sent a division of the army to Burhampoor, I determined to raise a contribution upon that city. My reasons for this determination were: first, I had reason to believe from Colonel Collins' report that Burhampoor was an open town, which it would not be possible for me to retain; and therefore, to levy the contribution was a likely mode of distressing the enemy, who, in fact, did give orders upon that city to part of his troops for their pay. Secondly, although I was not in immediate want of money, I had the prospect before me of an approaching want.

The expenses of this army had been vastly increased; first, by the course of the campaign, and the increased distance of our operations



from the sources of supply; secondly, by the increased price of every article of consumption, particularly of grain for the horses of the cavalry; and thirdly, by the necessity of paying the Peshwah's troops, and at times those of the Rajah of Mysore, when their money had not arrived. I had, besides, every reason to hope that Amrut Rao would join; and by arrangement made with the Peshwah, 5000 men were to be raised, 3000 of which were to serve with my army, and to be paid by me.

\* \* \* \* \*

Besides all these demands upon me, compared with my means of answering them, the Governor General had desired that any chief, who offered himself from the enemy, should be taken into the service, and particularly Meer Khan, the Patan chief in Holkar's service. This expense would also have fallen upon me, as the Nizam government have not supplied one farthing; and I have lately been obliged to lend Rajah Mohiput Ram  $3\frac{1}{2}$  lacs of rupees, to prevent a mutiny among the troops usually in his service. But I do not mention this circumstance as a reason for levying a contribution upon Burhampoor, as I was not aware of it at the time I ordered that measure.

I knew that the moment at which I should cease to pay the troops regularly would be the date of the commencement of the disasters of the campaign in this quarter; and therefore I conceive that I should have neglected my duty to the Governor General, if I had omitted to take any measure which could avert or procrastinate that evil day.

In respect to the amount raised at Burhampoor in this manner, I did not order that any particular sum should be raised. I desired Colonel Stevenson, generally, to raise a contribution, if he should be of opinion that the inhabitants would pay it. The most he first demanded was 10 lacs of rupees. Upon finding that sum could not be paid without difficulty, and without resorting to measures which I had forbid, he reduced the demand to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lacs; and the inhabitants who had been charged to collect the money then paid 75,000 of rupees more, which they had levied beyond the reduced sum. This is the fact related to me by Colonel Stevenson, and I have every reason to believe it is correct.

You have now the whole story, and the Governor General may form his own judgment upon it. I should have reported it before now, as I am desirous that this and every other part of my conduct should be investigated; only that I did not know the result of Colonel Stevenson's measures at Burhampoor till after he joined me at the battle of Argaum: and I did not know the exact sum which had been levied until a few days ago, when he was about to leave the army, and gave me the receipt of the Paymaster. But I had intended, and shall still make a regular report to the Governor General, upon this subject, as I have upon every other, either to him or to General Stuart.

The Governor General has trusted me to carry on an extensive service here; and I conceive that my duty to him requires that I should omit nothing which can ensure its success. It would have been no excuse to him, or to the world, if I had been obliged to give it up for want of money; and yet I must tell you, that if it had not been for this money levied at Burhampoor, and from the produce of the sales of property captured at Asseerghur, I should not have been able to have paid the troops in December, and I

should not be able to pay them now, but for the sales of property captured at Gawilghur. There is to the value of 2 lacs of rupees of plate captured at Gawilghur, which, unless I get up money from Poonah or Hyderabad, is my only resource for next month.

It is impossible to reason on the effect on the national character of levying a contribution, because no facts can be produced by which a judgment can be formed. I know that to levy a contribution is common in India and in Europe; that I should have levied one at Oomrawootty, and another at Nagpoor, if the Rajah of Berar had not made peace; and that it would have been much more disgraceful and disastrous to have lost the campaign from the want of money, than to have ensured in this manner the means of gaining it.

I believe I am as anxious as any other man that my character should not suffer—I do not mean in the mouths of common reporters and scandal bearers, but in the eyes of a fair judging people. I declare that I think that I have done what is right; but if the Governor General thinks it was wrong, it is easy to return the money to the people of Burhampoor. However, if he does this, he returns the money into Scindiah's pocket, for he will take it immediately.

I have many other important matters to write to you upon; but as nothing can go on smoothly till this matter is explained, I have thought it best to begin with this, and to send off the letter without delay.

At the same time with Sydenham's letter of the 4th, I received yours of the 8th, and also his of the 9th, enclosing the commencement of the Governor General's instructions upon the peace. As far as I can judge from his notes, in the margin of the sheets transmitted by you, I believe I have made a better peace than he expected. At all events, the Governor General's mind will very soon have been relieved from all anxiety respecting the junction of the interests of Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, as he must have received my letter on the subject of the suspension of arms with Scindiah.'

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145.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 14th Jan. 1804.

'In respect to Mysore, I recommend that a gentleman from the Bengal Civil Service should be Malcolm's successor there. The government of that country should be placed under the immediate protection and superintendence of the Governor General in council. The Governors of Fort St. George ought to have no more to do with the Rajah, than they have with the Soubah of the Deccan, or the Peshwah. The consequence of the continuance of the existing system will be, that the Rajah's government will be destroyed by corruption; or, if they should not be corrupt, by calumny. I know no person, either civil or military, at Fort St. George, who would set his face against the first evil; or who has strength of character or talents to defend the government against the second. In my opinion, the only remedy is, to take the Rajah under the wing of the Governor General; and this can be done effectually, only by appointing, as Resident, a gentleman of the Bengal Civil Service, and by directing him to correspond only with the Governor General. To fill this office with advantage to the public, will not require



very extraordinary talents when this arrangement shall be made. Good character, and decent, respectable manners will be far more important.

\* \* \* \* \*

The question is exactly this. Is it necessary for the general tranquillity and security of the British Government that the banditti who infest those countries should be put down, and that the governments of the Peshwah and the Nizam should be established in their territories respectively? If so, it is absolutely necessary that those powers should be obliged to keep up some military force for the purposes of their own government; or if they refuse to keep up their military establishments, and the *onus* is to fall upon the British troops, their numbers must be doubled, or even trebled; for it stands to reason that they are not now sufficiently strong to preserve order in countries of such vast extent.

\* \* \* \* \*

In the provinces depending upon Bengal there is a civil government, and some strength, besides that of the sword; but in the territories depending upon the subordinate governments there is no other power; and the moment that is weakened, the people rise in rebellion. I think, therefore, that the same number of troops will still be necessary, at least for some time, to support the authority of government in our own provinces.'

146.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 15th Jan. 1804.

'The services of the people of the description of those I have above recommended to your Excellency are more useful to the British Government than those of any other description about the native durbars. They, in fact, do all the business, and direct all measures, and one reward from the British Government, for services actually rendered, creates a general desire to merit and obtain a similar advantage by the same line of conduct.

It is not possible to reward these people excepting by pensions. They are so depraved in their habits; their notions of justice and government are so erroneous; and they are so little to be depended upon, excepting to follow their own interests, that they cannot be employed in any manner in the Company's service.'

147.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Warroor, 16th Jan. 1804.

'In respect to regular cavalry, it is my opinion that it ought not to be attempted. The formation and discipline of a body of cavalry are very difficult and tedious, and require great experience and patience in the persons who attempt it. After all, it is doubtful whether they will succeed, and whether the body of cavalry thus formed will be worth the expense of maintaining it; for at the same time that nothing can be more useful in the day of battle than a body of disciplined cavalry, nothing can be more expensive, and nothing more useless than a body of regular cavalry half and insufficiently disciplined; I should therefore recommend that this may not be attempted.

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The British Government has been left, by the late war, in a most glorious situation. They are the sovereigns of a great part of India, the protectors of the principal powers, and the mediators, by treaty, of the disputes of all.

The sovereignty they possess is greater, and their power is settled upon more permanent foundations than any before known in India: all it wants is the popularity which, from the nature of the institutions, and the justice of the proceedings of the government, it is likely to obtain, and which it must obtain, after a short period of tranquillity shall have given the people time and opportunity to feel the happiness and security which they enjoy.

But the resumption of these jaghires will bring ruin and distress on many noble families and ancient servants of the Nizam's government. Some of these may possibly have assisted in the different wars in which the British Government have been engaged, and in the establishment of the present happy state of affairs; and all the odium which the measures must produce will not fail to fall upon the British Government. I think, therefore, that it is advisable to avoid it, if it should be possible, and, at all events, that the British Government should not appear in the execution of the measure.'

148.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp at Warroor, 16th Jan. 1804.

'While writing upon this subject, I may as well mention to you, that I should be glad to see a little more conciliation towards the Guickwar Chiefs and troops. Upon a late occasion, I observe in the correspondence, that a wish was expressed that your communication with those Chiefs should be carried on through a particular officer belonging to your staff, with which you declined to comply.

It is true, that the gratification of the wishes of the natives may at times be attended with inconvenience; but unless they are gratified and conciliated, we can derive no advantage from their assistance. What would you say if they were all to insist upon communicating personally with yourself, as they do with me? Yet, I believe that as much business goes through my hands as through those of any other person; and I am convinced, that if I had refused to gratify this wish, I should have derived no assistance from them.'

149.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th Jan. 1804.

'I have written the Governor General a letter upon the subject of the property captured by the troops under my command; and I now enclose you a memorandum upon the same subject, which will explain my wishes.

I intended to have recommended that the contribution levied at Burham-poor might be given to the troops; but I have since thought it best to say nothing upon the subject.

Some time will elapse, I am afraid, before I shall be able to send an account of the value of the ordnance and military stores, as the ordnance must be weighed. But I think the best thing the Governor General can do, is to give the troops a sum of money, instead of the value of those articles.

All I can say is, that there are no troops who are more deserving of his favor; and I declare that I am convinced there is not one officer with the army, who has not been obliged to live at an expense far exceeding his pay, since the troops crossed the Kistna.

I am very anxious to have an early answer to my letter upon this subject. I have checked all interference of the army in this question, and I am



desirous that they should experience the advantage of conforming to the wishes of government, and that the officers should be relieved at an early period from the distress, which I know they suffer at present.'

## 150.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th Jan. 1804.

'In the course of the campaign I have had frequent opportunities of reporting their good conduct to your Excellency; and I have likewise to report that their patience under fatigue, and the persevering activity with which they performed all the duties required from them, were equal to their bravery when opposed to the enemy in the field; and the consequence of all those good qualities is, that notwithstanding the distance and difficulties attending our communication with the sources of our supplies, the great bodies of the enemy's horse, and the disaffected and disturbed state of the countries under the government of the Company's allies, I am enabled to state that, throughout the campaign, we did not lose one convoy, nor a particle of the Company's property of any description.

The troops composing the division under my immediate command were assembled from the most distant parts of the country, and have been in the field during two monsoons, that on the Eastern coast in the winter of 1802, and that on the Western coast in the course of 1803. These circumstances, and the exhausted state of the countries from the Kistna to the Taptee, have been the cause of the loss of the equipments of the officers of the army 3 or 4 times in one year. Those belonging to the subsidiary force were equally unfortunate; and all must have suffered the greatest inconveniences from the great advance of price of all the necessaries of life, in the countries which have been the seat of the war.'

## 151.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Camp, 21st Jan. 1804.

'I have only this day received your letter of the 23rd December, which had been transmitted by the Soubah's dawk to Ellichpoor, and I am delighted to find that you are pleased with our battle of Argauh.

I do not know whether I detailed the causes of the departure from the armistice, in that instance, in any of my public or private letters; but they appear fully on the minutes of the conferences. The fact was, that Scindiah complied with none of the conditions of the armistice, which he had not ratified at that time, and I attacked him, as I gave notice to his vakeels that I should, on the preceding day. They thought he was at too great a distance from me, and the intention of both Scindiah and Vincatjee Bhoonslah, in drawing up their army and apparently offering battle, was to impose upon the troops, and induce them to believe that we wanted confidence in our own strength. They would have drawn off at night, and we should have been obliged to fight a more desperate battle, in a position more favorable to the enemy, under the guns of Gawilghur.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have written to Colonel Close to have his opinion upon some points relative to the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, and as soon as I receive his answer I shall issue orders for the establishment of it. I propose to appoint

Colonel Wallace to command it till your orders shall be received. He is a brave soldier, in whom the troops have confidence. I shall leave the remains of the 74th with the subsidiary force for some time till we see how affairs settle at Scindiah's durbar.

I am much annoyed by the lumbago, a disorder to which, I believe, all persons in camp are liable; and if I do not go into a house soon, I am afraid I shall walk like old Pomeroy for the remainder of my life. I do not propose, however, to break up till I shall receive the ratification of the treaty of peace; although I shall have all the preparatory arrangements made, such as subsidiary force established, &c. &c. I am now going across the Godavery, to try if I cannot surprise and cut up the banditti upon the Nizam's frontier. At all events, I shall disperse them.'

## 152.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp at Paunchore, 22nd Jan. 1804.

'I have received another letter and message from Baba Phurkia; he throws himself upon the mercy of the Company, and asks only for a place in which his life will be in safety.

The war will be eternal if nobody is ever to be forgiven; and I certainly think that the British Government cannot intend to make the British troops the instruments of the Peshwah's revenge. You must decide what is to be done with this person. I have ordered him to quit the Nizam's territories, and not to come near this army. The answer of the vakeel is natural. It is, "Where is a man to go, who is not to be allowed to remain in the territories of the Company or of the Company's allies?" When the empire of the Company is so great, little dirty passions must not be suffered to guide its measures.'

## 153.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp, 26th Jan. 1804.

'I have now only to recommend to your attention the discipline of the troops under your command, and a determined resistance to every thing like an abuse in the service, which can tend to subtract from the efficiency of the corps in the field.

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Upon this subject I have to observe, that there is a tendency in the service in this country to admit abuses beyond any other that I have met with. I cannot say whether this is to be attributed to former habits and example, or to the laxity which must attend all distant establishments. But of this I am very certain, that it is the first duty of a commanding officer to resist every thing of the kind in a most determined manner. The want of discipline among troops is very bad, and renders them useless: but the want of efficiency, which is the result of the application to private purposes or profit of the persons paid by the public as troops, or as the necessary attendants or equipments of these troops, is worse, as it may exist with a certain degree and appearance of discipline, and Government may be misled by the notion that they have an army, whereas they have nothing but paper.

The troops under your command are in a distant country, and they can come but seldom under the view or inspection of the Government; it is therefore particularly incumbent on you to take care that no practice or cus-



tom shall exist which may destroy their discipline or lessen their efficiency ; and I beg leave to assure you, that without the most constant vigilance on your part, you will not be able to avert these evils.'

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154.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 26th Jan. 1804.

' If this be the case, we shall never be able to prevail upon him to do any thing which can be beneficial, either to his own government or the common cause ; and if to maintain our influence in the Marhatta empire be an object, the sooner I withdraw from the scene, and the sooner his jealousy is allayed, the better. In fact, this influence can be maintained only by conferring benefits on the persons who are the objects of it ; it is now fed and upheld by hope, but as soon as people shall find that my recommendation is the road to disgrace instead of to favor, they will not follow our fortunes much longer. I therefore think that as soon as I shall have settled every thing that I have to do, I ought to withdraw.

I certainly have a bad opinion of the Peshwah ; he has no public feeling, and his private disposition is terrible. I have no positive proof that he has been treacherous, but I have a strong suspicion of it ; and I know that since he signed the treaty of Bassein, he has done no one thing that has been desired, either with a view to forward his own interest, or the views of the alliance, or the common safety during the war.'

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155.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 27th Jan. 1804.

' I have no doubt whatever of the necessity of insisting that we should appear very prominent characters in this transaction. It is honorable to the national character ; and if we do not appear, we shall lose all the benefit that we expect from it.'

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156.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 29th Jan. 1804.

' If Gwalior belonged to Scindiah, it must be given up ; and I acknowledge that whether it did, or did not, I should be inclined to give it to him. I declare that when I view the treaty of peace, and its consequences, I am afraid it will be imagined that the moderation of the British Government in India has a strong resemblance to the ambition of other governments.'

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157.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 30th Jan. 1804.

' The Peshwah should be made to understand that the British Government feel for the honor, the security, and the prosperity of his government, in the same manner as they do for that of the Company ; that they are too strong to render it necessary that they should have recourse to intrigues to overturn his government, if they should wish it, which is by no means likely ; and that, on the other hand, their strength will always protect him from the effects of the intrigues among his relations and subjects, which he had heretofore so much reason to apprehend.'

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158.

To Major General Campbell.

Camp, 31st Jan. 1804.

' I know the Peshwah and his ministers, and the character of every Marhatta amildar, sufficiently well to be very certain that they would not scruple to involve the British Government in another war, were it only to get possession of, and plunder, one village. It is therefore very necessary that we should proceed with all this caution.'

159.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Munkaiseer, 5th Feb. 1804.

' After I had crossed the Godavery, and made one or two marches to the southward, I agreed to give cowle to the Chiefs who commanded the bands of freebooters who had carried on the operations on the western frontier of the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, on the condition of their dismissing their troops, and coming into my camp within 5 days, and I had some reason to believe that they would act as I had desired; but upon the expiration of the term fixed for their arrival in my camp, viz., the 2nd instant, finding that they had not come in, and that their troops were still assembled in the Soubah's territories between Perinda and Toljapoor, I determined to endeavor to cut them off. They were at the distance of 80 miles from my camp, and there was some reason to hope that I might surprise them by making forced marches.

I began my march on the 4th, in the morning, with the British cavalry, the 74th regt., the 1st batt. 8th regt., and 500 men belonging to the other native corps in my camp, and the Mysore and Marhatta cavalry. On my arrival at Sailgaon, near Perinda, after a march of 20 miles, I learnt that the enemy had broken up from their camp at Vyerag, and were come nearer Perinda, and that at that time they were not farther from me than 24 miles. I therefore marched again last night with an intention to attack their camp at daylight this morning.

Unfortunately, the road was very bad, and we did not arrive here till 9 in the morning. The enemy had received intelligence of my approach, and I

G. O.

Camp at Chob Neemgaum, 2nd Feb. 1804.

' Arrangements for the march of a detachment to surprise a body of freebooters dependent upon Scindiah at Munkaiseer near Perinda.

The following corps to march tomorrow morning under the orders of Major General Wellesley:

All the cavalry, the 74th regt., the 1st batt. 8th regt., 150 pioneers, and 100 men from each batt. of native infantry. Men must be picked for this service who have some means of carrying their baggage besides placing it on their backs—two 6 pounders, two brass 12 pounders, with their ammunition.

Captain Nagle is to proceed in command of the details of native infantry. The remainder of the division will halt under the command of Lieut. Colonel Wallace.

The sick of the corps named to be left with the army. Mr. Gilmour will provide medical attendance for them.

300 bullock loads of rice to be sent with this detachment, and 10 Company's carts with arrack, each drawn by 6 bullocks. Rice, salt, &c., for the Europeans in proportion; double sets of bullocks to go to carry the rice, and to draw the arrack, guns, and ordnance carriages.

The staff, excepting the Dep. Adjt. General, to accompany Major General Wellesley.

The corps which are to march, which have not received their pay for last month, are to send this evening to get money on account of their abstracts.

The general will beat at 5, the assembly at 6 o'clock, for the troops ordered to march. The infantry will close up to the left of the cavalry before assembly beating.

The troops will march by the right.'



am sorry to say that I have every reason to believe that they received it from persons in my own camp, and their camp was struck, and they had begun their march to their rear when I arrived.

I followed them, however, with the British cavalry, in one column, acting upon the right of their rear, while the Mysore and Marhatta cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, Goklah, and Appah Dessaye, pursued the centre and left. The enemy formed a large body of cavalry, apparently with an intention to cover the retreat of their guns and baggage, which were falling into our hands, and I formed the British cavalry in two lines to attack them. I followed them in this order from height to height, as long as I could see any of them collected. In this advance, some horse and infantry were cut up, and the whole of the enemy's guns, ammunition, bazaars, and baggage, fell into our hands.

The Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, and the Marhatta cavalry under Goklah, were engaged with the enemy on the right of the British cavalry, and killed great numbers of them, and these troops also followed them as long as they could see any collected.

Upon the whole, although I have reason to believe that the Chiefs have escaped, the result of this day is the complete defeat of a numerous and formidable band of freebooters, who were the terror of the country, were daily increasing in numbers, and had already defeated a body of the Soubah's troops, and had taken from them the guns which I have retaken. I do not think that they will venture, or indeed that they can collect again, as they have lost every thing which could enable them to subsist when collected.

The troops bear with the utmost cheerfulness the extraordinary fatigue of this short, but active expedition.\* The infantry under Major Swinton, of the 74th regt., arrived at the point of attack at the same time with the cavalry; but from the nature of the action, they could not co-operate further in it than by moving into the enemy's former camp, which they did with great regularity. The advance of the British cavalry, when formed, was in the best order, and very rapid, notwithstanding the fatigue to which both men and horses had been exposed for the last 24 hours. Our loss, of which I enclose a return, is but small.

I have given the 4 guns which we have taken to the killadar of Perinda, who lost them about 6 weeks ago.'

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160.

Camp, 7 miles s. of the Godavery, 40 miles n.e. from Ahmednuggur, 24th Jan. 1804.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

'I have not written to you, I believe, since I sent you the account of the battle which I fought at Assye on the 23rd September last, although many interesting events have occurred since that time; but the fact is, that I have not had leisure; and I knew that you would learn these events from the public dispatches. I propose, however, in this letter, to give you an outline of our operations in this part of India, which have ended in treaties of peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

After the battle of Assye, those two Chiefs fled into Candeish with their

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\* This expedition has often been remarked by the Duke of Wellington as the greatest march he ever made.

armies in great confusion; Scindiah's in particular was almost entirely disorganised, and vast numbers deserted him. Colonel Stevenson followed them down the Adjuntee ghaut. They fled to the Taptee, along which river they marched to the westward. As soon as I had placed my numerous wounded in security, I marched with my division to Adjuntee, and ordered Colonel Stevenson to advance towards Burhampoor, and levy a contribution upon that city, and to lay siege to Asseerghur.

Upon my arrival at Adjuntee, I found that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had quitted the Taptee, and had moved to the southward, apparently with an intention of passing out of Candeish through the hills situated north of the Godavery, and of invading the territories of the Peshwah or the Nizam, and all the remains of the defeated infantry had been sent across the Taptee towards Hindustan. This movement was intended to divert my attention from the siege of Asseerghur; or if I should persevere in that operation, the confederates would have invaded the territories of the Peshwah and the Nizam, and would have entirely destroyed the rich provinces of the latter, upon which I depended for resources of grain to enable me to carry on the war, and would, at all events, have cut off or impeded the communication which I had with Poonah and Bombay by Ahmednuggur. I therefore determined to leave the siege of Asseerghur to Colonel Stevenson's division, and to march myself to the southward, in order to follow the motions of the confederates.

On the 11th October I arrived in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, and there remained till the 15th. On that night I received most accurate accounts of the disposition of the enemy's army, from which I was of opinion that they intended to move upon Colonel Stevenson, in order to interrupt the siege of Asseerghur, and I returned immediately towards Adjuntee. I arrived there on the 18th, and descended the ghaut into Candeish on the 19th. Scindiah, who had returned to the northward, then halted his army at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, within 3 marches of Burhampoor.

Colonel Stevenson arrived on the 15th at Burhampoor, of which place he took possession; he marched to Asseerghur on the 17th, drove in the enemy, and took possession of the pettah on the 18th, by which means he had a fine situation from whence to carry on his attack against the fort; he broke ground on the 19th, and the fort surrendered on the 21st.

I did not receive intelligence of the surrender, on which I could depend, until the 24th, in the evening; and at the same time I learnt that the Rajah of Berar, who had separated from Scindiah when he had marched to the northward for the relief of Asseerghur, had passed through the hills which form the southern boundary of Candeish, and was then encamped between the hills and the river Godavery. There was no longer any reason for remaining below the ghauts, and I therefore determined to re-ascend them. I sent orders to Colonel Stevenson to re-equip his division for the siege of Gawilghur, in Berar, from the stores in Asseerghur; and while he was making the necessary arrangements for that purpose, to watch the motions of Scindiah's army, and prevent him from undertaking any thing of importance.

I arrived at Adjuntee, on the top of the ghaut, on the 25th, marched on the following days to the southward, and passed Aurungabad on the 29th. The Rajah of Berar, in the usual style of a Marhatta, had spent his time after he had come out of Candeish, in plundering the country, and negotiating



with Amrut Rao, who was encamped on the Godavery, to induce that Chief to join him.

The Rajah was still, on the 29th, between Aurungabad and the Godavery, and I hoped to have been able to attack him. He marched, however, on the night of the 29th, and between that time and the night of the 31st, during the whole of which I was in his neighbourhood, he marched with his camp 5 times. On the 31st, in the morning, he detached a body of 5000 horse to attack a large convoy on its march from the southward to join the troops on the frontier, the arrival of which had been delayed by the obstinacy of the officer who commanded, before it crossed the Godavery, and which river it crossed only on the 30th. The Rajah's troops were beat off with considerable loss, and the convoy joined me in safety on the 1st November.

The necessity of taking care of this convoy was unfortunate. If I had not been under the necessity of directing the movements of the troops in such manner as to protect it, at the same time that I pushed the Rajah, I should have had it in my power to have destroyed him between the 29th and 31st October. But all the subsequent solid operations of the war depended upon the arrival of that convoy, and it was more important to secure it, than to gain a victory over a body of horse; in the attempt to obtain which I might have failed, and then I should have lost the convoy.

The troops had now been in march nearly every day, from the beginning of October, and it was necessary to give them some rest. Accordingly, I left the Rajah to go off to the eastward, towards Berar, and I halted till the 4th in the neighbourhood of Umber.

Immediately after the battle of Assye, I had received from the confederates a variety of propositions tending to the commencement of negotiations for peace: they were all made in the usual Marhatta style, in such a manner, that it was possible either to deny that they had been made, or to continue the negotiations founded upon them, as it might suit the interests of the confederates. In answer to them all, I said that if the confederates, or either of them, wished for peace, they might send a vakeel to my camp with proper powers, who should be received with the respect due to his rank and character; and that I would listen with attention to what he might have to communicate, and would give him a distinct answer.

The result of the different propositions, and a variety of messages, was, that on the 6th November a vakeel from Scindiah arrived in camp. His name was Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, a nephew of the celebrated Morari Rao.

He was received with due respect, but when we began business, it was found that he had no powers, and then we came again to a stand. However, I allowed him to remain in camp for a few days, till he should receive his powers, which shortly afterwards arrived.

In the mean time, Amrut Rao, with whom, I believe I before informed you, I had made a treaty in August, joined me on the 12th November. According to the Marhatta custom, after making this treaty, he had waited to see which of the parties was likely to succeed in the war; and he had not decided this question in his own mind till after the battle of Assye and its consequence, the fall of Asseerghur.

As soon as Goorparah received his full powers, the first measure he proposed was a suspension of hostilities between the confederates and me. I

refused to suspend hostilities with the Rajah of Berar, but agreed to suspend them with Scindiah, in the Deccan and Guzerat, upon certain conditions, which appear in the treaty of which I enclose a copy.

My reasons for agreeing to this treaty were:—

First; I had, in fact, at that moment, no means of annoying Scindiah. I had defeated and destroyed his army, and taken every thing from him which he had in the Deccan. I could not carry the war into Hindustan till I should have secured the Rajah of Berar.

Secondly; He might do me a great injury, and materially impede my operations in Berar, either by assisting the Rajah with his army of horse, which still remained, or by a diversion such as the Rajah had made for him, viz., an irruption into the Nizam's or Peshwah's territories.

Thirdly; I could do him no injury on the side of Guzerat; the troops there were not sufficiently strong, or well organised, or equipped; and in that most important point in a war with the Marhattas, our attention was taken up by a domestic contest with a member of the Guickwar family. On the other hand, Scindiah had collected a numerous body of defeated infantry, cavalry, &c., at Ougein; and their advance into Guzerat would have been attended by unpleasant consequences.

Fourthly; By making the suspension of arms with Scindiah only, and by including in the treaty arrangements for the continuation of hostilities with the Rajah of Berar, I, in fact, dissolved the confederacy in the very best manner in which I could dissolve it; and Scindiah left the Rajah to our mercy.

I concluded this treaty on the 23rd November. While all this was going on, I was advancing gradually towards Berar, and pushing the Rajah before me to the eastward, and annoying his rear with my Mysore horse.

Towards the middle of November Colonel Stevenson had completed all his equipments for the siege of Gawilghur, and was enabled to quit Burhampoor. He marched up the valley of the Poorna river to Ballapoor in Berar, where he arrived on the 23rd, and he was joined on the 24th by the convoy which had been saved from the Rajah of Berar by Captain Baynes' affair at Umber, on the 31st October, and my march to the southward.

As soon as I found that the Rajah of Berar's march was decided, I determined to go into Berar to support and cover Colonel Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur. Scindiah had moved to the eastward in front of Colonel Stevenson, and towards the end of November had encamped in the neighbourhood of an army commanded by Vincatjee Bhoonslah, the brother of the Rajah of Berar, consisting of the greater number, if not the whole, of the Rajah's regular infantry and artillery, and a large body of cavalry. Thus, in the end of November, no less than 4 armies were assembled in Berar. A happy circumstance for the Rajah, who is supposed to have planned the confederacy.

The united armies of Scindiah and Vincatjee Bhoonslah were between Colonel Stevenson and the fort of Gawilghur, and it was necessary to beat them before the siege of that fort could be undertaken. Colonel Stevenson and I joined on the 29th November, at Parterly, about 17 miles north of the Poorna river, and I attacked the enemy that afternoon on the plains of Argaum, about 6 miles from that village, and gained a complete victory with



but small loss on our side, having taken from them all their cannon, ammunition, &c., numbers of elephants, camels, quantities of baggage, &c. From unavoidable circumstances, we did not begin the action till late in the day, and not more than 20 minutes' sun remained when I led on the British cavalry to the charge. But they made up for it by continuing the pursuit by moonlight; and all the troops were under arms till a very late hour in the night. I do not send the detailed account of this action; I think it probable that you will have received it before you get this letter.

It was an extraordinary and fortunate circumstance, that after Colonel Stevenson and I had been separated for above 2 months, at a distance of nearly 300 miles, I should have joined him on the very morning of this engagement; and that, in order to enable me to join him, he was not obliged to halt more than one day. But the operations of this war have afforded numerous instances of improvement in our means of communication, of obtaining intelligence, and above all, of movement. Marches, such as I have made in this war, were never known or thought of before. In the last 8 days of the month of October, I marched above 120 miles, and passed through 2 ghauts with heavy guns, and all the equipments of the troops, and this without injury to the efficiency of the army; and in a few days previous to this battle, when I had determined to go into Berar, I never moved less than between 17 and 20 miles, and I marched 26 miles on the day on which it was fought.

After the battle at Argaum, I moved on the 1st December with the 2 divisions in 2 columns, towards Gawilghur. I arrived at Ellichpoor on the 5th, and established there an hospital for the wounded in the battle at Argaum. On the 7th both divisions moved to take up the ground for the siege of Gawilghur. Colonel Stevenson's division, which had been equipped for the siege of Asseerghur, was destined to make the principal attack on the northern face; while that under my immediate command, with all the cavalry (British and native), should cover the siege, and co-operate with Colonel Stevenson as far as might be practicable, by attacks to the southward and westward. The march of Colonel Stevenson's division through the mountains, to the northern face of the fort, was one of the most difficult, and, in the success of the execution, extraordinary operations I have ever witnessed. All the heavy ordnance and store carriages were dragged by hand by the troops over high mountains, through valleys and ravines, for nearly 30 miles from Ellichpoor, by roads made by themselves with a laborious exertion to which I did not think they were equal. They were enabled to break ground on the 12th, and on the same night I commenced an attack upon the southern face.

On the 15th in the morning Colonel Stevenson had effected a breach in the outer walls of the fort, and we determined to storm. While he attacked the breaches on the northern wall, the infantry of my division were to attack the western and southern gates. There remained a third wall, which had not been breached, and this the troops escaladed, and we were shortly in possession of the place. Our loss on this occasion was not great, but that of the enemy was immense. The killadar, all the principal officers, and the greater part of the garrison were killed.

During the siege, the negotiations for peace were going on briskly, par-

ticularly with the Rajah of Berar's vakeel, who had arrived in camp on the day after the battle of Argaum. I concluded a treaty of peace with him, of which I enclose you a copy, on the 16th December, and signed it on the following morning, previous to my march towards Nagpoor, in order to keep alive the impressions under which it was evident that it had been concluded.

I halted after making 3 marches towards Nagpoor; as I found that the Rajah would ratify the treaty, and I saw that if I marched forward I should destroy his government entirely. I received the ratification on the 23rd December.

You will have observed, that after I had concluded the treaty for suspending hostilities with Scindiah, I had fought his army at Argaum on the 29th November. At that time he had not ratified the treaty, and he had not performed any one of its stipulations; and I gave notice to his vakeels that I should attack him if I should meet his army. After the battle he did ratify the treaty, but he did not perform the condition which required that he should go to the eastward of Ellichpoor. However, he did not interfere in the siege of Gawilghur, and did not take advantage of my being employed in that operation, to attack the Peshwah or the Nizam.

As soon as he found that the Rajah of Berar had made peace, he began to be a little alarmed respecting his own situation; and the negotiations for peace with his vakeels, in which no great progress had been made, then took a favorable turn.

On the 23rd, the day on which I received the Rajah's ratification of his treaty, Scindiah's two principal ministers, Eitul Punt and Moonshee Kavel Nyn, arrived in my camp to conclude the treaty of peace. On the same day I gave them notice, that on the 27th, if the treaty of peace should not then be concluded, hostilities would no longer be suspended; and on the 24th I returned to the westward, and joined Colonel Stevenson (who had only then come out of the mountains from Gawilghur), on the 26th, to the westward of Ellichpoor.

On the 28th I concluded a treaty of peace with Scindiah's ministers, which I signed at one in the morning of the 30th; and on the 5th January I received Scindiah's ratification of the treaty. I enclose a copy of this treaty, and copies of my letters to the Governor General upon this treaty, and that with the Rajah of Berar.

I have now brought you from the battle of Assye to the conclusion of peace, and my hand is almost tired; but I have other circumstances to mention to you, and if I do not continue now, it is possible that I may be delayed for another week before I shall be able to finish this epistle, the first page of which was written, as it appears, on the 24th January, and the remainder on the 1st February.

Since the peace I have marched to the southward, and am now encamped between Ahmednuggur and Kurdlah. A banditti were on this frontier, whom I intended to destroy, but they have dispersed, and I propose to break up the army almost immediately.

Malcolm is at Scindiah's durbar, endeavoring to arrange the defensive alliance, in which he has not made much progress. Mr. Elphinstone is with the Rajah of Berar. The Governor General is well pleased with the treaty with the latter, and has ratified it: he has sent me copies of your letters of the 30th August.'



161.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp at Munkaiseer, 7th Feb. 1804.

‘ My idea respecting your entering the King’s service was this, that you should get your rank in England, and a regiment in what is called the army of reserve. If you should succeed in that object, you might then resign your regiment or brigade of cavalry in this country, but not your pension on retirement. If you should not succeed, you ought not to give up your regiment or brigade here, without having a further provision. These are my opinions; you will see how affairs stand when you get home, and can arrange accordingly.

I am anxious, first, that the public should continue to enjoy the benefit of your services, in a country of which the climate may be more favorable to your health; and next, that you should have the satisfaction of serving in a war which goes to the existence of Great Britain as a nation. But you must not lose your income by it.’

162.

To Lieut. Colonel Gore.

Camp, 10th Feb. 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th January, for which I am much obliged to you. It is true that there are many important objects to engage my attention; but none of them can ever make me indifferent to what passes in the 33rd regt., in whose honor and welfare I always consider myself particularly interested. Accordingly I shall be glad to hear from you whenever you may have leisure to write; and whatever may be the nature of my occupation at the time I shall receive your letters, you may depend upon it that they shall not remain unanswered.

\* \* \* \* \*

You did quite right to go to Vellore. The 33rd could not join me. I should have lost the campaign if I had attempted to have drawn troops from General Campbell’s division. I shall be happy to have the regiment with me always; but God knows whether I shall be more successful in my future, than I have been in my past endeavors to effect this object, or whether I shall ever be 5 days in the same place.’

163.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 10th Feb. 1804.

‘ I have been very particular in stating to your Excellency all that occurs to me upon this subject, because it appears that the Commissioners in Cuttack are not aware, or not sensible, of the circumstances under which that article of the treaty was concluded, and which must be a guide in its application. They have a natural desire to extend it to as many cases as possible; because they feel that, in proportion as they extend its benefits, they increase the chance of the peace, the happiness, and the prosperity of the people whose country is committed to their management. But these, although important objects, are not to be compared to the importance of preserving the national faith.

Under this view of the subject, and having witnessed the confidence reposed in your Excellency’s government by all the powers of this part of India, I have given your Excellency more than ordinary trouble upon it, and I have only now to request your orders.’

164.

To Colonel Stevenson.

Camp, 11th Feb. 1804.

' Since I wrote to you last I have seen some English papers, and perused debates on the subject of the increase of the army.

When I first wrote to you on the subject of endeavoring to get removed to the King's service, I had reason to believe that all parties in England had agreed that it was absolutely necessary, at last, that Great Britain should really have an army, and not the skeleton of one, as had been the case hitherto. I knew that the object of having an army could not be accomplished without a very large increase of the number of officers, particularly of high rank; and it appeared to me that the services of yourself, and others of your description, from the service in this country, would be desirable. The plan adopted, however, does not by any means go upon the scale that I supposed it would. Every body appears to be convinced of the necessity of having an army, but nobody appears to be inclined to adopt the measures which are necessary for that purpose. The same little temporary expedients are adopted that have been before practised, and they will equally fail; and in respect to the plan I contemplated for you, that is entirely out of the question, as I observe that the service of several officers belonging to this country has been offered and declined. I am therefore most decidedly of opinion that you ought not to make up your mind to any thing till you shall get home. If you should find that circumstances are then favorable, and that you can change, without material loss to yourself or your family, you might do so, but not otherwise. But I am afraid that you will find that you will not be able to change at all.'

165.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Camp, 14th Feb. 1804.

' I think it desirable that I should soon quit this country. The Peshwah has manifested a most unaccountable jealousy of me, personally; and has refused to adopt certain measures, evidently calculated for his advantage, only because I recommended them. He has allowed their benefit, and has avowed this motive for refusing to adopt them. We have always found it very difficult to manage him; but it will become quite impossible, if this principle is allowed to guide his conduct. I therefore think it best that I should go away as soon as possible; and I am certainly very desirous of getting some rest.'

166.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp, 22nd Feb. 1804.

' In giving this recommendation, I am not cavilling about words, but from some experience and intimate knowledge of the Marhatta character, gained by having conducted a variety of negotiations with many chiefs, I am of opinion that no progress can be made in any negotiation that is not founded upon a respect for the character of the British Government, and which is not carried on in cordial and civil language.'

167.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 26th Feb. 1804.

' Bengal, "the paradise of nations," enjoys the advantage of a civil government and requires its military force only for its protection against



foreign enemies. All the other barbarous establishments called governments, without excepting even that of Fort St. George, have no power beyond that of the sword. 'Take from them the exercise of that power, and they have no other; and can collect no revenue, can give no protection, and can exercise no government. The native governments, I mean those of the Nizam and the Peshwah, are fifty times worse than ours in this respect. They do not choose to keep armies themselves, their territories are overrun by a race of armed men, who are ready to enlist with any body who will lead them to plunder; and there is no power in the country to support the government and give protection to the industrious classes of the inhabitants, excepting the British troops.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Governor General has never had this picture before him. No man has ever had so many opportunities of contemplating the subject in all its parts as I have; and possibly no man has ever adverted to it. The remedy is clear, viz., to force the allies to keep up their military establishments. This is the first step; I would then give them no assistance in carrying on their internal government, excepting to oppose formidable rebellions.'

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168.

To Colonel Murray.

Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

'In a transaction of this nature, however, the very foundations of which are the necessity of preserving the Company's faith, and the confidence of the enemy in the honor of the British Government, it is necessary to proceed with caution in every instance. Accordingly I wish you to let me know the particular agreement which you had made verbally with the Rajah of Lunawara before you received my letter of the 26th January: I still fear that Scindiah's ministers may object to the treaty, that it was not concluded till 6 weeks after they had signed the treaty of peace. However, if verbal engagements were made, by which both parties were bound, it must answer the same purpose.'

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169.

To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.

Camp at Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

'I hear from camp that every body was well satisfied with the arrangements which I made before I left it, excepting your friend ——. I must say that I think his dissatisfaction is unreasonable; and its existence entirely removes the regret which I felt upon the disappointment which he suffered. Supposing that your friendship for him gave him a claim upon you, his friendship for you should induce him to omit urging that claim, when your ease, your satisfaction, and your future success are at stake.'

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170.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

'I never conceived that my signature was a voucher to the correctness of the charges contained in any account to which it might be affixed; or even of the propriety of incurring any expense.

I conceive that my signature to an account is only an authority to the paymaster to discharge it; and that it is afterwards liable to all the forms of audit, &c., required by the regulations of the government. I am not aware

whether this notion is consistent with the principles of the Bombay regulations; but if it should not be so, I beg to be informed of it.'

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## 171.

To Major Graham.

Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

'I have received your letter of the 1st instant. It is necessary for a man who fills a public situation, and who has great public interests in charge, to lay aside all private considerations, whether on his own account or that of other persons. I imagine that you must feel on this subject as I do.

I am very much distressed on account of the inconveniences which your family suffer in your absence from Madras; and equally so, that it is not in my power to relieve their distress, by allowing you to quit your situation. But, under present circumstances, it is not in my power to grant your request to go to Madras, consistently with the duty which both you and I owe to the public, as public men.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will not urge me again upon this subject.'

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## 172.

To Lieut. Colonel Wallace and Officers  
of the Army of the Deccan.

Camp at Poonah, 4th March, 1804.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st instant, in which you have announced your intention to present to me a most handsome pledge of your respect and esteem, which shall commemorate the great victory which you gained over the enemy.

Be assured, Gentlemen, that I never shall lose the recollection of the events of the last year, or of the officers and troops, by means of whose ability, zeal, and disciplined bravery, they have in a great measure been brought about in this part of India; but it is highly gratifying to me to be certain, that the conduct of the operations of the war has met with the approbation, and has gained for me the esteem, of the officers under my command.'

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## 173.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Chowke, 9th March, 1804.

'While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid adverting to the conduct of the government of Mysore during the late war, and congratulating your Excellency upon the success of all your measures, and the accomplishment of all your objects in establishing it.

In consequence of the regularity of the system of government established by the Dewan, and the improvements of the country, its resources were so much increased as to enable him to provide for all the calls made upon him, either for the equipment of the corps fitted out at Seringapatam, for the subsistence of the army on its march from the Carnatic to the frontier, for the supply of the magazines formed in Mysore, or for the large quantities of grain required for the cavalry, and by the brinjarries. All these supplies were furnished with a facility and celerity hitherto unknown in this part of India. He has since continued to forward supplies to the army under my command, as fast as the brinjarries have been found to take them up; and,



besides contributing to the subsistence of the corps under Major General Campbell, he has lately forwarded large quantities of grain to Canara, in order to enable the collectors in that province to export larger quantities for the supply of Bombay and Poonah.

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174.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq., Residency at Poonah.

Bombay, 12th March, 1804.

‘When war is concluded, I am decidedly of opinion that all animosity should be forgotten.’

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175.

REPLY TO THE ADDRESS FROM THE BRITISH INHABITANTS OF BOMBAY.

Bombay, 13th March, 1804.

‘The approbation of this Settlement is a distinction which will afford a permanent source of gratification to my mind; and I receive, with a high sense of respect, the honor conveyed to me by your Address.

The events which preceded the war are of a nature to demonstrate the justice of our cause; while the forbearance with which the British Government refrained from the contest is calculated to manifest that the efficient state of our military equipment was directed to the preservation of peace, and consistent with the principles of our defensive policy. The comprehensive plan of operations for the conduct of the war was equalled by the extent of our resources, and supported by the concentrated power of the empire. The conflict in which the British armies were in consequence engaged presented a theatre capable of displaying at once the most splendid objects of military glory, and substantial proofs of the pervading wisdom of the British councils. To be engaged in such a scene was an object worthy of the highest ambition; and the contingencies which placed a division of the army under my command enabled me to appreciate the permanent causes of our success and power, in the established discipline of our troops, in the general union of zeal for the public interests, in the uniform effects of our consolidated strength, and in the commanding influence of our national reputation in India.

Under the effects of those certain causes, the troops under my command were enabled to give that support which they were destined by the Governor General to afford to the operations of the Commander in Chief. And, while the grand army, under his Excellency’s immediate command, decided the war in Hindustan, by the most rapid career of brilliant victories, the army of the Deccan, emulating that noble example, contributed to elevate the fame and power of Great Britain in India, to a height unrivalled in the annals of Asia.

In concluding the peace (a duty imposed on me by the local situation of the respective armies) I was enabled, under the immediate orders and instructions of the Governor General, to manifest a practical example of the moderation of the British councils, which arrested the progress of our arms in the hour of victory; to fix the tranquillity of India on the foundations of that enlarged policy; and to receive the best assurances of the continuance of peace from the confidence reposed by the states lately confederated against us, in the generosity, honor, and justice of the British Government.

In reviewing the consequences of our success, it is with unfeigned satis-

faction that I perceive the increasing channels of wealth which have been opened to this opulent settlement ; and it is peculiarly gratifying to my feelings, that I should have been instrumental in renewing the benefits of peace to a settlement, from the resources and public spirit of which, the detachments under my command have derived the most essential aids during the prosecution of the war.

The occasion which it has pleased you to choose of uniting my name with that of the Governor General has excited the warmest affections of my heart, together with the highest sentiments of public respect ; at the same time, therefore, that I receive, with peculiar gratitude, this mark of your kindness, I cannot discharge the obligations you have imposed on me, in a manner more conformable to my sense of the honor and welfare of this settlement, or of the reputation and interests of the empire, than by expressing my confidence of your cherishing those principles of loyalty, subordination, and government, which have raised and finally established the British empire in India on the extensive foundations of its present security, prosperity, dignity, and renown.'

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176.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

' I think it rather doubtful whether, in a case of this kind, we can adhere to one part of the treaty, and not to another, although I believe it is done in many instances. That is to say, the powerful party adopts the measures required by its own dignity, interest, and safety. This, I think, will be the Governor General's theme. But at the expense of what other party are those measures adopted? at the expense of that party who broke the treaty, but not at the expense of Scindiah, a power independent of both. The fair way of considering this question is, that a treaty broken is in the same state as one never made : and when that principle is applied to this case, it will be found that Scindiah, to whom the possession belonged, before the treaty was made, and by whom they have not been ceded by the treaty of peace, or by any other instrument, ought to have them.

In respect to the policy of the question, it is fully canvassed in the enclosed letter. I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every frontier of India, ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith, and the advantages and honor we gained by the late war and the peace ; and we must not fritter them away in arguments, drawn from overstrained principles of the laws of nations, which are not understood in this country. What brought me through many difficulties in the war, and the negotiations for peace? The British good faith, and nothing else.'

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177.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Bombay, 20th March, 1804.

' Although the Marhatta chiefs are capricious, and not entirely to be depended upon, I think they are to be kept in a disposition so favorable to us, by a constant course of civil communication and good offices, as that you will be able to command their services with their troops for payment.

\* \* \* \* \*

I rather think that you and the Governor General agree in opinion on the subject of the affairs of Malabar. He says, " examine and report the state of



the province before you commence your military operations : define the evils, and propose a system of government which shall afford a remedy, towards the establishment of which system the military operations may be directed ”

It would be useless to commence military operations upon any great scale, unless the civil officers should be prepared to take possession of the country, and to re-establish the civil government as the troops shall conquer it. If the civil government were not re-established in this manner, the rebels would rise again as soon as the troops would pass through the district ; and the effect of the operations of a large body of troops would be much the same as that of a small body. But if the civil government is to be re-established in this manner, it would be better to establish that system which is found to be good, and is to be permanent, than that which is known to be bad, and which is intended should not last.

Supposing that the bad system were first introduced, it must be followed afterwards by the good one ; and supposing that the bad system did not produce a rebellion of itself (which I acknowledge I do not think it would, as rebellion in Malabar is to be traced to causes entirely independent of all systems of civil government, excepting as they are connected with a strong or weak military force), the change from the bad to the good system would produce a degree of convulsion, and, possibly, momentary weakness, which it is always desirable to avoid. It is particularly desirable to avoid it in this instance, as it will not be difficult, by an examination of all that has passed in Malabar, to fix upon the general principles according to which that province ought to be governed, and to frame a system accordingly, in the time which must elapse before the troops can be employed in re-settling the province.’

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178.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Bombay, 27th March, 1804.

‘ One of the resources which I recommended to his Highness’ attention was to pardon those of his subjects who had offended him, and to return their houses and property, as the first step towards the establishment of tranquillity ; because I conceive that so long as his Highness detains in the hands of his government the property of a great proportion of his subjects, those subjects must plunder for their subsistence ; and I see no means in the hands of his Highness’ government to protect those who may be inclined to exert themselves to gain a subsistence by honest means.

As the expectation that I should interfere in the police of the country has now, for the first time, been brought forward officially, I beg that you will state distinctly to his Highness the Peshwah, that I have no means in my power to provide for the police of his territories. The British troops cannot be dispersed in small bodies for the purposes either of revenue or police. These are branches of the civil government in which the British Government are bound by treaty not to interfere. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that his Highness should adopt measures to have a force of his own for the ordinary purposes of his government, in order that he may not be obliged to have recourse to British assistance upon every trifling occasion. I request you to put this letter into the form of an official memorandum, and convey it to his Highness.’

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179.

To Major Graham.

Bombay, 29th March, 1804.

' We must make some arrangements to feed the poor. To issue grain *gratis* will not answer. It will draw numbers of people to Ahmednuggur, and will thereby increase the distress. The best thing to do would be to undertake some useful work, such as the completion of the *glacis* of the fort, to perfect it, to knock down that bad work in front of the gateway, and to make a good modern *flèche* in lieu thereof, and pay the workmen in grain. This might answer, and I shall write to the engineer to desire him to give me his sentiments on the subject of the work to be undertaken.'

180.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 30th March, 1804.

' My dear Malcolm, we shall have another war, and the worst of it will be, that all these questions will not bear inquiry. It is not even denied that the treaties were signed many days after the treaty of peace was known at Cuttack; but all that is nothing; the previous *verbiage* is thought sufficient to bind us, as if the signing of a treaty was not that which concluded and bound the parties; and as if, in the treaty of peace with Ragojee, we had not so far insisted upon this point as to continue our operations till he had ratified his treaty.

I declare that I am dispirited and disgusted with this transaction beyond measure; however, I can say no more on it. The orders are called final; but my public letters, written in February, show my opinion of it.'

181.

To Colonel Murray.

Bombay, 1st April, 1804.

' According to this mode of procedure, the trial and punishment of an offender will not be quite so quick as we might wish, but it will be certain and regular: at all events, it is the mode ordered by government, and must be put into execution.

However, I think that Bheels, and people of that description, whose profession is plunder, and who come armed into the camp for that purpose, ought not to be considered and treated as common robbers. They are public enemies and rebels against all authority, and I recommend that when one of them is caught in the camp, whether it be situated in the Company's territories, or in those of the Rajah, he may be shot by the nearest rear guard, if he should be taken in the act of robbery. If something of this kind be not done, the robberies and outrages of the Bheels will reduce the troops to the greatest distress.

\* \* \* \* \*

Accordingly, if a robbery be committed in the camp, when situated in the Rajah's territory, the criminal must be tried and punished by military process. Of course this power must be used with discretion; care must be taken not to shock the feelings by violent or unusual punishments, nor to interfere, in any manner, with persons employed in the collection of the revenue or the administration of the government.'

182.

To Major \* \* \* \* \*

Bombay, 3rd April, 1804.

' It is no part of my duty to defend the officers of the government of



Mysore, or I should find it an easy task upon the present occasion ; but it is so to confine the attention of the officers under my command strictly to their duty.'

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 183.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

Bombay, 7th April, 1804.

' I must first take the liberty of expressing my acknowledgments for the handsome manner in which you have been pleased to notice my services, in your dispatches to H. R. H. the Duke of York and to His Majesty's ministers.

In the course of the operations intrusted to me, I certainly had difficulties to encounter which are inseparable from all military service in this country, but I enjoyed an advantage which but few have had in a similar situation. I served under the immediate orders of an officer, who was fully aware of the nature of the operations to be performed ; and who, after considering all that was to be done, gave me his full confidence and support, in carrying into execution the measures which the exigency of the service might require. Under these circumstances I was enabled to undertake every thing with confidence ; and if I failed, I was certain it would be considered with indulgence. I declare that I cannot reflect upon the events of the last year without feeling for you the strongest sentiments of gratitude, respect, and attachment ; and to have received these marks of approbation has given me more real satisfaction, than all that I have received from other quarters.'

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 184.

To Peter Speke, Esq.

Bombay, 8th April, 1804.

' The approbation of gentlemen, with many of whom I have the honor of being personally acquainted, for whom individually I have the highest respect, and who have been distinguished during the eventful administration of His Excellency the Governor General, by their sentiments of zeal for the public interests, is extremely gratifying to me ; and I request you to express to the British inhabitants of Calcutta the satisfaction, respect, and gratitude, with which I receive this honorable testimony of their approbation of the conduct of the troops who served in the Deccan under my command, and of their kindness towards myself.'

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 185.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 9th April, 1804.

' I have always been of opinion that we have weakened Scindiah more than is politic ; and that we shall repent having established such a number of these little independent powers in India, every one of whom will require the support of the British Government, which will occasion a constant demand of employment of troops, a loss of officers and men, and a claim of money.'

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 186.

To Major Graham.

Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

' I have taken into consideration the various reports which I have received from you, of the miserable state of the lower classes of the inhabitants of Ahmednuggur, in consequence of the dreadful scarcity of provisions in that part of the country ; and I proceed to give you my sentiments on that subject, and directions regarding the mode of providing for their relief.

The delivery of the provisions *gratis* is, in my opinion, a very defective mode of providing against the effects of famine.

It is liable to abuses in all parts of the world, but particularly in India; and at Ahmednuggur, the consequence of its adoption would be, that crowds of people would be drawn there from other parts of the country, in which the distress is equally felt; and they would increase the distress at Ahmednuggur to such a degree as to render all the efforts to remove it from its immediate inhabitants entirely fruitless; and it might at last reach our own troops and establishments. - The principle, therefore, of the mode in which I propose to relieve the distresses of the inhabitants is not to give grain or money in charity.

Those who suffer from famine may properly be divided into two classes; those who can, and those who cannot, work. In the latter class may be included old persons, children, and the sick women; who, from their former situation in life, have been unaccustomed to labor, and are weakened by the effects of famine.

The former, viz., those of both sexes who can work, ought to be employed by the public; and in the course of this letter I shall point out the work on which I should wish that they might be employed, and in what manner paid. The latter, viz., those who cannot work, ought to be taken into an hospital and fed, and receive medical aid and medicine at the expense of the public.

According to this mode of proceeding, subsistence will be provided for all; the public will receive some benefit from the expense which will be incurred; and, above all, it will be certain, that no able-bodied person will apply for relief, unless he should be unwilling to work for his subsistence; that none will apply, who are able to work, and who are not real objects of charity; and that none will come to Ahmednuggur for the purpose of partaking of the food which must be procured by their labor, or to obtain which they must submit to the restraint of an hospital.'

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187.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 13th April, 1804.

'I am disgusted beyond measure with the whole concern; and I would give a large sum to have had nothing to do with the treaties of peace, and if I could now get rid of all anxiety upon the subject. All parties were delighted with the peace, but the demon of ambition appears now to have pervaded all; and each endeavors, by forcing constructions, to gain as much as he can.'

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188.

To General Lake.

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

'I learn from Major Malcolm that you are desirous of receiving accounts of the strength and position of the troops in the Deccan, in order that you may send me instructions in what manner to co-operate with you, in case you should be under the necessity of attacking Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

There are at Poonah 1 regt. of dragoons, the 19th; and 3 regts. of native cavalry; the 74th and 78th regts., and 7 batts. of native infantry, with a due proportion of artillery. There is, besides, 1 batt. of native infantry in garrison at Ahmednuggur. All these corps are weak, having suffered much during the war, and they have had neither time nor opportunity to recruit or refit.



The subsidiary force, serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, is posted as follows : 2 regts. of native cavalry, the 94th regt., and 4 batts. of native infantry, in the neighbourhood of Jaffierabad ; and 2 batts. of native infantry in Berar, near Oomrawooty ; the whole with a due proportion of artillery. These corps are strong : they were stronger than the common establishment of the army of Fort St. George at the commencement of the war ; and they did not suffer so much as the others in its operations.

In Guzerat there are two regts., the 65th and 86th ; and 6 batts. of native infantry, one of these batts. 1600 men. Of these, the 2 regts. and 4 batts. are encamped at Cupperwungee, beyond the river Myhie, about 70 miles north of Baroda. The remainder are, 1 battalion at Surat, and 1 at Baroda. A battalion landed about a week ago at Surat from Goa, and another on its march from Poonah will join Colonel Murray's camp on the Myhie.

I now proceed to detail to your Excellency my ideas regarding the operations of these troops, in case there should be a war with Holkar.

The possessions of this Chief, in the Deccan, are but very limited ; they consist of the district of Umber, situated between Jaulna, Aurungabad, and the Godavery ; half of the district of Sieugaum, south of the Godavery, (the other half belongs to Scindiah ; ) the fort of Chandore, and a few districts in Candeish. The operations of the troops in the Deccan ought, in the first instance, to be directed to obtain possession of these districts and of the fort of Chandore, which, I imagine, must be regularly attacked.

I should have no doubt of being able to accomplish these objects at a very early period, if I had not received within these last 2 days very distressing accounts of the state of the countries through which the troops must march to the northward ; and in which they must be stationed while these operations are carrying on.

Your Excellency is, I imagine, aware of the scarcity which prevails throughout the Deccan, and which has produced a famine. By a report which I have received from the commander of the Mysore horse, whom I had sent with his corps to forage in districts on the Nizam's frontier, which were supposed not to have suffered equally with those farther to the westward, I learn that the distress is extreme ; that he can scarcely procure forage or grain for his horses ; that that which is procured is at an enormous expense ; that he had been some days without food, and that he had lost 100 horses in one day. The horses of the British cavalry have been for some time eating rice at Poonah, a food which, it is well known, is unwholesome for them ; but as that is the only grain which Bombay could supply, and as the grain for horses and cattle could always, till now, be procured in the country, it is the only grain in the magazines which I have collected at Poonah and Ahmednuggur for the troops. Under these circumstances, I very much doubt whether I should not incur the risk of destroying the equipments of the army, and, of course, of failing even in these operations, if I were to attempt to move them from Poonah, where forage can always be procured, at least till a very advanced period of the rains, when the new grass will have begun to spring up, and the new crops will appear above ground. But if the war should begin with Holkar, your Excellency may depend upon it that I shall do every thing in my power to support your operations, and that nothing but the state of the country, which I have above described, shall stop me.

After passing Chandore, the country is a desert to the Taptee; it is inhabited by a half civilized race of Patans and Bheels; and it has been the scene of the depredations of the armies of Scindiah and Holkar for some years.

After crossing the Taptee, the road to Ougein and Indore passes over mountains to Chooly Myhissur, on the Nerbudda, where, I imagine, the country again becomes fertile. The distance from Poonah to Indore is, I believe, 600 miles, through a country in which there is a famine; and which, from the above description, you will observe, either from extraordinary circumstances or by nature, cannot afford subsistence for an army for one day.

If it were possible to reach and to obtain possession of Chandore immediately, which there is reason to doubt, I do not think that it would be proper to move the British troops out of the Deccan. Holkar's strength consists in freebooters, and the moment the British troops would pass Chandore, an army of this same description of people would be collected on the Soubah's frontier, and in the neighbourhood of Poonah, at least as numerous as that which is in Hindustan. A body of this description was collected at the close of the last war, which nothing but the British troops, by extraordinary exertion, could disperse.

If the troops in the Deccan should not be advanced into Hindustan, Scindiah's army ought to be reinforced by the subsidiary force to be attached to that Chief, and placed in a forward position to the northward of Ougein. The corps under Colonel Murray, with the exception of 2 battalions, to be left as a reserve in Guzerat, ought to be moved forward, reinforced by the Quick-war cavalry. These two armies upon Holkar's rear, while your Excellency would push him in front, must destroy him in a short space of time. But if the operations are not to be active, till I can arrive in Hindustan to take part in them; and if it should be decided that the British troops are to quit the Deccan, it would be best to delay the commencement of the war, if that should be possible, at least till the month of August.

In detailing the state of the troops under my command, my ideas of the operations to which they might be equal, and the state of the countries through which they would have to pass, and in which they would be stationed, I have delivered an opinion upon the general plan of the war; a liberty which, I hope, you will excuse. All that I can say is, that notwithstanding the difficulties to which I have above alluded, nothing will give me greater satisfaction than to contribute personally in forwarding any plan upon which your Excellency may determine.'

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189.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Bombay, 25th April, 1804.

'As far as I am personally concerned, it is a matter of indifference to me whether he is punished or not; but if it is to be a principle of British policy to introduce among the native powers, the allies and dependents of the British Government, the principles of good faith and political moderation; and if it is intended effectually to check the depredations of the Marhatta powers, not connected with the British Government, and of all freebooters, it is necessary to begin by preventing the nominal servants of our allies from infringing the treaties of peace, and from committing hostilities, and carrying on petty warfare under the shadow of the British power, in direct disobey-



dience of orders. This object can only be effected by punishment, where it is deserved.'

G. O.

Camp at Choke, 18th May, 1804.

'Officers belonging to the division of the army under Major General Wellesley's command, or to the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, who may obtain permission to visit Bombay, will report to the Adjutant General of the Army of that Presidency, and to the Town Major, their arrival there, and the place of their residence during their stay.'

G. O.

20th May, 1804.

'In consequence of the following orders from his Excellency the Governor General in Council, Major General Wellesley has determined that the corps and individuals who were present with the division of the army under the immediate command of Major General Wellesley, or with the subsidiary force serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, during the siege of Ahmednuggur or at the battle of Assye, or during the siege of Asseghur, or at the battle of Argaum, or during the siege of Gawilghur, are to share in the property captured.

The detachment stationed at Toka, under the command of Captain Campbell, during the siege of Ahmednuggur; the detachment under the command of Captain O'Donnell, in the affair at Korget Coraygaum, and that under the command of Captain Baynes in the affair at Umber, are likewise to share in the property captured during the war.

Prize rolls are to be made out by officers commanding corps according to those orders, and forwarded by the corps composing the division under the immediate command of Major General Wellesley to the Dep. Adj. General in Mysore, and by the corps in the subsidiary force to the Dep. Adj. General with that force.

The prize rolls are to mention the name of every officer and man entitled to share according to these orders, and opposite to the names of those not now present with the corps or company to which he belonged during the war, is to be a note stating what has become of him.

These prize rolls are to have an abstract of the total numbers of each rank at the back of them.

The Dep. Adj. General in Mysore, and with the subsidiary force, will compare those rolls with the returns, and see that the rolls are correct, when they will certify them by their signature respectively.

Captain Colebrooke will forward the rolls to Major General Wellesley as soon as he will have received and examined them.

The Dep. Adj. General in Mysore will make out a prize roll of the officers and others attached to the staff of Major General Wellesley's division; the Dep. Adj. General with the subsidiary force, a roll of the officers and others attached to the staff of the subsidiary force serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan. Officers commanding brigades a roll of the brigade staff, and Commissaries of stores a roll of the Europeans not belonging to corps in camp attached to the ordnance department.

The officers commanding the companies under the command of Captain Campbell, Captain O'Donnell, and Captain Baynes respectively, are each to send their rolls to the officer under whose command they were at Toka, at Korget Coraygaum, and at Umber. These officers will examine them, and see that they are correct, and will then certify and forward them to Major General Wellesley.

No man is to be included in more than one prize roll. Deserters are not to be included in any prize roll.'

GENERAL ORDERS BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST NOBLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Fort William, 12th April, 1804.

1. The Governor General in Council is pleased to direct that the following extract of a letter from Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General, dated Camp Jaffierabad, 17th January, 1804, be published in General Orders:—

'In the course of the campaign I have had frequent opportunities of reporting the good conduct of the troops to your Excellency, and I have likewise to report that their patience under fatigue, and the persevering activity with which they performed all the duties required from them, were equal to the bravery when opposed to the enemy in the field; and the consequence of all these good qualities is, that, notwithstanding the distance and difficulties attending our communication with the sources of our supplies, the great bodies of the enemy's horse, and the disaffected and disturbed state of the countries under the government of the Company's allies, I am enabled to state that throughout the campaign we did not lose one convoy or a particle of the Company's property of any description.

The troops composing the division under my immediate command were assembled from the

190.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp at Panowullah, 22nd May, 1804.

' You have now a great game in your hands, but all will depend upon your management of the natives with whom you will have to co-operate. I have only to recommend to you to conciliate them as much as possible; to treat them with the greatest kindness and attention is the only mode of drawing from them any assistance. At the same time you must not lose sight of the fact that they are Marhattas; that there is not one of them who can be implicitly trusted; and that, most probably, all are in correspondence with the enemy's camp. You must not allow them to perceive that you distrust them. You will excuse me for saying this to you. I have acted successfully as I now recommend to you; and my conduct and this recommendation are the result of long experience.'

the most distant parts of the country, and have been in the field during 2 monsoons, that on the eastern coast in the winter of 1802, and that on the western coast in the summer of 1803. These circumstances and the exhausted state of the countries from the Kistna to the Taptee have been the cause of the loss of the equipments of the officers of the army 3 or 4 times in one year.

Those belonging to the subsidiary force were equally unfortunate, and all must have suffered the greatest inconveniences from the great advance of price of all the necessaries of life in the countries which have been the seat of the war."

2. The Governor General in Council having received from Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley a report of treasure and other articles, being the public property of the enemy, captured by the troops under the command of Major General Wellesley during the progress of the late splendid and memorable successes of the army in the Deccan against the confederated Marhatta chieftians, amounting to 11,52,196½ Hydrabad rupees, deems it to be the duty of the Governor General, conformably to the general principle established by the general orders of the Governor General in Council of the 8th Oct. 1803, directing a distribution of prize money captured by the army under the personal command of his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, to anticipate the sanction of His Majesty and of the Honorable the Court of Directors for the distribution of this sum, as a testimony of the applause and gratitude with which the British government views the exemplary valor, discipline, zeal and firmness displayed by the army under the command of Major General Wellesley, during the recent arduous and glorious campaign.

3. The Governor General in Council accordingly authorises and directs Major General Wellesley to make an immediate distribution of the sum above mentioned to the troops under his command, in such proportions as may be conformable to the usage of the British service in similar cases. Major General Wellesley will determine and name in public orders the several corps, divisions or detachments of the army employed under his special command in the Deccan, which are to participate in this distribution.

4. Major General Wellesley will also determine and publish the general rules by which the shares of the respective officers and soldiers are to be apportioned, and will report his proceedings in the execution of those instructions to the Governor General in Council, and to the Governors in Council of the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay.

All ordnance, ordnance and military stores, taken by the troops composing the army under Major General Wellesley during the war, are to be reserved entire for further instructions.

5. The Governor General in Council will not fail to afford to the zeal, gallantry, and energy of the army (employed in services of arduous labor and peril, and remote from their Sovereign and their country) the most liberal and prompt encouragement which may appear compatible with the right of the Crown and the Company, and with the due principles of discipline, public order, and just economy.

6. The Governor General in Council, in consideration of the severe hardships and fatigues experienced by the officers of the army under the command of Major General Wellesley during the protracted time they have been in the field on active service, and also in the consideration of the heavy expenses to which the officers of the army employed under the command of Major General Wellesley during the recent arduous operation in the Deccan have been subjected by the repeated loss of their field equipments, combined with the inadequate amount of prize to be distributed amongst them, deems it equitable, and consistent with a liberal and wise policy, that this Government should award compensation to those officers, with a view to alleviate in some measure the hardship of their case, without establishing a precedent for incurring an unnecessary and improper expense in future.

The



191.

To General Lake.

27th May, 1804.

\*\*\*\*\* 'The account you give of the state of Holkar's army is very satisfactory. I have served a good deal in this part of India against this description of freebooter; and I think that the best mode of operating, is to press him with one or two corps capable of moving with tolerable celerity, and of such strength as to render the result of an action by no means doubtful, if he should venture to risk one. There is but little hope, it is true, that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps will come up with him. The effect to be produced by this mode of operation is to oblige him to move constantly and with great celerity. When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to stop to plunder the country, and he does comparatively but little mischief: at all events the subsistence of his army becomes difficult and precarious, the horsemen become dissatisfied, they perceive that their situation is hopeless, and they desert in numbers daily: the freebooter ends by having with him only a few adherents; and he is reduced to such a state as to be liable to be taken by any small body of country horse, which are the fittest troops to be then employed against him.

In proportion as the body of our troops, to be employed against a freebooter of this description, have the power of moving with celerity, will such

The Governor General in Council is therefore pleased to authorise a donation for the officers who have been serving with the troops employed under the command of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley during the late war in the Deccan against the Marhatta confederates, equal to 6 months' full batta of the rank in which they have been respectively serving during the war.'

G. O.

Camp at Panowullah, 29th May, 1804.

'Major General Wellesley will see the 3 regts. of Native Cavalry out in brigade at daylight tomorrow in front of the cavalry line. He requests that commanding officers will peruse the Memorandum concerning field movements which he gave them last year; and that they will caution their men against talking in the ranks.

Captains of the day will in future report in person to Major General Wellesley when they come off duty.'

*Memorandum referred to.*

Poonah, 23 May, 1803.

'Major General Wellesley requests the commanding officers of the regiments of cavalry to peruse the following memorandums, and to communicate them to their adjutants and such other officers as they may think proper.

1. When corps of cavalry act together, one corps is generally appointed the leading corps, and all are to conform to the movements of that corps, unless otherwise ordered. The leading corps may be altered, and all corps are to attend and follow the movements of that newly ordered as the leading corps. The rule applies equally whether they are in line, or otherwise formed; but it is not intended that when a line is to be formed from column, or to change its front, all corps are to perform that operation in the same mode; each is to perform it in that mode in which it can be done with the greatest celerity, combined with the greatest accuracy.

2. When a number of regiments are in column, either with the right or left in front, the formation into line may be either to the front or rear of the column, to its proper, or reverse flank, or oblique to the line of march.

3. If the column is one with the right in front, and its formation is to be made to the front, each corps disengages from the general column, as soon as the nature of the ground will admit, and goes to the left of the leading corps; the same mode is practised if the line is to be formed oblique to the line of march: in both these cases the adjutants of different regiments move out quickly as soon as they learn that the line is to be formed, and mark the ground, on which the left of their corps is to stand—*vice versa* if the column be one with the left in front.

4. If the formation from a column with the right in front, is to be made to the rear, all the corps in rear of that in which the line is to be formed, are to lead out from the general column

freebooter be distressed. Whenever the largest and most formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by our troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their villages; because their villages being in some degree fortified, they know well that the freebooters dare not wait the time which would be necessary to reduce them. When this is the case, all their means of subsistence vanish, no resource remains excepting to separate; and even this resource is attended by risk, as the village people cut them off on their way to their homes.'

192.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

'These frequent complaints against the officers of the army have given me the most serious concern; and I trust that the Governor in Council will do me the justice to believe that I shall exert the power which is in my hands to restrain and punish these disorders and irregularities. As, however, the complaints are frequent, and have been made against many individuals, it is to be apprehended that the only power which is in my hands, viz., that of trial by Court Martial, will fail to produce the wished-for effect, of deterring others by the example of the punishment of the prisoner who is now to be tried. If this should be the case, I beg to recommend that in future those

column to their right; all the corps in front of that in which the line is to be formed are to lead out from the general column to their left. The adjutants of the corps in the rear are to take up the ground on which their left is to stand; those of corps in front are to take up the ground on which their right is to stand—*vice versâ* if the column has its left in front.

5. If the line is to be formed from an open column with the right in front to the reverse flank, the corps follow their leaders, each wheeling up successively, as it reaches its ground, and the adjutants are to mark the ground on which their left is to stand—*vice versâ* if the column is with the left in front.

6. When a column is marching upon an alignment an object is generally given in front, on which the column is to march, the adjutants of corps are to assist in keeping the column in its true direction by placing themselves in the line and waiting there each, till the corps to which he belongs shall have passed him. The officers leading divisions in an open column, marching on an alignment on which the line is to be formed, are to go close to the horse's head of the adjutant who is marking the ground: a regiment is not to deviate partially from the alignment, marked by its adjutant, because the rear division of that in front of it may have done so.

7. When the line is to change its front and a new formation is to be made, all corps are to break towards that on which the new formation is to be made: if the corps is on the right, all the corps on the left break into an open column with the right in front, and the adjutants are to mark the ground on which the left is to stand in the new line: if the corps is on the left, all the corps on the right are to break into a column with the left in front, and the adjutant is to mark the ground on which the right is to stand.

8. The general rule is that the corps whether in forming line from column, or in changing front from line, are to enter on the new line at the point marked for them by their adjutants, which is always where their rear will stand; but as that is the mode of forming which takes most time, the practice is for each corps to enter the new line, either where its head is to stand, or in a central spot. The commanding officers must in that case take care to send forward a person to mark a true point in the line, at which he will enter, and to bring up the head of his regiment square to the proposed formation.'

G. A. O.

Camp at Chinchore, 4th June, 1804.

'1st. In order to relieve the distress of the camp for want of grain, and that of the followers on account of its high price, it is intended to supply the bazaars with rice from the stores in the dépôt.

2. The mode in which this must be effected is to bring rice from the dépôt to the army by means of the grain dealers, and to sell it to the bazaars at a reasonable rate.

3. The commanding officers of corps and heads of departments must take care that the public followers of their corps and departments are supplied by arrangements which they will make; the former with the cutwahls of their regimental bazaars, and the latter with the cutwahl of the grand bazaar.

4. The



officers of the army who may be guilty of riots, or who may oppose the execution of the laws, by acts of violence and outrage, or who may insult the magistrates, may be suspended from the service by authority of Government, or may be brought to trial before the Recorder of Bombay.

4. The rice must be drawn from the depôt by an order from the superintendents of the bazaars, specifying the rate at which the rice is to be delivered to the bearer of the order.

5. The superintendent will take care not to give an order for rice to any dealer who cannot give security that he will bring the rice for sale to the camp bazaar.

The security must be for a sum double the amount which the quantity of rice ordered would sell for in the bazaar of Poonah, or the country.

6. The superintendent will settle the rate at which the rice is to be delivered at the depôt to the grain dealers upon the basis of the rice being afterwards retailed in the bazaar at the rate of 6 seers for the rupee.

7. The grain dealers are not to pay for the rice at the depôt, but they will pay for it into the hands of the superintendent of bazaars, when they shall have sold it.

8. The storekeeper of the depôt will, in his accounts of issues of rice to the order of the superintendents of bazaars, state particularly the rate at which it appears by the order that the rice should be paid for, and the date of the order.

9. He will send to the superintendents at the end of every month an account of the quantity of rice issued during the month under his order, specifying to whom issued, and at what rate to be paid for, and the date of the order.

10. The superintendents will at the end of every month pay to the Paymaster, on account of the Honorable Company, the sum which he will have received from the dealers. He will give in an account, at the same time specifying the sum received from each dealer, for what quantity of grain, and he will support this account by that which he will receive from the grain keeper and the depôt as a voucher.

11. The superintendent will regulate the issue of this rice to the bazaars in the usual manner, in proportion to the consumption of each corps, and commanding officers of corps must take care, by the exertion of their influence over the regiment cutwahls, that the public followers are supplied in the first instance.

G. O.

5th June, 1804.

‘As some days may elapse before the troops will quit this ground, officers commanding brigades and corps will give particular orders respecting the preservation of cleanliness in the lines of the encampment.

The quarter masters of regiments of dragoons, Native Cavalry, and European Infantry, and quarter master serjeants of Native Infantry, are particularly responsible for the cleanliness of the lines of the encampment of their respective corps.

The necessaries must be made in front of the quarter guard, and rear of the rear guard, and people must be prevented from easing themselves in the ravines, holes, &c., which may be in the encampment.

Parties of camp Jansars of corps must be employed daily under the quarter master or quarter master serjeants of corps in cleaning the lines, removing or burying the carcasses of cattle and offal.

The general cleanliness of the lines of this camp is under the superintendence of the Deputy Quarter Master General and quarter masters of brigades. A party consisting of a jemidar and 20 pioneers to be in readiness in the pioneer lines daily, to attend the provost on his requisition, who is particularly responsible for the cleanliness of that part of the camp not immediately in the lines of corps under the quarter master. The provost will see that all dead carcasses, offal, &c., are buried. The quarter masters of brigades will occasionally inspect the state of the lines occupied by their brigades, and will report to the Quarter Master General if they should perceive any inattention to this order either in the quarter masters of corps or in the provost.

The superintendent of bazaars will give orders to the cutwahl to have regular necessaries made for the bazaar, and such other orders as may be required to preserve cleanliness in this part of the encampment.

The field officer of the day will be so kind as to notice to the Deputy Quarter Master General any neglect of cleanliness which he may observe in any part of the camp in going his rounds.

As it generally happens that the morning is fair, Major General Wellesley recommends that the officers commanding corps should avail themselves of that opportunity to remove the tents from the ground on which they usually stand, so as to allow it to dry.

People should be employed, however, to watch the weather, so that the tents may be pitched again before the rain commences.

There is to be a field officer of the day till further orders. The pickets on halting days are to mount at 8 in the morning instead of at *reveille*, as at present.

The

I am concerned to say that frequent complaints have been forwarded to me by Government, of instances of all these crimes; and it will be ruinous, as well to the authority of Government, as to the discipline of the army, if, owing to the defects of the military tribunal, or to any other causes, they should hereafter be unpunished.

I conclude that, under the regulations for the civil government of Surat, all native inhabitants of that city, whether belonging to the military profession, or followers of the military, are liable to the jurisdiction of the magistrate. I am desirous of receiving information upon this point, before I notice these disorders in the General Orders to the army.'

## 193.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Chinchore, 8th June, 1804.

'I wish you to take an opportunity of mentioning to the Governor General, that having a very strong desire to return to Europe, I applied lately to the

The piquets are to be brought to the parade by a commissioned officer, whether European or native, from each corps.

When arrived at the place of parade, they are to be received and formed by the adjutant of the day.

The daily guards of corps are to be brought to the general parade by a commissioned officer, and formed by the adjutant of the day: those of the right wing on the right of the piquets, those of the left wing on their left.

The piquets and daily guards are then to be marched off according to the order for mounting guard, by the field officer of the day.

In case the weather should be bad, the daily guards are not to come to the general parade, but relieve the guards from their own parades. The piquets also are to be marched off to the relief without loss of time. A captain to mount with the piquets, as formerly.

A subaltern of the 78th, and a subaltern of each brigade taken from a general roster, to mount with the native details of each brigade.

A subaltern of Native Infantry of each brigade to mount with the native details of the brigade on the inlying piquets, and a subaltern of each European regiment with a detail of it or the inlying piquet.'

G. A. O.

7th June, 1804.

'In order to ascertain the quantity of rice necessary to be thrown into the bazaars for the supply of the public followers and officers' private servants, without allowing any surplus which might induce the inhabitants of the country to resort to the camp bazaars, officers commanding corps, heads of departments, and officers not attached, are requested to send to the superintendent of bazaars the numbers of public followers and private servants attached to corps, departments, and officers above specified.

In this account puckallies, recruit boys, &c., who are not allowed rice by the Company, may be included, but not the native troops.'

G. O.

Camp at Chinchore, 8th June, 1804.

'The rice thrown into the bazaars, under the orders of the 4th inst., is for the general benefit, and it is not intended to preclude any body from enjoying it, but it is intended principally for the followers of the army, both public and private; and accordingly Major General Wellesley desires that measures should be taken by commanding officers and heads of departments, in order to secure to the followers what they should require. It appears, however, that the sepoys consider that they have an exclusive right of pre-emption in the bazaars, and that they have already been guilty of acts of riot and outrage, because they found that the orders and arrangements of commanding officers of corps under the particular directions of Major General Wellesley were found to give a preference to the followers of the army, for whose subsistence till then no provision had been made. The sepoys forget that they receive daily an allowance of rice *gratis*, and that at all events they have no right of pre-emption, excepting under an order, and that Major General Wellesley will not suffer violence, or outrage, or riot, on any account whatever.

He now desires that orders may be given to the guards in the different bazaars to take up immediately any sepoys or any body that may be found rioting or endeavoring to force the sale of grain and provisions. Any person guilty of such outrages shall be punished, and the allowance of rice to any sepoys who may be found guilty of riot shall be stopped.

Major General Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will be very particular



Commander in Chief for leave to quit this country when circumstances will permit it; and General Lake has given me his permission to go whenever I may think proper.

My principal reason for wishing to go is, that I think I have served as long in India as any man ought, who can serve any where else; and I think that there appears a prospect of service in Europe, in which I should be more likely to get forward.

cular in explaining these orders to the sepoy, and particularly the causes for which the arrangements were made which were ordered on the 4th inst.

Major General Wellesley particularly calls the attention of the adjutants to the regulations for mounting guards. The guards are to be paraded and marched off according to these regulations; excepting in the inspection of the adjutant of the day, which, as the guards are inspected by the adjutants of corps, and by the officers of the guards to which they belong, is not immediately necessary; and the inspection of so many men by one officer would take up too much time. That inspection, therefore, need not be made in this camp.

G. O.

Camp at Chinchore, 9th June, 1804.

Major General Wellesley takes this opportunity of expressing his satisfaction upon finding the corps of native infantry in such good order upon the inspection which he has made of them, and he will not fail to report their state to his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

It is by no means Major General Wellesley's wish that the corps should be harassed and fatigued by drill. After a corps is perfectly drilled in its exercise, but little attention will keep it in a state fit for service, or to be seen by the superior officer of the army, whenever it may be called upon. But in order to preserve the corps in the state in which they now are, Major General Wellesley desires that no corps may ever be dismissed from a parade with arms without performing some one, or more, if circumstances render it necessary, of the manœuvres laid down for the exercise of the troops; and commanding officers of corps will take care that whenever they perform any manœuvre, whether upon the regimental parade or elsewhere, or make any formation, that it be done upon true principles, and in the mode pointed out by the Regulations of the Army.

Officers commanding brigades are requested to notice any irregularity, or false movements, or incorrect principles which they may at any time observe in the exercise or formation of corps upon their regimental parade or elsewhere.

G. A. O.

12th June, 1804.

Major General Wellesley desires that the regiments of cavalry may parade on horseback twice at least in each week, weather permitting, and that whenever a regiment is paraded on horseback, it may perform some of the movements ordered for the practice and discipline of the cavalry. Commanding officers of regiments will take care that whatever movements they perform, or formations they make, are strictly conformable to the regulations.

Major General Wellesley also recommends that on the days on which, on account of the low state of the horses, the regiments of cavalry are not ordered to be taken out to exercise on horseback, the regiments may be out and exercised on foot, particularly in their wheelings and facings, and in those movements which will give them an understanding of the English words of command, as it is obvious that until the sepoy are accustomed to understand the meaning of those words of command, they cannot obey any commands given to them.

G. A. O.

14th June, 1804.

Major General Wellesley will see the line of native infantry out at exercise at 6 o'clock tomorrow morning, the weather permitting. Corps to parade in open column of companies, the right in front; the 5th brigade to close up to the 4th; piquets and quarter guards to join, sentries excepted.

Major General Wellesley requests the attention of officers commanding corps of infantry to the following instructions, when several battalions are required to march in line:—

1. When the battalion is in line, the post of the commanding officer is in the rear of the centre.

2. When the line is ordered to advance, each battalion is to march by its own centre, in the same manner as if it were alone. The commanding officer of each battalion is to fix upon an object perpendicular to the centre of his own battalion, upon which the officer who leads the battalion is to march.

3. The havildar or serjeant in the centre of the battalion between the colors is to follow exactly the steps of the officer or non commissioned officer who leads the battalion.

4. After the battalion shall have advanced a certain distance, the commanding officer will be able to see whether it approaches or recedes from the battalion which will have been named as that which leads the line. If he should find that the due distance is not preserved,

Another reason is, that I have been a good deal annoyed by the rheumatism in my back, for which living in a tent during another monsoon is not a very good remedy; and a third is, that I do not think I have been very well treated by the King's government. It is now about 2 years since I have been a Major General, and nearly as much since I was appointed to the staff at Fort St. George, by General Stuart. Since that time, it has been perfectly well known that I had led a body of British troops into the Marhatta territories; and supposing that I had no other pretensions to be placed on the staff, I might have expected a confirmation of General Stuart's act, under those circumstances. The staff in India had been under consideration, and another officer had been appointed to it.

This last reason for wishing to go to Europe is the only one which I have stated to General Lake, although it is the least strong; as I am very certain that I shall have been appointed to the staff, as soon as it was known in England that I had reached Poonah with the army; and General Lake has consented to my departure.

If the war with Holkar had not broken out, there would have been no difficulty in the business; and I should have been able to go in October, being the first period at which I could sail. As affairs are situated, I think it probable that the Governor General will have no objection to my departure, and this is the principal reason for which I trouble you. In the present state of affairs, I can do but little in the Deccan, and that little may as well be done by any body else. The siege of Chandore, when it can be undertaken, is a military operation of but little importance; and the operations of the troops from Guzerat are already beyond my guidance.

Under these circumstances, I wish that the Governor General would allow me to relinquish the command in the Deccan. If I should be able to go to England in October, it must be supposed that I have money matters to arrange in Mysore, and at Madras; particularly at the latter: my accounts of the late war, which, although sent up regularly every month, have not yet been passed.

I am, therefore, very anxious to receive your answer to this letter, at an early period, in order that I may arrive at Madras, if possible, early in September. I need scarcely add, that if the Governor General should have any desire that I should remain in this country, or should think that I can be of the smallest use to his plans, I shall remain with pleasure.'

194.

To Colonel Murray.

Camp at Chinchore, 15th June, 1804.

'The allied troops generally plunder for themselves, and carry nothing to

served, he is to alter the direction of his march, and point out another object to the officer or non-commissioned officer who shall lead the battalion, to which the leader will gradually alter his direction, and his steps will be strictly followed by the non-commissioned officers placed between the colors.

5. All changes of directions of a battalion marching in line, particularly if they are great changes, are equivalent to a wheel of the battalion on its centre, a movement of a very complicated nature, which requires time and great accuracy.

6. It follows, therefore, that in no case whatever must the pace of the battalion be hurried whilst the alteration of the direction is making, or that when it becomes necessary, to alter the direction to any great degree, it would be best to mark the time till the alteration is completed, and then to bring up the battalion to its place.

7. It must sometimes happen that the alteration of the direction of the march of the other battalions is so great as that it cannot be made by the wheel of the battalion each upon its centre:



account. We carry every thing to the public account, and Government gives order for the disposal of the captured property; and, in consideration of a variety of circumstances in the late war affecting the allies as well as ourselves, the Governor General did not order that any thing should be given to the allies. However, this depends entirely upon Government.

The plan which you must pursue is, to have an account taken of every article of property captured, and a valuation made. You must report on the subject, and the Government will order the disposal of the property. This is the mode in which I have proceeded.'

## 195.

To General Lake.

Camp at Chinchore, 24th June, 1804.

'In consequence of the orders of the Governor General, I have established the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, and have placed that, and the sub-

centre: when the alteration of the direction of a battalion is from any cause of this magnitude, it ought to be made by the *echelon* march of divisions.

8. When the commanding officer of a battalion in line finds it necessary to alter the direction of its march, he should apprise thereof the commanding officer of the next battalion on the flank most distant from the leading battalion.'

G. A. O.

18th June, 1804.

'Major General Wellesley will see the whole line of infantry out at exercise at 6 o'clock tomorrow morning, weather permitting.

(Other arrangements as on the 14th.)'

G. O.

Camp at Chinchore, 19th June, 1804.

'Major General Wellesley will present the new Union colors to the 1st batt. 4th regt. Native Infantry on the parade at 6 o'clock this evening, if the weather permits.

Upon the arrival of Major General Wellesley in front of the battalion, the 1st grenadier company, together with the commanding officer of the corps, and the officers who are to receive the new colors, will move out to the front. These officers will bring with them the old colors.

When Major General Wellesley shall deliver the new colors to the commanding officer the battalion will present arms, the officers salute, and the drums beat a march. The grenadier company advanced in front to receive the colors will at the same time present arms, the officers salute, &c.

After the colors shall have been received, the grenadier company will move off towards the battalion. Upon its arrival at the right of the corps it will file off from its left and march down the line. The front rank to march between the line of officers and the front rank of the battalion, and the rear rank between the front and rear ranks, the officers with the colors in front of the line of officers.

When arrived at the left of the battalion, the front and rear ranks are to wheel to their left, and to return along the line of the battalion, the front rank between the front and rear rank of the line, and the rear rank in the rear of the line, to their places in the line. The officers with the colors are to return along the front of the line to their places.

The battalion will present arms, the officers salute, and drums beat a march, when the company with the colors arrives upon the right; and will shoulder arms, &c., when the officers and colors take their places in line. The battalion will then break into an open column of companies, right in front, and march past the General to its lines.'

G. A. O.

19th June, 1804.

'Two salutes of 15 guns each to be held in readiness in the park tomorrow to be fired on the departure of Colonel Close and Major Malcolm.'

G. O.

24th June, 1804.

'Lieut. Colonel Haliburton, commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and Lieut. Colonel Wallace, commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, will each place themselves under the authority of the Resident at the durbar of the powers in whose service the troops under their command are employed, according to the orders and regulations of Government upon this subject.

Colonel Murray and the troops in Malwa will receive further orders for their guidance from the authorities at Bombay.

Upon the occasion of quitting the army, in consequence of the orders of the Governor General, General Wellesley once more returns his thanks to the officers and troops for their

uniform

subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, under the authority of the Residents, with the powers with which these troops are serving respectively; and I am about to proceed to Madras in obedience to his Excellency's orders of the 30th May.'

uniform good conduct since he has had the honor of commanding them. In the space of little more than a year those in this quarter in particular, now composing the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and those which are under orders to march to the southward, have been tried in every mode in which it is possible to try troops, and have uniformly manifested that patience under fatigues and severity of climate, that activity and perseverance in labor, and bravery and discipline in action, which are the characteristic qualities of the best soldiers; their success, and the honor which the troops have acquired, are proportionate to the good qualities which they have displayed: on which qualities Major General Wellesley has always had the fullest reliance in every emergency of the service.

He now recommends to them an adherence to the principles which have brought them with honor through so many difficulties, as the certain pledge of future success.

Major General Wellesley has frequently reported the good conduct of the troops to the Commander in Chief and the Governor General, and has recommended them to the notice of their Excellencies.

He will not fail to recommend individuals who have had opportunities of distinguishing themselves whenever an occasion may offer; and he assures all that he shall ever remember and reflect with satisfaction on their conduct and services, and that in every situation in which he may be placed he will be happy to forward their views.

Major General Wellesley has delayed to give orders for the division of the property captured during the war, according to the instructions of the Governor General, only till he receives all the prize rolls: he expects those of the 11th regt. from Berar in the course of a few days, when orders will be sent on that subject and regarding the batta for the officers.

Major General Wellesley takes this opportunity of expressing his approbation of the conduct of the troops serving under the Government of Bombay in Guzerat during the late war.'

*Extracts from a Memorandum given by Major General Wellesley to the Bombay Government relative to the formation of the Subsidiary Force at Poonah.*

'4. The subsidiary force is to consist of 6 battalions, each consisting of 1000 rank and file, 1 company of artillery, and 1 company or 100 pioneers, with their proper complement of ordnance and warlike stores.

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10. The next subject for consideration is the equipment of these corps for the field. The commanding officers of native corps on the establishment of Fort St. George carry the camp equipage and regimental stores for their corps; an arrangement which is certainly convenient to the service, and, as far as I am able to judge, economical. However, it is one which could not be introduced into the establishment of the Government of Bombay without reference to the Court of Directors. It will therefore be necessary to continue the present mode of carrying the camp equipage at the expense of the public, but I recommend that the tents should be carried upon camels instead of upon bullocks. This arrangement will be an economical one eventually, and will be attended by other advantages. A camel will carry 3 of the tents used by the Bombay army, with their poles, with great facility.

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12. The corps on the Bombay establishment are very deficient in regimental establishments to supply the troops with water. It would be a much better arrangement to give the adjutants of corps an allowance of 26 rupees per month to supply 2 puckalie men and 2 bullocks with bags for each company; the watermen, bullock bags, &c., to be mustered once a month at the same time with the corps, and the bullocks to be marked with the number of the corps and the letter W, to distinguish them from all other.

13. There is another establishment also much wanted with the corps of the Bombay army, and that is, one of bullocks to carry spare ammunition and entrenching tools, &c., of which I enclose a list, which the corps ought always to have with it:

Pickaxes with helves	12
Bill hooks	12
Musket cartridges	19,200
Musket flints	19,200
Gunny bags, ammunition	16
Do. do. for tools and stores	5
Rick, camp, with line	2
Tarpaulins, large	2
Momaters with handles	20

To carry the above, 24 bullocks.



196.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Poonah 24th June, 1804.

'I have the honor to inform you, that in consequence of the Governor General's instructions of the 25th May, I have broken up the army in the Deccan, and have established the subsidiary force, serving with his Highness the Peshwah; and have placed that force, and the subsidiary force serving

It would be proper to give an allowance of *per mensem* to the adjutants or any subaltern officer of corps, to provide bullocks and drivers for this service. These bullocks to be marked with the number of the corps and the letter A, and to be mustered with their drivers once a month with the corps.

14. In respect to carriage for the sick, I am fully aware of the difficulties under which the Government of Bombay must always labor in this part of their equipments. I should recommend, therefore, that the establishment of doolies with each native corps should be only 4; but that waggons should be made at Bombay to carry 20 men of each corps, besides those for whom doolies will be provided. General Bellasis will be able to make a pattern waggon: if it could be done with convenience and without great expense, the waggon ought to be upon springs, and at all events covered from the weather. Their wheels and axle trees ought to be strong, and they ought to have a greater capacity of turning than the waggon which General Bellasis lately sent to Poonah. It is not a matter of much consequence what number of men each waggon is made to contain, although possibly 6 men would be the most convenient number.

15. I enclose a statement of the establishment for each department, formed upon the model of that of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad; and they appear to me to be necessary.

When the Bombay native infantry shall form the subsidiary force, it will be necessary to add an establishment of armourers to the department of the commissary of stores, as those corps have no battalion armourers, and the repairs to their arms are always performed in the public stores.

16. In case General Stuart should not find it convenient to leave at Poonah the ordnance at present there, the ordnance which should be in the Peshwah's territory for the service of the subsidiary force are,

2 iron 18 pounders	18 brass 6 pounders
2 iron 12 pounders	2 5½ inch howitzers, with
2 brass 12 pounders	their proportion of tumbrils,

and 5 spare tumbrils for stores, and 30 platform carts, and an artificer's cart, and 11 arrack carts.

17. The commissary of stores at Poonah has a general state of stores which he ought to carry (exclusive of stores for the heavy guns, which can be but seldom required, and must be the subject of a distinct arrangement when required), and these will require 1000 bullocks, including their complement of spare cattle, 1 to every 6 bullocks.

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19. But supposing that they could be replaced, or that they would stay, it is notorious that the worst mode of procuring bullocks for the public service is to hire them, and the best is to have an establishment of bullocks and drivers, the property and in the service of the public; provided the persons composing it really know or are taught and are forced to perform their duty.

20. I am therefore induced by every consideration to recommend that a bullock establishment should be formed at Bombay to the extent at least that will be necessary to carry the stores for the subsidiary force.

21. The establishment should be in regular karkhanas. The drivers entertained for these bullocks should be accustomed at an early period to bring in their forage. The bullocks of each karkhana should be picketed in a separate line; they should receive their grain at the same time, and in the presence of the officer who will have the temporary charge of the department at Bombay. This officer ought also to see the forage which the drivers bring in for the cattle, and that the bullocks are rubbed down and cleaned every night. The drivers ought to be taught the mode of saddling and of loading and driving cattle, and every thing which relates to the duty of a bullock driver. Unless those who have charge of the cattle understand these duties, the cattle are destroyed, and the public are obliged to incur the expense of replacing them.

22. I recommend that the troops of the subsidiary force should be fed whenever they may be on actual service, and, when rice is not sold in the bazaar of the camp at 12 pucca seers (each of 2 lbs.) for a rupee, in the manner in which I fed the troops during the late war. They received their batta in money, and each man besides received half a seer or 1 lb. of rice gratis (daily).

with his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, under the authority of the Residents at the durbars of those powers respectively.

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Upon the occasion of relinquishing the command of the troops in this quarter, and consequently of giving up the immediate communication which I have held with your government upon all points connected with the public

As rice was seldom at so low a price as a rupee for 6 seers, the public gained by this arrangement in the mere expense of the rice issued to the troops; and the expense of half the carriage which would have been required to carry rice to last the troops for an equal length of time, supposing that a seer of rice had been issued to each man instead of batta; and I had the further advantage of not overburthening the army with cattle. I therefore strongly recommend this system.

23. The number of bullocks which I have attached to the grain department of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah is 5000, although there are none in the grain department with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

24. The reason for which I have departed from the model of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam in this instance is, that there is a famine in the Deccan at present, the effects of which may be felt for some time; and I could not depend upon the Marhatta brinjaries in the same manner as I know that the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam may upon those belonging to his Highness' territories. I have, however, lately suggested to Colonel Close the expediency of giving the Marhatta brinjaries a trial, from which Mr. Duncan will be able to judge whether they can be depended upon.

25. At all events, whether they can or not, I conceive that the quantity of grain for the carriage of which I have above provided, is far more than will be necessary upon any future occasion. In ordinary times, when the subsidiary force will not move, it is probable that no establishment of grain bullocks will be necessary, particularly if Colonel Close should find that he can command the services of the Marhatta brinjaries upon the plan proposed, or upon any other plan. If he should not be able to command their services, a bullock establishment, to carry rice to feed the number of fighting men at the half allowance for 30 days, will be necessary. But as it is possible that the plan proposed in respect to the Marhatta brinjaries will answer, and as at all events, supposing it should not, it is probable that some of the Mysore and Madras bullock owners and maistries attached to the grain department may be prevailed upon to stay, I do not now propose that a bullock establishment should be formed at Bombay for the grain as well as the store department; although, if it should be necessary to keep bullocks permanently to carry grain, in consequence of Colonel Close being unable to depend upon the brinjaries, it will be necessary hereafter to form such an establishment.

26. In that case they ought to be formed regularly at Bombay in the manner recommended for those of the store department.

27. The number of European troops will be so small that there will be no difficulty at any time in arranging for the carriage of their provisions.

28. The number of draft bullocks which I have allotted for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, as appears by the enclosed papers, is 1250, besides 100 belonging to the Bombay establishment at Poonah, which I placed under the charge of the commissary of grain at Poonah.

29. After making a liberal allowance for all the carriages to be drawn, and allowing the usual number of spare, this number is 350 more than the number of carriages will require.

30. However, the service in the Marhatta country will require great celerity and independence of movement; and it cannot be performed unless the commanding officer have the command of good cattle, in high condition, to draw his carriages. He may be obliged to be in the field during the monsoon: it must be expected that some cattle will die in that season, and yet the military operations must be continued.

Besides the ordnance and store carriages, for which provision has been and must be made, I have recommended that waggons should be constructed for the carriage of the sick: these may require 4 or 6 bullocks each, and will increase the demand from 100 to 120 bullocks.

31. It is therefore my opinion that the number of draft bullocks with the subsidiary force ought not to be less than 1300.

32. I know the Mysore people, who attend the draft bullocks now with the subsidiary force, will not stay in the Peshwah's territories after the troops belonging to the Government of Fort St. George shall come away; indeed it would be unreasonable to expect that they should stay. Their families live near Seringapatam, and they can purchase food and all the necessaries of life in Mysore at one sixth of the price at which the same articles can ever be procured at Poonah.

33. Supposing, therefore, that it should be convenient to the Government of Fort St. George



service, allow me once more to return you my thanks for the many instances of your confidence, favor, and kindness, which I have received since I have conducted the service in this part of India. Although at a distance, I shall ever be anxious for the honor and prosperity of your government, and I shall be happy to have any opportunity to evince my zeal in your service.'

197.

To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.

Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

'The draft bullocks allotted to your corps are 300 more than the carriages you have will require, including the heavy ordnance; viz., two 18 and two 12 pounders, and the spare cattle for each piece of cannon, according to the regulations of Government. It is scarcely necessary that I should point out to you the necessity of making every exertion to keep these cattle in condition. In fact, the existence of the detachment under your command may depend upon the state of this part of your equipment.

I cannot close my letter to you upon this subject, without earnestly recommending to you the strictest attention to the discipline of the troops, and to keep them and their followers in order. In this distant station, as the troops can but seldom come under the eye of the superior officers of the army, it will require the most constant and regular attention to preserve their discipline and order; and, it is certain, that in no part of India will those qualities be required in a greater degree than in the detachment serving with his Highness the Peshwah.

The licentiousness of the followers of the troops, particularly when those troops have been successful, is an evil of the greatest magnitude, and of quick

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George to hand over to the Government of Bombay the bullocks now at Poonah, it would be necessary that the Government of Bombay should entertain persons, and form an establishment of servants to attend upon the cattle.

34. I proceed now to detail the mode in which I recommend that that plan should be carried into execution, in reference to an establishment of draft bullocks for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah.

35. The number of karkhanas which will be required will be 13, to be numbered accordingly. In my opinion, the best place at which to collect the drivers and other servants, and of training them to their business, will be the head quarters of the subsidiary force. There are already a certain number of Marhatta drivers in the Mysore karkhanas left at Poonah which might be the foundation of the establishment.

36. An establishment of servants and drivers should be formed for 13 karkhanas.

37. By degrees they may draft into these karkhanas the Marhatta drivers belonging to the Mysore karkhanas, and when they would find the drivers, &c., sufficiently trained and steady both in the mode of taking care and of driving the cattle, they may send the Mysore drivers away to Seringapatam, and keep Marhatta servants and drivers only in charge of the bullocks.

38. It will not be possible to hire in the Marhatta territories or at Bombay, servants and drivers of bullocks at the same rate of wages as those receive who belong to the Company's establishment in Mysore. On the other hand, it is very desirable for the Government, as well as for the officers of the army, that the wages of labor prevalent at Bombay should not be paid in the subsidiary force.

I recommend, therefore, that it should be left to the authorities at Poonah to settle the rate of the wages of the different descriptions of servants and drivers who are to form this establishment of draft bullocks. But care must be taken to fix the wages of the drivers of the karkhana of carriage bullocks for the department which must be formed at Bombay at the same rate, otherwise it will be necessary to raise the wages of the attendants and drivers belonging to the draft karkhanas to the Bombay standard.

39. It will be impossible to form the carriage karkhanas in camp; there are no carriage bullocks in camp on that establishment, and there is no model; and as the camp will be moving, it will not be possible to train the servants and drivers so well as they can be trained at Bombay.'

growth. I therefore anxiously recommend the conduct of these people to your attention ; and that you should suppress at once, by decided measures, any attempts which they may make to depart from the rules of good order, and to shake off the restraint under which they have been hitherto held.

I also recommend to your attention the state of all the public establishments, and the establishments kept by commanding officers of corps, for the carriage of the camp equipage and stores. There is a tendency in the service, particularly when troops are employed at a distance, to admit abuse, which, if not checked in time, must be attended in every instance by the most inconvenient consequences ; and which can be checked only by a constant attention on the part of the commanding officer.

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 198.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Tiraloo, 27th June, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th instant, upon the subject of an application from Colonel Murray, that provision might be made for the silladar horse who might be wounded in the service ; and for the families of those who might be killed.

It is not reasonable to expect that persons of this description, who have no means of subsistence, excepting those afforded by military service will risk their lives, or being disabled, unless made certain of a provision hereafter. The want of this provision is the great defect of all the native military services ; and is the cause of the frequent instances of misbehavior before an enemy of the country troops. The truth of this observation is proved by the fact, that the troops in the service of Hyder Aly, and his son Tippoo, and those now in the service of the Rajah of Mysore, for whom provision is made, in case they should receive wounds, and for their families, in case they should be killed, have uniformly behaved better in battle than any other native troops of whom we have a knowledge.

I therefore strongly recommend to government, that the measures proposed by Colonel Murray may be adopted. It would be necessary, however, in the first instance, to submit the claims of those disabled by wounds, and of the families of the horsemen who may be killed in the service to the decision of a committee of officers, in the same manner as the claims of persons actually in the military service of the Honorable Company.’

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 199.

To Lieut. Colonel Wallace

Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804.

‘ I believe that in my public dispatches I have alluded to every point to which I should wish to draw your attention, excepting one, which I will mention to you—that is, the secrecy of all your proceedings.

There is nothing more certain than that, of 100 affairs, 99 might be posted up at the market-cross, without injury to the public interests ; but the misfortune is that, where the public business is the subject of general conversation, and is not kept secret, as a matter of course, upon every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that occasion on which it is necessary. There is an awkwardness in a secret which enables discerning men (of which description there are always plenty in an army) invariably to find it out ; and it may be depended upon that, whenever the public business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is exposed to public view.



For this reason secrecy is always best, and those who have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs are in the habit of never making known public business of any description that it is not necessary that the public should know. The consequence is that secrecy becomes natural to them, and as much a habit as it is to others to talk of public matters; and they have it in their power to keep things secret or not, as they may think proper.

I mention this subject to you because, in fact, I have been the means of throwing the public affairs into your hands, and I am anxious that you should conduct them as you ought. This is a matter which would never occur to you, but it is essentially necessary.

Remember, that what I recommend to you is far removed from mystery: in fact, I recommend silence upon the public business upon all occasions, in order to avoid the necessity of mystery upon any.

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200.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

3rd July, 1804.

‘In respect to the general question of a military establishment, it has always appeared to me that Government has made an erroneous calculation of the value of their conquests, as those were to tend to the decrease of the military establishments and their expense. They have adverted only to the fact that, by the success of their arms, they have diminished the number of their external enemies; and they have imagined, that in proportion as they have become secure abroad, they ought to have the means of reducing their armies at home. This appears to be particularly the error of the Court of Directors.

They have not adverted to the fact that all government in India, excepting perhaps that in Bengal, is held by the sword; that, in order to carry on their foreign wars, they have been obliged to weaken the means of their internal government; that is to say, the power of the sword in their own provinces, by which till this last war, they have invariably suffered; and that the conclusion of the most successful foreign war in India, that by which the most formidable enemy may have been subdued, if it gives an accession of territory, must bring with the territory a necessity to increase the army; because the government must be established in the new territory, and supported, as well as in the old, by the power of the sword. The want of knowledge, or rather of recollection, of these facts, is the cause of all the complaints of high military establishments and expenses, and of all the difficulties in which you must have found yourself, from the want of troops.

This want, however, it is to be hoped, will not hereafter be so severely felt. For the last 5 or 6 years, great exertions have been made, and the Company’s power has been vastly extended, without any very great increase of their military resources. What has been done has been by great military activity and exertion; for I believe it will be found, upon an examination of the Company’s military establishments, that, excepting in cavalry, they are but little larger than they were in Lord Cornwallis’s time, and not so strong in European troops. Accordingly, every thing has been on the stretch, and every nerve has been exerted, to support the authority of government in its extended provinces, as well as to provide the means of making foreign con-

quests. But now I believe that we can conquer no more, at least on the establishment of Fort St. George; and the troops and military resources of this Presidency will be applicable to the defence of the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to provide for the peace of the country.

I have never had much apprehension of the attack of an European enemy in India, and least of all in this war; because the enemy appear to have turned their resources to that kind of naval equipment which, it must be obvious, they could not use in an attack on this country.

In respect to the internal peace, I have great hopes of it, from the operation of the systems of government adopted in the latter end of Lord Clive's time. All arguments founded on theory are in their favor; and we have also in their favor the practical example of a long course of peace and increasing prosperity in the provinces under Fort William, administered by the same system; and that of the peace and tranquillity of the provinces under the government of Fort St. George (excepting always Malabar) in the late war, being the only foreign war in which the Company have ever been engaged, during which the people in all their provinces in the Peninsula, from which their troops were withdrawn, were not in rebellion. It is true that the circumstances and events of the war were favorable to internal peace, and all ought not to be attributed to the system of civil government lately established. But, on the other hand, a Marhatta war is one during which, above all others, the country is likely to be disturbed, as the Marhattas have their agents and intrigue every where; and therefore I think it but fair to attribute the general tranquillity, excepting always in Malabar, throughout the late war, to something more than chance, or than to the circumstances and events of the war itself.

Still, however, the sword is the main support of the government; and it is necessary now to provide a military establishment adequate to defend the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to preserve the internal tranquillity: and I have adverted particularly to the state of the civil government, as in my opinion that must influence in a great degree, not only the amount of the force in each of the military divisions, but the mode in which that force ought to be disposed.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to point out that place on the great extent of coast, for the defence of which you have to provide, on which it is most probable that the French would make an attack. After providing for the defence of Goa, on the western coast, and Masulipatam, and Fort St. George on the eastern, that distribution of the army which would best provide for the support of the internal government, and would preserve tranquillity, would probably answer best to defend the Peninsula against the attack of an European enemy. I shall proceed, therefore, to state my opinion upon this part of the subject.

In the countries in which the new systems of government have been introduced, there can be little occasion (or at least it is probable that in a short time there will be little occasion) for the constant interference of the military in the support of the civil government and of the police. In those districts it will be possible to collect the troops allotted to the division in one or two great stations. This arrangement will be advantageous to discipline; it will be attended by the advantage of giving you the ability to move the troops, at once, to any point on the coast which may be threatened or attacked, you



will always have a force ready to move to suppress insurrection or rebellion; and supposing that it should be necessary to keep troops in these districts, at all times, for the support of the civil government, those which you might withdraw from a great station, in which some troops would be left, would not be missed, as they have been heretofore, when the troops, being scattered in numerous small posts, have been withdrawn from the whole, and all have been left unoccupied in time of war, when to hold them would appear most important. But although I thus recommend the assembly of the troops in each division, where the new systems of government have been established, generally in one large station, I am by no means an advocate for the destruction of the forts. You have my opinion already upon that subject; and I shall only mention here that the forts in these countries ought either to be made over to the civil government, or held by small detachments made from one corps at the principal station.

In the countries in which the new system of civil government has not been introduced, I fear that the old mode of distributing the troops must still continue. But even in these, I should recommend, as a general principle, to draw the corps together as much as possible, and to make detachments only in case of very evident necessity. If this principle can be carried into effect in every division of the army, and I conceive that it might in some degree, it will give you in each division a small disposable force. This may not be equal to all the demands which may arise, but it will give you some strength every where; and considering the great extent of coast you have to defend, and of the Company's territories under the government of Fort St. George, I should prefer that to the concentration of your force in one position.

In the present state of the army equipments, I conceive that, for the purposes of defence against an European enemy, or even of preserving internal tranquillity, and suppressing insurrection and rebellion, there is but little occasion to have the troops constantly in the field. Both native and European troops have their camp equipage always in readiness: and I can speak with certainty of Seringapatam, and I should think it probable, of other principal stations of the army, that the time which would be required to bring in the cattle belonging to the ordnance, and for the carriage of the camp equipage of corps, would be sufficient to procure the bullocks which might be necessary to carry any stores that might be wanted, and the provisions for the European troops. The cattle for the carriage of the gram for the horses of the cavalry can always be procured as soon as the gram.

Even if you were to form a field force, it is probable that you would not give it a gram department; and, therefore, when it would move, it would depend upon its bazaars and the country for its supplies, as must the troops when they move suddenly from these great stations.

The only advantage in point of equipment that the field force would have, would be carriage for the sick; but even some of that is always to be procured: and it is to be supposed that the troops moving suddenly, for which event the field force would be provided, would leave their sick behind them in their station.

The objections to the central field force are, that with the expense of an army in the field, they become, in a short time, not much better than troops in a cantonment. The field force at Hyderabad, and those at Cawnpore and

Futtyghur in Bengal, are examples of the truth of this observation. Those troops are in barracks and the officers in bungalows; and it is as difficult to move them, as it is to move a similar number from a garrison, and a proportion of them must be left to take care of the cantonment.

But in respect to an invasion by the French, I should suppose that your mode of defence would be to collect, as speedily as possible, a body of troops in the neighbourhood of the spot on which the French might land, with directions to watch and circumscribe their movements as much as possible, to cut off their communications with the country, and to prevent them from receiving supplies of cattle, provisions, &c. Supposing the landing to be made in the Carnatic, and the number of men the French should land to be as large as any they have been able to bring out to India, I should imagine the disposable troops in the eastern division of the Carnatic, collected, I would suppose, at Wallajahbad, to be fully equal to the service proposed for them. It is probable that the central field force, unless reinforced by the disposable troops in the other divisions, would not be equal to more; and the troops at Wallajahbad would have the advantage over them, that the enemy would feel them at an earlier period than they would the field force.

On the other hand, supposing the enemy to land on the western coast, the measures to be pursued would be the same. The troops would collect in Malabar in their neighbourhood; they would be joined by those from Seringapatam; and they would certainly be felt before the field force could approach.

When preparations are to be made for a great foreign war, such as the late war with the Marhattas, the mere readiness of the troops is nothing, in comparison with the preparations required for the departments of the service. You could march the troops from the most distant garrisons before these would be ready, and therefore here again the field force would be of no use. I acknowledge that I have altered my opinion upon this subject: but the state of the country has altered much since I formed it; the equipments of the army have been much improved; I have gained more experience and knowledge of the real benefits of these field forces; and I acknowledge that I am sanguine in my expectations, that the improvements of the civil government have established tranquillity in the districts in which they have been made, upon a basis more firm than has hitherto existed.

## 201.

To Colonel Close.

Camp at Akowla, 11th July, 1804.

‘I answered, that nothing would give the British Government greater satisfaction than to see the Peshwah surrounded by his principal subjects, I observed, that as these held lands under his government, it was but reasonable that they should serve him, or resign their lands; but that if they did serve him with fidelity and zeal, it was reasonable that they should enjoy, in peace and security, the benefits which they then held. I said that the British Government’s wishes were confined to an arrangement between the Peshwah and his subjects on those principles.’

## 202.

To the Native Inhabitants of Seringapatam (in answer to an Address.)

Seringapatam, 16th July, 1804.

‘In every situation in which I have been employed, it has been my uni-



form wish and endeavor to conduct the public affairs intrusted to my management, according to the orders and intentions of the Government which I am serving, and under whose protection you are living.

I have always been particularly interested in the welfare and prosperity of the inhabitants of Seringapatam, and have been anxious that they should enjoy the full benefit of the security which the laws and regulations by which the British Government is administered afford to every individual.

The attention which I have given to your affairs, in every situation in which I have been placed, has been a part of my duty, and a necessary consequence of my desire that you should not cease to feel the benefit of the Company's government; and it is very gratifying to my feelings to find that my conduct has been satisfactory to you.'

## 203.

To Lieut. \_\_\_\_\_.

Seringapatam, 17th July, 1804.

'I have received your letter, in which, among other things, you reproach me with having withdrawn from you my confidence. A man must have been stout indeed in his confidence in any body who would continue to repose it, after having received such complaints as I have received against you.

In respect to your money concerns, I do not wish to inquire into them, and I shall not notice them, excepting to observe, that a person, trusted as you were, ought to have refrained from such practices when you held a public trust.

It is not the fact that you did Major \_\_\_\_\_'s duty without receiving his salary. You received the allowance for the duty you did, and your own allowance for the duty done by another person in the field.

I shall close upon this subject by telling you, that it is useless to go into long proofs of matters entirely irrelevant to the charge brought against you. You have been accused, on oath, in a public trial, of having received, through your moonshee, 1200 rupees on corrupt grounds. The moonshee positively received the money. He must be prosecuted in the Phousdarry, and convicted of a breach of trust and duty, otherwise you must resign your office of \_\_\_\_\_.

I cannot go on with a man against whom there will be such a public imputation as there will be against you, if the moonshee should not be convicted of having taken and applied this money to his own use. I enclose answers to the memorandums sent.'

## 204.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Fort St. George, 2nd August, 1804.

'It must be obvious to every man, that in a war, such as the late war, there could be no success unless the officer commanding the troops was able to move, at all times, with the utmost celerity of which the troops were capable, and to continue his movements so long as was necessary. Rapid movements with guns and carriages cannot be made without good cattle, well driven, and well taken care of; and without adverting to what passed subsequently, it is more than probable, that if I had had the service of such cattle only, as served Lord Cornwallis and General Harris in former wars, I should never have reached Poonah, and that I should have been obliged to find my way back without the wheel carriages, in the best manner I could.

I therefore take the liberty of recommending this establishment of cattle to your protection. It is founded upon the most efficient and most economical principles, and will never fail the army, so long as it is superintended and conducted, as it has been hitherto.'

## 205.

To Captain Wilks.

Fort William, 9th Sept. 1804.

'I think, however, that it is not inconsistent with the principle not to interfere with the Rajah's servants, to give rewards to those of them who may serve the Company usefully and with fidelity; particularly if care be taken, as it will be in these instances, to bring forward the government of Mysore as much as possible; and to provide that the rewards given shall be through the hands of the Rajah's government, and shall be dependent upon the continuance of the faithful services of the receiver, and in a great measure upon the pleasure of the Dewan.

Purneah, like other men, has his faults. He is particularly jealous of the intercourse between the servants of his government and the European gentlemen, and of the favors which the former may receive from the Company. This jealousy arises principally from ignorance of the European character, and partly from being insensible of the strong impressions in his own favor, which his conduct, his character, and his abilities have made upon all the persons who have at present any power in India. But I am of opinion that we should not act as we ought, if we were to allow that jealousy to prevent us from giving those rewards which are justly due, and which policy urges us to give as strongly as justice and gratitude.'

## 206.

To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.

Fort William, 12th Sept. 1804.

'Some time has elapsed since I have written to you, but you will readily believe that I have had much to do; and I had nothing to say to you which could interest you.

I have spoken to the Governor General regarding your situation when the Coast troops shall be relieved at Poonah; and he has determined that you shall continue to command the subsidiary force, and Agnew to retain his situation of Deputy Adjutant General.

I have not yet had an opportunity of speaking to him regarding the other officers belonging to the Coast army, attached to the staff of the subsidiary force, but I will do so; and I have no doubt but that I shall be able to arrange that to their satisfaction. At all events, if I should not be able to fix them with you, I shall have no difficulty in providing for them elsewhere. I do not wish you to talk upon this subject; but if you should hear of any anxiety respecting their staff situations when the relief shall take place, I authorize and request you to say that you know I am not inattentive to their views.

You will have heard reports of poor Monson's reverses; but as I am on the spot, you will be glad to hear the truth from me; and as they give some important military lessons to us all, I do not regard the trouble of writing them to you.

When it became necessary to attack Holkar, Monson was detached from



the grand army with 3 battalions and their guns, and a body of cavalry, under Lieut. Lucan. Holkar, who was then near Ajmeer, with an army composed only of horse (and as General Lake was at no great distance from Monson), retreated towards Malwa.

After quitting the river Jumna, and passing through the flat countries depending on Agra, the first country, going to the southward, is a mountainous tract called Jeypoor, governed by the Rajah of that name, who had been tributary to Scindiah and Holkar previous to the late war, and who had been relieved from his tribute by the operation of the treaty of peace. Joining to the territories of Jeypoor is that of the Rajah of Boondy, of the same description: and joining to Boondy is the territory of the Rajah of Kota.

These last two Rajahs had been, and are still, tributary to Scindiah; and Holkar has claims upon them which they hoped to get rid of by the British assistance, in consequence of their conduct in the war; at all events, they were desirous to obtain for a time the British protection against the demands of Holkar.

Between Boondy and Jeypoor is a small territory and fort, called Rampoor, which, at the commencement of the war, belonged to Holkar. This territory had formerly been part of the Jeypoor territory, and had been seized by the Holkar family in some of their former contests with the Rajah of Jeypoor. The whole of this country between Agra and the province of Malwa, which joins to the Kota territory, and which is entered through a pass called the Muckundra ghaut, is intersected by rivers and nullahs, which are either full throughout the western rains, or are filled at times by those rains, and become impassable for troops. Of these, the principal is the river Chumbul, which runs between Kota and Boondy, and the river Banas, which runs between Rampoor and Agra.

When Holkar fled in front of the army of the Commander in Chief, Colonel Monson followed him successively to Boondy and Kota, the Rajahs of which countries were very desirous to have the protection of the British troops against his exactions, and promised supplies and every thing which Colonel Monson could want.

At the same time that Colonel Monson advanced, a detachment under Colonel Don, consisting of 2 battalions, was sent to take Rampoor, of which place it got possession by storm, and this detachment afterwards joined and reinforced Monson's corps, which then consisted of 5 battalions.

In the month of June, the Commander in Chief withdrew his army into cantonments, leaving Monson's corps in the Kota country. Monson, towards the end of that month, passed through the Muckundra ghaut into Malwa, accompanied by the troops of the Rajah of Kota, and some of Scindiah's, under Bappojee Scindiah, and attacked, and took by storm, the hill fort of Hinglisghur; and after this operation he took up a position in Malwa, recommended to him by the Rajah of Kota, at some distance from the Muckundra ghaut, in which the Rajah told him he was likely to get supplies, and from which Monson expected to be able to communicate with Colonel Murray, at that time on his march from Guzerat towards Ougein.

After his retreat in front of the Commander in Chief, Holkar had first threatened Ougein, and afterwards had gone to Mundissoor, a town belonging to Scindiah, situated to the north west of Ougein, and on the left of the

Chumbul. Between the middle and latter end of June, he took and plundered this town; and at that time the river Chumbul was between him and Colonel Monson, who was encamped about 5 coss from the river, on the right bank.

Towards the beginning of July, Holkar passed the Chumbul with his army. Colonel Monson learnt that he was doing so, and intended to attack him. He moved towards the place at which he heard Holkar was, and found that the whole army had crossed the river; nearly about the same time, he understood that Colonel Murray, who had made two marches towards Ougein from Guzerat, had recrossed the Myhie; and upon the whole, Monson, having only 2 days' provisions, thought it best to retreat.

Accordingly, he sent off his baggage early on the following morning, the 8th July (I believe), towards the Muckundra ghaut; and he followed with the infantry at about 9 in the morning, meaning to reach Muckundra that night, the distance about 17 miles. He left Lucan, with his irregular horse and Bappojee Scindiah's horse, to cover his rear, and to follow as his rear guard. After Monson had marched a few miles, he heard that Holkar had attacked, with his cavalry, his rear guard of irregular horse; and shortly afterwards, he received intelligence that the rear guard was destroyed, and Lucan taken prisoner. He arrived at Muckundra unmolested, and took up a position that covered the ghaut; but which, like all others that I have seen, had many passages practicable for cavalry.

On the next day, or the next but one, Monson was attacked by the whole of Holkar's cavalry, in three separate bodies, who, however, could make no impression upon him; and they were beat off. Towards evening he heard that the infantry was arrived at a camp within 2 or 3 coss of the Muckundra ghaut, with their guns, 175 in number; and he determined to retreat again. He accordingly marched to Kota, the Rajah of which place urged him to stay there, but could not supply him with provisions, and then Monson marched on the following day, and crossed the Chumbul in boats, provided by the Rajah, which he sunk after he had crossed.

The rain began about the 10th July, and became incessant, and rendered Monson's marches much more difficult than they would otherwise have been; particularly in that country, which is a black cotton ground. At last, after he had crossed the Chumbul, he was obliged to spike his guns and leave them behind, and he continued his march, getting but little provision on the road until he reached Rampoor. He was followed, but not much harassed, by a body of Holkar's horse, which overtook him at a nullah, which being full, stopped him. He twice beat up the camp of this body of horse, and then I believe they quitted him.

On his arrival at Rampoor, Monson was joined by 2 battalions with their guns, and a body of Hindustany horse, under Major Frith, which had been sent from Agra to reinforce him, and he immediately began to collect provisions at Rampoor.

The rains, which had been so distressing to Monson, likewise impeded Holkar, some of whose guns remained to the southward of the Muckundra ghaut. His progress to the northward was likewise impeded by Monson having destroyed the Rajah of Kota's boats on the Chumbul. However, at last he advanced, and towards the 20th August, again approached Monson at Rampoor.



By this time, Monson had collected only about 12 days' provisions, and the Commander in Chief foreseeing the difficulty in which he might again be involved, desired him on the 20th August to retire towards Jeypoor, if he should think it probable that he might be distressed for provisions.

Monson, however, remained till Holkar approached him within 6 coss with his whole army, and on the 21st August, in the evening, commenced his retreat towards Agra, by Kooshalghur, leaving Jeypoor on his left hand. He left 15 companies as a garrison in Rampoor. He arrived at Banas river on the 23rd, and found that it was full: on the 24th in the morning, it fell, and became fordable, and he passed over his baggage and a battalion; and between 12 and 3 o'clock he passed over 3 more battalions, leaving the piquets and one battalion to support them on the southern bank.

Holkar's troops had appeared in the morning, and were seen crossing at different fords on the right and left flank; and towards evening, Holkar's infantry and guns appeared in front. They attacked the piquets, but were repulsed; and the piquets and battalion took 8 guns; but afterwards our troops were overpowered by superior numbers, and were obliged to retreat across the river to the main body, in which operation they lost many men, being attacked on their rear, and also by the horse, who had crossed the river and moved up its bed.

Monson retreated from Banas river on the night of the 24th, leaving his baggage, and arrived at Kooshalghur, about 40 miles distant, on the night of the 25th. He was followed throughout the march by Holkar's horse, who, however, were not able to make any impression upon him. He halted on the nights of the 25th and the 26th, at Kooshalghur, and on the 26th at night marched towards Agra. Something happened on the 27th, of which I have not received an account; but on the 30th, Monson and his detachment arrived at Agra.

The Commander in Chief has taken the field, and it is to be hoped that he will have an early opportunity of wiping away the disgrace which we have suffered.

It is worth while to review these transactions, in order that we may see to what these misfortunes ought to be attributed, that in future, if possible, they may be avoided.

In the first place, it appears that Colonel Monson's corps was never so strong as to be able to engage Holkar's army, if that Chief should collect it; at least the Colonel was of that opinion. Secondly; it appears that it had not any stock of provisions. Thirdly; that it depended for provisions upon certain Rajahs, who urged its advance. Fourthly; that no measures whatever were taken by British officers to collect provisions either at Boondy or Kota, or even at Rampoor, a fort belonging to us, in which we had a British garrison. Fifthly; that the detachment was advanced to such a distance, over so many almost impassable rivers and nullahs, without any boats collected, or posts upon those rivers; and, in fact, that the detachment owes its safety to the Rajah of Kota, who supplied them with his boats.

The result of these facts is an opinion, in my mind, that the detachment must have been lost, even if Holkar had not attacked them with his infantry and artillery.

In respect to the conduct of the operations, it is my opinion that Monson ought to have attacked Holkar in the first instance. If he chose to retire, he

ought to have been the rear guard with his infantry, and to have sent the irregular horse away with the baggage.

When he began to retreat, he ought not to have stopped longer than a night at Muckundra; because he must have been certain that the same circumstances which obliged him to retire to Muckundra would also oblige him to quit that position. The difference between a good and a bad military position, is nothing when the troops are starving.

The same reasoning holds good respecting Monson's halt at Rampoor, unless he intended to fight. As he had been reinforced, he ought to have fallen back till he was certain of his supplies; and having waited till Holkar approached him, and particularly as Holkar's army was not then in great strength in infantry and guns, he ought to have vigorously attacked him before he retired. When his piquets were attacked on the Banas, he ought to have supported them with his whole corps, leaving one battalion on the northern bank to take care of his baggage; and if he had done so, he probably would have gained a victory, would have saved his baggage, and regained his honor.

We have some important lessons from this campaign.

First; we should never employ a corps on a service for which it is not fully equal.

Secondly; against the Marhattas in particular, but against all enemies, we should take care to be sure of plenty of provisions.

Thirdly; experience has shown us, that British troops can never depend upon Rajahs, or any allies, for their supplies. Our own officers must purchase them; and if we should employ a native in such an important service, we ought to see the supplies before we venture to expose our troops in the situation in which they may want them.

Fourthly; when we have a fort which can support our operations, such as Rampoor to the northward, or Ahmednuggur, or Chandore, in your quarter, we should immediately adopt effectual measures to fill it with provisions and stores, in case of need.

Fifthly; when we cross a river likely to be full in the rains, we ought to have a post and boats upon it; as I have upon all the rivers south of Poonah, and as you have, I hope, upon the Beemah and the Godavery.

In respect to the operations of a corps in the situation of Monson's, they must be decided and quick; and in all retreats, it must be recollected that they are safe and easy, in proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreating corps. But attention to the foregoing observations will, I hope, prevent a British corps from retreating.

These misfortunes in Hindustan will, I fear, take me back to the Deccan. Indeed, I shall leave this immediately, and orders have been already given that cavalry may be prepared to reinforce the troops with you.

207.

To Colonel Murray.

Fort William, 14th Sept. 1804.

'Under these circumstances the situation of your corps becomes a consideration of some importance; and as I have had some experience in the warfare of these Marhattas, my sentiments upon it may not be disagreeable to you.

There are two modes in which the Marhattas carry on their operations.



They operate upon supplies by means of their cavalry; and after they have created a distress in the enemy's camp, which obliges the army to commence a retreat, they press upon it with all their infantry and their powerful artillery. Their opponent, being pressed for provisions, is obliged to hurry his march, and they have no fear of being attacked. They follow him with their cavalry in his marches, and surround and attack him with their infantry and cannon when he halts, and he can scarcely escape from them.

That, therefore, which I consider absolutely necessary in an operation against a Marhatta power (indeed in any military operation in India) is such a quantity of provisions in your camp as will enable you to command your own movements, and to be independent of your magazines, at least for that length of time which may be necessary to fulfil the object for which you may be employed.

The next object to be considered is, the strength of your corps. Experience has shown us that the Marhatta cavalry are not very formidable when opposed to our infantry; that of Holkar, in particular, made no impression upon Monson's detachment in its long retreat. All the impression was produced by the infantry and cannon, the weather, and want of provisions. The infantry is the strength of Holkar's, as it is of every other army, and to that I conceive your corps to be fully equal.

It is probable that the Commander in Chief will not be at Kota till towards the end of October, and supposing that Holkar should adopt the plan of operations which I have detailed in the commencement of this letter, he will be near you about the beginning or middle of that month. You ought therefore to have at least a month's provision in your camp.

If he should bring his infantry and cannon near you, you ought to throw your baggage into any fortified village, or throw up a few redoubts to cover it, in any place in which there may be water, where you will leave a guard to take care of it, and march to attack his infantry. If you should beat that, the cavalry will not hold together.

You must by all means avoid allowing him to attack you with his infantry. There is no position in which you could maintain your camp against such powerful artillery as all the Marhattas have. If you should not hear of their approach until they are close to you and coming to attack you, it would be better to secure your baggage in any manner, and move out to attack them. Do not allow them to attack you in your camp, on any account.

Holkar may, however, possibly keep his infantry out of your way, surround you with his cavalry, and entirely cut off your communication. You have then only to beat up his cavalry camps as frequently as you may hear of their situation. Do not allow the enemy to lay near you with impunity, and you will soon clear the communication. Send constant accounts towards Kota of your situation; and if you should hear of the infantry camp, move upon it with celerity and attack it.

In this consideration of the subject, I have supposed that you will have no cavalry. If you should have any, you will, of course, use it in attacks upon the enemy as often as may be practicable; and if you should support those attacks by your infantry and your cannon, you may be certain that they will be successful.

If your provisions should fail you, and you should hear that Holkar's

infantry is near you, you ought to attack them before you think of any thing else. If you should be obliged to draw off towards your magazines, make your regular marches at the regular hours; beat up the cavalry corps as frequently as you can: if the infantry, or any part of them, should approach you, attack them with vigor. Even if you should lose a day or two by it in the time of your arrival at your magazines, you will probably gain time in the period of your relief from your distresses, as the cavalry will cease to hang upon your flank when the infantry will be beaten. Burn all the baggage which you cannot carry on. But if you should have provisions in your camp in sufficient quantities to enable you to fulfil the objects for which your corps is employed, there is nothing which can oblige you to retreat.

I do not know what orders you may have received from the Commander in Chief. His intention is, I believe, that you should act as I proposed in my letter of the 7th May. At all events, whatever his intention may be, you must have a store of provisions in your camp, or you will not be in safety, much less be of any use to his operations.'

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 208.

## MEMORANDUM ON THE TREATY OF BASSEIN.

'European governments were, till very lately, guided by certain rules and systems of policy, so accurately defined and generally known, that it was scarcely possible to suppose a political event, in which the interest and conduct of each state would not be as well known to the *corps diplomatique* in general, as to the statesmen of each particular state.

The Asiatic governments do not acknowledge and hardly know of such rules and systems. Their governments are arbitrary, the objects of their policy are always shifting; they have no regular established system, the effect of which is to protect the weak against the strong: on the contrary, the object of each of them separately, and of all of them taken collectively, is to destroy the weak; and if by chance they should, by a sense of common danger, be induced for a season to combine their efforts for their mutual defence, the combination lasts only so long as it is attended with success, the first reverse dissolves it; and, at all events, it is dissolved long before the danger ceases, the apprehension of which originally caused it.

There cannot be a stronger proof of this defect of policy in the Asiatic governments than the dissolution of the combination of the year 1790, between the English, the Marhattas, and the Nizam, by the attack of the Marhattas upon the Nizam in the year 1795.

These observations apply to the government of the Marhattas, more than to any other of the Asiatic governments. Their schemes and systems of policy are the wildest of any. They undertake expeditions, not only without viewing their remote consequences upon other states, or upon their own, but without considering more than the chance of success of the immediate expedition in contemplation.

The Company's government in India, the other contracting party to their alliance, is one bound by all the rules and systems of European policy. The Company's power in India is supposed to depend much upon its reputation: and although I do not admit that it depends upon its reputation, as distin-



guished from its real force, as appears to be contended by some, I may say that it is particularly desirable for a government, so constituted as the Company's, never to enter upon any particular object, the probable result of which should not be greatly in favor of success.

Besides this, the Company's government in India is bound by acts of Parliament not to undertake wars of aggression, not to make any but defensive alliances, and those only in cases in which the other contracting party shall bind itself to defend the possessions of the Company actually threatened with hostilities.

The Company's government in India are also connected with His Majesty's Government, and, as an Asiatic power, are liable to be involved in wars with European powers possessing territories in India, whenever His Majesty shall be at war with those powers.

The picture above drawn of the state of politics among Asiatic powers proves that no permanent system can be adopted, which will preserve the weak against the strong, and will keep all for any length of time in their relative situations, and the whole in peace; excepting there should be one power which, either by the superiority of its strength, its military system, or its resources, shall preponderate and be able to protect all.'

## 209.

To Major Shawe.

On board the Bombay Frigate, 20th Nov. 1804.

'I do not recollect whether any thing was done respecting Major Macaulay. There is not a doubt but that the mode in which he brought forward his proposition regarding the tobacco was unguarded. But Major Macaulay is an honest and deserving servant of the public; one who, I know, is attached personally to the Governor General, and to the good principles of government in India; and it is evident that he has felt the censure which he has received. The explanation which he has given of his conduct is satisfactory, and there is nothing against him, excepting that he did not at first sufficiently explain the transaction which he brought under the view of the Governor General. That being the case, he no longer deserves the censure of the Government; and, as it is certain that these censures never fail to damp the zeal and cool the attachment of the public servants of the Government; and as the attachment of a man such as Macaulay must always be of use, I most anxiously recommend that some measure may be adopted to soothe his feelings. In fact, if it be true that Macaulay did not deserve the censure, and received it only because he made an erroneous or imperfect statement of a transaction in which he had been concerned, which I believe to be the case, to recall or cancel the censure is only a matter of justice.'

## 210.

To Lieut. Col. Montresor.

Fort St. George, 24th Nov. 1804.

'As I have served much in the Marhatta territory, and, from experience, must have acquired some knowledge of the people, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to preserve the most strict discipline among your troops and their followers; and to make them pay for every thing which they may want. You will do well to keep up and encourage, by mild treatment, a constant intercourse with the natives of the country through which you will pass, as the best means of drawing from them the resources which the districts can afford.'

## 211.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Fort St. George, 24th Nov., 1804.

' I acknowledge that I do not exactly understand the validity of this objection; but it comes from the first authority, and nothing can be said against it.

In the mean time, Colonel Haliburton is promoted, and you are superseded in your command; which, at the present moment, must be unpleasant to you, and inconvenient to the service. However, as it could not be avoided, and I did every thing in my power to prevent it, I am convinced that you will, with your usual zeal, exert yourself to prevent it from being so detrimental to the service as might be expected, and that you will do every thing in your power to assist Colonel Haliburton.'

## 212.

To Colonel Close.

Serlingapatam, 11th Dec. 1804.

' I received last night your letter of the 2nd, and I assure you that I have regretted most sincerely our poor friend.\* This loss is a public misfortune, in my judgment; and I am convinced will be so considered by every man who has a spark of public feeling, or the capacity to understand the public interests.'

## 213.

To Colonel Close.

Serlingapatam, 27th Dec. 1804.

' There is no longer any power in any of the governments to restrain the rebellious and discontented spirits, and we must expect that they will fly out whenever they see a weak or undefended point. The only remedy is, to be guarded every where, and to force our allies to keep up troops for their own defence. Till that is effected, our system is rotten to the core, and our empire must crumble to atoms by the operations of its size and weakness.'

## 214.

To Major Shawe.

Serlingapatam, 4th Jan. 1805.

' Upon the whole, therefore, I conceive that I am justified in not going into the Deccan, by the accomplishment of one object in view in sending me there; by a concurrence of circumstances, which render another impracticable, useless, and dangerous; and by the sentiments of the Governor General. I acknowledge, however, that I have determined not to go into the Deccan without a considerable degree of doubt and hesitation. I know that all classes of the people look up to me, and it will be difficult for another officer to take my place. I also know that my presence there would be useful in the settlement of many points which remain unsettled, and which probably will require time and peace to bring to a conclusion. But these circumstances are not momentary; whenever I should depart, the same inconveniences would be felt even in an increased degree, and very possibly the same state of affairs which now renders my presence in the Deccan desirable, will exist for the next 7 years. I certainly do not propose to spend my life in the Deccan; and I should not think it necessary, in any event, to stay there one moment longer than the Governor General should stay in India. I conclude that he intends to go in February, as he proposed when I left Calcutta, in case Holkar should be defeated, and the peace should be cer-

\* Josiah Webbe, Esq.



tain; and upon this point, having considered whether my presence in the Deccan for one, two, or three months would answer any purpose whatever, I am decidedly of opinion that it would not.

In regard to staying longer, the question is exactly whether the Court of Directors, or the King's Ministers, have any claim upon me, strong enough to induce me to do any thing so disagreeable to my feelings (leaving health out of the question) as to remain for a great length of time in this country. I have served the Company in important situations for many years, and have never received any thing but injury from the Court of Directors, although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the governments, and in communication with all the Political Residents, and many civil authorities; and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill temper from any one of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom I have acted.

The King's Ministers have as little claim upon me as the Court of Directors. I am not very ambitious; and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military services in India would be considered in the scale in which are considered similar services in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the Staff in India; and yet if it had not been for the lamented death of General Fraser, General Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary. This is perfectly well known to the army, and is the subject of a good deal of conversation.

If my services were absolutely necessary for the security of the British empire, or to ensure its peace, I should not hesitate a moment about staying, even for years; but these men or the public have no right to ask me to stay in India, merely because my presence, in a particular quarter, may be attended with convenience. But this is not the only point in which this question ought to be viewed. I have considered whether, in the situation of affairs in India at present, my arrival in England is not a desirable object. Is it not necessary to take some steps to explain the causes of the late increase of the military establishments, and to endeavor to explode some erroneous notions which have been entertained, and circulated upon this subject? Are there not now a variety of subjects in discussion, relating to this country, upon which some verbal explanation is absolutely necessary? I conceive, therefore, that in determining not to go into the Deccan, and to sail by the first opportunity for England, I consult the public interests not less than I do my own private convenience and wishes.

I have now detailed the grounds upon which I have formed my plans and determination to go home: however, I must inform you, that I am not in a hurry to carry them into execution. I am prepared for every thing, and in 5 days I can be at Madras; and, on the other hand, if I should see any solid necessity for going into the Deccan, I shall not be remiss in my duty. But I can tell you that I shall not be drawn there by mere suspicions and unfounded surmises.

for him, and considered my own credit, as well as yours, involved in his character; and therefore I did every thing in my power to screen him from an inquiry. However, the complaints against him were of a nature so serious, and as they had been laid before the Nizam's durbar, I could do nothing but make the inquiry; and the result has been the discovery of a scene of disgraceful fraud, such as I believe has never before been practised. I enclose you herewith copies of all the papers upon this subject; from which you will be able to form a judgment of every thing that has passed, and of my motives in permitting the inquiry.'

## 216.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Seringsapatam, 13th Jan. 1805.

'Upon this ground I conceive it to be proper not to allow this subject to pass unnoticed. I request you therefore to state to Suddasheo Munkaiseer that I am of opinion, and I know that the Governor General considers, that Colonel Wallace has performed services of the greatest importance to the Peshwah's state, with a degree of gallantry, celerity, and skill, which has seldom been surpassed; that under these circumstances it might have been expected that his Highness would have received with becoming honor and distinction an officer who had served him so well; and that the excuse for not receiving him in this manner is futile and extremely unbecoming, and will be very displeasing to his Excellency the Governor General.

If this remonstrance should not have the desired effect, I beg that Colonel Wallace may not go to the durbar, and you will inform the minister that I have given you this direction.'

## 217.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Seringsapatam, 21st Jan. 1805.

'The lands granted as serinjaumy to the sirdars of the Marhatta state are held upon a tenure very different from those called jaghires. The serinjaumy lands are granted for the payment of the expenses attending troops and their equipments, and are resumable at pleasure; and it has been customary to resume them, and not to allow any sirdar to hold particular lands for any great length of time, when the Government has been in such a state of strength as to be able to enforce its orders.

In discussing the question regarding the disposal of Prittee Niddee's lands, it is absolutely necessary to recollect this distinction.

I have always been anxious to protect the great families of the Marhatta empire, living under the Poonah state; as I am convinced that the peace of the country is more likely to be secure through their means, than through those of any other description of persons who might be brought forward by the Peshwah or his ministers: and in consideration of the length of time during which the Mahratta government has been disturbed by the factions which have existed; of the state of weakness to which the government was reduced; and of the irritation which was produced on the mind of the Peshwah on the one hand, and on those of his sirdars on the other, I have been induced to wink at the disobedience of the Peshwah's orders by the great serinjaumy sirdars to the southward; and to be of opinion that we ought to wait till time shall have effaced from the minds of both parties a recollection



of their mutual injuries, and till the allies shall be at peace externally, before we endeavor to establish the Peshwah's rights over the serinjaumy sirdars.

There is, however, a great difference between the conduct of these sirdars in general, and of the Prittee Niddee. They have not come forward to assist the Peshwah with the quotas of troops which they ought to have in his service; but they have never been in rebellion to his government, have never used the power which they had in their hands to obstruct the operations of the British armies, and thus to injure the alliance.

Forbearance towards them, therefore, may be very proper, on the grounds which I have above detailed, but towards the Prittee Niddee it would be weakness: it would encourage the others to rebellion; and at all events, you would lose an opportunity of showing them, that even a sirdar of the first family in the state shall not be permitted to rebel against the government of the Peshwah with impunity.

I am, therefore, of opinion, that the Prittee Niddee ought to be deprived of all his serinjaumy possessions; leaving in his hands his lands held in jaghire, or in enaum, whether by grants from the Rajah or from the Peshwah.'

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218.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 28th Jan. 1805.

'I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. Buchan, on the subject of a monument which it is proposed to erect to the memory of Mr. Webbe.

The application to the Governor General appears directed more immediately to his private character than to his public situation; and in this light I do not consider it to be objectionable. His patronage of a mark of respect by individuals to a deserving public officer, will add respectability to the undertaking, at the same time that it will mark the Governor General's regard for a man, who was certainly much attached to him personally, and to his principles of government.

At all events, if there should be any thing objectionable in the request, it must be attributed to me, who have forwarded it to be laid before the Governor General, and not to the gentlemen at Madras, who referred their wishes to my judgment, either to be made known, or otherwise, according to my sense of their propriety.'

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219.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 3rd Feb. 1805.

'Your letters of the 14th Jan. have removed from my mind a load of anxiety upon the subject of my remaining at this place; and I observe from those documents, and the Governor General's dispatch of the 9th Jan., that I have acted in conformity with his wishes and intentions. I now feel an anxiety only about my departure for England, the extent of which I cannot describe. I have no confidence in my own judgment in any case in which my own wishes are involved. This is the cause of the great anxiety which I have felt, and still feel, upon these subjects.

I know that my presence in England would be useful, and I am certainly very anxious to go there. The peace appears to be established in India:

we are certain that the Rajah of Berar will remain at peace; and as for Scindiah, he has crossed the Nerbudda, and, by a letter from Colonel Close of the 21st Jan. received this day, and written from the neighbourhood of Colonel Haliburton's camp, I see that, up to that period, he had received no intelligence from Mr. Jenkins. I conclude, therefore, that all is right, particularly as the Rajah of Berar has positively disowned and punished those who were guilty of the late irruption into the Nizam's territories.

But even supposing Scindiah to be hostile towards us, his plan must be to invade the Company's territories under the government of Bengal; and I certainly cannot impede his progress. All that can be done in the Deccan, is to seize his districts near Ahmednuggur, the city of Burhampoor, and Asseerghur; and there appears no cause for which I should delay my voyage with a view to carrying on those operations, which any body can carry on with equal advantage and success. The time presses for a decision. If I do not go in the first fleet that sails from Madras, I shall lose the season, and may as well delay my voyage till October next; and then I shall be too late to be of any public utility in England.

Upon the whole, therefore, I have determined to take my passage in one of the ships to sail from Madras at the end of this month; and as I have been so fortunate hitherto as to view every thing in the same light with the Governor General, I think that I am not mistaken in this decision. I mistrust the judgment of every man in a case in which his own wishes are concerned; and I have not come to this determination without consulting Malcolm, who agrees in opinion with me upon every part of the subject.

At all events, supposing that, after the Governor General shall have perused my letter to you of the 4th of last month, he should desire that I should not go to England, the only inconvenience which can result from the step which I now take is, to forfeit my passage money, and to return from Madras.'

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220.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Cradock, K.B.

19th Feb. 1805.

'I have the honor to inform you that I applied to General Lake, in the course of last year, for leave to go to England, when the situation of affairs in this country would allow of my departure, and I enclose an extract of his Excellency's answer.

The Governor General has been pleased to allow me to resign the political and military power with which he had intrusted me in the Deccan, because my presence in that quarter is no longer necessary; and therefore I consider that to avail myself of the Commander in Chief's leave of absence, at the present moment, will not be attended by inconvenience: I therefore request your permission to proceed to England by one of the ships now under dispatch.

In case you should grant my request, I enclose a letter to the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, by which I resign all appointments and offices which I held in the army serving under his Lordship's Government, including that of Major General on the Staff, to which I was appointed by the late Governor in Council, at the recommendation of the late Commander in Chief.'



221.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Fort St. George, 19th Feb. 1805.

' I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I applied to his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India for permission to go to England, whenever the situation of affairs in this country would permit ; and his Excellency was pleased to comply with my request.

As the Governor General has permitted me to resign the political and military powers with which I was intrusted by his Excellency in the Deccan, because the state of affairs in that part of India no longer requires my presence, I have applied to Sir J. Cradock for permission to avail myself of the leave of absence given to me by the Commander in Chief, and to go to England by one of the ships now under dispatch ; and, in case his Excellency should grant my request, I beg to resign all the offices and appointments which I hold in the army serving under your Lordship's Government, including that of a Major General on the Staff, to which I was appointed by the late Governor in Council, at the recommendation of Lieut. General Stuart.'

222.

To Purneah, Dewan of the Rajah of Mysore.

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

' Lieut. Colonel Malcolm will have informed you that affairs having begun to have a more settled appearance in the Deccan, I have obtained permission to go to England, and I shall commence my voyage in a few days.

I part with you with the greatest regret ; and I shall ever continue to feel the most lively interest for the honor and prosperity of the government of the Rajah of Mysore, over which you preside.

For 6 years I have been concerned in the affairs of the Mysore government, and I have contemplated with the greatest satisfaction its increasing prosperity under your administration.

Experience has proved the wisdom of the arrangement which was first made of the government of Mysore ; and I am convinced that under no other management would it have been possible for the British Government to derive such advantages from the country which you have governed, as I have enjoyed in the various difficulties with which we have contended since your authority was established.

Every principle of gratitude, therefore, for many acts of personal kindness to myself, and a strong sense of the public benefits which have been derived from your administration, render me anxious for its continuance and for its increasing prosperity ; and in every situation in which I may be placed, you may depend upon it that I shall not fail to bear testimony of my sense of your merits upon every occasion that may offer, and that I shall suffer no opportunity to pass by which I may think favorable for rendering you service.

Upon the occasion of taking my leave of you, I must take the liberty to recommend to you to persevere in the laudable path which you have hitherto followed. Let the prosperity of the country be your great object ; protect the ryots and traders, and allow no man, whether vested with authority or otherwise, to oppress them with impunity ; do justice to every man ; and attend to the wholesome advice which will be given to you by the British Resident ; and you may depend upon it that your government will be as prosperous and as permanent as I wish it to be.

I recommend to your constant favor and protection Bistnapah Pundit, Govind Rao, Ragonaut Rao, Ranary, and all the sirdars and troops who served meritoriously with me in the last war; and Sheshiah and the hircarrahs belonging to you who accompanied me. They are all deserving of your favor.

You know that, for some years, I have under my protection Salabut Khan, the supposed or adopted son of Dhoondiah Waugh. I have given him a sum of money, and placed him under the guardianship of the court at Seringapatam, and I request you to take him into the Rajah's service hereafter, if you should find him to be worthy of your favor.

As a testimony of my sense of the benefits which the public have derived from your administration, of my sincere regard, and of my gratitude for many acts of personal kindness and attention, I request your acceptance of my picture, which will be sent to you from Bengal.'

## 223.

To Colonel Close.

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

'In regard to myself, I before informed you, that with the consent of the Governor General, founded upon his hopes that the peace would be uninterrupted in the Deccan, I was going home. From a letter which I received from Major Shawe, dated the 18th of February, since I began this letter, I judge that the Governor General is of opinion, that the late transactions in Scindiah's camp, of which he had received a tolerably accurate report, through hircarrahs, would not lead to war, and he is determined to preserve the peace, if it can be preserved.

Under the circumstances I do not see any thing to alter my determination. But at all events, supposing it were desirable that I should return to the Deccan, 3 months must elapse before I could join the army; the season for operations would be over; and the expectation of my return, as it would check all decided measures, would be more injurious than my presence would be beneficial; therefore, I still propose to embark with the Admiral.

I acknowledge that I wish that affairs were in a more settled state; but I do not conceive that my presence will make any alteration in them. We must expect that, for a time, the affairs of the Marhatta empire will be unsettled; and I do not consider that the late events in Scindiah's camp have, in any degree, altered the grounds on which I determined to go home; more particularly as, supposing that war should be the consequence of them, the scene of operations will be in Hindustan.

I leave in this country some valuable friends, with whom I have been intimately connected in friendship, and in constant communication on public affairs for some years; and I part from them with regret. I consider you as one of them, and I assure you that it will give me the greatest satisfaction to meet you again.'

## 224.

To Lieut. Colonel Gore.

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

'I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th of February.

Nearly 12 years have elapsed since His Majesty was pleased to appoint me to be Lieut. Colonel of the 33rd regt.; and in the whole course of that period,



during which I have been either in the exercise of the command of the regiment, or in constant communication with the actual commanding officer, I have had every reason to be satisfied with their conduct.

It has been my uniform object to maintain the system of discipline, subordination, and interior economy, which I found established in the regiment by the Marquis Cornwallis, our Colonel: and by the influence of this system, the foundation of which is vigilance on the part of the officers to prevent the commission of military crimes; and by the support and assistance which I have uniformly received from Colonel Sherbrooke, Lieut. Colonel Elliot, and yourself, and the officers of the regiment, my duties, as Lieut. Colonel, have always been a pleasing occupation.

It is most gratifying to me to receive this mark of approbation, conveyed by your letter, from officers with whose conduct I have so much reason to be pleased, and with many of whom I have been so long and intimately acquainted. I beg that you will assure them that I shall never forget their services, and that I shall always be happy to forward their views. I have only to recommend to them to adhere to the system of discipline, subordination, and interior economy, which they have found established in the regiment; and above all to cherish and encourage among themselves the spirit of gentlemen and of soldiers.

With the most anxious wishes for the success and prosperity of yourself and of the 33rd regt.'

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 225.

To the Native Inhabitants of Seringapatam.

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

'I have received your affectionate address upon the occasion of my departure for Europe; and I am much gratified by the proof which it affords, that my endeavors to extend to you the benefits to which the subjects of the Honorable Company residing at Seringapatam are entitled, under the existing regulations, have been successful; and that you are fully impressed with the advantages of your situation.

I have had frequent opportunities of observing and reporting your loyalty to Government; and I request you to be convinced, that I shall not cease to feel the most lively interest in every thing which concerns you.'

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 G. O.

Fort St. George, 9th March, 1805.

'Major General Sir A. Wellesley informs the troops under his command, that he has received the permission of his Excellency the Governor General to resign the political and military powers with which he had been lately intrusted in the Deccan, and the leave of his Excellency the Commander in Chief to proceed to England.

He cannot avoid expressing the regret which he feels upon taking leave of officers and troops with whom he has served so long.

In the course of the period of time which has elapsed since Major General Wellesley was appointed to the command of a division of this army, various services have been performed by the troops, and great difficulties have been surmounted, with a steadiness and perseverance which have seldom been surpassed. Upon every occasion, whether in garrison or in the field, the Major General has had reason to be satisfied with their conduct; and he once more returns them his thanks, and assures them that he shall never forget their services, or cease to feel a lively interest in whatever may concern them. He earnestly recommends to the Officers of the army, never to lose sight of the great principles of the military service, to preserve the discipline of the troops, and to encourage, in their respective corps, the spirit and sentiments of gentlemen and of soldiers, as the most certain road to the achievement of every thing that is great in their profession.

Upon the occasion of taking leave of the troops who have been so long under his command, Major General Wellesley cannot avoid noticing and recording the assistance which he has received from Officers commanding districts and divisions under his orders; and the officers

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## 226.

To the Officers of the Garrison of Seringapatam. Fort St. George, 8th March, 1805.

' I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th February, and I am much flattered by the expression of your regret upon the occasion of my departure from this country.

The period which has elapsed since I was appointed to the command of Seringapatam has been probably the most eventful of the history of the British nation in India, and that place has always been an important point in the military operations which have been carried on.

The discipline and good order of that garrison, and the efficiency of the public departments, have always been objects of most anxious solicitude to my mind; and I am happy to have an opportunity of declaring, that the order and regularity of the troops which have been stationed there have been exemplary; and that the efficiency and zeal of the public departments fixed at Seringapatam have been the principal source and foundation of the successes which you have noticed.

In whatever situation His Majesty may think proper to employ my services, I shall always be interested in the welfare of officers, with whose conduct, in their several public capacities, I have so much reason to be pleased, and in whose private society I have enjoyed so much satisfaction.'

## 227.

To the European Inhabitants and Military Officers of the Presidency of Fort St. George.

Fort St. George, March, 1805.

' Although I have served the government of Fort St. George for some years, I have had but limited opportunities of cultivating an acquaintance with the gentlemen at Madras, as I have resided in the provinces. I therefore consider as a most gratifying distinction, the marks of attention with which I have been honored since my arrival here, by a society whose public spirit has been manifested upon every important occasion that has occurred.

The successes of the army which I was so fortunate as to command in the late war, are to be attributed to various permanent causes which I hope will never fail to produce similar effects. The vigilance of Government enabled them to foresee the impending contest, and preparations corresponding with the extent of the operations, calculated to bring the war to a speedy and fortunate issue, were ordered by the Supreme Government, and were carried into execution by this Government and the Government of Bombay, with promptitude and vigor. The Governments were supported in these efforts by the civil and military servants, and by the commercial bodies at the different Presidencies, with the zeal which has distinguished their conduct on all occasions.

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of the staff appointed to assist him : of the former, some distinguished characters are now no more, and others are gone to Europe, and all are sufficiently known to the troops; but in noticing the assistance he has received from the staff, he must record particularly his obligations to Major Barclay, Captain Bellingham, and Lieut. Campbell of the 78th regt.

Orders will be given from Head Quarters, regarding the mode of conducting the duties and making the reports in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara, as also at Goa. The reports from the corps in the Deccan, under the orders of Colonels Wallace and Haliburton, are to be made according to the orders by Major General Sir A. Wellesley, of the 24th June, 1804.

The troops belonging to the army in the Deccan, entitled to share in the prize money of the late war, are informed that measures have been taken to insure, at an early period, the division of that part of it not yet divided.'



The discipline and bravery of the troops were to be depended upon in every emergency, and a glorious example was held out to them by the army under the personal command of the Commander in Chief. To these advantages I have to add the cordial co-operation of all the political Residents and civil servants, in communication with whom I acted, an advantage which I must observe that I have uniformly enjoyed in every situation in which I have been placed since I have served this Government: under these circumstances, I had every incitement to make the exertions which have met with your approbation.

I shall have great pleasure, Gentlemen, in complying with your desire; and I consider myself to be highly honored by being numbered among those who have been deemed by you to be worthy of this mark of your approbation by the services they have rendered to their country in this part of India; and it is most gratifying to my feelings that the desire of this settlement should be communicated to me by gentlemen distinguished by a long course of able and zealous services, and by their public spirit, and for whom I entertain the highest respect.<sup>2</sup>

## COPENHAGEN.

228.

In reply to the Speaker conveying the thanks of the House of Commons, for his conduct at Copenhagen.

Feb. 1808.

Mr. Speaker,—I consider myself fortunate that I was employed by His Majesty on a service which this House has considered of such importance as to have marked with its approbation the conduct of those officers and troops who have performed it. The honor which this House has conferred upon my honorable friends and myself is justly considered by the officers of the navy and army, as the highest which this country can confer: it is the object of the ambition of all who are employed in His Majesty's service, and to obtain it has doubtless been the motive of many of those acts of valor and good conduct which have tended so eminently to the glory, and have advanced the prosperity and advantage of this country. I can assure the House that I am most sensible of the great honor which they have done me, and I beg leave to take this opportunity of returning you, Sir, my thanks for the handsome terms, respecting myself, in which your kindness to me has induced you to convey the resolution of the House.'

## THE PENINSULA.

229.

To Major General Hill.

Dublin Castle, 23rd June, 1808.

'Pray let me hear from you, and acquaint me with all your wants, and whether I can do any thing for you here. You will readily believe that I have plenty to do, in closing a government in such a manner as that I may give it up, and taking the command of a corps for service; but I shall not fail to attend to whatever you may write to me.'

230.

To Brig. General Lee.

Cork, 7th July, 1808.

'From these circumstances it is obvious that it is the duty of every General Officer to make himself acquainted with the local circumstances of his district, and with the characters of the different individuals residing within it, in order that he may decide for himself according to the best of his judgment and information, and that he may not be misled by others.

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The General Officer, then, has no remedy excepting, by his acquaintance and communications with the magistrates and gentlemen of the county, to acquire a knowledge of characters, and to become acquainted with all the circumstances which occur.

It frequently happens that the people who do commit outrages and dis-



turbances have some reason to complain ; but, in my opinion, that is not a subject for the consideration of the General Officer. He must aid in the preservation of the peace of the county, and in the support of the law ; and he who breaks the law must be considered in the wrong, whatever may have been the nature of the provocation which he has received.

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But these circumstances afford no reason why the General Officer should not give the military aid which he may have at his command to preserve the peace, to repress disturbance, and to bring those to justice who may have been guilty of a violation of the law.'

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231.

To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.

Coruña, 21st July, 1808.

'It is impossible to convey to you an idea of the sentiment which prevails here in favor of the Spanish cause. The difference between any two men is whether the one is a better or a worse Spaniard, and the better Spaniard is the one who detests the French most heartily. I understand that there is actually no French party in the country ; and at all events I am convinced that no man now dares to show that he is a friend to the French.'

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232.

To Major General Spencer.

H. M. S. Crocodile, off the Tagus, 26th July, 1808.

'In the mean time the Spaniards will acquire strength and experience ; and I must observe that nothing we can do can be so useful to them as to get possession of and organise a good army in Portugal.

'On the other hand, if the efforts of the Spanish nation should fail, and if the French are now able to obtain possession of Cadiz, I do not think the presence of your corps would be of much avail to prevent the occurrence of this misfortune ; while its presence here is of the utmost importance, to enable me to perform the operations intrusted to me, the success of which would be a great benefit to Great Britain,—even if all should unfortunately fail.

Therefore, in either and all the views of the case, whether Spain is to continue or to fail, Portugal is an object, and your presence here is most necessary.'

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233.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

H.M.S. Donegal, off Mondego River, 1st Aug. 1808.

'I have this day commenced my disembarkation in the river of Mondego, because I was apprehensive that any further delay might tend to discourage the country, and because I shall experience greater facilities in making the arrangements for the movement and supply of the army when it shall be on shore than while it shall continue afloat. The landing is attended with some difficulties even here, and would be quite impossible if we had not the cordial assistance of the country, notwithstanding the zeal and abilities of the Officers of the navy.'

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234.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

H.M.S. Donegal, 1st August, 1808.

'Pole and Burghersh have apprised me of the arrangements for the future

command of this army; and the former has informed me of your kindness towards me, of which I have experienced so many instances, that I can never doubt it in any case. All that I can say upon that subject is, that whether I am to command the army or not, or am to quit it, I shall do my best to insure its success; and you may depend upon it that I shall not hurry the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be commenced, in order that I may acquire the credit of the success. The government will determine for me what way they will employ me hereafter, whether here or elsewhere.

My opinion is, that Great Britain ought to raise, organise, and pay an army in Portugal, consisting of 30,000 Portuguese troops, which might be easily raised at an early period; and 20,000 British, including 4000 or 5000 cavalry. This army might operate on the frontiers of Portugal in Spanish Estremadura, and it would serve as the link between the kingdoms of Galicia and Andalusia: it would give Great Britain the preponderance in the conduct of the war in the Peninsula; and whatever might be the result of the Spanish exertions, Portugal would be saved from the French grasp. You know best whether you could bear the expense, or what part of it the Portuguese government would or could defray. But if you should adopt this plan, you must send every thing from England—arms, ammunition, clothing, and accoutrements, ordnance, flour, oats, &c. These articles must find their way to the frontier, partly by the navigation of the Douro and Tagus, and partly by other means.'

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 235.

Proclamation by the Commanders in Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Land and Sea Forces, employed to assist the loyal Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Portugal.

'PEOPLE OF PORTUGAL.

The time is arrived to rescue your country, and restore the government of your lawful Prince.

His Britannic Majesty, our most gracious King and master, has, in compliance with the wishes and ardent supplications for succour from all parts of Portugal, sent to your aid a British army, directed to co-operate with his fleet, already on your coast.

The English soldiers, who land upon your shore, do so with every sentiment of friendship, faith, and honor.

The glorious struggle in which you are engaged is for all that is dear to man—the protection of your wives and children; the restoration of your lawful Prince; the independence, nay, the very existence of your Kingdom; and for the preservation of your holy religion. Objects like these can only be obtained by distinguished examples of fortitude and constancy.

The noble struggle against the tyranny and usurpation of France will be jointly maintained by Portugal, Spain and England; and in contributing to the success of a cause so just and glorious, the views of His Britannic Majesty are the same as those by which you are yourselves animated.'

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 236.

To Lieut. Colonel Trant.

Lavos, 6th August, 1808.

'There is nothing so foolish as to push these half-disciplined troops forward; for the certain consequence must be, either their early and precipi-



tate retreat, if the enemy should advance, or their certain destruction. I am determined not to move a man of my army till I am fully prepared to support any detachment I may send forward; and for this reason I object to send any troops to Leyria, in answer to various applications which have been made to me by a Portuguese Commissary, who has applied for protection, being, as he says, employed to collect supplies for the British troops, and which will probably fall into the hands of the enemy, if he should not be supported.

I have uniformly objected to sending any detachment or any person forward, till I should be enabled effectually to protect them; and I should have sent on in ample time to secure every thing for the army that it could require, or that Leyria could afford. It is unfortunate, therefore, that this gentleman has been sent forward, particularly if the consequence should be the loss of the supplies which Leyria might otherwise have afforded.'

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 237.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Lavos, 8th Aug. 1808.

'My dispatch contains the fullest information upon every subject, and I have nothing to add to it. I have had the greatest difficulty in organising my commissariat for the march, and that department is very incompetent, notwithstanding the arrangements which I made with Huskisson upon the subject. This department deserves your serious attention. The existence of the army depends upon it, and yet the people who manage it are incapable of managing any thing out of a counting house.

\* \* \* \* \*

I shall be obliged to leave Spencer's guns behind for want of means of moving them; and I should have been obliged to leave my own, if it were not for the horses of the Irish Commissariat. Let nobody ever prevail upon you to send a corps to any part of Europe without horses to draw their guns. It is not true that horses lose their condition at sea.

I have received your private letter of the 21st July, for which I am much obliged to you. I shall be the junior of the Lieutenant Generals; however, I am ready to serve the government wherever, and as they please.'

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 238.

To Lieut. Colonel Trant.

Calvario, 13th Aug. 1808.

'I have just received your letter of this date, and I am concerned to find that the arrangements to enable the Portuguese army to take the field, in co-operation with the British troops, have been so much neglected as to render that measure impracticable. I have written to General Freire this day upon the subject of his supplies, upon which I have nothing further to say. As to his plan of operations, I do not see what purpose it is to answer, in view to the result of the campaign; and I certainly can never give my sanction to any thing which appears so useless, and so crudely digested, so far as even to promise to communicate with or aid the person who is carrying it into execution.

I have one proposition to make to General Freire, that is, that he should send me his cavalry and his light infantry, and a corps of 1000 regular infantry, to be employed as I choose, and I engage to give these men their

bread ; and for meat, wine, and forage, they shall fare as well as our troops. If he will accept of this proposition, let the troops join me to-morrow at Alcobaça. If he does not, I beg that he will carry on such operations as he may think proper.

I shall execute the orders which I have received from my government, without the assistance of the Portuguese government ; and General Freire will have to justify himself with the existing government of Portugal, with his Prince, and with the world, for having omitted to stand forward upon this interesting occasion, and for having refused to send me the assistance which it is in his power to give.'

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 239.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Caldas, 16th Aug. 1808.

' I marched from Lavos on the 10th, and was joined at Leyria on the 12th by the Portuguese troops under General Bernardin Freire, consisting of between 5000 and 6000 men. But I am concerned to inform your Lordship that they have not accompanied me any farther. Since my arrival in this country, General Bernardin Freire, and the other Portuguese officers, had expressed a wish that the British Commissariat should support the Portuguese troops from the British stores during the campaign ; particularly in a meeting which I had with them at Oporto on the night of the 24th July, and in another at Monte Mór o Velho on the 7th instant ; and upon both these occasions I told them explicitly that it was impossible to supply their wants from the British stores ; that those stores were formed with a view to the consumption of the British only, and that but during a short time ; and that it was a proposition of a novel nature to require an army landing from its ships not only to supply its own consumption of bread, but likewise that of the army of the state to whose assistance it had been sent. I told the Portuguese officers, however, that I believed I should not have occasion to call upon the country to supply bread during my march towards Lisbon ; but that I should require beef, wine, and forage, all of which the Bishop of Oporto engaged should be supplied to me.

Before I marched to Leyria, the Portuguese officers earnestly urged my early advance, to secure a magazine which had been formed at that place, as I understood, for the use of the British troops, and my advance certainly saved it from the enemy. But I received no supply from the magazine, which was left entire for the use of the Portuguese army. On the evening, however, of the arrival of the Portuguese army at Leyria, some very extraordinary messages were sent to me respecting their supplies ; and in a conversation which I had with him that night, General Freire expressed his anxiety upon the subject. The plan of the march for the next morning was communicated to him, and the hour for the departure of the Portuguese troops was fixed. Instead of making the march, however, as had been agreed upon, I received from General Freire a proposition for a new plan of operations, which was to take the Portuguese troops to a distance from the British army, by Thomar, towards Santarem, unless I should consent to feed the whole of them ; and the pretext for the adoption of this plan was the probable want of supplies on the road which I had proposed to take, and their



great plenty in the proposed quarter ; and that the Portuguese troops would be in a situation to cut off the retreat of the French from Lisbon.

In my reply, I pointed out the inefficiency and danger of this plan, and requested the General to send me 1000 infantry, all his cavalry, and his light troops, which I engaged to feed ; and I recommended to him either to join me himself with the remainder, or at all events to remain at Leyria, or at Alcobaça, or somewhere in my rear, where at least his own troops would be in safety. He has sent me the troops which I have required, to the amount of 1400 infantry, and 260 cavalry ; but he has announced to me that he intends to persevere in his proposed plan of operations for the remainder of his army, notwithstanding that I have informed him that I have found resources in the country fully adequate to the subsistence of his troops.

I have been thus particular in detailing to your Lordship the circumstances which have attended, for I am certain they have not occasioned, the separation of the Portuguese army from that of His Majesty. There must have been in the magazine at Leyria bread for the Portuguese troops for 2 days. I found at Alcobaça a sufficiency to last them one day, and more might have been procured ; and this town would have afforded ample supplies. General Freire has been apprised of this state of the resources, and yet he perseveres in his plan ; and I acknowledge that I can attribute it only to his apprehensions, which, however, he has never hinted to me, that we are not sufficiently strong for the enemy. I am convinced that he can have no personal motive for his conduct, as I have been always on the most cordial good terms with him ; I have supplied him with arms, ammunition, and flints, and have done every thing in my power for his army ; and only on the day before he communicated to me the alteration of his plan for the march of his army, he voluntarily placed himself and his troops under my command.

Having found the resources of the country more ample than I expected, I should certainly have undertaken to feed his army according to his desire ; as I consider it of importance, on political rather than on military grounds, that the Portuguese troops should accompany our march ; only that I have found the British Commissariat to be so ill composed as to be incapable of distributing even to the British troops the ample supplies which have been procured for them ; and I did not wish to burden them with the additional charge of providing and distributing supplies to the Portuguese army. Besides, as I have above explained to your Lordship, I do not believe the motive stated is that which has caused the determination to which I have adverted.

I marched from Leyria on the 13th, and arrived at Alcobaça on the 14th, which place the enemy had abandoned in the preceding night ; and I arrived here yesterday. The enemy, about 4000 in number, were posted about 10 miles from hence at Roliça ; and they occupied Obidos, about 3 miles from hence, with their advanced posts. As the possession of this last village was important to our future operations, I determined to occupy it, and as soon as the British infantry arrived upon the ground I directed that it might be occupied by a detachment consisting of 4 companies of riflemen of the 60th and 95th regts.

The enemy, consisting of a small piquet of infantry and a few cavalry,

made a trifling resistance and retired ; but they were followed by a detachment of our riflemen to the distance of 3 miles from Obidos. The riflemen were there attacked by a superior body of the enemy, who attempted to cut them off from the main body of the detachment to which they belonged, which had now advanced to their support ; larger bodies of the enemy appeared on both the flanks of the detachments ; and it was with difficulty that Major General Spencer, who had gone out to Obidos when he heard that the riflemen had advanced in pursuit of the enemy, was enabled to effect their retreat to that village. They have since remained in possession of it, and the enemy have retired entirely from the neighbourhood. In this little affair of the advanced post, which was occasioned solely by the eagerness of the troops in pursuit of the enemy, I am concerned to add that Lieut. Bunbury, of the 2nd batt., 95th regt., was killed, and the Hon. Captain Pakenham\* wounded, but slightly ; and we have lost some men, of whose numbers I have not received the returns.

Besides the corps of about 4000 men, commanded by Generals Laborde and Thomière, which is retiring in front of the army by the sea road towards Lisbon, there is another corps, consisting of about 5000 men, assembled at Rio Mayor, under General Loison, which I conclude will retire by the great Lisbon road, and they will probably join near Lisbon with whatever troops can be spared from the defence of the fortifications.

Loison's corps has lately been employed in Alentejo against a Spanish detachment of about 1000 men, and the Portuguese insurgents in that quarter, and with a view to the relief of Elvas. I understand that it has suffered much in the expedition, as well as by the fatigue of the marches which it has made, as by the opposition it has met with.

When I was at Alcobaça I communicated with Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, who was detained off Nazareth with a convoy of victuallers and ordnance store ships, and he landed a supply, which I hope to receive this evening ; and he is now off Peniche, where I intend, if possible, to communicate with him tomorrow morning.'

## 240.

Caldas, 16th Aug. 1808.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

' I have but little to add to my letters of this day. We are going on as well as possible ; the army in high order and in great spirits. We make long marches, to which they are becoming accustomed ; and I make no doubt they will be equal to anything when we shall reach Lisbon. I have every hope of success. The affair of the advanced posts of yesterday evening was unpleasant, because it was quite useless ; and was occasioned, contrary to orders, solely by the imprudence of the Officer, and the dash and eagerness of the men : they behaved remarkably well, and did some execution with their rifles.

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Our artillery horses are not what we ought to have. They have great merit in their way as cast horses of dragoons, and Irish cart horses, bought for £12. each ! but not fit for an army that, to be successful and carry things with a high hand, ought to be able to move.'

\* Major General the Hon. Sir H. Pakenham, K.C.B.



241.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Villa Verde, 17th Aug. 1808.

'The French General Laborde having continued in his position at Roliça, since my arrival at Caldas on the 15th instant, I determined to attack him in it this morning. Roliça is situated on an eminence, having a plain in its front, at the end of a valley, which commences at Caldas, and is closed to the southward by mountains, which join the hills forming the valley on the left. Looking from Caldas, in the centre of the valley and about 8 miles from Roliça, is the town and old Moorish fort of Obidos, from whence the enemy's piquets had been driven on the 15th; and from that time he had posts in the hills on both sides of the valley, as well as in the plain in front of his army, which was posted on the heights in front of Roliça, its right resting upon the hills, its left upon an eminence on which was a windmill, and the whole covering 4 or 5 passes into the mountains on his rear.

I have reason to believe that his force consisted of at least 6000 men, of which about 500 were cavalry, with 5 pieces of cannon; and there was some reason to believe that General Loison, who was at Rio Mayor yesterday, would join General Laborde by his right in the course of the night.

The plan of attack was formed accordingly, and the army, having broken up from Caldas this morning, was formed into 3 columns. The right, consisting of 1200 Portuguese infantry, 50 Portuguese cavalry, destined to turn the enemy's left, and penetrate into the mountains in his rear. The left, consisting of Major General Ferguson's and Brig. General Bowes' brigade of infantry, 3 companies of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, and 20 British and 20 Portuguese cavalry, was destined, under the command of Major General Ferguson, to ascend the hills at Obidos, to turn all the enemy's posts on the left of the valley, as well as the right of his post at Roliça. This corps was also destined to watch the motions of General Loison on the enemy's right, who, I had heard, had moved from Rio Mayor towards Alcentre last night. The centre column, consisting of Major General Hill's, Brig. General Nightingall's, Brig. General C. Craufurd's, and Brig. General Fane's brigades (with the exception of the riflemen detached with Major General Ferguson), and 400 Portuguese light infantry, the British and Portuguese cavalry, a brigade of 9 pounders, and a brigade of 6 pounders, was destined to attack General Laborde's position in the front.

The columns being formed, the troops moved from Obidos about 7 o'clock in the morning. Brig. General Fane's riflemen were immediately detached into the hills on the left of the valley, to keep up the communication between the centre and left columns, and to protect the march of the former along the valley, and the enemy's posts were successively driven in. Major General Hill's brigade, formed in 3 columns of battalions, moved on the right of the valley, supported by the cavalry, in order to attack the enemy's left; and Brig. Generals Nightingall and Craufurd moved with the artillery along the high road, until at length the former formed in the plain immediately in the enemy's front, supported by the light infantry companies, and the 45th regt. of Brig. General Craufurd's brigade; while the 2 other regiments of this brigade (the 50th and 91st), and half of the 9 pounder brigade, were kept up as a reserve in the rear.

Major General Hill and Brig. General Nightingall advanced upon the ene-

my's position, and at the same moment Brig. General Fane's riflemen were in the hills on his right, the Portuguese in a village upon his left, and Major General Ferguson's column was descending from the heights into the plain. From this situation the enemy retired by the passes into the mountains with the utmost regularity and the greatest celerity; and notwithstanding the rapid advance of the British infantry, the want of a sufficient body of cavalry was the cause of his suffering but little loss on the plain. It was then necessary to make a disposition to attack the formidable position which he had taken up.

Brig. General Fane's riflemen were already in the mountains on his right; and no time was lost in attacking the different passes, as well to support the riflemen as to defeat the enemy completely.

The Portuguese infantry were ordered to move up a pass on the right of the whole. The light companies of Major General Hill's brigade, and the 5th regt. moved up a pass next on the right; and the 29th regt., supported by the 9th regt., under Brig. General Nightingall, a third pass: and the 45th and 82d regts., passes on the left. These passes were all difficult of access, and some of them were well defended by the enemy, particularly that which was attacked by the 29th and 9th regts. These regiments attacked with the utmost impetuosity, and reached the enemy before those whose attacks were to be made on their flanks.

The defence of the enemy was desperate; and it was in this attack principally that we sustained the loss which we have to lament, particularly of that gallant officer, the Hon. Lieut. Colonel Lake, who distinguished himself upon this occasion. The enemy was, however, driven from all the positions he had taken in the passes of the mountains, and our troops were advanced in the plains on their tops. For a considerable length of time the 29th and 9th regts. alone were advanced to this point, with Brig. General Fane's riflemen at a distance on the left, and they were afterwards supported by the 5th regt., and by the light companies of Major General Hill's brigade, which had come upon their right, and by the other troops ordered to ascend the mountains, who came up by degrees.

The enemy made some most gallant attacks upon the 29th and 9th regts., supported as I have above stated, with a view to cover the retreat of his defeated army, in all of which he was, however, repulsed; but he succeeded in effecting his retreat in good order, owing principally to my want of cavalry; and, secondly, to the difficulty of bringing up the passes of the mountains, with celerity, a sufficient number of troops and of cannon to support those which had first ascended. The loss of the enemy has, however, been very great, and he left 3 pieces of cannon in our hands.

I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of the troops throughout this action. The enemy's positions were formidable, and he took them up with his usual ability and celerity, and defended them most gallantly. But I must observe, that although we had such a superiority of numbers employed in the operations of this day, the troops actually engaged in the heat of the action were, from unavoidable circumstances, only the 5th, 9th, 29th, the riflemen of the 95th and 60th, and the flank companies of Major General Hill's brigade; being a number by no means equal to that of the enemy. Their conduct therefore deserves the highest commendation.



I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgments for the aid and support I received from all the General and other Officers of this army; I am particularly indebted to Major General Spencer for the advice and assistance I received from him; to Major General Ferguson, for the manner in which he led the left column; and to Major General Hill, and Brig. Generals Nightingall and Fane, for the manner in which they conducted the different attacks which they led.

I derived most material assistance also from Lieut. Colonel Tucker and Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, in the offices of Deputy Adjutant and Deputy Quarter Master General, and from the Officers of the Staff employed under them. I must also mention that I had every reason to be satisfied with the artillery under Lieut. Colonel Robe. I have the honor to enclose herewith a return of killed, wounded, and missing.\*

## 242.

To R. Borough, Esq.

Lourinha, 18th Aug. 1808.

'I do not recollect the occasion upon which I have written with more pain to myself than I do at present, to communicate to you the death of your gallant brother-in-law.\* He fell in the attack of a pass in the mountains, at the head of his regiment, the admiration of the whole army; and there is nothing to be regretted in his death, excepting the untimely moment at which it has afflicted his family,† and has deprived the public of the services of an Officer who would have been an ornament to his profession, and an honor to his country.

It may at the moment increase the regret of those who lose a near and dear relation, to learn that he deserved and enjoyed the respect and affection of the world at large, and particularly of the profession to which he belonged; but I am convinced, that however acute may be the sensations which it may at first occasion, it must in the end be satisfactory to the family of such a man as Colonel Lake, to know that he was respected and loved by the whole army, and that he fell, alas! with many others, in the achievement of one of the most heroic actions that have been performed by the British army.'

## 243.

To Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard, Bart.

Vimeiro, 21st Aug. 1808.

'I have the honor to inform you, that the enemy attacked us in our position at Vimeiro this morning.

The village of Vimeiro stands in a valley, through which runs the river Maceira; at the back, and to the westward and northward of this village, is a mountain, the western point of which touches the sea, and the eastern is separated by a deep ravine from the heights, over which passes the road which leads from Lourinha, and the northward to Vimeiro. The greater part of the infantry, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th brigades, were posted on this mountain, with 8 pieces of artillery, Major General Hill's brigade being on the right, and Major General Ferguson's on the left, having one battalion on the heights separated from the mountain. On the eastern and southern side of the town is a mill, which is entirely commanded, particularly

\* Lieut. Colonel the Hon. G. A. F. Lake, 29th regt.

† General Lord Lake, the father, had died early in the year.

on its right, by the mountain to the westward of the town, and commanding all the ground in the neighbourhood to the southward and eastward, on which Brig. General Fane was posted with his riflemen, and the 50th regt., and Brig. General Anstruther with his brigade, with half a brigade of 6 pounders, and half a brigade of 9 pounders, which had been ordered to the position in the course of last night. The ground over which passes the road from Lourinha commanded the left of this height, and it had not been occupied, excepting by a piquet, as the camp had been taken up only for one night and there was no water in the neighbourhood of this height. The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the valley, between the hills on which the infantry stood, both flanking and supporting Brig. General Fane's advanced guard.

The enemy first appeared about 8 o'clock in the morning, in large bodies of cavalry on our left, upon the heights on the road to Lourinha; and it was soon obvious that the attack would be made upon our advanced guard and the left of our position; and Major General Ferguson's brigade was immediately moved across the ravine to the heights on the road to Lourinha, with 3 pieces of cannon; he was followed successively by Brig. General Nightingall, with his brigade and 3 pieces of cannon, Brig. General Acland, and his brigade, and Brig. General Bowes, with his brigade. These troops were formed (Major General Ferguson's brigade in the first line, Brig. General Nightingall's in the second, and Brig. General Bowes' and Acland's in columns in the rear) on those heights, with their right upon the valley which leads into Vimeiro, and their left upon the other ravine, which separates these heights from the range which terminates at the landing place at Maceira. On the last mentioned heights the Portuguese troops, which had been in the bottom near Vimeiro, were posted in the first instance, and they were supported by Brig. General C. Craufurd's brigade. The troops of the advanced guard, on the heights to the southward and eastward of the town, were deemed sufficient for its defence, and Major General Hill was moved to the centre of the mountain, on which the great body of the infantry had been posted, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve to the whole army; in addition to this support, these troops had that of the cavalry in the rear of their right.

The enemy's attack began in several columns upon the whole of the troops on this height; on the left they advanced, notwithstanding the fire of the riflemen, close to the 50th regt., and they were checked and driven back only by the bayonets of that corps. The 2d batt. 43d regt. was likewise closely engaged with them in the road which leads into Vimeiro; a part of that corps having been ordered into the churchyard, to prevent them from penetrating into the town. On the right of the position they were repulsed by the bayonets of the 97th regt., which corps was successfully supported by the 2d batt. 52d, which, by an advance in column, took the enemy in flank.

Besides this opposition given to the attack of the enemy on the advanced guard by their own exertions, they were attacked in flank by Brig. General Acland's brigade, in its advance to its position on the heights on the left, and a cannonade was kept up on the flank of the enemy's columns by the artillery on those heights. At length, after a most desperate contest, the enemy was driven back in confusion from this attack, with the loss of 7 pieces of cannon, many prisoners, and a great number of Officers and soldiers killed and wounded. He was pursued by a detachment of the 20th light dragoons,



but the enemy's cavalry were so much superior in numbers, that this detachment has suffered much, and Lieut. Colonel Taylor was unfortunately killed.

Nearly at the same time the enemy's attack commenced upon the heights on the road to Lourinha: this attack was supported by a large body of cavalry, and was made with the usual impetuosity of French troops. It was received with steadiness by Major General Ferguson's brigade, consisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st regts., and these corps charged as soon as the enemy approached them, who gave way, and they continued to advance upon him, supported by the 82d, one of the corps of Brig. General Nightingall's brigade, which, as the ground extended, afterwards formed a part of the first line by the 29th regt., and by Brig. General Bowes' and Acland's brigades; whilst Brig. General C. Craufurd's brigade and the Portuguese troops, in two lines, advanced along the height on the left. In the advance of Major General Ferguson's brigade, 6 pieces of cannon were taken from the enemy, with many prisoners, and vast numbers were killed and wounded.

The enemy afterwards made an attempt to recover part of his artillery, by attacking the 71st and 82d regts., which were halted in a valley in which it had been taken. These regiments retired from the low grounds in the valley to the heights, where they halted, faced about, and fired, and advanced upon the enemy, who had by that time arrived in the low ground, and they thus obliged him again to retire with great loss.

In this action, in which the whole of the French force in Portugal was employed, under the command of the Duc D'Abrantes in person, in which the enemy was certainly superior in cavalry and artillery, and in which not more than half of the British army was actually engaged, he has sustained a signal defeat, and has lost 13 pieces of cannon, 23 ammunition waggons, with powder, shells, stores of all descriptions, and 20,000 rounds of musket ammunition. One General Officer has been wounded (Brenier) and taken prisoner, and a great many Officers and soldiers have been killed, wounded, and taken.

The valor and discipline of His Majesty's troops have been conspicuous upon this occasion, as you, who witnessed the greatest part of the action, must have observed; but it is a justice to the following corps to draw your notice to them in a particular manner: viz., the Royal artillery, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Robe; the 20th light dragoons, which has been commanded by Lieut. Colonel Taylor; the 50th regt., commanded by Colonel Walker; the 2d batt. 95th foot, commanded by Major Travers; the 5th batt. 60th regt., commanded by Major Davy; the 2d batt. 43d, commanded by Major Hull; the 2d batt. 52d, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Ross; the 97th regt. commanded by Lieut. Colonel Lyon; the 36th regt., commanded by Colonel Burne; the 40th, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Kemmis; the 71st, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Pack; and the 82d regt., commanded by Major Eyre.

In mentioning Colonel Burne and the 36th regt. upon this occasion, I cannot avoid adding that the regular and orderly conduct of this corps throughout the service, and their gallantry and discipline in action, have been conspicuous.

I must take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to the General and Staff Officers of the army. I was much indebted to Major Gene-

ral Spencer's judgment and experience in the decision which I formed in respect to the number of troops allotted to each point of defence, and for his advice and assistance throughout the action. In the position taken up by Major General Ferguson's brigade, and in its advances upon the enemy, that Officer showed equal bravery and judgment; and much praise is due to Brig. General Fane and Brig. General Anstruther for their gallant defence of their position in front of Vimeiro, and to Brig. General Nightingall, for the manner in which he supported the attack upon the enemy made by Major General Ferguson. Lieut. Colonel G. Tucker, and Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, and the Officers in the departments of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General, and Lieut. Colonel Torrens and the Officers of my personal staff, rendered me the greatest assistance throughout the action.

P. S. Since writing the above I have been informed that a French General Officer, supposed to be General Thiébault,\* the chief of the Staff, has been found dead upon the field of battle.'

## 244.

To H.R.H. the Duke of York.

Vimeiro, 22nd Aug. 1808.

'I cannot say too much in favor of the troops: their gallantry and their discipline were equally conspicuous; and I must add, that this is the only action that I have ever been in, in which every thing passed as it was directed and no mistake was made by any of the Officers charged with its conduct. I think if General Hill's brigade and the advanced guard had moved upon Torres Vedras, as soon as it was certain that the enemy's right had been defeated by our left, and our left had pursued their advantage, the enemy would have been cut off from Torres Vedras, and we should have been at Lisbon before him; if, indeed, any French army had remained in Portugal. But Sir H. Burrard, who was at this time upon the ground, still thought it advisable not to move from Vimeiro; and the enemy made good their retreat to Torres Vedras.'

## 245.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Vimeiro, 22nd Aug. 1808.

'After I wrote to you yesterday morning, we were attacked by the whole of the French army, Sir H. Burrard being still on board ship, and I gained a complete victory. It was impossible for troops to behave better than ours did; we only wanted a few hundred more cavalry to annihilate the French army.

I have sent my report upon this action to Sir H. Burrard, who will send it home. You will see in it that I have mentioned Colonel Burne, of the 36th regt., in a very particular manner; and I assure you that there is nothing that will give me so much satisfaction as to learn that something has been done for this old and meritorious soldier.† The 36th regt. are an example to this army.

Sir Harry did not land till late in the day in the midst of the attack, and he desired me to continue my own operations; and as far as I am personally

\* It was not General Thiébault.

† This officer was shortly afterwards rewarded by the government of Carlisle being conferred on him.



concerned in the action, I was amply rewarded for any disappointment I might have felt in not having had an opportunity of bringing the service to a close, by the satisfaction expressed by the army that the second and more important victory had been gained by their old general. I have also the pleasure to add, that it has had more effect than all the arguments I could use to induce the general to move on, and I believe he will march tomorrow. Indeed, if he does not, we shall be poisoned here by the stench of the dead and wounded; or we shall starve, every thing in the neighbourhood being already eaten up.'

246.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Ramalhal, 25th Aug. 1808.

'If I had not been prevented, I should have pursued the enemy to Torres Vedras on that evening, and, in all probability, the whole would have been destroyed.'

247.

To Lord Mulgrave, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Ramalhal, 26th Aug. 1808.

'I also beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's favor and protection Lieut. Fleetwood, the agent of transports, who superintended the fleet in which the army under my command was embarked. He is the most active, intelligent, and zealous of all the officers that I have seen in that line of the naval profession, and he really deserves promotion. If his services should be continued in the transport line of the profession, benefit will be derived from his promotion, as his sphere will be enlarged, and the armies to which he may be attached in future will not suffer the inconvenience which that under my command did, of having him superseded by an officer without any of his qualifications, in the midst of the service. I have to add that Captain Malcolm is equally satisfied with Lieut. Fleetwood.'

248.

To Captain P. Malcolm, H.M.S. Donegal.

Torres Vedras, 29th Aug. 1808.

'Captain Dalrymple arrived this morning with the Convention, signed by General Kellermann and Colonel Murray; but it was so objectionable in many parts, that a meeting of the General Officers was called to deliberate upon and settle the alterations to be made in it, which meeting I attended. The result of the meeting was a proposal to make certain alterations, which I acknowledge I do not think sufficient, although the treaty will answer in its amended form. In the mean time the army remains on its present ground, very much against my opinion.

'I am afraid that I am so much connected with the credit of this army, that I cannot remain with it without falling as it will fall. If I could be of any use to men who have served me so well, I would stay with them for ever; but as matters are situated, I am sure that I can be of no use to them; I am convinced they cannot render any service, and I have determined to go home immediately.

At the same time I must say that I approve of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal, because I see clearly that we cannot get them out of Portugal otherwise, under existing circumstances, without such an arrangement;

and we should be employed in the blockade or siege of the places which they would occupy during the season in which we ought and might be advantageously employed against the French in Spain. But the Convention, by which they should be allowed to evacuate Portugal, ought to be settled in the most honorable manner to the army by which they have been beaten; and we ought not to be kept for 10 days on our field of battle before the enemy (who sued on the day after the action) is brought to terms.

I am quite annoyed on this subject.'

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249.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Camp, north of Torres Vedras, 30th Aug. 1808.

'I assure you, my dear Lord, matters are not prospering here; and I feel an earnest desire to quit the army. I have been too successful with this army ever to serve with it in a subordinate situation, with satisfaction to the person who shall command it, and of course not to myself. However, I shall do whatever the Government may wish.'

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250.

To the General Officers.

Zambujal, 3rd Sept. 1808.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of this day, and I assure you that it is a source of great gratification to me to find that my conduct in the command, with which I was lately intrusted by His Majesty, has given you satisfaction.

As my efforts were directed to forward the service on which we were employed, I could not fail to receive your support and assistance; and to the cordial support and friendly advice and assistance which I invariably received from you collectively, and individually, I attribute the success of our endeavors to bring the army in the state in which it was formed to meet the enemy on the days on which the gallantry of the Officers and soldiers was stimulated by your example, and their discipline aided and directed by your experience and ability.

Under these circumstances my task has been comparatively light, and I imagine that its difficulty has been overrated by your partiality; but I have a pride in the reflection that as I should not deserve, so I should not possess, your regard, if I had not done my duty; and with these sentiments, and those of respect and affection for you all, I accept of that testimony of your esteem and confidence which you have been pleased to present to me.'

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251.

To Captain P. Malcolm, H.M.S. Donegal.

Zambujal, 5th Sept. 1808.

'I lament the situation of our affairs as much as you do, and I did every thing in my power to prevent it; but my opinion was overruled. I had nothing to do with the Convention as it now stands; and I have never seen it to this moment.

\* \* \* \* \*

Give my best love to Cadogan, and tell him that I lament the result of our labors as much as he does, but that it is not my fault. I have only to regret that I put my name to an agreement of which I did not approve, and which



I did not negotiate: if I had not done it, I really believe that they would not have dared to make such a Convention as they have made: notwithstanding that that agreement was never ratified, and is now so much waste paper.'

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 252.

To Lieut. Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.

Zambujal, 5th Sept. 1808.

'I hope you will be able to make a good arrangement for the performance of the duty required from me in the Asturias, for which I deem myself incapable. If it were not so, I believe your experience of the zeal with which I served Lord Cathcart would convince you that I would not decline performing any duty which the Government could require from me. I shall not conceal from you, however, that I consider myself in a very different situation in this army from that in which Lord Cathcart placed me; and I acknowledge that I cannot venture to do many things which I did for him, because it is evident that there exists a want of confidence which never existed in respect to me in any former instance. This, however, did not affect my decision in the service required of me yesterday, which I certainly should have undertaken if I had been capable of performing it.'

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 253.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Zambujal, 5th Sept. 1808.

'As for preventing the retreat of the French from Spain, it is quite out of the question. They have possession of all the fortresses on this side of the Pyrenees, through which mountains there are not less than 40 passes by which troops could march. Besides, if it were possible under these circumstances to place an army in their rear, with the object of cutting them off from France, you might depend upon it that all France would rise as one man for their relief, and the result would be the loss of the army which should be so employed.

In respect to your wish, that I should go into the Asturias to examine the country, and form a judgment of its strength, I have to mention to you that I am not a draftsman, and but a bad hand at description. I should have no difficulty in forming an opinion, and a plan for the defence of that country, provided I was certain that it would be executed. But it would be an idle waste of my time, and an imposition upon you, if I were to go into that country with the pretence of giving you, or any General Officer you should employ there, an idea of the country; and it would be vain and fruitless to form a plan for the defence of the country which would depend upon the execution of another. Indeed, this last would only bring disgrace upon me, and would disappoint you.

Under these circumstances, I have told Sir Hew Dalrymple that I was not able to perform the duty in which you had desired I should be employed; that I was not a topographical engineer, and could not pretend to describe in writing such a country as the Asturias; and he appeared to think that some of the gentlemen of the Quarter Master General's department might be more usefully employed on this service. I hope you will not believe that I feel any disinclination to performing any service in which you may think I can be of use to you; and that I have discouraged the idea of

employing me on that proposed, solely from my incapacity of performing it as it ought to be performed, and from a certainty that you were not aware of the nature of the service which you required from me when you wrote to Sir H. Dalrymple.'

## 254.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Zambujal, 5th Sept. 1808.

'You will receive from me by this opportunity a long letter upon our future operations. This relates solely to my private views. It is quite impossible for me to continue any longer with this army; and I wish, therefore, that you would allow me to return home and resume the duties of my office, if I should still be in office, and it is convenient to the Government that I should retain it; or if not, that I should remain upon the Staff in England; or, if that should not be practicable, that I should remain without employment. You will hear from others of the various causes which I must have for being dissatisfied, not only with the military and other public measures of the Commander in Chief, but with his treatment of myself. I am convinced it is better for him, for the army, and for me, that I should go away; and the sooner I go the better.'

## 255.

To the Bishop of Oporto.

Zambujal, 6th Sept. 1808.

'I must inform your Lordship, that the battle of the 21st August was the conclusion of my command of the British forces in Portugal. Indeed a senior officer, Sir H. Burrard, was in the field towards the close of the action, and directed the operations which were carried on after that battle was concluded. Sir H. Dalrymple, the present Commander in Chief, landed on the morning of the 22d August; and on that evening he negotiated in person with the French General Kellermann an arrangement for the suspension of hostilities. I was present during the negotiation of this agreement; and, by the desire of the Commander in Chief, I signed it. But, as I have above informed your Lordship, I did not negotiate it; nor can I in any manner be considered responsible for its contents.

'This agreement was followed by a negotiation with the French Commander in Chief, of a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army, through the medium of Colonel Murray, the Quarter Master General of the army, which Convention has been concluded and ratified by the Commanders in Chief of both armies, and is now in the progress of execution. I have not seen this Convention, and cannot inform your Lordship of its contents; but I doubt not but it will be laid before your Lordship by the Commander in Chief.'

## 256.

To Lieut. General Sir H. Dalrymple.

Zambujal, 10th Sept. 1808.

'I had the honor of receiving, in the night, the letter which you wrote to me yesterday. My wish is, at all times, to render myself as useful as may be in my power to the Officer under whose command I may be serving; and this desire is limited only by the doubt which I may entertain of my fitness for the employment held out to my acceptance. The view which I have



taken of the state of affairs in Spain has long ago suggested to me the propriety of placing in that Kingdom a person of the description stated by yourself, possessing full powers, the means of exerting them on all parts of Spain, and of communicating and treating with all the local juntas of government.

In order to be able to perform the important part allotted to him, this person should possess the confidence of those who employ him; and, above all, in order that he may recommend, with authority, a plan to the Spaniards, he should be acquainted with those of his employers, the means by which they propose to carry them into execution, and those by which they intend to enable the Spanish nation to execute that which will be proposed to them.

I certainly cannot consider myself as possessing those advantages, personally, which would qualify me for the situation you have proposed for me; and you must be the best judge whether you have made up your own mind, and are able to instruct me, and are inclined to confide in me, to the extent which in my opinion will be necessary, in order to derive any general advantage from such a mission. It is true that one might be undertaken with more limited views and objects than those above adverted to; and which are discussed in the letter which I have had the honor to receive from you; and it might be confined to the mere arrangement with General Castaños, or the military committee at Madrid, of a plan for the remaining part of the campaign. This mission, however, would require a full and clear explanation of views and means; and the person who undertakes it must have the confidence of his employer, and must be certain that the plan, which he would arrange under these circumstances, would be carried into execution.

I beg that you will consider me ready to be employed in any manner you may think proper; and I have above pointed out the powers and instructions which can alone, in my opinion, render the employment of any person, in the situation which you have held out to me, at all useful to the army or to the country.'

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257.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Moore, K.B.

Lumiar, 17th Sept. 1808.

'I write to you on the subject to which this letter relates with the same freedom with which I hope you would write to me on any point in which you might think the public interests concerned.

It appears to me to be quite impossible we can go on as we are now constituted; the Commander in Chief must be changed, and the country and the army naturally turn their eyes to you as their commander. I understand, however, that you have lately had some unpleasant discussions with the King's Ministers, the effect of which might be to prevent the adoption of an arrangement for the command of this army, which, in my opinion, would be the best, and would enable you to render those services at this moment for which you are peculiarly qualified. I wish you would allow me to talk to you respecting the discussions to which I have adverted, in order that I may endeavor to remove any trace which they may have left on the minds of the King's Ministers, having the effect which I have supposed.

Although I hold a high office under Government, I am no party man,

but have long been connected in friendship with many of those persons who are now at the head of affairs in England; and I think I have sufficient influence over them, that they may listen to me upon a point of this description, more particularly as I am convinced that they must be as desirous as I can be to adopt the arrangement for the command of this army which all are agreed is the best. In these times, my dear General, a man like you should not preclude himself from rendering the services of which he is capable by any idle point of form. Circumstances may have occurred, and might have justified the discussions to which I have referred; but none can justify the continuance of the temper in which they are carried on: and yet, till there is evidence that it is changed, it appears to be impossible for the King's Ministers to employ you in the high situation for which you are the most fit, because during the continuance of this temper of mind there can be no cordial or confidential intercourse.

In writing thus much I have perhaps gone too far, and have taken the permission for which it was the intention of this letter to ask; but I shall send it, as it may be convenient for you to be apprised of the view which I have already taken of these discussions, as far as I have any knowledge of them, in deciding whether you will allow me to talk to you any further about them. If you should do so, it would probably be most convenient to us both to meet at Lisbon, or I can go over to you, if that should suit you better.'

## 258.

To Lieut. Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.

Lisbon, 19th Sept. 1808.

'In regard to matters personal to myself, I shall not enter into them; I wish that Sir Hew had given me credit for a sincere desire to forward his views, whatever they might be; and I think I could have been of as much use to him as I believe I have been to other Officers under whose orders I have served. He is the only one of whom I have not been the right hand for some years past; and at the same time I must say that I felt the same inclination to serve him that I had to serve others.'

## 259.

To Major General Beresford.

Lisbon, 19th Sept. 1808.

'It is extraordinary that after I have been the instrument of the British Government, which has had the principal share in restoring the Portuguese monarchy, I should be obliged to apply to you to exert the influence which I am convinced you will have over the government that may be established in Portugal, to obtain for this gentleman the objects for which he is solicitous. But I am satisfied you will believe me when I assure you that he deserves them, and much more, from his government, for his faithful and efficient services; and that your friendship for me will induce you to intercede for him with the persons who may exercise the powers of government, which I ought to have been in the situation to do for him myself. I shall desire him to wait upon you.'

## 260.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

London, 6th Oct. 1808.

'I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I arrived in London this



day, by leave of the Commander of the Forces in Portugal; and having seen a copy of his Excellency's letter to your Lordship, dated at Cintra, the 3d September, in which it would appear, from an inaccuracy of expression, that I had agreed upon and signed certain articles "for the suspension of hostilities on the 22d August;" I beg leave to inform your Lordship that I did not negotiate that agreement; that it was negotiated and settled by his Excellency in person, with General Kellermann, in the presence of Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard and myself, and that I signed it by his Excellency's desire. But I could not consider myself responsible in any degree for the terms in which it was framed, or for any of its provisions.

At the same time, adverting to the situation which I had held in Portugal previously to his Excellency's arrival, I think it but just to inform your Lordship, that I concurred with the Commander of the Forces in thinking it expedient, on the 22d August, that the French army in Portugal should be allowed to evacuate that Kingdom, with their arms and baggage, and that every facility for this purpose should be afforded to them. I deemed this to be expedient, in the relative state of the two armies on the evening of the 22d, considering that the French army had then resumed a formidable position between us and Lisbon; that they had the means of retiring from that position to others in front of that city, and, finally, of crossing the Tagus into Alentejo, with a view to the occupation, in strength, of the forts of Elvas, La Lippe, and eventually Almeida.

As Lieut. General Sir J. Moore's corps had been diverted from the occupation of the position at Santarem which had been proposed for them, there were no means to prevent, and no increase of numbers could have prevented, the French army from effecting these objects.

The British army, after waiting for and receiving its reinforcements, would thus have been precluded from the use of the Tagus for some time longer; and as it depended for its supplies of provisions and ammunition upon its communication with the fleet, which, in the end of August, would have become most precarious by the coast, it would have been involved in difficulties for the want of necessaries, which would have been aggravated by the increase of its numbers.

To these circumstances, which affected the immediate situation of the army and its existence in Portugal, there were other considerations to be added respecting its future operations. I considered it most important that the British army in Portugal should be at liberty at an early period to march into Spain. Not only no arrangements for the march into Spain could be made, till the French should have evacuated Elvas and Almeida, and we should have possession of the Tagus and the Douro, but the army must have attacked and taken these places by regular sieges, before His Majesty could have restored the government of his ally, or could have moved his troops to the assistance of the Spaniards. I need not point out to your Lordship the difficulties of these operations, their increase in the season in which they would have been undertaken, or the time which they would have lasted.

These circumstances, affecting the situation, the objects, and the future operations of the army, were to be attributed to the fact, that the enemy occupied, in a military point of view, the whole of Portugal, having every stronghold in their hands; that their situation on the evening of the 22d

August enabled them still to avail themselves of these possessions, and to strengthen them as they might think proper; and I conceived that an army whose retreat was open, and which possessed such advantages, had a fair claim to be allowed to have the facility of withdrawing from the country.'

## 261.

Address and Narratives delivered to the Court of Inquiry into the Convention, &c., in Portugal

'I hope that in delivering this my narrative to the Court, I shall be permitted to make a few observations upon the paper which has been read by Sir H. Dalrymple.

I have as much reason to complain as he has that the writers in the newspapers should for some weeks past have amused the public with supposed accounts and comments on the late transactions in Portugal, and most particularly that they should have ventured to state some of them from what they call authority from me or my friends.

I never said, nor ever authorised any body to say, and more I can venture to say, that no person connected with me, as my relations, friends, or aides de camp, or otherwise in the service, ever gave any authority to any publisher of a newspaper, or any body else, to declare that I was compelled, or even ordered, to sign the paper to which my name appears. It is true that I was present when the Armistice was negotiated by the Commander in Chief, and I did assist in his negotiations, and I signed it by desiré of the Commander in Chief: but I never said, and never will say, that the expression of the desire of the Commander in Chief was in the shape of an order which it was not in my power to disobey, much less of compulsion. I thought it my duty to comply with this desire of the Commander in Chief from the wish which I have always felt, according to which I have always acted, to carry into effect the orders and objects of those placed in command over me, however I might differ in opinion with them. I certainly did differ in opinion with the Commander in Chief upon more than one point in the detail of what I was thus called upon to sign, as I shall show hereafter; but as I concurred in and advised the adoption of the principle of the measure, viz., that the French should be allowed to evacuate Portugal, for reasons which I shall state at a future period, I did not think proper to refuse to sign the paper on account of my disagreement on the details.

I have thought it necessary to say thus much upon this subject; and I now beg leave to deliver in a narrative of my proceedings from the time I took upon me the command of the army at Cork to the moment at which I delivered over the command to Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard, on the afternoon of the 20th.

'MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

'Having received the directions of the Judge Advocate General to attend you here this day, with as much detailed information in writing as I may think proper to offer, of my proceedings from the time I sailed with the troops from Ireland to the time I gave up the command to Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard, I have now the honor to submit to the Court of Inquiry copies of my dispatches to the Secretary of State, detailing my proceedings.



As these proceedings are fully detailed in the dispatches which contain an account of my motives for my actions at the moment I carried them into execution, I should be satisfied if the Court were to form an opinion upon a consideration of their contents ; but as the Court have expressed a desire, at the same time, to have a narrative of my proceedings, I have drawn one out principally from the dispatches.

I sailed from Cork in the *Donegal* on the 12th July ; I went on board the *Crocodile* on the 13th, and sailed to Coruña, where I arrived on the 20th July. I there found that the French had, on the 14th, defeated the armies of Castille and Galicia, under Generals Cuesta and Blake ; but, having sounded the Junta respecting their wish to have the assistance of the army under my command, in the existing crisis of their affairs, they declared explicitly that they did not want the assistance of troops ; but, eventually, arms and ammunition, and money immediately. A sum of £200,000 for their use had arrived on the 20th, and their requisition for arms and ammunition was sent home immediately. The Junta of Galicia at the same time expressed the greatest anxiety that the troops under my command should be employed in driving the French out of Portugal, as they were persuaded that the Spaniards of the north and south of the Peninsula could never have any decided success independently of each other, and could never make any great simultaneous effort to remove the French from Spain till they should be driven from Portugal, and the British troops in that Kingdom should connect the operations of the northern and the southern Spanish armies. The Junta of Galicia, at the same time, strongly recommended to me to land in the north of Portugal, in order that I might bring forward and avail myself of the Portuguese troops which the government of Oporto were collecting in the neighbourhood of that city. I have to observe to the Court, that they will not see, in my dispatches to the Secretary of State from Coruña, the detail of the wishes and sentiments of the Junta on my plan of operations, because they did not come regularly within the scope of a military dispatch ; but the subject is mentioned in my dispatch to General Spencer of the 26th July.

I sailed from Coruña on the 22d, and joined the fleet off Cape Finisterre next day, and quitted it again at night, and went to Oporto, in order to hold a conference with the Bishop and the General Officers in the command of the Portuguese troops. On my arrival at Oporto, on the 24th, I received a letter from the Admiral, Sir C. Cotton, in which he recommended to me to leave the troops either at Oporto or at the mouth of the Mondego river, and to proceed to Lisbon in a frigate, to communicate with him before I should determine upon the plan of operations and the landing place. The result of the conference which I had on the night of the 24th with the Bishop and the General Officers of the Portuguese army was an agreement, that about 5000 Portuguese troops should be sent forward to co-operate with me against the enemy ; that the remainder of the Portuguese troops, amounting to about 1500, and a Spanish corps of about 1500 men, then on its march from Galicia, and another small Spanish corps of about 300 men, and all the Portuguese armed peasantry, should remain in the neighbourhood of Oporto, and in the province of *Tras os Montes* ; a part to be employed in the blockade of Almeida, and a part in the defence of the province of *Tras os Montes*, which province was supposed to be threatened by an attack from the French corps,

under Marshal Bessières, since the defeat of the Spanish armies under Blake and Cuesta at Rio Seco, on the 14th July. The Bishop of Oporto likewise promised to supply the army under my command with mules and other means of carriage, and with slaughter cattle.

I sailed from Oporto on the morning of the 25th, and joined the fleet, and settled with Captain Malcolm that it should go to Mondego Bay; and I left it again that night, and went to the mouth of the Tagus to confer with the Admiral. I joined him on the evening of the 26th; and I there received letters from General Spencer, at Puerto de S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, in which he informed me that he had landed his corps in Andalusia, at the request of the Junta of Seville, and he did not think it proper to embark it again till he should receive further orders from me; and he appeared to think that my presence in Andalusia, and the assistance of the troops under my command, were necessary to enable General Castaños to defeat General Dupont.

As I was of opinion that the most essential object for the Spaniards, as well as for us, was to drive the French from Portugal, and that neither his corps nor mine were sufficiently strong when separate to be of much service anywhere, and that when joined they might effect the object which had been deemed of most importance in England, and in Galicia, I immediately dispatched orders to General Spencer to embark his troops, unless he should be actually engaged in an operation which he could not relinquish without loss to the Spaniards, and to join me off the coast of Portugal.

The result of the information which I received from General Spencer, of the strength of the French army in Portugal, was, that they consisted of more than 20,000 men. The accounts of their numbers which I received from the Admiral, and had received from the Portuguese, did not make their force so large; but, upon the whole, I was induced to believe that they had not less than from 16,000 to 18,000 men. Of this number they had from 600 to 800 in the fort of Almeida, 600 or 800 in Elvas, 800 in Peniche, 1600 or 1800 in Setuval, and the remainder were considered about 14,000, disposable for the defence of Lisbon, and the forts on the Tagus. The whole of this disposable force was at this time in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, excepting about 2400 men at Alcobaça, under General Thomière.

I considered with the Admiral the propriety of carrying into execution any of the proposed plans of attack upon the Tagus, or upon the coast in the neighbourhood of the Rock at Lisbon; and it appeared to us both that all the attacks upon the river, which had been proposed to Government, were impracticable; that the attack upon Cascaes Bay was likewise so; that a landing in any of the small bays in the neighbourhood of the Rock was a matter of considerable difficulty at any time, and that there was a risk that if a part of the army, or even the whole army were landed, the state of the surf which prevails upon the whole coast of Portugal might prevent the disembarkation of the rear in the one case, and of the stores and provisions which were necessary in the other. At all events, the disembarkation would be made in the neighbourhood of the whole disposable force of the French army; and the British troops would be exposed to their attack on their landing, probably in a crippled state, and certainly not in a very efficient state. By making our disembarkation in one of the bays near the Rock of Lisbon, it was certain that we should not have the advantage which, at that



time, we expected to derive from the co-operation of the Portuguese troops. It appeared to us that the fort of Peniche, which was garrisoned by the enemy, would prevent the disembarkation under the shelter of that peninsula: and therefore it appeared to the Admiral and to me, that it would be most advisable to disembark the troops in the Mondego river.

I quitted the Admiral off the Tagus on the 27th, and joined the fleet of transports off the Mondego on the 30th. I there received information from Government, dated the 15th July, that they intended to reinforce the army under my command with 5000 men, under the command of Brig. General Acland, in the first instance, and eventually with the corps, consisting of 10,000 men, which had been under the command of Sir J. Moore in Sweden; and that Sir H. Dalrymple was appointed to command the army. I was likewise directed to carry into execution the instructions which I had received, if I conceived that my force was sufficiently strong.

Besides these dispatches from Government, I received information on my arrival at the Mondego of the defeat of the French corps under Dupont by the Spanish army under Castaños, on the 20th July; and I was convinced that General Spencer, if he did not embark immediately upon receiving intelligence of that event, would do so as soon as he should receive my orders of the 26th July: I therefore considered his arrival as certain, and I had reason to expect the arrival of General Acland's corps every moment, as I had been informed that it was to sail from Harwich and the Downs on the 19th July. I also received accounts at the same time that General Loison had been detached from Lisbon across the Tagus into Alentejo on the 27th July, in order to subdue the insurrection in that province, and open the communication with Elvas. The insurgents had lately been joined by about 1000 men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and the insurrection had made considerable progress, and was become formidable in Alentejo.

I therefore considered that I might commence the disembarkation of the troops, without risk of their being attacked by superior numbers before one or both the reinforcements should arrive; and I was induced to disembark immediately, not only because the troops were likely to be better equipped, and more able to march in proportion as they should have been longer on shore, but because I had reason to believe that the Portuguese had been much discouraged by seeing the troops so long in the ships after the fleet had arrived in Mondego Bay; and I was certain they would suspect our inclination or our ability to contend with the French, if they had not been disembarked as soon as I returned from the Tagus. I therefore determined to disembark as soon as the weather and the state of the surf would permit us, and we commenced the disembarkation on the 1st August. The difficulties of landing, occasioned by the surf, were so great, that the whole of the corps was not disembarked till the 5th, on which day General Spencer arrived, and his corps on the 6th. He had embarked at Puerto de S<sup>ta</sup> Maria on the 21st July, when he had heard of the defeat of Dupont by Castaños, and had not received the dispatches addressed to him by me on the 26th July, General Spencer disembarked on the 7th and 8th, on which night the whole army was in readiness to march forward.

From the 1st August to that day the time had been usefully spent in procuring the means for moving with the army the necessary stores, pro-

visions, and baggage, and in arranging those means in the most advantageous manner to the different departments: the cavalry and the artillery received a large remount of horses, means were procured of moving with the army a sufficient supply of ammunition and military stores, and a seasonable supply of hospital stores; but I determined to march towards Lisbon by that road which passes nearest to the sea coast, in order that I might communicate with Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, who attended the movements of the army with a fleet of victuallers and store ships. The communication with this fleet, however, it was obvious, would be very precarious, as well on account of the state of the surf of the coast, in the different points of rendezvous which had been settled, as because it might happen that it would be more advantageous to the army to take another line of march, passing further inland.

I therefore made arrangements for carrying with the army such a supply of the articles of first necessity as should render it independent of the fleet till it should reach the Tagus, if circumstances should prevent the communication with the fleet, or should render it advantageous to relinquish it. In the same period of time I also armed the Portuguese troops, and ascertained, as far as lay in my power, the degree of their discipline and efficiency, and recommended and superintended their organization. I offered such a sum of money as the funds of the army could afford, to defray any expense which it might be deemed necessary to incur in their equipment for the field, which was declined by the Portuguese General Officers; and I met these gentlemen at Monte Mór o Velho on the 7th, and arranged with them the plan of our operations and march, which was delayed for the main body of the army till the 10th, at their desire, for the convenience of the Portuguese troops.

On the 8th I wrote a letter to Sir H. Burrard, which I left with Captain Malcolm, of the *Donegal*, to be delivered to him upon his arrival at the Mondego, detailing all the circumstances of our situation, and recommending for his consideration a plan of operations for the corps under the command of Sir J. Moore. The Court will find the copy of this letter enclosed in my dispatch to Lord Castlereagh of the 8th August.

The advanced guard marched on the 8th, supported by the brigades under General Hill and General Ferguson, as I had heard that General Laborde had collected his own corps and General Thomière's, consisting of from 5000 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Leyria, which place he threatened, as it contained a magazine formed for the use of the Portuguese army. On the 10th the main body followed, and the advanced guard arrived at Leyria on the 10th, and the main body on the 11th.

I received a letter from Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle at Coruña, on the 10th, detailing the inefficient state of the Galician army under General Blake; that the General had separated his troops, which consisted of infantry from the cavalry under General Cuesta; and that neither were in a condition to act offensively against Bessières, or even to follow that General if he should march into Portugal, or to attack him if he should make any considerable detachment to that quarter. At the same time I received the intelligence of the retreat of Joseph Buonaparte from Madrid on the 29th July; and I concluded that Bessières instead of moving out, or



detaching towards Portugal, would cover the retreat of Joseph Buonaparte towards the French frontier. Whether he did so or not, it was obvious to me that I should have time for my operations against Junot before Bessières could arrive in Portugal to interrupt them; and it was probable that General Acland's corps, or Sir J. Moore's, would arrive and land in Portugal before Bessières could come from the north of Spain.

Adverting, therefore, to the advanced state of the season, the necessity of communicating with the sea coast, and the certainty that that communication would be nearly impracticable after the month of August, and to the still dispersed state of the French forces in Portugal, I considered it to be important to endeavor to perform those operations to which the army was equal, and for which it was fully equipped and prepared, without loss of time. I communicated, however, the intelligence which I had received from Mr. Stuart, and my opinion upon it, to Sir H. Burrard, in a letter which I addressed to him on the 10th August; a copy of which, and of a private letter to Sir H. Burrard, the Court will find in my dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 18th August.

The Portuguese army, consisting of about 6000 men, including 500 cavalry, arrived at Leyria on the 12th, where the whole force was then assembled.

The French General Loison, who, I have informed the Court, had been detached across the Tagus into Alentejo, on the 26th or 27th July, with between 5000 and 6000 men, had withdrawn the greatest part of the garrison of Setuval, consisting of 1600 men, by which he had been joined, and he had immediately marched towards Evora, where he defeated and dispersed a Spanish detachment, consisting of 1000 men, and the force of the insurrection of Alentejo collected in that town; he then marched to Elvas, re-victualled that place, suppressed the insurrection, and re-established the French authority in Alentejo, and made arrangements for the purchase and collection of the grain of that province. He crossed the Tagus again at Abrantes, and marching down that river, he arrived at Thomar, about 16 miles to the south east from Leyria, on the evening of the 11th, on which day the British army arrived at Leyria.

The corps under Laborde was at the same time at Alcobaça, about 16 miles from Leyria to the south west, and the object of the French officers had evidently been to join at Leyria before the British troops could arrive there. This town is on the high road from Lisbon to the north of Portugal, to the eastward of which, and nearly parallel to the road, there is a chain of high mountains which runs from Leyria nearly to the Tagus, over which chain there is no good passage for carriages. In consequence of the early arrival, therefore, of the British troops at Leyria, General Loison was obliged to return to the southward before he could effect his junction with General Laborde, who was thus exposed to be attacked when alone, and was attacked on the 17th August. The Court will find in my dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 16th August, from Caldas, an outline of the operations of Loison's corps, of which what I have here stated is a more detailed account.

All the arrangements for the march having been made, and communicated to the Portuguese officers, the army marched on the 13th in two

columns to Calvario, and on the 14th in two columns to Alcobaça, from whence General Laborde had retreated in the course of the preceding night. The Portuguese troops had not marched from Leyria as had been arranged, and as I had expected, under the pretence that they had no provisions; and I received on the 13th, in the evening, a letter from Colonel Trant, who was employed by me to communicate with the Portuguese General, in which he informed me of the General's intention to halt at Leyria, unless I should consent to supply the Portuguese troops with provisions from the British Commissariat on the march to Lisbon. He also explained a plan of operations, which General Freire proposed to carry into execution, by which he would have been left without any communication with the British army, exposed to be attacked by the French army, if they should choose to abandon the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, and proceed to the northward and eastward, or even if they should be compelled to retire after an action with the British troops.

In my reply to this communication I pointed out the impossibility of my complying with the demand for provisions, and the danger which would result from the adoption of the plan of operations proposed for the Portuguese corps. I urged the Portuguese General, in the most earnest terms, to co-operate with me in the deliverance of his country from the French, if he had any regard to his own honor, to the honor of his country, or of his Prince; and I pointed out to him the resources of which he could avail himself to feed the army. I then proposed to him that, if he should not march with his whole corps, he should send to join me 1000 regular infantry, all his light troops and his cavalry, which troops I engaged to feed, as the utmost I could undertake to perform that way.

These troops, in number, 1000 regular infantry, 400 light troops, and 250 cavalry, joined me at Alcobaça, on the evening of the 14th, with Colonel Trant, and remained with me during the remainder of the operations. The main body of the Portuguese corps, instead of carrying into execution the plan of operations which I had originally proposed, or that which General Freire had substituted, adopted the measure of safety which I had recommended in the event of his determination not to join me, and remained at Leyria, and afterwards at Caldas and Obidos, till the 22nd August.

On the arrival of the army at Alcobaça, I immediately opened a communication with Captain Bligh, of the *Alfred*, who had been for 2 days waiting with the fleet of victuallers and store ships off Nazareth. A supply of bread and oats was immediately landed; and I appointed Peniche, which place I intended to reconnoitre, as our next point of communication.

The army marched on the 15th, in two columns, to Caldas, where it halted the 16th, to allow the Commissariat to come up, and to receive the supplies which had been landed at Nazareth. On the 15th in the evening there was a skirmish between the troops of the advanced guard of Laborde's corps and our riflemen, in which the latter sustained some loss. But we kept possession of the post at Obidos, which commands the valley of Caldas. The details of this affair are published in the *Gazette*, as are those of the action of the 17th.

Throughout that day we had reason to believe that General Loison, who



had moved from Rio Mayor on the evening of the 16th, would be found on Laborde's right, and the disposition for the attack was made accordingly. During the action a French Officer, who was dying of his wounds, informed me that they had expected Loison to join them that day at 1 o'clock by their right, which was the reason for which they stood our attack; that their numbers were 6000; and that their loss had been severe. Intelligence to the same purport was received from other prisoners; and as a small patrol of French infantry appeared at no great distance from the left of our position on the 17th at dusk, and I heard that Loison's corps was at that moment arriving at Bombarral, which was about 5 miles from the field of battle, I conclude that the junction had been intended, and was prevented only by our early attack. At all events great caution was necessary in all the movements of that day; and indeed the nature of the ground over which the troops were obliged to move rendered a very rapid attack impossible.

The two French corps joined on that night, and retired beyond Torres Vedras, which was 10 miles from the field of battle towards Cabeça de Montachique. My intention was to march to Torres Vedras on the morning of the 18th; and the troops were under arms, and the orders for the march had been issued, when I received from General Anstruther an account of his arrival on the coast, and of his junction with Captain Bligh. My original intention had been to employ the corps under General Acland and General Anstruther in the siege of Peniche, if I should find it necessary to undertake it; or if I should not, to send them down the coast to effect a landing in some of the bays in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon, in the rear of the enemy, while I should press upon their front. But the disappointment which I experienced in the hope of co-operation of the Portuguese troops, which were with me in the action of the 17th, and above all, the determined and gallant resistance of the enemy in that action, induced me to be of opinion that I ought to land General Anstruther's brigade, and General Acland's when it should arrive, and to join those troops to the army.

I therefore marched on the 18th to Lourinha, from whence I communicated again with General Anstruther, and on the 19th to Vimeiro, which appeared on the whole to be the position best calculated to secure the junction of General Anstruther, at the same time that it was a march in advance on our route. On account of the calms, the fleet which was anchored off the Berlings could not stand in till late on the 19th, and General Anstruther did not land till late that evening, and he formed a junction with 2 brigades detached from our left on the morning of the 20th, and took his position in the advanced guard.

Between the 18th and 20th the French corps had assembled at and about Torres Vedras, the troops last arrived under Junot forming the advanced guard, in a strong position in front of the town; and the divisions of Laborde and Loison, the main body, in another strong position behind it. Their cavalry was very active throughout the days of the 19th and 20th; they covered the whole country, patrolled frequently up to our position, and on the 20th a patrol was pushed into the rear of our right, as far as the landing place at Maceira. Under these circumstances we could gain no

detailed information of the enemy's position, excepting that it was very strong, and occupied by their whole force.

My intention was to march on the morning of the 21st, and orders were issued accordingly. I should have pushed the advanced guard as far as the heights of Mafra, and should have halted the main body about 4 or 5 miles from that place. By this movement the enemy's position at Torres Vedras would have been turned, and I should have brought the army into a country of which I had an excellent map and topographical accounts, which had been drawn up for the use of the late Sir C. Stuart;\* and the battle, which it was evident would be fought in a few days, would have had for its field a country of which we had a knowledge, and not very distant from Lisbon, into which town, if we had been successful, we might have entered with the retreating enemy.

I was informed in the middle of the day of the 20th, that General Acland's brigade was in the offing, and I made arrangements for their disembarkation as soon as they should arrive; and in the evening of this day Sir H. Burrard arrived in Maceira roads in the *Brazen*. He immediately assumed the command of the army.

The Court will observe that the last of my dispatches to the Secretary of State is dated the 18th, and the account of my proceedings on the 19th and 20th, the last two days of my command, is made from memory, assisted by a reference to private letters written at the time; and if the Court should wish it, it can be substantiated by evidence.

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#### MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

The Court will permit me, I hope, to begin the address with which I have to trouble them with some few observations upon that part of Lieut. General Sir H. Dalrymple's narrative which refers to the operations of the army while under my command in Portugal, in which, of course, I feel much interested. It appears that the General had at a very early period conceived an opinion that I had undertaken an operation of extreme difficulty and hazard; and yet he entertained the intention of leaving me to conclude it as I could, and of joining at the Mondego the reinforcements expected from England. Indeed, he states that he acted upon this intention, and that he communicated it to me by his aide de camp; but I can assure the Court that yesterday was the first time I heard of it.

I do not mean now to extenuate the difficulty and the hazard of the enterprise which I undertook when I commenced my march from the Mondego; I am addressing myself to persons too well acquainted with the operations of war not to appreciate them; but I contend for it, notwithstanding the opinion as at present stated, of an Officer of so much more experience than myself, that the means which I had in my power, those which I expected, and the measures which I adopted and recommended, were more than adequate to overcome the difficulties, and remove the risks of the operations which I conducted, excepting those inseparable from all military operations. The Court have already before them, in my dispatches to the

\* Lieut. General the Hon. Sir C. Stuart, K.B., brother of the first Marquis of Bute, and father of Lord Stuart de Rothesay. He had commanded a British force for some time in Portugal.



Secretary of State, to Sir H. Burrard, and my narrative, the reasons which induced me to land, and to march without waiting for further reinforcements ; upon which I would wish to rely. But what has fallen from Sir H. Dalrymple renders it necessary for me to trouble them with something further upon this part of the subject.

The questions, as arising out of his statement, are, whether I was in the first instance sufficiently strong to get the better of the enemy in the field ; and if I were, whether I adopted the best means of getting the better of him. In respect to my strength, in comparison of the army of the enemy, I do not desire to be judged by the result of the campaign, as far as it was conducted by me, but by the commencement, at which time the measures were adopted, from which, as it was truly stated, it would not have been easy, and I certainly had no inclination to withdraw.

My strength then consisted of nearly 13,000 British troops, and I had the assistance of 6000 Portuguese troops, from whose co-operation I expected to derive advantages ; in which expectation, I admit, I was subsequently disappointed. But I will ask this Court, what would have been said, and deservedly said, and felt of me, throughout the army and the country, and by the government by which I was intrusted, if with such a force I had hesitated to advance upon the enemy ? I have already told the Court, in my narrative, that I do not believe his force was more than 16,000 to 18,000 men, only 14,000 of which number could be disposable in the field. The largest account we received, which was deemed an exaggerated one, of the strength of the enemy, made them 20,500, and even admitting those numbers to be correct, the troops disposable for the field could not have equalled in numbers those which I had under my command and co-operating with me.

It appears that I was not mistaken upon this subject, for, in point of fact, the largest number at which I have ever heard the French force estimated in the battle of the 21st August was 16,000 men ; and I, who saw them, did not think they had more than 14,000 ; every man of which, excepting the cavalry, who remained untouched, were actually engaged, and particularly General Kellermann's reserve. Now if all this be true, I may fairly conclude, that if the enterprise was hazardous and difficult, I was not without means of bringing it to a fortunate conclusion.

The next question is, whether, having adequate means in my power, I adopted proper measures to effect my object. Sir H. Dalrymple says, that, by the line of march I adopted, all the strong positions were in the hands of the enemy ; but I can assure him that he will find it very difficult to adopt any line of march in Portugal which will not afford strong positions to an enemy acting on the defensive. But there was one advantage attending the line which I adopted, which was, that it rendered the enemy's superior cavalry useless, in the way in which he ought and would have employed it, if I had adopted any other line.

If I had adopted the line by the high road from Lisbon, to the north by Santarem, I must have kept up my communication with the Mondego ; which would have weakened my force for operations in the field ; and after all, the enemy with his cavalry must have broken in upon it. By adopting the line by the sea coast, and depending for my supplies upon the shipping, my communication was so short that it defended itself ; I was enabled to

keep my force collected in one body; and I had my arsenals and magazines close to me whenever I required to communicate with them. Having taken this line myself, I proposed that by Santarem to Sir H. Burrard, for Sir J. Moore's corps; by which it might have been adopted with safety, as I was upon the sea line.

The Lieutenant General has stated, that by the line I adopted I left all the strong positions in the enemy's hands. I do not know what positions were in the enemy's hands of which I could have deprived him, or he could have been deprived by the adoption of any other line of march. If the march had been made, as I had ordered it on the 21st August in the morning, the position at Torres Vedras would have been turned; and there was no position in the enemy's possession excepting that in our front at Cabeça de Montachique and those in the rear of it; and I must observe to the Court, that if Sir J. Moore's corps had gone to Santarem as proposed, as soon as it disembarked in the Mondego, there would have been no great safety in these positions, if it was, as it turned out to be, in our power to beat the French in the field.

I will not follow the example of Sir H. Dalrymple in entering into a discussion on the probable effects of the battle of the 21st August, if a certain line of action had been adopted, because an officer, supposed to be concerned in that question, is not present; and I dare say that opportunities will not be wanting of entering into that part of the subject. It has been my misfortune to have been accused of temerity and imprudence, as well as of excess of caution, in the late transactions in Portugal; but without appealing to the result of what happened at the moment I gave over the command of the army, I may safely assert, that whatever might be the difficulty of the operation I had undertaken, means existed to bring it to a fortunate conclusion; that there was no ground for the apprehension for my safety, which Sir H. Dalrymple seems to have entertained; and that under the instructions which I had received, I should have been blamed deservedly if I had not commenced my operations as soon as I thought I had a sufficient force.

The next point to which I shall take the liberty of drawing the attention of the Court is the share which I am supposed to have had in the negotiation of the Armistice and the Convention. In that part of the question which I have discussed hitherto, I am wholly and solely responsible; in that part which follows, I am held responsible for the advice I am supposed to have given in character, at least, if not in person and in my profession. It is important for me, therefore, to show what advice I really did give, in what view I gave it, and what would have been the result, if the measures which I recommended had been pursued. I did recommend and concur in the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage; and here I must observe, that it was particularly understood in the negotiation of the Armistice, that in the words "property of all descriptions," was to be included only military baggage and equipment; that this understanding was carried into execution by a separate article of the Convention; and that the commissioners for executing the Convention acted upon this principle.

When the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal was to be taken into consideration, viz., on the evening of the 22nd August, it was ne-



cessary to review the situation, the means, and the resources of the two armies, and our own objects. The enemy had collected their forces after the defeat of the 21st, and were about to resume the position of Cabeça de Montachique, from whence their retreat was open to other positions in front of Lisbon, and from thence across the Tagus into Alentejo. They had all the facilities in their power to make these movements; and when they should have reached Lisbon, the possession of that river by the forts and by the Russian fleet, and the great number of boats of which they would have had the use, would have enabled them to cross in one body, covered by the citadel and the high grounds; and they would scarcely have lost their rear guard. In Alentejo they had provided ample supplies.

As I have stated in my narrative of my proceedings from the 12th July to the 20th August, Loison had re-established the French authority in that province, during his expedition towards Elvas in the month of July, and the grain which it had produced was purchased for the use of the French army. I know this circumstance, not only from the reports of the country, but from intercepted letters written to Loison by the French agents in Alentejo, which were shown to me. On their arrival in that province, the French would have had to march, unmolested, by the finest road in Portugal, to Elvas, which is a fortress at least of the second order among the fortresses in Europe; where they would have placed a part of their corps in garrison, and they would have sent the remainder across the upper Tagus to Almeida. This place was already provisioned in some degree; and that part of their force, which the French would have detached to Almeida, would have experienced no difficulty in relieving the distant blockade kept up by the Portuguese peasantry, and in throwing in such quantities of provisions as they would have required.

Sir J. Moore's corps had been ordered, on the evening of the 20th, to join the army; for which corps a disposition had been proposed for the purpose of preventing the French from carrying into execution the plan of operations which I have supposed, and which it is certain they would have adopted after their defeat in the field. Sir J. Moore's corps could have supported itself at Santarem, as proposed, only by keeping up its communication with the Mondego; because the victuallers and transports could lie in safety in that river only; and the country on the banks of the Mondego, and under the authority of the government of Oporto, could alone furnish the means of keeping up that communication to any efficient purpose. When Sir J. Moore's corps, therefore, was called down to join the army, it could operate only as it was intended by Sir H. Burrard that it should operate, in immediate aid and communication with that under my command, depending for its subsistence upon the means which had been provided for the army, and the whole bearing upon the enemy's front. Our operations, when we should have joined, would have been those of a superior army pressing upon an inferior on its retreat; but nothing which we could have done would have cut off this retreat; the enemy must have been in Lisbon before us; the Tagus would have been the enemy's to the last moment of their passage; and, after they should have crossed, the necessity of possessing ourselves of the forts on the river, and the Russian fleet in the first instance, and the want of boats, which the enemy would have

carried off, would have given them ample time to make all their arrangements in Alentejo before our troops could reach them. But in carrying on these operations we should have been involved in many difficulties and distresses, which might have again placed in a state of risk all the objects of the campaign.

The communication with the shipping on the coast of Portugal is at all times precarious; and becomes more so towards the end of August, and is at length quite impracticable. In fact, many boats were swamped in the last week in August, vessels lost their anchors, and more than once the fleet was obliged to go to sea in danger. On the 22nd August there were 11 days' bread in camp for the original force which marched from Lavos on the 9th and 10th August; the troops which had landed on the 20th had brought 4 days' bread for themselves, and the supply for the whole might have been for 8 or 9 days, and no means could be procured of moving a larger quantity: no bread whatever could be procured in the country, and, in point of fact, I believe that, excepting a few thousand rations of bread left behind by the French at Alcobaça, Caldas, and Torres Vedras, and which were given to the Portuguese troops, the country supplied not a single ration from the time the troops landed till I came away on the 20th September.

It was obvious, then, that when Sir J. Moore's corps should land at Maceira, and should nearly double the consumption of the army, without increasing the means of procuring and conveying its supply, there was a risk of its being in want. Sir J. Moore's corps could not be expected to be on shore and in a situation to commence its operations till the end of August, during which period the enemy would have fortified his position at Cabeça de Montachique, and in the rear towards Lisbon; and it would have been unreasonable to expect to be able to force or turn them in less than 10 days. During the whole of this period, as well as during the time that would be employed in landing Sir J. Moore's corps, the whole army would have subsisted, and would have depended, upon the means which had been collected and provided for the subsistence of half of it; and it would have been certain of a supply only at the time it should reach and be in possession of the river Tagus so as to admit the transports.

After we should have obliged the enemy to cross the Tagus, and we should have possessed ourselves of the forts on that river, and of the Russian fleet, and we should have crossed that river with the British army, we must have placed ourselves in a situation to invest Elvas for a blockade or a regular siege. In either case, the army would have been exposed to the effects of a bad climate in the worst season of the year; and in the latter case, they would have had to move the means for the siege from Abrantes, beyond which place the Tagus would not have carried them, to the scene of action, a distance of not less than 60 miles. After having performed this operation, the army would have been obliged to renew it in order to obtain possession of Almeida. I am convinced that we should not have had possession of Elvas till late in December; and I think it more than probable that we should have been glad to allow the French to evacuate Portugal in that month instead of August, if we had persevered, after having sustained the loss of a great part of our army by sickness, and of 3 months of most valuable time with reference to further operations.



I conceived that the objects of His Majesty and of the Spanish nation were, that the British army should co-operate with the Spanish armies.

I believed that the only mode in which the operations of the Spanish corps could be brought to bear upon the same object, was by the influence which the co-operation of a British army would give to the government; and I believed that it was important to the Spanish nation to have the co-operation of 30,000 British soldiers in Spain, to receive the assistance of 4000 Spanish soldiers, who were prisoners to the French, and of about 2000 who were employed in Portugal. I considered these objects to be so important as to counterbalance the disadvantage of throwing 20,000 additional French troops, at no very remote period, upon the Pyrenees; that the Spanish nation would gain, even upon a comparison of numbers, not less than 16,000 good troops; but, if I were not mistaken in my political speculations upon this subject, they would likewise acquire strength in their own union, the amount of which could not be estimated; which strength, I well knew, they could acquire from no other source excepting Portugal, if a British army were to give it to them, as I knew that this country could not afford to send out another army of sufficient strength.

I may have been mistaken in my speculations upon this subject; but, in point of fact, the Spanish nation do now enjoy the very advantages from the Convention to which I have above referred, and which I had in contemplation at the time the Armistice was negotiated; and besides these advantages they have acquired another, viz., the service of the army of Estremadura, consisting of between 14,000 and 16,000 men, a part of them cavalry, which had been employed on the frontiers of Portugal, and have been equipped from the stores of Elvas, and are on their march towards the frontiers of France; and not a man of the French army which evacuated Portugal under the Convention has yet been brought, or can be brought for some time, upon the frontiers of Spain.

In reference to political and military objects, then, at least in my view of them, the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal was an advantage. If I was mistaken in my view of this advantage, it was a mistake into which I fell with the Spaniards themselves; for the army of Dupont, which was really in a situation to be obliged to surrender, was allowed to evacuate Andalusia by sea, and to serve again, under the Convention made by the Spanish General Castaños. If, however, it was an advantage, there is another question attending it, which is, was it disgraceful *per se*? I am not now discussing the detail of the Convention; but the mere measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal.

Those who argue upon this part of the subject contend, that the French ought to have been forced to lay down their arms. It is certainly a very desirable object, at all times, to oblige the army of an enemy to lay down its arms; but the question here was one of means. I wish that those who think that the French ought to have been obliged to lay down their arms had reviewed the history of all or of any of the armies which have been forced to adopt that extremity, and had compared their situation with that of the French army in Portugal. Those armies have invariably been surrounded by bodies superior in numbers, in equipments, or in efficiency; and have been distressed, or in the utmost danger of immediate distress, for the want of provisions, and without

hope of relief. I need not point out to this Board that the French army in Portugal were not in that situation, and were not likely to be in such a situation. In fact, they had the military possession of Portugal; they had their magazines in the country, the fortresses, and the harbours; and they incurred no risk of distress from the want of provisions; but we, who were to oblige them to lay down their arms, did incur that risk, till we should obtain possession of the Tagus. But this is not all. Let the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal be compared with other measures of the same description which have been not only approved, but deservedly, in my opinion, extolled in this country. Let the situations of the garrisons of Cairo and Alexandria be compared with the situation of the French army in Portugal: and I believe it will be admitted that the latter possessed advantages which the former did not; at the same time that those who had to decide upon this measure in Portugal knew that there must have been other objects for the British troops in that country, which the situation of Europe, at the time of the Convention in Egypt, did not hold out to the British troops employed there.

But although I concurred in the general principle of the measure of evacuation, and advised it, I did not agree in all the details either of the Armistice or of the Convention. In the first place I must inform this Board that in the first interview I had with Sir H. Dalrymple, after his arrival in Portugal, on the morning of the 22nd August, I, who am supposed to have been his adviser, and am here now for no crime excepting my supposed advice, had reason to believe that I did not possess his confidence; nay, more, that he was prejudiced against the opinions which I should give him: I had an opportunity of talking to him upon business that morning, as I can prove; in consequence of which I formed this belief; of which, if it is desired, I will state the grounds. I may have been mistaken in it; but I certainly entertained it, as I can prove, if the Board wish it, by an examination of those to whom I confided it.—But I think the Board will be inclined to admit that I might have had grounds for believing that Sir H. Dalrymple was prejudiced against the opinions which I should give him, when they shall recollect his own account of the opinions he entertained of the operations I had conducted even before he landed.

General Kellermann arrived at the advanced sentries of the British army between 1 and 2 o'clock of the 22nd, and sent in a flag of truce to announce that he wished to speak to me, who, of course, he supposed commanded the army. It is true, as stated by Sir H. Dalrymple, that there was an alarm in the camp when he arrived, which was occasioned by a Portuguese Officer who had come from General Freire, at Lourinha, and who represented General Kellermann's escort, which he had seen, as the whole French army. The Commander of the Forces was to do me the honor of dining with me on that day, and as he was then riding into the village of Vimeiro, I asked him whether I should go up to the out-posts, and speak to General Kellermann? His answer was "No;" that the General had desired to speak to him, the Commander of the army, and that he would receive him at my quarters. General Kellermann was brought there, and he arrived at about half past 2. Shortly after his arrival, Sir Hew sent for me into the room in which they were, and communicated to me the object of General Kel-



lermann's mission, which was repeated by Kellermann in my presence, and he afterwards read from a paper a memorandum of the wishes of the French Commander in Chief.

Sir H. Dalrymple, Sir H. Burrard, and I withdrew into an inner room to deliberate upon Kellermann's propositions; but we had not the paper, as I had refused to take it, conceiving that the negotiation then going on ought to be confined to a mere suspension of hostilities. When we had gone into the inner room, I told Sir H. Dalrymple that I considered that it was advisable to allow the French to evacuate Portugal, for reasons upon which I am afraid I have already delayed the Court too long; and I said that I did not conceive that there existed any objections at that moment to granting the French a suspension of hostilities for 48 hours, for the purpose of negotiating a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal. Whether Sir Hew acquiesced in my opinion upon this subject, or I in his, I do not recollect, nor is it material; but I know that we all agreed that there was no objection to allow the French to evacuate Portugal by sea.

I then told Sir Hew that I thought there was an objection, in point of form, to allow the negotiation then going on to extend to other objects than the mere suspension of hostilities; and that for that reason I had declined to take from Kellermann the paper which he had read to us; but of which I told him that I accurately remembered all the particulars. He was of opinion, however, that as long as we agreed upon the material point, viz., that the French should be allowed to evacuate Portugal by sea, it was useless "to drive them to the wall upon a point of form;" and in this manner this objection was overruled.

After dinner the negotiation with Kellermann was continued. The first point which was discussed was the property which the French were to carry off with them, which was explained by him to mean only the "*military baggage and equipments.*"

The next point of difficulty was that respecting the Russians, which at first stood in a form different from that in which it stands in the Armistice; and upon this point I stated to Sir H. Dalrymple my opinion, that the French ought not to be allowed to stipulate for the Russians at all. He would not allow the article in respect to the Russians to stand as at first proposed by Kellermann, under which they would have returned to the Baltic unmolested; and, in point of fact, the French General at first consented, as I understood, to leave out the stipulation in respect to the Russians, on the ground that it was a point referable to the Admiral. He brought it forward again, however, in the shape in which it now stands, and the Commander of the Forces consented to allow it to remain in the treaty, with the condition, that, if the Admiral did not agree to it, it must be struck out.

When General Kellermann first proposed the arrangement in respect to the Russians, as it now stands in the Armistice, the Commander of the Forces, Sir H. Burrard, and I, withdrew into the inner room; and I told his Excellency what had passed between Admiral Sir C. Cotton and me, upon this subject, in a conference which I had with the Admiral, when I was at the mouth of the Tagus, on the 26th and 27th July.

The Admiral had then told me, that he had heard that the Russian Admiral intended to remain neutral in the contest between the British and

the French troops ; and would claim the neutrality of the port of Lisbon ; and Sir C. Cotton asked me what I thought upon that claim ? I told him that I thought the only way of getting rid of it was, to be so quick in our operations, that there would be no time for the Portuguese to make it before he would attack the Russian fleet ; and that it was a subject upon which it would be necessary to make a reference to England. I pointed out to Sir Hew, however, that this was a claim which might be made by the Russians on their own account, or by the Portuguese in favor of the Russians, but not by the French. The Commander of the Forces appeared to be of opinion that as the question was, in fact, understood by Kellermann to be referable to the Admiral, it was not important whether this agreement was in the arrangement or not.

It is true, as stated by Sir H. Dalrymple, that there was a long, and the longest, discussion, upon the point relating to the Russians ; but it related to a claim made by General Kellermann, that the Russian fleet should be allowed to depart from Lisbon, and that the British fleet should not be allowed, to pursue them for a limited time. The Commander of the Forces, however, insisted that they should have no more in the port of Lisbon than the rights of a neutral nation ; and this point was yielded by General Kellermann.

The next point of importance was that relating to the length of time during which the suspension of hostilities should last ; and Sir H. Dalrymple admits that I proposed to limit the duration of the suspension of hostilities to 48 hours only, whereas that he preferred the proposal of General Kellermann, that the suspension should be unlimited in the first instance, and followed by a limited suspension of 48 hours when either party should wish to put an end to it.

I shall consider presently the advantage which I conceived the limited term of suspension had over the unlimited term, in the then situation of the two armies. But I shall now consider this circumstance in another point of view. First, I am called the negotiator of this instrument, and in this important point the plan of the French General is adopted instead of mine, by the Commander of the Forces. But, secondly, I am called the adviser of these measures, and for this crime of advice I am here. Now although I must submit to incur disgrace and punishment, where I shall be found to deserve those misfortunes, I must say that I think it is a new measure of punishment which appears invented for me ; that I, a subordinate Officer, am to be punished for advising measures which were not conducted according to my advice.

I say that this point was most important in a view to the state of our resources, to the state of the season, and to the tone in which the Convention should be negotiated ; and above all, it was important in a view to the threats of the French in respect to the Russians. If there was any foundation for those threats, which I acknowledge I imagined there was, and that they would have received assistance from the Russians ; if the Admiral refused his consent to the article respecting the Russian fleet, which I was sure he would do ; it was most important that if the negotiations should then be broken off, and notice given of the conclusion of the suspension of hostilities, a period of 48 hours should not be allowed to the French to equip



and prepare the Russians before we should begin our operations. If we derived any advantage, which I contend we did not, from prolonging the suspension of hostilities, I was sure that we could always prolong it. But whatever may have been the opinion of the Commander of the Forces on the 22nd, and whatever may be Sir H. Dalrymple's opinion now, he was of a different opinion on the 25th August; and, in point of fact, when he began to negotiate, he did at my suggestion give notice of the conclusion of the suspension of hostilities in 48 hours from noon of the 26th August, as appears by his instructions of the 25th August to Lieut. Colonel Murray.

After the articles were settled, Sir H. Dalrymple says, that General Kellermann asked him who should sign the Armistice, and he said himself, and he was about to sign it, when General Kellermann informed him that my name was in the title, and that it was not usual for an Officer of the rank of Commander in Chief to sign an instrument with one of inferior rank.

I am afraid that Sir H. Dalrymple's memory has not served him very well upon this occasion; if my name had been at that time inserted in the title of the instrument, as the negotiator of it, General Kellermann could have no reason to ask who was to sign it: and if this question was asked by General Kellermann after the instrument was drawn up, and Sir H. Dalrymple was about to sign it, he was about to sign it without reading the instrument; for if he had read it, he would have seen that my name was used in it. The fact is, that when the terms had been generally settled, General Kellermann was dictating the fair copy of the instrument to the Officers who were writing it, and before he wrote and dictated the title, he asked Sir H. Dalrymple who was to sign it? and Sir Hew said himself. General Kellermann then represented that he (Sir Hew), being Commander in Chief, ought not to sign an agreement with an inferior Officer, and proposed that I should sign it. Sir H. Dalrymple then came into another room, where I was, and told me that General Kellermann had proposed that I should sign the instrument, and he asked me whether I had any objections to doing so. My answer was, that I would sign any paper he wished me to sign.

It may not be very important at what period Sir H. Dalrymple had intended to sign the instrument; but this is very obvious, that he had intended to sign it, which he would not have done, if I had negotiated it; and indeed the very question asked by General Kellermann showed who was the negotiator; for if it had been me, or if it had been Sir H. Burrard, there would have been no doubt, and the question would have been useless; but as Sir H. Dalrymple was the negotiator himself, and it was not regular for an Officer commanding in chief to sign an agreement with an Officer of inferior rank, General Kellermann was obliged to inquire who should sign; and in point of fact proposed me. I repeat that I was not in the room at the time this conversation between General Kellermann and Sir H. Dalrymple took place; but as I went into the room more than once while the Officers were writing the instrument, which was after I had been asked and had consented to sign it, I know it must have been when the title was making out, and not when the whole was drawn up.

When it was drawn up I read it over, and at the table gave it to Sir H.

Dalrymple to read, with an observation that it was an extraordinary paper. He answered that it did not contain any thing that had not been settled, and I then signed it. This is the mode in which this agreement was negotiated; and I repeat that I never considered myself in any manner responsible for its contents, or for the manner in which it was drawn up.

It is perfectly true that I advised the principle of the arrangement, that I assisted the Commander in Chief in discussing the different points with General Kellermann, and that I gave him my opinion when he asked it, and when I thought it desirable to give it him. But I was not the negotiator, and could not be, and was not so considered, the Commander of the Forces being present in the room deciding upon all points, and taking part in all discussions. If indeed the Commander of the Forces had given me instructions to negotiate this instrument, and I had then negotiated and signed it, I might have been responsible for its contents, or at all events for the manner in which it was drawn up; but as it is, my signature is a mere form.

But this instrument, about which so much has been said, and respecting which I have troubled the Court so much at length, is in point of fact a dead letter: it was never ratified by any of the parties in whose name it was concluded, and no one article in it was ever carried into execution, excepting that by which hostilities were suspended. From the beginning, my object had been to keep the Russians clear from the French. I have shown that I endeavored to effect that object in the negotiation of the Armistice; and I will now show the subsequent measures which I adopted with a view to effect the same object in the subsequent negotiations.

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd, the army marched under my command to Ramalhal. Lieut. Colonel Murray had been sent off from Vimieiro at an early hour, to communicate to the Admiral the contents of the agreement for suspending hostilities, and upon my arrival at the ground at Ramalhal, I gave to the Commander of the Forces a paper, of which what follows is a copy:

MEMORANDUM HANDED TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE BY SIR A. WELLESLEY, FOR LIEUT. COLONEL MURRAY, CHARGED WITH THE NEGOTIATION FOR A CONVENTION.

Ramalhal, 23rd August, 1808.

I. It would be very desirable to instruct Colonel Murray at an early hour this day, to urge the Admiral to have a communication with the Russian Admiral, in which the latter should be informed, that whatever might be the result of the negotiations between Sir Hew and the Duc D'Abrantes, the Russian fleet should not be molested if they conducted themselves as they ought in a neutral port, and took no part in the contest.

II. If the Admiral should consent to this arrangement in favor of the Russians, and the Russians should be satisfied upon this point, the French Commander in Chief should be pressed upon the following points in the negotiation for the Convention.

1st. The fort of Peniche to be evacuated in 2 days; the forts of Elvas and La Lippe in 4 days; the fort of Almeida in 5 days. The French army to cross the Tagus, and evacuate Lisbon and all the forts on the Tagus in 4 days from the signature of the Convention, and to be prepared to embark in 7 days, or as soon afterwards as the British Commander in Chief may appoint.

The British army, in the mean time, to have the use of the port of Lisbon and the navigation of the Tagus.

2ndly. The mode of paying for the hire of the transports to be settled.

3rdly. The ports to be settled to which they are to go. Rochefort or L'Orient would answer best, as being the greatest distance from Spain and the Austrian frontier.

4thly. Security to be required for the transports going to the ports appointed, and for the



return of the transports; as 50 of those sent with the army of Egypt were detained in France.

5thly. Some mode to be devised to make the French Generals disgorge the church plate which they have stolen.

6thly. An exchange of prisoners to be settled.

7thly. There are no horse transports; and the French must be permitted to leave Commissaries to sell the horses, or to hire vessels to transport them to France; but certainly not the cavalry itself.'

The object of the paper was to get the Russians out of the hands of the French; and I did think that it was a matter of indifference what arrangement was made with them, or what became of the Russian fleet, provided it was not allowed to return to the Baltic. I was, and am still of opinion, that the best arrangement would have been to leave them in the port of Lisbon, on the ground of its neutrality. Two events might have occurred, either of which would have placed them in our hands; and in the mean time the Officers and seamen would not have been sent back to Russia to co-operate in the war against the Swedes.

One of the events is the declaration of Russia against the Spaniards and Portuguese, the other the re-entry of the French into Portugal. But whatever may have been the nature of the terms to be granted to the Russians, it appeared to me most important that the French should have nothing to do with the negotiations affecting their fleet.

I beg to observe to the Court that it always occurred to me, that one of the practical effects of the Convention with the French for the evacuation of Portugal must have been to give to the Russians the benefit of the neutrality of the port of Lisbon. The Convention must have provided for the occupation of the forts of the Tagus by the British troops, and at this time the Portuguese flags would be hoisted. It would be impossible for the British Admiral to go in and attack the Russians while the arrangement under the Convention should be in the course of execution; and while they would have continued in this state the Russians would have time to claim, and the Portuguese to grant, the neutrality of the port. The question then must have been referred to the British Government, and would have been discussed between them and the Portuguese.

I do not know whether Sir H. Dalrymple sent instructions to Lieut. Colonel Murray according to the recommendation contained in the paper which I have just read; but I rather believe he did not, as he appeared to be convinced that the Admiral would not agree to the terms proposed for them under the 7th article of the agreement for suspending hostilities. Lieut. Colonel Murray returned to Ramalhal from the Admiral in the night of the 24th, and having called upon me to inform me that the Admiral would not consent to the terms proposed for the Russians, I desired him to tell the General that, in my opinion, he ought to inform the French Commander in Chief, as soon as possible, that he should consider the suspension of hostilities at an end in 48 hours.

I waited upon Sir H. Dalrymple at daylight on the morning of the 25th, in company with Captain Malcolm of the Navy; and, in his presence, I told him that I thought that he ought immediately to put an end to the suspension of hostilities, on the ground of the Admiral's dissent from the articles, without specifying which of them; and to leave it to the French

Commander in Chief to renew the negotiation for the evacuation of Portugal, if he should think proper, but that we ought to lose no further time in advancing.

I then pointed out to Sir H. Dalrymple the practical inconvenience which resulted at that moment from his having allowed the French a suspension of hostilities for an unlimited period of time, followed by a limited period of 48 hours.

Sir H. Dalrymple told me that as soon as Lieut. Colonel Murray should have rested himself he would draw up a report of what had passed between him and the Admiral, on which he should be better able to form his opinion.

In the course of that morning he sent for me again, and he showed me the report which Lieut. Colonel Murray had made. I again recommended to him to put an end to the suspension of hostilities, on the ground of the Admiral's dissent, without entering into details, and to leave it to the French Commander in Chief to recommence the negotiation for the evacuation, if he should think proper. Sir H. Dalrymple was, however, of a different opinion, and determined to communicate, through Lieut. Colonel Murray, to the French Commander in Chief the Admiral's sentiments on the agreement for suspending hostilities; because Lieut. Colonel Murray informed us that, when he was leaving the *Hibernia*, with Junot's aide de camp, the latter had asked him whether any thing had passed with the Admiral likely to break off the negotiation, and had urged the propriety of informing Junot if that was the case. The Lieut. Colonel had replied, that he did not think that any thing had occurred which ought to preclude further negotiation.

The Commander of the Forces having thus determined that he would communicate to the French Commander in Chief, in detail, the Admiral's sentiments on the Armistice, Lieut. Colonel Murray's instructions were drawn, by which he was ordered to give notice of the end of the suspension of hostilities in 48 hours; and he was authorised to negotiate a Convention with the French for the evacuation of Portugal, on the terms contained in the paper which I had delivered to the General on the 23rd August, and which I have just read to the Court.

Thus, then, between the 23rd and 25th, I took two opportunities of endeavoring to effect the object I had in view, viz., to separate the Russians from the French; and I really believe that, if the Commander of the Forces had not been influenced by his desire to perform with good faith that to which he thought Lieut. Colonel Murray had bound him by his conversation with Junot's aide de camp, and had not stated to Junot the detail of the Admiral's sentiments respecting the Russians, the negotiations would have been continued with the French only, and the Russians would have been left to their fate.

But the Court will see that I made another effort to effect this same object on the 27th, and that, in point of fact, it was effected; and that the General gave orders that the negotiation should be broken off entirely, if it was not so understood.

Lieut. Colonel Murray went to Lisbon on the 25th; and on the 27th, in the morning, Sir H. Dalrymple sent for me and Sir J. Moore, and not Sir H. Burrard, as stated by Sir H. Dalrymple, to communicate to us a letter received from Lieut. Colonel Murray, and another from Junot. Lieut. Colonel Murray reported that Junot had agreed to continue the negotiation



without reference to the article of the Armistice relative to the Russians; and that the suspension of hostilities would terminate at a particular hour named, unless the negotiation, in which he was engaged with General Kellermann, should be brought to a conclusion.

General Junot appeared, by his letter, to think that the suspension of hostilities was still indefinite, and to consider the negotiation of the Military Convention as depending upon the negotiation of a Naval Convention between the British and the Russian Admirals.

I recommended to the General to instruct, and I drew for him instructions to Lieut. Colonel Murray, which are in the collection of papers dated the 27th August, which I will now read, by which he was directed to call upon General Kellermann to explain and reconcile the difference between his (Lieut. Colonel Murray's) statement and the General's intention, and that contained in Junot's letter to Sir H. Dalrymple; and to break off the negotiation, and to come away within the period limited for the suspension of hostilities, if this explanation should not be satisfactory; but that if the explanation should be satisfactory, he was to continue the negotiations; and if further time was necessary to enable him to bring them to a conclusion, he was permitted to suspend hostilities for a further period of 24 hours. Lieut. Colonel Murray was also directed to inform General Kellermann that it was expected that, in future, Junot should confine to the channel of Lieut. Colonel Murray any communication he had to make to Sir H. Dalrymple.

Sir H. Dalrymple says, in his narrative, that there was but little difference between Junot's letter and Lieut. Colonel Murray's. I have not got Lieut. Colonel Murray's letter, but, as well as I recollect, the difference was very material. At all events, it appears from the letter of the 27th, that Junot's notion was inconsistent with the intention of the Commander of the Forces, which intention was to allow the French to have nothing to say to the Russian negotiation; and that was what Lieut. Colonel Murray was ordered to set right in this letter written by me. I never saw the answer to this letter, nor do I know any thing further of the negotiation till the 29th; but I believe the Court will be of opinion, that if the plan detailed in that letter had been carried into execution, there would have been no occasion for treating with the Russians and the French at the same time.

On the 28th, that part of the army which had been originally under my command marched to the neighbourhood of Torres Vedras, leaving General Anstruther's and General Acland's brigades, and a part of Sir J. Moore's corps, which had been landed, in the camp at Ramalhal. On the 29th, in the morning, Sir H. Dalrymple sent for me to Ramalhal, where I went to take into consideration a Convention which had been agreed upon between General Kellermann and Lieut. Colonel Murray, and had been ratified by General Junot, dated the 28th August. There were present at Head Quarters, Sir H. Burrard, Sir J. Moore, Lieut. General Hope, Lieut. General Mackenzie Fraser, and myself; and the Convention was taken into consideration article by article.

It was altered in many important particulars.

1st. The article respecting property was placed on a proper footing; the French were to be allowed to carry off only their military equipments; and

were to restore property of all descriptions which had been taken from the churches or the inhabitants of Portugal.

2ndly. The security given to the purchasers of property from the French was not afforded by the alteration made.

3rdly. The French were to find the transports for their own cavalry.

4thly. The Commander of the Forces engaged to use his good offices, instead of stipulating for indemnity, for the inhabitants of Portugal in the French interest, during the time they should remain in Portugal.

5thly. The French were required to evacuate all the forts on the right of the Tagus immediately, as far up as Belem; and Lisbon itself, when the second division should embark.

I was most anxious, and pressed upon Sir H. Dalrymple that they should be required to evacuate Lisbon, and to cross the Tagus forthwith, according to the plan recommended in the paper which I had given him on the 23rd, in order to give us possession of the harbour, and the use of the navigation of the river; because, as I told him, he would not be able to conduct the service, and do all that would be necessary to refit the army, unless he should have a free and easy communication between every corps of the army and the transports; that this would be impossible even with the possession of Belem, if the French were to continue in Lisbon with a circuit of 3 leagues; and that the navigation of the Tagus, at an early period, was necessary in a view to the future operations of the army. Sir H. Dalrymple overruled this proposition of mine, and directed that the article might stand as I have above stated, viz., giving to the French a circuit of 2 leagues round Lisbon, with a league of distance between their posts and ours; and to us the possession of all the forts on the right bank of the Tagus, including Belem.

I beg that the Court will not understand, that this meeting of the Lieutenant Generals of the army, at Sir H. Dalrymple's quarters, or that any of the meetings which I had with him during the course of these negotiations, were at all of the nature of councils of war. They were merely meetings of General Officers with whom the Commander of the Forces chose to converse on the subjects then under his consideration; but, whatever might be the opinion of any, or the whole of those Officers, he decided for himself; and, in this last meeting of the 29th August, he decided for himself upon every proposition.

I never knew for what reason the improvements made in the Convention in this meeting of the 29th August were not carried into execution. I returned to Torres Vedras after the meeting was concluded; head quarters were moved there on the following day, the 30th; but I did not see the Commander in Chief, and I marched to Sobral with my division on the morning of the 31st. When I was near Sobral, I received a message from the Commander in Chief, acquainting me that the Convention had arrived, signed by General Kellermann and Lieut. Colonel Murray, and desiring to see me; but I was so far from Torres Vedras, that I conceived I should not be able to arrive there in time, and I did not go; and the Court will see that my name is not in the list of those Officers who were present at this meeting, as read by Sir H. Dalrymple. I understand, however, that the Commander in Chief ratified the Convention on that day, without any



of the alterations made by the meeting of General Officers on the 29th August; and, in point of fact, I never saw the Convention till I arrived in England.

I have now stated to the Court all that I had to do with the treaties, and the opinions I gave to the Commander of the Forces at different periods while they were negotiating; and I really believe that if a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal had been concluded according to the terms which Sir H. Dalrymple admits I recommended to him on the 23rd August, and with which he actually instructed Lieut. Colonel Murray on the 25th August, the country would have been satisfied.

But there is one article in the Convention particularly disapproved of in this country, of which I approved, notwithstanding that it is not contained in that paper which I gave to the Commander of the Forces on the 23rd.

It relates to the Spanish prisoners, who were certainly at the time of the Convention completely and entirely in the power of the French. The Court will observe that the principle upon which I thought that any Convention ought to be made with the French was, that they had the military possession of the country; and that their retreat was open to Elvas and Almeida: they had in their power to do as they pleased with their Spanish prisoners; and I conceived that they had a fair claim to be allowed for them in the negotiation. The exchange of the Frenchmen taken in Spain, not in military operations, for these Spaniards, appeared to me to be not an unreasonable arrangement; and it was one to which I had reason to believe the Junta of Galicia, at least, would not object. The only objection which I saw to the article was, that the Commander of the Forces engaged to obtain the release of the Frenchmen, instead of engaging to use his good offices to obtain their release; and he appears to have directed that an alteration might be made in this article, by his letter to Lieut. Colonel Murray of the 29th August, which I heard read to the Court.

It will be necessary that I should call evidence to support part of this statement; but I will trouble the Court as little as possible. I have called no evidence yet; and I beg leave now to declare, that the Officers at home from the army are here on leave of absence, either on account of their health or their private affairs; and have not been called, and are not detained by me.

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#### MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

Two or three points have been adverted to in the narrative of Sir H. Burrard, and some circumstances have been stated in evidence, upon which I wish to trouble the Court with some observations.

The first and principal of these is the reason stated by Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard for not deeming it expedient to place Lieut. General Sir J. Moore's corps at Santarem, as proposed by me in my letters of the 8th, 10th, and 12th August, which are before the Court, because, as Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard states, it would not, in his opinion, have been sufficiently strong to oppose the enemy, if he had retreated by that road.

I beg to refer the Court to my dispatches of that period, which I consider the fairest documents to which I can refer, as when they were written I had certainly no notion that the subjects to which they related would

ever have become the topic of discussion here. The Court will see, that in these dispatches I always considered the possession of Lisbon and of the Tagus to be the great object of the campaign both to us and the French ; that for this object a battle would be fought in the field, in which I thought I had reason to expect success ; and that the enemy would, after this battle, endeavor to retire across the Tagus to Elvas, or along the right bank of the Tagus by Santarem towards Almeida.

If the Court will refer to the paper drawn by the French engineer, laid before them by Lieut. General Sir H. Dalrymple, they will see that these are the lines of retreat recommended by the Officers of the engineers to the French Commander in Chief. Now the occupation of the position at Santarem by Sir J. Moore's corps was calculated to cut off these lines of retreat ; in the first supposed case, by the facility and celerity with which the Tagus would have been crossed ; in the second, as it was upon the road which the enemy must have taken. But as I set out with the certainty, that the French would not—nay, could not—abandon Lisbon and the Tagus, without fighting a battle for those possessions, I may conclude that, after that battle, they would have been so much weakened as that Sir J. Moore's corps would have been a match for them ; and, at all events, it is not to be supposed that, if this battle had been fought, they would not have been followed by a part, if not the whole of the army, which, in this supposition, would have defeated them. Indeed the Court will have observed, by my correspondence with Sir H. Burrard, that I considered this position at Santarem to be so little dangerous, and at the same time so advantageous, that if the brigades of Brig. Generals Acland and Anstruther had been equipped to act independently of any other body of troops, I should have ordered those brigades to occupy it.

The next point on which I wish to observe is the mode in which I proposed and intended that this corps should be supplied at Santarem. The Court will see this mode, and all the difficulties which attended it, discussed in my letters to Sir H. Burrard ; and I have no doubt whatever that he would have been able to procure carts in the country, on the Mondego, to enable him to form at Leyria the proposed depôt, and at that place the means of moving what should be required to Santarem. I also wish to say a few words upon the strength of the corps under my command, in comparison with that of the enemy.

I marched from Lavos on the 10th August with 13,000 men, and I was joined by and expected the co-operation of 6000 Portuguese troops ; I was disappointed in this expectation of the 13th August, when I was engaged in an operation against a detachment of the enemy, which promised the utmost success, from which I could not with propriety withdraw, and which ended in the battle of the 17th August. On the 18th I heard of the arrival of General Anstruther's brigade, and on the 20th, in the evening, when Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard decided that he would alter the principle on which we had before carried on our operations, General Acland was arrived in Maceira roads with his brigade, and he was landed on that night. The force then consisted of between 16,000 and 17,000 men, British troops, and 1650 Portuguese troops, actually in camp. We had been successful in the action of the 17th, and the army was in the highest order and the



highest spirits; well equipped, supplied with 12 days' provisions for the original number, and every thing it required for its future operations.

In discussing and considering the propriety of the decision of Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard, or of my previous operations, it would not be fair to estimate the enemy's force at larger numbers than 20,000 men, of which they were reported to consist, by General Spencer, in his report to Government from the mouth of the Tagus. From this number the garrisons of Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche were to be deducted, which I always reckoned at 2000 men; then there were the forts of St. Julian, Cascaes, the citadel of Lisbon, Bugio, Belem, and the batteries on the Tagus and the coast, as far as the Rock of Lisbon, which would have required at least 3000 more. This would have left the enemy with only 15,000 men for operations in the field, while we had above 18,000 men.

If it is contended that the estimate of the enemy's strength ought to be made according to their embarkation returns, instead of according to General Spencer's return of their force, a deduction ought to be made, from the amount of 24,000, of the real numbers of the garrisons of Almeida, Elvas, and Peniche, and of 3000 men for the garrisons upon the Tagus and upon the coast; and, if but a small allowance is made for non-combatants, it will still turn out that the force to be met in the field did not exceed 15,000 or 16,000 men. From this statement it will appear that the force of 3000 or 4000 men, which it was reported had arrived at Torres Vedras after the action, could not have existed; and, in point of fact, it was a report circulated by General Junot, and indeed the fact was published in the newspapers of Lisbon, with other false accounts of the circumstances of the action.

In respect to other points I shall not observe upon them, as the evidence is before the Court, who will judge of it. I consider it proved and admitted that I recommended on the evening of the 20th August that the army should not halt, and that the proposed disposition for Sir J. Moore's corps should not be altered; that the enemy were completely defeated in the action of the 21st August, on all points of attack, and that I proposed to Sir H. Burrard the pursuit of them.

The Court have before them my reasons for advancing on the 10th August, and for thinking that I was strong enough for the enemy; and for recommending to Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard a perseverance in the plan of operation which I commenced; and, in my evidence of yesterday, my reason for thinking that the most beneficial consequences would have resulted if the enemy had been pursued. Upon all these points of difference of opinion between Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard and me, the Court will form their judgment upon the evidence. I think it necessary, however, to detain the Court for a short time upon another part of the subject which has been under their consideration.

Although I am decidedly of opinion that the most decisive consequences would have resulted from the march as proposed, and the pursuit of the enemy on the 21st August after the battle, yet it does not follow that the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal was not right on the evening of the 22nd. On the 21st August the enemy were defeated and in confusion; and I have explained the grounds which I have for thinking

that the most advantageous consequences would have resulted from a pursuit. On the 22nd, in the evening, when the question of the evacuation was considered and decided, the enemy was no longer in confusion, and they had resumed the position of Cabeça de Montachique, between us and Lisbon. The relative situation of the two armies was then to be taken into consideration, as well as in the other case; but that of the French army had been materially improved by our omission to pursue our advantages; and we were then to look to our relative means of annoying each other, and our own objects. I have already detailed to the Court, in a former statement, the relative situation and means of the 2 armies at that period of time; and I conceive that the battle of the 21st August could be taken into consideration in the discussion of the question, whether the French should be allowed to evacuate Portugal or not, only in this way, viz., that it was a trial of strength between the two contending armies, and it proved the superiority of that of His Majesty. It was also clear to me that the French would not risk another action; that their object was to secure a retreat across the Tagus; and that they would use their positions in front of Lisbon to facilitate and secure that object.

As I have already explained to the Court, we had no means on the 22nd of preventing them from effecting that object, from which I did, and do still think, it was important to us to preclude them, excepting by a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal.

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MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

At a former meeting of the Court, Lieut. General Sir H. Dalrymple expressed a wish that the Court should have before it a copy of the letter which I was supposed to have addressed to the Bishop of Oporto on the 24th August; and I then told the Court that I would lay before them all the letters I had written to the Bishop of Oporto, of which I had copies among my papers.

I find that I have the copies of only two letters, although I have written many, which I now lay before the Court [*these letters were not deemed necessary, and were therefore withdrawn*]; and I should have taken an earlier opportunity of laying those letters before the Court, only that one of them relates to transactions in which Sir H. Burrard was a party; and I was unwilling to make it public during his absence.

In respect to the letter supposed to have been written by me on the 24th August, I repeat that I have no recollection of having written it; and I have no copy of it; and I think it probable, from an inaccuracy of the date, from the address, and some of the expressions, that I did not write it; but I adopt as my own all the sentiments which it contains.

It congratulates the Bishop upon the prospect of the evacuation of Portugal by the French, which the Court will have observed I always considered a subject of congratulation; and it states that the agreement for the suspension of hostilities contains nothing else that is remarkable, excepting a stipulation that the port of Lisbon should be considered a neutral port in respect to the Russians.

It is well known and admitted, that there was another part of that agree-



ment to which I entertained objections ; but in respect to the Portuguese, it did contain nothing remarkable, excepting this stipulation ; and this remark, if I wrote the letter, rather tends to confirm that which I have always stated were my sentiments in respect to this stipulation.

This mode of laying a private letter before a Court is not regular, any more than the mode of calling for a letter of this description ; but if the Court should be desirous of seeing this, or any other letters of mine to the Bishop of Oporto in an official shape, they may call for them at the office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, through which channel, I doubt not, they can be procured.'

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' I trust that the Court will permit me to address a few words to them upon this occasion.

Although I did differ, and do still differ, in opinion with Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard, respecting the measures adopted immediately after the battle of the 21st August, I hope it will not be deemed presumptuous in me as an inferior Officer to declare to the Court and to the public the opinion which I have always entertained, that Sir H. Burrard decided upon that occasion upon fair military grounds, in the manner which appeared to him to be most conducive to the interests of the country ; and that he had no motive for his decision which could be supposed personal to me, or which as an Officer he could not avow.'

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261.

In reply to the Speaker conveying the Thanks of the House of Commons for his conduct at Vimieiro.

' MR. SPEAKER,—I beg leave to express my acknowledgments to the House for the high honor which they have conferred upon me, by the notice which they have taken, and the approbation they have conveyed, of my conduct during the time I commanded His Majesty's troops in Portugal.

No man can value more highly than I do the honorable distinction which has been conferred upon me—a distinction which it is in the power of the representatives of a free people alone to bestow, and which it is the peculiar advantage of the Officers and soldiers in the service of His Majesty to have held out to them as the object of their ambition, and to receive as the reward of their services.

I beg leave to return to you, Sir, my thanks for the handsome terms in which your kindness—I ought to say your partiality—for me, has induced you to convey the approbation of the House.'

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262.

MEMORANDUM ON THE DEFENCE OF PORTUGAL.

London, 7th March, 1809

' I have always been of opinion that Portugal might be defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain ; and that in the mean time the measures adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their contest with the French.

My notion was, that the Portuguese military establishments, upon the footing of 40,000 militia and 30,000 regular troops, ought to be revived; and that, in addition to these troops, His Majesty ought to employ an army in Portugal amounting to about 20,000 British troops, including about 4000 cavalry. My opinion was, that even if Spain should have been conquered, the French would not have been able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force than 100,000 men; and that as long as the contest should continue in Spain this force, if it could be put in a state of activity, would be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might eventually have decided the contest.

It is obvious, however, that the military establishments of Portugal could not be revived without very extensive pecuniary assistance and political support from this country; and the only mode in which it appeared to be safe or even practicable to give this assistance and support, or to interfere at all in a military way in the concerns of Portugal, was to trust the King's Ambassador at Lisbon to give or withhold such sums as he might think necessary for the support of military establishments only, and to instruct him to see that the revenues of Portugal, whatever they might be, were in the first instance applied to the same objects. By the operation of these powers and instructions, it is probable that he would have had a complete control over the measures of the Portuguese government; and we might have expected by this time to have in the field an efficient Portuguese army.

As it was not possible, however, to adopt these measures at that time, and as the attention of the government has necessarily been drawn to other objects, it is probable that the military establishments of Portugal have made but little progress; and in considering the extent of the British force required for the defence of that country, and the other measures to be adopted, the small extent of the Portuguese force, and the probability of an early attack by the enemy, must be considered on the one hand; and, on the other, the continuance of the contest in Spain, and the probability that a very large French force will not be disposable in a very short period of time for the attack upon Portugal. I would still recommend the adoption of the political measures above suggested, with a view to the revival of the military establishments in Portugal. It is probable that the expense of these measures will not in this year exceed a million sterling. But if they should succeed, and the contest should continue in Spain and in Portugal, the benefit which will accrue from them will be more than adequate to the expense incurred.

The British force employed in Portugal should, in this view of the question, not be less than 30,000 men, of which number 4000 or 5000 should be cavalry, and there should be a large body of artillery. The extent of force in cavalry and artillery, above required, is because the Portuguese military establishments must necessarily be deficient in these two branches; and British or German cavalry and artillery must be employed with the Portuguese infantry.

The whole of the army in Portugal, Portuguese as well as British, should be placed under the command of British Officers. The Staff of the army, the Commissariat in particular, must be British; and these departments must be extensive in proportion to the strength of the whole army which will act in Portugal, to the number of detached posts which it will be necessary to occupy, and in a view to the difficulties of providing and distributing



supplies in that country. In regard to the detail of these measures, I recommend that the British army in Portugal should be reinforced as soon as possible with some companies of British riflemen, with 3000 British or German cavalry; that the complement of ordnance with that army should be made 30 pieces of cannon, of which two brigades of 9 pounders; that these pieces of ordnance should be completely horsed; that 20 pieces of brass (12 pounders) ordnance upon travelling carriages should be sent to Portugal, with a view to the occupation of certain positions in the country; that a corps of engineers for an army of 60,000 men should be sent there, and a corps of artillery for 60 pieces of cannon.

I understand that the British army now in Portugal consists of 20,000 men, including cavalry. It should be made up 20,000 infantry at least, as soon as possible, by additions of riflemen and other good infantry, which by this time may have been refitted after the campaign in Spain. The reinforcements may follow, as the troops shall recover from their fatigues.

The first measures to be adopted are to complete the army in Portugal with its cavalry and artillery, and to horse the ordnance as it ought to be. As soon as this shall be done the General and Staff Officers should go out; as it may be depended upon that as soon as the newspapers shall have announced the departure of Officers for Portugal, the French armies in Spain will receive orders to make their movements towards Portugal, so as to anticipate our measures for its defence. We ought therefore to have every thing on the spot, or nearly so, before any alarm is created at home respecting our intentions.

Besides the articles above enumerated, 30,000 stands of arms, clothing and shoes, for the Portuguese army, should be sent to Lisbon as soon as possible.'

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263.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Cradock, K.B.

Lisbon, 23rd April, 1809.

'Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday, and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to entertain in respect to the further movement to the northward.

I conclude you will have determined to halt the army at Leyria. I think that before any further steps are taken in respect to Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor, how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, and the means of defence of the eastern frontier, while the British army shall be to the northward; and eventually the means of the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, in case this attack should be made upon this country.

All these subjects must have been considered by you, and I fear in no very satisfactory point of view, as you appear to have moved to the northward unwillingly; and I should be glad to talk them over with you, in order to be able to consider some of them, and make various arrangements which can be made only here. I have asked Beresford also to come, if he should not deem his absence from the Portuguese troops in their present state likely to be disadvantageous to the Portuguese service, and I have desired him to let you know whether he will come or not.

It might possibly also be more agreeable and convenient to you to see me

here than with the army, and if this should be the case, it would be a most desirable arrangement to meet you here : I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only in a view to your own convenience and wishes. If you should come down, I should be much obliged to you if you would bring with you the Adjutant and Quarter Master Generals, the Chief Engineer, the Commanding Officer of Artillery, and the Commissary General.'

## 264.

To the Junta of Spanish Estremadura.

Lisbon, 28th April, 1809.

I have had the honor to receive the representation which you addressed to me yesterday, and I assure you that I am not insensible to the dangers which threaten the southern provinces of Spain and the Kingdom of Portugal.

With every disposition to meet and avert those dangers, I am concerned that I have it not in my power to do all that I wish ; and, particularly as the security of the Kingdom of Portugal being the principal object entrusted to me, I cannot divert from it the forces which are necessary for the accomplishment of all the other objects which you have recommended to my attention.

You must be aware that the forces of this Kingdom are but in their infancy in respect to organization, discipline, and equipment ; and it is not with troops in this state that any reasonable expectation can be formed of success against the veteran and disciplined troops of France, notwithstanding that I have every confidence in the valor, the zeal, and the loyalty of the troops of Portugal.

The safety of Portugal must therefore depend upon the exertions of the troops of His Majesty ; and I cannot venture to employ their services out of this Kingdom, although ultimately for its advantage and safety as well as for the general advantage, till the enemy who has invaded Portugal shall have been removed.'

## 265.

To Don Gregorio Cuesta.

Villa Franca, 29th April, 1809.

' Your Excellency must be aware of the state of the Portuguese army : a commencement has only lately been made to organise and discipline it ; and although I have the utmost reliance on the valor, the zeal, and the loyalty of the troops of Portugal, I cannot at this moment consider them in such a state of discipline as to confide to their exertions the safety of Portugal, especially committed to my care, against the further attempts which may be made upon it by the disciplined troops of France, which have already invaded, and are in possession of, an important part of this Kingdom.

Under these circumstances, my attention has necessarily been directed, in the first instance, to remove from Portugal the further evils with which both Spain and Portugal are threatened by Marshal Soult ; and the greatest part of the army under my command is now on its march for that purpose. A small detachment of British troops, with one of Portuguese troops, will remain upon the Tagus, to watch the movements of the enemy, and to guard the passages of that river, in case the enemy should direct his attack upon this country.



If I should succeed in removing Marshal Soult from the north of Portugal, I intend to go forthwith with all the troops under my command (consisting of about 25,000, of which nearly 4000 will at that time be cavalry), to the Eastern frontier of Portugal, in the neighbourhood of Elvas; and I shall be happy to co-operate with you in any plan which may be agreed upon for the attack of Marshal Victor.

In the mean time, a detachment of the garrison of Elvas has been directed to take the field, in co-operation with a similar detachment of the garrison of Badajoz, to act as a corps of observation in that quarter; but I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of recommending that this corps should not be exposed to the attack of the enemy, or to be cut off from the garrisons to which the parts of it respectively belong.

In the present situation of affairs, all that we can require is time: and that we should not lose our men, or any of the valuable positions which we still possess. In a short time we shall all be enabled to co-operate in a vigorous attack upon the enemy; and till that period shall arrive, it is not very material whether he acquires a little more of the open country, provided we do not lose any of the men who are destined to defend the valuable points and positions which remain in our hands.'

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266.

To Don Martin de Garay.

Villa Franca, 29th April, 1809.

'In the mean time, I cannot sufficiently recommend a strict defensive position in all quarters. In the present situation of affairs, we have every reason to hope that in a short time we shall all be able to co-operate in a vigorous attack upon the only remaining force of the enemy; in which attack we have every reasonable prospect of success, if we do not lose any of the valuable positions which we still possess, or the men who defend them, in fruitless attacks of the enemy in the plains. It cannot be a matter of much importance whether they possess, for a short time longer, more or less of the plains of La Mancha, provided the Spanish troops do not incur the risk of sustaining a fresh defeat by the superior cavalry of the enemy, and, by diminishing the strength and efficiency of the corps destined to defend the passes of the Sierra Morena, risk the loss of those important positions, and of all that remains that is valuable.'

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267.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Coimbra, 2nd May, 1809.

'I am obliged to you for your offer to procure me assistance to copy my dispatches; but I have plenty of that description. The fact is, that, excepting upon very important occasions, I write my dispatches without making a draft, and those which I sent to you were so written before I set out in the morning, and I had not time to get them copied before they were sent, which is the reason why I asked you to return me copies of them.'

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Head Quarters, 14th Nov. 1810.

'The Commander of the Forces has been pleased to direct that the standing General Orders for the Army under his command should be printed, not only for the more perfect reference to them as a code of Regulations, which practice was established as essentially necessary for

268.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Oporto, 12th May, 1809.

‘ I had the honor to apprise your Lordship on the 7th instant, that I intended that the army should march on the 9th from Coimbra, to dispossess the enemy of Oporto.

for a British Army in the field, but also to enable the Adjutant General to furnish immediately every regiment that joins the army, or every new division or brigade that may be formed, with complete copies of all the Rules and Orders which have been issued from time to time, for the conduct and guidance of the British Forces serving in the Peninsula.

## NOTE.

The General Orders of the Army have invariably been issued by paragraphs, each being numbered for the more easy reference to any particular point of the General Orders of the day.

It is to be observed, however, that in order to make the printed volumes as concise as possible, all paragraphs are omitted which relate only to temporary regulation or incidental circumstances. But it has been found expedient in the edition to make no change of the numbers, in consequence of the omission of any paragraphs, as there are references throughout the General Orders to the numbers of the paragraphs as they at present stand.

N.B. Where there is a lapse of dates, on those days no General Orders of moment have been issued.’

G. O.

Adjutant General's Office, Lisbon, 27th April, 1809.

‘ 1. His Majesty has been pleased to appoint Lieut. General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., to be Commander of his Forces in Portugal, and his Excellency having arrived in this country to assume the command, all reports, applications, &c., are henceforward to be addressed to him through the usual channels.’

G. O.

Coimbra, 3rd May, 1809.

‘ 2. Upon all occasions, when the army will march, it will be in one or more columns, on one or different roads, with a view to take up a position, or by separate battalions, brigades, or larger divisions, with a view to occupy certain cantonments. In the first case, the reserve artillery and stores, drawn, or carried by horses or mules are to follow the troops; then the baggage of regiments and individuals of each column is to follow arranged in the order in which the corps or individual will stand in the column; and lastly, the artillery and commissariat stores on carts, drawn by bullocks.

3. In the other cases, when battalions or larger divisions are to take up cantonments, the baggage of each division, going to a separate cantonment, is to follow that division, and is to be arranged in the order, in which each corps or individual will stand in the order of march of the division, to which he may belong.

4. On all occasions, the leaders of columns, whether composed of the whole army, or of smaller divisions, will halt, once in every hour and a half, for 5 minutes, to allow the men to fall out; and commanding officers of companies will be held responsible if any man falls out of the ranks at any time during the march, excepting during these halts, or is absent from his company at the end of it, upon any occasion, excepting sick and consequent inability to keep up.

5. If any man should be taken ill on a march, measures are to be taken for the care of him, according to the mode heretofore pointed out in the General Orders, particularly paragraph No. 11, of the General Order 24th April; and the Commanding Officer of his company will send a non-commissioned Officer with him to the nearest magistrate as therein pointed out.

6. When circumstances may oblige battalions, in rear of any column, to halt, the head of such column must not be halted without the special orders of the Officer commanding the column, who will judge of the necessity of halting, according to the length of the interval which will thereby be occasioned in his column, the necessity there is that the column should be well closed up, and the probability that from the nature of the impediments of the road, the head of the column will soon be halted, and give time to the rear to close up.’

G. O.

Coimbra, 4th May, 1809.

‘ 2. Although this is to be the order of the line of battle, circumstances of ground and situation may render a deviation from it necessary.

3. The light infantry companies belonging to, and the riflemen attached to each brigade of infantry, are to be formed together, on the left of the brigade, under the command of a Field Officer or Captain of light infantry of the brigade, to be fixed upon by the Officer who commands it. Upon all occasions, in which the brigade may be formed in line, or in



The advanced guard and the cavalry had marched on the 7th, and the whole had halted on the 8th, to afford time for Marshal Beresford with his corps to arrive upon the Upper Douro. The infantry of the army was formed into three divisions for this expedition, of which two, the advanced guard, consisting of the King's German Legion, and Brig. General R. Stewart's brigade, with a brigade of 6 pounders, and a brigade of 3 pounders, under Lieut. General Paget; and the cavalry under Lieut. General Payne; and the brigade of Guards, Brig. General Campbell's and Brig. General Sontag's brigades of infantry, with a brigade of 6 pounders, under Lieut. General Sherbrooke, moved by the high road from Coimbra to Oporto: and one, composed of Major General Hill's and Brig. General Cameron's brigades of infantry, and a brigade of 6 pounders, under the command of Major General Hill, by the road from Coimbra to Aveiro.

On the 10th in the morning, before daylight, the cavalry and advanced guard crossed the Vouga, with the intention to surprise and cut off 4

in column, when the brigade shall be formed for the purpose of opposing an enemy, the light infantry companies and riflemen will be of course in the front, flanks, or rear, according to the circumstances of the ground, and the nature of the operation to be performed. On all other occasions, the light infantry companies are to be considered as attached to their battalions, with which they are to be quartered or encamped, and solely under the command of the Commanding Officer of the battalion to which they belong.

4. An Assistant Commissary, with the necessary number of clerks, will be attached to each brigade of infantry, to each regiment of cavalry, to the artillery, and to head-quarters, to whom application must be made for provisions and supplies of all kinds required for the brigade, corps, or department, to which he will be attached. No requisitions must be made upon the country, excepting by the Commissary General, or his Deputy or Assistants, excepting in cases of necessity, in which small bodies of troops may be in upon their march, unattended by a Commissary; which case of necessity must always be clearly made out to the satisfaction of the Commander of the Forces.

5. All requisitions made contrary to this order will be paid for by the Commissary, and the amount charged to the account of the officer who will have signed it.

6. The officers of the army must have observed the scarcity of all the supplies, which our army requires in Portugal; at the same time that the discipline and efficiency of the troops depend upon their regular delivery. The Commander of the Forces trusts, therefore, the General Officers of the army, and the Commanding Officers of regiments, particularly those who may be detached, will communicate constantly with the officer of the Commissariat department attached to their brigades and regiments, and will advise and assist them as far as may be in their power in their endeavouring to procure supplies for their troops.

9. Major Campbell, Assistant Adjutant General, is appointed to act as Commandant of Head Quarters until further orders. Major Campbell will regulate all matters, concerning the quartering, marches, and police of head quarters. Whenever the head quarters are to move, all persons concerned are to send an Officer to the Commandant, for instructions relative to the moving of their baggage, &c., and for which a proper guard will be allotted by the Adjutant General.

Officers belonging to Head Quarters will give strict injunctions to their servants in charge of their baggage, to have it ready at the place and time that shall be fixed by the Commandant; and they must be warned that all orders issued by him are to be implicitly obeyed, as he is answerable to the Commander of the Forces for the regular march of the baggage of Head Quarters, and conduct of those who accompany it.

G. O.

Coimbra, 5th May, 1809.

2. Whenever an order is given for the troops to march on the following day, the Commissaries attached to those troops are to issue to them, one day's meat, which is to be cooked on that night, for the following day, so that the troops on their arrival at their new ground, having carried their provisions for the day, will be sure to have them.

12. Those horses of the Dragoons and Artillery, which will eat the corn and forage of the country, are to feed with that description of forage only; the Commanding Officers of Dragoons and Artillery will give directions that all their horses may be accustomed to the corn and forage of the country, by being fed at first, in the proportions of half English and half Portuguese corn and forage; then of two thirds Portuguese and one third English; and lastly of the whole Portuguese; the Commissary General will make his issues accordingly to Cavalry and Artillery.

regiments of French cavalry, and a battalion of infantry and artillery, cantoned in Albergaria Nova and the neighbouring villages, about 8 miles from that river; in the last of which we failed; but the superiority of the British cavalry was evident throughout the day. We took some prisoners and their cannon from them; and the advanced guard took up the position of Oliveira. On the same day Major General Hill, who had embarked at Aveiro on the evening of the 9th, arrived at Ovar, in the rear of the enemy's right; and the head of Lieut. General Sherbrooke's division passed the Vouga on the same evening.

On the 11th, the advanced guard and cavalry continued to move on the high road towards Oporto, with Major General Hill's division in a parallel road which leads to Oporto from Ovar. On the arrival of the advanced guard at Vendas Novas, between Souto Redondo and Grijó, they fell in with the outposts of the enemy's advanced guard, which were immediately driven in; and shortly afterwards we discovered the enemy's advanced guard, con-

G. O.

Coimbra, 7th May, 1809.

4. The Commanding Officers of regiments will make reports to the Officers commanding brigades, at the moment they find any ammunition, of any man in the regiment they command, damaged or deficient, in order that requisitions may be forthwith made to replace it, and that the requisitions may not be made out at a moment a corps is to march.'

G. O.

9th May, 1809.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests that attention may be paid to the order relative to soldiers marching out of the ranks, and he desires that the files may be counted, and if men are absent, the roll shall be called of each company when the men shall reach their ground after a march, and absentees are to be reported to the Officers commanding brigades.'

G. O.

Oporto, 12th May, 1809.

The Commander of the Forces congratulates the troops upon the success which has attended their operations for the last four days, upon which they have traversed above 80 miles of most difficult country, in which they have carried some formidable positions, have beat the enemy repeatedly, and have ended by forcing the passage of the Douro, and defending the position they had so boldly taken up, with numbers far inferior to those with which they were attacked. In the course of this short expedition the Commander of the Forces has had repeated opportunities of witnessing and applauding the gallantry of the Officers and troops, the activity and conduct of the 95th, and of the light infantry of the 29th, 43rd, and 52nd. The bravery of the 16th Portuguese regt., the able movement made by Major General Murray with 1st and 2nd batt. Hanoverian Legion, under Brig. General Langworth, and the gallant attack made by Brig. General the Hon. Charles Stewart with a squadron of the 16th, and a squadron of the 20th Light Dragoons, under the command of Major Blake of the 20th, contributed essentially to the success of the attack on the enemy's advanced guard on the 11th, and the steady gallantry of the Buffs, 48th and 16th regts., under the command of Major General Hill. The timely passage of the Douro and subsequent movement on the enemy's flank by Lieut. General Sherbrooke, with the brigade of Guards and 29th regt., and the bravery of the two squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, under the command of Major Hervey, and led by the Hon. Brig. General C. Stewart, obtained the victory, which has contributed so much to the honor of the troops on this day. The Commander of the Forces has to express his acknowledgments to the Hon. Lieut. General Edward Paget, for the manner in which he conducted the advanced guard on the 10th, 11th, and 12th, and in which he took up the position beyond the Douro, and he regrets the misfortune which has deprived him (he hopes only for a time) of his assistance; to Lieut. General Sherbrooke, Major General Murray, Major General Hill; to the Hon. Brig. General Charles Stewart; to Lieut. Colonel Delancey, Quarter Master General's department, and Captain Mellish, Adjutant General's Department, in the assistance they rendered General Stewart, in his charge of the enemy's defeated infantry, on the 11th and 12th, and to Major C. Campbell, of the Adjutant General's Department, for the assistance he rendered General Hill, on the defence of his post, and Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart in his charge on the enemy's infantry, on the 12th.

The Commander of the Forces also acknowledges the assistance he has received from the Adjutant and Quarter Master General, and the officers of these departments respectively; and to Lieut. Colonel Bathurst and the Officers of his personal staff.'



sisting of about 4000 infantry and some squadrons of cavalry, strongly posted on the heights above Grijó, their front being covered by woods and broken ground. The enemy's left flank was turned by a movement well executed by Major General Murray, with Brig. General Langwerth's brigade of the King's German Legion; while the 16th Portuguese regt. of Brig. General R. Stewart's brigade attacked their right, and the riflemen of the 95th, and the flank companies of the 29th, 43d, and 52d of the same brigade, under Major Way, attacked the infantry in the woods and village in their centre. These attacks soon obliged the enemy to give way; and Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart led 2 squadrons of the 16th and 20th dragoons, under the command of Major Blake, in pursuit of the enemy, and destroyed many, and took several prisoners.

'On the night of the 11th the enemy crossed the Douro, and destroyed the bridge over that river. It was important, with a view to the operations of Marshal Beresford, that I should cross the Douro immediately; and I had sent Major General Murray in the morning with a battalion of the King's German Legion, a squadron of cavalry, and two 6 pounders, to endeavor to collect boats, and, if possible, to cross the river at Avintas, about 4 miles above Oporto; and I had as many boats as could be collected brought to the ferry, immediately above the towns of Oporto and Villa Nova.

The ground on the right bank of the river at this ferry is protected and commanded by the fire of cannon, placed on the height of the Serra convent at Villa Nova; and there appeared to be a good position for our troops on the opposite side of the river, till they should be collected in sufficient numbers. The enemy took no notice of our collection of boats, or of the embarkation of the troops, till after the first battalion (the Buffs) were landed, and had taken up their position, under the command of Lieut. General Paget, on the opposite side of the river. They then commenced an attack upon them, with a large body of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, under the command of Marshal Soult, which that corps most gallantly sustained, till supported successively by the 48th and 66th regts., belonging to Major General Hill's brigade, and a Portuguese battalion, and afterwards by the 1st batt. of detachments belonging to Brig. General R. Stewart's brigade.

Lieut. General Paget was unfortunately wounded soon after the attack commenced, when the command of these gallant troops devolved upon Major General Hill.

Although the French made repeated attacks upon them, they made no impression; and at last, Major General Murray having appeared on the enemy's left flank on his march from Avintas, where he had crossed; and Lieut. General Sherbrooke, who by this time had availed himself of the enemy's weakness in the town of Oporto and had crossed the Douro at the ferry between the towns of Villa Nova and Oporto, having appeared upon their right with the brigade of Guards, and the 29th regt.; the whole retired in the utmost confusion towards Amarante, leaving behind them 5 pieces of cannon, 8 ammunition tumbrils, and many prisoners. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded in this action has been very large, and they have left behind them in Oporto 700 sick and wounded. Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart then directed a charge by a squadron of the 14th dragoons, under

the command of Major Hervey, who made a successful attack on the enemy's rear guard.

In the different actions with the enemy, of which I have above given your Lordship an account, we have lost some, and the immediate services of other valuable Officers and soldiers. In Lieut. General Paget, among the latter, I have lost the assistance of a friend, who had been most useful to me in the few days which had elapsed since he had joined the army. He had rendered a most important service at the moment he received his wound, in taking up the position which the troops afterwards maintained, and in bearing the first brunt of the enemy's attack. Major Hervey also distinguished himself at the moment he received his wound in the charge of the cavalry on this day.

I cannot say too much in favor of the Officers and troops. They have marched in 4 days over 80 miles of most difficult country, have gained many important positions, and have engaged and defeated three different bodies of the enemy's troops.

I beg particularly to draw your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Lieut. General Paget, Major General Murray, Major General Hill, Lieut. General Sherbrooke, Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart; Lieut. Colonel De Lancey, Deputy Quarter Master General, and Captain Mellish, Assistant Adjutant General, for the assistance they respectively rendered General the Hon. C. Stewart in the charge of the cavalry this day and on the 11th; Major Colin Campbell, Assistant Adjutant General, for the assistance he rendered Major General Hill in the defence of his post; and Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart in the charge of the cavalry this day; and Brigade Major Fordyce, Captain Currie, and Captain Hill, for the assistance they rendered General Hill.

I have also to request your Lordship's attention to the conduct of the riflemen and of the flank companies of the 29th, 43d, and 52d regts., under the command of Major Way of the 29th; that of the 16th Portuguese regt., commanded by Colonel Machado, of which Lieut. Colonel Doyle is Lieut. Colonel; that of the brigade of the King's German Legion, under the command of Brig. General Langwerth; and that of the 2 squadrons of the 16th and 20th light dragoons, under the command of Major Blake of the 20th, in the action of the 11th: and the conduct of the Buffs, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Drummond; the 48th, commanded by Colonel Duckworth; and 66th, commanded by Major Murray, who was wounded; and of the squadron of the 14th dragoons, under the command of Major Hervey, in the action of this day.

I have received the greatest assistance from the Adjutant General, and Quarter Master General, Colonel Murray, and from all the Officers belonging to those departments respectively throughout the service, as well as from Lieut. Colonel Bathurst and the officers of my personal staff; and I have every reason to be satisfied with the artillery and Officers of engineers.

I send this dispatch by Captain Stanhope, whom I beg to recommend to your Lordship's protection: his brother, the Hon. Major Stanhope, was unfortunately wounded by a sabre whilst leading a charge of the 16th light dragoons on the 10th instant.



## 269.

## PROCLAMATION.

Head Quarters, Oporto, 13th May, 1809.

Arthur Wellesley, Commander of the British army in Portugal, and Marshal General of the armies of H.R.H. the Prince Regent.

Inhabitants of Oporto!—The French troops having been expelled from this town by the superior gallantry and discipline of the army under my command, I call upon the inhabitants of Oporto to be merciful to the wounded and prisoners. By the laws of war they are entitled to my protection, which I am determined to afford them; and it will be worthy of the generosity and bravery of the Portuguese nation not to revenge the injuries which have been done to them on these unfortunate persons, who can only be considered as instruments in the hands of the more powerful, who are still in arms against us.

I therefore call upon the inhabitants of this town to remain peaceably in their dwellings. I forbid all persons not military to appear in the streets with arms; and I give notice that I shall consider any person who shall injure any of the wounded or of the prisoners as guilty of the breach of my orders.

I have appointed Colonel Trant to command in this town till the pleasure of the Government shall be known; and I have ordered him to take care that this Proclamation is obeyed.'

## 270.

To H. R. H. the Duke of York.

Oporto, 13th May, 1809.

'It is impossible to say what induced Soult to be so careless about the boats on the river, particularly near Oporto; or to allow us to land at all at a point so interesting to him as that which we occupied. I rather believe we were too quick for him, and that he had not time to secure the boats on all the points necessary to protect the retreat of his corps.'

## 271.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Montealegre, 18th May, 1809.

'The enemy commenced this retreat, as I have informed your Lordship, by destroying a great proportion of his guns and ammunition. He afterwards destroyed the remainder of both and a great proportion of his baggage, and kept nothing excepting what the soldiers or a few mules could carry. He has left behind him his sick and wounded; and the road from Penafiel to Montealegre is strewed with the carcases of horses and mules, and of French soldiers, who were put to death by the peasantry before our advanced guard could save them. This last circumstance is the natural effect of the

G. O.

Ruivães, 17th May, 1809.

'2. The troops will have observed the extreme difficulty of supplying them with bread in this part of the country, and the necessity that exists, that they should take care of that which is issued to them, and make it last for the time specified in General Orders: for want of attention to this object, and care of their bread, the best operations are necessarily relinquished.

3. On leaving Oporto, the troops had all bread to the 16th, inclusive; some of them received bread at Villa Nova, and all one day's bread at Braga; and yet, on this day, they had none: the state of the provisions require the continual superintendance of the Commanding Officers of regiments, and of the General Officers.

4. Till the army will be in a more plentiful country, the allowance of bread is to be 1 lb., and 1½ lb. of meat each man.'

species of warfare which the enemy have carried on in this country. Their soldiers have plundered and murdered the peasantry at their pleasure; and I have seen many persons hanging in the trees by the sides of the road, executed for no reason that I could learn, excepting that they have not been friendly to the French invasion and usurpation of the government of their country; and the route of their column, on their retreat, could be traced by the smoke of the villages to which they set fire.

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I hope your Lordship will believe that no measure which I could take was omitted to intercept the enemy's retreat. It is obvious, however, that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and every thing which can strengthen it, and can enable it to act together as a body; and abandons all those who are entitled to its protection, but add to its

G. O.

San Pedro, 19th May, 1809.

4. When bread cannot be delivered to the troops, they must have 2lbs. of beef for their ration.

5. It is to be understood by the soldiers, that wine forms no part of their ration; it is given to them at the pleasure, and upon the responsibility of the Commander of the Forces, and must be discontinued when circumstances prevent its being procured.

6. The ration of bread is to be increased to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  lb., by order from the Officers commanding Brigades, as soon as the Assistant Commissaries of Brigades shall report that they can make issues to that amount.

7. All horses, mules, bullocks, &c. taken from the enemy, are to be offered for sale to the Commissary General, who will buy them, if they should be found to answer for the cavalry, the artillery, or for commissariat purposes.

8. All purchases of captured horses, mules, &c. contrary to this order, will, in future, be considered null and void, unless they should be purchased by officers commanding troops or companies, with the knowledge and consent of the General Officers commanding their Brigades, for the purpose of carrying camp kettles, &c.

9. The officers commanding troops and companies will recollect, that although mules were given to them from the commissariat, at the commencement of the campaign, they have received an allowance from the public to purchase them, and it was expressly understood that they were to purchase others, if the mules given to them by the commissariat should be worn out.

10. As the Commander of the Forces has reason to believe many horses and mules are kept by even the soldiers of the army, and maintained by means entirely inconsistent with discipline and good order, he desires the Officers commanding regiments and brigades to inquire into the number of horses and mules which are attached to the regiments under their command, and to enforce the immediate sale of those not allowed to be kept by the regulations of the army.

11. The Commander of the Forces is much concerned to learn that the unmilitary practice of firing off their pieces in their quarters, which he had attributed entirely to troops not supposed to be so well disciplined as those of His Majesty, is to be attributed equally to those from whom he expected a better example.

12. The practice of firing off pieces by the soldiers in their quarters, or at all, but by order of their officers, is strictly forbid, and any man guilty of it is to be punished for disobedience of orders.

13. The soldiers are to be accountable for the quantity of ammunition in their possession, and any man who shall be found to have made away with it, is to be tried and punished.

14. This is not the only irregularity of which the Commander of the Forces has to complain.

15. Under the practice of taking horses from the enemy, the soldiers have taken them from Portuguese gentlemen, and have even gone so far as to take 2 horses belonging to the 16th light dragoons, which the Quarter Master General had at Ruivaea.

16. The attention of the Officers, commanding regiments and brigades, is called particularly to the conduct of the soldiers under their command.

17. The officers of companies must attend to their men in their quarters, as well as on a march, or the army will very soon be no better than a banditti: if these practices are continued, he desires that officers, commanding brigades, will give directions that the rolls of companies may be called every hour, and all absentees may be punished. He is, besides, determined that those troops who plunder shall be in the rear instead of in the front of the columns.



weight and impede its progress ; it must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed, with any prospect of being overtaken, by an army which has not made the same sacrifices.'

## 272.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

Braga, 20th May, 1809.

' I shall not remark on the General's observations on former plans of operations, or upon our system being that of not exposing our troops, excepting to declare that I shall adhere to that system, as I did in the case of the detachments from the garrisons of Elvas and Badajoz, whenever I shall not see any clear advantage to be derived from exposing the troops.'

## 273.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Oporto, 23rd May, 1809.

' I wish you to consider the question not only as one of civil law, but also in reference to the manner in which the Portuguese Government would feel, if we were to consider the property which we found here in possession of the enemy as prize ; for however glad I shall be that the success of the army should turn out to their benefit, as well as to their honor, and however convenient it might be to me to share in this benefit myself, I am very unwilling to be instrumental in forwarding such a claim, if it is to have the effect of putting our friends out of temper with us.'

## 274.

To Brig. General A. Campbell.

Oporto, 24th May, 1809.

' I observe from the date that this offence was aggravated by being committed at a moment when the troops were in march in pursuit of the enemy. I am not disposed, however, to carry matters to extremities with the Marquez ; and I beg that you will call him and the Officers of the regiment to which he belongs before you, and point out to him the extreme impropriety of his conduct. You will particularly point out to him that all the exertions of Great Britain, and that all the valor and discipline of British soldiers can effect, will not save Portugal and secure her independence, unless the

G. O.

Ruiuaes, 20th May, 1809.

' 1. The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the officers, commanding brigades and regiments, to the following extract of a letter from the Bishop of Braga : it points out forcibly the necessity which exists, that the officers of companies should attend to the conduct of the soldiers under their command, and in what manner want of discipline and good order must defeat the best combined operations.

2. The bread represented to have been irregularly seized by the soldiers in the rear, was intended for those at the head of the column, who have, therefore, been in want : commanding officers of regiments are held responsible for obedience to the General Orders of the 4th instant, relative to requisitions from the country.'

A. G. O.

Oporto, 23rd May, 1809.

' 1. The Commander of the Forces has been informed, and, indeed, has observed, notwithstanding the orders issued by the late Commander of the Forces and himself, much of the private baggage of the army is moved upon bullock cars. The officers must have felt the inconvenience which this mode of transporting their baggage must be to themselves personally. It is scarcely possible that the baggage can keep up with them, even at present, and when the Army will move in larger divisions, will become quite impossible.

The public inconvenience resulting from this mode of transporting private baggage is still greater. The Commander of the Forces is aware that in forced marches, and in bad weather, it may happen that animals provided for carriage will knock up ; but hopes that officers of the army will consider it as a determined measure, that no baggage is to be carried upon bullock cars, excepting those allowed by the late Commander of the Forces ; and that those who have baggage to carry, must be provided with mules or horses.'

people of Portugal exert themselves in their own cause; and that it is particularly incumbent upon the nobility and persons of great fortune and station to set the example of that devotion to the service of their country, and of that strict attention to the rules of military discipline and subordination, which can alone render any exertions useful, and lead to that success to which all must look forward with anxiety.

You will tell the Marquez that I hope that the lenity with which his fault has been treated, upon this occasion, will induce him to be more attentive to his duty; and that I expect from him exertions in the cause of his country, patience to bear the hardships of a military life, and submission to the rules of military discipline and subordination, in proportion as his rank, station, and fortune are superior to those of others of his countrymen in the service. You will then release the Marquez from his arrest.'

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275.

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

Aveiro, 27th May, 1809.

'With every sense of Mr. G——'s merits, I must have a longer experience of them, and a better opportunity of comparing them with the merits of others, than I have had in the short period since the troops took the field.'

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276.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Aveiro, 27th May, 1809.

'The foundation of all military plans is compounded of the situations of one's own troops, those of the allies, and those of the enemy; but if I cannot be certain even of my own, it is impossible for me to form, much less to execute, any military plan. I do not in general leave the troops idle, and you may depend upon it they will have enough to do before the campaign is over.'

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277.

To Marshal Beresford.

Coimbra, 29th May, 1809.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter, enclosing one from Major General ——, expressing the desire of that Officer to be relieved from the command of the brigade placed under his orders, and to be allowed to return to England, if it is intended to employ his services in future in co-operation with the Portuguese troops.

As the Commander in Chief of the British and Portuguese allied army in this country, it is impossible for me to engage to any Officer that the troops under his command shall not be employed in concert or co-operation with any particular description of troops. In that capacity, I consider myself wholly and solely responsible that His Majesty's troops shall not be employed in improper situations, and the Major Generals or other inferior

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G. O.

Oporto, 24th May, 1809.

'2. The army being likely to go into huts at an early period, the Commander of the Forces is disposed to supply the officers with tents from the public stores, in the proportion of one tent for each Field Officer, and one tent for the officers of each company, and one for the staff: it will be necessary, however, that the officers, to whom these tents will be issued, shall provide means for the carriage, without increasing the demands for forage.

3. The Officers commanding regiments will send to the Q. M. G., through the officers commanding their brigades, returns of the names of those officers who are desirous of having tents, stating the numbers required for the regiments under their command, according to the proportions above specified.'



officers responsible only that they and those under them do their duty in the situation in which they may be employed.

I request you, therefore, to inform Major General — that he has my leave to resign the command of his brigade, and to go to England when he thinks proper; and that I desire he will deliver over the command to the senior Officer of the brigade present.'

278.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Coimbra, 30th May, 1809.

'I do not dispute the rank of the Portuguese commission; on the con-

G. O.

Coimbra, 29th May, 1809.

'The Commander of the Forces is much concerned to be obliged again to complain of the conduct of the troops: not only have outrages been committed by whole corps, but there is no description of property of which the unfortunate inhabitants of Portugal have not been plundered by the British soldiers, whom they have received into their houses, or by stragglers from the different regiments of the army. The Commander of the Forces apprehends, that the interior discipline of the regiments is materially relaxed; and he therefore desires that the soldiers of every company, in each of the regiments, may be formed into as many squads as there are non-commissioned officers, each squad having in it one non-commissioned officer, who must be responsible for the conduct of the soldiers in his squad.

The non-commissioned officers must always be quartered with the men of their squads.

On halting days an officer of each company must visit the quarters of the men of his company, 4 times each day, of which one must be at 8 o'clock in the evening. On marching days an officer of each company must visit the quarters, twice after the men have got into them, of which once must be at 8 o'clock in the evening. An officer must also visit the quarters of the company, before the soldiers march in the morning.

The object of these visitings is to see that the soldiers conduct themselves regularly in their quarters, to ascertain whether there are any complaints by the landlords, and of whom, and that the men are in their quarters, instead of marauding in search of plunder.

The officers of the companies, who will visit, must report to the commanding officer that they have visited the quarters the number of times ordered, specifying the number.

The commanding officer will report daily to the Officer commanding the brigade, that these visitings have been made. The officers must be quartered in the immediate neighbourhood of their companies.

The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the officers commanding Brigades and regiments to the orders given out, and repeated, with a view to prevent the soldiers from straggling from their regiments on a march, which have hitherto been ineffectual. He desires that a report of absentees may be made after every march to the Officer commanding the brigade; and the Officer commanding the brigade will send this report, with a statement from what companies the men are absent, to the Commander of the Forces.

The use of carts to carry baggage of any description is again positively forbid; and it is equally forbid to have guards with any baggage.

The hospital bedding and stores heretofore carried under the charge of regimental surgeons, is to be sent into the hospital at Coimbra: there will be only one cart attached to each regiment, viz. that to carry men who may fall sick on a march; no guard whatever must be out of the ranks on a march, excepting those ordered by the General Orders.

No soldier must be employed to press carts or bullocks, for draught or food, excepting accompanied and directed by the Assistant Commissary of the brigade, or his deputy or clerk, except in cases of evident necessity; when the commanding officer of the brigade, in the absence of the assistant commissary, may direct that carts or bullocks for draught or food may be pressed; in which case an officer must command the party; and the Officer commanding the brigade must report the circumstance, as soon as possible, to Head Quarters.

The circumstances which have occasioned these orders have given the Commander of the Forces the greatest concern; and he hopes, with the assistance of the officers of the army, to put an end to the disgraceful practices which have prevailed.

The people of Portugal deserve well of the army; they have in every instance treated the soldiers well; and there never was an army so well supplied, or which had so little excuse for plunder, if any excuse can in any case exist. But if the Commander of the Forces should not by these and other measures be enabled to get the better of these practices, he is determined to report to His Majesty, and send into garrison those corps who shall continue them; as he prefers a small but disciplined and well ordered body of troops to a rabble, however numerous; and he is resolved not to be the instrument of inflicting upon the people of this country the miseries which result from the operations of such a body.

The regulations of these orders are to be understood as applicable to the dragoons and the artillery, as well as the infantry.'

trary, I assert it: but I wish that an arrangement should be made which would satisfy the Officers of this army respecting the rank they are to hold in relation to their juniors in the British service who hold superior military rank in the Portuguese service. It may be asked, Why are they to require satisfaction?—to which I only answer, that men's minds are so constituted, that when they conceive they are injured, they are not satisfied until the injury is removed. Dissatisfaction on one subject begets it on others, and I should have (indeed I may say I have, for the first time) the pain of commanding a dissatisfied army.

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We are not naturally a military people; the whole business of an army upon service is foreign to our habits, and is a constraint upon them, particularly in a poor country like this. This constraint naturally excites a temper ready to receive any impressions which will create dissatisfaction; and when dissatisfaction exists in an army, the task of the Commander is difficult indeed. I am, therefore, most desirous that the reasonable grounds for it, which do now exist, should be removed; and I have pointed out one of two modes in which this object can be effected.'

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279.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

'I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country most terribly, which has given me the greatest concern. The Town Major of Lisbon, if he has the orders, will show you, if you wish to read them, those that I have given out upon this subject.

They have plundered the people of bullocks, among other property, for what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand is their practice, to sell them to the people again. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention this practice to the Ministers of the Regency, and bid them to issue a proclamation forbidding the people, in the most positive terms, to purchase any thing from the soldiers of the British army.'

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280.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Coimbra, 31st May, 1809.

'The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear success any more than Sir J. Moore's army could bear failure. I am endeavoring to tame them; but, if I should not succeed, I must make an official complaint of them, and send one or two corps home in disgrace. They plunder in all directions.'

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G. O.

Coimbra, 3rd June, 1809.

'2. Whenever it is possible for the Assistant Commissaries of brigades to issue the quantity, cavalry must receive and carry 3 days corn, and the infantry 3 days bread.

3. The senior of the officers left in charge of the sick at the different hospitals must take the command of the whole, and correspond with Head Quarters; no convalescents must be moved from any hospital station without orders from Head Quarters.'



281.

To Don Gregorio Cuesta.

Abrantes, 10th June, 1809.

‘ I should with great pleasure comply with your desire, and place at Alcantara a British detachment, if it were not desirable, on many accounts, to keep the British army as much concentrated and collected as possible. Indeed, it is only by keeping them in a collected state that we can hope to derive from them that service which they are capable of rendering.’

282.

To Lieut. Col. Bourke, A. Q. M. G.

Abrantes, 13th June, 1809.

‘ As to the plan of attack mentioned in the General’s letter, it is too loose for me to be able to give any opinion upon it: as far as I can understand it, it labors under the disadvantage of separating the combined armies, and

G. O.

Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

‘ 2. When the Army is in cantonments, the following rules are to be observed in respect to quarters. The allotments of the quarters of any considerable corps of the Army is to be made by the Officer commanding it, through the Assistant Quarter Master General attached to the corps, or, in his absence, through any other officer of his staff: no individual is to take quarters for himself or change them, without the authority of the Officer commanding in the cantonments. The staff and other unattached officers are to be quartered by the Ass. Quarter Master General of the corps of the army to which they belong, or the officer acting for him. Regimental officers are to take their quarters in the street or district allotted to their respective corps; but when a regiment is placed in any public building, which does not afford accommodation for officers, such as are not ordered to remain with the men will have quarters allotted to them. All regulations respecting quarters in the town or village where the head quarters of the army are established, are to be made by the Commandant at Head Quarters.’

G. O.

Abrantes, 13th June, 1809.

‘ 1. Whenever 40 men at general hospital are sufficiently recovered to be able to march, an order and a route will be sent for their march by easy stages.

2. They are to take with them at setting out, 3 days’ bread in biscuit, which they are to keep by them as a reserve.

3. The Commissary General will arrange that they shall be fed at the different halting places.

4. An officer must be sent in command of every detachment of 40 men, and 2 officers if the number should amount to 80, and so on; one officer for every 40 in addition; one non-commissioned officer must be sent for every 20 sick; and the commanding officer at the hospital must make arrangements that other officers and non-commissioned officers should take charge of the remaining sick of the brigade, in charge of which such officer or non-commissioned officer have been left at the hospital.

5. The senior officer at the hospital will report to the Q. M. G. the departure of the recovered men; and officers commanding the party of recovered men must report their progress to head quarters by every opportunity.

7. The Commander of the Forces requests that olive and other fruit trees may not be used by the troops in hutting, except in cases of evident necessity.

8. If the country in the neighbourhood of the several cantonments should afford materials fit for hutting, the Commander of the Forces is desirous that the troops should be moved into huts as soon as possible; the officers commanding brigades will make arrangements accordingly. The tents will be delivered to the officers who have made requisitions for them, under the orders of the 24th May, as soon as they shall arrive from Lisbon.

10. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have to announce to the army that private — —, of the —rd regt. has been wounded, and has probably died of the wounds he received from some peasants in the neighbourhood of Coimbra; and that corporal — — and private — — have probably met with the same fate: this is one of the consequences of the irregularities of which the soldiers have been guilty, which have had the effect of turning into enemies a people who were grateful for the benefits which they had received from the British nation, and manifested their gratitude by affording to the soldiers every comfort and assistance which was in their power.

The Commanding Officers of Brigades and regiments are particularly requested to point out to the soldiers the consequences of their irregularities.’

placing the French army between them, without having the advantage of cutting off the enemy's retreat, which is the plan I had proposed.

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I have no objection to taking any share of the action that may be allotted to me; but I am convinced that, if the Spanish army separates itself from us, as proposed, at the distance of 10 or 15 leagues, with rivers and mountains between us, they will be defeated, and we shall see nothing of the enemy. I shall be obliged to you if you will make a suggestion to General Cuesta in this view of the case.'

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283.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Abrantes, 13th June, 1809.

'I am sorry to say that, from the conduct of the soldiers of the army in general, I apprehend that the peasants may have had some provocation for their animosity against the soldiers; but it must be obvious to you and to the Government that these effects of their animosity must be discouraged, and even punished; otherwise it may lead to consequences fatal to the peasantry of the country in general, as well as to the army. The Government may depend upon my exertions to keep the troops in order, and that I shall exert all the power which the law has placed in my hands to punish those who may be guilty of any outrages. The discovery and proof against the soldiers guilty of them is, however, a matter of considerable difficulty, as the law now stands; and it is rendered more difficult by the unwillingness of the inhabitants of the country to come forward to give their evidence on oath before a Court Martial. Probably this evil might be remedied, or removed, either by the circulation of a proclamation or a circular letter to the country magistrates, by the Government, calling upon the people to come forward with their complaints against the soldiers, and to prosecute them to conviction before a Court Martial. What I have now to request is, that strict inquiry may be made respecting the circumstances of the probable death of the 3 soldiers of the 53d regt. at Murtede, that those who put them to death may be discovered and brought to trial.'

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284.

To Don Gregorio Cuesta.

Abrantes, 14th June, 1809.

'We have nothing now to apprehend, excepting that a misfortune may happen to one army before the other can join it, or shall be in a position to co-operate with or give it assistance; and I feel confident that when your Excellency shall have considered the situation in which I stand at this moment, the absolute necessity which exists that I should delay my march till all my troops shall have joined, and till I shall have received all that I require, you will deem it most for the general benefit to place your army in a secure position till I can move to your assistance, which you may depend upon my doing as soon as it shall be in my power.'

G. O.

Abrantes, 16th June, 1809.

'1. Two more assistant provosts will be appointed. Commanding Officers of brigades will please to send in recommendations of men capable of filling the situation: one of the assistant provosts is to repair to the camp near Abrantes, and to report himself to the officer commanding the camp. He will patrol round the neighbourhood of it, and will take up all stragglers and marauders; two dragoons are to be attached to this provost, and to be relieved daily.'



285.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

‘ I cannot, with propriety, omit to draw your attention again to the state of discipline of the army, which is a subject of serious concern to me, and well deserves the consideration of His Majesty’s Ministers.

It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight of their Officers, I may almost say never out of the sight of the Commanding Officers of their regiments, and the General Officers of the army, that outrages are not committed ; and notwithstanding the pains which I take, of which there will be

G. O.

Abrantes, 17th June, 1809.

‘ 1. The Commander of the Forces has been much concerned to receive reports of the misconduct of the soldiers left behind, in all the hospitals, particularly at Oporto ; and he desires that in future, whenever an hospital is established, the following regulations will be observed :

When soldiers are dismissed from the hospital as convalescents, they are, if possible, to be quartered in the same building ; if that should not be possible, they are to be quartered on the inhabitants of the house in which the hospital is established ; in either case the officers in charge of the men left behind in hospital are to attend, and to put in execution the Orders of the 29th ult. relative to visiting the soldiers in their quarters.

2. No convalescent must ever be permitted to appear out of his quarters in the streets of the town, excepting with his side arms, and dressed according to the orders of his regiment. As soon as a sufficient number of convalescents are strong enough, a guard must be mounted daily, of which patrols under a non-commissioned officer must be sent during the night to take up all soldiers straggling from their quarters after hours. Convalescents must parade with their arms twice a day, once in the morning, and in the evening at sun-set ; all officers being present at each parade. After the evening parade the soldiers are to be marched to their quarters, and none are to be permitted to appear in the streets after that hour.

3. All officers left in sick quarters, in any town where an hospital is established, are to be considered as belonging to the hospital until they shall have recovered, and are to do duty according to their respective ranks with the officers left in charge of the sick men in hospital, till they shall be ordered to join the army.

4. The officer commanding at each of the hospitals, including that of Lisbon, will report to the Adjutant General that these orders have been carried into execution, along with the weekly report ordered to be made by the General Orders of the 13th June. Copies of these orders are to be sent to all the hospitals, and a copy to be left by the Adjutant General whenever an hospital may be left in future.

5. When the Army, or any portion of it, in future requires green forage, Commissaries, or if there should be no Commissary, the quarter master of the regiment, under the orders of the General or commanding officer, will make a requisition upon the magistrate for it, and will point out to him the field or place from whence it can be provided : the magistrate is then to have it cut ; forage is to be delivered to the troops by the Commissary, in rations, according to the ordered proportions. A guard will be left in the field, in charge of the remainder of the forage, after the Commissary has made his delivery. If there should be no magistrate, or if the magistrate should refuse to consent to deliver or cut the green forage, or if it should be necessary on any account the troops should cut it for themselves, the Commissary of the brigade or regiment, accompanied by an officer of the Quarter Master General’s department, or if there should be none with that division of troops, by the quarter master of a regiment, and if possible by the magistrate of the place, or the occupier of the ground, or by some inhabitant of the country, is to proceed to value the field, and to estimate the number of rations of forage it contains. Having done this, the Commissary is to allot the field in its due proportions to the Quarter Masters of the different regiments to be supplied with forage from it ; parties of fatigue from those regiments, under the command of an officer, are to proceed and cut and carry away the forage thus allotted to them. For all green forage required, the usual receipts must be given.

6. The Commissary of each division, brigade, or regiment, on his arrival in any place near which he understands the troops to which he is attached are to halt more than one night, must take immediate and effectual measures to ascertain the number of ovens in the neighbourhood : and if they should be insufficient to supply the troops to which he is attached with bread, he will take care that a sufficient number are built forthwith.

8. No man of the brigades in huts must be allowed to quit the lines of his regiment without being dressed with his side arms, according to the orders of his regiment.’

ample evidence in my orderly books, not a post or a courier comes in, not an Officer arrives from the rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march, having been sick, or having straggled from their regiments, or who have been left in hospitals.

We have a provost marshal, and no less than 4 assistants. I never allow a man to march with the baggage. I never leave an hospital without a number of Officers and non-commissioned Officers proportionable to the number of soldiers; and never allow a detachment to march, unless under the command of an Officer; and yet there is not an outrage of any description, which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet, for one moment, suffered the slightest want, or the smallest privation.

In the first place, I am convinced that the law is not strong enough to maintain discipline in an army upon service.

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There is another branch of this subject which deserves serious consideration. We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies must depend upon the diligence of the regimental Officers, particularly the Subalterns. I may order what I please; but if they do not execute what I order, or if they execute with negligence, I cannot expect that British soldiers will be orderly or regular.

There are two incitements to men of this description to do their duty as they ought—the fear of punishment, and the hope of reward. As for the first, it cannot be given individually; for I believe I should find it very difficult to convict any Officer of doing this description of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to be tried by others probably guilty of the same offence. But these evils of which I complain are committed by whole corps; and the only way in which they can be punished is by disgracing them, by sending them into garrison and reporting them to His Majesty. I may and shall do this by one or two battalions, but I cannot venture to do it by more; and then there is an end to the fear of this punishment, even if those who received it were considered in England as disgraced persons rather than martyrs.

As for the other incitement to Officers to do their duty zealously, there is no such thing. We who command the armies of the country, and who are expected to make exertions greater than those made by the French armies,—to march, to fight, and to keep our troops in health and in discipline,—have not the power of rewarding, or promising a reward for a single Officer of the army; and we deceive ourselves, and those who are placed under us, if we imagine we have that power, or if we hold out to them that they shall derive any advantage from the exertion of it in their favor.

You will say, probably, in answer to all this, that British armies have been in the field before, and that these complaints, at least to the same extent, have not existed; to which I answer—first, that the armies are now larger, their operations more extended, and the exertions required greater than they were in former periods; and that the mode of carrying on war is different from what it was. Secondly, that our law, instead of being strong in proportion to the temptation and means for indiscipline and irregularity,



has been weakened; and that we have not adopted the additional means of restraint and punishment practised by other nations, and our enemies, although we have imitated them in those particulars which have increased and aggravated our irregularities. And, finally, that it is only within late years that the Commanders in Chief abroad have been deprived of all patronage, and of course of all power of incitement to the Officers under their command. It may be supposed that I wish for this patronage to gratify my own favorites; but I declare most solemnly that, if I had it tomorrow, there is not a soul in the army whom I should wish to promote, excepting for services performed.

I have thought it proper to draw your attention to these subjects, which I assure you deserve the serious consideration of the King's Ministers. We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight; but we are worse than an enemy in a country; and take my word for it, that either defeat or success would dissolve us.'

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286.

To Lieut. Col. Gordon.

Abrantes, 22nd June, 1809.

'I trouble you with these papers, not because I am apprehensive that the Commander in Chief, or the head of the Medical Department in England, should listen to the reports of an inferior Officer to the prejudice of his superior. If we are fit to be trusted with the charge with which we are invested, our characters are not to be injured by defamatory reports of this description. But I am aware that there are not wanting in England channels for circulating defamation of this kind; and I am desirous of laying before the Commander in Chief, in the most authentic form, the original complaint, and the real state of the case as it was found to be upon inquiry.'

G. O.

Abrantes, 18th June, 1809.

'2. The Commander of the Forces is concerned, from reports which have been lately made to him of the practice of some of the regiments in the army, to be obliged to desire the captains of companies to inspect the arms, ammunition, and flints, in possession of the soldiers of their companies at every parade with arms, and particularly on the march, which takes place on the morning of a march.'

G. O.

Abrantes, 20th June, 1809.

'1. When the troops march with a route, it must be invariably specified, in the route, where they are to get provisions; and they are to receive provisions according to what is stated in the route. The Commissaries attached to brigades and regiments of cavalry, must not issue provisions to troops marching with a route, unless it is specified in the route that they are to do so.

2. As the supply of cattle is not now plenty, all the troops in the huts, and towns of Abrantes and Punhete, and the neighbouring cantonments, will be supplied with salt meat for a few days.'

G. O.

Abrantes, 24th June, 1809.

'1. The frequent irregularities which occur on the march of detachments of convalescents, or recruits to join their regiments with the army, render it necessary to publish the following regulations:—

2. All detachments must march by a route from the Quarter Master General's department, in which will be named the places at which such detachments will receive provisions, and from whom.

3. The commanding officer of each detachment on its march must take care to send forward notice to the person from whom the provisions are to be received, of the arrival of the detachment, and of its strength.

287.

To Major General Mackenzie.

Abrantes, 25th June, 1809.

'I have received your letter of the 23rd. I beg that you will let Mr. Downie know that I am perfectly satisfied with the activity with which he has done his duty, and sensible of the advantage, in a military point of view, which I have derived from his late reconnoissance into the vale of Plascencia.

My objection to his conduct was founded upon his own report, written in pencil on the letter from Colonel Grant, upon the military principle, that the only proper place for any military Officer was that to which he was ordered. However, I am not irreconcilable upon this or any other subject; and I am quite convinced that Mr. Downie did what he thought best for the service, and that a gentleman who feels a censure so sorely will take care not to incur the risk of receiving another.'

288.

To Marshal Beresford.

Abrantes, 27th June, 1809.

'Having received his answers upon these subjects, you ought to publish an order to forbid any Officer to make a report to any superior authority, excepting through the medium of his immediate Commanding Officer; and you ought to point out the variations, the inconsistencies, and the falsehoods in the report made by ———, as the cause of the order at that moment. I think that by these means you will give a check to the propensity of these gentlemen to endeavor to acquire popularity at your expense, by trick and falsehood. I would insert in this order, or in the correspondence, no severity or asperity, only a plain and short abstract of the facts.'

4. It is to be understood that when two or more days' provisions are issued to the troops, they are not to receive, at the same time, two or more days' wine. It has already been frequently explained in Orders, that wine forms no part of the soldier's ration; it will be delivered to them when it can be procured, and when it cannot, they must go without it.

5. When a detachment will move, the soldiers must be formed into divisions, and officers and non-commissioned officers must be posted to each division.

The orders of the 29th May must be particularly attended to by the officers posted to divisions; and they must exert themselves to prevent the repetition of the complaints which are so disgraceful to the army.

6. A detachment must universally march at day light in the morning; the officers and non-commissioned officers must march with the divisions, to which they are posted, and must prevent the soldiers falling out of the ranks or straggling. The detachments must march at the rate of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles an hour; one halt must be made for 5 or 10 minutes at the end of every  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hour.

7. Officers commanding detachments are to report their progress to Head Quarters by every opportunity.'

G. O.

Abrantes, 26th June, 1809.

'1. The Commander of the Forces desires that the troops should always march at day light, in order that they may reach the ground at as early an hour as may be practicable; he is also desirous that they should hut every day; and it is to be understood that they are to hut invariably where there is wood conveniently situated, in reference to water. This wood, however, must not be olive trees, or other valuable fruit trees.

2. The Order (No. 5 of the 3rd May) in respect to men taken sick on the march, referring to the Order (No. 11 of the 24th April) by the late Commander of the Forces, is countermanded. The Commander of the Forces being convinced, that from circumstances, it is impossible to carry it into execution.

3. In future, the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades will direct, that men taken sick upon a march, may be carried on till orders will be given for forming a general or brigade hospital.'



To Viscount Castlereagh.

Castello Branco, 30th June, 1809.

‘The mischief of these returns is that they never convey an accurate notion of the strength of the army. According to your account I have 35,000 men; according to my own, I have only 18,000; and the public will not be satisfied either with you or me, if I do not effect all that 35,000 men are expected to do. Including Officers, who ought to be counted, I make no doubt that I shall have before long more than 35,000 men; but from all these returns a deduction of 10 in the 100 ought always to be made for sick, and then you may come nearly to the mark.’

G. O.

Castello Branco, 1st July, 1810.

‘2. Great care must be taken when rye is given to the horses that they are not watered 2 hours before, or 2 hours after they are fed; the same rule should be observed when they are fed with Indian corn or barley.’

G. O.

Zarza la Mayor, 4th July, 1809.

‘1. The Assistant Adjutant Generals, and Brigade Majors of those divisions and brigades stationed in the neighbourhood of Head Quarters, must attend at the Adjutant General’s Office for orders, at 10 o’clock precisely.

2. The Brigade Majors will attend at the Assistant Adjutant Generals of divisions to receive the division orders, at half-past 11 o’clock, and at 1 the Brigade Majors must give out the orders to the adjutants of regiments, which must be given out to troops and companies, and read to the soldiers at evening parades.

3. In case circumstances should prevent the Brigade Majors from issuing the General Orders to the adjutants of regiments before 3 o’clock on any halting day, they are to receive and issue on that day only the orders requiring immediate execution, of which the General Officers commanding brigades are to make the selection, and on the following day the other orders of General Regulations.

4. All orders received by the adjutants of regiments must at the first parade, or earlier if necessary, be read to the troops.

5. On marching days the Assistant Adjutant Generals, and Brigade Majors stationed near Head Quarters will attend at the Adjutant General’s Office for orders, as soon as the troops reach their ground.

6. All orders requiring immediate execution issued on marching days must be given to the adjutants, and read to the troops as soon as possible.

7. The General Orders will be sent from Head Quarters to divisions at a distance by the first opportunity; those requiring immediate execution must be issued and read to the troops as soon as received; the others, if not received by the general officer of the division before 2 P.M. are not to be issued till the following day.

8. The Assistant Adjutant Generals, or the Brigade Major of the division or brigade at a distance to which the General Orders will have been sent, must send to the Adjutant General by the first opportunity a receipt for the orders received, specifying the numbers of each day.

9. When pass orders will be sent, directions will be written on the back of them, stating whether they are to be circulated by the person who has carried them from Head Quarters, or to the officers respectively to whom they will have been addressed.

10. Every officer to whom they are addressed must sign his name on the paper on receiving them, and insert the hour of the day at which they reached him.

11. As pass orders invariably must require immediate execution, they must be issued and read to the troops without loss of time.

12. The numberless mistakes which have occurred, and the many instances of neglect and disobedience of orders issued referring to the health, subsistence, or the convenience of the troops, render it necessary not only to observe the early circulation of orders, but if possible, obedience to them and their early and prompt execution.

13. The obedience to orders of General Regulations must depend upon the attention of General Officers commanding brigades, and commanding officers of regiments, and their determination to enforce regularity and discipline; but obedience to them requiring execution can be secured by other means.

14. Accordingly the Commander of the Forces desires that officers commanding regiments shall report to the General Officer commanding the brigade, that the General Orders requiring the performance of any duty, or the execution of any arrangement have been obeyed.

15. The General Officers commanding divisions and brigades will take care to notify to the troops, to what day they have received bread upon every issue

## 290.

To Lieut. Colonel Roche.

Plasencia, 8th July, 1809.

' I beg that you will tell General O'Donju that I have no apprehensions for Portugal. Braganza must be plundered, and that we cannot help ; but I have taken measures to prevent any serious impression being made upon Portugal. I think, however, that the corps under Colonel Guipé may be destined to pass through the Puerto de Perales or the Puerto de Baños, to endeavor to ascertain what is going on in this quarter. The latter will be occupied on the 11th instant ; but it is very desirable that some measures should be taken to occupy the Puerto de Perales, from whence the enemy could equally and most effectually annoy my communications with Portugal.'

## 291.

To Lieut. General Sherbrooke.

Plasencia, 15th July, 1809.

' I am not astonished that you and the General Officers should feel indignant at the neglect and incapacity of some of the Officers of the Commis-

17. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of General Officers commanding divisions and brigades to the General Orders of the 4th and 5th March, by the late Commander of the Forces, relative to the use of the mules allowed for carrying camp kettles, in any service excepting the carriage of camp kettles.

18. The consequence of loading them with other baggage is, that they are unequal to carry the kettles which they are given to convey, and the loads are so ill put on that they fall from the mules, and the camp kettles do not arrive from the march till after the hour at which they ought to be used by the troops.

20. General, staff, and other officers are requested to put their names on the doors of the houses in which they are quartered.'

G. O.

Zarza la Mayor, 5th July, 1809.

' 1. The Commander of the Forces desires that it may be considered as a standing order, that the troops are not to quit the lines, unless dressed according to the orders of their regiment, with their side arms ; excepting when on fatigue duty, in which case they must be in charge of an officer, or non-commissioned officer, according to their numbers.'

G. O.

Plasencia, 9th July, 1809.

' 1. All the officers belonging to regiments which are in huts must be encamped with the men, excepting those whose health requires that they should remain in houses : applications for quarters for those officers must be made through the General Officer commanding the brigade, to the officer of the Quarter Master General's department with the division, or with head quarters.

2. The officer of the Quarter Master General's department with divisions, must quarter the General Officers and their staff as near to their divisions and brigades as possible.

4. As commissaries have been appointed to supply all and every part of the army, to whom every individual, entitled to provisions and forage, can apply for what he requires, no application, excepting by the commissaries, must be made by any officer, or soldier, or other persons attached to the army, to the magistrates of the country for any article whatever.'

A. G. O.

Plasencia, 9th July, 1809.

' The Commander of the Forces having arranged with the magistrates of the different districts and towns in Spain, that the officers, and others belonging to the army, are to be furnished with what they require, at the market prices of each place where they may be quartered, makes known to the troops, that the magistrates will cause to be put up, in the square or market place of each town or village, a list of the various articles of provisions, &c. &c. with their prices annexed to them ; and in case any of the inhabitants should demand a higher price than that fixed, the soldiers are to complain to their officers, stating what inhabitants attempted to impose upon them, and the commanding officer of the regiment is to make known the soldier's complaint to the magistrates of the town, who will take proper measures on the occasion. The soldiers are not, however, to attempt to take things by force, or on their own terms, under pretence that large prices have been demanded from them.

Heads of departments, and persons attached to Head Quarters, in addition to putting up their names on the doors of their quarters, will always, on their arrival in a new quarter, immediately send their addresses to the Adjutant General, and to the commandant at Head Quarters.'



sariat, by which we have suffered and, are still suffering so much ; but what I have to observe, and wish to impress upon you, is, that they are gentlemen appointed to their office by the King's authority, although not holding his commission ; and that it would be infinitely better, and more proper, if all neglects and faults of theirs were reported to me, by whom they can be dismissed, rather than that they should be abused by the General Officers of the army. Indeed, it cannot be expected that they will bear the kind of abuse they have received, however well deserved we may deem it to be ; and they will either resign their situations, and put the army to still greater inconvenience, or complain to higher authorities, and thereby draw those who abuse them into discussions, which will take up, hereafter, much of their time and attention.

I do not enter into the grounds you had for being displeased with Mr. ———, which I dare say were very sufficient, but I only desire that, in all these cases, punishment may be left to me, who alone can have the power of inflicting it.'

## 292.

To Major General Mackenzie.

Plasencia, 16th July, 1809.

'But supposing he was struck by the Officer, as it appears he was by the serjeant, it is no justification for the crime of the greatest magnitude that a soldier can commit, and committed, I observe, in this instance, after previous repeated threats. A soldier has modes of redress for violence committed upon him by his Officer, without threats and blows ; and the General Court Martial cannot intend, by their sentence, to give currency and sanction to an opinion that a soldier can be justified, by any circumstances, in threatening and striking his Officer.

I am the more anxious that the General Court Martial should revise their sentence upon this occasion, because I am concerned to state that several instances have occurred lately of soldiers having struck Officers and non-commissioned officers in the execution of their duty.'

## 293.

To Marshal Beresford.

Plasencia, 17th July, 1809.

'I asked Cuesta to secure for me the passes of Baños and Perales, and he has occupied the former, but has left the latter to be occupied by the Duque del Parque. I wish that you would send somebody to see how the pass is occupied, and that, at all events, you should have an eye to that pass. It will make me quite secure, and will render me the greatest service that in their present situation the Portuguese troops could render. I do not think that the French would like to venture through that pass in the existing situation of their affairs. The bridges of Alcantara and Almaraz being irreparable, they would be in a *cul de sac*, and would have no *exit*, excepting through a desert on the frontier of Portugal.'

G. O.

Oropesa, 20th July, 1809.

'The Commander of the Forces wishes that the corps should be as strong as possible, and that no man should be left with baggage whom it is not absolutely necessary to leave in care of it.

The men's arms to be particularly examined this afternoon by the officers ; every man must

294.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

Talavera de la Reyna, 24th July, 1809.

‘I certainly lament the necessity which obliges me to halt at present, and will oblige me to withdraw from Spain, if it should continue. There is no man that does not acknowledge, even General Cuesta himself acknowledges, the justice and propriety of my conduct in halting now, or in eventually withdrawing; and I can only say, that I have never seen an army so ill-treated in any country, or, considering that all depends upon its operations, one which deserved good treatment so much.

It is ridiculous to pretend that the country cannot supply our wants. The French army is well fed, and the soldiers who are taken in good health, and well supplied with bread, of which indeed they left a small magazine behind them. This is a rich country in corn, in comparison with Portugal, and yet, during the whole of my operations in that country, we never wanted bread but on one day on the frontiers of Galicia. In the Vera de Plasencia there are means to supply this army for 4 months, as I am informed, and yet the alcaldes have not performed their engagements with me. The Spanish army has plenty of every thing, and we alone, upon whom every thing depends, are actually starving.

I am aware of the important consequences which must attend the step which I shall take in withdrawing from Spain. It is certain that the people of England will never hear of another army entering Spain after they shall have received the accounts of the treatment we have met with; and it is equally certain that without the assistance, the example, and the countenance of a British army, the Spanish armies, however brave, will never effect their object. But no man can see his army perish by want without feeling for them, and most particularly must he feel for them when he knows that they have been brought into the country in which this want is felt by his own act, and on his own responsibility, and not by orders from any superior authority. I shall be obliged to you if you will make known to the Government my sentiments upon this subject.’

295.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Talavera de la Reyna, 24th July, 1809.

‘Within these two days I have had still more reason for adhering to my determination to enter into no new operation, but rather to halt, and even to

must have a good flint, and the dust must be well cleaned from the locks and touch-holes. The Commander of the Forces desires that the unmilitary practice of firing in the neighbourhood of the lines may be discontinued by the troops.

The commissaries must give receipts or pay for whatever they may receive from the inhabitants of the country. The time of the Commander of the Forces yesterday was occupied in hearing complaints of the commissaries having taken different articles of provisions without giving receipts for them, and he trusts that he shall have no further ground for noticing this disobedience of orders.’

G. O.

Oropesa, 21st July, 1809.

‘The Commander of the Forces desires that mules, which bring the provisions may be allowed to go away as soon as the provisions shall be delivered, and those who bring them will have got their receipts: the most serious inconvenience has already resulted from the detention of those mules.’

G. O.

Talavera de la Reyna, 22nd July, 1809.

‘One third of each regiment to remain accoutred in their lines, and the whole must be on the alert.

Officers commanding regiments are to keep their officers with their companies.’

T



return to Portugal, if I should not be supplied as I ought; as, notwithstanding His Majesty's troops have been engaged in very active operations, the success of which depended no less upon their bravery and exertions than upon the example they should hold out and the countenance they should give to the Spanish troops, they have been in actual want of provisions for these last 2 days; and even if I should have been willing, under such circumstances, to continue my co-operation with General Cuesta, I am unable to do so with any justice to the troops. General Cuesta is, I believe, fully sensible of the propriety of my determination, and I understand that he has urged the Central Junta to adopt vigorous measures to have our wants supplied. It is certain that at the present moment the people of this part of Spain are either unable or unwilling to supply them; and in either case, and till I am supplied, I do not think it proper, and indeed I cannot, continue my operations in Spain.

I ought probably to have stipulated that I should be supplied with the necessary means of transport before the army entered Spain. I did require and adopted the measures necessary to procure these means, which I conceived would have answered, considering the large supplies of the same kind which the army under the command of the late Sir J. Moore had procured; and as I could not engage to enter upon any operations in Spain which should not be consistent with the defence of Portugal, I did not think it proper to make any stipulation for the advantage of the troops, which stipulation after all did not appear necessary, in order to enable me to procure what I wanted.'

## 296.

To Viscount Castlereagh,

Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809.

'General Cuesta followed the enemy's march with his army from the Alberche, on the morning of the 24th, as far as Sta Olalla, and pushed for-

G. O.

Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809.

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the officers and troops, for their gallant conduct in the two trying days of yesterday and the day before, in which they have been engaged with, and beaten off the repeated attacks of, an army infinitely superior in number.

He has particularly to request that Lieut. General Sherbrooke will accept his thanks for the assistance he has received from him, as well as from the manner in which he led on the infantry under his command to the charge of the bayonet. Major General Hill and Brig. General Alex. Campbell are likewise entitled in a particular manner to the acknowledgments of the Commander of the Forces, for their gallantry and ability with which they maintained their posts against the attacks made upon them by the enemy.

The Commander of the Forces has likewise to acknowledge the ability with which the late Major General Mackenzie (whose subsequent loss the Commander of the Forces laments) withdrew the division under his command from the out-posts, in front of the enemy's army, on the 27th instant; as well as to Colonel Donkin for his conduct on that occasion.

The Commander of the Forces likewise considers Lieut. General Payne and the cavalry, particularly Brig. General Anson and his brigade, who was principally engaged with the enemy, to be entitled to his acknowledgments; as well as Brig. General Howorth and his artillery, Major General Tilson, Brig. General R. Stewart, Brig. General Cameron, and the brigades under their commands, respectively.

He had opportunities of noticing the gallantry and discipline of the 5th batt. 60th, and the 45th, on the 27th; and of the 29th and 1st batt. 48th on that night; and on the 28th, of the 7th and 53rd; and he requests their commanding officers, Major Davy, Colonel Guard, Colonel White, Colonel Donellan, Lieut. Colonel Sir W. Myers, and Lieut. Colonel Bingham, to accept his particular thanks.

The charge made by the brigade of Guards under the command of Brig. General H. Campbell,

ward his advanced guard as far as Torrijos. For the reasons stated to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 24th, I moved only two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry across the Alberche to Cazalegas, under the command of Lieut. General Sherbrooke, with a view to keep up the communication between General Cuesta and me, and with Sir R. Wilson's corps at Escalona.

It appears that General Venegas had not carried into execution that part of the plan of operations which related to his corps, and that he was still at Daymiel, in La Mancha; and the enemy, in the course of the 24th, 25th, and 26th, collected all his forces in this part of Spain, between Torrijos and Toledo, leaving but a small corps of 2000 men in that place. This united army thus consisted of the corps of Marshal Victor, of that of General Sebastiani, and of 7000 or 8000 men, the guards of Joseph Buonaparte, and the garrison of Madrid; and it was commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, aided by Marshals Jourdan and Victor, and by General Sebastiani.

On the 26th, General Cuesta's advanced guard was attacked near Torrijos and obliged to fall back; and the General retired with his army on that day to the left bank of the Alberche, General Sherbrooke continuing at Cazalegas, and the enemy at Sta Olalla. It was then obvious that the enemy intended to try the result of a general action, for which the best position appeared to be in the neighbourhood of Talavera; and General Cuesta having consented to take up this position on the morning of the 27th, I ordered General Sherbrooke to retire with his corps to its station in the line, leaving General Mackenzie with a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry as an advanced post in the wood, on the right of the Alberche, which covered our left flank.

The position taken up by the troops at Talavera extended rather more than 2 miles: the ground was open upon the left, where the British army was stationed, and it was commanded by a height, on which was placed *en échelon*, as the second line, a division of infantry under the orders of Major General Hill.

There was a valley between the height and a range of mountains still farther upon the left, which valley was not at first occupied, as it was commanded by the height before mentioned; and the range of mountains appeared too distant to have any influence on the expected action.

The right, consisting of Spanish troops, extended immediately in front of the town of Talavera, down to the Tagus. This part of the ground was covered by olive trees, and much intersected by banks and ditches. The

Campbell, on the enemy's attacking column, was a most gallant one; and the mode in which it was afterwards covered by the 1st batt. 45th was most highly creditable to the most excellent corps, and to their commanding officer, Major Middlemore. The Commander of the Forces requests Colonel Fletcher, the chief engineer, Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart, Adjutant General, Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General, and the officers of those departments respectively, and Lieut. Colonel Bathurst and those of his personal staff, will accept his thanks for the assistance he received from them throughout these trying days.'

G. P. O.

Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809.

'The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of officers commanding brigades and regiments to prevent the practice of the soldiers firing off their muskets in camp; such men, whose arms cannot be drawn, must be regularly paraded, and their firelocks discharged at the same time.'



I have particularly to lament the loss of Major General Mackenzie, who had distinguished himself on the 27th, and of Brig. General Langwerth, of the King's German Legion, and of Brigade Major Beckett, of the Guards.

Your Lordship will observe that the attacks of the enemy were principally, if not entirely, directed against the British troops. The Spanish Commander in Chief, his Officers and troops, manifested every disposition to render us assistance, and those of them who were engaged did their duty; but the ground which they occupied was so important, and its front at the same time so difficult, that I did not think it proper to urge them to make any movement on the left of the enemy while he was engaged with us.

I have reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the Officers and troops. I am much indebted to Lieut. General Sherbrooke for the assistance I received from him, and for the manner in which he led on his division to the charge with bayonets; to Lieut. General Payne and the cavalry, particularly Brig. General Anson's brigade; to Major Generals Hill and Tilson, Brig. Generals Alex. Campbell, R. Stewart, and Cameron, and to the divisions and brigades of infantry under their command respectively; particularly to the 29th regt., commanded by Colonel White; to the 1st batt. 48th, commanded by Colonel Donellan; afterwards when that Officer was wounded, by Major Middlemore; to the 2nd batt. 7th, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Sir W. Myers; to the 2nd batt. 53rd, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Bingham; to the 97th, commanded by Colonel Lyon; to the 1st batt. of detachments, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Bunbury; to the 2nd batt. 30th, commanded by Major Watson; the 45th, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Guard; and to the 5th batt. 60th, commanded by Major Davy.

The advance of the brigade of Guards was most gallantly conducted by Brig. General H. Campbell; and, when necessary, that brigade retired and formed again in the best order.

The artillery, under Brig. General Howorth, was also throughout these days of the greatest service; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the assistance I received from the Chief Engineer, Lieut. Colonel Fletcher; the Adjutant General, Brig. General the Hon. C. Stewart; the Quarter Master General, Colonel Murray; and the Officers of those departments respectively; and from Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, and the Officers of my personal Staff.

I also received much assistance from Colonel O'Lawlor, of the Spanish service, and from Brig. General Whittingham, who was wounded in bringing up the two Spanish battalions to the assistance of Brig. General Alex. Campbell.

MEMORANDUM UPON THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

'The position was well calculated for the troops which were to occupy it. The ground in front of the British army was open, that in front of the Spanish army covered with olive trees, intersected by roads, ditches, &c. The Spanish infantry was posted behind the bank of the road leading from Talavera to the left of the position.

The German Legion were on the left of the position in the first line. I had intended this part for the Guards; but I was unfortunately out, employed in bringing in General Mackenzie's advanced guard, when the troops took up their ground. The 5th and 7th battalions of the Legion did not stand their ground on the evening, and in the beginning of the night of the 27th, which was the cause of the momentary loss of the height in the second line.

General Sherbrooke moved his division, which was the left of the first line, to support General Hill's attack, in order to regain the height; and it was difficult to resume in the night the exact position which had been first marked out; and in fact, on account of these circumstances, we had not that precise position till after the enemy's attack upon the height at daylight in the morning had been repulsed.

The advance of the Guards to the extent to which it was carried was nearly fatal to us, and the battle was certainly saved by the advance, position, and steady conduct of the 48th regt., upon which General Sherbrooke's division formed again.

The ground in front of the Spanish troops would not have been unfavorable to an attack upon the enemy's flank, while they were engaged with us, as there were broad roads leading from Talavera and different points of their position, in a direct line to the front, as well as diagonally to the left. But the Spanish troops are not in a state of discipline to attempt a manœuvre in olive grounds, &c., and if they had got into confusion all would have been lost.'

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298.

To Major General O'Donaju.

Talavera de la Reyna, 31st July, 1809.

'Adverting to the intelligence which has been received of the movements of a French corps towards the Puerto de Baños, I cannot avoid requesting that you would press his Excellency General Cuesta to detach towards that quarter, on this night, a division of his infantry with its guns, and a Commanding Officer upon whose exertions and abilities he can rely.

I certainly never should have advanced so far, if I had not had reason to believe that that point was secure; and I still think that the movements of General Beresford with the Portuguese army on the frontier, or that of the Duque del Parque from Ciudad Rodrigo, combined with the natural difficulties of the country, and the defence by the Marques de la Reyna, may delay the enemy's advance till the arrival of this division.

At all events this division will not be missed here, and it will be in a situation to observe the enemy, if he should have crossed the mountains before the arrival of the division. But if the division should arrive in time, it will perform a most important service to the common cause, as it will preclude the necessity of my adopting more effectual measures to re-establish and secure my communication with Portugal, which measures must tend to delay the execution of all our plans against the great body of the enemy.

P. S. I have to observe that his Excellency is equally interested with me in preventing this irruption into Plasencia, as the enemy's first step will certainly be to interrupt his Excellency's communication with Seville by the bridge of Almaraz.'

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298.

To Major General O'Donaju.

Talavera de la Reyna, 31st July, 1809.

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299.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

Talavera de la Reyna, 31st July, 1809.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to him if he will understand that I have no authority, nay, that I have been directed not to correspond with any of the Spanish ministers ; and I request that he will in future convey to me through you the commands which he may have for me. I am convinced that I shall then avoid the injurious and uncandid misrepresentations of what passes, which Don M. de Garay has more than once sent to me, apparently with a view of placing on the records of his Government statements of my actions and conduct which are entirely inconsistent with the truth, and to which statements I have no regular means of replying.

As soon as my line of march into Spain was determined upon, which you and Don M. de Garay are aware was not till a very late period, I sent to procure means of transport and other supplies at the places in which I considered it most likely I should get them, namely, Plasencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Gata, Bejar, &c. ; and as soon as I found that I had failed, I wrote to General O’Donoju, on the 16th July, a letter, of which you have, and of which I know the Government have, a copy, in which I told him that, as I had not received the assistance I required, I could undertake for no more than the first operation, which I had settled with General Cuesta in my interview with him on the 11th. It is therefore an unfounded assertion that the first account that the Government received of my intentions not to undertake any new operations was when they heard that I had left General Cuesta alone to pursue the enemy.

The statement is not true, for, although I disapproved of General Cuesta’s advance of the 24th and 25th, which I knew would end as it did, I did support it with two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, which covered his retreat to the Alberche on the 26th, and his passage of that river on the 27th : and supposing the assertion to have been true, and that General Cuesta was exposed to be attacked by the enemy when alone, it was his fault and not mine ; and I had given him fair notice, not only by my letter of the 16th July, but frequently afterwards, that I could do no more.

It is not a difficult matter for a gentleman in the situation of Don M. de Garay to sit down in his cabinet and write his ideas of the glory which would result from driving the French through the Pyrenees ; and I believe there is no man in Spain who has risked so much, or who has sacrificed so much, to effect that object as I have.

But I wish that Don M. de Garay, or the gentlemen of the Junta, before they blame me for not doing more, or impute to me beforehand the probable consequences of the blunders, or the indiscretion of others, would either come or send here somebody to satisfy the wants of our half starved army, which, although they have been engaged for two days, and have defeated twice their numbers, in the service of Spain, have not bread to eat. It is positively a fact that, during the last 7 days, the British army have not received one third of their provisions ; that at this moment there are nearly 4000 wounded soldiers dying in the hospital in this town from want of common assistance and necessaries, which any other country in the world would have given even to its enemies ; and that I can get no assistance of any description from the country. I cannot prevail upon them even to bury the

dead carcasses in the neighbourhood, the stench of which will destroy themselves as well as us.

I cannot avoid feeling these circumstances; and the Junta must see that, unless they and the country make a great exertion to support and supply the armies, to which the invariable attention and the exertion of every man and the labor of every beast in the country ought to be directed, the bravery of the soldiers, their losses and their success, will only make matters worse and increase our embarrassment and distress.

I positively will not move, nay, more, I will disperse my army, till I am supplied with provisions and means of transport as I ought to be.'

## 300.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Talavera de la Reyna, 1st Aug. 1809.

'On the 30th we received intelligence that provisions had been ordered for a French corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, on the road from Alba de Tormes towards Bejar, in the Puerto de Baños, which affords the best road through the range of mountains which separates Plasencia and Estremadura from Castille. I had hoped that this pass had been effectually secured by the Spanish troops, otherwise I certainly should not have moved from Plasencia; and I had taken the further precaution to secure that point, as well as the frontier of Portugal, by directing Marshal Beresford to assemble the Portuguese army in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, within the Spanish frontier.

I am apprehensive, however, that the Marshal, although he was at Ciudad Rodrigo, had not been able to collect his troops in time; and as I cannot prevail upon General Cuesta to detach a sufficient force to secure that important point, I am apprehensive that this French corps will pass through the mountains into Estremadura in our rear.

These circumstances, combined with the extreme fatigue of the troops, the want of provisions, and the number of wounded to be taken care of, have prevented me from moving from my position.'

## 301.

To the Right Hon. J. H. Frere.

Oropesa, 3rd Aug. 1809.

'Notwithstanding the anxiety which I felt, the pains which I took, and the assurances which were given to me respecting the security of the Puerto de Baños, General Cuesta received intelligence yesterday morning, that the French corps which had threatened that point had passed through unopposed, and had entered Plasencia on the 1st, at about 2 o'clock.

G. O.

Talavera de la Reyna, 2nd Aug. 1809.

'2. The soldiers plunder the inhabitants bringing in provisions, notwithstanding the repeated orders given upon the subject, and the knowledge which they all have that this practice must tend to their own distress.

3. The Commander of the Forces desires that particular attention may be paid to former orders, requiring that no soldier should quit his lines, excepting on fatigue, in charge of an officer or non-commissioned officer, unless he is dressed according to the standing orders of his regiment with side-arms.

The rolls must be called in camp every 2 hours, and commanding officers of brigades will give directions what proportion of officers of each regiment are to be present. The provost and his assistants must patrol the neighbourhood of the camp constantly, and the assistants must relieve each other.'



I had at last prevailed upon the General to detach a sufficient corps to defend the Puerto, which marched yesterday morning; but after the evil was done, he became equally sensible with myself of the important advantage which had been gained by the enemy, and he came to me to propose that half of the army should march immediately to set the matter right again. I told him that if by half of the army he meant half of the Spanish and English corps, I could not consent to the proposal, and that I would either stay or go with my whole corps. He then desired that I would choose, and I offered to go.

My reason for this preference is, that I think that I shall effect the operation, probably without contest, in a shorter time than he could, and with much more certainty; and that I can bring to bear upon this point, not only all the Spanish troops in the neighbourhood, but the Portuguese army, which are collected not far from Ciudad Rodrigo.'

## 302.

To the Duke of Richmond.

Deleytosa, 8th Aug. 1809.

' Since I wrote to you last, the enemy have introduced a large corps, supposed to be 30,000 men, into our rear by Baños and Plasencia; in consequence of which, and of a train of mismanagement by the Spaniards, we have been obliged to withdraw, and to take up the defensive line of the Tagus. I have desired Lord Castlereagh to send you a copy of my dispatch and its enclosures, if he should not publish it, which will make you acquainted with every thing. We were in a bad scrape, from which I think I have extricated both armies; and I really believe that, if I had not determined to retire at the moment I did, all retreat would have been cut off for both.'

## 303.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Deleytosa, 8th Aug. 1809.

' I apprised your Lordship on the 1st instant of the advance of a French corps towards the Puerto de Baños, and of the probable embarrassment of the operations of the army, which its arrival at Plasencia would occasion; and these embarrassments having since existed to a degree so considerable as to oblige us to fall back, and to take up a defensive position on the Tagus, I am induced to trouble you more at length with an account of what has passed upon this subject.

When I entered Spain, I had a communication with General Cuesta, through Sir R. Wilson and Colonel Roche, respecting the occupation of the Puerto de Baños, and the Puerto de Perales; the former of which it was at last settled should be held by a corps to be formed under the Marques de la Reyna, to consist of 2 battalions from General Cuesta's army, and 2 from Bejar; and that the Puerto de Perales was to be taken care of by the Duque del Parque, by detachments from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. I doubted the capacity of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to make the detachment to the latter, but so little as to the effectual occupation of the former, that in writing to Marshal Beresford on the 17th July, on this subject, I desired him to look to the Puerto de Perales, but that I considered Baños secure, as appears by the extract of my letter, which I enclose.'

## 304.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Deleytosa, 8th Aug. 1809.

' I have but little to add to my public dispatch of this date, which I hope will justify me from all blame in the eyes of His Majesty's Ministers, excepting that of having trusted the Spanish General in any thing. We should have been safe, if I could have prevailed upon him to occupy Baños, as it ought to have been; and we should have avoided the disgrace of the loss of the hospital, if he had sent away General Bassecourt on the night of the 30th or on the morning of the 31st, or if he had maintained his post at Talavera.

As it is, I really believe that I have saved the whole of both armies, by determining to retire to Arzobispo, and taking up the line of the Tagus, as soon as I found the enemy at Navalmoral, and that General Cuesta had irrevocably quitted Talavera.

We have now in Estremadura the whole host of Marshals, Soult, Ney, Mortier, Kellermann, Victor, and Sebastiani, and the King and 5000 men from Suchet.'

## 305.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Deleytosa, 8th Aug. 1809.

' These measures are equally necessary for the Spanish and the British armies. No troops can serve to any good purpose unless they are regularly fed; and it is an error to suppose that a Spaniard, or a man or animal of any country, can make an exertion without food. In fact, the Spanish troops are more clamorous for their food, and more exhausted if they do not receive it regularly, than our own are.

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The plan of operation which I should recommend for the Spanish nation is one generally of defence. They should avoid general actions, but should take advantage of the strong points in their country to defend themselves and to harass the enemy.'

## 306.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Deleytosa, 8th Aug. 1809.

' I am happy to find that the Junta have taken measures to supply the armies. Your Lordship will receive my sentiments, upon the permanent arrangements to be adopted for this purpose, by the courier who will deliver this letter. In the mean time I must inform your Excellency, that if the Government have not already made great exertions to supply us, and if we do not experience the immediate effects of these exertions, by receiving a plentiful supply of provisions and forage, we must move away in as many detachments as there are roads from hence to the frontiers of Portugal. I assure your Excellency that, since the 3rd, the army has had no bread till yesterday, when about 4000 lbs. of biscuit were divided among 30,000 mouths.

The army will be useless in Spain, and will be entirely lost, if this treatment is to continue; and I must say, that if any efficient measures for our relief had been adopted by the Government when they first received the accounts of our distresses from the want of provisions, we ought before now



to have received the benefit of them. There is this day again no bread for the soldiers.

I must, at the same time, do the late British Minister the justice to declare that I do not conceive that this deficiency of supplies for the army is at all to be attributed to any neglect or omission on his part. It is to be attributed to the poverty and exhausted state of the country; to the inactivity of the magistrates and people; to their disinclination to take any trouble, excepting that of packing up their property and running away when they hear of the approach of a French patrolle; and to their habits of insubordination and disobedience of, and to the want of power in, the Government and their officers.'

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307.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Deleytosa, 8th Aug. 1809.

'The public dispatches which I transmit with this letter will give you a full and faithful picture of the state of affairs here. You have undertaken an Herculean task; and God knows that the chances of success are infinitely against you, particularly since the unfortunate turn which affairs have taken in Austria.

I wish I could see you, or could send somebody to you; but we are in such a situation, that I cannot go to you myself, and I cannot spare the only one or two people, to converse with whom would be of any use to you. I think therefore, that the best thing you can do is to send somebody to me as soon as you can; that is to say, if I remain in Spain, which I declare I believe to be almost impossible, notwithstanding that I see all the consequences of withdrawing. But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and their spirit. They plunder even in the presence of their Officers. The Officers are discontented, and are almost as

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G. O.

Deleytosa, 9th Aug. 1809.

'1. As the troops composing the army in Spain have not received their rations regularly since the 22nd July, it is not just that the full price of the ration should be stopped from the soldier's pay; from the 23rd July, therefore, the stoppage from the soldier's pay, on account of his rations, is to be only 3*d.* until the supplies are such as it will be possible to make regular deliveries of provisions. The Commander of the Forces will hereafter give notice of the period at which the full price of the rations is to be charged to the men: this order is applicable to the troops composing General R. Craufurd's brigade, only from the 30th July inclusive, and to the horse artillery only from the 3rd August.

2. The Commander of the Forces desires that the roll may be called in camp every 2 hours, and the Officers commanding divisions will give directions what proportion of officers are to attend.

3. The soldiers themselves render the difficulties of the moment greater than they would otherwise be by their irregularity, as they seize and plunder the mules coming in with provisions, by which the good and regular soldiers of the army are deprived of their just share of them.

4. The provost marshal will ascertain by what roads provisions are coming in; he will take care that his assistants patrolle those roads constantly, and any man caught in the act of plundering provisions coming to the army, is to be punished on the spot as such a heinous offence deserves.

5. Soldiers must not quit their lines unless dressed with their side-arms, excepting when on fatigue: all soldiers on fatigue must be under the command of an officer or non-commissioned officer.

6. The practice of taking roots and vegetables without paying for them must be entirely discontinued: if roots or vegetables are required, they must be taken by regular parties formed under the command of an officer, who must take care and is responsible that the owner of the ground is paid for what is taken.'

bad as the men ; and with the army which a fortnight ago beat double their numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half their strength.'

## 308.

Le Général Kellermann.

Deleytosa, 9th Aug. 1809.

' Le sort de la guerre a mis dans les mains du Commandant en Chef de l'armée Française des Officiers et des soldats blessés de l'armée Anglaise dans la bataille qui s'est donnée dernièrement à Talavera. J'écris au Commandant en Chef de l'armée Française, pour lui recommander ces soldats, et pour le prier de me permettre d'envoyer à Talavera pour en avoir soin des Officiers, qui ne seront pas censés être prisonniers de guerre, et auxquels il sera permis de s'en retourner à l'armée quand les blessés seront rétablis. Je le prie aussi de me permettre d'envoyer des petites sommes d'argent aux Officiers.

Ayant l'honneur de vous connaître, j'ose réclamer vos bons offices auprès du Commandant en Chef de l'armée Française, et vous recommander mes blessés. Si c'est le Maréchal Soult qui commande, il me doit tous les soins qu'il peut donner à ces braves soldats, car j'ai sauvé les siens, que le sort de la guerre a mis dans mes mains, des fureurs de la populace Portugaise, et les ai bien soignés. D'ailleurs comme les deux nations sont toujours en guerre, nous nous devons réciproquement ces soins que je réclame pour mes blessés, et que j'ai donnés toujours à ceux que le sort a mis dans mes mains.'

## 309.

To General Eguia.

Jaraicejo, 18th Aug. 1809.

' Your Excellency is much mistaken in supposing that I intended to remain in my position, if I should receive a portion of the supplies to be collected at Truxillo for the use of the armies, although I might be convinced that such portion would be allotted honorably and with good faith.

That which obliges me to move into Portugal is a case of extreme necessity, viz., that description of necessity which an army feels when it has been starving for a month, when it wants every thing and can get nothing : and as I stated to your Excellency yesterday, this necessity has now become so urgent, that I must either move into Portugal, where I know I shall be supplied, or I must make up my mind to lose my army, unless I am made certain, not only of a portion of the supplies which may be sent to Truxillo, but of a sufficiency of bread and corn for the troops and horses daily.

I hope, therefore, that your Excellency will occupy the posts on the Tagus this night. But if you should not do so, I can only say that my troops shall be withdrawn from them to morrow night, whether relieved or not.'

G. O.

Jaraicejo, 16th Aug. 1809.

1. The soldiers are again positively prohibited to plunder bee-hives : any man found with a bee-hive in his possession will be punished.

2. The rolls to be called in camp every two hours : the Officers commanding divisions will settle what number of officers of each regiment are to attend.

3. The provost must patrole in the neighbourhood of the camp, and every man found out of his lines without his accoutrements, and not dressed as a soldier ought to be, is to be punished.

Men sent on fatigue will be under the command of an officer, or non-commissioned officer.'



## 310.

To General Eguia.

Jaraicejo, 19th Aug. 1809.

' I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of this day's date, and feel much concerned that any thing should have occurred to induce your Excellency to express a doubt of the truth of what I have written to you. As, however, your Excellency entertains that doubt, any further correspondence between us appears unnecessary; and accordingly, this is the last letter which I shall have the honor of addressing to you.

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Whatever your Excellency may think of the truth or falsehood of my assertion, I repeat, that want, and the apprehension of its further consequences, are the only reasons for my quitting Spain.'

## 311.

To Señor Don Luis de Calvo.

Jaraicejo, 20th Aug. 1809.

' You gave me assurances yesterday, which you have repeated in your letter, that these privations shall not continue; that in 3 days there shall be plenty of provisions; and that in the mean time we shall have all that the magazine at Truxillo contains. In answer, I have to observe to you, that I have received the same assurances from every Spanish Commissioner who has been employed with the British army; each in his turn has disappointed me; and although your rank is higher, and your powers are greater than those of the other Spanish officers who have been with me, I acknowledge that, in a case so critical as that of a starving army, I feel no confidence in your assurances; and I give no credit to the accounts of the existence of resources said to be upon the road, (in what place not known,) or of any others in the magazine at Truxillo. In respect to the magazine at Truxillo, according to the accounts of its contents yesterday evening, which I received last night, it does not contain enough to feed the British army one day only; and the provisions for the Spanish army must be likewise drawn from it.

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But I am not responsible for these consequences, whatever they may be. Those are responsible for them who, having been made acquainted with the wants of the British army more than a month ago, have taken no efficient measures to relieve them; who have allowed a brave army, that was rendering gratuitous services to Spain, that was able and willing to pay for every thing it received, to starve in the centre of their country, and to be reduced by want almost to a state of inefficiency; who refused or omitted to find carriages to remove the Officers and soldiers who had been wounded in their service, and obliged to give up the equipment of the army for the performance of this necessary duty of humanity.'

## 312.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Truxillo, 21st Aug. 1809.

' I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency copies of letters which I

G. O.

Truxillo, 20th August, 1809.

' 4. Officers commanding corps will give particular directions that the men having charge of cars are not to load them above 600 lb. weight, the utmost they can carry: the consequence must be, if this order is not complied with, that cars must break down, and cannot now be replaced.'

have received from General Eguia, and copies of my answers. Your Excellency will observe in General Eguia's letter to me of the 19th instant a very injurious, improper, and unfounded assertion, that I made use of the want of provisions as a pretext for withdrawing from Spain; and that it was a false one, for that there were plenty of provisions for the army. I assure your Excellency, that on that very day the troops in my camp at Jaraicejo received only  $\frac{3}{4}$  lb. of flour, and the cavalry and the other horses of the army no forage excepting what they could pick up.

Until this insulting assertion was withdrawn, it was impossible for me to continue any correspondence with General Eguia, after I should have replied to his letter, which I hope I did with the temper which became my situation and character.

Your Excellency will observe, that in his reply to me he has either misunderstood or affected to misunderstand that part of his former letter to which I referred; and he has, in fact, left the charge of making use of a false pretext where it stood; and I have, therefore, not given him any reply upon that or any other subject on which he has addressed me.'

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 313.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Merida, 24th Aug. 1809.

'From all that I have heard of the state of the Government of Seville, I am not surprised that they should have been astonished and alarmed, when they heard that I had at last determined to adopt the measure which I had so frequently informed them I should adopt.

Although I was desirous to avoid, as long as possible, withdrawing into Portugal, and certainly remained in the position upon the Tagus so long as it was practicable, and longer probably than was consistent with the anxiety which I have always felt for the welfare and comfort of the troops placed under my command, I am of opinion that, having been compelled to withdraw, it becomes a question for serious consideration, whether any circumstances should now induce me to remain in Spain, and to hold out hopes of further co-operation with the Spanish troops, to be decided on grounds very different from those which were to lead to a decision whether, being joined in co-operation with the Spanish army, I ought or ought not to separate from them.

I beg to lay my ideas upon that point before your Excellency, and to re-

G. O.

Medellin, 23rd Aug. 1809.

'1. Officers commanding divisions and brigades will be pleased to take measures to prevent the women, and followers of the army, buying up the bread which is prepared for the soldiers' rations: this practice, carried on in the irregular manner as it is at present, must ultimately prejudice the soldiers, and prevent the regular supply of bread.'

G. P. O.

Medellin, 23rd Aug. 1809.

'The women of the army must be prevented from purchasing bread in the villages within 2 leagues of the station of any division of the army; when any woman wants to purchase bread, she must ask the officer of the company to which she belongs for a passport, which must be countersigned by the commanding officer of the regiment; any woman found with bread in her possession, purchased at any place nearer than 2 leagues, will be deprived of the bread by the provost, or his assistants; as will any woman who goes out of camp to purchase bread without a passport.

Women who shall be discovered disobeying this order will not be allowed to receive rations.'



quest the aid of your superior judgment to enable me to decide upon it, in the manner which will be most beneficial to the national interests.'

## 314.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Merida, 25th Aug. 1809.

' Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has, by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I cannot say that they do any thing as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of nature.

I really believe that much of this deficiency of numbers, composition, discipline, and efficiency, is to be attributed to the existing government of Spain. They have attempted to govern the Kingdom in a state of revolution, by an adherence to old rules and systems, and with the aid of what is called enthusiasm; and this last is, in fact, no aid to accomplish any thing, and is only an excuse for the irregularity with which every thing is done, and for the want of discipline and subordination of the armies. People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French through their revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which have nearly conquered the world; but if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was the instrument which brought forward those great resources under the system of terror which first stopped the allies; and that a perseverance in the same system of applying every individual and every description of property to the service of the army, by force, has since conquered Europe.

After this statement, you will judge for yourselves, whether you will employ any, and what strength of army in support of the cause in Spain. Circumstances with which you are acquainted have obliged me to separate myself from the Spanish army, and I can only tell you that I feel no inclination to join in co-operation with them again, upon my own responsibility; and that I shall see my way very clearly before me indeed, before I do so; and I do not recommend you to have any thing to do with them in their present state.

Before I quit this part of the subject, it may be satisfactory to you to know that I do not think matters would have been much better if you had sent your large expedition to Spain instead of to the Scheldt. You could not have equipped it in Galicia, or any where in the north of Spain.

If we had had 60,000 men instead of 20,000, in all probability we should not have got to Talavera to fight the battle, for want of means and provisions. But if we had got to Talavera, we could not have gone farther, and the armies would probably have separated for want of means of subsistence,

G. O.

Merida, 25th Aug. 1809.

' 3. The army must not take forage for themselves, but must get it from the Commissary according to the usual mode, by sending in returns of the number of animals for which forage is required, and receiving from him the regular rations; or if forage cannot be provided in that mode, and it is necessary it should be taken from the fields, it must be taken according to the General Orders of the 17th June, 1809.'

probably without a battle; but certainly afterwards. Besides, you will observe that your 40,000 men, supposing them to be equipped and means to exist of feeding them, would not compensate for the deficiency of numbers, of composition, and of efficiency in the Spanish armies; and that, supposing they had been able to remove the French from Madrid, they could not have removed them from the Peninsula, even in the existing state of the French force.

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The next point in this subject is, supposing the Portuguese army to be rendered efficient, what can be done with it and Portugal, if the French should obtain possession of the remainder of the Peninsula? My opinion is, that we ought to be able to hold Portugal, if the Portuguese army and militia are complete.

The difficulty upon this sole question lies in the embarkation of the British army. There are so many entrances into Portugal, the whole country being frontier, that it would be very difficult to prevent the enemy from penetrating; and it is probable that we should be obliged to confine ourselves to the preservation of that which is the most important—the capital.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to bring the contest for the capital to extremities, and afterwards to embark the British army. You will see what I mean, by a reference to the map. Lisbon is so high up the Tagus that no army that we could collect would be able at the same time to secure the navigation of the river by the occupation of both banks, and the possession of the capital. One of the objects must, I fear, be given up, and that which the Portuguese would give up would be the navigation of the Tagus; and, of course, our means of embarkation. However, I have not entirely made up my mind upon this interesting point. I have a great deal of information upon it, but I should wish to have more before I can decide upon it.

In the mean time, I think that Government should look to sending back at least the coppered transports, as soon as the grand expedition shall have done with them; and as they receive positive intelligence that Napoleon is reinforcing his armies in Spain: for you may depend upon it, that he and his Marshals must be desirous of revenging upon us the different blows we have given them; and that, when they come into the Peninsula, their first and great object will be to get the English out.'

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315.

To W. Huskisson, Esq., Sec. to the Treasury.

Merida, 30th Aug. 1809.

'I wish that the eyes of the people of England were open to the real state of affairs in Spain, as mine are; and I only hope, if they should not be so now, that they will not purchase the experience by the loss of an army.'

G. O.

Merida, 27th Aug. 1809.

'4. The Commander of the Forces begs to call the attention of the officers of the army to the orders of the 29th May, 1809. General Officers commanding divisions and brigades are requested to have the orderly books of those regiments examined which arrived in Portugal since the 1st May last, and they will have inserted in them, and read to the soldiers, all orders of regulations, if any there be, which have not been issued to them.'



We have gained a great and glorious victory over more than double our numbers, which has proved to the French that they are not the first military nation in the world. But the want of common management in the Spaniards, and of the common assistance which every country gives to any army, and which this country gives most plentifully to the French, have deprived us of all the fruits of it.

The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, bravery, nor arrangement, to carry on the contest; and if I could consent to remain in Spain, its burthen and the disgrace of its failure would fall upon me.'

## 316.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Merida, 30th Aug. 1809.

'I do not know what can be done to Oporto. It appears to me that it cannot be defended, excepting by an army in the field; and whether the army should be assembled for the defence of that place only, or for the defence of any other part of Portugal which may at the same time be threatened, must be a question to be determined by those who are to consider of the general defence of the country at the moment it is menaced. It is very obvious, however, that the lines at Oporto did more harm than good, and would do more harm than good again, if they were not to be defended by a good army.'

G. O.

Badajoz, 4th Sept. 1809.

'10. The soldiers in the hospitals must not be allowed to straggle about the towns in which the hospitals are stationed, and all men found at the distance of one street from the hospital must be tried and punished for the disobedience of orders. The rolls of the hospital must be called once every hour, in the presence of an officer, or such number of officers as the commanding officer at the hospital will appoint to attend to the roll calling.

11. All men absent from roll calling to be tried and punished for disobedience of orders.

12. The soldiers in hospital, or convalescent at the station where the hospital is, and victualled by the Commissary, or on the route to join their regiments, are not to receive wine, unless directions in writing should be given by the medical officer that they are to receive it; and the medical officer is particularly desired not to give those directions, unless in cases in which it may have appeared to him that the soldiers have conducted themselves as they ought in the hospital, and in such a manner as to secure their early recovery.

13. As comforts for the sick can now be got, the regimental hospitals are to be established upon the plan ordered by His Majesty's regulations, and the soldiers are to be under the usual stoppage while in hospital.'

G. A. O.

Badajoz, 4th Sept. 1809.

'The Commander of the Forces is concerned to hear, that last night several soldiers came into the town of Badajoz, and plundered a bakery and the houses of several individuals of bread. This continued misbehaviour of the soldiers gives the Commander of the Forces the greatest concern; and he is determined, however difficult it may be, to put a stop to it. The rolls are to be called in the different corps of the 4th division every hour till further orders: and the Commander of the Forces desires that no soldier whatever may be allowed to quit his lines on any account, excepting in charge of an officer.

The provost must punish all those found disobeying this order. A guard must be placed at the gate of the town of Badajoz, and all soldiers attempting to pass in are to be made prisoners, and sent to the provost guard. The provost will forthwith turn out of the town all soldiers who may be in it.'

G. O.

Badajoz, 7th Sept. 1809.

'1. Notwithstanding the repeated orders given out upon the subject, the soldiers of the 4th division of infantry plundered bee hives, in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, on the day before the division marched from that place; it is impossible these outrages can be committed daily, and that this last outrage in particular could have been committed without the officers obtaining some knowledge of it. The officers with the army do not appear to be aware how much they suffer in the disgraceful and unmilitary practices of the soldiers, in

317.

To Marshal Beresford.

Badajoz, 8th Sept. 1809.

'We are mistaken if we believe that what these Portuguese and Spanish armies require is discipline, properly so called. They want the habits and

in marauding and plundering every thing they lay their hands upon. The consequence is, the people of the country fly their habitations, no market is opened, and the officers, as well as the soldiers, suffer in the privation of every comfort and every necessary, excepting their ration, from the neglect of the former, and the criminal misconduct of the latter. The Commander of the Forces has done, and will continue to do every thing in his power, to put an end to these disgraceful practices; but it is obvious that all his efforts must be fruitless, unless the officers of the army generally, and individually, exert themselves for the same object.

2. The practice of seizing and detaining carts has been prohibited by the General Orders of the army, but it still continues to such an extent as to render it difficult, if not impossible, to supply the troops with what they require, and if persevered in will again cut off the communication with the sources of supply. Commanding officers of divisions, brigades, and regiments are referred to the General Orders of the 25th June, No. 10.

3. All carts now with any department, regiment, or individual to which a driver is attached (whether drawn by mules or bullocks) are to be forthwith allowed to return to their homes, the Commissary paying them their hire for the time they have been employed.

4. Regiments or departments which have carts without drivers are to retain them.

5. Commanding officers of regiments are to report to the officers commanding brigades, what number of carts with drivers each will have sent away, and what number of carts without drivers each will have retained under these orders. Commanding officers of brigades will transmit these reports, in the usual channel, to the Quarter Master General. Heads of departments are to make a similar report to the Quarter Master General. These orders are not intended to apply to the covered carts drawn by mules lately sent from Seville, nor to any carts actually engaged in the performance of any service, until that service shall have been completed. In future when carts are required by regiments or departments, application is to be made for them to the Commissary General, according to the orders of the 25th June, No. 10.

6. The Commander of the Forces has observed that camp kettles are, in some instances, carried upon carts, a practice which is positively contrary to orders, and must be exceedingly inconvenient and prejudicial to the troops. He begs that the officers commanding brigades and regiments will see that regiments are properly provided with the means of carrying camp kettles without loss of time.

7. The officer in command of the hospital at Elvas, and the officer commanding at Lisbon, will take care that every soldier joining the army from either of those places is supplied with 2 good shirts, and 2 good pairs of shoes, which will be supplied by the Commissary upon his requisition. The officer or non-commissioned officer, in charge of the hospital of the soldier requiring the necessaries, will make the requisition, specifying in it the soldier's name, the regiment and company to which he belongs, and the number of shirts and pairs of shoes he requires: this must be given in duplicate; one copy of which must be sent to the regiment, and the other delivered to the Commissary. The officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of the soldier requiring the necessaries, is to sign the receipt of the necessaries at the bottom of both copies of the requisition, when they will have received them from the Commissary.

8. When officers are in such a state of health as to render it necessary that they should quit the army, they must send to Head Quarters a certificate that the state of their health requires removing; this certificate will be sent to the Inspector of hospitals, and a board of medical officers will be ordered to assemble to consider of the necessity of this removal; and unless this board should certify that removal is necessary, it will not in any case be permitted. In the same manner, if the medical attendant of any officer, either with the army or at out-quarter, should think his return to England necessary, he will certify it to the board ordered to consider of the case.

The Commander of the Forces cannot avoid to take this opportunity of observing that when an officer is separated from his regiment in the performance of his duty, or by unavoidable circumstances, it is his first duty to endeavor to join, when the duty shall have been performed, or the circumstances shall no longer exist which occasioned his separation from his regiment; this is peculiarly his duty, and most probably would be an object to every officer in this army, at a moment when the army might be supposed to be involved in difficulties. From the excellent character which Lieut. \_\_\_\_\_ bears, and from his former services and good conduct, the Commander of the Forces believes with the Court Martial that he was desirous of joining his regiment. That which has occurred to him,

however,



spirit of soldiers—the habits of command on one side, and of obedience on the other—mutual confidence between officers and men; and, above all, a determination in the superiors to obey the spirit of the orders they receive, let what will be the consequence, and the spirit to tell the true cause if they do not.’

however, and the fact, which is notorious to the whole army, if any effort had been made to join it, it must have been successful, should be a warning to all officers in the situation in which Lieut. \_\_\_\_\_ found himself, not to listen to the senseless reports which invariably prevail on the flank and rear of all armies, but to endeavor seriously to join their regiments; at all events, not to go farther to the rear till the necessity for doing so will have become evident and urgent.

10. It is directed that particular attention may be paid by the regiments of the army to sending in their weekly states and monthly returns correct. There have been of late so many mistakes and alterations in men and horses unaccounted for, that almost invariably the states have been returned to the regiments prior to the possibility of making out the general state of the army. This occasions not only trouble, but considerable delay. In addition to the due examination of the returns by the commanding officer previous to his signature, and his comparing them with the former to see that they correspond, Brigade Majors and Assistant Adjutant Generals of divisions must strictly compare and examine all states sent in; the latter will be held particularly responsible for forwarding correct states.’

G. O.

Badajoz, 8th Sept. 1809.

‘The Commander of the Forces has heard with much concern, that persons employed at Lisbon in landing stores for the army have landed goods liable to pay duty, under pretence that they were for the use of the troops. The Commander of the Forces is determined to disgrace and punish those who shall be found out to have been concerned in those scandalous transactions; and in order to prevent them in future, he desires that when any articles are to be landed from any ship in the Tagus for the use of the troops, the officer at the head of the department, for whose service they are to be landed, is to give one day’s previous notice to the officer commanding at Lisbon, of this intention, stating particularly the ship from which, in the river, and the place to which on shore, the articles are to be taken, and, as far as may be possible, the denominations and quantities of the articles to be landed.

The commanding officer at Lisbon is immediately to convey this notice to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Lisbon, in order that he may make such communications on the subject to the Government as he may think proper. In case the Government may think proper to order it, custom house officers are to be allowed to attend in the ship, in the boats conveying the articles from the ship to the shore, and in the store house, in order to see that the goods are conveyed to their destination according to notice given.’

G. O.

Badajoz, 11th Sept. 1809.

‘2. The Commander of the Forces cannot however avoid to observe that unfortunate catastrophe which has occurred, and the circumstances which have brought these serjeants to trial before the General Court Martial originated in disobedience of orders, repeatedly given out in Orders.

3. The use and object of a sick-cart to any regiment is to carry the men, or the arms of the men who may be taken ill on the march; and in order to accomplish this object, the cart ought to be with the regiment, and not 2 days’ march in the rear: if a cart is to be employed to carry sick men, it should equally accompany the regiment, in which case, if the cattle which draw it should be tired, application might be made to the Commissary for fresh cattle, and at all events, no cart carrying sick should be left without some medical officer attending it: besides this, the Commander of the Forces observes, that the paymaster’s books, and probably other articles belonging to him, were left upon this cart, which is positively contrary to orders, other means being provided to carry the paymaster’s books; and he desires that the commanding officer of the 2nd batt.,—th regt., will call on the paymaster to account for his books being upon this cart, and will report whether he is now furnished with a horse, or mule, to carry his books.

4. The occurrences which have been the subject, and have been brought out before this General Court Martial, pointed out forcibly the necessity that the officers of the army should obey strictly the orders they receive.

5. The means of transport and conveyance are so scarce in this country, that unless the regulations respecting them are strictly obeyed, the army cannot be served; and most particularly it cannot be served, if every officer and non-commissioned officer is to do as he pleases, and take what he pleases by force of arms, wherever he may meet it.’

## 318.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Badajoz, 12th Sept. 1809.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your kind letter of the 20th August, as well as for the mark of the King’s approbation, which your friendship for me has induced you to suggest to your colleagues to recommend to the King to confer upon me. I can only promise to do my best to prove myself not undeserving of the King’s favor and of the partiality of my friends.

It has been most gratifying to me to read the proofs which you sent me, that the King’s mind corresponded with the wishes of my friends upon this occasion ; and I have great hopes that he will not be dissatisfied with subsequent transactions in this country, although they are of a different nature from those of which he had marked his approbation in a manner so gracious towards me.’

## 319.

To Lieut. Col. Gordon.

Badajoz, 13th Sept. 1809.

‘ I know nothing of Major Middlemore, excepting as a soldier on service ; and I should not recommend him if I did not believe that his promotion would give general satisfaction, and that he really deserves it.’

G. A. O.

Badajoz, 12th Sept. 1809.

‘ The 4th division having again in 3 instances plundered bee hives, notwithstanding the orders of the 7th instant, the regiments of that division are forthwith, upon the receipt of this order, to be turned out and placed under arms, and they are not to quit their arms till one hour after sunset, when they are to be sent to their huts, and sentries placed round the camp to prevent all men from straggling ; and they are to be put under arms again tomorrow morning, at an hour before sunrise, and to stand by their arms till an hour after sunset, and so on, day after day, till the soldiers shall have been discovered who have been guilty of these outrages, which, it is repeated, cannot be committed without the knowledge of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the regiments. When the regiments shall be under arms, men must be sent under fatigue for water, for their provisions to cook, &c. &c., under charge of officers and non-commissioned officers, in proportion to the strength of the parties, who must be brought back to the lines as soon as the work required for them shall have been performed.

Colonel Kemmis will report whether the Orders of the 4th instant, requiring that the rolls should be called in the 4th division every hour, have been obeyed. This Order is not intended to apply to the 11th regt.’

G. O.

Badajoz, 14th Sept. 1809.

1. The Orders of the 12th instant respecting the plunder of bee hives by the troops of the 4th division, are countermanded ; the plunderers having been discovered and ordered for trial.

2. The Commander of the Forces is always concerned when he is obliged to order any measure of severity towards the troops ; he is concerned that the disorders of which frequent complaints are made, are committed by a few ; but unless the good soldiers, and the officers and non-commissioned officers in particular, exert themselves to prevent these outrages, and discover the perpetrators when they are known to them, the whole army must suffer in character, as well as the privations which are the invariable consequence of plunder by the troops.

3. The cavalry have been distributed in their present quarters, principally with a view to their being fed with facility, and in order that the horses might recover their condition. In order to insure this object, it is desirable that they may not be used as orderlies to carry letters, and the Commander of the Forces prefers infinitely to pay for messengers to the use of the cavalry in this manner.

If it should be necessary, however, at any time to send a dragoon with a letter, in consequence of the impossibility of procuring a messenger, the Commander of the Forces desires that his rate may be confined to the walk of his horse, unless in a case of very urgent necessity which may require the early delivery of the letter.’



320.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Badajoz, 20th Sept. 1809.

‘The Portuguese head quarters must accommodate matters a little. I am willing to give every thing to the Portuguese army that our stores and means can afford; but it must be done in the way of subsidy to the Portuguese Government, according to the mode which I have repeatedly pointed out. Half the business of the world, particularly that of our country, is done by accommodation, and by the parties understanding each other; but when rights are claimed they must be resisted, if there are no grounds for them: when appeal must be made to higher powers there can be no accommodation, and much valuable time is lost in reference which ought to be spent in action. I have never refused any thing that has been asked for the Portuguese Government which our stores could afford; I have invariably given my time and attention to frame the modes in which all assistance could be given, and all difficulties occasioned by the orders under which we act could be overcome; but when, instead of adopting these modes, what is wanted is claimed as a right, I must resist every claim of that description, not founded upon the King’s regulations; or, if they are persisted in, I must appeal to England.’

321.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Badajoz, 22nd Sept. 1809.

‘I acknowledge that I have a great dislike to a new popular assembly. Even our own ancient one would be quite unmanageable, and, in these days, would ruin us, if the present generation had not before its eyes the example of the French revolution; and if there were not certain rules and orders for

G. O.

Badajoz, 16th Sept. 1809.

1. The Commander of the Forces cannot avoid to take this opportunity of calling upon the field officers of the regiments in particular, and all the officers in general, to support and assist their commanding officer in the maintenance of discipline, and in the preservation of order and regularity of their corps.

2. The officers of the army are much mistaken if they suppose that their duty is done when they have attended to the drill of their men, and to the parade duties of the regiment: the order and regularity of the troops in camp and quarters, the subsistence and comfort of the soldiers, the general subordination and obedience of the corps affords constant subjects for the attention of the field officers in particular, in which, by their conduct in the assistance they will give their commanding officer, they can manifest their zeal for the service, their ability and their fitness for promotion to the higher ranks, at least equally as by attention to the drill and parade discipline of the corps.

3. The Commander of the Forces desires that the principle of the order of the 29th May, given out at Coimbra, which requires that officers should be quartered near the companies, may be applied to the encampments, that the tents of the officers may be placed near those of the men under their command, and that the situations of the field officers may be pitched upon by the Quarter Master of the battalion.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that all officers and soldiers of the army will understand, that the Spanish and Portuguese soldiers are intrusted with the performance of duties when sentry, equally with British soldiers in the same situation; and that any resistance to a Spanish or Portuguese sentry, and particularly any violence committed upon him, upon any assumed superiority of character, by any British officer or soldier, will be punished as such a breach of military discipline shall deserve.’

G. O.

Badajoz, 19th Sept 1809.

‘4. The Commander of the Forces cannot avoid to take this opportunity of drawing the attention of the army to the unworthy conduct of these soldiers who have plundered the stores on their way to the army, for the use of their comrades, over which they were placed as a guard.’

its guidance and government, the knowledge and use of which render safe, and successfully direct its proceedings. But how will all this work in the Cortes, in the state in which Spain now is? I declare that if I were in Buonaparte's situation, I should leave the English and the Cortes to settle Spain in the best manner they could; and I should entertain very little doubt but that in a very short space of time Spain must fall into the hands of France.

At the same time I must agree with you in thinking that affairs are now in so desperate a situation that they cannot be worse; that there is a real want of men of common capacity in Spain, in whose hands any form of government, intended for vigorous action, could be placed with any hope that their powers could be used to the public advantage; and that the Cortes, with all their faults, and the dangers attendant upon such an assembly, will have at least this advantage, that they will have the confidence of the country, and the prejudices of their countrymen of the lower class in our favor, and against France; your remark being perfectly well founded, that there is no prejudice or jealousy of us any where in Spain, excepting by the Government.

But, in order to enjoy common safety under such an assembly as the Spanish Cortes, the rules and orders for their proceedings and internal government ought to be well defined, and to be, if possible, a part of the constitution of the assembly. Great care should also be taken in their formation, to protect them from the effects of popular fury in the place of their sitting; but still, with all these precautions, I should prefer a wise Bourbon, if we could find one, for a Regent, to the Cortes.

I wish you would add to your note of the 8th September advice that the Junta, appointed to consider of calling the Cortes, should suggest rules for their proceedings, and to secure the freedom of their deliberations; as, in case of accidents, it will show that the rock upon which such a machine was likely to split was not unforeseen.'

## 322.

To Marshal Beresford.

Badajoz, 24th Sept. 1809.

'There never was any thing like the madness, the imprudence, and the presumption of the Spanish officers, in the way they risk their corps, knowing

G. O.

Badajoz, 24th Sept. 1809.

1. The mistakes made in the returns and states sent from many of the regiments of the army are so frequent, and so glaring, that the Commander of the Forces apprehends that the proper mode of keeping an account of their men is neglected, or is not known in those regiments. The foundation of all states and returns is the roll, and morning and evening states of the troop or company, in which every man absent ought to be accounted for by name, including casualties, till struck off the strength by order of the commanding officer of the regiment.

The weekly and other states called for from regiments are made up of the totals of the states of each troop or company, which totals should be entered in the regimental weekly or monthly state book, and at the bottom the names of all men making any alteration from the preceding state should be entered by companies.

2. No state should be ever sent in without being made to tally with the last state sent in; and it may be certain that if the second state, whether weekly or monthly, does not account for every man returned in the first, there has been an error, which ought to be investigated, and rectified before the state is sent in.

4. The Commander of the Forces is convinced that either those regiments have never  
known



that the national vanity will prevent them from withdrawing them from a situation of danger, and that, if attacked, they must be totally destroyed.'

323.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Badajoz, 24th Sept. 1809.

'I desired Beresford to speak to you respecting the increase of pay to the Portuguese officers, because it appeared to me that you had adopted a decided opinion upon that subject, which it was not very likely I should shake by a letter. It appears from his answer that I entirely misunderstood your objection to recommend the increase of pay to the Portuguese officers; and I now find that, notwithstanding that I think the objection a very solid one, and that it is very probable that you will not succeed in obtaining the object, you are so kind as to say that you will propose it, if I should think it desirable that it should be proposed.

I acknowledge that I think it ought to be proposed, and strenuously urged upon the Portuguese Government to increase the pay of their officers. How can it be expected that, in a country in which the expense of the necessaries of life is higher than in England, men will serve as officers upon the pay which our serjeants and even soldiers receive?

Whatever may be eventually the fate of Spain, Portugal must be a military country; and it is certain that it cannot become so, till the gentry of the country enter the army as officers, and this they will never do as long as the pay continues upon the existing footing.

If we do not succeed in carrying the measure, the French will carry it for us; and on every ground, I believe, there is no doubt that it ought to be adopted.

But all this is not exactly applicable to the question for consideration; which is, whether you should now propose the increase to the Portuguese Government, notwithstanding their repugnance to it, founded as it is upon their want of means?

My opinion is, that we, who are charged with the defence of this country, should not be justifiable if we neglect to propose to the Portuguese Government, or to our own, any measures which we may think it advisable to adopt, with a view to the defence of Portugal; and that this is a most essential one no man can doubt. But I conceive that this proposition to

known the proper mode of making out a return, or that their interior economy has been lately entirely neglected.

5. He requests the General Officers commanding brigades to inspect accurately the books of the regiments of their brigades, and to see in what manner they make out their states, whether the absent men of each troop or company are accurately accounted for by name on the rolls, and on the morning and evening states at every parade, and that they will look particularly into the interior economy of the regiments under their command.

6. The Commander of the Forces wishes the commanding and other officers of the regiments, particularly the field officers, to recollect that there is a great deal to do to keep their regiments in order upon service, besides attending to the parades and drills of the men.

7. The Commander of the Forces desires that Colonel Peacocke will pay attention to the state of discipline (meaning by that word habits of obedience to orders, subordination, regularity, and interior economy) of the 2nd batt. 83rd regt., and 2nd batt. 87th regt., lately ordered to Lisbon, as well as to their parade discipline and drill.

8. The Commander of the Forces deems it but justice to the two batts. of Guards to state that their returns have in every respect been as accurate as the conduct of these excellent corps has been regular and exemplary in every other respect.

The returns of the Legion and of the regiments of cavalry are also very accurate.'

the Portuguese Government is the first step to be taken to procure from the British Government the means to provide for the expense, at least for a time. The British Government can have no official knowledge of the deficiency of the means in Portugal to provide for this essential expense, till the subject shall have been discussed with the Portuguese Government, and they shall have stated the deficiency; and that will be the time to press the British Government to provide for this expense. Upon every ground, therefore, I should recommend to you to lose no time in urging the measure upon the Portuguese Government.'

324.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Badajoz, 6th Oct. 1809.

'I think it desirable that that tonnage should be kept in the Tagus, if not inconvenient to the service, for these reasons: First, it gives confidence to our own officers and troops: Secondly, whenever it does become necessary seriously to think of embarking, this country will not be alarmed by seeing the collection at Lisbon of a large fleet of transports. They will have become accustomed to the sight of the ships; the arrival of a few more will, if noticed at all, make no impression upon them, and the operations of the native troops will be carried on, and the exertions of the people made, without the suspicion that we intend to leave them to their fate. I do not mean to say that we ought, in any case, to deceive them; on the contrary, they ought to be distinctly apprized that the King would not risk the loss of his army by capture by the enemy, but that we should not quit them until the last moment; and that the period would depend very much upon their own exertions. Still, however, the lower orders would suspect our intentions; and the arrival of a large fleet of transports at the moment of danger and exertion would excite their suspicions, and probably paralyse their exertions in their own defence. At the same time, all these reasons for keeping the coppered transports in the Tagus are worth nothing, if they are wanted elsewhere, or if any expense or inconvenience would be occasioned by the measure.

I am going to Lisbon on Sunday, all being quiet; and I hope in a short time to be able to make a report on the defence of Portugal which will be satisfactory to Government.'

G. O.

Badajoz, 1st Oct. 1809.

1. The Commander of the Forces observes that the women of the regiments have come up from Lisbon along with the clothing, to the great inconvenience of the army, and to their own detriment; and as they travel on the cars, they delay and render uncertain the arrival of the regimental clothing for the troops, and defeat all the arrangements for bringing it up to the army.

2. The Commander of the Forces desires that Colonel Peacocke will prevent the women from leaving Lisbon with the clothing and regimental baggage; and the officers and non-commissioned officers, coming up from Lisbon in charge of clothing, are desired to prevent the women from travelling on the carts.'

G. O.

Badajoz, 7th Oct. 1809.

'The claims sent to the military secretary will be referred to this board for their consideration and decision.

2. The principles on which such claims are to be considered and decided are as follows: no claim for a loss can be allowed, which has been occasioned by a disobedience of orders, or by neglect or omission in the party claiming for the loss, or his servant or bat men.

No claim can be allowed for a loss sustained by the ordinary occurrences of the service, such as deaths of horses or mules of fatigue, occasioned by the ordinary marches of the army, the loss of accoutrements and necessaries in hospital, or by the breaking down of carts, fatigue of oxen, &c. &c.

3. As



325.

Memorandum.

Lisbon, 11th Oct. 1809.

‘ In respect to the army and armament of the people in Spain and Portugal, there is no man more aware than I am of the advantage to be derived

3. As the principal on which the compensation for losses by the public is founded, is that the claimant may replace his loss, and the public may not lose his services; claims for losses on behalf of officers or soldiers who are dead cannot be admitted.

4. As the officers of the army have been restricted in the amount of their baggage by different orders by the late and by the present Commander of the Forces, it would be inconsistent with every principle on which compensation for losses is granted, and with the practice of former Boards of Claims, if the full amount of the value of the whole of an officer's baggage (as allowed by His Majesty's regulations) was granted to replace the baggage allowed to be carried, or actually carried by an officer on the service, in Spain or Portugal.

5. The value of the whole and of the different proportions of officers' baggage lost, is to be rated at two-thirds of the sum allowed by His Majesty's regulations.

6. The claim for regimental baggage, accoutrements, and horse appointments lost, are likewise to be considered as decided upon by the Board upon the same principles.

7. But it is to be observed that clothing, accoutrements, and horse appointments lost, can be paid for according to the practice of the service, only when they shall be replaced by new, and then only three-fourths of the price.

8. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be obliged to notice that, notwithstanding repeated orders upon the subject, and particularly the General Order of the 4th May, the officers of the army continue to give receipts for articles of provisions and forage, notwithstanding that other arrangements are made for their supply.

9. Those officers marching up from Lisbon, in particular, either alone or with detachments, have taken up articles of provisions and forage upon their own receipts, contrary to the orders given them in their routes, and notwithstanding that there is a Commissary at every stage, at which it is specified in their route that they are to receive the provisions and forage for themselves and their detachments.

10. This repeated disobedience of all order defeats every arrangement which can be made for the regular supply of the troops, and gives the Commander of the Forces the greatest concern. He is determined to carry into execution his Order of the 4th May, and he gives notice that every officer who shall make a requisition, and give a receipt for any article of supply, will be called upon to account for his having done so; and if his act should have been in disobedience of orders, or unnecessary, such officer will have to pay for the supplies for which he will have given a receipt.

11. In case any officer or non-commissioned officer should have occasion to make a requisition and sign a receipt for any article of supply delivered by any of the magistrates of the country, the requisition and receipt must be made out according to the following form, and can always be procured in print from any of the Commissaries.

G. O.

Lisbon, 11th Oct. 1809.

1. ‘ The Commander of the Forces is apprehensive that his orders, respecting the returning of carts in the possession of the regiments of the army, have not been understood, as they have not been obeyed; he now desires, that upon the receipt of this order, the officers commanding regiments will send to the Commissary of the brigade or division, in which the regiment is placed, all carts in possession of the regiments to which native drivers are attached.

2. In future, if any regiment should retain a cart after it shall have performed the special service for which it has been supplied to the regiment, the hire of such cart for the number of days it will be so detained will be charged against the subsistence of the regiment.

3. The officers commanding brigades will report to the Quarter Master General, on the 18th instant, whether this order has been obeyed.

4. The carts with oxen or mules without native drivers are to be retained in the service of the regiments which have them, and these regiments are to send to the Quarter Master General a monthly return of them on the 1st of every month.

5. The officer commanding the cavalry will take care that each detached squadron of the cavalry receives and carries into execution this order.

6. The clothing and other regimental stores received by the different regiments of the army are to be delivered out to the soldiers, as soon as possible after they shall be received, as it will be impossible to provide carriages to remove them in case any movement should be made.

7. The officers commanding brigades will report to the Quarter Master General that this order has been obeyed on the 5th day after each regiment shall have received clothing or stores.

from those measures, and if I had not reflected well upon the subject, my experience of the war in Portugal and in Spain (in Portugal, where the people are in some degree armed and arrayed, and in Spain, where they are not) would have shown me the advantage which an army has against the enemy when the people are armed and arrayed, and are on its side in the contest. But reflection, and, above all, experience, have shown me the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of view; and I only beg that those who have to contend with the French will not be diverted from the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training regular bodies, by any notion that the people, when armed and arrayed, will be of, I will not say any, but of much, use to them. The subject is too large for discussion in a paper of this description, but I can show hundreds of instances to prove the truth of as many reasons why exertions of this description ought not to be relied on. At all events, no officer can calculate upon an operation to be performed against the French by persons of this description; and I believe that no officer will enter upon an operation against the French without calculating his means most anxiously.'

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326.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Sherbrooke, K.B.

Lisbon, 13th Oct. 1809.

'I am very anxious to throw as many impediments in the way of people leaving the army as is possible, and therefore I have ordered the certificates, medical boards, &c. &c.; but if you know any body who really requires change of air, do not hesitate about letting him go.'

G. O.

Badajoz, 20th Oct. 1809.

1. Complaints having been made of the irregularity and difficulties which exist in quartering officers in Lisbon, owing to the disobedience of the General Orders of the late Commander of the Forces, of the 14th March last, these orders are again published, and the attention of the officers of the army is again called to them.

2. Officers now quartered in Lisbon are forthwith to return to the Assistant Quarter Master General, at Lisbon, their names, stating where they are quartered; and the Assistant Quarter Master General will make out a general list of the officers and their quarters, and will deliver it to the Superintendent of the Police.

3. Officers who shall omit to give their names and places of abode to the Assistant Quarter Master General, according to this order, will be considered as having quitted the house in which they were billeted, others will be billeted on the house, and the officer, who shall be guilty of this omission, will be obliged to hire a lodging.

4. In future all officers moving from one place to another, in Portugal or Spain, are to have a route from the Quarter Master General's department, which is to specify where the officer is to halt each day.

5. The officers of the Quarter Master General's department, who will grant these routes upon application for them, will keep copies of them; and the officers, who will receive them, will send them to the Quarter Master General on their arrival at their destination.

6. Officers applying for a route to quit Lisbon are to return their billets to the Assistant Quarter Master General, who will forthwith send it to the Superintendent of Police.'

(Order referred to.)

G. O.

Lisbon, 14th March, 1809.

'Representations having been made to the Commander of the Forces on the subject of the inconvenience sustained, both by the inhabitants and officers of the army, from want of better arrangement regarding billets, his Excellency finds it necessary to establish the following regulations.

1. All General Officers and heads of departments will apply, and receive their billets, from the Deputy Quarter Master General.

2. All other officers are to receive their billets from the Town Major.

3. No officer quitting Lisbon is to retain his quarters, but he must give back his billet to the department from which he has received it, whether the Deputy Quarter Master General, or Town Major.

4. No



327.

## MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COLONEL FLETCHER, COMMANDING THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.\*

Lisbon, 20th Oct. 1809.

' In the existing relative state of the Allied and French armies in the Peninsula, it does not appear probable that the enemy have it in their power to make an attack upon Portugal. They must wait for their reinforcements; and as the arrival of these may be expected, it remains to be considered what plan of defence shall be adopted for this country.

The great object in Portugal is the possession of Lisbon and the Tagus, and all our measures must be directed to this object. There is another also connected with that first object, to which we must likewise attend, viz.—the embarkation of the British troops in case of reverse.

In whatever season the enemy may enter Portugal, he will probably make his attack by two distinct lines, the one north, the other south of the Tagus; and the system of defence to be adopted must be founded upon this general basis.

In the winter season the river Tagus will be full, and will be a barrier to the enemy's enterprises with his left attack, not very difficult to be secured. In the summer season, however, the Tagus being fordable in many places between Abrantes and Salvaterra, and even lower than Salvaterra, care must be taken that the enemy does not, by his attack directed from the south of the Tagus, and by the passage of that river, cut off from Lisbon the British army engaged in operations to the northward of the Tagus.

The object of the allies should be to oblige the enemy as much as possible to make his attack with concentrated corps. They should stand in every position which the country could afford, such a length of time as would enable the people of the country to evacuate the towns and villages, carrying

\* 'The plan was altered after this memorandum was written, as it was found that the plain of Castanheira could not be occupied with advantage; the right was therefore thrown back on Alhandra. But this memorandum is the foundation on which the whole work was commenced and completed. It was written after a detailed reconnoissance of the ground, and a personal visit to every part of it.'

4. No officer is on any account to select any particular house, nor to choose his own quarters; all that they can expect is, that each shall be provided with a quarter suitable to his rank.

5. Colonels will be entitled to 4 rooms, field officers 3, captains 2, subalterns 1 room for each. Staff officers will have quarters allotted them according to the comparative rank they hold in their several departments, civil or military.

6. No officer, under the rank of a General Officer, is to require more than two servants' beds at the most.

7. No officer is on any account to deliver over his billet to another.

8. No billet is to be exchanged for any officer of any rank, without previous application to the Deputy Quarter Master General. If the officer applying be under the rank of a General Officer, he is to apply through the Town Major, who will presently explain to the Deputy Quarter Master General the cause of the application.

9. No officer whatever has any pretension to look for or require any thing more than his lodgings, where he is billeted.

10. The Town Major, in applying to the Intendant General for billets, is to specify the several ranks for which they are required, and if they are for staff officers, he will indicate the comparative rank held by them.

All officers whatever who have got into houses without regular billets, are to send in their names to the Deputy Quarter Master General, that billets may be either made out for the present quarters they now occupy, or other quarters allotted to them.'

with them or destroying all articles of provisions and carriages, not necessary for the allied army; each corps taking care to preserve its communication with the others, and its relative distance from the point of junction.

In whatever season the enemy's attack may be made, the whole allied army, after providing for the garrisons of Elvas, Almeida, Abrantes, and Valença, should be divided into three corps, to be posted as follows:—one corps to be in Beira; another in Alentejo; and the third, consisting of the Lusitanian legion, 8 battalions of caçadores, and 2 of militia, in the mountains of Castello Branco.

In the winter, the corps in Beira should consist of two thirds of the whole numbers of the operating army. In the summer, the corps in Beira and Alentejo should be nearly of equal numbers.

I shall point out in another memorandum the plan of operations to be adopted by the corps north and south of the Tagus in the winter months.

In the summer it is probable, as I have above stated, that the enemy will make his attack in two principal corps, and that he will also push one through the mountains of Castello Branco and Abrantes. His object will be, by means of his corps south of the Tagus, to turn the positions which might be taken up in his front on the north of that river; to cut off from Lisbon the corps opposed to him; and to destroy it by an attack in front and rear at the same time. This can be avoided only by the retreat of the right centre, and left of the allies, and their junction at a point at which, from the state of the river, they cannot be turned by the passage of the Tagus by the enemy's left.

The first point of defence which presents itself below that at which the Tagus ceases to be fordable is the river of Castanheira, and here the army should be posted as follows:—10,000 men, including all the cavalry, in the plain between the Tagus and the hills; 5000 infantry on the left of the plain; and the remainder of the army, with the exception of the following detachments, on the height in front, and on the right of Cadafões.

In order to prevent the enemy from turning, by their left, the positions which the allies may take up for the defence of the high road to Lisbon by the Tagus, Torres Vedras should be occupied by a corps of 5000 men; the height in the rear of Sobral de Monte Agraço by 4000 men; and Arruda by 2000 men.

There should be a small corps on the height east by south of the height of Sobral, to prevent the enemy from marching from Sobral to Arruda; and there should be another small corps on the height of Ajuda, between Sobral and Bucellas.

In case the enemy should succeed in forcing the corps at Torres Vedras, or Sobral de Monte Agraço, or Arruda; if the first, it must fall back gradually to Cabeça de Montachique, occupying every defensible point on the road: if the second, it must fall back upon Bucellas, destroying the road after the height of Ajuda: if the third, it must fall back upon Alhandra, disputing the road particularly at a point one league in front of that town.

In case any one of these 3 positions should be forced, the army must fall back from its position as before pointed out, and must occupy one as follows:

5000 men, principally light infantry, on the hill behind Alhandra; the



main body of the army on the Serra de Serves, with its right on that part of the Serra which is near the Casal de Portella, and is immediately above the road which crosses the Serra from Bucellas to Alverca; and its left extending to the pass of Bucellas. The entrance of the pass of Bucellas to be occupied by the troops retired from Sobral de Monte Agraço, &c., and Cabeça de Montachique, by the corps retired from Torres Vedras.

In order to strengthen these several positions, it is necessary that different works should be constructed immediately, and that arrangements and preparations should be made for the construction of others.

Accordingly, I beg Colonel Fletcher, as soon as possible, to review these several positions.

1st. He will examine particularly the effect of damming up the mouth of the Castanheira river; how far it will render that river a barrier, and to what extent it will fill.

2nd. He will calculate the labor required for that work, and the time it will take, as well as the means of destroying the bridge over the river, and of constructing such redoubts as might be necessary on the plain, and on the hill on the left of the road, effectually to defend the plain. He will state particularly what means should be prepared for these works. He will also consider of the means and time required, and the effect which might be produced by sloping the banks of the river.

3rd. He will make the same calculations for the works to be executed on the hill in front, and on the right of Cadafões, particularly on the left of that hill, to shut the entry of the valley of Cadafões.

4th. He will examine and report upon the means of making a good road of communication from the plain across the hills into the valley of Cadafões, and to the left of the proposed position, and calculate the time and labor it will take.

5th. He will examine the road from Otta by Abregada, Labrugeira to Merciana, and thence to Torres Vedras; and also from Merciana to Sobral de Monte Agraço. He will also examine and report upon the road from Alemquer to Sobral de Monte Agraço.

6th. He will entrench a post at Torres Vedras for 5000 men. He will examine the road from Torres Vedras to Cabeça de Montachique; and fix upon the spots at which to break it up as might stop or delay the enemy; and if there should be advantageous grounds at such spots, he will entrench a position for 400 men to cover the retreat of the corps from Torres Vedras.

7th. He will examine the position at Cabeça de Montachique, and determine upon its line of defence, and upon the works to be constructed for its defence, by a corps of 5000 men; of which he will estimate the time and the labor.

8th. He will entrench a position for 4000 men on the two heights which command the road from Sobral de Monte Agraço to Bucellas.

9th. He will entrench a position for 400 men on the height of Ajuda, between Sobral and Bucellas, to cover the retreat of the corps from Sobral to Bucellas; and he will calculate the means and the time it will take to destroy the road at that spot.

10th. He will construct a redoubt for 200 men and 3 guns at the wind-

mill on the height of Sobral de Monte Agraço, which guns will bear upon the road from Sobral to Arruda.

11th. He will ascertain the points at which and the means by which the road from Sobral to Arruda can be destroyed.

12th. He will ascertain the labor and time required to entrench a position which he will fix upon for 2000 men to defend the road coming out of Arruda towards Villa Franca and Alhandra, and he will fix upon the spot at which the road from Arruda to Alhandra can be destroyed with advantage.

13th. He will construct a redoubt on the hill which commands the road from Arruda, about one league in front of Alhandra.

14th. He will examine the æstuaries at Alhandra, and see whether, by damming them up at the mouths, he could increase the difficulties of a passage by that place; and he will ascertain the time and labor and means which this work will require.

15th. He will fix upon the spots, and ascertain the time and labor required to construct redoubts upon the hill of Alhandra on the right, to prevent the passage of the enemy by the high road; and on the left, and in the rear, to prevent by their fire the occupation of the mountains towards Alverca.

16th. He will determine upon the works to be constructed on the right of the position upon the Serra de Serves, as above pointed out, to prevent the enemy from forcing that point; and he will calculate the means and the time required to execute them. He will likewise examine the pass of Bucellas, and fix upon the works to be constructed for its defence, and calculate the means, time, and labor required for the execution.

17th. He will calculate the means, time, and labor required to construct a work upon the hill upon which the windmill stands, at the southern entrance at the pass of Bucellas.

18th. He will fix upon spots on which signal posts can be erected upon these hills, to communicate from one part of the position to the other.

19th. It is very desirable that we should have an accurate plan of the ground.

20th. Examine the island in the river opposite to Alhandra, and fix upon the spot, and calculate the means and time required to construct batteries upon it to play upon the approach to Alhandra.

21st. Examine the effect of damming up the river which runs by Loures, and calculate the time and means required to break up the bridge at Loures.'

'I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from the Secretary of State, relative to the defence of this country, in the event of the enemy's armies in Spain being reinforced to such a degree as to render the possession of Portugal doubtful.

In case the enemy should make a serious attack upon Portugal, his object, as well as that of the allies, would be the possession of the city of Lisbon. The British army would necessarily have another object, viz.—a secure embarkation, after the possession of the city of Lisbon should be evidently lost.



The line of frontier of Portugal is so long in proportion to the extent and means of the country, and the Tagus and the mountains separate the parts of it so effectually from each other, and it is so open in many parts, that it would be impossible for an army, acting upon the defensive, to carry on its operations upon the frontier without being cut off from the capital. The scene of the operations of the army would therefore most probably be considerably within the frontier, whether their attack be made in winter or in summer; but if it should be made in summer, when the Tagus is fordable in many places, at least as low down as Salvaterra, the scene of the operations of the army would necessarily be lower down than that point. It is probable, also, that in the event of the enemy being enabled to invade this country in force, he will make his principal attack by the right of the Tagus; but he will employ one corps upon the left of that river, with the immediate object of embarrassing, if not of preventing, the embarkation of the British army, and of precluding the use of its navigation by the allies. I should wish, then, to be assisted with your opinion respecting the possibility of embarking the army in its transports, and bringing them away from the following places, in the event of a defeat by the enemy in the field which should oblige the British army to evacuate the country, and which of course supposes that they would be pressed by the enemy.

1st, Peniche.—I conceive that I should be able to hold this place during any length of time that might be necessary for an embarkation; but, from what I have above stated, you will observe that in the event of the attack being made between the months of June and November, when the Tagus is fordable, the operations of the army would be carried on in a part of the country which would be cut off from Peniche, and the retreat to that place would be impracticable.

2ndly, Paço d'Arcos on the Tagus.—I could not pretend to hold the high ground which commands Paço d'Arcos without occupying it with at least 20,000 men, which, in the circumstances stated, would possibly be the total amount to be embarked.

3rdly, The two bays to the eastward of St. Julian.—I could hold St. Julian and the Bugio for at least 8 days, and could cover an embarkation to be made in these bays, particularly in that immediately under St. Julian, and protect the passage of the fleet out of the river.

In deciding upon all projects of embarkation in the Tagus, I beg of you to advert to the probability that the enemy, if in sufficient force, may and will occupy the ground on the left of the river from Almada to Trafaria; and that you will consider how far it will be practicable, if it should be necessary under these circumstances, to remain in the Tagus with the fleet of transports.

4thly, Setuval.—I could hold the ground which would cover the embarkation and protect the passage of the fleet out of Setuval for 8 days: but it must be observed respecting this place of embarkation, that an enemy's corps on the left of the Tagus might, if in sufficient strength, render it impracticable to reach it with a beaten army.

It is also to be observed, that if the army, after its defeat, should be able to embark in boats and cross the Tagus, to go to Setuval, it might equally embark in boats to go to the transports in the Tagus, and a long and fatiguing march would be avoided.'

## 329.

To Colonel Peacocke.

Lisbon, 26th Oct. 1809.

' I am concerned to be obliged to inform you, that it has been mentioned to me that the British officers who are in Lisbon are in the habit of going to the theatres, where some of them conduct themselves in a very improper manner, much to the annoyance of the public, and to the injury of the proprietors and of the performers. I cannot conceive for what reason the officers of the British army should conduct themselves at Lisbon in a manner which would not be permitted in their own country, is contrary to rule and custom in this country, and is permitted in none where there is any regulation or decency of behaviour.

The officers commanding regiments, and the superior officers, must take measures to prevent a repetition of the conduct adverted to, and of the consequent complaints which I have received; or I must take measures which shall effectually prevent the character of the army and of the British nation from suffering by the misconduct of a few.

The officers of the army can have nothing to do behind the scenes, and it is very improper that they should appear upon the stage during the performance. They must be aware that the English public would not bear either the one or the other, and I see no reason why the Portuguese public should be worse treated. I have been concerned to see officers in uniform, with their hats on, upon the stage during the performance, and to hear of the riots and outrages which some of them have committed behind the scenes; and I can only repeat, that if this conduct should be continued, I shall be under the necessity of adopting measures to prevent it, for the credit of the army and of the country.

I beg you to communicate this letter to the commanding officers of the regiments in the garrison of Lisbon, and to the commanding officer of the detachments of convalescents, and desire them to communicate its contents to the officers under their command respectively. Indeed, officers who are absent from their duty on account of sickness might as well not go to the playhouse, or at all events upon the stage, and behind the scenes. I beg you also to take such measures as may appear to you to be necessary to prevent a repetition of this conduct.'

## 330.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Badajoz, 30th Oct. 1809.

' I am not surprised that Don M. de Garay should endeavor to attribute to the irregularities of the English Commissariat the deficiencies of supplies by means of transport experienced by the British army in its late service in Spain. I am not disposed to justify the English Commissaries where they deserve blame; but I think it only justice to them to declare that the British army is indebted to their exertions for the scanty supplies it received.

From some of the statements contained in Don M. de Garay's note, it would appear that the British army had suffered no distress during the late service; others have a tendency to prove that great distress was suffered by both armies at a very early period; particularly the quotation of a letter from General Cuesta of the 1st August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed to have made, that the Spanish army and their prisoners were



better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great distress from want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment; and although that distress might have been aggravated, it could not have been occasioned by the inexperience or the irregularity of the English Commissariat.

I know nothing of the orders which Don M. de Garay states were sent by the Government to the different Provincial Juntas, to provide provisions and means of transport for the British army, on its passage through the different towns in the provinces. If such orders were sent, it is obvious that the Central Junta, as a Government, have no power or influence over the Provincial Juntas and magistrates to whom their orders were addressed, as they produced no effect; and the supplies, such as they were, were procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English Commissaries. But it is obvious from Don M. de Garay's account of these orders, that the Central Junta had taken a very erroneous view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of the provision to be made for the troops while engaged in those operations; the Government provided by their orders for the troops only while on their passage through the towns; relying upon their immediate success, and making no provision for the collection in one body of not less than 50,000 men, even for one day. At the same time that they were guilty of this unpardonable omission, which paralysed all our efforts, they rendered that success doubtful by countermanding the orders given to General Venegas by General Cuesta; and thus exposing the combined armies to a general action with the enemy's concentrated force. The effect of their orders will appear more fully in the following detail.

As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I sent a Commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo to endeavor to procure mules to attend the army, in concert with Señor Lozano de Torres; that city and its neighbourhood being the places in which the army commanded by the late Sir J. Moore had been most largely supplied. Don M. de Garay expresses the astonishment of the Government that the British army should have entered Spain unprovided with the means of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs preceding this expression of astonishment, he informs your Excellency, in the name of the Government, that they had given orders to the Provincial Juntas of Badajoz and Castille (at Ciudad Rodrigo), and the magistrates, to supply and provide us with those means, which of course they must have been aware that we should require. No army can carry on its operations if unprovided with means of transport, and the British army was, from circumstances, particularly in want at that moment.

The means of transport commonly used in Portugal are carts drawn by bullocks, which are unable, without great distress, to move more than 12 miles in a day, a distance much shorter than that which the state of the country in which the army was to carry on its operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, would oblige the army to march. The number of carts which we had been able to bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw our ammunition, and there were none to carry provisions.

Having failed in procuring at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the neighbourhood the means of transport which I required, I wrote to General O'Donoju on the 16th July a letter, in which, after stating our wants, and the failure of

the country in supplying them, I gave notice that if they were not supplied, I should discontinue my co-operation with General Cuesta, after I should have performed my part in the first operation which we had concerted, namely, the removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and if not supplied as I required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. From this letter of the 16th it will appear that I called for the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain if they were not furnished, not only long previous to the retreat across the Tagus of the 4th August, but even previous to the commencement of the operations of the campaign.

Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th July was communicated to the Central Junta both by Mr. Frere and General Cuesta, the British army has to this day received no assistance of this description from Spain, excepting 20 carts which joined at Merida, 10 on the 30th August, and 10 on the 1st September; and 300 mules of about 500 which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. None of the mules stated to have been hired and dispatched to the army from Seville, or by Egua or Cevallos, or the two brigades of 40 each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; and I conclude they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, as are the remainder of the 10 brigades of carts (100), which were intended and are marked for the British army. But none of these mules or carts, supposing them to have been sent from Seville for our use, reached Estremadura till after the 21st August, the day on which, after 5 weeks' notice, I was obliged to separate from the Spanish army.

It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from Spain, as then carried into execution, "was sudden," or ought to have surprised the Government; nor does it appear to have been "perilous," from what has since occurred in this part of Spain. I ought probably on the 16th July to have determined to suspend all operations till the army should be supplied with the means it required; but having on the 11th July settled with General Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by the armies under the command of General Venegas, General Cuesta, and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint General Cuesta. I believed that General Venegas would have carried into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his army, although I was afterwards disappointed in that expectation; and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience rather than that General Venegas' corps should be exposed alone to the attack of the enemy; and above all, I was induced to hope that I should be supplied.

Accordingly I marched on the 18th July from Plasencia, the soldiers carrying on their backs the provisions to the 21st, on which day a junction was formed with General Cuesta's army; and from that day to the 24th August the troops or their horses did not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and deficiency both in quality and quantity were so great, that I considered it a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them, during that period, half the sum usually stopped from their pay for rations. The forage given to the horses was picked up for them by their riders, wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, which are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was, that, exclusive of the loss by



engaging with the enemy, the army lost in the short period of 5 weeks not less than 1500 horses.

I have no knowledge of what passed between General Cuesta and Señor Lozano de Torres and the Intendant of provisions of the Spanish army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; the first time on the 22nd July, when he waited upon me to claim for the Spanish army 16,000 rations of bread, which had been brought into Talavera and had been sent to my quarters, and which were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that the British troops were in want: and the second time on the 25th July, when he waited upon me also at Talavera to desire that the ovens of that town might be delivered over for the use of the Spanish army; they having moved to Sta Olalla, and the British army being still at Talavera. This request, which was not complied with, is an example of the preference which was given to the British troops while they were in Spain.

The orders stated to have been given by the Central to the Provincial Juntas and magistrates were not more effectual in procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In the interval between the 15th and 21st July, the British Commissaries had made contracts with the magistrates of the different villages in the Vera de Plasencia, a country abounding in resources of every description, for the delivery at Talavera, on different days before the 24th July, of 250,000 rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed; the British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the enemy when he retired on that day; and I conclude that the French army have since subsisted on these resources.

The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the rice or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for their use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which the men were only prevented from starving, during the period to which I have adverted; nor was it attended "by the troops of biscuit bakers;" nor did it enjoy any of the advantage of their labors; nor was the supposed magazine of 400,000 lbs. of biscuit ever formed. These are notorious facts which cannot be disputed, to the truth of which every officer and soldier in the army can bear testimony.

I assure your Excellency, that not only have the supplies furnished to the army under my command been paid for, whenever the bills for them could be got in, but the old debts, due to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to the army under the command of the late Sir J. Moore, have been discharged; and I have repeatedly desired the Spanish agents, and others acting with the army, and the different Juntas with which I have communicated, to let the people know, that all demands upon the British Government which could be substantiated would be discharged.

I beg to refer your Excellency to my dispatches of the 21st August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at Truxillo, on the 20th August; and of the state of the supplies of provisions and forage at that period.

Lieut. Colonel Waters had, by my desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish Commissariat for the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two armies; and he, as well as I, was satisfied with the principle and detail of that arrangement. But if the British army received only one

third of a ration on the 19th August, and only one half of a ration on the 20th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses of the army received nothing, and if the state of the magazine at Truxillo was such at that time as to hold out no hope, not of improvement, (for it was too late to wait for improvement,) but of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all descriptions, I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point of fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement made by Lieut. Colonel Waters, was to be the sole source of the supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th August, a sufficiency to supply one day's demand upon it.

But it is said that Don L. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the British army; upon which I have only to observe, that I had trusted too long to the promises of Spanish agents; and that I had particular reason for want of confidence in Don L. de Calvo; as, at the moment he was assuring me that the British army should have all the provisions the country could afford, in preference to, and to the exclusion of, the Spanish army, I had in my possession an order from him, (of which your Excellency has a copy,) addressed to the magistrate of Guadalupe, directing him to send to the head quarters of the Spanish army provisions which a British Commissary had ordered to be prepared and sent to the magazine at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, in conformity with the agreement entered into with the Spanish Commissaries by Lieut. Colonel Waters.

As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate cause (as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing from Spain, I beg to observe to your Excellency, that I was not mistaken in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not misinformed, General Eguia's army suffered the greatest distress in the neighbourhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the country and the magazine at Truxillo had been relieved from the burthen of supporting the British army.

In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the Spanish General Officers, many things were done of which I did not approve, some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary to positive agreement.

Don M. de Garay has stated that the orders to the Marques de la Romana were framed in conformity with suggestions from Marshal Beresford; and thence he infers that the operations of that corps were approved of by me.

The Marques de la Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th, and I believe as late as the 9th August; and the armies of Estremadura retired across the Tagus on the 4th August. This reference to dates shows that there was, and could have been, no connexion in the operations of those different armies. In fact, I knew nothing about the Marques de la Romana's operations; and till I heard on the 3rd August that Marshal Ney's corps had passed through the mountains of Estremadura at Baños, and was at Naval-moral, I did not believe that that part of the enemy's army had quitted Astorga; or that the Marques was at liberty, or had it in his power to quit Galicia.

Marshal Beresford's corps was collected upon the frontiers of Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming the troops; and it was hoped that he would keep in check the enemy's corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened Portugal; that he would act as a corps of observation in that quarter, and on the left of the British army;



and I particularly requested Marshal Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. But I never intended, and never held out any hope to the Spanish officers, that the corps under Marshal Beresford could effect any operation at that period of the campaign; and never was a party to any arrangement of an operation in which that corps was to be concerned.

In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of which I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary to positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion may have been right; but still they acted in a manner of which they were aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note that all operations were carried on with my concurrence is unfounded.

I expected, from the communications I had with General Cuesta through Sir R. Wilson and Colonel Roche, that the Puerto de Baños would have been effectually occupied and secured; and at all events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, upon which I was aware that all the operations, nay the security, of the army depended, would not have retired without firing a shot.

It was agreed between General Cuesta and me, on the 11th July, that General Venegas, who was under his command, should march by Tembleque, Ocaña, and Fuentidueña, to Arganda, near Madrid; where he was to be on the 22nd and 23rd July, when the combined armies should be at Talavera and Escalona. This agreement was not performed; and the consequence of its non-performance (which had been foreseen) occurred, viz., that the combined armies were engaged with the enemy's concentrated force. I have heard that the cause of the non-performance of this agreement was, that the Central Junta had countermanded the orders which General Venegas had received from General Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I shall make no observation upon this proceeding; excepting that the plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into execution by General Venegas in this instance.

It was agreed by General Cuesta on the 2nd August, that when I marched against Soult on the 3rd, he should remain at Talavera; that agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion, that he ought not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the charge of my hospital, without my consent. I do not conceive, that if General Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added 34,000 men to the numbers already opposed to the combined armies in Estremadura, the enemy were too strong for us; and it was necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if General Cuesta had held the post at Talavera according to agreement, I should have been able to remove my hospital; or at all events, to know the exact situation of every individual left there, and I think that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat.

When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid observing upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting the assistance afforded by General Cuesta to remove the English hospital from Talavera; that assistance amounted to 4 carts on the 3rd August at Talavera; and 2 carts on the 4th August at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded,

and of those subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army, or the country. We were obliged to lay down our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army, and to unload the treasure, and employ the carts in the removal of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance which could have been afforded was withheld on the 22nd and 23rd August; Don L. de Calvo and Señor Lozano de Torres being in the town.

In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by me, I am of opinion, that if General Bassecourt had been detached towards Plasencia on the 30th July, when I recommended that movement, and if the troops had done their duty, Soult would have been stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient length of time to enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and here again the hospital would have been saved. He was not detached, however, till the 2nd; and then, I understand from Don M. de Garay's note, that it was General Cuesta's opinion that the movement was useless.

It could not have been considered useless by General Cuesta on the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment from the combined armies originated with himself on that day; and it could not have been considered useless even on the morning of the 2nd; as, till the evening of that day, we did not receive intelligence of the arrival of Soult at Plasencia. A reference to the date of the period at which the General considered this detachment as useless would have been desirable.

I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by General Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa on the morning of the 4th August. The army had left Talavera on the morning of the 3rd, and had marched to Oropesa, 6 leagues, or 24 miles on that day; which I conceive a sufficient distance for a body of men which had been starving for many days before. The accounts received on the evening of the 3rd, of the enemy's position at Navalnoral, and of his strength, and of General Cuesta's intended march on that evening, leaving my hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and consider our situation; and at least not to move before daylight on the 4th; shortly after which time General Cuesta arrived at Oropesa.

Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus; and that every moment's delay must expose them to the risk of being cut off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if it had been successful, could not have improved our situation: two battles, or possibly three, must have been fought and gained before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the British army at least equal to such an exertion at that moment. It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army; but the occurrences at Arzobispo a few days afterwards showed that they were not equal to any great contest.

Don M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of supplies, which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the British army experienced. I know of but one



alteration in the plan of operations, and in the direction of the march, which was occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred. When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy at Plasencia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to move towards Plasencia, to attack the enemy's corps which had passed through the Puerto. That intention was altered only when I heard of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and when I found that, by General Cuesta's movement from Talavera, the rear of the army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option, to join, or to attack us in separate bodies. It could not be attributed to me that this large reinforcement was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier intelligence of their approach.

The Puerto de Baños was abandoned, without firing a shot, by the Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the Junta of Castille, if they knew of the collection of the enemy's troops at Salamanca, sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received till accounts came that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Roble and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the enemy marched into Navalmoral in Estremadura in such strength, and the post at Talavera was abandoned, the Central Junta will find it difficult to convince their country and the world that it was not expedient to alter the plan of our operations, and the direction of our march.

But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army, in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was from the offensive to the defensive; the march was retrograde; and if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly, we did meet supplies on the road; but they were for the Spanish army; and, although our troops were starving at the time, they were forwarded untouched to their destination.

I have sent to Marshal Beresford a copy of that part of Don M. de Garay's note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army under his command, upon which he will make his observations, which I propose to forward to your Excellency. I shall here, therefore, only repeat, that the want of magazines, and the apathy and disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great distress from want while within the Spanish frontier.

Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are remedied; till I shall see magazines established for the supply of the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled; and an army upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I do not think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to show the fallacy of Don M. de Garay's calculations of the relative numerical strength of the allies, and of the enemy in the Peninsula: if the fallacy were not so

great as I am certain it is, I should be of the same opinion respecting the expediency of co-operating with the Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no injury: and if Don M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is, in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in the state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and in which they ought to be to invite our co-operation, the deficiency of 36,000 men, which the British and Portuguese armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their undertaking immediately those operations which Don M. de Garay is of opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those blessings for which we are contending.'

## 331.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Badajoz, 14th Nov. 1809.

'I delayed to reply to Lord Castlereagh's dispatch of the 14th September, till I should be able to go to Lisbon, and should have ascertained, on the ground, the possibility of defending the Kingdom of Portugal, from which I was prevented till late in October by the movements of the armies in the neighborhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the report required by his Lordship has been further delayed by a necessary reference to the opinion of Admiral Berkeley on some of the points of the inquiry, and by my journey to the south of Spain to communicate personally with Lord Wellesley, previous to his departure for England.

From all I have learned of the state of the enemy's force at present in the Peninsula, I am of opinion, that unless the Spanish armies should meet with some great misfortune, the enemy could not make an attack upon Portugal; and if events in Spain should enable the enemy to make such an attack, the force at present in Portugal is able to defend that country.

If in consequence of the peace in Germany the enemy's army in the Peninsula should be largely reinforced, it is obvious that the enemy will acquire the means of attacking Portugal, not only in proportion to the extent of his reinforcements, but in proportion as the arrival of those reinforcements may have an effect upon the public mind in Spain, and may induce persons, now in hostility with the enemy, to submit to his usurpation, and thus enable him to employ troops in active operations which are at present employed only on the defensive, in keeping up the communication between his armies, or in guarding certain interesting and important points in the country.

Even in this case, however, I conceive that till Spain shall have been conquered, and shall have submitted to the conqueror, the enemy will find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, if His Majesty should continue to employ an army in the defence of this country, and if the

G. A. O.

Badajoz, 31st Oct. 1809.

'3. The Commander of the Forces requests the officers commanding divisions will make their divisions march a distance of not less than 3 leagues in marching order twice a week, besides the formations which the nature of the ground may induce them to make in the course of the march. The officers commanding the cavalry and artillery will also, by frequent exercise, prevent the horses losing the habit of marching.

5. The Commander of the Forces desires that the officers commanding brigades of artillery will distinctly understand, that he holds them responsible for the condition of the artillery horses attached to their brigades, and they will take measures that the officers and men of the gunner drivers do their duty by taking proper care of them.'



improvements in the Portuguese military service should be carried to the extent of which they are capable.

The extent of the army which it would be necessary that His Majesty should employ in Portugal ought to be 30,000 effective men, in aid of the whole military establishment of Portugal, consisting of 3000 artillery, 3000 cavalry, 36,000 regular infantry, and 3000 caçadores and the militia.

I have lately ascertained, as nearly as possible, the expense to Great Britain of this British army in Portugal, which I find amounts to £1,756,236 per annum. It must be observed, however, upon this point, that these troops, if employed elsewhere abroad, would cost an equal sum; and if employed in Great Britain or Ireland, would cost £1,188,192, or £568,044 less than they would in Portugal or Spain. In this calculation I have not included the expense of transports to attend upon this army. This is an expense which must be incurred for a British army employed on any service abroad, and in the circumstances now under consideration, must be incurred for the army employed in Portugal. But it is probable that the larger part, if not the whole of the transports, which it would be necessary to attach to the army in Portugal, would be on the public service, if the army were at home.

In respect to the Portuguese army, the public now incur an expense of about £600,000 per annum, being the expenses of 20,000 Portuguese troops, and the pay of the British officers employed with the Portuguese army: but I conceive that other expenses must be incurred in order to put the Portuguese army in the state in which it ought to be for this impending contest.

The expense which in my opinion must be incurred at present by Great Britain, in addition to that already incurred, is that of an increase of pay to the officers of the Portuguese army, without which it is vain to hope for much exertion from them. The officers of the Portuguese army have for many years done little or no duty. Their country having, with trifling and short exceptions, been at peace since the year 1763, they were generally throughout their service employed in the same garrison, if they remained with their regiments; or they lived with their families at home. Besides these advantages, I believe that the abuses which had crept into the service afforded them others, of no small amount; and they were certainly enabled to maintain themselves upon this low pay, as officers ought, in a country in which all the necessaries of life are dearer than they are in England.

It is scarcely necessary to point out the alteration in their situation produced by the appointment of Marshal Beresford to command the Portuguese army. All the abuses which existed in the service have been done away; and a regular system of discipline has been established, requiring the attention and attendance of all the officers with their regiments; and the situation of the country, and the duties required from the army, have necessarily removed the regiments from their fixed stations, and have increased to a very large amount the necessary expenses of the officers.

Your Lordship will observe, from what I shall have to lay before you in a subsequent part of this dispatch, that it is absolutely impossible for the Portuguese Government to bear the expense of this augmentation of the pay of the officers of the army. As far as I have been able to learn their sentiments, they feel the necessity for it; but are unwilling to give orders that

it should be carried into execution, till they shall be certain that they possess the means of defraying the expense.

I enclose a paper stating the actual pay of each rank in the Portuguese service, with the proposed increase, the expense of which will amount to about £130,000 per annum. Adverting to the miserable situation in which those officers now are, compared with that of the British, the Spanish (whose pay has been very largely increased), and the French officers, with whom they are liable to meet on service; and the severe, but necessary discipline which has been introduced into their army; and to the service which will be required from them, I cannot avoid recommending that His Majesty should furnish the Portuguese Government with a sum sufficient to defray the expense of this augmentation of pay during the war.

I am not aware of any other specific head of expense, the means of which it would be desirable that Great Britain should furnish, in order to enable the Portuguese Government to support the impending contest. I cannot avoid, however, drawing your Lordship's attention to the general state of the finances of this Government, of which I have obtained a knowledge, in consequence of the confidence reposed in me, with His Majesty's consent, by the Prince Regent.

The estimated expense, civil and military, of the Government of Portugal for the year 1809 is 14,679,250 dollars. The estimated revenue is 8,447,500 dollars; thus leaving a deficiency of 6,221,750 dollars.

The revenue, the heads of which we estimated, actually received and expected to be received by the end of the year, amounts to 7,031,927 dollars; and the sums have been received this year, which cannot be expected in future, making a total receipt, in 1809, of 8,607,337 dollars, leaving a deficiency of 6,070,000 dollars.

The public servants on the civil and judicial establishments, the interests of debts, and other necessary expenses of the Government, have been paid only in part; and the necessary expenses only, such as the army, and some civil expenses, equally necessary for the existence of the state, have been defrayed.

The assistance afforded by Great Britain amounts to about £500,000 per annum; and the remainder, about £900,000, is a deficiency which cannot be made good in Portugal. It is obvious that it becomes more probable every day, that this deficiency of revenue will fall upon the means allotted for the support of the army. Very lately, His Majesty's servants and officers in this country were obliged to consider of means to be afforded immediately to enable the Portuguese Government to collect magazines for the support of their army; without which, they must have disbanded a part of their force, and the whole would have been in a state of inefficiency at the moment at which their services would be called for. It does not appear to me to be practicable to diminish the expenses, or to increase the revenue of the country, or to raise money by loans on its own credit.

In respect to the revenue, I have to observe, that the country is so much impoverished by the events of late years, and by the emigration of the Court to Brazil, that the inhabitants are not able to pay the taxes already imposed upon them; and the produce of the Customs, which was formerly the principal branch of the revenue, is almost reduced to nothing, owing to the transfer of the Brazil trade from Portugal to Great Britain.



This transfer, if an advantage to Great Britain, as it is evidently and materially disadvantageous to Portugal, would appear to give to Portugal a claim for some assistance in this moment of difficulty, in addition to that which the policy of His Majesty has induced him to afford to the Government to support their military establishment. Probably a sum of £300,000 per annum, in addition to the expense of the increase of pay to the officers, to enable the Government to defray the expense of forming and maintaining the magazines, for the support of the Portuguese army; or an engagement by the British Government to maintain 10,000 additional troops, which would cost about £250,000 per annum, leaving the expense of the magazines upon the Government, would enable them to get through the difficulties of the moment; but I am convinced, from what I have seen of the state of the Portuguese finances, that without some assistance of this description, the whole will sooner or later fail; and all the trouble taken, and all the expense hitherto incurred, will have been thrown away.

In respect to the embarkation of the British army, in the event of failure in the contest which we may expect in Portugal, I have the honor to enclose the copies of a correspondence which I have had with Admiral Berkeley upon that subject, and I have no doubt that we should be able in that case to embark, and bring away the British army, not including the horses of the cavalry and of the artillery.

In respect of these, I would submit to your Lordship, that it should be decided that they should not be brought away from the Peninsula. In the event of an embarkation after a defeat, it would be impossible to bring them away; and in any other event, if the transports which should be employed should be retained only 3 months in the service, their expense for each horse will amount to £30, after deducting the expense of transporting the man, for whom provision must still be made, whereas the original purchase money of the horse would be only 25 guineas. It is true that many of the horses are worth more money; but others, after long service in this country, would be useless in England; and if the army should not be forced to embark by adverse circumstances, it is probable that the horses would be sold for more than it would cost to take them home.

I would therefore recommend to the Government to provide transports only for the conveyance of the better horses belonging to officers, which could not be replaced without large expense to themselves, or to the public. In the event of the evacuation of Portugal by the British army, either at the present moment, or after a defeat, I am not aware of any measures which could be adopted, which would enable the Portuguese Government to continue to hold the country for the Prince Regent.

Although I consider the Portuguese Government and army as the principals in the contests for their own independence, and that the success or failure must depend principally upon their own exertions, and the bravery of their army (and I am sanguine in my expectations of both from them, when excited by the example of British officers and troops), I have no hope of either, if His Majesty should now withdraw his army from the Peninsula; or if it should be obliged to evacuate it by defeat. I have no doubt that the immediate consequence of withdrawing from the Peninsula would be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably without contest, and that other

consequences would follow, affecting the state of the war not only in Portugal, but in Spain.

If, therefore, it should be thought advisable now to withdraw from Portugal, or if, eventually, the British army should be obliged to withdraw, I would recommend to His Majesty's Government to consider of the means of carrying away such of the Portuguese officers and troops as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than to continue by their means the contest and the defence of Portugal.'

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332.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Badajoz, 14th Nov. 1809.

'I wrote to you an official letter this day, in answer to one from Lord Castlereagh of the 14th September, which will probably satisfy you upon all the points referred to by your Lordship in your private letter of the 20th October. However, as the arrangement of the questions\* contained in that letter may be more convenient to you than those in Lord Castlereagh's dispatch, to which mine is an answer, which were of a general nature, and as every consideration of this interesting subject is desirable, I proceed to give you answers to the questions contained in your letter.

In answer to the first question, my opinion is, that if the Spaniards are commonly prudent, if they do not adventure themselves too far forward to obtain possession of the capital before the enemy shall receive his reinforcements, and to gain a momentary popularity for the cause, it must be a very large reinforcement indeed which would give the enemy the military possession, much larger that which would lead to the complete subjugation of the country.

In answer to your second question, my opinion is, that the enemy ought to make the possession of Portugal their first object, when their reinforcements shall arrive in Spain.

I do not think they will succeed with an army of 70,000, or even of 80,000 men, if they do not make the attack for 2 or 3 months, which I believe now to be impossible. I conceive not only that they may, but will make the attack before they will subdue the north of Spain. The centre of Spain, or Old Castille, is already subdued; and indeed that country, at all times, in all wars, has been in the possession of the army which was strongest, particularly in cavalry.

In answer to your third question, my opinion is, that the enemy have

\* Questions put to Lieut. General Viscount Wellington in Lord Liverpool's private letter of the 20th October:—

1st. As there is every reason to believe that peace has been concluded between France and Austria, and that the whole military efforts of France will probably in a short time be directed in consequence of this event against Spain, what is the chance of these efforts proving successful;—I mean their leading, with partial exceptions, to the complete subjugation of the country?

2nd. Would the French be likely to make a serious attack upon Portugal before they had acquired a tolerably quiet possession of every part of Spain north of the Sierra Morena? Are they likely to be able to spare an army sufficient for this purpose, before the north and centre of Spain are subdued?

3rd. If a serious attack is made by the French upon Portugal, what is at present the prospect of successful resistance?

4th. If resistance is not likely to prove ultimately successful, how far would the British army be endangered, and its embarkation be likely to be prevented, by delaying to withdraw it till the French had penetrated in force into Portugal?



neither the means nor the intention of attacking Portugal at present, and that they would be successfully resisted. I am likewise of opinion that when they shall receive their reinforcements, they can be successfully resisted.

You will find a complete answer to your fourth question in my dispatch of this date. I am convinced we could embark after defeat.

I enclose the last weekly state of the army, which will show you its strength. Included in the sick and absent are the wounded at Talavera, about 1500 in number, and about 1700 convalescents at Lisbon and Elvas, which will reduce the number of sick to about 6000 men upon an army of about 30,000. We are now, as I believe the whole world is, very sickly; but in all times and places the sick list amounts to at least 10 men in the 100, or 3000 upon 30,000 men. In order, therefore, to give us an efficient operating army of 30,000 men, you should send us 3000 men soon. We ought also to have 1000 men to occupy the castle of Lisbon, and another 1000 to make up for the deficiency in the return, which will be occasioned by the departure of the 23rd light dragoons, and probable losses by death between this time and the period in which we shall have the contest, making in the whole 35,000 rank and file, besides the prisoners at Talavera, still in the return.

I would besides recommend a relief of our bad second battalions. There are really many in this army that are quite unfit for service in respect to composition and discipline; and they, as well as the old regiments, are made worse by the constant change of the officers. At this moment, there are not less than 60 officers quitting the battalions in this army, with which they have served and have acquired some experience, to join other battalions of the same regiment in some other part of the world. The worst of this arrangement is, that the officers who go are the oldest, and probably the best of their respective ranks; and they are replaced by others, without experience, who have no knowledge of their men or of their duty, or of the orders and regulations of this army, and the whole must be taught to them; and it is not less expensive to the public than it is prejudicial to the service, as the travelling expenses of each of these officers to and from their battalions are paid by the public.

It is besides very necessary that some effectual measures should be taken to increase the medical staff, not with gentlemen of rank, but with hospital mates. The duty of the general hospitals in every active army ought to be done by the general Medical Staff, and the regiments ought to have their surgeons and assistants entirely disengaged for any extraordinary event or sickness that may occur. We have not now one surgeon or assistant with each regiment, instead of three, the others being employed in the hospitals instead of hospital mates, and we have always been equally deficient. Indeed, one of the reasons which induced me to cross the Tagus on the 4th August, instead of attacking Soult, was the want of surgeons with the army, all being employed with the hospitals, and there being scarcely one for each brigade; and if we had had an action, we should not have been able to dress our wounded.

G. O.

Badajoz, 16th Nov. 1809.

'8. The Commander of the Forces requests the officers commanding regiments will take care that the officers who have lately joined this army are made acquainted with all the General Orders which have at different times been given out.'

I entirely concur with you, and wish you every success in the measures you are taking for forming a Government, and I hope you will not allow yourself to be diverted from them by any circumstances whatever. If you are beaten you cannot help it, but do not give up unnecessarily.'

## 333.

To Lieut. Colonel Roche.

Badajoz, 19th Nov. 1809.

'I do not understand how General Areyza could think that I was to co-operate with him. I can co-operate in nothing of which I have no knowledge, or, indeed, I might say, which is not concerted with me; but not only was this plan not concerted with me (if there was ever any plan at all), but the whole system on which it is founded and proceeds is known to be directly contrary to my opinion, and the advice I have repeatedly given.'

## 334.

To Bart. Frere, Esq.

Badajoz, 19th Nov. 1809.

'With respect to the blame that will be transferred to us for the misfortunes which there is reason to apprehend will be the result of these operations, I am too much accustomed to receive blame for the actions of others to feel much concern upon the subject, and I can only endeavor not to deserve any for my own.'

## 335.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Badajoz, 21st Nov. 1809.

'I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the frequent paragraphs in the English newspapers, describing the position, the numbers, the objects, and the means of attaining them, possessed by the armies in Spain and Portugal.

In some instances the English newspapers have accurately stated, not only the regiments occupying a position, but the number of men fit for duty of which each regiment was composed; and this intelligence must have reached the enemy at the same time it did me, at a moment at which it was most important that he should not receive it.

The newspapers have recently published an account of the defensive positions occupied by the different English and Portuguese corps, which certainly conveyed to the enemy the first knowledge he had of them; and I enclose a paragraph recently published, describing the line of operation which I should follow in case of the occurrence of a certain event, the preparations which I had made for that operation, and where I had formed my magazines. It is not necessary to inquire in what manner the newspapers acquire this description of information; but if the editors really feel an anxiety for the success of the military operations in the Peninsula, they will refrain from giving this information to the public, as they must know that their papers are read by the enemy, and that the information which they are desirous of conveying to their English readers is mischievous to the public, exactly in proportion as it is well founded and correct. Your Lordship will be the best judge whether any and what measures ought to be adopted to prevent the publication of this description of intelligence. I can only assure you that it will increase materially the difficulty of all operations in this country.'



336.

To \*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*

Badajoz, 26th Nov. 1809.

‘ It always gives me great concern to be under the necessity of refusing compliance with a request made to me by an officer of the army under my command; and I might have hoped to have been spared this concern by one who must know that I should be happy to gratify him if it were in my power; and who must be aware that it is not only unusual, but absolutely without precedent, that any officer should ask, much less obtain leave of absence from the army while on foreign service on any account, excepting on that of sickness or of business, the neglect of which might be materially prejudicial to the officer who requests the leave.

I repeat, that I cannot give leave to any officer whose health does not require his return to England, or who has not business to transact which cannot be done by another, and cannot be delayed. You cannot bring forward either of these pleas. Your health is good; and as for your business, I know of none that can require your immediate return which would not have required that you should have remained in England when you left it 6 months ago.

I trust that I shall be spared the pain of again refusing you.’

337.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Badajoz, 28th Nov. 1809.

‘ I have received your letter of the 1st instant, and I assure you that nothing can be more satisfactory to me than to renew my public communications with you. I am convinced that I shall always receive from you that fair protection, support, and assistance, to which an officer is entitled when he acts fairly by the public; and all the friendship and kindness which I have been accustomed to receive from you in another situation.

I trust that my public and private letters on the subject of the war in the Peninsula, and of Portugal in particular, will have been satisfactory to you and to the Government. You see that I agree entirely in opinion with you, not only that we cannot in good policy give up the Peninsula, but that we may be able to continue the contest in Portugal with success, and that we shall finally bring off our army.

During the continuance of this contest, which must necessarily be defensive on our part, in which there may be no brilliant events, and in which, after all, I may fail, I shall be most confoundedly abused, and in the end I may lose the little character I have gained; but I should not act fairly by

G. A. O.

Badajoz, 29th Nov. 1809.

‘ 1. Officers commanding brigades of artillery are requested to give directions, that when the horses attached to their guns are sent to water, or to exercise, they may be marched regularly under the command of an officer of the gunner drivers; an officer of the gunner drivers should likewise attend all horse parades.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests the officers commanding regiments to explain to both officers and soldiers of the battalions under their command, that it is equally criminal to resist a Spanish or Portuguese sentry or guard, as it is to resist either belonging to the British army.

A guard or sentry must be understood at all times to be charged with the execution of the orders of a competent authority at the place in which either may be stationed, or may be found, and must not be resisted on any account.

Guards or sentries may mistake their orders, or may execute them improperly, and in these cases complaints must be made; but on no account must they be resisted.’

the Government if I did not tell them my real opinion, which is, that they will betray the honor and interests of the country if they do not continue their efforts in the Peninsula, which, in my opinion, are by no means hopeless, notwithstanding the defeat of Areyzaga.'

338.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Badajoz, 30th Nov. 1809.

'The Spanish army in La Mancha, which I reported to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 16th November, were on the 10th instant at Los Barrios, not far from Ocaña, moved on that night to attack a French corps which was in Ocaña.

It appears that the Spanish Commander in Chief was not aware that the French corps in Ocaña consisted of 5000 infantry as well as of 800 cavalry; and he made his first attack with the Spanish cavalry only, supported by the infantry, which were repulsed with some loss of men, and, as I have understood, of 2 pieces of cannon. The French maintained their position in Ocaña till 3 in the morning, when they retired one league from the town towards Aranjuez; and at daylight they retired to that town, and the Spanish army took up its quarters again at Los Barrios. They remained there till the 13th, when they moved to their right to Santa Cruz de la Zarza; and on the 18th they returned to Los Barrios, with an intention of attacking a French corps of about 25,000 men, including 5000 cavalry, which was advanced from Aranjuez towards Ocaña.

General Areyzaga found, however, that it was most probable that the enemy would attack him before he should be prepared to make his movement, and he formed his army in the plain in the rear of Ocaña to receive their attack on the morning of the 19th instant. The enemy advanced in 3 columns, with one of which they took possession of Ocaña; and having overthrown the Spanish cavalry on the right of their position, they broke the Spanish infantry of the right wing, which was thrown into confusion; and the left wing of the army, which was likewise threatened with an attack by the right column of the enemy, retired without firing a shot.

The loss of the Spanish army upon this occasion has been considerable.

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I was at Seville, however, when the General commenced his march from the Sierra Morena; and in more than one conversation with the Spanish Ministers and Members of the Junta, communicated to them my conviction that General Areyzaga would be defeated.

The expectation, however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of 50,000 men, was so general and so sanguine, that the possibility of disappointment was not even contemplated; and, accordingly, your Lordship will find it was not until the 16th that the Government began to think it necessary to endeavor to make a diversion in favor of General Areyzaga; and it is probable that it was thought expedient to make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the General's own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the 10th instant.

It is impossible for me to express any opinion on the probable consequences of this defeat, till I shall know its exact extent, and in what numbers and in what state the Spanish troops will re-assemble.



I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British army, and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castille, from thinking that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy from effecting any important object, and which will best answer for my future operations in the defence of Portugal.'

339.

To Colonel Malcolm.

Badajoz, 3rd Dec. 1809.

'You cannot conceive how much I have felt for what has passed on the Madras Establishment. I scarcely recognise in those transactions the men for whom I entertained so much respect, and had so much regard, a few years back; and I can only lament that they, and the army, and the affairs of that Presidency in general, have been so much mismanaged. These transactions, and their causes, prove that it is not always the man who has the character of being the best natured, and one of the easiest disposition, who will agree best with those placed in authority over him, or those with whom he is to co-operate. They owe their origin to the disputes of the persons in authority in India, that is to say, between the Governor and the Commander in Chief. Both, but principally the latter, looked for partisans and supporters; and these have ended by throwing off all subordination, by relinquishing all habits of obedience, and almost by open resistance. Nothing can be more absurd than the pretext for this conduct.

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It is really not worth while to take up my time in describing, or your's in perusing, a description of the folly, the inconsistency, or the breaches of discipline and subordination contained in all those documents. I have so much regard for the Madras army, to which I owe much, that I would sacrifice a great deal to have it in my power to restore them to that state of discipline, union, and respectability in which I left them in the year 1805; and I assure you that I shall rejoice most sincerely when I shall hear that their good sense and good temper have predominated over their feelings of party and their prejudices.

\* \* \* \* \*

You will have heard of all that has passed in this country, and I will not, therefore, trouble you with a repetition of the story. The battle of Talavera was certainly the hardest fought of modern days, and the most glorious in its result to our troops. Each side engaged lost a quarter of their numbers.

It is lamentable that, owing to the miserable inefficiency of the Spaniards, to their want of exertion, and the deficiency of numbers even of the allies, much more of discipline, and every other military quality, when compared with the enemy in the Peninsula, the glory of the action is the only benefit which we have derived from it. But that is a solid and substantial benefit, of which we have derived some good consequences already; for, strange to say, I have contrived, with the little British army, to keep every thing in check since the month of August last; and if the Spaniards had not contrived, by their own folly, and against my entreaties and remonstrances, to lose an army in La Mancha about a fortnight ago, I think we might have brought them through the contest. As it is, however, I do not despair. I have in hand a most difficult task, from which I may not extricate myself;

but I must not shrink from it. I command *an unanimous army*; I draw well with all the authorities in Spain and Portugal, and I believe I have the good wishes of the whole world. In such circumstances one may fail, but it would be dishonorable to shrink from the task.

Pray remember me kindly to all friends in the East Indies. I do not mention names, as I do not know whom you have with you; but I assure you that I have the most affectionate recollection of them all, and that nothing gives me greater pleasure than to hear of their prosperity.'

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340.

To Bart. Frere, Esq.

Badajoz, 6th Dec. 1809.

'I shall not detain the messenger by any addition to my official letters of this day, excepting to lament that a cause, which promised so well a few weeks ago, should have been so completely lost by the ignorance, presumption, and mismanagement of those to whose direction it was intrusted.

I declare that if they had preserved their two armies, or even one of them, the cause was safe. The French could have sent no reinforcements which could have been of any use; time would have been gained; the state of affairs would have improved daily; all the chances were in our favor; and in the first moment of weakness occasioned by any diversion on the Continent, or by the growing discontent of the French themselves with the war, the French armies must have been driven out of Spain. But no! Nothing will answer excepting to fight great battles in plains, in which their defeat is as certain as is the commencement of the battle. They will not credit the accounts I have repeatedly given them of the superior number even of the French; they will seek them out, and they find them invariably in all parts in numbers superior to themselves.'

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341.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Badajoz, 6th Dec. 1809.

'I am convinced that, in all your recommendations to Government, you act fairly upon your own opinions, and it gives me the greatest satisfaction at all times to concur with you. Men in your situation and in mine, however, must look at all questions with a very different view; which difference of view is, I believe, the main cause of any difference of opinion which may appear to exist between us. In my situation, I am bound to consider not only what is expedient, but what is practicable; and no General Officer in

G. O.

Badajoz, 5th Dec. 1809.

The conduct of Lieut. —, the officer of the barrack guard of the —th regt., in interfering with his guard between Lieut. — and the Spanish guard, was still more improper than the conduct of Lieut. —; and its indiscretion was equally manifested with its impropriety, as he was very shortly obliged to withdraw from all interference, by the superior numbers of the Spanish guard.

The officers and troops in Badajoz are to understand that they are quartered in this town, only because it is a convenient station in the line of cantonments occupied by the army; but they are no part of the garrison of the fort, and have nothing to do with its duties.

The guards which are mounted by the British troops are solely for regimental or brigade purposes, and for the security of the stores of the army over which they are placed: they have nothing to say to the safety of the place or its police, as connected with its security.

The Commander of the Forces adopts this mode of expressing his disapprobation of the conduct of Lieuts. — and —, of the —th regt. He desires however, that these officers may be released from their arrest, as he hopes that what he has above stated will prevent them, as well as others, from being guilty of such conduct in future.'



these days can venture, even in a confidential dispatch to a minister, to speculate upon advantages of any description which it is not practicable to accomplish. If he ventures upon such speculations, the tables are immediately turned upon him; and although none of the conditions or requisites of his speculation may have been performed, he is asked for what reason he did not acquire those advantages which he had described in his dispatches.

Besides that, I conceive that acting as I do confidentially with Ministers, and acquainted as I am with their means, the employment for them, and the difficulties of all descriptions which in these days they have to contend with, I should not act fairly by them, if I were to speculate in my dispatches upon advantages which would result if certain measures were adopted, which measures I know it to be out of their power to adopt.

This principle applies strongly to the question of the increase of the force in this country. I am perfectly aware that 40,000 men are better than 30,000; and that the sickness of the army, and other circumstances, may prevent my having 30,000 men for the field, out of the number for which I have called. But upon this point I beg to refer you to Mr. Canning's dispatch to Lord Wellesley of the 12th August, in which the whole question of the means of increasing the force in the Peninsula is fully canvassed, and the amount disposable for that purpose is decidedly stated. With the knowledge of these facts and opinions by the Government, would it be fair, or indeed honest, in me to call for a man more than I thought absolutely necessary for my purpose?

## 342.

To Bart. Frere, Esq.

Badajoz, 9th Dec. 1809.

'Recent events in La Mancha, as well as in Old Castille, must have shown the Spanish Government that it is desirable that they should avoid general actions in plains.

Admitting that the Spanish infantry, in its present state, is able to contend on equal terms with the French, it is obvious that the cavalry is not so; and without that arm an army is incomplete, and enters upon every operation under very considerable disadvantages. It is not fair or just to the cavalry to attribute their conduct in the different actions which have been fought lately to want of spirit. They are people of the same description with the other soldiers of the army, and must partake of the same feelings. It is, in fact, want of discipline. Undisciplined cavalry have always conducted themselves in the same manner, in all countries; and in the first years of the revolutionary war, the French themselves suffered frequently the same disasters from the flight and misbehaviour of their cavalry. The want

G. O.

Badajoz, 8th Dec. 1809.

'5. The Commander of the Forces requests that on the march which the army is about to make, the officers will attend to the orders of the 4th May, No. 5 and 6, and to the General Orders of the 7th October, No. 8, 9, 10, and 11, relating to the mode of making requisitions upon the country. In addition to these orders, the Commander of the Forces desires that when any officer finds himself in the situation to be obliged to take articles of provisions or forage from the country upon his own receipts, he will report to his commanding officer that he has done so, specifying particularly the date, the place, and the articles for which he has given his receipt. The commanding officer will send this report to the Assistant Commissary attached to the brigade, regiment, or division, of the army to which the officer belongs.'

of discipline in the cavalry is an evil to which time alone can apply a remedy; and in the mean time it is probable that the experience of the whole war, and particularly of their recent misfortunes, will have pointed out to the Government the only system of war which their troops are at present capable of undertaking, and for which their country is well adapted.

I would strongly recommend to them, if they should be able to collect their troops again, to form their armies in large masses, for the occupation and defence of the many strong and important positions which the country affords; to support these armies by magazines; and while they will draw the attention of the great bodies of the enemy, who are well aware, particularly from what occurred lately at Tamames, that the Spanish troops cannot be attacked with impunity, or with small numbers, in a strong position, the parties of guerrillas, &c., may carry on their operations upon the enemy's communications, and upon his flanks. If this system should be adopted, the enemy must turn these positions, if he should not attack them: this must take time, must alter the nature of his operations, must oblige him to form magazines for the support of his army, and increase the difficulty of all he undertakes.

\* \* \* \* \*

I am not acquainted with the means which the Government have of reforming their armies, and particularly of arming their troops, who must now require large numbers of arms. But in case they should have it in their power to collect an army again, after their late defeats, the plan, of which I have above suggested the general outline and some of the details, appears the best calculated for the circumstances of the moment. It is founded upon experience of past misfortunes, and upon a general knowledge of the country. It will keep the contest in existence; and if successful, will prevent the enemy from extending himself. It will give Spain the chance of accidents, and of a change in the affairs of Europe; and if any circumstances should oblige the enemy to weaken his force in Spain, or should even prevent him from feeding its strength with reinforcements; or if time should improve the military system and means of the Spanish nation, it may lead to the results for which we all wish.'

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### 343.

#### MEMORANDUM OF OPERATIONS IN 1809.

(See letter to Lord Liverpool: Badajoz, 19th December, 1809.)

*The Notes to this Memorandum are in the Manuscript.*

Badajoz, 9th Dec. 1809.

'The British army, intended for the service in Portugal and Spain, was complete in the end of April, with the exception of 1 brigade of infantry not arrived, and some troops expected from Gibraltar, when relieved by others to be sent from Portugal. Sir A. Wellesley landed at Lisbon on the 23rd April.

At that time the French had got possession of Zaragoza, Marshal Soult held Oporto and the northern provinces of Portugal. The battle of Medel-lin had been fought on the 29th March; and General Cuesta was endeavoring to recover from its effects, and to collect an army again at Monas-



terió, in the mountains of the Sierra Morena. The French, under Marshal Victor, were in possession of the Guadiana, and had their advanced posts as forward as Los Santos. Sebastiani was at Ciudad Real, and held in check the army of La Carolina, at that time under the command of General Venegas, consisting of about 12,000 men. Ney was in possession of Galicia; Salamanca was held by a small detachment of French troops; St. Cyr was in Catalonia with his corps of 25,000 men; and Kellermann, who had succeeded to Bessières in the command of the 6th corps, was at Valladolid. Mortier with his corps,\* and the Duc d'Abrantes, with the 8th corps, at Zaragoza.

The Portuguese army was totally disorganised, and nearly annihilated; and the Spanish troops were scarcely able to hold their positions in the Sierra Morena.

The Marques de la Romana, who had been with his corps on the frontiers of Portugal, near Chaves, from the period of the embarkation of the British army at Coruña, in the month of January, till the month of March, had moved from thence when Soult invaded Portugal by Chaves, and afterwards moved towards the Asturias with his army, and went himself into that province.

Sir J. Cradock gave up the command to Sir A. Wellesley, on the 27th April; and on the same day the orders were given for the collection and march of the troops, preparatory to the attack of Soult at Oporto. Soult was driven from Oporto on the 12th May, and on the 18th he entered Galicia, closely pursued by the British and Portuguese troops, having lost all his cannon, his military chest, many stands of arms, baggage, &c., &c., and bringing with him not more than 8000 men of his corps.†

In the mean time the following events had occurred in other parts. Ney, in conjunction with Kellermann, had invaded the Asturias, which province they entered on the beginning of May; the Marques de la Romana having escaped from Gijon in a sloop of war. The inhabitants of Vigo, aided by Captain Mackinley of the *Lively*, had taken possession of that town; and in the absence of Ney and Soult from Galicia, had pushed their parties as far as Lugo, which town they had attacked. Marshal Victor repassed the Guadiana about the 12th or 13th May, and detached a division across the Tagus at Alcantara on the 14th. This division retired again in a few days, probably as soon as it had heard of the success of the 12th against Soult; but Sir A. Wellesley having discontinued the further pursuit of Soult on the 18th May, and having on the 19th received the accounts of the passage of the Tagus of this division, immediately gave orders for the return of the troops to the southward, and set out himself.‡

The leading troops arrived at Coimbra, on the Mondego, on the 26th May; but Sir A. Wellesley having in the mean time heard that the French division which had passed the Tagus at Alcantara had recrossed that river, discontinued the rapidity of the march which he had at first ordered, and the British troops did not arrive on the Tagus till between the 7th and 12th

\* 'I rather believe that Mortier had removed from Zaragoza; but some time elapsed before he arrived in Old Castille.'

† 'See letters to the Secretary of State of the 18th May.'

‡ 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 20th May.'

June.\* They halted here till the 27th June, partly to receive supplies of money, and of shoes and other articles of equipment wanting, and to give rest to the men and horses after the rapid marches they had made to the frontier of Galicia and back again. It was also desirable to receive the reinforcements of the 48th and 61st regts. expected from Gibraltar, and the 23rd light dragoons arrived from England before any further operations were entered upon.

During this time the French brought Ney's corps out of Asturias back into Galicia; and on the 6th June they made an attempt, in conjunction with a detachment from Soult's corps, to obtain possession of Vigo. In their attempt upon the bridge of San Payo they failed entirely; and Soult failed equally in all his endeavors to bring to action on the river Sill the corps of the Marques de la Romana, which had again in the beginning of the month of June assembled near Orense upon the frontiers of Portugal.

The Marques de la Romana having retired from Orense towards Vigo, Soult determined to withdraw from Galicia altogether, leaving Ney's corps alone in that province; † and he marched in the end of June to Zamora, on the Duero, in order to re-equip and refit his army. Ney, finding himself too weak to maintain Galicia when alone, also evacuated that province in the middle of July, and posted himself at Astorga. ‡

As soon as Victor found that the British army had arrived upon the Tagus, he began to retire from Estremadura on the 14th and 15th June; and he finally crossed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 24th June, 2 days before the British army broke up from Abrantes, &c., to march to Plasencia §

\* 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 31st May.'

† 'See the letters from Soult to King Joseph intercepted upon General Franceschi.'

‡ 'After the perusal of these details, and of Soult's letter to King Joseph, can any man doubt that the evacuation of Galicia was occasioned by the operations of the British troops in Portugal? Soult retired from Portugal in such a state that he could do nothing till he was re-equipped, for which purpose he went to Zamora, leaving Ney in Galicia, and directing him to hold the province. Ney finds himself too weak to hold his ground, and goes to Astorga, and the province remains in the possession of the Marques de la Romana (who had been too weak to engage Soult's corps singly, even in its reduced and crippled state), and of the British seamen and others in the garrison of Vigo.'

§ 'One of the *cries* against Sir A. W. has been for delaying his march from Abrantes to so late a period, which was declared to be owing to some disputes with General Cuesta about command, or some other trifling object. During the halt at Abrantes, a discussion was carried on with General Cuesta, through Lieut. Colonel Bourke, not about command or any other trifling object, but about the future operations of the two armies. The whole correspondence went to Mr. Frere, and is probably in the Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But I believe no man who knows what an army is—that the people and animals composing it are men and beasts like others, who require rest after great fatigues in a hot climate, and that carriages in an army, and other articles of equipment, require repair and to be replaced, after a long journey over bad roads, such as had been made from the Tagus to Galicia, and back again in little more than a month—will believe that the halt upon the Tagus for one fortnight was too long. Besides, the army could not march without money. A supply reached Abrantes on the 25th; and the moment it was received the march was ordered, and commenced on the 27th.'

'But the pith of this *cry* is, that in consequence of this delay upon the Tagus, Victor escaped from Estremadura. Let any man trace Victor's operations from the middle of May till the end of June, when he finally crossed the Tagus, and he will see that they were guided by the intelligence he received of those of the British army. He sent a corps across the Tagus, and repassed the Guadiana himself, when he found the British army gone to Oporto to attack Soult: he withdrew that corps again when he heard of the result of the attack of Soult at Oporto: he began to retire across the Tagus on the 14th and 15th June, when he found the British army arrived upon the Tagus at Abrantes; and he withdrew his troops from Merida, and completed the evacuation of the southern Estremadura, and crossed the Tagus on the 24th June, when he found that the British army was



Kellermann's corps evacuated Asturias and Biscay, and returned to Valladolid; and Mortier's corps was at Leon. Suchet, having defeated Blake at Belchite on the 18th June, had returned to Zaragoza; and the corps of St. Cyr was employed in the blockade of Gerona.

The Spanish army under General Cuesta, which had been reinforced with cavalry and infantry, and had been refitted with extraordinary celerity since the action of Medellin, had advanced from Monasterio in the middle of May, when Victor had crossed the Guadiana to support the division which he had detached over the bridge of Alcantara; and General Cuesta made an attack upon a fortified post which the enemy had left at Merida. In this attack he did not succeed; the enemy maintained their post at Merida, and General Cuesta had his head quarters at Fuente del Maestre till the end of June, when the enemy evacuated Estremadura, and passed the Tagus at Almaraz, upon hearing of the arrival of the British army upon that river at Abrantes.

In the end of June, General Cuesta fixed his head quarters at the Puerto de Mirabete, opposite Almaraz, having a division of his army at Arzobispo. Thus, then, in the end of June, the Spanish army under Cuesta was upon the Tagus; the French, under Victor, at Talavera de la Reyna; Sebastiani had retired from Ciudad Real, and had arrived near Toledo; and Venegas' corps, which had likewise been reinforced, had advanced into La Mancha. The French had evacuated Galicia, with the exception of Ney's corps, which left that province at a later period, and arrived at Astorga in the middle of July. Mortier was at Leon, Soult at Zamora, Kellermann at Valladolid, Suchet at Zaragoza, and St. Cyr engaged in the blockade of Gerona. The British army broke up from Abrantes, &c., on the 27th June to march to Plasencia, in order to co-operate with the Spanish troops in an endeavor to drive the French from the south of Spain.

The Commanding Officer of the King's troops in Portugal is alone responsible for this operation, for which the motives were various. First, adverting to the general state of the war in Spain, as well as in Germany, it appeared to be desirable to make an effort at that time in Spain. Secondly, the means appeared to be adequate to the object in view. General Cuesta had under his immediate command 38,000 men, and General Venegas 18,000; and the British army was not less than 20,000 men, besides General R. Craufurd's brigade, which had landed at Lisbon on the 28th June, and was to commence its march to join the army immediately. Against these troops were to be opposed 28,000 men under Victor, and 12,000 under Sebastiani; and whatever the King could bring from the garrison of Madrid, and his guards.

It was not known till the beginning of July that even Soult had evacuated Galicia, in a state, as appears by the intercepted letters taken on General Franceschi, very unfit for service; nor that Ney had quitted that province and gone to Astorga, till late in July;\* and Mortier and Kellermann were supposed still to be in the Asturias and Biscay.

about to march towards Plasencia. If these facts are all true, and they are all recorded in the official reports of the day, what difference could it have made in Victor's situation if Sir A. W. had moved from Abrantes a few days sooner? Only that Victor would have retired across the Tagus a few days sooner than he did!!!

\* 'I do not think we were certain of Ney's evacuation of Galicia till he entered Estremadura, in August.'

The difficulties of the operation were calculated; but it was supposed that the orders of the Spanish Government would furnish the means of transport and provisions that were or might be required, as they had expressed the greatest anxiety for the co-operation of the British troops. The means of transport were known to exist in the country, and the harvest about to be reaped, it was imagined, would have afforded an abundance of provisions.

The troops which broke up from Abrantes and the neighborhood on the 27th July reached Plasencia between the 7th and 10th July, on which day Sir A. Wellesley went over to the Puerto de Mirabete, to confer and concert a plan of operations with General Cuesta. The objects of the plan were to bring into operation upon the enemy, at the same time, the British army and the two Spanish corps, under Cuesta and Venegas, in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from bringing his concentrated force to bear upon either.

It was impossible for the corps of Cuesta and Venegas, issuing from the defensive positions which they had occupied in Estremadura and La Mancha respectively, to join, or to have any military communication in this operation; excepting by Talavera and the bridge of Toledo; \* and it was obvious that unless the enemy should be alarmed for the safety of Madrid by one of the corps, he would fall with his whole collected strength upon the other. It was necessary to divide the attention of the enemy as much as possible, and to choose such a line of march for each corps as to prevent the enemy from opposing the march of either by natural obstacles, or by any thing excepting detachments from his own concentrated force.

General Venegas was therefore ordered by Cuesta to direct his march by Tembleque, Tarancon, and Fuentidueña to Arganda, where he was to be on the 22nd July, the day appointed for the arrival of the combined British and Spanish armies at Talavera. By passing by Fuentidueña, General Venegas could have crossed the Tagus at a ford, and nothing could have prevented his arrival at his station but the opposition of the enemy. This was all that was wished for; at the same time that, if he had been opposed by a corps too strong for him, his retreat was always open to the mountains of Cuenca; and the enemy could not have followed him in strength, and could not have undertaken any operation against La Carolina, pressed as they would have been on the other flank by the combined armies.

The only corps with which it was supposed that the combined armies would have had to engage, were the corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and the King. The other French corps in Spain were understood to be otherwise occupied; and at all events it was conceived that the occupation of the Puerto de Baños by General Cuesta's detachment, and of the Puerto de Perales by the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and by the position of Marshal Beresford's corps on the frontiers of Portugal, would have prevented the enemy from penetrating into Estremadura by the passes in the rear of the army. †

Sir A. Wellesley returned to Plasencia on the 12th, and found that the hopes were disappointed which he had formed of drawing from Ciudad Rodrigo, and other places in Castille, the means of transport which he had required ‡; and which had been supplied by those places in the preceding

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Wellesley of the 24th August from Merida, describing the difficulty of such an operation.'

† 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 8th August.'

‡ 'See letter to General O'Donju of the 16th July, enclosed in dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 24th July.'



year to the army under Sir J. Moore. He still considered it necessary, however, to carry into execution the plan of operations agreed upon with General Cuesta, as he was unwilling to disappoint that General; and as General Venegas' corps, which it was supposed would have commenced its operations, would have been exposed to risk; and, moreover, Sir A. W. expected that the army would have been supplied with provisions from the Vera de Plasencia till it should be supplied with means of transport from Seville, for which General Cuesta had written, or from La Mancha. Sir A. W., however, gave notice that he should co-operate only in the first operation,\* which should put General Cuesta in possession of the passage of the Alberche, and of the course of the Tagus, and should enable him to communicate with General Venegas, until the wants of the British army should be supplied.

A part of the British army, consisting of about 1000 Portuguese troops under Sir R. Wilson, (and which corps had been reinforced by two Spanish battalions,) was to march according to the plan through the Vera de Plasencia, on the left of the combined armies, to Escalona, on the Alberche. This corps marched on the 15th July, and the British army, according to the plan agreed upon, commenced its march on the 17th and 18th July; the 23rd light dragoons and 48th regt. having joined the army while it was at Plasencia, and the 61st being expected to join on the 18th.

Sir R. Wilson arrived at Escalona on the 22nd, and the combined armies at Talavera on the same day; and they drove in the enemy's outposts. On the 23rd,† arrangements were made, and the British army had marched and was in column near the Alberche to attack the French corps of Victor, posted on the heights beyond the river; but General Cuesta preferred to delay the attack till the following morning; and when the troops were formed on that morning at daylight, it was found that the enemy had withdrawn during the night. General Cuesta then continued his march in pursuit of them to Sta Olalla; but they had gone to Torrijos, and thence even farther, to Bargas. The main body of the British remained at Talavera; with a division of infantry at Cazalegas to keep up the communication with General Cuesta; and another at Cardiel, on the Alberche, to keep up the communication with Sir R. Wilson at Escalona.

The scarcity of provisions had been so great since the 20th, owing to the failure of the magistrates and inhabitants of the Vera de Plasencia to perform the contracts into which they had entered with a British Commissary,

\* 'See letter to General O'Donju of the 16th July.'

† 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 24th July.'

¶ All the discussions upon this subject, and the misrepresentations, show the difficulty of serving the British public, and the small degree of satisfaction which any foreign officer has in co-operating with the British troops. General Cuesta chose to delay the attack to the 24th, for which delay there were not wanting good and valid reasons; but no such reasons are conceived, or are allowed to exist. A lie is invented and circulated, viz.—that the 23rd was Sunday, and then Sir A. W. is abused for being the author of the lie. There was, however, one curious circumstance attending this transaction, which shows the nature of the war in Spain, and the deficiency of intelligence by the Spanish General Officers, and that is—that although Sir A. W. suspected it on the evening of the 22nd, and made preparations accordingly, it was not positively ascertained till the morning of the 23rd that the whole French army was at Cazalegas; and yet the vedettes of the outposts were within shot of each other, and the narrow river of the Alberche alone divided the armies!!! The French must, in the night of the 23rd, have acquired from our army the knowledge of our intended attack.'

to supply at Talavera 240,000 rations before the 24th, that the British army was totally unable to move.\* The armies remained on the 25th in the positions taken up on the 24th, and the enemy collected all his force at Bargas.

It appears that General Venegas had not obeyed the orders he had received, to direct his march upon Fuentidueña and Arganda.† The enemy therefore had no apprehension from his operations, and they collected their whole force to oppose the combined armies. They attacked Cuesta's outposts at Torrijos on the morning of the 26th, and drove them in; and General Cuesta retired with his army on that day to the left bank of the Alberche, the British division still remaining at Cazalegas, the division at Cardiel having joined; and on the 27th General Cuesta crossed the Alberche, and took up his position near Talavera; and the British troops retired from Cazalegas, one division remaining as an outpost in the woods opposite the enemy's position on the Alberche, the other going to its position near Talavera.

A general action being obviously to be expected on the 26th, Sir R. Wilson was ordered from Escalona to join the army with his corps, through the mountains by Marrupe. The enemy attacked the outposts in the woods on the 27th, which retired to the position occupied by the army; and on that night, and on the 28th, followed the battle of Talavera.‡ The enemy retired in the evening and during the night of the 28th, and took up a position, with a rear guard of 10,000 men, on the heights of Cazalegas, beyond the Alberche. The British army and Spanish armies, which had been joined on the evening of the 29th by General R. Craufurd's brigade of infantry, remained on the field of battle of Talavera, with their advanced posts, consisting of General Craufurd's brigade, in the woods, nearly in the place in which they had been on the 27th.

On the 29th, General Venegas went to Aranjuez, and made an attack upon a post of about 2000 men, which the enemy had left at Toledo. The King, with the reserve, therefore, and Sebastiani's corps, went to oppose his advance, while Victor was left to watch the combined armies.

On the 31st, Sir R. Wilson's corps, which had been called to the army when the general action was expected, and had arrived at Marrupe, returned towards Escalona; and the enemy's rear guard at Cazalegas retired on the same night, and went to Maqueda.

On the 30th, accounts had been received by General Cuesta that rations for a corps of 12,000 men had been ordered at Fuente Roble, north of the Puerto de Baños; and for 24,000 men at Los Santos, near the same place; supposed to be for the corps of Soult, which was known to have been at Zamora in the end of June, and for which equipments had been called for by Soult. It was expected, however, that the troops in the Puerto would

\* 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 24th July. There is no doubt that if these contracts had been performed the British army would have been at Madrid on the 27th July. Would matters have been improved by their going there, the French having at this time brought into that part of Spain all their troops, amounting to not less than 90,000 men?'

† 'This failure by General Venegas is to be attributed to orders which he had received from the Central Junta!'

‡ 'See the Dispatches to the Secretary of State of the 29th July, and of the 5th August.'



make some resistance, and would stop their march; or that Soult might have been induced to desist from it by the position of Marshal Beresford's corps, or by the accounts he would have received of the victory at Talavera on the 28th July.

It has already been stated that the Portuguese army in April was totally disorganised, and nearly annihilated; at the same time it had been necessary to employ the few men who were in the service in the expedition against Soult, and in the defensive measures adopted for the security of the western frontier, when the army marched on that expedition.

When the British army was about to enter Spain in the end of June, there was no longer any danger for the north of Portugal; and it was desirable that advantage should be taken of the leisure which this security afforded, to collect in one camp the disposable part of the Portuguese army, in which Marshal Beresford should have an opportunity of forming and organising the troops.

A camp on the frontiers of Beira, between Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, was considered the best situation for this purpose; and it had this additional recommendation, that the Portuguese corps, to which a British brigade was to be added, principally for the purpose of example, would protect the only vulnerable part of the Portuguese frontier which was exposed to attack; added to the security of the left of the British army; and, above all, protected the passage into Estremadura by the Puerto de Perales. From this situation, also, this Portuguese corps could have been brought with advantage in a subsequent part of the campaign when it was hoped that the troops would be formed; but it was neither intended nor expected that Marshal Beresford's corps should co-operate, except as above stated, in the first operations of the months of July and August.

Notwithstanding the hopes entertained that Soult's march might have been stopped, or that he might have been induced to desist from it, it was desirable, as General Cuesta had not confidence in the exertions of the troops in the Puerto, that they should be reinforced; but he declined to reinforce them, and persisted in his refusal to do so, till the morning of the 2nd August, when he detached General Bassecourt with his division for that purpose. In the mean time the troops in the Puerto had retired without firing a shot, and had gone to the bridge over the Tagus at Almaraz, which they took up; and Soult entered Plasencia unresisted on the 1st August.\*

It was then necessary to take decisive measures to re-establish the communication with Portugal, and for this purpose the British army marched on the morning of the 3rd to Oropesa, leaving General Cuesta's division in charge of the post at Talavera, and of the hospital.† On that day, for the first time, General Cuesta received accounts, apprising him of the real strength of the army which Soult had brought with him into Estremadura, which consisted of 34,000 men, and he imagined that the British corps was not equal to a contest with such numbers. He therefore immediately determined to withdraw from Talavera, and to join the British army at Oro-

\* 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 8th August.'

† 'It will scarcely be believed that the French were able to collect the three corps of Ney, Soult, and Mortier, at Salamanca, and to make preparations there for this march, and that the Junta of Old Castille, sitting at Ciudad Rodrigo, knew nothing about it! And yet this is a fact.'

pesa; and thus he lost the hospital, and exposed the combined armies to be attacked in front and rear at the same time.

Soult's army arrived at Navalморal on the evening of the 3rd; and in this position stood between the combined armies and the bridge of Almaraz, which it was supposed had been removed, but most probably was, or it might have been, easily destroyed. The only retreat which remained was by the bridge of Arzobispo. There was a direct road to this bridge from Talavera de la Reyna, by Calera, and another direct from Navalморal, each of them passing at not less than 10 or 12 miles' distance from Oropesa, the station at which the combined armies were assembled on the morning of the 4th instant.

Besides these circumstances attending the only retreat the armies had, it was to be observed that the enemy had now collected in Estremadura all the disposable force which he had in Galicia and Castille, with the exception of the corps of Kellermann, which still remained at Valladolid: 34,000 men were known to be added to the force already opposed to the combined armies; and it was obvious that they must retire across the Tagus, and take up a defensive position on that river. Accordingly, the British army having halted at Oropesa on the night of the 3rd, marched early on the 4th to Arzobispo, and immediately crossed the Tagus; and the Spanish army, which had marched from Talavera on the night of the 3rd, halted during the early part of the day of the 4th at Oropesa, and marched, and arrived at Arzobispo on the evening of the 4th.

On the 5th, the British army continued its march, and the advanced guard was placed upon the Mesa de Ibor, to secure that passage; and on the 6th the army arrived at the Mesa de Ibor, and the advanced guard at the Casas del Puerto, on the Tagus, opposite Almaraz; and on the 7th the head of the column of the army arrived at Deleytosa, which place was reached on the 8th and 9th by the rear divisions.\*

The Spanish army in the mean time crossed the Tagus on the 5th, and the head quarters were removed to Peraleda de Garbin on the 7th, leaving an advance at the bridge of Arzobispo; which was surprised on the 8th, and lost many men, and 30 pieces of cannon.†

On the 11th August the head quarters of the British army were transferred to Jaraicejo, leaving Deleytosa open for the Spanish army, to which place their head quarters were removed on the 13th; General Cuesta having resigned the command of the army on the 12th.

\* 'This is the history of our giving up the *post of honor*, as the French call it, to the Spaniards. In fact, the British army was necessarily the left throughout the operations; and could not change that disposition without giving up the defence of Portugal. Besides that, all these operations, from the morning of the 4th, were carried on against the inclination of General Cuesta; and the retreat being necessary, Sir A. W. could not have made it, or have forced Cuesta to make it, if the British army had not begun it. Another circumstance is that the bridge of Arzobispo was not reckoned the *post of honor*. The Mesa de Ibor, till the evening of the 5th, was the point, the loss of which was most apprehended.'

† 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 21st August.

'The French made much more of this affair than they ought. Nothing could behave worse than they did, excepting the Spaniards. They ought to have annihilated the Spanish army, but they were afraid to follow them, and did not even know that they had taken the greatest part of the cannon; they had not even patrolled the ground 3 days afterwards when Colonel Waters went to Mortier with a flag of truce from me. See dispatch to Lord Wellesley of the 9th August, for the detail of this surprise; and of the state of the Spanish army afterwards.'



While this was going on on the left, General Venegas was attacked at Aranjuez by Sebastiani and the King on the 5th;\* in which action he had some success. But he then resolved to retire to the Sierra Morena, and actually marched as far as Tembleque. † He then altered this resolution, and he returned to Almonacid on the 11th, where he was attacked and defeated, with the loss of 4000 men. ‡ He then retired into the mountains of the Sierra Morena.

When the French evacuated Old Castille in the end of the month of July, to collect their armies in Estremadura, the Duque del Parque, the Commandant of Ciudad Rodrigo, sent a detachment from his garrison to take possession of Salamanca. This circumstance, and the probable early arrival of Romana's corps in Old Castille from Galicia, and the certainty that the position taken up by the allied armies was of such a nature, that no effort which they could make would dislodge them from it, induced the enemy to march the corps of Soult and Ney to Plasencia on the 9th, 10th, and 11th; and to send the latter into Castille through the Puerto de Baños, on the 12th August. § Ney there fell in with, and defeated Sir R. Wilson's detachment; which, after the combined armies had retired from Talavera and Oropesa to Arzobispo, had been unable to reach the latter place; and had marched through the Vera de Plasencia, and the Puerto de Tornavacas; and was on its march when Ney passed through the Puerto de Baños. Thus, in the middle of August, Ney was at Salamanca; Kellermann at Valladolid; Soult at Plasencia; Mortier at Oropesa and Arzobispo; Victor at Talavera and Toledo; and Sebastiani in La Mancha: while the British army was at Jaraicejo; General Eguia at Deleytosa (General Cuesta having resigned); and General Venegas at La Carolina, in the Sierra Morena.

On the 20th August, the British army having suffered from extreme distress of provisions, broke up from its positions at Jaraicejo and the Casas del Puerto, || the latter of which was occupied by the Spanish troops; and it moved its head quarters to Badajoz, on the 3rd September, and occupied a position on the frontiers of Spain and Portugal, in which, while it would give protection to both countries, it would be enabled to subsist with ease; and it would be possible to give the troops the refreshments they required, as well as the clothing and equipments which they wanted; and it has remained in that position. ¶ The Portuguese army, under Marshal Beresford,

\* † ‡ § 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 21st August.'

|| 'See dispatches to the Secretary of State of the 21st August; and to Lord Wellesley of the 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 21st, and 22nd August.'

¶ 'There never was a position better calculated than this was for the purposes of defending Spain and Portugal.

'The French had from the end of August not less than from 70,000 to 90,000 men disposable; they have since destroyed two armies of Spaniards which it was thought proper to expose to their attack; and yet they have not been able to advance, or to gain any solid advantage beyond that of destroying the Spaniards.

'The fact is, that the British army has saved Spain and Portugal during this year. The Spaniards have no army now that is complete, excepting 13,000 men under the Duque de Alburquerque, in Estremadura; and yet nothing can be done by the French after all their victories. What would have been the relative state of the two contending parties, if the Spaniards had been tolerably prudent, and had acted as they were advised to act?

'The advantage of the position of Badajoz was, that the British army was centrally posted, in reference to all the objects which the enemy might have in view; and at any time, by a junction with a Spanish corps on its right, or a Portuguese or Spanish corps on its left, it could prevent the enemy from undertaking any thing, excepting with a much larger force than they could allot to any one object.'

also withdrew nearly about the same time within the Portuguese frontier, and went into cantonments.\*

In the mean time the Spanish army of Estremadura was reduced to the number of 6000 men at Deleytosa; and general Eguia commenced his march with the remainder towards La Mancha in the middle of September. Nearly about the same period 13,000 men of the corps of the Marques de la Romana arrived in the neighborhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, from Galicia; and the command was taken from the Marques and given to the Duque del Parque.† The Duque immediately put himself at their head, and marched to Villa Vieja,‡ and threatened the French posts towards Salamanca; but the enemy having reconnoitred him, and having drawn in all their detachments with a view to attack him, the Duque del Parque retired from Villa Vieja on the 23rd, to the neighborhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The forward movement by the Duque del Parque, which the French conceived to be connected with a movement to be made by the British army, and with the march of General Eguia into La Mancha, induced Soult to abandon Plasencia on the 1st October,§ and he moved to Oropesa. The Duque del Parque then occupied the strong position of Tamames, on the Castille side of the Puerto de Baños; in which he was attacked on the 19th October by General Marchand, in the command of Ney's corps, || Ney having gone to France; and the French were defeated, with the loss of one piece of cannon. The Duque del Parque was joined on the following day by Ballesteros' division of the Marques de la Romana's corps; and he then marched forward, and took possession of Salamanca on the 25th, the enemy having retired towards the Duero.

These events in Old Castille induced the enemy to withdraw¶ some of the troops from Estremadura; and an army was collected there consisting of Ney's, Kellermann's, and a part of Mortier's corps, amounting to 36,000 men, under the command of Marshal Mortier. The arrival of these troops in Old Castille obliged the Duque del Parque again to retire; and he arrived at Bejar, where he placed his head quarters on the 8th November. The movements of General Eguia into La Mancha from Estremadura, in the middle of September, induced the French to move a large corps of 30,000 men under Victor, into that province; \*\* when the Spaniards retired to the Sierra Morena, and the French again withdrew their troops to the Tagus.

But the events which had occurred in Castille in October, particularly the battle of Tamames, induced the Spanish Government to believe that a favorable opportunity offered for obtaining possession of Madrid; and they

\* 'The Portuguese army would have been ruined if they had remained longer in the field; they wanted clothing, and every description of equipment; they were raw recruits, detested serving in Spain, where they were ill treated; and deserted in large numbers in the short time they were in that country. There are now good grounds for hope that something will be made of them.—See Marshal Beresford's letter to Sir A. Wellesley, dated 26th September, included in a dispatch to the Secretary of State, dated the 29th September.'

† 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 13th September.'

‡ 'See dispatches to the Secretary of State of the 21st and 29th September.'

§ 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 6th October.'

|| 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 31st October.'

¶ 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 16th November.'

\*\* 'See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 22nd October.'



directed General Areyzaga, who had, in October, taken the command of the army of La Mancha, to move forward and push for the possession of Madrid. He marched on the 3rd November, and reached Los Barrios, near Ocaña, on the 10th.\* He made an attack upon a French corps of 5000 men, which occupied that town on the night of the 10th,† in which he lost some men and horses; and the French made good their retreat. He then moved to S<sup>a</sup> Cruz de la Zarza on the 13th, where he remained till the 18th; and having heard of an enemy's corps in his front, at Arganda, which was about to pass the Tagus on his right at Fuentidueña, while there was another corps of 25,000 men at Aranjuez and Ocaña, he returned to Los Barrios, and prepared to attack the French corps in his front. He found, however, on the morning of the 19th, that the French were likely to anticipate his attack; and he formed his army, consisting of 50,000 men, in the rear of Ocaña. The French attacked him with 25,000 men, and completely defeated and dispersed the Spanish army, taking 55 pieces of cannon. The head quarters arrived at La Carolina on the 22nd; and very few men had been collected on the 28th. The French did not pursue farther than Villarta.

In the mean time, the Duque de Albuquerque, who had assumed the command of the army of Estremadura, in the beginning of November, marched to Arzobispo, when the French collected their troops on the Upper Tagus to oppose Areyzaga. The French also, with the same view, drew out of Old Castille, on the 13th and 14th November, a part of the troops which they had sent into that province to oppose the Duque del Parque. The Duque, upon finding Old Castille weakened, moved forward from Bejar on the 17th November, and arrived at Alba de Tormes on the 28th,‡ with his advanced guard at Carpio. It was there attacked by a French corps assembled from Valladolid, &c., but the French were repulsed with some loss. The Duque then moved forward to Fresno; but retired again on the 26th, in consequence of orders from the Junta.

By this time, also, the French had reinforced again their corps in Old Castille; and the Duque was attacked on the 27th and 28th on his retreat, and at Alba de Tormes, and suffered considerably. He continued his retreat, however, towards Ciudad Rodrigo and the mountains; and on the 29th, when within 2 leagues of Tamames, the troops were alarmed by the appearance of 30 dragoons in their rear, and dispersed. There was no enemy, however, at hand to take advantage of this panic; and it was expected that they would be collected again. While this was going on in Old Castille, the Junta ordered the Duque de Albuquerque to fall back with his corps on the Guadiana; and thus to give up the position of the Puerto de Mirabete, on the Tagus, and the Mesa de Ibor.§

These circumstances, and the necessity that the British army should be

\* ' See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 16th November.'

† ' See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 30th November.'

‡ ' See dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 7th December.'

§ ' This position is the most important in the country, to the province of Estremadura and the south of Portugal. If this position is held, the enemy cannot cross the Tagus to any efficient purpose, between the Bridge of Toledo and Villa Vella, in Portugal.

' The position could not well be lost if the Spaniards would destroy the bridge of Arzobispo, as Sir A. Wellesley has frequently advised.'

north of the Tagus, when the enemy's reinforcements should arrive, induced Sir A. Wellesley to put the British army in motion to cross that river immediately. He had long had that movement in contemplation, and had given notice of it to the Junta.\*

## 344.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Badajoz, 17th Dec. 1809.

'The French General Officers have in general behaved remarkably well to the British officers and soldiers who fell into their hands in consequence of the march of the Spanish army from Talavera de la Reyna in the month of August last; and in many instances they have supplied the officers with money.'

## 345.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Badajoz, 19th Dec. 1809.

'I have just received your letter of the 21st November. I sent by the last post to Mr. Sydenham, for the use of Pole principally, and of Lord Wellesley, a narrative† of the description you wish to have; and I desired him to show it to nobody else, lest it should get into print. I have now written to request him to let you have a copy of it; and you will communicate it to whomsoever you please; only I beg that it may not be printed. You will find it will answer your purpose perfectly; and I have referred in the margin to the official documents and authorities from which I drew it up.'

## 346.

To Lieut. Col. Roche.

Badajoz, 19th Dec. 1809.

'The Spaniards ought to defend the Despeña Perros with the force they have; but they go to the plains to be beaten, and thus cow the troops who would otherwise defend themselves in the mountains.'

## 347.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Badajoz, 22nd Dec. 1809.

'He was appointed by me to the Commissariat in June, and on the 11th July he writes a letter to the Lords of the Treasury, in which he gives them

\* 'The object in occupying this proposed position, is to be at the point of defence of Portugal; to divert the attention of the French from the south of Spain when they shall receive their reinforcements, and thus give time to the Spanish Government to repair their losses. The filling of the rivers, and the destruction of the roads, will, with a very few troops, be a sufficient defence in the winter for the south of Spain. The same events which might impede the march of the British army to the north of Portugal, if longer delayed, would be fatal to Portugal, and might be so to the British army, if the enemy were to be able to invade that kingdom during the winter. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, to cross the Tagus immediately; and it may be depended upon, that the enemy's first effort upon receiving his reinforcements will be upon the troops north of the Tagus. The contents of this Memorandum must show the great use the British army has been to Spain and Portugal. Since they arrived in April, the French have destroyed 3 Spanish armies,—Blake's, Areyza's, and Del Parque's; and yet they can do nothing.

'They have been obliged to evacuate the north of Portugal, Galicia, South Estremadura, and they hold but part of La Mancha; and also to keep their force concentrated in Old Castille, and about Madrid.

'If the Spaniards had not lost two armies lately, we should keep up the ball for another year. But as it is!—but I won't despair!'

† See Memorandum of Operations in 1809: Badajoz, 9th December, 1809.



to understand neither more nor less than that the Commissary General, and all his officers, as well as myself, are either knaves or fools; and that he can

A. G. O.

Badajoz, 13th Dec. 1809.

'The Commander of the Forces is concerned to notice the continued and repeated disobedience of orders by the officers of the army, in pressing mules and carts, and in taking articles from the country upon their own informal receipts. He is concerned to be obliged to resort to measures to enforce obedience to his orders, and he now directs that Captain —, of the —th regt., may be put in arrest by the commanding officer of the hospital, at Elvas, for taking away mules belonging to the Commissariat, at Badajoz, contrary to orders; his crime will be sent to him by the Adjutant General, and he is to proceed forthwith to Badajoz.

2. The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the officers of the army to the following order, by the late Commander of the Forces, in Portugal.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL ORDERS, BY LIEUT. GENERAL SIR J. CRADOCK.

No. 2. "The army is referred to the Orders of the 14th March, on the subject of quarters, which General Officers are requested to impress on the troops under their command; and it is to be clearly understood that cover is all that any officer has a right to expect, and he has no pretensions to ask for either bed or furniture: when such articles are supplied, it is a matter of civility on the part of the owner, and must be received as a favor, and not as a right."

This principle has been before laid down in General Orders, and must be extended throughout this Kingdom.'

G. A. O.

Badajoz, 14th Dec. 1809.

'The Commander of the Forces is happy to find that the circumstances respecting the conduct of Captain —, — regt., did not occur as they were represented to him by the officer of the commissariat department, Mr. —; and that he is therefore enabled to release that officer from his arrest, notwithstanding that an irregularity was committed by the soldiers under his command.

Captain — is therefore released from his arrest, and is to join his regiment.'

G. O.

Badajoz, 17th Dec. 1809.

'1. The officer commanding the General Hospitals, at Elvas, Estremoz, and Villa Viçosa, is to appoint a board of officers at each of those places to examine the arms, accoutrements, clothing, &c. belonging to the soldiers now in hospital, or who have been discharged from the hospital, or have died, which articles may be in the possession of the Purveyor General at the present moment.

This board is to make a register of these articles by regiments, inserting in the register the marks or names on each article.

Of this register one copy must be given to the Purveyor General, and one copy forwarded to the Adjutant General's office, to be communicated to the several regiments.

2. The Assistant Quarter Master General, at Elvas, must be one of the members of this board.

3. The Purveyor General must be particularly careful in keeping the register of arms, &c., brought by the soldiers to the General Hospital in future, in obedience to His Majesty's regulations of the 31st March, 1800.

4. In order to enable the Purveyor General, or his deputy, to obey this order, the officers commanding regiments are invariably to send with a soldier to the hospital, whether general, brigade, detachment, or regimental, a ticket made out in the following form.

5. When men are sent to a general or detachment hospital by any regiment, the officer commanding must report to the General Officer commanding the brigade whether this order has been obeyed.

6. The Purveyor General, or the medical officer, in charge of the arms, accoutrements, &c., in any hospital, must report immediately any instance in which obedience to this order may have been neglected, otherwise he will be considered responsible for all loss and damage of arms and accoutrements of soldiers in hospital.

7. The officer commanding at Lisbon will give directions that these orders, respecting the formation of the registry, &c. may be carried into execution at the General Hospital at Lisbon.'

G. O.

Badajoz, 18th Dec. 1809.

'1. In order to prevent the inconvenience which the army would suffer from the absence of the officers of the staff, the Commander of the Forces has determined that all officers belonging to the departments of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General of the army in Spain and Portugal, who shall be absent from the Peninsula, on any account, except that

of

save thousands upon thousands to the public, by some new mode he has discovered of supplying the troops with bread. He disclaims, at the same time, any intention of making a charge against any of us!

Now, I must say that, if Mr. — has made any discovery upon this subject, it was his duty to apprise me of it; and at least to try whether our failure to save the public these thousands upon thousands was to be attributed to kuavery or folly, before he wrote to the Treasury upon the subject.'

## 348.

To Bart. Frere, Esq.

Gafete, 27th Dec. 1809.

'I consider that the feelings of His Majesty, and of the public in general, are so much interested in favor of the brave officers and soldiers, who are in the hands of the enemy only because they were wounded in fighting the battles of Spain, that I cannot any longer delay reporting for His Majesty's information, the unusual difficulties which the Spanish Government and officers have thrown in the way of every communication between the French Generals and me, which had for its object either the relief, or the exchange of these unfortunate persons. I must at the same time do the people of Spain the justice to say, that these difficulties are as inconsistent with their wishes as they are with their interests, or with humanity; as they have done every thing in their power to relieve these officers and soldiers, and have assisted such of them who have escaped from captivity, as much as has been in their power in their passage through the country.'

## 349.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Pombal, 2nd January, 1810.

'I believe there never was any officer, but certainly never a British officer, placed in so difficult a situation as I am in. Every body looks for British

of having been wounded, shall cease to receive their staff pay and allowances in 2 months from the period of their embarkation, although they will continue on the list of their respective departments, and will return to their duties in them, when they shall rejoin the army.

The Adjutant and Quarter Master General will attend to this order in making up the abstracts of their several departments.'

G. O.

Gaviao, 28th Dec. 1809.

'The Commander of the Forces requests the Officers commanding divisions will direct the officers of the Quarter Master General's department, attached to them respectively, to arrange with the magistrates of the different towns and villages in which the troops may be cantoned, in what houses General Officers, field officers, captains, and subalterns, respectively, shall be quartered; and the officers are to be quartered according to this arrangement.

The Commander of the Forces is concerned to notice that complaints of the conduct of some of the officers of the army to the inhabitants of Portugal have already reached him; and he is convinced that it must be of those who have lately joined the army, and were not partakers of the kindness with which the whole army were treated by the people of this country at the commencement of the campaign.

There is no doubt that by civility and good treatment the officers of the army will receive from the inhabitants of Portugal again all the assistance and kindness which they can afford; and the Commander of the Forces is exceedingly anxious that the people of this country should not be brought, by the misconduct of the army, to detest those who are sent here to assist them in the defence of their country.

He particularly desires that the officers on the commissariat and medical staff will pay attention to these orders, and that the Commissary General will send a copy of them to each of the Commissaries who are detached.'



assistance in every thing: money, stores, provisions, and all that keep an army together, are required by both Spaniards and Portuguese; and they and the British nation, and even the Government, conceive that I have all at my command, and that I have only to say the word to supply all their wants, and satisfy all their demands. The fact is, however, that I have not more than enough for my own army, and I have received the order of the Government to give nothing.

\* \* \* \* \*

You see the dash which the Common Council of the city of London have made at me! I act with a sword hanging over me, which will fall upon me whatever may be the result of affairs here; but they may do what they please, I shall not give up the game here as long as it can be played.'

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350.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pombal, 2nd Jan. 1810.

'I see that the Common Council of the city of London have desired that my conduct should be inquired into; and I think it probable that the answer which the King will give to this Address will be consistent with the approbation which he has expressed of the acts which the gentlemen wish to make the subject of inquiry; and that they will not be well pleased. I cannot expect mercy at their hands, whether I succeed or fail; and if I should fail, they will not inquire whether the failure is owing to my own incapacity, to the blameless errors to which we are all liable, to the faults or mistakes of others, to the deficiency of our means, to the serious difficulties of our situation, or to the great power and abilities of our enemy. In any of these cases, I shall become their victim; but I am not to be alarmed by this additional risk; and whatever may be the consequences, I shall continue to do my best in this country.

I wrote to you the other day about General Officers. I only beg you not to send me any violent party men. We must keep the spirit of party out of the army, or we shall be in a bad way indeed.'

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351.

To Colonel Peacocke.

Coimbra, 4th Jan. 1810.

'I have been informed by the Secretary of State to the Government of Portugal that certain officers in the garrison of Lisbon lately went in a masonic procession through the streets of the city, from the citadel to the British factory.

I have no doubt but that this act was innocently committed by those con-

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G. A. O.

Coimbra, 5th Jan. 1810.

'1. As the profession of Free Masonry is contrary to the law of Portugal, the Commander of the Forces requests that the meetings of the lodges existing in the several corps, the use of masonic badges and emblems, and the appearances of the officers and soldiers in masonic processions may be discontinued, while the troops shall be in this country.

The Commander of the Forces is convinced, that the officers and soldiers of the army will feel the necessity of obeying the laws of the country which they are sent to protect, and that they will show their respect for the attachment of the people of Portugal to their own laws, by refraining from an amusement which, however innocent in itself, and allowed by the law of Great Britain, is a violation of the law of this country, and very disagreeable to the people.'

cerned in it; but I have to inform you that the procession, the insignia, and the existence of Free Masonry, are contrary to the law in Portugal; and adverting to circumstances which have recently occurred at Lisbon, and to the reports in circulation of the causes of the confinement of different individuals by the Government, I should have believed it impossible that it was not already known that these proceedings were illegal, if the persons concerned in them were not British officers.

I am informed that this procession was most offensive to many persons in Lisbon, who are at least equally attached to the laws of the country as we are to those of our own; and that nothing prevented the expression of the general indignation by a riot, excepting the respect for the British character, and the hope entertained by the majority of the people that the violation of the law was to be attributed to ignorance of its provisions.

I beg of you to communicate the contents of this letter to the Commanding Officers of regiments, and principal officers of the army at Lisbon, and that you will state to them my wish that the meeting of masonic lodges in their corps, and the wearing of all masonic emblems, and all masonic processions, may be discontinued during the time they may be in Portugal.'

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352.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Coimbra, 6th Jan. 1810.

'I have no objection to any gentleman dedicating to me his work; but I cannot give my formal sanction to his doing so without reading and considering the work, and seeing whether it is of a nature to deserve that recommendation to the public. I have not leisure for this, and I therefore return the gentleman's paper.'

G. O.

Viseu, 12th Jan. 1810.

1. All officers wishing to go to any part of the country by post, must apply for a passport; if at Head Quarters, to the Commander of the Forces; if at any of the cantonments of the army, or at Lisbon, Elvas, &c., to the General Officer commanding the division, or to the commanding officer at Lisbon, Elvas, &c. respectively; to whom blank passports will be transmitted for this purpose.

2. When the Commissary, attached to any division detached from Head Quarters, wishes to send a courier by post, he is to apply to the commanding officer of the division for a passport, who will grant it if he should concur in the expediency of sending the courier.

The Commissary General will apply for passports for the same purpose to the Commander of the Forces.

3. Persons belonging to the English army will not be supplied with post horses at any of the post stages, unless they should produce these passports for post horses of the Commander of the Forces.

4. When soldiers are sent to the general, or any detachment hospital, their ammunition is to be delivered into store to the officer commanding the artillery, with the division in which the regiment is placed, with a return of the quantity so delivered in; which the officer commanding the artillery with the division is to direct the Commissary of artillery to receive. The commanding officers of regiments are to adopt means for the preservation of the ammunition of soldiers in regimental hospitals.

5. The Commander of the Forces desires that the shooting of bullocks may be discontinued, as being a great waste of ammunition.

6. The Government of Portugal having expressed their desire to give the troops a double allowance of wine on 3 days, as a demonstration of their satisfaction, upon the return of the army to Portugal, a double allowance for each man is to be issued by the Commissary, on the 18th instant, being Her Majesty's birth day, on the 21st Jan., and on the 28th Jan.

7. The officers commanding regiments are informed, that they must not allow either officers or soldiers to absent themselves from their regiments without leave from the Commander of the Forces.'



## 353.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Viseu, 14th Jan. 1810.

' You have seen all the dispatches that I have ever written to England, and know, as well as I do, how far they have confirmed what I wrote on the 14th November. Circumstances have certainly altered materially since that letter was written; but the question for me is, have they altered in such a manner as to induce me to think that with 30,000 men, which I have reason to believe I shall have in the course of a few weeks (together with the Portuguese army, which, by the bye, is better than I ever expected it would be, and wants only to be equipped as it ought), I shall not be able to save Portugal, or, at all events, to sell the country dearly?

I think that if the Spanish armies had not been lost, and if the Spaniards had made good use of their time, very large reinforcements indeed would have been necessary to enable the French even to attack us. As it is, have we now no chance? Ought we to withdraw from the Peninsula, and give up the whole (for when we withdraw we shall give up the whole) an easy prey to the conqueror? Will 10,000 men more, which will distress our means, supposing that Great Britain can afford to supply them, compensate for the loss of these Spanish armies, and put us in the situation in which my dispatch of the 14th November supposed we ought and should stand?

I conceive that the honor and interests of the country require that we should hold our ground here as long as possible; and, please God, I will maintain it as long as I can; and I will neither endeavor to shift from my own shoulders on those of the Ministers the responsibility for the failure, by calling for means which I know they cannot give, and which, perhaps, would not add materially to the facility of attaining our object; nor will I give to the Ministers, who are not strong, and who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position which, in my opinion, the honor and interest of the country require they should maintain as long as possible.

I think that if the Portuguese do their duty, I shall have enough to maintain it; if they do not, nothing that Great Britain can afford can save the country; and if from that cause I fail in saving it, and am obliged to go, I shall be able to carry away the British army.'

## 354.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Viseu, 22nd Jan. 1810.

' I am much concerned that you should imagine that measures are adopted for the supply of this army that occasion an useless expense which might be avoided. If ever there was an officer at the head of an army interested (personally I may say) in keeping down the expenses of the army, it is myself; for I am left wholly to my own resources, and am obliged to supply the wants of the allies, as well as of the British army, from what I can get; and if I fail, God will, I hope, have mercy upon me, for nobody else will. But besides economy in the expenditure of money, I must be certain of efficiency in the supply of necessaries for the troops; and it will not do for me to depend for what I want upon the navigation of the sea upon the coast of Portugal, during the winter, by victuallers and transports, or upon the

passage of the bar of the Mondego by square rigged vessels, at a season when all the people of the country agree in stating that the bar can scarcely be passed by a schooner drawing little water.

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I beg you to observe that I am held severely responsible for all failures, as well of supplies as of every thing else; and I have given the Commissary General these directions in the confidence that your information respecting the Mondego is authentic, and that transports and victuallers can enter that river with greater facility in winter, than I know from experience they can in summer.'

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355.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 24th Jan. 1810.

'I certainly think the army are improved. They are a better army than they were some months ago. But still these terrible, continued outrages give me reason to apprehend that, notwithstanding all the precautions I have taken, and shall take, they will slip through my fingers, as they did through Sir J. Moore's, when I shall be involved in any nice operation with a powerful enemy in my front.'

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356.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Viseu, 25th. Jan. 1810.

'In respect to the expenditure of the money received, I believe there is no man who doubts that the first and principal object of my attention, and of that of every British officer, must be the British army, and afterwards the allies, whom His Majesty has bound himself to support. The nature and constitution of the British army absolutely requires that it should be regularly paid. It cannot plunder or take what it wants upon requisition, like the French army, because it is not sufficiently numerous; and all the necessaries, and much of the food of the soldiers, depend upon their regular payment. I believe I have gone farther than any officer in withholding this payment, excepting Lord Hutchinson in Egypt; but there it must be observed that the troops received a description of ration which they could, and did, barter with the natives for the other articles which they required.'

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357.

To Lieut. General Payne.

Viseu, 27th Jan. 1810.

'Considering that the cavalry do no work, and that they are all in stables,

G. O.

Viseu, 24th Jan. 1810.

'3. As the distance which the army is from Lisbon makes it impossible to procure money in time to discharge the amount of the estimates in advance, as required by the regulations; and as the consequence of the discharge of the balances due to the soldiers on the 24th of each month, for the month then ending, would be, that for a month the officers commanding companies would have no money in hand to supply those necessaries which the soldiers should require;

The Commander of the Forces desires that in future the accounts of the soldiers are to be settled on the 24th of every month, according to the regulations of the service, and the balances struck; but the balances not to be paid to the soldiers till the 21th of the following month; that is to say, the balance due to the soldiers on the 24th Jan. not till the 24th Feb., and thus in succession from month to month.

An alteration in conformity to this order must be made in the certificate of payment at the bottom of the monthly return of regiments.'



and adverting to the very excellent condition in which the horses of the hussars are which have been most worked, and which I am sorry to say are now frequently fed upon rye, I cannot but be apprehensive that there is some deficiency of attention to stable duties. I should recommend to you, therefore, to call the attention of commanding officers of regiments to this subject, and to resume the use of the currycomb and brush universally, if they should not be able immediately to supply themselves with the hair gloves which you preferred.'

358.

To Bart. Frere, Esq.

Lisbon, 9th Feb. 1810

'The Government, however, must not expect that I shall risk the British army to effect this object. It must be obvious to them that Spain can derive no great advantage from any temporary effect produced by such an operation, without great exertion on the part of the Government. They must also see clearly that, in the present situation of affairs, the occurrence of any misfortune to the British army would be fatal to the cause. I trust, therefore, that if I should find that circumstances will not permit me to undertake an operation which shall create a substantial diversion in their favor, the Government will be satisfied that I refrain from it only because I am unable to undertake it with any reasonable prospect of advantage.'

359.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Lisbon, 9th Feb. 1810.

'It is obvious that there is nothing in this situation of the enemy which can affect the British army or this country, even if the Spanish corps remaining in Granada and in the Sierra de Ronda should be dispersed. The enemy could not be in a situation for a considerable length of time to attack this country; and although I am of opinion that the time may come when it may be doubtful whether a perseverance in the contest in Portugal will hold out "any prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to His Majesty's allies," I conceive that it is a question upon which it is difficult for His Majesty's Government at this distance to decide. That it must depend upon events in Spain, upon which no calculation can be formed, as well as upon the existing spirit and the prospect of resistance by the people in this country, and in some measure upon the season of the year in which the attack will be made, and upon the preparation which the enemy will have made for it; and that adverting to the certainty that, in all events, the British army will be able to embark, and that its continuance on the Peninsula must be beneficial to His Majesty's and the general interest, as it must draw the attention of the enemy, and must tend to His Majesty's honor, it would probably be best to leave to the decision of the officer commanding the troops in this country the period of the evacuation as a military question, after an explanation by His Majesty's Government of their objects in the continuance of the contest.'

G. O.

Visou, 30th Jan. 1810.

'2. The officers of the army who have soldiers for their servants, should be particularly cautious not to give them orders, the execution of which are breaches of discipline and good order, and not to expose them in a state of intoxication to the temptation of committing offences which must lead to the punishment of the soldier.'

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I have come to this part of the country to view the progress of the works which I had ordered to be constructed when here in October; and I propose to return to the army tomorrow.'

360.

To Marshal Beresford.

Viseu, 19th Feb. 1810.

'I have written to the Government respecting the mode in which the Governor of Estremadura has executed the work on the road from Thomar to Espinhal. It might be made the best, instead of being the worst, military road in Portugal; and it is really a most important line of communication, without which all our combinations for defence, and any offensive measures we may adopt, must be very imperfect. There is not a hill upon the road; it runs along a river; and there are materials close to it which might make it excellent.'

361.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

Viseu, 27th Feb. 1810.

'The misfortune throughout the war has been that the Spaniards are of a disposition too sanguine. They have invariably expected only success in objects for the attainment of which they had adopted no measures. They have never looked to, nor prepared for, a lengthened contest; and all those, or nearly all, who have had any thing to do with them, have imbibed the same spirit, and the same sentiments. Without adverting to the enormous armies which are daily pouring into Spain, in addition to those which were before in the country, and were already superior in number to the allies; or to the fact that there is now no army in the field excepting the British army, they are thinking of offensive operations from Cadiz; and they appear to me to hold the Isla de Leon more as the intrenched camp (and hardly even deserving that name) of an army, than as a fortified post, upon the possession of which every thing is to turn in future.'

362.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 1st March, 1810.

'Since I wrote to you respecting the use to be made of the Portuguese

G. O.

Viseu, 28th Feb. 1810.

'6. The Commander of the Forces draws the attention of the soldiers of the army to the consequence of the crimes committed by the soldiers thus ordered for execution under the sentence of a General Court Martial. ———, of the —th regt., and ———, of the —th regt., committed a crime which the Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe is too common in this army; they robbed and ill treated an inhabitant of this country, whom they met on the road; a crime which the Commander of the Forces is determined in no instance to forgive.

The soldiers of the army have been invariably well treated by the inhabitants of Portugal; and the frequent instances which have occurred of their being robbed and ill-treated, and of murders being committed, by soldiers who straggle from their detachments on a march, are a disgrace to the character of this army, and of the British nation.

The Commander of the Forces is therefore determined in every case of the kind that may occur to have proof adduced of the crime committed; and the sentences of the General Courts Martial, whatever they may be, shall be carried into execution.

The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe that the crime committed by ———, private in the —th regt., is no less common in this army than robbery and murder; and in respect to this crime he is equally determined to carry into execution the sentences of the General Courts Martial, whatever they may be.'



fleet eventually, I have turned over in my mind the expediency of encouraging a general emigration from this country; and I acknowledge that, upon the whole, I am disposed to doubt it. I think that we ought, and I propose to endeavor, to carry off all the regular army, because we may be very certain that all that we leave behind will very soon be made French soldiers; but I think that we ought to have in Portugal, and to encourage to remain here, all the gentlemen of the country, as a germ of insurrection, whenever circumstances shall afford them an opportunity to throw off the French yoke, which may be afforded by thousands of events in the Peninsula, in France, and in Europe. If we should encourage the party in general to withdraw, no advantage can be taken of these events hereafter; and we gain no advantage at present by withdrawing them, as they will be only a burden to us, or to the Government of Brazil. At the same time I think we are bound to provide for the removal of all who have been concerned in carrying on the government, and who are now or hereafter may be conspicuously active against the French. Pray turn this subject over in your mind, and let me know your opinion upon it.'

## 363.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 10th March, 1810.

'It appears to me to be most probable that, in a short time, there will be no resistance to the French troops in any part of Spain, excepting at Cadiz, and in any other of the forts and strongholds which may be able to hold out. But there will be no obedience, and there will remain an universal disposition to revolt, which will break out upon the first, and every, opportunity that will be afforded by the absence or the weakness of the detachments of French troops, which must usually be kept in all parts of the country for the ordinary purposes of government, and, in the end, the French yoke must be shaken off. This disposition of the people will be much encouraged by the continuance of the contest at Cadiz, by the possession by the loyal party of the islands in the Mediterranean and of the fleet, and by the continued loyalty of the colonies.

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What I have already written is probably as extensive a consideration of the question respecting Cadiz, as is necessary in the existing situation of the contest in the Peninsula. I shall, however, go one step further, and suppose for a moment that it was possible to renew it with the aid of Spanish armies, &c. &c.; and knowing what I do of the country and of the disposition of the people, and of the state, and probable future state, of their army, I am decidedly of opinion that the largest British army which Great Britain can afford to supply would do better to carry on its operations through Portugal, and make Lisbon the point of its communication with England, than carry on its operations through the south of Spain, communicating with Cadiz and Gibraltar.

It is useless to trouble you with a consideration of the different topics which bear upon this question. I shall only observe that we can advance with safety nearer to the centre of the scene of operations, and retire with greater ease; and, I hope, get away with equal safety from the Tagus; and that,

as we now show, we can keep in check, as long as we can remain, a much larger force than we could oppose, if we were in the south of Spain, and it were brought against us.

I can tell you no more than I have already told you about the embarkation of the Portuguese army. If you will let us have a large fleet of ships of war, and 45,000 disposable tons of transports, I shall try, and I think I shall bring them all off; but I cannot be certain, until the time comes, that I shall be able to bring off a man.

In respect to home politics, I acknowledge that I do not like them much, and I am convinced that the Government cannot last. I do not think that any Government can stand, after an inquiry into an important measure by a Committee of the House of Commons. However, I am of opinion that the King has a right, and must be supported in the exercise of the right, to choose his own servants, as long as he thinks it proper to persevere in retaining those whom he prefers in his service; and if no other advantage shall have been gained by the formation of the existing Government, it has at least drawn from Lord Grenville opinions which will render the employment of him not inconsistent with the King's ease, if he should think proper to call him to his service.

I assure you that what has passed in Parliament respecting me, has not given me one moment's concern, as far as I am personally concerned; and indeed I rejoice at it, as it has given my friends an opportunity of setting the public right upon some points on which they had not been informed, and on others on which the misrepresentations had driven the truth from their memories. But I regret that men like Lord —— and others should carry the spirit of party so far as to attack an officer in his absence, should take the ground of their attack from Cobbett and the *Moniteur*, and should at once blame him for circumstances and events over which he could have no control, and for faults which, if they were committed at all, were not committed by him.'

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364.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 10th March, 1810.

'This being the case in regard to the tonnage, I cannot, as an honest man, encourage the Spanish armies to retire upon Portugal, however it may strengthen ourselves at the critical moment. If the Spanish, and even the Portuguese troops were like others, and I could reckon with entire confidence upon their exertions in the hour of trial, I should urge the Marques de la Romana to co-operate with us in the defence of our position, from being certain that we can lose it only from the deficiency of numbers of good troops to defend it. But if he should retire with us towards the Tagus, and if, as is probable, his troops should behave ill, and if, consequently, we should be obliged to embark, I should have treated him ungenerously and ill to leave him behind. I therefore propose to leave him upon the rear of the enemy, as I shall the greatest part of the Portuguese militia, and all those troops of the line which will be in garrisons, forts, &c. &c.

As for the advantage which the enemy will derive from finding at Lisbon rich and valuable property, I cannot put it in competition with that which they would derive from obtaining the services of a large, and, to a certain degree,



disciplined army. To remove this instrument out of their way should be the first object of our attention, and afterwards any thing else of which it may be desirable to deprive them; and those persons and families whom it may be desirable to remove from their reach.'

## 365.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 20th March, 1810.

'The want of money to pay the British troops with regularity, and to discharge the demands for their provisions, forage, and means of transport, is also an evil which may be attended by the most serious consequences, in the critical situation in which the army may shortly be placed.

The constitution, and the whole system of the discipline, efficiency and equipment of the British army, depend upon regular payments. All the soldiers' necessaries, and much of their provisions, and the provisions, equipments, and comforts of the officers, are purchased and paid for out of their pay; and if these articles cannot be paid for, the soldiers will take them without payment, notwithstanding all the exertions of the officers to prevent them.

The quantity of supplies drawn from Portugal for the use of the British and Portuguese armies has been so large, that it is most difficult now to procure any without payment. I have accounts from all quarters of the increasing difficulties in the supply of the troops; and it is reasonable to suppose that the inhabitants of the country are unwilling to part with their provisions, without payment in ready money, to an army which they must expect will, before long, evacuate the country.

If not supplied with money in sufficient quantity to pay for the supplies required, the supplies must be taken from the country, without payment, by force. Detachments of the troops must be employed upon this service, instead of in opposing the invasion of the enemy; and fresh opportunities will be afforded for the disorders and outrages to which I have more than once drawn your Lordship's attention, at the moment at which every thing may depend upon the efficiency, discipline, and good order of the troops, and upon the good will of the inhabitants of the country.'

## 366.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Viseu, 23rd March, 1810.

'I wish I could do more; but, upon a fair calculation of circumstances, probable events and means, I do not think I can, with propriety, undertake, or do otherwise than give my opinion against undertaking more.

I think it scandalous that the Portuguese regular army should not be 100,000 instead of 50,000 men; more scandalous that they should want near 10,000 men to complete to 50,000; still more scandalous that they have not means to support even the army which they have; and, almost as bad as all the rest, that Great Britain should not have been able to send arms and clothing for men as soon as the French have been able to send in their reinforcements of made soldiers, which are now upon our frontier.

G. O.

Viseu, 23rd March, 1810.

'1. The soldiers of the army are desired not to eat roots, particularly the onions which they find growing wild in the fields, and even in the gardens many of them are poisonous, and a serjeant of the —th regt. has died of the consequences of eating them.'

The means however being, as they are, deficient, I must not undertake what is not necessary, with insufficient means.'

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367.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 24th March, 1810.

'I am glad that Dom M. Forjaz is turning his mind to keeping the town in a state of tranquillity at this critical moment, as he may depend upon it that it is impossible, however desirable it may be, to occupy the left bank of the river. We shall be much pressed for numbers even on the right bank; and it would be the height of folly to extend our posts to the left bank, when it does not appear to be necessary.

Till I received Dom M. Forjaz's letter, I admit that I did not contemplate the probable insurrections in the town, which, whether on the right or the wrong side, would be equally fatal to us, and would probably oblige me to withdraw, even though pressed by no other military necessity. Thus the people would be the immediate cause of their own subjugation. I conceive, however, that it will be possible to establish in the town a very vigorous system of police, to be well weighed, considered, and arranged beforehand, to be carried into execution at the critical moment. The foundation of this system should be the existing police, which I believe is very good. The town, if not already divided, might be divided into districts; in each district there should be a person employed under the Lieutenant de Police. A certain number of the married inhabitants of each district, not already belonging to any of the military establishments, should be enrolled to be police constables or soldiers, under the direction of this magistrate or officer, to keep the peace of their own district, in case there should be any disturbances in the town.

These persons should be armed, but not paid, unless actually called out and employed under a proclamation by the Government. They might then, by patrolling the streets of their district constantly, at all hours of the day or night, prevent assemblies of people in the streets or coffee houses, where all mischief commences. This is an outline upon which Dom M. Forjaz, who has more local knowledge and ability, might work, and bring out a perfect, and, I hope a simple and practicable system.

The object and pretence for its establishment at present might be stated to be the movements of the French corps upon the frontier; the probability that Portugal would soon be attacked; and the danger and inconvenience which experience had demonstrated to result from popular commotions in

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G. O.

Viseu, 25th March, 1810.

'The Commander of the Forces requests that the officers commanding regiments will draw the attention of the soldiers under their command to this example of the consequences of the disgraceful outrages of which too many of the soldiers of this army have been guilty.

The Commander of the Forces repeats his determination to spare no trouble to procure and produce evidence against those who may be guilty of such outrages, and to carry into execution invariably whatever may be the sentence of the Court Martial. His Excellency particularly requests the commanding officers of regiments to revert to the General Orders, and to draw the attention of the officers and non-commissioned officers under their command to those orders which have for their object to prevent the commission of those crimes, and to render unnecessary these dreadful punishments, by the preservation of order and regularity among the soldiers, on their marches, in their quarters, and particularly on detachments.'



all great towns, particularly in the Peninsula, at the moment the armies were engaged upon the frontiers.

If the Government should be of opinion that a letter from me, recommending a measure of this description to their consideration, would at all strengthen their hands in carrying it into execution, I will write such a one.'

## 368.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

Viseu, 27th March, 1810.

'I am concerned to observe that the Spanish troops make no progress in their discipline; and that they are not better in that respect, or improved in efficiency since you went to Cadiz. I am afraid that much time will elapse before any considerable improvement will be made in the state of these troops, or before several other measures will be adopted by the Spanish Government, which are expedient and even necessary in the existing situation of their affairs. We must not be discouraged, however, by these untoward circumstances. I have but little doubt that the Spanish troops, bad as their appearance and discipline are, will do their duty in fortified positions; and even if they were worse than they are, and the difficulties of all kinds with which we have to contend were greater than they are, the interests of Great Britain and the world are too deeply involved in this contest for us to recede one step from it, which may not be rendered absolutely necessary by circumstances.

The affairs of the Peninsula have invariably had the same appearance since I have known them; they have always appeared to be lost; means have always appeared inadequate to objects; and the sole dependence of the whole has apparently been upon us. The contest however still continues, and is in its third year; and we must continue it as long as we can with the means which the country affords, improving them as much as the people will allow us, as it is obvious that Great Britain cannot give us larger means than we have.'

## 369.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Viseu, 27th March, 1810.

'Those who see the difficulties attending all communications with Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence can be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon us for every thing, will be astonished that, with so small a force as I have, I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this country. I certainly should not be able to stay if I were to weaken it any further; and yet, if I should go from this country, Cadiz would not hold out a month, even if I were to take there a great part of the British army. The French might and could collect there their whole force; and then the serious attack would be made, and the place would really be in danger.'

## 370.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 28th March, 1810.

'The French attacked the post at Barba de Puerco, which was occupied by 4 companies of the 95th regt. under Lieut. Colonel Beckwith on the night of the 19th instant.

Immediately opposite to Barba de Puerco, on the other side of the river, is San Felices, and between these two villages the only bridge on the Agueda below Ciudad Rodrigo, and the recent fall of rain had filled the river, which was no where fordable.

The enemy had collected a brigade of infantry at San Felices; and crossed the bridge with 600 men after dark, keeping the remainder on the other side. These followed the piquet of the 95th up from the bridge, and immediately made their attack; but they were repulsed with the loss of 2 officers and 7 men killed, 6 prisoners, and 30 firelocks.

I am sorry to add that Lieut. Mercer of the 95th and 3 men were killed, and 10 were wounded in this affair, which was highly creditable to Colonel Beckwith, and displayed the gallantry and discipline of the officers and troops under his command. The Adjutant, Lieut. Stewart, distinguished himself.'

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 371.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viscu, 30th March, 1810.

'I am fully aware of the mutual hatred of the Spanish and Portuguese people towards each other; and you may depend upon it that I adverted to that circumstance when I considered of the propriety of sending to Cadiz a Portuguese regiment. From experience of the manner in which the service of Portuguese troops was received in other Spanish garrisons, I did not consider it probable that this hatred was likely to affect the reception of the Portuguese regiment at Cadiz; and having that regiment at my disposal at the moment a garrison was wanted for Cadiz, I did not think it proper to allow the consideration of the hatred of these nations towards each other to deprive the cause of this timely assistance.'

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 372.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.

Viscu, 31st March, 1810.

'The French threaten us on all points, and are most desirous to get rid of us. But they threaten upon too many points at a time to give me much uneasiness respecting any one in particular, and they shall not induce me to disconnect my army. I am in a situation in which no mischief can be done to the army, or to any part of it; I am prepared for all events; and if I am in a scrape, as appears to be the general belief in England, although certainly not my own, I'll get out of it.'

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 373.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viscu, 1st April, 1810.

'In respect to the Patriarch's proposal to divide the Kingdom into districts, it is my opinion that the Kingdom is already divided in a very convenient manner; the magistrates are fully sufficient for the performance of the duty required of them; the laws and regulations are excellent; and all that is required is to put the whole in motion, and to carry the laws into execution.

I can have no objection to give Beresford any power; on the contrary, the greater the power he has, the better it will be for the public service: but, for his own sake, I should think it better to leave the execution of the laws in the hands of the ordinary magistrates. Settle it, however, in any way you think best.'



374.

To Lieut. General Hill.

Viseu, 2nd April, 1810.

‘ You see what the opinion of people in England is of affairs here. My instructions so far concur with the general sentiment as to forbid any risk, or any unnecessary loss ; and you will attend to that in any movement which you may make.’

375.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 2nd April, 1810.

‘ The great disadvantage under which I labor is, that Sir J. Moore, who was here before me, gave an opinion that this country could not be defended by the army under his command ; and, although it is obvious that the country was in a very different situation at that time from what it is at present ; that I am in a very different situation from that in which he found himself ; and that, moreover, it can be proved, from the marches and operations of the army under Sir J. Moore, and his dispatches, that little was known of Portugal at that time ; yet persons, who ought to be acquainted with these facts, entertain a prejudice against the adoption of any plans for opposing the enemy, of which Portugal is to be the theatre, or its means the instrument, and will not even consider them. I have as much respect as any man can have for the opinion and judgment of Sir J. Moore ; and I should mistrust my own, if opposed to his, in a case which he had had an opportunity of knowing and considering. But he positively knew nothing of Portugal, and could know nothing of its existing state. Besides this prejudice, founded on Sir J. Moore’s opinion, there is another very general prejudice against any military operation in the Peninsula.

My opinion is, that as long as we shall remain in a state of activity in Portugal, the contest must continue in Spain ; that the French are most desirous that we should withdraw from the country, but know that they must employ a very large force indeed in the operations which will render it necessary for us to go away ; and I doubt whether they can bring that force to bear upon Portugal without abandoning other objects, and exposing their whole fabric in Spain to great risk. If they should be able to invade it, and should not succeed in obliging us to evacuate the country, they will be in a very dangerous situation ; and the longer we can oppose them, and delay their success, the more likely are they to suffer materially in Spain.

All the preparations for embarking and carrying away the army, and every thing belonging to it, are already made, and my intention is to embark it as soon as I find that a military necessity exists for so doing. I shall delay the embarkation as long as it is in my power, and shall do every thing in my power to avert the necessity of embarking at all.

If the enemy should invade this country with a force less than that which I should think so superior to ours as to create the necessity for embarking, I shall fight a battle to save the country, for which I have made the preparations, and if the result should not be successful, of which I have no doubt, I shall still be able to retire and embark the army.

In short, the whole of my conduct shall be guided by a fair and cool view of the circumstances of our situation at the moment, and a reference to your Lordship’s instructions of the 27th February (A).

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I am willing to be responsible for the evacuation of Portugal, under your Lordship's instructions of the 27th February. Depend upon it, whatever people may tell you, I am not so desirous as they imagine of fighting desperate battles; if I was, I might fight one any day I please. But I have kept the army for 6 months in two positions, notwithstanding their own desire, and that of the allies, that I should take advantage of many opportunities which the enemy apparently offered of striking a blow against them; in some of which the single operation would certainly have been successful. But I have looked to the great result of our maintaining our position on the Peninsula; and have not allowed myself to be diverted from it by the wishes of the allies, and probably of some of our own army, that I should interfere more actively in some partial affairs; or by the opinion of others, that we ought to quit the country prematurely; and I have not harassed my troops by marches and countermarches, in conformity to the enemy's movements. I believe that the world in the Peninsula begin to believe that I am right.

I am convinced that, if the Spaniards had followed my advice, Spain would now have been out of danger, and that the conduct which I have pursued has given us at this moment an efficient army, which is the only hope of the Peninsula. I am perfectly aware of the risks which I incur personally, whatever may be the result of the operations in Portugal. All I beg is, that if I am to be responsible, I may be left to the exercise of my own judgment: and I ask for the fair confidence of Government upon the measures which I am to adopt.

If Government take the opinions of others upon the situation of affairs here, and entertain doubts upon the measures which I propose to adopt, then let them give me their instructions in detail, and I will carry them strictly into execution. I may venture, however, to assure you, that, with the exception of Marshal Beresford, who I believe concurs entirely in all my opinions respecting the state of the contest, and the measures to be adopted here, there is no man in the army who has taken half the pains upon the subject that I have.'

G. O.

Viseu, 4th April, 1810.

'The Commander of the Forces requests that the attention of the troops may be drawn to this additional example of the consequences of the bad conduct of the soldiers; the soldiers must see that it is impossible for them to commit these outrages without being discovered, and that conviction and punishment are the certain consequences of their crimes: indeed it has rarely happened that one of those who have conspired to commit these crimes, (for they are all the result of conspiracy,) has not offered himself as an evidence to convict the other criminals. The Commander of the Forces is obliged to observe that these crimes could not be so frequently committed, these conspiracies could not be formed, a robbery of the description of that for which these prisoners are now ordered for execution, could not have been known to the soldiers of almost the whole company, if the non-commissioned officers did their duty, and remained at all times among the soldiers.

His Excellency also observes that the non-commissioned officers can do their duty, and can maintain the authority of their situation, only by having the support of the officers belonging to their company given to them upon all occasions, by constant visiting the soldiers' quarters, and by invariable attendance upon the parade, from the moment the soldiers are under arms. The Commander of the Forces draws the attention of the General and superior officers of the army, and of all the other officers, to his Orders of the 29th May, 1809, to which he desires a strict attention may be paid in future: it is impossible that the time of the officers of the army can be employed to so much advantage to the service, or with so much satisfaction to themselves, whilst the troops are in cantonments, as in giving their attention to support the authority of the non-commissioned officers, to instil into them a just



## 376.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Viscu, 4th April, 1810.

'The Austrian marriage is a terrible event, and must prevent any great movement on the Continent for the present. Still I do not despair of seeing at some time or other a check to the Buonaparte system. Recent transactions in Holland show that it is all hollow within, and that it is so inconsistent with the wishes, the interests, and even the existence of civilised society, that he cannot trust even his brothers to carry it into execution.

If the Spaniards had acted with common prudence, we should be in a very different situation in the Peninsula, but I fear there are now no hopes. The Government are terribly weak, and I think it probable will be beaten upon the Walcheren question. It is impossible to say what will be the consequence. I think the King may be able to form a government without having recourse to Lord Grenville; but there will be no strength in that government, and the members will have no satisfaction in conducting public affairs.'

## 377.

To Colonel Peacocke.

Viscu, 5th April, 1810.

'After all, I believe it will be found, that if attention be paid by the officers to the food of the soldiers; if they prevented them from straggling from their corps on a march, or from their quarters or camp, in search of wine or plunder after the march is made; and if the soldiers are regularly organised and told off into the several parties to be sent for those articles of food, fuel, &c., which they require; and that the officers superintend the execution of these duties,—it will be found that but few soldiers are so young, and still fewer so old and infirm, that they cannot make those marches and perform those duties which the service requires from them.'

## 378.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Viscu, 6th April, 1810.

'But the inhabitants of the country have such a respect and affection for the British nation, and particularly for the military qualities of the soldier, (who presumes upon his military reputation to commit many of the crimes of which he is guilty,) that it is most difficult to prevail upon the inhabitants to

just sense of their situation and of their duties, and thus to prevent these conspiracies and crimes, of which the Commander of the Forces finds himself under the necessity of making such frequent examples.'

G. O.

Viscu, 5th April, 1810.

'The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the officers of the army to the General Orders 4th May, Nos. 5 and 6, and of the 7th Oct., Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11, also of the 8th Dec. No. 5; their inattention to these Orders is the greatest inconvenience to the service, increases the detail of business in the public departments, renders necessary references to themselves and to the Commander of the Forces, on every article which they receive from the magistrates of the country upon irregular vouchers: the whole of this might be avoided, if the officers would attend to the Orders which have been issued upon this subject.

It will give the Commander of the Forces much concern to be under the necessity of requiring officers who give irregular vouchers to the magistrates of the country, to pay for the articles which they have received; but the frequent occurrence of inattention to these Orders which can be obeyed with so much facility, and the extent of the business which so much inattention throws upon all the departments, will render this measure necessary.'

give testimony of the injuries they have received, and they will rarely point out the person who has committed the offence; and the soldiers themselves will rarely tell the truth before a Court Martial.'

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379.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Viscu, 7th April, 1810.

'The Government are terribly afraid that I shall get them, and myself, into a scrape. But what can be expected from men who are beaten in the House of Commons 3 times a week? A great deal might be done now, if there existed in England less party, and more public sentiment, and if there was any Government.'

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380.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viscu, 11th April, 1810.

'Several have lately been convicted before General Courts Martial, and have been executed, an example which I hope will have effect, as well upon the officers as the men. Upon the former I hope it will operate to induce them to take more pains to keep their men in order, and support the authority of the non-commissioned officers, and to instil into them a proper sense of their situation and duty; and I hope it will convince the latter that I possess the power, and am determined to exert it, to punish those who are guilty of those disgraceful outrages. I am still apprehensive of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation before the enemy, for they really forget every thing when plunder or wine is within their reach.'

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381.

To Lieut. General Graham.

Cea, 15th April, 1810.

'I mention these ideas only in confirmation of your own. I had but little opportunity of forming a correct judgment upon the subject; and if you should entertain an opinion different from mine in any part of this general outline, I am convinced that you must be right.'

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382.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cea, 15th April, 1810.

'I am also of opinion, that we should endeavor to make the Spaniards believe we feel it to be their interest that our troops should remain at Cadiz, and that we consider we have conferred an obligation upon them by going there. As long as they entertain this belief, they will treat us well: as soon as they lose it, I know them well enough to be certain that there is no enormity that they will not commit in order to get rid of us. They are much more likely to continue in this belief, if we insist upon the performance of the conditions on which I allowed the troops to go to Cadiz at all; and indeed I drew those conditions with that view.'

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383.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viscu, 19th April, 1810.

'I think it would be desirable to define with precision our ideas respecting the establishment of military law, before we determine to alter the established law of the country in any case.

The following questions are worth consideration and decision on this topic



What is military law? Military law as applied to any persons, excepting the officers, soldiers, and followers of the army, for whose government there are particular provisions of law in all well regulated countries, is neither more nor less than the will of the General of the army. He punishes, either with or without trial, for crimes either declared to be so, or not so declared by any existing law, or by his own orders. This is the plain and common meaning of the term military law. Besides the mode of proceeding above described, laws have been made in different countries at different times to establish and legalise a description of military constitution.

The Commander in Chief, or the Government, has been authorised to proceed by military process, that is, by Court Martial or Council of War, against persons offending against certain laws, or against their own orders, issued generally for the security of the army, or for the establishment of a certain government or constitution odious to the people among whom it is established. Of both descriptions of military law there are numerous instances in the history of the operations of the French army during the Revolution; and there is an instance of the existence both of the first mentioned description and of the last mentioned in Ireland during the rebellion of 1798, when the people were in insurrection against the Government, and were to be restrained by force.

The next question which is worth our consideration, is, for what object is military law of either description to be established in Portugal? Upon this point I would observe, that I believe there is no instance in history of the establishment of military law, excepting with a view to restrain the people. We have no such object in Portugal. What we want is:

1st. To make the magistrates do their duty. We may try them by Court Martial or Council of War for neglect of duty; but what punishment would a Court Martial inflict upon them for neglect of duty, however criminal, except dismissal from office? and that punishment can be inflicted by the Government at any time without trial.

2ndly. We want to induce the people to perform the duties, and to supply the articles required from them by the law, and by the orders of Government. The law which imposes these duties, and requires these supplies and assistance for the armies, furnishes the means of its own execution, and imposes the penalties of non-performance of its provisions; and it is the duty of the inferior magistrate to inflict the penalty of the law for its breach.

We are mistaken, if we suppose that a peasant who has deserted from the militia or the line, or who has avoided to give his grain, or his straw, or his bullocks, or to supply his cart when called for, will attend the General to receive the notification of his will regarding his punishment, or the sentence of a council of war. Inferior officers and persons must seek for him. If military law is to supersede every other authority, the troops must be the executive officers of the law; they must be employed to seek and bring forward the criminal; and probably at the period when the enemy may be in the province governed by this law, the troops may be employed in the civil government, instead of opposing the enemy.

I wish these points to be maturely considered before we go farther. Let us define our notions; and, depend upon it, we shall find that the establishment of military law will only increase our difficulties.

384.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Viseu, 20th April, 1810.

'I received yesterday your letter of the 18th, which I would not answer immediately, that I might give to your proposition all the attention which it deserves.

The consequence of the attack which you propose would be to commence a description of warfare upon our outposts, in which we should certainly sustain some loss of men; and I should be obliged to bring up the army to the front, than which nothing can be more inconvenient, and eventually injurious to us.

I do not know whether the state of tranquillity in which affairs have been for some time is advantageous to the French, but I know that it is highly so to us. The British army is increasing in strength daily, and a continuance of the tranquillity in which we have been, for a short time longer, will add considerably to our numbers. The discipline and equipment of the Portuguese troops is improving daily. The equipment in particular, which is not very defective, will in a short time be complete, as all the articles for it are arrived from England. The sick of this army are also coming out of hospital fast. The arms for the militia have lately arrived, but some time must elapse before they can be transported to the points at which they can be issued to the different corps. All these services must necessarily be impeded, if not entirely stopped, by the necessity of being in a state of preparation in front, which the existence of *la petite guerre* would undoubtedly occasion, and these objects are most essential to this country if we are to be attacked, and to the perfection of our army, if circumstances should enable us to make a forward movement.

I am not insensible of the advantages which we should derive from the successful issue of an expedition, such as you have proposed, particularly on the state of the war in Spain. But I think that the Spaniards begin to be sensible of the advantages which they derive from our position in this country, and are aware that circumstances do not allow us to interfere with more activity, at present, in the operations of the war. Upon the whole, I prefer not to undertake this expedition.

In answer to your letter of the 17th, I will only tell you that it has excited any feeling in my mind excepting anger. I have already told you that I shall regret exceedingly the existence of a necessity to place in other hands the command of our advanced guard; and I shall regret it particularly if it should deprive me of your assistance altogether.

I expect Marshal Beresford here in a day or two, when I shall be able to make arrangements that may enable me to leave you in the command of your division, which I am very anxious to do. In the mean time, you have the 3 battalions of Caçadores, as I do not mean to withdraw the 1st and 2nd till I shall see the Marshal.'

385.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 21st April, 1810.

'The state of opinion in England is very unfavorable to the Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the public, or as the Opposition pretend to be; and they appear to be of opinion that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle which is to answer no purpose.



Their private letters are in some degree at variance with their public instructions, and I have called for an explanation of the former, which, when it arrives, will show me more clearly what they intend. The instructions are clear enough, and I am willing to act under them; although they throw upon me the whole responsibility of bringing away the army in safety, after staying in the Peninsula till it shall be necessary to evacuate it. But it will not answer in these times to receive private hints and opinions from ministers, which, if attended to, would lead to an act directly contrary to the spirit, and even to the letter, of the public instructions; at the same time that, if not attended to, the danger of the responsibility imposed by the public instructions is increased tenfold.'

386.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 28th April, 1810.

'The principal strength of the Regency consists in the regularity and legality of their appointment by the Prince Regent; and I know of no person in Portugal whose assistance, as a colleague in the Government, would compensate for the loss of this advantage, by their making any addition or alteration in their body by their own assumed and illegal authority.'

387.

To Lieut. General Graham.

Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

'The principle of the decision of the Commander in Chief on the relative rank between officers of the British army and British officers serving with Portuguese troops, would apply to British officers receiving rank from the Spanish Government; and when British officers serving with the Spanish troops, meet with British officers serving with the British troops, they must rank according to the seniority of their respective Spanish and British commissions. When British officers are serving with British troops only, there can be no doubt that they must rank according to the seniority of their several commissions from His Majesty.'

388.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

'Some deserters, German as well as of other nations, have declined altogether to enlist into the King's service; and these have been sent to England, with a letter to the Commandant of the depôt, stating that I had promised that means should be facilitated to them for their return to their own countries. In the mean time, till these means shall be found, your Lordship will observe that they are to be paid, and in every respect treated as British soldiers.

The great impediment to desertion is the danger of being murdered, which all soldiers of the French army incur in Spain, when they wander from their quarters, and are found singly, or in small bodies, by the inhabitants of the country. This impediment was in some degree removed in the last year, by the offer of a reward, by General Cuesta, for every soldier of the French army brought in by the peasantry; and it is probable that the

same measure would produce the same effects at present. The reward, however, must be offered by some person whose character is known in the country, and in whom the people have confidence; but unfortunately there are none of that description in this part of Spain.'

389.

To Lieut. General Hill.

Celorico, 3rd May, 1810.

'I have read over all my letters to you, and it does not occur to me that it is necessary to give you any further instructions. If any point occurs to you on which you think you are not fully instructed, or you entertain any doubts, let me know it, and I will communicate to you my opinion immediately; and if you are obliged to act in any manner without waiting for my opinion, do so with confidence that I have every disposition to approve of every thing you do.

I consider all the letters which I have written to you, although in a private form, to convey official instructions and authority upon every point to which they relate.'

390.

To Lieut. General Graham.

Celorico, 3rd May, 1810.

'Whatever might be the degree of the control and responsibility which the Government and Commander in Chief might think it proper I should have in the affairs at Cadiz, I should always have thought it proper to give you my opinion upon any thing on which I thought it desirable you should have it; and, on the other hand, if the corps at Cadiz had been part of this army, I should have hesitated long, before I should have adopted my own opinion in preference to your's.

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In respect to the other point adverted to in your letter to the Secretary of State, viz., whether you should continue at Cadiz, or join the army in Portugal, supposing the corps at Cadiz were considered part of the army in Portugal, I think it depends much upon your own feelings, and upon the situation of affairs at Cadiz. I do not think the service in this country is likely to hold out a prospect of any thing very brilliant: I must maintain myself on the Peninsula till it is necessary to withdraw from it; and when it is necessary to withdraw, I must carry off the army without disgrace, and without loss, if possible.

In the war in which we are engaged, no man can pretend to say how long it will last, or what may be its events and circumstances; or in what manner they may influence the share and interest which Great Britain has in the contest.

On the other hand, the state of affairs at Cadiz is highly interesting, not only to the Peninsula, but to Great Britain and to the world. You may render the most important services there; and to withdraw you from that place might shake the confidence and damp the spirits of the Spanish Government, and of the people of the town, upon whose exertions the defence and ultimate safety of the place must in a great measure depend. However desirable, therefore, it might be to me that you should be in Portugal, I cannot but think that it would be most advantageous to the public interests



that you should remain at Cadiz, at least as long as that place is seriously threatened by the enemy.'

## 391.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 5th May, 1810.

'I have no doubt whatever that the whole of the Commissariat arrangements of both the British and the Portuguese army might be very much improved; and one of the improvements would doubtless be to place the whole under one regulation, and an unity of superintendence. Unfortunately, however, the orders of our own Government, and various other considerations,—some political, others military, and others financial,—do not allow of this amalgamation. All that can be done is, that we should assist each other as much, and clash as little, as possible: and arrangements have been made by me to provide for those objects, and directions have been given by the Commissary General to his deputies and assistants to carry those arrangements into execution.

Nothing can be more advantageous to me, or can give me more satisfaction, than to receive the assistance of your opinion upon any subject; but you may depend upon it there are few of the general arrangements of the army which have not been maturely considered by me; and that, although some inconveniences may attend some of them, they are the smallest that after full consideration, it was found would attend any arrangement of the subjects to which those arrangements relate. I request, therefore, that whenever you see reason to wish to make any alteration, you will let me know it; but do not make the alteration without reference to me.'

## 392.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 6th May, 1810.

'In respect to military law, the subjection of the country to that system of rule is a consideration of a very different description from that of the improvements suggested by Beresford for the proceedings for the military jurisprudence of the country. There is no doubt of the evil of which he complains. The remedy is not quite so clear. I am not well acquainted with

G. O.

Celorico, 4th May, 1810.

'1. The frequent loss of money on its progress from one station to another, renders necessary the following regulations:—

2. When any officer of the Commissariat or Paymaster General's department takes charge of money to be transmitted from one station to another, they are to count it and place it in the different boxes or packages in which it is to be carried, and to see that these boxes or packages are well closed and secured.

3. When the money is to be removed, the officer of the Commissariat or Pay department in charge is to see that all the boxes and packages are secured, and he will give them over in this state to the officer or non-commissioned officer commanding the military escort; he will himself accompany the escort, and at the end of the march he will again inspect the boxes, have them all placed in his own quarters, and apply for a sentry over the treasure.

4. The same practice must be repeated daily on the march till the arrival of the money at the place of its destination.

5. The money is to be counted and delivered over to the person to whom it had been consigned, in presence of the officer of the Commissariat or Pay department in whose charge it had been sent; and he is to be responsible for all deficiencies from the hour from which he originally receives charge.

6. Whenever money is sent from one station to another, the officer of the Commissariat or Pay department in charge must have with him a copy of these Orders.'

the subject; but it appears to me that the proceedings of the Courts Martial are conducted on the principles of the civil law courts; that the documents are very voluminous; there is seldom any oral testimony in court; and the court decide upon a perusal of the documents and of the testimony which has generally been taken, not before the court, but by the Judge Advocate.

It is difficult to point out a remedy for these defects. The proceedings of a Court Martial must be founded on, in a great measure, and analogous to, the proceedings of the other courts of law; and I certainly do not understand the subject sufficiently, nor have I leisure to give my attention to understand it sufficiently, to suggest a remedy for the evil which certainly exists.'

## 393.

To Don Andres Herrasti, Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Celorico, 7th May, 1810.

'I shall always be happy to have it in my power to render your Excellency and the city of Ciudad Rodrigo assistance; and the allied army under my command is at present in a situation from which it can move to the aid of Ciudad Rodrigo, if circumstances should permit me to do so. Your Excellency must, however, be aware that the protection of that place is not the only object intrusted to me, and that I must use the means which I have in my power with that prudence and circumspection which the situation of affairs requires.'

## 394.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

'I am perfectly aware of the quantities of papers and vouchers required by the Auditors of accounts. This difficulty comes in my way at every step; and I declare it to be my opinion that no one department of the service is formed for an extended system of operations abroad. But unfortunately I must adhere to rules and regulations formed by my superiors, and a great part of my time is spent in endeavors to discover expedients for carrying on the service in a manner that is consistent with the rules and regulations.

I have no doubt also that there is great inexperience, and many faults in the execution of the detail of their duty by the officers of the commissariat: it cannot be otherwise. But adverting to the mode in which it is necessary at times to divide the component parts of a division,—I should doubt the expediency of the division of the duties among the officers of the commissariat, attached to such a body of troops, in the manner proposed by you, in every instance. However, I shall peruse what you propose with all the attention it deserves, and you may depend upon it that I am not prejudiced on the subject.'

G. O.

Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

'3. The General Officers commanding brigades, and officers commanding regiments of cavalry, are requested to adopt efficient measures to prevent the sale by the soldiers of the cavalry of the grain intended for the horses; this object can be effected only by the constant attention of the officers to their stable duties.

The Commander of the Forces likewise requests the Officers commanding brigades and regiments of cavalry will communicate with the magistrates in the several districts and villages in which the cavalry are cantoned, to prevent the purchase by the inhabitants of the country of any article whatsoever from the soldiers, most particularly those destined for the food of the horses.'



## 395.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

‘I assure you that I am perfectly satisfied with all the arrangements for the embarkation of the army. Every thing is prepared for us either to go or stay; and I have no doubt that if we should be obliged or ordered to quit, the embarkation will be made with the utmost order, and with requisite celerity.’

## 396.

To Lieut. General Graham.

Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

‘The existence of the difficulties in making any exertion or arrangement at Cadiz, for the security of the place to which you refer, is very distressing; and I am concerned that you meet with them. But the character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the war: they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy, by which their situation might be gradually improved. The leading people among them have invariably deceived the lower orders; and, instead of making them acquainted with their real situation, and calling upon them to make the exertions and sacrifices which were necessary even for their defence, they have amused them with idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary plans of offensive operations, which those who offer them for consideration know that they have not the means of executing, and with hopes of driving the French out of the Peninsula by some unlooked for good. The consequence is, that no event is provided for in time; every misfortune is doubly felt, and the people will, at last, become fatigued with the succession of their disasters, which common prudence and foresight in their leaders would have prevented.’

## 397.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 13th May, 1810.

‘In my opinion, the fault of all these proclamations in the Peninsula has been, that the writers of them have followed the example of those published by the French during the revolution; and they have invariably flattered and deceived the people. What we want is: 1st, an exposition of their danger. 2ndly, a reference to the existing means of resistance. 3rdly, an exposition of their own duties. 4thly, an exhortation to perform them: and lastly, a declaration by the Government, that those who should not perform their duty would be punished without distinction of persons. This ought to be stated in plain language, without bombast, and ought, above all, to be short. But these “*Corir sobre os nossos inimigos*” will only tend to increase the existing evils. Every man in Portugal is sufficiently alive to the danger, and is very anxious to avert it: there is plenty of enthusiasm; there are cries of “*Viva*” and illuminations, and patriotic songs and feasts every where: but that which is wanting, is the plain simple performance of his duty, each in his station, and obedience to order.

These are my general objections to this paper. But besides these, I entertain objections to some of the phrases. In the first place, the abuse of the French in the first paragraph is unbecoming in a proclamation published by a regular authority, such as the Regency, although it would do well enough

for a Spanish Junta. Indeed, the whole paper is too much in imitation of those of the Junta. Then the term "*systema continental*" is ambiguous, and a term of that kind ought never to be used in a paper of this description. The continental system as contra-distinguished from the insular system, that is, preventing England from interfering in the continental politics, may be a very fit system of politics to be followed by the Portuguese nation; at all events, it may be a question. The continental system, as meant by Buonaparte, and as forced upon all Europe, means the destruction of all commerce excepting that which is carried on for the benefit of France. That cannot be a fit system for Portugal. But my objection to the expression is, that the meaning assigned to it by the writer of the proclamation may be misconstrued wilfully or otherwise, and misunderstood by those who shall read it.'

## 398.

To Brig. Gen. Cox, Governor of Almeida.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

'War is a terrible evil, particularly to those who reside in those parts of the country which are the seat of the operations of hostile armies; but I believe it will be found upon inquiry, and will be acknowledged by the people of Portugal, that it is inflicted in a less degree by the British troops than by the others; and that eventually all they get from the country is paid for, and that they require only what is necessary. In our present situation it is necessary that the people of Portugal should furnish the troops with carriages to move our magazines, or that they should feed the troops in the advanced stations, or the troops must be withdrawn. This may be a disagreeable alternative, but it cannot be avoided; and I am convinced that if you had taken this, which is the fair and true view of the subject, your regard for these same people would have induced you to urge them to make an effort to supply what was required, rather than to give harsh terms to requisitions, made upon them by necessity rather than by choice.'

## 399.

To Lieut. General Hill.

Celorico, 17th May, 1810.

'I do not understand either the nature or the objects of the position taken up by the Marques de la Romana with his right, or the movements by which he proposes to protect it, or those by which you are to assist him in protecting it. If we are to be involved in these operations, we must not only thoroughly understand them, but we must direct them. You will of course proceed with great caution; and recollect that, if you are once in-

G. A. O.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

'The officers of the Commissariat have been frequently urged to attend to the orders of the Commissary General; and the Commander of the Forces is concerned to have to observe that many of them have neglected to obey his orders in very important instances in which obedience was undoubtedly in their power.

He now publishes the names of officers of the Commissariat from whom reports ought to have been received at stated periods of the state of the magazines and supplies in their charge, with the dates of the last reports received from each, showing a neglect of an important duty, and a disobedience of a positive order.

The Commander of the Forces will take no further notice of this neglect, but to warn those gentlemen and others of the necessity of paying strict obedience to the orders of their superiors; and he assures them that the publication of their names to the army, as persons guilty of disobedience and neglect, will not be the only notice taken of such conduct in future.'



volved in this desultory system of operations, you cannot withdraw from them without doing those whom you intend to assist more injury, when you leave them to return to your position, than you can do them good by involving yourself in them. The assistance which you give them should be instantaneous, should have a precise object, and should be decisive; and you should then return to your position at Portalegre.'

400.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 17th May, 1810.

'I wish to mention to you that neither I, nor any other officer of the British army, have the power of confining or punishing the magistrates or others in authority in Portugal. All that can be done, in case they do not exert themselves to comply with your requisitions, is to report them to me, stating specifically their offence, which is, I imagine, generally, one of omission of duty; and I shall order them to head quarters, and thence to Lisbon, to be punished by the Government.'

401.

To Lieut. General Hill.

Celorico, 18th May, 1810.

'This is a part of the system on which all the Spanish authorities have been acting to induce us to take a part in the desultory operations which they are carrying on.

False reports and deceptions of every description are tried, and then popular insults, to show us what the general opinion is of our conduct. However, nothing of this kind shall make me take one step either way, which is not dictated by my sense of what is best for the cause.'

402.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 20th May, 1810.

'What is stated in that memorandum will show you how difficult it is for any General Officer to frame a code of regulations for the conduct of this, or indeed any other department, connected with the particular body of troops under his command. In respect to this particular department, the duties of the officers employed in it are so various, and must be performed in a manner so different in different parts of the country, and depend so much upon the regular supply of money, and other circumstances, that I consider it a more difficult task to frame a code of regulations for the performance of active duties, which shall be applicable to this department, than I should find it for any other branch of the service.'

403.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 29th May, 1810.

'I am really concerned that you should believe I had any such feeling as disapprobation towards you, in consequence of our late discussions upon commissariat concerns. You and I necessarily take a different view of these questions; I must view them in all their relations, with all the different parts of the army, with the persons concerned in carrying them on, and with the Government and departments at home; your view of them is naturally confined to their relation with your own immediate command. In discussing

them with you, in the manner and form in which I did discuss them, I considered that the subject was fairly before us, and that the discussion was to be carried on, as if neither had any concern in the situation of things as they stood. I therefore made my remarks with perfect freedom on the different regulations as they came before me, without taking much trouble to choose the terms in which I was to make them; but there was no feeling of disapprobation during the discussion, and none has been felt since.

I conceive that a part of my business, and perhaps not the most easy part, is to prevent discussions and disputes between the officers who may happen to serve under my command; and I therefore did not send you the extract of a letter from General Cox to Marshal Beresford, to which you refer; nor do I now know the reason for which he sent it. The observations which I made upon the letter would show you what I felt upon the case in question.

But it is really better to drop the whole of this subject; and I hope that this letter may reach you in time to induce you to refrain from sending me the paper which you inform me you have written.

I am convinced that in all that you have done, you have been actuated solely by a desire to forward the service; and to force those, who are more interested than we in the success of our operations, to do their duty by their country and by us.'

## 404.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

'It may be depended upon that when the British troops shall have evacuated Portugal, and more particularly if we should not make an effort to maintain our position, whatever may be the numbers opposed to us, we shall not be very popular in the Peninsula. It may be expected that the people of Cadiz, and possibly even the Spanish Government, would refuse us admission, which would be an awkward occurrence; and might render uncomfortable the situation of those already in the place. Would it not be better, after the evacuation of Portugal, to wait till a further reinforcement should be called for by the people of Cadiz, or by the Government? Or, at all events, to confine the numbers of additional troops to be sent to Cadiz, to those really required for the defence of the place and its dependencies?

Another point to which I wish to give further consideration, is my own situation after Portugal shall have been evacuated. I will do whatever the King's Government think proper to order me to do; but I wish you to consider whether it may not be deemed a hardship upon General Graham that I should go there, and supersede him in the command of the operations for the defence of Cadiz, at the moment when the measures for the defence will be completed, and the serious attack is about to commence. All these difficulties will be avoided by ordering the army to Gibraltar, if you should still wish to keep it in the south of Spain.'

G. O.

Celorico, 1st June, 1810.

'3. The Commander of the Forces re-publishes an order given out by the late Commander of the Forces; and it is to be understood that the stoppage from the soldier, on account of cartridges lost or made away with, ought always to have been, and must in future be, 4d. for each cartridge, and 1d. for each flint.

It is not intended, however, to open again old accounts for those losses.'



405.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 2nd June, 1810.

'The enlistment of deserters into His Majesty's service is a subject for consideration, entirely different from the encouragement to be given to soldiers to desert from the enemy.

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It is desirable that the wishes of Government upon this subject should be conveyed by only one authority; as in more than one instance the instructions which I have received from the Commander in Chief, respecting these deserters, have not been consistent with those which I have received from your Lordship.'

406.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Celorico, 5th June, 1810.

'I wish that the Ministers could strengthen their government; and that somebody would take pains to inform the public and guide their opinion, and not allow every news-writer to run away with the public mind, upon points essential to the interests of the country.'

407.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 7th June, 1810.

'I have also taken the liberty of drawing your Lordship's attention to the state of discipline of the army in general, which I have stated to be attributed, in some degree, to the want of the power of reward in the hands of

G. A. O.

Celorico, 2nd June, 1810.

'1. The officers commanding regiments of infantry are requested as soon as possible, to make the following arrangement for sending into store the great coats or the blankets belonging to the regiments under their command respectively, according to the returns they before made upon the subject.

2. The blankets to be sent in are to be made up in bales, each containing 50 blankets; and if the bales which brought the blankets to the army should be lost or mislaid, a blanket may be used as the bale to hold the others.

3. The great coats must each be marked with the name of the soldier to which it belongs, and his company and his regiment. The great coats must likewise be made up into bales, each containing 50 great coats; and each bale must be marked, viz. Great Coats belonging to — regt.'

G. O.

Celorico, 4th June, 1810.

'3. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be obliged to bring before the troops another example of the consequences of their irregularities, breach of discipline, and crimes.

In order to get liquor, these soldiers formed a conspiracy to commit a robbery; in the course of the commission of this crime, one of a greater enormity, a murder, is committed, which is soon discovered. Then the parties to the commission of these crimes are eager to give information against each other, and the result is an example, such as that which will be brought before the troops upon this occasion.

If such frequent instances had not occurred of the same circumstances produced by the same unvaried course of events, it would not be credible that British soldiers should so far forget their duty as to conspire to commit a robbery on a people they are sent to protect, and by whom they have been invariably well treated, and should murder in cool blood a fellow creature who had done them no injury; more particularly, having a knowledge that those guilty of these crimes are invariably discovered, that the conspirators invariably inform against each other, and that the result of the trial must be the execution of the criminals.

The Commander of the Forces repeats his determination to persevere in carrying into execution the sentence of every General Court Martial on crimes of this description, in the fervent hope that each of them, which he will confirm, will be the last which he shall have to consider.'

G. O.

Celorico, 7th June, 1810.

'2. The Commander of the Forces publishes this sentence to the army in order to show his determination to bring to trial those non-commissioned officers who disgrace themselves, and prove that they are not fit for their situations.'

those who are honored with the charge of commanding His Majesty's troops on foreign and active service.'

408.

To Charles Stuart, Esq

Celorico, 8th June, 1810.

'I am convinced that the French now see the necessity of getting us out of the Peninsula as the first object of their attention, and that they will risk every thing for that object, and the trial will be made in a short time.'

409.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

'This *bicoque* has been in part invested for nearly two months; and a fortnight has elapsed since the guns moved from Salamanca; and the French are not yet in possession of the ground they must have for the siege. This is not the way in which they have conquered Europe! Having obliged the French to collect an army for this enterprise, that is, to make the attack of the worst fortified place in the world, I fear that I can do no more for it. I think that I might have delayed still longer the complete investment of the place, and the chances of war and chapter of accidents, which in these days are not allowed to be counted for any thing, might have enabled me to prevent the siege altogether, if the Government possessed any strength, or desired to have any thing done but what is *safe and cheap*. But, with an army considerably inferior in numbers, consisting of a large proportion of troops of a doubtful description, which are scarcely formed, and the enemy being infinitely (three times) superior in cavalry, I think I ought not now to risk a general action in the plains to relieve the place.

However, I do not yet give the matter up. The defence of a Spanish place must not be reckoned upon according to the ordinary rules. If they will defend themselves as others have, the French must feel the consequences of Massena having weakened every other point to collect this large army; and if he should be induced to reduce it at all, I shall be at hand to assist and relieve them.

I have no doubt whatever but that the French feel, throughout the Peninsula, the inadequacy even of the large force they have in it, to complete the conquest and to establish and support the Government; and the continued hostility of the people must distress them much. All the intercepted correspondence tends to show their misery and despondence. Although they may succeed in taking Ciudad Rodrigo, it does not follow that even the force which they have collected will be sufficient to oblige us to evacuate the Peninsula; and as long as we shall not shrink, the cause will not be lost.

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I think, however, there is something discordant in all the French arrangements for Spain. Joseph divides his Kingdom into *préfetures*, while Napoleon parcels it out into governments; Joseph makes a great military expedition into the south of Spain, and undertakes the siege of Cadiz, while Napoleon places all the troops and half the kingdom under the command of Massena, and calls it the Army of Portugal.

It is impossible that these measures can be adopted in concert; and I should suspect that the impatience of Napoleon's temper will not bear the delay of the completion of the conquest of Spain; and that he is desirous of making one great effort to remove us by the means of Massena.'



## 410.

To Lieut. General Hill.

Celorico, 15th June, 1810.

' I would recommend that the troops should not go into huts, as long as it is possible to avoid it; and do not allow them to turn out before daylight or to be out after nightfall, particularly if you should be obliged to keep any of them in stations reported to be unhealthy.'

## 411.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 15th June, 1810.

' I am going to write to the Regency respecting their issuing a proclamation to have the harvest beat out as soon as possible after it is reaped; also respecting their taking pains to collect at Lisbon as large a quantity of provisions, particularly grain, as possible. We shall have a great consumption there if we should be shut up in our positions for any time; which certainly will be the case, unless the enemy should introduce such a force into the country as to oblige me to withdraw. It is desirable that you should press Lord Wellesley to encourage the exportation, as soon as possible, of cargoes of flour particularly, but if not to be got, of wheat, or barley, or oats from Ireland; I shall not be in want for my troops, but the supply of the inhabitants may be a matter of difficulty, and should be looked to by the Government.'

## 412.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 17th June, 1810.

' I do not think that any measure can be adopted, with propriety, to prevent the circulation of false reports, or to remedy the evil which results from them. I believe that false reports respecting the operations of armies are always circulated, particularly where British armies and officers are concerned. These reports are circulated even in this town, where there is no reserve upon any subject, and every person who chooses to call at head quarters sees the reports of intelligence received. Then we are the most indefatigable writers of letters and of news that exist in the world, and the fashion and spirit of the times give encouragement to lies. I know no mode of getting the better of the inconvenience, which is certainly the consequence of the circulation of these false reports, excepting to have no reserve on the subject of the real and well founded intelligence from the armies. I would not recommend publication, as it might lead to inconveniences of another description, and is beneath the dignity of every government; nor would I, as ————— very innocently but indiscreetly did last year, check by any public order or proclamation the circulation of any description of report.'

## 413.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Almeida, 27th June, 1810.

' It is obvious, however, that it would be impossible to relieve, much less raise the siege of, Ciudad Rodrigo, without fighting a general action, with forces which, I have reason to believe, not from report only, but from intercepted letters and returns, are infinitely superior in number to any that I have

G. O.

Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

' 7. The Commander of the Forces requests that the order of the 19th May, 1809, may be understood as applying to the horses, &c. brought in by deserters from the enemy; it is desirable and it must be the wish of every officer in the army that these men should have the full benefit which may result from the sales of what they may bring off with them, and therefore their horses, &c., should be allowed to be sold by public auction.'

it in my power to bring against them. With every desire, and a strong interest for the preservation of this place, I cannot conceive that any view of the interests of the allies can render it desirable that I should incur the risk of a defeat, under such circumstances, in attempting to effect its relief; and although I have encouraged the Governor to persevere in its defence, and shall still encourage him to persevere, by maintaining a position in the neighbourhood as long as possible, and thus obliging the enemy to keep his force collected for the purpose of this attack, I have repeatedly and invariably told the Governor that the measures which I should adopt, when Ciudad Rodrigo should be in danger, must depend upon a larger view of the interests of the allies in the contest than the mere preservation, however important, of that place.'

414.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Almeida, 28th June, 1810.

'Your situation gives me a great deal of uneasiness; and it appears that, if the enemy should make their preparations to attack you before daylight in the morning, and should make the attack at daylight, you would find it very difficult to withdraw your corps. It is certainly very desirable that we should maintain our position as long as may be possible, but we must not risk such a loss as your corps would be. I have no apprehensions for the day or the night, but I am uneasy respecting the time which intervenes between the night and broad daylight.'

415.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 3rd July, 1810.

'It may be satisfactory to the Government to have the reason which this paper affords, for believing that the enemy have no better means of acquiring intelligence in England than are therein referred to; but I would wish again to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the inconveniences and disadvantage under which we labor, from the indiscretion with which intelligence of this description is continually published in the English newspapers. Very recently all the newspapers contained accounts, not only of the numbers, but of the positions occupied by this army.'

G. O.

Alverca, 6th July, 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to notice the frequent omissions of the regiments to send proper returns of the necessaries, &c. of the soldiers to the General Hospital along with them, the consequence of which is, that the Purveyors of the Hospital cannot be responsible for the necessaries of the men.

They are referred to the General Orders, 17th Dec., 1809, in which it will be observed, that a report is required to be made to the General Officer commanding the brigade that it has been obeyed.

2. As it appears that the necessaries of several men, particularly 1st bat. 11th regt., were found deficient, in addition to the men who were sent in without proper returns, an officer of the 11th is to proceed to Coimbra forthwith to inquire into the circumstances which occasioned the deficiencies.

3. The Adjutant General will send to the commanding officers the list of the names of the men, and the deficiencies of each.

4. As it appears from comparing at the Adjutant General's Office the division orderly books with the general orderly book of the army, that various omissions and mistakes have arisen, it becomes necessary to call the attention of the officers of the department very particularly to the future regularity of the General Orders issued by them to the different divisions.



## 416.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

‘ I likewise enclose the last state which I have received of the sick of the army. The difference between this state and the military return of the sick in hospital, is to be attributed to the fact that the regiments return all men as sick in hospital who have been sent to the hospital from the regiment, whether on the road to the hospital, convalescent at the hospital station, or on the road to join, recovered ; and the hospitals return only those men who are actually on the hospital books.’

## 417.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 14th July, 1810.

‘ I have no disposition to offer my services where they are likely to be refused, or where the offer is likely to be badly received.

At the same time I repeat that I am at the disposal of the King’s Government, and will do what they have directed or what they may think proper to direct.’

## 418.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 23rd July, 1810.

‘ In respect to the business itself, it appeared to me from the first, that it

5. It has been conceived by some gentlemen that the orderly books were their own property, and on the removal of an officer of the department from one division to another, they have thought themselves entitled to the orderly book of the division they served in.

6. It is the Commander of the Forces positive directions, that the orderly books now belonging to each division are never to be carried away, or exchanged, but to be considered as wholly appertaining to the division ; and if it should be broken up or divided, the officer of the department in charge of the orderly books will apply to the Adjutant General’s office for instructions concerning them.

7. The officers of the department must enter the General Orders into the orderly book themselves and not entrust them to a clerk. They must sign their names at the bottom of each day’s orders, as being responsible for the entry.

8. The General Orders are to be kept at one end of the book and the Division Orders at the other ; when they meet, a new book is to be procured, which is charged in the contingent account. This will facilitate the comparing the General Orders.

9. Division orderly books will be called for every 2 months to be compared, and returned with the Adjutant General’s signature as being correct : any errors the officers of the department will have to repair to Head Quarters to correct.

10. Division officers of the department will call for in the same manner the Brigade Major’s orderly books, and compare them with their’s.

11. Officers of the department are not only to acknowledge the receipt of General Orders, but they are to make a particular report, on the 1st and 14th of every month, of the days upon which no General Orders have been received, addressed to the Adjutant General.

12. General officers commanding divisions will please to see these orders strictly complied with.’

G. O.

Alverca, 13th July, 1810.

‘ 1. The men, according to the return underneath, were deficient in necessaries when sent to the General Hospital on the 6th instant.

These men have declared, what the Commander of the Forces is disinclined to believe, that the returns of their necessaries were made without a previous inspection by the officers of the companies to which they belong.

The General Officers commanding brigades are requested to inquire into this circumstance.

The further particulars of the return are sent to the regiments concerned.’

G. O.

Alverca, 20th July, 1810.

‘ 1. The Commander of the Forces requests that when commanding officers of regiments, brigades, or divisions, think it proper to order that any of the troops should fire by way of practice, they will give notice of their intention to fire to the detachments of troops which may be cantoned in their neighbourhood.’

would and must have succeeded, notwithstanding the gallantry and steadiness of the French infantry, if various accidents had not prevented the execution of the plan, as first formed; and I have stated this, as my opinion, in the report which I have made upon the business.

Your own report points out clearly the variations from the original plan, and the different accidents which occurred in the execution, among which certainly, must be classed the charge of the 1st squadron of the 16th, to the left of the Hussars; and the delay between the first charge by Talbot, owing to the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 16th having gone off after the cavalry. But even then the infantry would not have got away, if the squadrons coming out of Barquilla had not been taken for the enemy.

I can only say that I have never seen an attack by our troops in which similar, if not greater, accidents and mistakes have not occurred, and in which orders have not been given, for which no authority had proceeded from the Commander, and in which there were not corresponding accidents and failures. This is to be attributed to the inexperience of our officers, and I must add, to some good qualities in them, as well as in the troops.

All this would not much signify, if our Staff and other Officers would mind their business, instead of writing news and keeping coffee houses. But as soon as an accident happens, every man who can write, and who has a friend who can read, sits down to write his account of what he does not know, and his comments on what he does not understand; and these are diligently circulated and exaggerated by the idle and malicious, of whom there are plenty in all armies. The consequence is, that officers and whole regiments lose their reputation; a spirit of party, which is the bane of all armies, is engendered and fomented; a want of confidence ensues; and there is no character, however meritorious, and no action, however glorious, which can have justice done to it. I have hitherto been so fortunate as to keep down this spirit in this army, and I am determined to persevere.'

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419.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

'The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo was felt as a great misfortune by the people of Castille in general; and they are not satisfied with the British nation, as an effort was not made to raise the siege of the place.

This dissatisfaction, combined with the effect which I have above described as having been produced by the improved conduct of the French officers towards them, has probably been the cause of their discontinuing all correspondence with us, of their ceasing to give us any intelligence, and even refusing to forward the communication of those employed to acquire it.

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G. O.

Alverca, 24th July, 1810.

'7. The Commander of the Forces has no doubt that the measures he has adopted will soon discover to him who committed this horrid murder; but that the murderers may not any longer enjoy the fruits of their crime unpunished, he hereby offers a reward of 50 dollars and a pardon to any person who will give information to produce the conviction of the murderers.

8. The Commander of the Forces repeats that he is convinced, if the non-commissioned officers did their duty, these crimes could not be committed by the soldiers without their knowledge. It is incumbent upon those belonging to the regiments stationed at Guarda whose uniforms have been described, to exert themselves to discover who committed this shocking murder.'



It is probable that these sentiments, and the consequent conduct of the people in this part of Spain in general, may be but temporary; but I have thought it proper to apprise His Majesty's Government of their existence.'

420.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

Alverca, 26th July, 1810.

'If you should have occasion to send to me upon any thing important, particularly in the night, send an officer who knows the road; or, if you should not have one who knows the road, send a guide with him.'

421.

To Major General the Hon. L. Cole.

Celorico, 30th July, 1810.

'I request you to write your communications, notwithstanding that you may think it proper to send an officer; as the mode of stating a circumstance makes a difference in the meaning.'

G. O.

Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

'1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the officers commanding regiments, will invariably adopt effectual measures to prevent the streets of the towns in which they may be cantoned, or the roads in the neighbourhood of their cantonments, from being choked up with baggage, with carriages, or otherwise.

2. All carriages and loaded animals on their march must, when halted, if only for a short period, be packed in a field in the neighbourhood of the high road, or housed, but must not on any account be left in the streets of any villages, or on the road.

3. When a regiment on its march is halted for any length of time, or when halted is bivouacked, the soldiers must not be permitted to sit or lie down upon the road, but must be placed on one side of it.

4. The officers commanding detachments with baggage, or carriages of any description, the conductors of ordnance or commissariat stores, and the officers commanding regiments, are responsible for a strict obedience to this order.

5. The General and other officers of the army will see the necessity of an early and strict obedience to the orders of the army, respecting the marching, cantoning, and provisioning of the troops, and to the preservation of order and discipline, as well as those which may be issued for the operation of the troops.'

G. O.

Celorico, 29th July, 1810.

'4. The Commander of the Forces observes that notwithstanding repeated orders upon the subject, nearly all the regiments of the army have cars in their possession carrying baggage and attended by soldiers. He refrains upon this occasion from taking any further notice of this irregularity, but if he should see hereafter a cart drawn by bullocks in any part of the line of march of the troops, orders will be given that the baggage shall be destroyed, and the officer to whom it belongs will be brought before a General Court Martial.'

G. O.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810.

'1. The following Orders and Rules are to be observed respecting communications with the enemy's out posts.

2. No flag of truce must be sent to the enemy without orders from the Commander of the Forces.

3. No letter, or other communication, must be sent by a flag of truce which has not been ordered by the Commander of the Forces, unless such letter has first been transmitted to Head Quarters, and it must be open.

4. Flags of truce from the enemy must be received by the officer commanding the first post at which they will arrive. The officer commanding the post is to receive the flag of truce, or officer coming with it, to take from him the letter or communication with which he will be charged, and to give him a receipt for it, and he is then to send him back again to his own lines.

5. The simplicity and indiscretion with which communications have been made to the enemy respecting the provisions, &c. of this army and other circumstances, render these orders absolutely necessary, and the Commander of the Forces trusts that the officers commanding at the out piquets, who may have to receive the enemy's flags, will confine their conversation entirely to the subject on which they are to communicate, viz. the receipt of the letter or message from the enemy, and the immediate departure of the officer delivering it.'

422.

To Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810

‘That which the commanding officers do not, or will not understand, is that we shall retreat, and that bullock carts cannot keep up on a retreat with cavalry. I am quite tired of this subject, upon which I have been writing above 6 weeks.’

423.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 3rd Aug. 1810.

‘In respect to yourself, you can no more accept the office of Regent without the King’s consent, than I could that of Commander in Chief, or Marshal General, without the King’s authority; but notwithstanding the additional trouble it may throw upon you, I do most anxiously recommend and entreat you to advise the King’s Government to give His Majesty’s consent to your acceptance of this office, and to your holding it with the office of King’s Minister at Lisbon. I see no other mode in which we shall be able to manage this Government at all, or to get through our difficulties. In respect to the trouble, I do not conceive it will throw much upon you. It will not be necessary for you to attend constantly. You will have a knowledge from Dom M. Forjaz of the important business likely to come under consideration, and you can attend at that time; and the influence which you will soon acquire over the decisions of the Government will prevent the other Ministers from venturing to decide, during your absence, upon any measure of importance. In short, I am convinced that your being in the Regency will be highly beneficial; and at all events, is the only remedy for the mischief with which the new arrangement is pregnant.’

424.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens.

Celorico, 4th Aug. 1810.

‘I have never been able to understand the principle on which the claims of gentlemen of family, fortune, and influence in the country, to promotion in the army, founded on their military conduct, and character, and services, should be rejected, while the claims of others, not better founded on military pretensions, were invariably attended to. It would be desirable, certainly, that the only claim to promotion should be military merit; but this is a degree of perfection to which the disposal of military patronage has never been, and cannot be, I believe, brought in any military establishment. The Commander in Chief must have friends, officers on the staff attached to him, &c., who will press him to promote their friends and relations, all doubtless very meritorious, and no man can at all times resist these applica-

G. O.

Celorico, 4th Aug. 1810.

‘7. The Commander of the Forces has frequently had occasion to complain of the inconvenience which resulted to the public service from the practice which prevails of officers and soldiers pressing carriages of the country by their own authority, and this inconvenience has been again felt in an aggravated degree in consequence of the pressing of carriages, in a recent instance, by a conductor of stores, — — —; he requests the commanding officer of artillery will report what occasion this conductor had for carriages, and will cause strict inquiry to be made, whether, before he pressed these carriages, he made application for them to any British Commissary or magistrate of the country, and will report whether conductor — — — had made any report of his having pressed these carriages.

8. It is impossible to carry on the service if these irregularities are persevered in, and the Commander of the Forces is determined to punish, in this, and in every other instance, any disobedience of his repeated orders upon this subject.’



tions ; but if there is to be any influence in the disposal of military patronage, in aid of military merit, can there be any in our army so legitimate as that of family connexion, fortune, and influence in the country ?

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While writing upon this subject, I am also tempted to communicate to you my opinion upon another branch of it, viz., the disposal of the patronage of the troops serving on foreign service. In all services, excepting that of Great Britain, and in former times in the service of Great Britain, the Commander in Chief of an army employed against the enemy in the field had the power of promoting officers, at least to vacancies occasioned by the service, in the troops under his own command ; and in foreign services, the principle is carried so far, as that no person can venture to recommend an officer for promotion belonging to an army employed against the enemy in the field, excepting the commander of that army.

It was pretty nearly the case formerly in our own service ; and I believe the greater number of the General Officers of the higher ranks of the present day were made lieutenant colonels by Sir W. Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, Lord Cornwallis, General Burgoyne, Lord Dorchester, &c. But how is it now ? The form remains still in some degree the same ; that is to say, my secretary keeps the register of the applications, memorials, and regimental recommendations, a trouble which, by the bye, might as well be saved ; but the substance is entirely altered ; and I, who command the largest British army that has been employed against the enemy for many years, and who have upon my hands certainly the most extensive and difficult concern that was ever imposed upon any British officer, have not the power of making even a corporal !!! It is impossible that this system can last. It will do very well for trifling expeditions and short services, &c. ; but those who are to superintend the discipline, and to excite and regulate the exertions of the officers of the army, during a long continued service, must have the power of rewarding them by the only mode in which they can be rewarded, that is, by promotion. It is not known to the army and to strangers, and I am almost ashamed of acknowledging, the small degree (I ought to say nullity) of power of reward which belongs to my situation ; and it is really extraordinary that I have got on so well hitherto without it ; but the day must come when this system must be altered.

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The consequence of the change of the system in respect to me would be only to give me the power of rewarding the services of those who have exerted, or should exert, themselves zealously in the service ; and thus to stimulate others to similar exertions.

Even admitting that the system of promotion by seniority, exploded in other armies, is the best for that of Great Britain, it would still be an advantage that those who become entitled to it should receive it immediately, and from the hand of the person who is obliged to expose them to danger, to enforce discipline, and to call for their exertions. I would also observe that this practice would be entirely consistent with the unvaried usage of the British Navy.

I admit that it may be urged with truth that a larger view may be taken of the interests of the public, in the mode of promoting officers of the army, than I am capable of taking ; and this view may have suggested the expe-

diency of adopting and adhering to the mode now in use; at the same time I must say that the public can have no greater interest than in the conduct and discipline of an army employed against the enemy in the field; and I am thoroughly convinced, that whatever may be the result in my hands, a British army cannot be kept in the field for any length of time, unless the officers composing it have some hope that their exertions will certainly be rewarded by promotion; and that to be abroad on service, and to do their duty with zeal and intelligence, afford prospects of promotion not afforded by the mere presence of an officer with his regiment, and his bearing the King's commission for a certain number of years.

I have been induced to communicate these opinions to you, from the consideration of the claims of those officers to which I have drawn your attention at the commencement of this letter, from a strong conviction of their truth, and not, I assure you, from any interest I feel in the result. I would not give one pin to have the disposal of every commission in the army.'

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425.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 4th Aug. 1810.

'It is extraordinary that during the time that you and I have been working here to give strength and stability to the Government, and principally to support Dom M. Forjaz, as being the best instrument to co-operate with us to carry on the war, the King's Minister in Brazil should have promoted a new arrangement of the Government, purposely calculated to destroy the very influence which we had supported. Then the admission of Dr. Raymondo Nogueira into the Regency, and the reasons for this admission, are truly ludicrous. He is to aid in the destruction of the influence of the Secretariat which we had labored to establish and support; and his appointment is to be agreeable to the lower orders, from among whom he is selected!

It is unfortunate for the people of the Peninsula that we in England have always thought proper to give a democratical character to their proceedings; whereas nothing was ever farther from their intentions. The principle of all the actions of the good people of these countries is anti-Gallican, and that alone; all that they desire is, that they should be saved from the grasp of the French; and it is a matter of indifference to them by what persons, or by what class of persons, their salvation is effected. In the abstract, I believe that they would prefer to be governed by the higher classes, from a feeling that those belonging to the higher classes have turned their minds more to the business of Government, have more experience and capacity in the transaction of public business, and are more deserving of their confidence, as being more likely to save them from the French. If indeed the Doctor had ever shown any talents as a political character, there might be some reasons for his appointment; but as it is, it is absurd and mischievous.'

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426.

PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF PORTUGAL.\*

4th Aug. 1810.

'The time which has elapsed during which the enemy have remained upon

\* The original draft of this proclamation having been found, it is substituted for the one published in the first edition, which was a translation from the Portuguese.



the frontiers of Portugal, has fortunately afforded to the Portuguese nation experience of what they are to expect from the French.

The people had remained in some villages trusting to the enemy's promises, and vainly believing, that by treating the enemies of their country in a friendly manner, they should conciliate their forbearance, and that their properties would be respected, their women would be saved from violation, and that their lives would be spared.

Vain hopes! The people of those devoted villages have suffered every evil which a cruel enemy could inflict. Their property has been plundered, their houses and furniture burnt, their women have been ravished, and the unfortunate inhabitants, whose age or sex did not tempt the brutal violence of the soldiers, have fallen the victims of the imprudent confidence they reposed in promises which were made only to be violated.

The Portuguese now see that they have no remedy for the evil with which they are threatened but determined resistance. Resistance, and the determination to render the enemy's advance into their country as difficult as possible, by removing out of his way every thing that is valuable, or that can contribute to his subsistence, or frustrate his progress, are the only and the certain remedies for the evils with which they are threatened.

The army under my command will protect as large a proportion of the country as will be in their power; but it is obvious that the people can save themselves only by resistance to the enemy, and their properties only by removing them.

The duty, however, which I owe to H. R. H. the Prince Regent and to the Portuguese nation, will oblige me to use the power and authority in my hands to force the weak and the indolent to make an exertion to save themselves from the danger which awaits them, and to save their country; and I hereby declare, that all magistrates or persons in authority who remain in the towns or villages, after receiving orders from any of the military officers to retire from them; and all persons, of whatever description, who hold any communication with the enemy, and aid or assist them in any manner, will be considered traitors to the state, and shall be tried and punished accordingly.'

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427.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810.

'Since I have commanded the troops in this country, I have always treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I have had for this conduct has been that they might treat our officers and soldiers well who might fall into their hands, and I must do the French the justice to say that they have been universally well treated, and in recent instances the wounded prisoners of the British army have been taken care of before the wounded of the French army.'

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428.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810.

'There is great firmness, considerable talent and ability, great zeal, and the best inclination in the persons who compose the Government in Por-

tugal, but they are unfortunately under the control of the Government of Brazil; and it is difficult, if not impossible, to prevail upon them to adopt measures of obvious advantage, and even necessity, because some of them are referrible to the Prince himself, and others interfere with long established but vicious customs and prejudices. The local Government do not feel themselves sufficiently strong in the support of the Government in Brazil to attempt the reforms in all branches of the Government which the circumstances of the country require; and the consequence is, that many regulations of trade and finance, by which the revenue of the country would be much increased, have not been carried into execution.'

429.

To Lieut. General Graham.

Celorico, 10th Aug. 1810.

'I beg to draw your attention to the orders which I have given this day respecting the private correspondence of the officers of the army. I was astonished some time ago to see in the English newspapers an accurate account of the batteries and works erecting at Cadiz and on the Isla, with the number of guns, and of what calibre each was to contain, and their distance from each other, and from the enemy's works. This information must have been extracted from the letter of an officer. If officers wish to give their friends this description of information, they should request them not to publish their letters in the newspapers.'

430.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 10th Aug. 1810.

'I hope the Regency will have firmness to resist the demand of a free trade with the colonies; as a boon to the colonies, it might answer in some degree, and might be connected with measures of finance which would probably give them a very large revenue. But we have no right, and it is the grossest impolicy in us to demand it. Great Britain has ruined Portugal by

G. O.

Celorico, 10th Aug. 1810.

'7. The Commander of the Forces will not make any inquiry to discover the writer of the letters which have occasioned this unnecessary alarm in a quarter in which it was most desirable it should not be created. He has frequently lamented the ignorance which has appeared in the opinions communicated in letters written from the army, and the indiscretion with which those letters are published.

It is impossible that many officers of the army can have a knowledge of facts to enable them to form opinions of the probable events of the campaign; but their opinions, however erroneous, must, when published, have mischievous effects.

8. The communication of that, of which all officers have a knowledge, viz. the numbers and disposition of the different divisions of the army, and of its magazines, is still more mischievous than the communication of opinions, as must be obvious to those who reflect that the army has been for months in the same position; and it is a fact come to the knowledge of the Commander of the Forces, that the plans of the enemy have been founded on information of this description extracted from the English newspapers, which information must have been obtained through private letters from officers of the army.

9. Although the difficulties inseparable from the situation of every army engaged in operations in the field, particularly in those of a defensive nature, are much aggravated by communications of this description, the Commander of the Forces only requests that the officers will for the sake of their own reputations, avoid to give opinions upon which they cannot have a knowledge to enable them to form any, and that if they choose to communicate facts to their correspondents, regarding the positions of the army, its numbers, formation of its magazines, preparations for breaking bridges, &c. they will urge their correspondents not to publish their letters in the newspapers until it shall be certain that the publication of the intelligence will not be injurious to the army, or to the public service.'



her free trade with Brazil: not only the customs of Portugal, to the amount of a million sterling per annum, are lost, but the fortunes of numerous individuals, who lived by this trade, are ruined; and Cadiz will suffer in a similar manner, if this demand is agreed to. Portugal would be now in a very different situation as an ally, if our trade with Brazil was still carried on through Lisbon; and I would only ask, is it wise, or liberal, or just, to destroy the power and resources, and absolutely to ruin our allies, in order to put into the pockets of our merchants the money which before went into their treasuries, and would be now employed in the maintenance of military establishments against the common enemy?’

## 431.

To Brig. General Sir N. Trant.

Celorico, 11th Aug. 1810.

‘It is impossible for me to foretel the result of the operations of a war in which so much depends upon contingencies, upon the effect of which no calculation can be made.

In my situation it is a duty incumbent upon me to be prepared, as far as circumstances will permit, for every probable event; and although I do recommend to the inhabitants of Oporto to place in security their valuable property, I have no reason to believe that they are at present in any degree exposed to the rapacity of the enemy; or that they are likely to be so exposed in the probable course of the operations of the war. If circumstances should alter, there will be time to see, and provide against the increased danger, as far as our means will permit.

I request you to adopt any mode you think best to communicate these sentiments to the principal inhabitants of Oporto. I wish that it was in my power to give them assurances of complete security; but I am as unwilling to deceive them, and that they should incur any loss by a blind confidence in me which they could avoid by early precaution, as I am desirous that they should not injure their own property and the general cause of the allies by premature and unfounded alarm.’

## 432.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 19th Aug. 1810.

‘The importunity with which I press the war in this country upon the attention of His Majesty’s Ministers will, I hope, plead my excuse for troubling you for a few moments with my own private feelings upon the subject.

Nothing can be more irksome to me than the operations which have been carried on for the last year; and it is very obvious that a continuance of the same cautious system will lose the little reputation which I had acquired, and the good opinion of the people of this country. Nothing therefore could be more desirable to me personally than that either the contest should be given up at once, or that it should be continued with a force so sufficient as to render all opposition hopeless.

In either case the obloquy heaped upon me by the ignorant of our own country, as well as of this, and by those of this whom I am obliged to force to exertion, and who, after all, will be but imperfectly protected in their persons and property, would fall upon the Government. But seeing, as I do, more

than a chance of final success if we can maintain our position in this country, although probably none of a departure from our cautious defensive system, I should not do my duty by the Government if I did not inform them of the real situation of affairs, and urge them, with importunity even, to greater exertion.

I acknowledge that it has appeared to me, till very lately, that the Government themselves felt no confidence in the measures which they were adopting in this country; and not an officer has come from England, who has not told me that it was generally expected that he would, on his arrival, find the army embarking; and even some have told me that this expectation was entertained by some of the King's Ministers. These sentiments are not encouraging; and I acknowledge that I have been induced to attribute the little exertion which has lately been made in the cause to this want of confidence of the members of the Government in the result of the contest.

If Government are really in earnest in the contest I recommend the following measures to their immediate attention:

1. To order positively the commanding officers in Sicily and Malta to send their troops. Those islands cannot be attacked under present circumstances.

2. The same orders to be sent to Halifax.

3. To make me responsible for the safety of Cadiz and Gibraltar, and to leave it to my discretion to draw away such parts of the garrisons of those places as I may think proper.

4. To send to Lisbon as much of the disposable Walcheren infantry as may be in any state for service. They shall not be moved from the neighbourhood of that town, and they will probably recover there entirely.

5. To send to the Tagus, without loss of time, arms, military stores, clothing, shoes, great coats, and blankets; and to authorise me, or any body else, to give them to Spaniards or Portuguese, as may be thought expedient.

6. To send some victuallers and ordnance store ships to Lisbon loaded with provisions, arms, ammunition, powder, shoes, and great coats; and authorise me to send them round to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, for the supply of the garrisons, &c. there.

7. To authorise me to assist the Spaniards or Portuguese with small sums of money, if I should have it in my power, or stores, or provisions, if necessary.

There is one point to which likewise I wish to draw your attention again, and that is the necessity which exists of keeping a large fleet in the Tagus, as well of ships of the line, as of frigates and small craft.'

G. O.

Celorico, 20th Aug. 1810.

1. The General Orders of the 17th December, 1809, specifying the ticket to be sent to the General Hospital with sick soldiers, is applicable to detachments as well as regiments.

2. It is extraordinary that the Commander of the Forces should be obliged to remind the officers of the army in General Orders of the common practices and forms of the service, and of the standing military regulations; as if these forms and regulations were not founded on the same principle of utility, and were not particularly necessary in an army on service in a foreign country.

3. The ticket required under the General Orders of this army to be sent with soldiers, is that in use throughout Great Britain, and ordered by His Majesty's Regulations.

4. The King's Regulations, likewise, and the common forms of the service require, that, when an officer is passing through a town in which there are troops, he should report himself

self



433.

To \_\_\_\_\_.

Alverca, 23rd Aug. 1810.

' I have received your letter, containing a complaint against \_\_\_\_\_, of the Quarter Master General's department, that he had ill-treated one of your servants, into which I shall make inquiry, and let you know the result.

It is impossible, however, for me to interfere in any manner with a billet given by the magistrate of Coimbra, for an officer and his family to be quartered in your house. I must at the same time inform you, that I am not a little surprised that a person of your rank and station, and quality in the country, should object to give accommodation in your house, and should make a complaint of this officer, that he had asked you for additional accommodation; when it appears by the letter which you enclosed, and which I now return, that when you objected to give him this additional accommodation for which he had asked, he acquiesced in your objection, and did not any longer require this accommodation.

The unfortunate situation in which Portugal is placed, and the desire of the insatiable enemy of mankind to force this once happy and loyal people to submit to his iron yoke, to plunder them of their properties, to destroy their religion, and to deprive them of their monarch, has rendered it necessary to collect in this country a large army, in order, if possible, to defeat and frustrate the designs of the enemy. It is the duty of those whose age, whose sex, or whose profession do not permit them to take an active part in the defence of their country, to assist those employed in its defence with provisions, lodgings for officers and troops, means of transport, &c., and at all events not to oppose themselves to the granting of this description of assistance. These duties are more peculiarly incumbent upon the rich and high in station, who would be the first victims of, and greatest sufferers from, the enemy's success; unless indeed they should be of the number of those traitors who are aiding to introduce the common enemy into the country, to destroy its happiness and independence.

Under these circumstances, I am not a little astonished to receive these frivolous and manifestly unfounded complaints from you, and that you should be the person to set the example of objecting to give quarters to an officer, because he is married and has children.

It is not very agreeable to any body to have strangers quartered in his house; nor is it very agreeable to us strangers, who have good houses in our own country, to be obliged to seek for quarters here. We are not here for our pleasure: the situation of your country renders it necessary; and you, a man of family and fortune, who have much to lose, should not be the first to complain of the inconvenience of our presence in the country.

I do every thing in my power to alleviate the inconvenience which all must suffer. We pay extravagant prices for every thing we receive, with unparalleled punctuality; and I make it a rule to inquire into and redress every injury that is really done by the troops under my command, as I shall into

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self to the commanding or staff officer there stationed. All this is neglected, to the great inconvenience of the service.

5. The Commander of the Forces will at last find himself under the necessity of bringing to trial those officers who shall neglect the performance of the common duties required, not only by the General Orders of this army, but by the King's Regulations and the universal practice of the service at home, as well as abroad.'

that to which I have above referred, of which you complain in the conduct of ——— towards your servant.'

## 434.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 29th Aug. 1810.

'I am aware that their ultimate success depends upon my being able to maintain my ground. But still they would not understand the motive of the advice I should give them; more particularly as hitherto I have constantly urged them to keep their armies in a state of security, and not to risk them in actions of which the result was doubtful. I did arrange a plan of operations with the Marques de la Romana, applicable to his own corps when this country should be attacked; but, although I entertain a high opinion, and great regard, for the Marques de la Romana, I cannot feel confident that he will carry the plan into execution. Indeed I am apprehensive that he has already put it out of his power to be of much use to us, and the enemy certainly may cut him off from us. However, I have written to urge him to fall back, and secure his communication with us under any event.'

## 435.

To Dom Miguel Forjaz.

Gouvea, 6th Sept. 1810.

'I request the Government to believe that I am not insensible of the value of their confidence, as well as of that of the public; as also that I am highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my Sovereign, to the Prince Regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit public clamor or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end.'

## 436.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 7th Sept. 1810.

'I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures may be adopted, not only in the country between the Tagus and the Mondego, north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal; and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military officers.

I have already adopted this measure with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted in others, in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavor to penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other measures which for the last 12 months I have recommended to the Government, to impede and render difficult, and, if possible, to prevent the advance into and establishment of the enemy's forces in this country.

But it appears that the Government have lately discovered that we are all wrong; they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power, I would have prevented the Spanish armies from



attending to this call, and the cause would now have been safe; but now, having the power in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese Government.

I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the Regency, and as I must attribute it to the persons recently introduced into the Government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the Prince Regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct.

I leave it to you to communicate the whole or any part of this letter to the Regency.'

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 437.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 7th Sept. 1810.

'While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid drawing your Lordship's attention to the mode of promoting, not only commissaries, but the officers of the army, and those attached to all the departments. With the largest concern to manage that has lately been entrusted to any officer in the British army, and with the heaviest responsibility that ever was placed upon any, I have not the power of promoting a man of any rank or of any description; and the trial will certainly have been made in my case, whether with success or not still remains to be ascertained, with how small a proportion of the power of reward an officer in command of an army can carry on the service. At the same time I assure your Lordship that I have no desire to possess the power of promoting officers of the Commissariat, which it is the design of the enclosed letter to retain in the hands of the Commissary in Chief, or that of promoting officers in the army. I am not acquainted even with their names or their persons, excepting in the service; and excepting to reward their services, or to stimulate their exertions, it must be a matter of indifference to me whether they are promoted or not.'

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 438.

To Marshal Beresford.

Gouvea, 8th Sept. 1810.

'Upon considering the subject which you mentioned to me last night, I do not think it so important as it appeared to me upon first hearing it. The remedy which we agreed upon will answer some purpose, and I have it in my power to make some arrangements immediately, and others hereafter, which will effectually prevent all mischief of the description supposed in that quarter.

I beg you, however, not to mention the subject to any body. The croaking which already prevails in the army, and particularly about head quarters, is disgraceful to us as a nation, and does infinite mischief to the cause; and it would become much worse if this story were known.'

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 439.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 9th Sept. 1810.

'These measures will accustom the mob of Lisbon to the discipline they must undergo, and will keep matters quiet at the critical moment. I can only declare this,—that if I find the Government hesitating upon this

subject, and alarmed by the mob of Lisbon, and inclined to allow them to go to the lengths in which they will be really formidable, I shall forthwith embark the army, whatever may be the prospects of final success in our military operations. In taking this step, I shall literally obey the instructions which I have received; and the Portuguese nation will have the satisfaction of losing itself, and the Peninsula, notwithstanding the best prospects of salvation, by the folly of the people and the pusillanimity of the Government.'

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440.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 11th Sept. 1810.

'While writing upon this subject, I should wish to draw your attention to the inconvenience resulting from the precipitation of the Government, as well as from the practice, notwithstanding what I before wrote to them, of publishing Marshal Beresford's accounts, as well as mine, of the same transactions. There is no person who deprecates mystery more than I do; and it is impossible for two people to understand each other better than Beresford and I. He is 2 miles from this, and I see him every day; and I believe that we take pretty nearly the same view of every transaction. But a different mode of expression, a difference in the degree of importance assigned to any transaction, the details of which are related by different individuals, who probably have taken the same view, make a material difference in the eyes of the very jealous public, both of the Peninsula and of England, who will judge of our actions.

In a late instance I see that the Portuguese papers have observed and canvassed some little difference which they suppose there was between Beresford's reports and mine, which observations will certainly be copied into the English newspapers, with all the additional observations which malevolence can suggest. I attribute the publication of these reports made by Beresford to the feverish state in which the Government has been since Principal Sousa has become a member of it. Beresford very properly makes a daily report of events, but it must be observed that the view to be given in these reports cannot be so accurate as that which is given after the events have been well considered and further inquired into.

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It appears that you have had a good smart contest with the Government respecting our plan of operations. They will end in forcing me to quit them, and then they will see how they will get on. They will then find that I alone keep things in their present state. Indeed, the temper of some of the officers of the British army gives me more concern than the folly of the Portuguese Government. I have always been accustomed to have the confidence and support of the officers of the armies which I have commanded; but, for the first time, whether owing to the opposition in England, or whether the magnitude of the concern is too much for their minds and their nerves, or whether I am mistaken and they are right, I cannot tell; but there is a system of croaking in the army which is highly injurious to the public service, and which I must devise some means of putting an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have a right to form their own opinions upon events and transactions; but Officers of high rank or



situation ought to keep their opinions to themselves: if they do not approve of the system of operations of their commander, they ought to withdraw from the army. And this is a point to which I must bring some, if I should not find that their own good sense prevents them from going on as they have done lately. Believe me that, if any body else knowing what I do, had commanded the army, they would now have been in Lisbon, if not in their ships.'

441.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 13th Sept. 1810.

'This country has before been in great danger, and a great part of it, probably the richest and most important, was last year in the possession of the enemy; but at all times, and under all circumstances, I have possessed the confidence of the Government; and their object has been, as far as was in their power, to forward my views for the public service. I have apprized them of the system of operations in which I deemed it expedient to carry on the defence of the country, and they are aware of the grounds of my opinion, and the details of the plan; and till the late change, excepting occasional remarks from the Patriarch on the supposed danger of his favorite city Oporto, I never received from the Government any observation, excepting of confidence, in the measures which I recommended or adopted; and the confidence and satisfaction of the public surpassed that of the Government. But the Principal Sousa, who was introduced recently into the Government, is of that impatient, meddling, and mischievous disposition (without, however, designing to do harm), that we cannot expect to go on as we have hitherto, so long as he shall continue a member of the Government. His indiscretion is equally well known with the other defects of his character; and to this I attribute the dangerous sensation which appears to have been occasioned at Lisbon on the fall of Almeida.

In imitation of the fatal conduct of the Central Junta, the Portuguese Regency, since the late changes, have flattered, instead of coercing the mob of Lisbon, which will become dangerous in proportion as this new system is persevered in.


They have likewise, in imitation of the same body, interfered in the military operations, have deliberated upon the propriety of adopting offensive measures, and of moving the army into Spain; and I have no doubt that from the usual indiscretion of the same gentleman, these deliberations and opinions are as well known to the mob of Lisbon as they are to me. Then they have cast reflection and suspicion on every Portuguese employed by Marshal Beresford and me, likewise, in imitation of the Central Junta; and in many important instances, some relating exclusively to the army, they

G. O.

Gouvea, 13th Sept. 1810.

'2. The Commander of the Forces regrets that Captain — should have thought proper to defer till he was brought to trial, to explain the disrespectful expressions, which he made use of to his commanding officer, notwithstanding the repeated offers made to him by his commanding officer to receive such explanation.

The officers of the army should recollect that it is not only no degradation, but it is meritorious for him that is in the wrong to acknowledge and atone for his error; and that the momentary humiliation which any man may feel, upon making such an acknowledgment, is more than atoned for by the subsequent satisfaction which it affords him, and by avoiding a trial and conviction of conduct unbecoming an officer.'



have recently disobeyed the orders of the Prince Regent, to adopt no measure without consulting my opinion.

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The Portuguese Regency may be right in their notion of an offensive operation, and I may be wrong in the calculations which have induced me to prefer the defensive system which I have pursued ; but I am very certain that the General and other officers of the British army, at least, of the two, prefer that which I have adopted ; although if some of them held the command, the army would long ere now have been in their transports.'

442.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.

Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810.

In respect to other parts of your letter, I observe from some expressions which it contains, and the general tenor of your observations, that I trod upon tender ground when I addressed you on the subject to which it relates. The sooner I quit it therefore the better, and I shall confine myself merely to referring you to my letter, in respect to the claims of gentlemen of family, fortune, and influence, to promotion ; from which you will observe that I urged the expediency of attending to their claims to promotion, only when their professional merits were at least equal, if not superior, to those of others. When I wrote to you I had no intention of making any invidious statement of the advantages which any set of individuals had derived from the system of promotion which had been adopted. I adverted to what is generally understood and reported in the army; and as I purpose to drop the subject entirely, about the result of which I do not care a pin, I shall not enter into any proof of the truth of the statement which I made.'

443.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cortiço, 18th Sept. 1810.

' I have received your letters of the 15th ; I never was so shocked as upon hearing the account of the arrests. I declare publicly against it ; and if I find that justice is not done to us by the Portuguese nation upon this subject, I shall take some opportunity of making known my opinion of it to the public.

I make no objection to the publication of any official papers received by the Government ; but I wish to give them reports of the transactions which I am conducting, and if they publish any other reports, I shall not give them any. Of course, both Beresford and you must make regular reports to the authorities by which you are respectively employed ; but it is impossible to lay before the public two reports on the same transactions, in which the ingenious public, or rather, the newswriters, will not discover an inconsistency : this I want to avoid.'

G. O.

Coimbra, 30th Sept. 1810.

' 1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General and other officers and soldiers of the army, for their conduct during the whole time they occupied the position of Busaco, and in the action with the enemy on the 27th instant.

He witnessed several instances of intrepidity in the officers and troops, and others have been reported to him by the General Officers, of which he will not fail to report his sense to His Majesty, and to the government of H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

Every friend to his country and to the liberties of the world and the whole British army must



444.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Coimbra, 30th Sept. 1810.

' While the enemy was advancing from Celorico and Trancoso upon Viseu, the different divisions of militia and ordenanza were employed upon their flanks and rear; and Colonel Trant with his division attacked the escort of the military chest and reserve artillery near Tojal, on the 20th inst. He took 2 officers and 80 prisoners, but the enemy collected a force from the front and rear, which obliged him to retire again towards the Douro. I understand that the enemy's communication is completely cut off, and he possesses only the ground upon which his army stands.

My dispatch of the 20th instant will have informed you of the measures which I had adopted and which were in progress to collect the army in this neighbourhood, and, if possible, to prevent the enemy from obtaining possession of this town.

On the 21st the enemy's advanced guard pushed on to S<sup>ta</sup> Combadaõ, at the junction of the rivers Criz and Daõ; and Brig. General Pack retired across the former and joined Brig. General Craufurd at Mortagoa, having destroyed the bridges over those two rivers. The enemy's advanced guard crossed the Criz, having repaired the bridge, on the 23rd, and the whole of the 6th corps was collected on the other side of the river. I therefore withdrew the cavalry through the Serra de Busaco, with the exception of 3 squadrons, as the ground was unfavorable for the operation of that arm.

On the 25th, the whole of the 6th and of the 2nd corps crossed the Criz in the neighbourhood of S<sup>ta</sup> Combadaõ; and Brig. General Pack's brigade and Brig. General Craufurd's division retired to the position which I had fixed upon for the army on the top of the Serra de Busaco. These troops were followed in this movement by the whole of the corps of Ney and Regnier (the 6th and the 2nd); but it was conducted by Brig. General Craufurd with great regularity, and the troops took their position without sustaining any loss of importance. The 4th Portuguese caçadores, which had retired on the right of the other troops, and the piquets of the 3rd division of infantry, which were posted at S<sup>c</sup> Antonio de Cantaro, under Major Smyth of the 45th regt., were engaged with the advance of Regnier's corps in the afternoon, and the former showed that steadiness and gallantry which others of the Portuguese troops have since manifested.

The Serra de Busaco is a high ridge which extends from the Mondego in

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must have observed with the greatest satisfaction the gallantry and steadiness of the Portuguese troops during these days, and that they equally with their brother soldiers in His Majesty's service, have deserved and obtained the approbation of Marshal Beresford, and of the Commander of the Forces.

Although the designs manifested by the enemy's movements induced the Commander of the Forces to withdraw the army from their position, which it was not in the power of the enemy to force, he hopes to be enabled by the discipline and determined bravery of the officers and troops, to frustrate all his designs, and to save this country, "in which the British army has been so well treated," from the degrading yoke which is prepared for it.

2. \* \* \* \* Which sentence has been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

3. Although the Commander of the Forces has long determined that he will not pardon men guilty of crimes of which these prisoners have been convicted, he is induced to pardon these men in consequence of the gallantry displayed by the 45th regt. on the 27th inst. He trusts that this pardon will make a due impression upon the prisoners, and that by their future regular and good conduct, they will endeavor to emulate their comrades, who have by their bravery saved them from a disgraceful end.

a northerly direction about 8 miles. At the highest point of the ridge, about 2 miles from its termination, is the convent and garden of Busaco. The Serra de Busaco is connected by a mountainous tract of country with the Serra de Caramula, which extends in a north easterly direction beyond Viscu, and separates the valley of the Mondego from the valley of the Douro. On the left of the Mondego, nearly in a line with the Serra de Busaco, is another ridge of the same description, called the Serra da Murcella, covered by the river Alva, and connected by other mountainous parts with the Serra d'Estrella. All the roads to Coimbra from the eastward lead over the one or the other of these Serras. They are very difficult for the passage of an army, the approach to the top of the ridge on both sides being mountainous.

As the enemy's whole army was on the right of the Mondego, and it was evident that he intended to force our position, Lieut. General Hill crossed that river by a short movement to his left, on the morning of the 26th, leaving Colonel Le Cor with his brigade on the Serra da Murcella, to cover the right of the army, and Brig. General Fane, with his division of Portuguese cavalry and the 13th light dragoons in front of the Alva, to observe and check the movements of the enemy's cavalry on the Mondego. With this exception, the whole army was collected upon the Serra de Busaco, with the British cavalry observing the plain in the rear of its left, and the road leading from Mortagoa to Oporto, through the mountainous tract which connects the Serra de Busaco with the Serra de Caramula.

The 8th corps joined the enemy in our front on the 26th, but he did not make any serious attack on that day. The light troops on both sides were engaged throughout the line.

At 6 in the morning of the 27th the enemy made two desperate attacks upon our position, the one on the right, the other on the left of the highest part of the Serra. The attack upon the right was made by two divisions of the 2nd corps, on that part of the Serra occupied by the 3rd division of infantry. One division of French infantry arrived at the top of the ridge, where it was attacked in the most gallant manner by the 88th regt., under the command of Lieut. Colonel Wallace, the 45th, under the command of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Meade, and by the 8th Portuguese regt., under the command of Lieut. Colonel Douglas, directed by Major General Picton. These 3 corps advanced with the bayonet, and drove the enemy's division from the advantageous ground which they had obtained. The other division of the 2nd corps attacked farther on the right, by the road leading by S' Antonio de Cantaro, also in front of Major General Picton's division. These were repulsed, before they could reach the top of the ridge, by the 74th, under the command of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Trench, and the brigade of Portuguese infantry of the 9th and 21st regts., under the command of Colonel Champelmond, directed by Colonel Mackinnon. Major General Leith also moved to his left to the support of Major General Picton, and aided in the defeat of the enemy by the 3rd batt. of Royals, the 1st batt. of of the 9th, and the 2nd batt. of the 38th regts. In these attacks Major Generals Leith and Picton, Colonels Mackinnon and Chapelmond, of the Portuguese service, who was wounded, Lieut. Colonel Wallace, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Meade, Lieut. Colonel Sutton, of the 9th Portuguese, Major Smyth of the 45th, who was afterwards killed, Lieut. Colonel



Douglas, and Major Birmingham, of the 8th Portuguese regt., distinguished themselves.

Major General Picton reports the good conduct of the 9th and 21st Portuguese regts., commanded by Colonel Sutton and Lieut. Colonel A. Bacellar, and of the Portuguese artillery, under the command of Major Arentschildt. I have also to mention, in a particular manner, the conduct of Captain Dansey of the 88th.

Major General Leith reports the good conduct of the Royals, 1st batt., and 9th, and 2nd batt. of the 38th regts.; and I beg to assure your Lordship that I have never witnessed a more gallant attack than that made by the 88th, 45th, and 8th Portuguese regts., on the enemy's division which had reached the ridge of the Serra.

On the left, the enemy attacked with 3 divisions of infantry of the 6th corps, on the part of the Serra occupied by the light division of infantry commanded by Brig. General Craufurd, and by the brigade of Portuguese infantry commanded by Brig. General Pack. One division of infantry only made any progress to the top of the hill, and they were immediately charged with the bayonet by Brig. General Craufurd, with the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th, and the 3rd Portuguese caçadores, and driven down with immense loss. Brig. General Colman's brigade of Portuguese infantry, which was in reserve, was moved up to the right of Brig. General Craufurd's division, and a battalion of the 19th Portuguese regt., under the command of Lieut. Colonel MacBean, made a gallant and successful charge upon a body of another division of the enemy, which was endeavoring to penetrate in that quarter. In this attack, Brig. General Craufurd, Lieut. Colonels Beckwith, of the 95th, and Barclay, of the 52nd, and the commanding officers of the regiments, distinguished themselves.

Besides these attacks, the light-troops of the two armies were engaged throughout the 27th; and the 4th Portuguese caçadores, and the 1st and 15th regts., directed by Brig. General Pack, and commanded by Lieut. Colonel Hill, Lieut. Colonel Luis do Rego, and Major Armstrong, showed great steadiness and gallantry.

The loss sustained by the enemy in his attack of the 27th has been enormous. I understand that the Generals of division, Merle, Loison, and Maucune are wounded, and General Simon was taken prisoner by the 52nd regt.; and 3 Colonels, — officers, and 250 men. The enemy left 2000 killed upon the field of battle, and I understand from the prisoners and deserters that the loss in wounded is immense.

The enemy did not renew his attack, excepting by the fire of his light troops on the 28th; but he moved a large body of infantry and cavalry from the left of his centre to the rear, from whence I saw his cavalry in march on the road from Mortagoa over the mountains towards Oporto.

Having thought it probable that he would endeavor to turn our left by that road, I had directed Colonel Trant, with his division of militia, to march to Sardaõ, with the intention that he should occupy the mountains, but unfortunately he was sent round by Oporto, by the General Officer commanding in the north, in consequence of a small detachment of the enemy being in possession of S. Pedro do Sul; and, notwithstanding the efforts which

he made to arrive in time, he did not reach Sardaõ till the 28th at night, after the enemy were in possession of the ground.

As it was probable that, in the course of the night of the 28th, the enemy would throw the whole of his army upon the road, by which he could avoid the Serra de Busaco and reach Coimbra by the high road of Oporto, and thus the army would have been exposed to be cut off from that town or to a general action in less favorable ground, and as I had reinforcements in my rear, I was induced to withdraw from the Serra de Busaco.

The enemy did break up in the mountains at 11 at night of the 28th, and he made the march I expected. His advanced guard was at Avelans, on the road from Oporto to Coimbra, yesterday, and the whole army was seen in march through the mountains. That under my command, however, was already in the low country, between the Serra de Busaco and the sea; and the whole of it, with the exception of the advanced guard, is this day on the left of the Mondego.

Although, from the unfortunate circumstance of the delay of Colonel Trant's arrival at Sardaõ, I am apprehensive that I shall not succeed in effecting the object I had in view in passing the Mondego and in occupying the Serra de Busaco, I do not repent my having done so. This movement has afforded me a favorable opportunity of showing the enemy the description of troops of which this army is composed; it has brought the Portuguese levies into action with the enemy for the first time in an advantageous situation; and they have proved that the trouble which has been taken with them has not been thrown away, and that they are worthy of contending in the same ranks with British troops in this interesting cause, which they afford the best hopes of saving.

Throughout the contest on the Serra, and in all the previous marches, and those which we have since made, the whole army have conducted themselves in the most regular manner. Accordingly all the operations have been carried on with ease; the soldiers have suffered no privations, have undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no loss of stores, and the army is in the highest spirits.

I have received throughout the service the greatest assistance from the General and Staff Officers. Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer has given the assistance his experience enables him to afford me; and I am particularly indebted to the Adjutant and the Quarter Master Generals, and the officers of their departments and to Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, and the officers of my personal staff; to Major General Howorth and the Artillery, and particularly to Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, Captain Chapman, and the officers of the Royal Engineers. I must likewise mention Mr. Kennedy, and the officers of the Commissariat, which department has been carried on most successfully.

I should not do justice to the service, or to my own feelings, if I did not take this opportunity of drawing your Lordship's attention to the merits of Marshal Beresford. To him exclusively, under the Portuguese Government, is due the merit of having raised, formed, disciplined, and equipped the Portuguese army, which has now shown itself capable of engaging and defeating the enemy. I have besides received from him all the assistance which his experience and abilities, and his knowledge of this country, have qualified him to afford me.



The enemy have made no movement in Estremadura, or in the northern provinces, since I addressed your Lordship last.

My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 9th instant.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the allied armies in the course of the 25th, 26th, and 27th.

I send this dispatch by my aide de camp, Captain Burgh,\* to whom I beg to refer your Lordship for any further details, and I recommend him to your Lordship's notice.'

445.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alcobaga, 5th Oct. 1810.

'With few exceptions, the troops have continued to conduct themselves with great regularity, and they have suffered no fatigue. The army is now

G. O.

Leyria, 3rd Oct. 1810.

'There are more stragglers from these 3 regiments than from all the others of the British army taken together, which must be occasioned either by the neglect of the officers, or by the soldiers being unable to keep up with the march.

In either case, these regiments are unfit to do duty with the army; and if the Commander of the Forces should observe any more of this straggling on the march, he will send the regiments into garrison, and report their conduct especially to His Majesty.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that Major General Leith will communicate these orders to the Portuguese troops in his division, of whom, particularly the Lusitanian Legion, there is as much reason to complain, as of the British brigade.

He also requests to have a return this day of the number of men missing from each regiment, British and Portuguese, in the division, on each day's march, since the 1st inst. inclusive.

3. General officers commanding divisions are requested to direct the provost marshal attached to their division to punish any man who may be found straggling from the regiment and division to which he belongs.

4. General officers commanding divisions are requested to direct that there may be an inspection of the soldiers' packs, both British and Portuguese, this day after the march, and every thing, not strictly regimental necessaries, is to be taken from them and burnt, and those who have these articles are to be punished, as they have certainly procured them by plunder.

Major General Picton is requested not to allow the troops of his division to enter any town unless necessarily obliged to pass through it, until further orders.'

A. G. O.

Leyria, 3rd Oct. 1810.

'The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have been under the necessity of carrying into execution the determination which he has so long announced, of directing the immediate execution of any soldiers caught plundering; and that a British and a Portuguese soldier have consequently been hanged this day for plundering in the town of Leyria, where they were contrary to order, and for this criminal purpose.

He trusts that this example will deter others from those disgraceful practices in future; and the troops may depend upon it that no instance of the kind will be passed over. They are well fed and taken care of, and there is no excuse for plunder, which could not be admitted on any account.

Once more, the Commander of the Forces calls upon the commanding officers of regiments to oblige their men to march in a regular manner with their companies.'

G. O.

Alcobaga, 5th Oct. 1810.

'1. The Commander of the Forces announces to the army that 30 of the stragglers, who are absent from their regiments, of which 10 are British soldiers, were taken yesterday by the enemy in villages near the road on which the army marched 3 or 4 days before, that is on the 1st and 2nd instant.

This misfortune would be a subject of regret to the Commander of the Forces under any circumstances, but it is particularly so, as it has been occasioned by the irregularity of the soldiers themselves, and by the neglect of their officers to attend to the orders repeatedly issued upon this subject.'

\* Lord Downes, K.C.B.

at no great distance from the position in which I proposed that it should receive the enemy, and it is in high spirits.

From all accounts which I have received, the enemy suffer great distress. The inhabitants of the country have fled from their houses universally, carrying with them every thing they could take away which could be deemed useful to the enemy; and the habits of plunder which have so long been encouraged in the enemy's army prevent them from deriving any general advantage from the little resource which the inhabitants may have been obliged to leave behind them.'

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 446.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Rio Mayor, 6th Oct. 1810.

'I have received your letters of the 5th, and I shall take care that the Commissary General shall not exchange any paper during the existing crisis. I do not know what people feel at Lisbon, but we at the army entertain but little doubt of success.

The Bishop and Sousa would do more harm than good in the north, where we are carrying on operations of great importance; but I hope the letter which I enclose will bring these gentry to their senses, or I shall certainly carry into execution the threat which it contains.

I believe you and the Government do not know where the lines are. Those round Lisbon are not those in which I shall place the army, but those extending from Torres Vedras to the Tagus. All I ask from the Government is tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops; and as God Almighty does not give "the race to the swift or the battle to the strong," and I have fought battles enough to know, that even under the best arrangements, the result of any one is not certain, I only beg that they will adopt preparatory arrangements to take out of the enemy's way those persons who would suffer if they were to fall into his hands.'

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 447.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Rio Mayor, 6th Oct. 1810.

'I beg that you will do me the favor to inform the Regency, and, above all, Principal Sousa, that His Majesty and the Prince Regent having intrusted me with the command of their armies, and exclusively with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or any body else, to interfere with them; that I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system, framed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz., to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army, and of the people, while the troops shall be engaged with the enemy.

As for Principal Sousa, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the Government; that being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to their end; but that no power on earth shall induce



me to remain in the Peninsula, for one moment, after I shall have obtained His Majesty's leave to resign my charge, if Principal Sousa is to remain either a member of the Government, or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I shall; and if I should be obliged to go, I will take care that the world, in Portugal at least, and the Prince Regent, shall be made acquainted with my reasons.

From the letter of the 3rd instant, which I have received from Dom M. Forjaz, I had hoped that the Government were satisfied with what I had done and intended to do; and that, instead of endeavoring to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town. But I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure. I request you to communicate this letter to the Regency; and to transmit it to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

P.S. All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is, tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions *for their own troops*, while they shall be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt of success; but as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to discover that the result of any one is not certain, even under the best arrangements, I am anxious that the Government should adopt preparatory arrangements to take out of the enemy's way those persons and their families, who would suffer if they were to fall into his hands.'

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448.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 17th Oct. 1810.

'I do not wish the sick men (now ordered to be embarked) to be sent to England. I am firmly of opinion that the enemy cannot succeed; but as I know that their situation is desperate, we must expect that there is no risk they will not incur to attain their object, and I know enough of operations of this kind to be aware that nobody can be certain of their result. My wish therefore is to have embarked in the ships every body who cannot walk down to the beach, because, in case any accident should happen, I know

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G. O.

Rinho, near Sobral, 13th Oct. 1810.

'When any officer is desirous of communicating a message to the Commander of the Forces, it is only necessary to send it to the nearest telegraph and to request the officer of the navy at that telegraph to communicate it to the Sobral station: in the same manner messages may be communicated to any other station.'

G. O.

Pero Negro, 17th Oct. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General Officers of the army to the Orders which have been often issued, relative to the detention and use of dragoons as orderlies.

2. If the circumstances require that any General Officer should use dragoons to keep up a communication, he will apply for a party for that purpose, which must be sent back as soon as the purpose for which it was applied for is accomplished, and the dragoons must not be used as orderlies contrary to orders, on any account.

3. The Commander of the Forces is convinced that the General Officers will see the necessity of attending to this order, in order to keep the cavalry in a state of efficiency.

4. All General and staff officers, who have dragoons with them, are requested to send a return of their names, their troops, and the regiments to which they belong, to the Assistant Adjutant General of the cavalry at Mafra.'

well that, even under the best arrangements, those who must be carried will have but a bad chance of being removed.'

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449.

To the Earl of Liverpool

Pero Negro, 20th Oct. 1810.

'The difficulties which the enemy experience in procuring subsistence, owing to their having invaded this country without magazines, and having adopted no measures for the security of their rear, or of their communication with Spain, has rendered it necessary for the soldiers to straggle in search of food, and not a day passes that prisoners and deserters are not sent in.'

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450.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 21st Oct. 1810.

'I enclose you a newspaper, which contains a paragraph which I have marked, to which I request you to draw the attention of the Government. I have sins enough of my own to answer for; and it is rather hard upon me to incur the odium of having recommended acts to this Government, which they committed without my knowledge, and of which I could not approve.

I must request that they will publish my letter to them upon the absurd and odious transaction to which this paragraph refers.'

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G. O.

Pero Negro, 23rd Oct. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces has observed with the greatest concern, the large number of men returned by the several regiments as sick in General Hospital, compared with the returns received from the medical officers, of the number of men actually on their books in the hospitals.

2. The former, at present, is more than double the latter, and it must be owing to some existing abuse.

3. The Commander of the Forces has besides been informed by many officers commanding regiments and brigades in the army, that there are many non-commissioned officers and soldiers walking about the streets in Belem and Lisbon, quite recovered, while others are doing the duty of these men before the enemy in the field.

4. In order to put a stop to these abuses, the Commander of the Forces desires that the following regulations may be attended to.

5. He repeats the orders which have been so frequently issued, that no officer in the medical department shall have any soldier from the ranks as his servant or bat man, or to attend upon him in any manner, and declares his determination to bring before a General Court Martial any officer of the medical department who shall make use of a non-commissioned officer, or soldier, in any menial capacity whatever, or as a clerk, store keeper, ward master, or orderly, except under the following regulations.

6. A Board to assemble at Lisbon tomorrow, to consist of, Colonel Peacocke, the Inspector General of Hospitals, and Captain M'Kenzie, A.Q.M.G., to consider of and decide upon the number of clerks, store keepers, ward masters, and orderlies from the ranks, required to attend upon the sick.

7. In considering these points, the Board will advert to the facility of obtaining the service of Portuguese clerks, store keepers, &c. at Lisbon, and they will send the return for the inspection and approbation of the Commander of the Forces.

They will also advert to the necessity that the officers of the medical department should themselves attend the wards of the hospitals, and not have non-commissioned officers as ward masters, at a period when the whole army are left at their post day and night. The Commander of the Forces must insist upon the officers of the medical department being at all times in the wards of the hospitals.

8. When the necessary number of attendants in the hospital shall be fixed, Colonel Peacocke will fix upon the names of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the several regiments, who are to be attendants in the hospital, and he will send lists of their names to the several regiments.

9. Colonel Peacocke is requested occasionally to inquire respecting the number of sick  
and



451.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 26th Oct. 1810.

' In respect to military operations, there can be no interference on the part of the Regency, or any body else. If there is, I can be no longer responsible. If our own Government choose to interfere themselves, or that the Portuguese Regency should interfere, they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I shall carry them strictly into execution to the best of my ability, and I shall be responsible for nothing but the execution. But if I am to be responsible, I must have full discretion, and no interference on the part of the Regency, or any body else.'

452.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

' Your Lordship has been apprized of the measures which had been adopted to induce the inhabitants of Portugal to quit that part of the country through which the enemy was likely to pass, or which it was probable would become the seat of his operations, carrying off with them their valuable property, and every thing which could tend to the enemy's subsistence, or to facilitate his progress. There is no doubt that these inhabitants had suffi-

and wounded in the hospital at Lisbon, and to augment or diminish the number of attendants according to the number of sick, and according to the degree of assistance which can be procured by the employment of Portuguese attendants, reporting such increase or diminution to the Commander of the Forces, and sending lists of names of non-commissioned officers to be so employed or dismissed from employment, to the several regiments.

10. All men thus dismissed from employment in the hospitals, either now or at any future period, are to be sent by the first opportunity to their regiments, and the Commander of the Forces positively forbids, that any non-commissioned officer or soldier shall be employed as an attendant, at the hospitals at Lisbon or Belem, without the order of Colonel Peacocke, in his orderly book.

11. Non-commissioned officers and soldiers, employed as attendants in the hospitals, are not on any account, at any time, to quit the square of the building in which the hospital is.

12. The soldiers when discharged from the hospital are to be sent to the convalescent Barracks at Belem, and it is to be understood by their officers and them, that they are not sent there for their amusement, but that they may recover their health entirely, and return to their duty with the army. There appears therefore no occasion for their being in the streets and public houses at all hours of the day and night, but they ought to be made to lead a sober and regular life.

13. The Commander of the Forces therefore desires, that no non-commissioned officer or soldier in the Convalescent Barracks at Belem may be suffered to go out of the barrack yard, at any time, excepting on duty in charge of an officer or non-commissioned officer.

14. The Commander of the Forces refers the commandant of the depôt at Belem to the General Orders of the 17th June, 1809.

15. He likewise desires, that non-commissioned officers and soldiers, convalescent in the depôt at Belem, may not have a ration of wine, unless the surgeon who attended them while in hospital should recommend that they should have it for their more early recovery.'

G. O.

Pero Negro, 26th Oct. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces has directed the Commissary General to supply the troops with a certain quantity of rice till further orders.

The quantity supplied will be 1 lb. among 8 men, which is to be boiled up with their meat.

2. Commanding officers of regiments will make requisitions upon the Assistant Commissaries attached to brigades for this rice, as soon as the latter shall be enabled to supply it.

3. In order to keep up the supply of cattle, the Commander of the Forces has likewise given orders that the troops shall be supplied for the present with salt meat on 2 days in each week.

4. The commanding officers of regiments will settle with the Commissaries the days on which they are to receive fresh, and those on which they are to receive salt meat.'

cient knowledge, from former experience, of the treatment they would receive from the enemy; and there is no instance of those of any town or village having remained, or of their having failed to remove what might be useful to the enemy when they had sufficiently early intimation of the wishes of Government, or of myself, that they should abandon their houses, and carry away their property.

All those who are acquainted with the nature of military operations, with their dependence upon the assistance of the country to supply the wants of the army, and particularly with the degree to which the French armies depend upon this assistance, must be aware of the distress which this system has occasioned to the enemy; and the official and private letters which have been intercepted are filled with complaints of its effects, which have been repeated in the official papers published in the *Moniteur* at Paris.

It happened unfortunately, that the Indian corn harvest, which is the principal support of the inhabitants of a large part of Portugal, was on the ground at the moment of the enemy's invasion. This of course could not be carried off: the enemy's troops have, as usual, destroyed what they could not move; and nothing remains. If, therefore, the result of the campaign should be to oblige the enemy to withdraw from Portugal, it is much to be apprehended that the greatest distress will be felt in those districts through which the enemy's troops have passed, which there are no means whatever in this country of relieving.

Upon former occasions, the wealthy inhabitants of Great Britain, and of London in particular, have stepped forward to assist and relieve the distresses of foreign nations, whether suffering under calamities inflicted by Providence, or by a cruel and powerful enemy. This nation has received the benefit of the charitable disposition of His Majesty's subjects, and there never was a case in which their assistance was required in a greater degree, whether the sufferings of the people, or their fidelity to the cause they have espoused, and their attachment to His Majesty's subjects, be considered.

I declare that I have scarcely known an instance in which any person in Portugal, even of the lowest order, has had communication with the enemy inconsistent with his duty to his own Sovereign, or with the orders he had received.

I would, therefore, beg leave to recommend the unfortunate portion of the inhabitants who have suffered from the enemy's invasion, to your Lordship's protection; and I request you to consider of the mode of recommending them to the benevolent disposition of His Majesty's subjects, at the moment which I hope may be not far distant that the enemy may be under the necessity of evacuating the country.'

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453.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

'Having observed that I am supposed to have advised the measures recently adopted by the Regency in Portugal, in respect to certain individuals who have been sent out of the Kingdom; and as I know that credit is given to calumnies of this description, and that they are frequently repeated, and brought forward in the shape of charges against those who are serving His Majesty abroad, I am desirous that your Lordship should be informed how this matter really stands.



The first I heard of the arrest of the persons in question was from public report, and from the Portuguese newspapers. The Secretary of the Regency afterwards sent me a paper upon the subject, of which I enclose a copy, to which I wrote the answer expressing my disapprobation of the measure, of which I enclose the draft.

I am decidedly of opinion that the Portuguese Government had no reason for arresting those individuals, excepting a desire to gratify the populace by an act of vigor against those supposed to be well wishers of, and partisans of the French. It is impossible for me to say whether they are so or not, but I am very certain that they had it not in their power to do any mischief, and that their sudden arrest and transportation for crimes not stated, were calculated to do much injury at the time, by creating general suspicion and mistrust.

I am afraid that the Portuguese Government, after they had carried this measure into execution, and had found that commiseration for the sufferings of individuals had excited the disapprobation of many persons in Lisbon of the whole proceedings, gave their sanction to the reports which were circulated by their friends, that it had been adopted at the suggestion of the British authorities, although they had adopted it not only without consulting any of us, but had persevered in carrying into execution notwithstanding the remonstrances of His Majesty's Minister and of the Admiral, and they knew that I disapproved of it entirely.'

## 454.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

'I did every thing in my power, short of deceiving General Herrasti with hopes of relief at all risks to the army under my command, to induce him to defend the place intrusted to his charge. It is a very convenient doctrine for the French, that a fortified place which is attacked by them, and has no hope of relief from an army in the field, ought to surrender without making any defence; but the contrary doctrine is the only one by which they can be effectually opposed. The inhabitants of every town in a state of siege must suffer considerably, but their remaining in it during the period of the siege is a matter of choice, and in the case of Ciudad Rodrigo in particular, was not a matter of necessity; and it would be quite a new principle in war, and a most advantageous one for the French, that every town threatened with a siege of which the inhabitants might feel the inconvenience, and for which there could be no hope of relief by an army in the field, ought to surrender without making any defence.'

## 455.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

'I am not quite certain that I ought not to attack the French, particularly as they have detached Loison, either to look for provision; or to open the road for their retreat; but I think the sure game, and that in which I am likely to lose fewest men, the most consistent with my instructions and the intentions of the King's Government; and I therefore prefer to wait the attack. Besides, although I have the advantage of numbers, the enemy are in a very good position, which I could not turn with any large force, without

laying open my own rear, and the road to the sea. This is the worst of all these strong countries, that they afford equally good positions to both sides.'

456.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 28th Oct. 1810.

'But if we are to go on as we have hitherto; if Great Britain is to give large subsidies, and to expend large sums in the support of a cause, in which those most interested sit by and take no part; and those at the head of the Government, with laws and power to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil, but neglect their duty, and omit to put the laws into execution, I must believe their professions to be false; that they look to a little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence.

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This defect in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly pointed out to the Government, and a remedy for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by the Prince Regent, but they will not adopt it; and it would be much better if there were no laws for the government of the army, than that the existing laws should continue without being executed.'

457.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens.

Pero Negro, 2nd Nov. 1810.

'I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th ult., with its enclosures, on the subject of Mr. Kennedy's representations of the want of sufficient escorts for his stores.

I recollect that the Commissary General mentioned to me, about the period of the date of his letter to the Commissary in Chief, the inconveniences experienced from the deficiencies of stores when they reached the army from the depôts, occasioned, partly by the desertion of the bullock drivers, and partly by robberies committed by the same description of persons, and by the mule drivers. Upon that occasion I pointed out to Mr. Kennedy the inconvenience which would result to the service from giving escorts to every convoy of grain or bread, from the irregularity of the British soldiers when detached from their corps; and the probability that the employment of these escorts would occasion greater inconveniences and deficiencies than were at that moment experienced. The Spanish muleteers, who perform the greatest part of the transport service of the army, would not submit to the brutal

G. O.

Pero Negro, 30th Oct. 1810.

'1. The Commander of the Forces has given directions, that an issue of a blanket for 2 men of the non-commissioned officers and rank and file may be made to the several regiments, and the commanding officers of regiments will as soon as possible send to the Quarter Master General returns of the number of blankets which they will require for this proportion for the effective men.

The regiments which retained their blankets in the month of June last will of course receive none; but the Commander of the Forces requests that the commanding officers of those regiments will send to the Quarter Master General a return of the number of great coats they have in store, and will make application for means of transport to have them brought up to their regiments, and issue them to the men to whom they belong.

The regiment will likewise make a return of the number of great coats wanting to complete every non-commissioned officer and soldier with a great coat.'



violence of a drunken English soldier, and these people would desert with their mules, if escorted by troops; and I believe that the delays which the drunkenness and irregularity of the troops would have occasioned in the arrival of the stores, and the loss by their own thieving, would have been found still greater than those suffered by the dishonesty of the muleteers.

Another practice very common among the troops, would have been found equally prejudicial to the service in the case of the use of carts. A detachment has scarcely ever gone as an escort with carts, even carrying treasure or sick, that the soldiers have not taken bribes from the drivers to be allowed to quit the convoy with their carts and bullocks. This practice leads to fresh irregularities of the same description. They must then be employed to press carts in the country to supply the deficiency of transport, occasioned by their own villany and forgetfulness of their duty. This is always an act of violence; and the inhabitants frequently bribe the soldiers not to press their carriages.

All these circumstances induced me to believe, that it was better to submit to the inconvenience of the loss of some of the stores, than to suffer that inconvenience, with the additional evils which I have above described. I did, however, make arrangements to have the convoys attended by detachments of the *ordenanza*, and I believe there was afterwards no positive loss of stores, although the petty robberies of mule and cart drivers still continued.

I do not think that two companies of a veteran battalion would behave better than the other British troops employed on this service. No soldier can withstand the temptation of wine. This is constantly before their eyes in this country, and they are constantly intoxicated when absent from their regiments, and there is no crime which they do not commit to obtain money to purchase it; or if they cannot get money, to obtain it by force. I believe that the best mode of ensuring the safety and the regular arrival of stores from the depôts to the troops, would be to employ a sufficient number of sober, honest, and steady conductors, to send one at least with each escort; and having thus provided a control over the drivers of bullocks and mules, which would ensure their regular arrival at least, and check their dishonesty, I would recommend that they should be made responsible for the losses and deficiencies in their loads.

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458.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 3rd Nov. 1810.

‘The Government are not aware of the difficulties of my situation, or of the orders of the Government, or of the King’s wishes and intentions; and they give me more trouble in writing letters upon their nonsense, and lose more of my time, than can be conceived. I am responsible, and they are not, for the success of our operations; and if they will not do what I advise them, I shall only place their refusal or omission upon the records of the Government, in justification of myself.’

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459.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 3rd Nov. 1810.

‘I wish it was in my power to give your Lordship an opinion of the pro-

bable course of the enemy's operations, founded upon the existing state of affairs here, considered in a military point of view; but from what I am about to state to your Lordship, you will observe that it is impossible to form such an opinion.

The expedition into Portugal was, in my opinion, founded originally upon political and financial, rather than military considerations. It is true, that with a view to the conquest of Spain, there were advantages purely military to be derived from the removal of the British army from Portugal; but I think I could show that it was not essentially necessary to effect that object, particularly after the door into Castille had been closed upon us, by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.

The political object, therefore, in removing us from Portugal, which was the effect that our evacuation of the Peninsula would have had upon the inhabitants of Spain in general, and upon those of Cadiz in particular; and the financial object, which was the possession and plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, were the principal motives for the perseverance in the expedition into Portugal. I believe the latter to have been more pressing even than the former.

It is impossible to describe to your Lordship the pecuniary and other distresses of the French armies in the Peninsula. All the troops are months in arrears of pay; they are in general very badly clothed; their armies want horses, carriages, and equipments of every description; their troops subsist solely upon plunder, whether acquired individually, or more regularly by the way of requisition and contribution; they receive no money, or scarcely any, from France; and they realise but little from their pecuniary contributions in Spain. Indeed, I have lately discovered that the expense of the pay and the hospitals alone of the French army in the Peninsula amounts to more than the sum stated in the financial *exposé* as the whole expense of the entire French army. This state of things has very much weakened, and in some instances, destroyed, the discipline of the army; and all the intercepted letters advert to acts of malversation and corruption, and misapplication of stores, &c., by all the persons attached to the army.

I have no doubt, therefore, that the desire to relieve this state of distress, and to remove the consequent evils occasioned by it, by the plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, was the first motive for the expedition into Portugal. The expedition, not having been founded upon any military necessity, has been carried on and persevered in against every military principle. We know that Massena could expect no immediate reinforcements; and without adverting to the various errors which I believe he would acknowledge he had committed in the course of the service, he has persevered in it, after he found that he was unable to force the troops opposed to him when posted in a strong position, and when he knew that they had one still stronger in their rear, to which they were about to retire; and that they were likely to be reinforced, while his army would be still further weakened by sickness, and by the privations to which he knew they must be liable on their march. He knew that the whole country was against him; that a considerable corps was formed upon the Douro, which would immediately operate upon his rear; that at the time of the battle of Busaco he had no longer any communication with Spain; and that every step he took farther in advance



was a step towards additional difficulty and inconvenience, from which the retreat would be almost impossible.

If the expedition into Portugal had been founded upon military principle only, it would have ended at Busaco; and I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I expected that Massena would retire from thence, or at all events would not advance beyond the Mondego. But he has continued to advance, contrary to every military principle; and I therefore conclude that the pressure of financial distresses, which was the original motive for the expedition, was that for persevering in it, and may operate upon the measures of the present moment.

In this view of the case, it is probable that Massena may endeavor to maintain his position, as long as he can keep alive any proportion of his troops, being certain that the same difficulties which induced the Emperor to undertake the expedition without any military necessity, would induce him to make every effort to reinforce him at the earliest possible period of time, and therefore that he will remain some time longer where he is.

Your Lordship is already acquainted with the means of reinforcing him. There is no doubt that, by raising the siege of Cadiz, and abandoning other unattainable objects, Massena may be reinforced to a very considerable extent.

Under these circumstances, I have frequently turned over in my mind the expediency of attacking the French army now in my front, before it should be joined by its reinforcements; and, upon the whole, I am inclined to be of opinion that I ought not to do so.

I enclose your Lordship an account of the number of battalions, squadrons, &c., which entered Portugal with Massena, and I cannot believe that they composed an army of less than 70,000 men at the battle of Busaco. I calculate their loss, including sick, since that time, at 15,000 men, which would leave them with 55,000 men, of which 6000 or 7000 are cavalry, at the present moment.

The effective strength of the British army, according to the last returns, was 29,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and one regiment at Lisbon, and one at Torres Vedras, which, in the view of the contest, ought not to be taken into the account; and I enclose a statement of the Portuguese force, according to the last returns.

Besides this force, the Marques de la Romana's corps consists of about 5000 men; making a total of 58,615, of which I could command the services, in case I should act offensively against the enemy, and of which about — would be cavalry.

Besides these troops, there are different bodies of militia, infantry and artillery, in our positions; but I should deceive myself if I could expect, and your Lordship if I should state, that any advantage would be derived from their assistance in an offensive operation against the enemy.

Although the enemy's position is not so strong as that which we occupy, there is no doubt but that it has its advantages; one of which is, that in attacking it, we could hardly use our artillery. I would also observe, that in every operation of this description by the British army in Portugal, no attempt can be made to manœuvre upon the enemy's flank or rear; first, because the enemy show they are indifferent about their flanks or rear, or

their communications ; and secondly, because the inevitable consequence of attempting such a manœuvre would be to open some one or other road to Lisbon, and to our shipping, of which the enemy would take immediate advantage to attain his object.

We must carry their positions, therefore, by main force, and consequently with loss ; and, in the course of the operations I must draw the army out of their cantonments ; I must expose the troops and horses to the inclemencies of the weather at this season of the year, and must look to all the consequences of that measure in increased sickness of the men, and in loss of efficiency and condition in horses.

I observe that, notwithstanding the length of time which has elapsed since the greatest and most efficient part of the French army has been employed against us, there is yet no other military body in the Peninsula which is capable of taking, much less of keeping, the field : and the relief of Cadiz, which appears to me to be a probable consequence of the state of affairs here, would not give us the assistance of an army from that quarter, either in the way of co-operation or of diversion ; nor would the removal of Sebastiani from Granada, which would be the consequence of the relief of Cadiz, enable Blake to make any progress beyond the Sierra Morena towards Madrid. We should still stand alone in the Peninsula as an army ; and if I should succeed in forcing Massena's positions, it would become a question whether I should be able to maintain my own, in case the enemy should march another army into this country. But, when I observe how small the superiority of numbers is in my favor, and know that the position will be in favor of the enemy, I cannot but be of opinion that I act in conformity with the instructions and intentions of His Majesty's Government, in waiting for the result of what is going on, and in incurring no extraordinary risk.

Every day's delay, at this season of the year, narrows our line of defence, and consequently strengthens it ; and when the winter shall have set in, no number, however formidable, can venture to attack it ; and the increase of the enemy's numbers at that period will only add to their distress, and increase the difficulties of their retreat.

I have thought it proper to make your Lordship acquainted with the course of my reflections upon this subject, and my present determination, which I hope will be consistent with the wishes of His Majesty's Government. Circumstances may change : the enemy's distresses for provisions, and the operations of our detachments in his rear, may induce him to detach to such a degree, as to render a general attack upon him a measure of positive advantage, in which case I shall alter my determination. But advert- ing to the necessity of placing the troops in the field in this season if I should make any attack, the advantage must be very obvious before I adopt a measure which must be attended by the consequence of losing the services of my men by sickness.'

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460.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Pero Negro, 4th Nov. 1810.

'The natural course of all popular assemblies, of the Spanish Cortes among others, is to adopt democratic principles, and to vest all the powers of the state in their own body ; and this assembly must take care that they do not



run in this tempting course, as the wishes of the nation are decidedly for a monarchy : by a monarchy alone can it be governed ; and their inclination to any other form of government, and their assumption of the power and patronage of the state into their own hands, would immediately deprive them of the confidence of the people ; and they would be a worse government, and more impotent, because more numerous than the Central Junta.'

## 461.

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

Pero Negro, 6th Nov. 1810.

' I may be wrong, but I have objections to all those rules which prevent the promotion of officers of merit. It is the abuse of the unlimited power of promotion which ought to be prevented ; but the power itself ought not to be taken, by regulation, from the Crown, or from those who do the business of the Crown. By these regulations we are undermining, as fast as possible, the efficiency of the Government. There is no power any where of rewarding extraordinary services, or extraordinary merit ; and under circumstances which require unwearied exertion in every branch and department of our military system, we appear to be framing regulations to prevent ourselves from commanding it by the only stimulus,—the honorable reward of promotion.'

G. O.

Pero Negro, 5th Nov. 1810.

' 1. The Commander of the Forces desires that when Paymasters or Quarter Masters, or other officers of regiments are sent to Lisbon on duty, they may not take detachments or non-commissioned officers and soldiers with them.

2. The depôt at Belem will always furnish the men which are required for any fatigue duty which they may require to be performed.

3. Officers and others allowed servants, who proceed to Lisbon on duty, or on account of their health, if allowed to take with them their servants, should not be allowed to retain those soldiers who are able to do their duty. There are at Belem men belonging to every regiment in the army not fit to do their duty in the field, who should be employed as servants to officers and others who, on account of duty or health, are obliged to remain at Lisbon or Belem.

4. When any officer proceeds to Lisbon with a detachment, or with only one soldier as his servant, he must make a nominal return of the detachment, or send the soldier's name to the officer commanding the depôt of convalescents at Belem.

G. O.

Pero Negro, 10th Nov. 1810.

' 1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have received reports from some of the regiments of the desertion of British soldiers to the enemy ; a crime which, in all his experience in the British service, in different parts of the world, was till lately unknown in it ; and the existence of which, at the present moment, he can attribute only to some false hopes held out to those unfortunate criminal persons.

The British soldiers cannot but be aware of the difference between their situation and that of the enemy opposed to them ; and the miserable tale told by the half starved wretches whom they see daily coming into their lines, ought alone, exclusive of their sense of honor and patriotism, to be sufficient to deter them from participating their miserable fate.

However, although the Commander of the Forces laments the fate of the unfortunate soldiers who have committed this crime, he is determined that they shall feel the consequence of it during their lives, and that they shall never return to their friends or their homes.

He accordingly requests that the commanding officers of regiments from which any soldier has deserted to the enemy, will as soon as possible send to the Adjutant General's Office a description of his person, together with an account when he was enlisted with the regiment, where born, and to what parish he belongs, in order that the friends of these soldiers may be made acquainted with the crime which they have committed ; may be prepared to consider them as lost for ever, and may deliver them up to justice in case they should ever return to their native country.'

462.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Pero Negro, 11th Nov. 1810.

‘The freedom of the press is undoubtedly a benefit, and it is difficult possibly to fix the limits beyond which it shall not go. But, if the benefit consists in the information which the press conveys to the nation and the world in general, it appears to be necessary that that information should be founded in fact, and that discussions upon the conduct of military operations, and the characters of officers who carry them on, should be founded on real knowledge of events, of the true state of affairs, of the character of the troops, and, above all, of the topography of the country which may be the seat of the operations.

I think much mischief is done in England, not only to me personally, but to the character of the army and of the country, by foolish observations upon what passes here, in all the newspapers. But in England we are accustomed to these calumnies, and to read this nonsense, which it is to be hoped makes no real impression, particularly as the same newspaper generally contradicts the first statement, or argues against the first reasoning, in the course of a short time after it has been inserted. But in Spain, a country unaccustomed to these discussions, in which all, even the best men, are objects of suspicion, and every measure is considered the result of a treasonable conspiracy, it is highly dangerous to expose men in the situation of the Marquis de la Romana to this description of calumny, and unfair statement and sophistical reasoning on his conduct. And it is particularly hard upon the individual, because, in the present situation of affairs in the Peninsula, neither he, nor his friends, nor the Government, who in this instance have approved of his conduct, can venture to defend him, because, if they do, on real grounds, they must convey information to the enemy.

There is another very forcible objection in my opinion, to subjecting officers in the situation of Romana to this description of discussion, and that is the effect which it may be expected it will have on the officers and soldiers of the armies under their command. The Spanish armies, which are neither fed, nor paid, nor clothed, cannot be kept together by the bonds of discipline, as I keep my troops; but the authority of the General and the operations of the armies depend almost entirely upon the opinion which they entertain of him, and the confidence they repose in him. Both must be shaken by this description of discussion; and I should not be at all surprised, if Romana were to inform me, on some fine day, that the opinion of his army was against his remaining here, and that he must go: as Carrera informed me, during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, that notwithstanding his opinion agreed entirely with mine, and he wished to remain with me during the campaign, the opinion of his troops would be so much against us, if we did not attempt to relieve the place, that he should be obliged to separate from me, if it should fall; and he actually marched on the evening of the day that the place surrendered. This fact shows what it is to command troops held together solely by opinion, and how dangerous these discussions must be in a country which has only an army of this description.

Romana’s junction with me in this position was founded upon two circumstances. First; the impossibility of his remaining in Estremadura, if I should be obliged to embark; and the expediency of his embarking his



troops at the same time, in order to save them for the Spanish nation. Secondly; upon the expediency of increasing, to the utmost extent that was practicable, the disposable force which I should collect in these positions.

In respect to the operations proposed for Romana in these discussions on the enemy's rear, I would observe, that the enemy have shown in this campaign, and throughout all their operations in Spain, that they are entirely indifferent as to what passes in their rear; and it is a circumstance not generally observed in the French system, and which makes them most formidable as opponents, that they invariably operate upon the flanks and rear of their enemies, but are entirely indifferent as to what passes on their own communications.

We have so much force in their rear at present, that they can have no communication with Spain excepting by large corps; and they have not attempted such a communication. The addition of the Marques de la Romana's corps to the other troops thus employed would not have increased their difficulties for subsistence, or have enabled us to press closer upon their rear, because, even if the Marques de la Romana could have ventured to place himself on the right of the Tagus, behind the enemy, he could not have ventured to place himself on the right of the Zezere. The enemy must still have had possession of the country along the right bank of the Tagus to that river, and they extend no farther now.

But if the Marques de la Romana had placed himself upon the right of the Upper Tagus by Abrantes, and we had been obliged to embark, what was to become of his corps? It must have been left behind to the mercy of the enemy, or must have made the best of its way through the mountains to the Mondego, and thence to the north of Portugal. In the mean time, the want of its services and assistance in these positions, by its absence for other objects, in a situation in which it could be of no use, might be the cause of the loss of the whole, and of the misfortune of our being obliged to withdraw.

I have written you thus much in order that you may have topics wherewith to remind your friends in the Cortes that they should not always go full gallop; they should pull the bit sometimes, or they will destroy the whole fabric which it is their object to raise, and will lose the confidence of all the wise and thinking men in Europe.'

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463.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 21st Nov. 1810.

'Having advanced from the positions in which I was enabled to bring the enemy to a stand, and to oblige them to retire without venturing upon any

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G. O.

Alenquer, 16th Nov. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that when any of the General Officers quit their quarters, if only to take a ride, they will leave at home some person to receive, open, and carry into execution any orders that may be sent to them.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests the officers commanding regiments will be very cautious in occupying the quarters in which the French troops may have been quartered, to make their men clean them well out before they sleep in them; and, if possible, to have fires lighted in them, but care must be taken not to burn the houses. These precautions will be found to contribute much to preserve the health of the soldiers.

3. The allowance of rice, which has been given to the troops lately, must of necessity be discontinued, as soon as the Assistant Commissaries shall have issued that which they have with their several brigades.'

attack, it is but justice to Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, and the officers of the Royal Engineers, to draw your Lordship's attention to the ability and diligence with which they have executed the works by which these positions have been strengthened, to such a degree, as to render any attack upon that line occupied by the allied army very doubtful, if not entirely hopeless. The enemy's army may be reinforced, and they may again induce me to think it expedient, in the existing state of affairs in the Peninsula, to resume these positions; but I do not believe they have it in their power to bring such a force against us as to render the contest a matter of doubt. We are indebted for these advantages to Lieut. Colonel Fletcher and the officers of the Royal Engineers, among whom I must particularly mention Captain Chapman, who has given me great assistance upon various occasions.

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Throughout the period during which we occupied those positions, every thing went on with the utmost regularity, and to my satisfaction, notwithstanding that the force was composed of troops of various descriptions and of different nations; and I attribute these advantages entirely to the zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and the conciliatory disposition of the chiefs and General Officers of the armies of the different nations; and I have no doubt that the same cordiality will prevail as long as it may be expedient that the armies should continue united.'

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464.

To Lieut. General Hill.

Cartaxo, 27th Nov. 1810.

'I wish that the gentlemen in Abrantes, and particularly —, would begin to have some little confidence in themselves, and in that which they have been repeatedly told; viz., that the enemy can make no serious attack upon Abrantes without sending a large force across the Tagus; that he cannot send a large corps across the Tagus without exposing himself to loss on one side or the other; that if he makes an attack upon Abrantes without sending a force across the Tagus, I must have it in my power, and will relieve and reinforce the place; and lastly, that the successful attack upon Abrantes is impracticable, if these gentlemen are of good heart and do their duty; and that the regular attack of the place, at this season of the year, is out of the question; and that the enemy are unprovided with means to undertake it.'

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465.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 29th Nov. 1810.

'It would be worth while to give Sampayo a hint that he will not improve his situation by a connexion with Mr. —. He knows that I have

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G. O.

Cartaxo, 26th Nov. 1810.

'2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers and commanding officers of regiments will take measures to prevent the soldiers from using the doors and windows, and pulling down the timbers of the houses for fire wood. The consequence will be that the soldiers will be without quarters, besides the serious injury that these practices occasion to the inhabitants of the country.'

G. O.

Cartaxo, 27th Nov. 1810.

'1. The Commander of the Forces reminds the commanding officers of regiments of the inconvenience which the troops have experienced from the want of salt occasionally during the campaign, and he urges them and the officers commanding companies, to make their men take care of the salt which they receive occasionally with their salt meat.'



always treated him handsomely, and have been disposed to give a liberal consideration to any statement of losses incurred by those who have served the army. But I will not be forced to authorise a bargain in the first instance which is inconsistent with the regulations and instructions of the Treasury, which is what Mr. —— has invariably driven at since he has turned his mind to our concerns; and the consequence of Sampayo's connexion with him will be, that he will exclude himself from them in future.

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466.

To H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

Cartaxo, 30th Nov. 1810.

'The Governors of the Kingdom will, without doubt, transmit to be laid before your Royal Highness, a detailed account of recent events and transactions in Portugal; and I should not think it necessary to trouble your Royal Highness upon this occasion, if some discussions which I have lately had with the Governors of the Kingdom had not rendered it desirable that I should make your Royal Highness acquainted with the opinions which I have entertained, and the principles on which I have acted. Your Royal Highness is informed, that till the recent change made in the Government of this country, I had the good fortune to possess the confidence and good opinion of the Governors of the Kingdom; and notwithstanding the magnitude, the variety, and the intricacy of the affairs which I had transacted with them, there had existed no difference of opinion upon any point of importance.

When the peace was made in Germany, in October, 1809, it was necessary that I should consider of the system of military operations to be carried on by the allied armies of your Royal Highness and of His Majesty, the command of which had been intrusted to me, in reference to the state of affairs in the Peninsula; to the description of the troops of which the armies were composed; and the defence of your Royal Highness' dominions. Having formed the plan in concert with Marshal Beresford, I went to Lisbon early in February last from the frontiers of Beira, purposely to communicate it to the Governors of the Kingdom, whose approbation, including that of the Patriarch, it received.

It is not necessary that I should trouble your Royal Highness with a detail of this plan. It was founded upon the fact, that the allied army under my command was the only organised body existing in the Peninsula which could keep the field against the enemy.

I considered that Lisbon and the Tagus were the sinews of your Royal Highness' Government, the point of communication with your Royal Highness' person and with His Majesty's Government; and that they were the objects which it was essential for the allies to retain, and for the enemy to get possession of.

I also considered that it was expedient, in the existing state of the war in the Peninsula, to avoid risking the fate of the whole in one general action, the result of which might, from circumstances, be doubtful. I therefore made the possession of Lisbon and the Tagus the principal object of my attention; others were considered subordinate to these, and were to be maintained or not, according to the circumstances of the moment, and to the

chance I had of success in a contest to maintain them with the force which the enemy should employ to obtain possession of them.

These principles were thoroughly understood, and were approved of, as well as the details of the plan which was founded upon them; and I have invariably acted upon these principles in all the operations which I have carried on since I have commanded the allied army.

Unfortunately, one of the gentlemen who was appointed by your Royal Highness to be a member of the new Government, in the month of \_\_\_\_\_, did not approve of the plan of operations, or of the principles on which it was founded. Possibly, when your Royal Highness appointed me to be the Marshal General of your armies, and to hold that office with all the powers and privileges which were enjoyed by the late Duque da La Foës, your Royal Highness intended that I, and not the local Government of Portugal, much less any individual member of the Government, should be responsible for the plan and conduct of the military operations. At all events, His Majesty, with the command of whose troops I am likewise intrusted, considers me responsible for the honor and safety of his army; and I could not allow any individual however respectable, to interfere in the performance of duties peculiarly and exclusively, in my opinion, my own.

The Principal Sousa, however, was of opinion, that the war ought to have been maintained, at all events, upon the frontiers of Beira; that an offensive operation ought to be carried on within the Spanish frontier; that a general action ought to be fought, at all risks; and he entertained and delivered other opinions upon the details of the operations, with which, in my judgment, he had no concern whatever.

Entertaining these opinions, both of the plan of operations which was adopted and of that which ought to have been adopted, he, by his influence over the other members of the Government, prevailed on the Government to omit and delay to carry into execution many measures recommended by me, which were calculated to aid the military operations, and to be of service to the people of the country themselves, in order to refer to me, and discuss, the propriety of adopting another system of operations which he preferred.

As it was probable that circumstances would render it advisable to bring the contest to a decision in the neighbourhood of the capital, it was necessary that the different divisions of which the army was composed should retire from the frontier; and I recommended that the people of the country should be directed to remove out of the enemy's reach, carrying with them, as far as was possible, their valuable property and what could be useful to the enemy, and rendering useless the mills. This measure had been successfully adopted in Upper Beira, under the provisions of a Proclamation issued by me on the 4th August, 1810;\* and it could be carried into execution effectually, and with convenience to the inhabitants of other parts of the country, only by being adopted at an early period; and it was recommended at an early period to the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom.

But it was delayed in respect to the country between the Tagus and the Mondego till the last moment, by various discussions, and under various pretences, and particularly because it was contended by the Principal Sousa that the war ought to be maintained on the frontier. The inhabitants con-

\* See p. 375.



sequently had not time to carry it into execution ; and the enemy have found in Portuguese Estremadura every thing which could tend to their comfort and subsistence, and to enable them to maintain their position in Portugal, notwithstanding that, as your Royal Highness is aware, the local circumstances of Portuguese Estremadura afforded means of removing these articles out of their reach, which do not exist in other parts of the country.

Although I have adopted the plan of operations, which I have followed upon mature reflection, and every day's experience convinces me of its propriety, it is possible that the Principal Sousa may be right, and I may be wrong ; and that it would have been expedient to adopt the system recommended by him, which I had thought the experience of the misfortunes in Spain had exploded. But even in this case, I contend for it, that the Governors of the Kingdom ought to have adopted without delay the measures which I recommended to them, to aid and conform to the plan of the military operations.

As I have already explained to your Royal Highness, some of the Governors of the Kingdom, including the Patriarch, approved of the plan which was adopted ; but even if they had not (and I admit that the Principal Sousa had not), it was still their duty to aid and co-operate in that plan by every means in their power, and particularly not to thwart or delay measures recommended by me. If I was wrong ; if I had showed myself incapable of executing the great trust reposed in me, the proper steps to be adopted would have been to request your Royal Highness and His Majesty to dismiss me from my command ; but as long as I continued to exercise it, the Governors of the Kingdom were bound, as honest men and well wishers to their country, to aid and co-operate with me as I recommended. By the delays occasioned by the opposition to those measures given by the Principal Sousa, they have been rendered nugatory, and parts of your Royal Highness' dominions, and some of your people are now suffering. The influence of the Principal Sousa has, in this instance, been pernicious ; and I leave it to your Royal Highness to determine, whether it is expedient that that gentleman should continue to be a member of the Government.

It is with pain that I make this appeal to your Royal Highness. I am fully aware of the patriotism and of the integrity of this gentleman, and of his connexion with persons of high rank in your Royal Highness' service and of consideration in this country. But I cannot conceal from your Royal Highness, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting business with your Government since he has been a member of it ; all confidence is at an end ; and your Royal Highness will judge whether it is possible for things to go on as they are.

It is unnecessary that I should trouble your Royal Highness upon the sentiments of each individual member of the Government, on the questions to which this letter relates. In late instances, I believe that a large majority of the members of the Government have decided at once to adopt the measures which I have recommended to them ; and have not suffered them to be delayed by farther references to me, and by the discussions proposed by the Principal Sousa ; and I am convinced, that, if this gentleman should be removed from the Government, affairs will be conducted with the same unanimity and satisfaction to me as they had been till his appointment.

I cannot conclude this letter without stating to your Royal Highness, in justice to myself, that I have never obtruded my opinion upon your Government on any subject not immediately connected with the military service, or the operations of the army, on which they have not previously desired to have it. The differences of opinion which I have had with the Government, or, more properly speaking, with Principal Sousa, have been either on subjects exclusively military or on others intimately connected with the military operations; for in nothing else do I take any concern.'

467.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 2nd Dec. 1810.

'I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of their war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz, the seat of their Government, upon having one or two more or less British regiments; and that after having been shut in for 10 months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them. The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities, that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation, till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.'

468.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 5th Dec. 1810.

'From your letter of the 3rd, I am apprehensive that my address to the Prince Regent may have involved you in some unpleasant discussions in the Regency, but after what had passed I could not avoid writing to the Prince, and it would not have been fair to transmit such a letter without sending it

G. O.

Cartaxo, 5th Dec. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers and the commanding officers of regiments will take measures to prevent the troops under their command from cutting the olive and other fruit trees for fire wood.

2. Parties on fatigue from each regiment should be sent out every morning to cut the quantity of wood required for fires; and as there is no want of fire wood in the neighbourhood of all the cantonments, there can be no occasion for cutting the olive trees for that purpose.'

G. O.

Cartaxo, 12th Dec. 1810.

2. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to learn, that notwithstanding his repeated orders, and the inconvenience which all the officers and soldiers have experienced, from the practice of burning doors and windows, and the furniture and materials of houses, it still continues, and within these few days, the furniture and doors in the quinta of the Duque da La Foës in the neighbourhood of Alcoentrinha, and Alcoentre, have been carried off and burnt.

3. The Commander of the Forces is ashamed to acknowledge, that the British troops have, in many instances, done more mischief to the country in this manner, than had been done by the enemy.

4. The necessity of repeating orders is the strongest proof of the want of discipline in the troops, and of attention in the officers, who have it in their power if they do their duty, to prevent these practices; and the Commander of the Forces declares it to be his intention to report to His Majesty, the name of the commanding officer and officers of any regiment by the soldiers of which these practices may be committed in future.'



to the Government, that they might have an opportunity of justifying themselves.'

## 469.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 15th Dec. 1810.

'From the knowledge I have of Mr. ——'s character and qualifications, I have no doubt whatever that the Spanish cause will derive advantage from his being employed to raise in Estremadura and command a legion, but my approbation of the measure of employing him goes no farther.

Although Mr. —— has talents and spirit to qualify him for such an employment, it is not fit, in my opinion, to place British Officers under his command; and so far to risk the character of the British army in this concern.

There is no doubt but that the greatest benefit would be derived from the employment of British officers with the Spanish troops; but this measure must be connected with others of reform of the Spanish military system: regular means must be adopted to feed, clothe, discipline, and pay the troops, or the efforts of these officers must fail; at the same time that their characters, as well as that of the British army, and that of the person who should approve of their being thus employed, would suffer for their failure.'

## 470.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 16th Dec. 1810.

'I have had some difficulties lately with the Spanish muleteers attached to the British army, in consequence of the general requisition which is said to be made of all individuals of the military ages for the army.

I doubt very much whether this requisition is or can be enforced; and I believe that the magistrates in the different districts are very glad to show the activity and steadiness with which they execute the law, by calling for these people, who they know will quit with reluctance the lucrative business in which they are engaged, to serve as soldiers. However, I cannot encourage them to stay away when they are called for; and I very much apprehend that the army will be reduced to the greatest distress if they should leave us, notwithstanding the pains which I have taken, and the expense which I have incurred, to have it equipped as it ought to be with the means of transport.

It appears to me that the production of a certificate from me, or Colonel Alava, or Colonel O'Lawlor, that a man is employed as a muleteer with the British army, might exempt him from service as a soldier, without any great violation of principle or any inconvenience. I do not believe that the whole number of persons of this description exceeds 500; and of these many cannot be of the military ages.

I hope some arrangement will be adopted upon this subject; and I can only say that if something is not done, and I am to be deprived of all those persons of this description who have until now been attached to this army, I shall be entirely crippled, and it will be a question whether we ought not to quit the Peninsula entirely. I doubt that even here we could exist one day without their assistance.'

471.

To Colonel Gordon.

Cartaxo, 19th Dec. 1810.

' In respect to the latter part, I believe your object, as well as mine, is the same, viz., that the British Commissariat should be efficient. My opinion agrees entirely with yours respecting the expediency of preventing the offices in the Commissariat from becoming objects of parliamentary patronage; but I am apprehensive that the regulations which have been made are efficient for that purpose only, and will not give you a good Commissariat. I know from experience that the officers who perform exceedingly well the duties of the lower ranks of the Commissariat are not of course, even after the experience of 5 years, equal to those of the higher ranks. A good clerk does not of course make a good Assistant Commissary; and upon this point I could beg to refer you to Mr. Murray for a few anecdotes of Mr. Assistant Commissary —, who was promoted because he was a good clerk.

In my last letter I never intended to complain of the incapacity of any gentleman for the duty on which he was employed; but I do not know any of the higher ranks who have talents for the performance of the duty of the Commissary General.

If it be true (and my experience teaches me that it is) that a gentleman in the lower ranks of the Commissariat, even after length of service, does not of course become qualified for the duties of the higher ranks, it follows that the regulation which requires that these gentlemen shall be promoted in their turns, according to a kind of regimental succession, after a certain number of years' service, is not the most likely to give the army an efficient Commissariat. It follows also that this regulation is likely to entail upon the public a large and useless expense, in proportion as it will be carried into execution for persons who will be useless in the higher ranks of the department to which they belong. I give you my opinion very freely upon your regulation, which, however defective, may, I admit, be necessary, in order to prevent the interference of members of parliament in the disposal of offices in the department.

There is another point to which I would refer, and that is the degree of reward for service in the Commissariat. I do not think it fair to compare the reward of any rank in the Commissariat with the reward of the same amount to the officers of the army. I am of opinion, first, that all the officers of the British army are paid too little, and much less than the officers of any other army in Europe, adverting to the mode of living in England, to the value of money, and to the reward for talents and exertions in other professions: but, secondly, officers of the army have rank and other objects to look to, to which not only a Commissary cannot aspire, but from which he is precluded; and indeed I might add, that the prejudices of society against a Commissary almost prevent him receiving the common respect due to the character of a gentleman.

In estimating the length of time which a gentleman ought to serve in the lower ranks of the Commissariat in order to obtain pay, and eventually half pay, equal in amount to that received by certain ranks in the army, we should look a little to the difference of objects and to the difference in the situa-



tions of the officers whose length of service and advantages we are comparing. However, my opinion being adverse to the regulation which requires a certain length of service for promotion in the Commissariat, and which places the officers of the Commissariat in a list of succession to claim promotion by seniority, I only advert to this last point to show you where, in my opinion, you have erred in principle in forming your plan.

My own opinion is, that the Commissariat should be formed, in respect to promotion, on the principle of a civil rather than a military establishment; that the pay and the half pay of the different officers in it should be increased in proportion to the number of years of their service; and that none should be promoted who are not recommended for promotion by the Officers in command of the troops. These, being held tolerably severely responsible for the success of their operations, will of course take care not to recommend any for promotion who do not deserve it, and who will not be of service in the higher ranks. You will thus have efficient people in the higher ranks, and no expense will be incurred that is not necessary.'

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472.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 21st Dec. 1810.

'I did not know what to say about the reduction of the number of our transports in the Tagus: I have no apprehension that we shall be obliged to embark, and no idea that the enemy will for a length of time be in a situation to oblige us to think of such an operation; but I cannot, as an Officer, be so certain of the course of events as to tell you that the transports may be withdrawn.

It may be necessary to request your attention for a few moments to explain our situation in reference to that of the enemy, and the general state of affairs in the Peninsula as affecting this question. I have no doubt that the enemy is not, and does not consider himself, able to force the position of the allies in this country. Indeed, I believe I have the means of beating the force now opposed to me, in their own position, of course with the sacrifice of a certain loss of men.

I think that the paper published in the *Moniteur* of the 23rd November shows that our position in front of Lisbon is considered so strong, as that it ought not to be attacked in front; and, from the perusal of that paper, I am of opinion that the enemy will endeavor to maintain a position in this country with the troops now in it, probably reinforced by some of those now on the frontier, and will endeavor to dislodge us by occupying the countries north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, and thus distress us for supplies. The accomplishment of this plan will require an enormous force and some length of time; but when I recollect that in the last year the whole of the north of Spain, and of Old Castille, were abandoned by the enemy, even before the battle of Talavera, I cannot doubt that they will abandon those countries likewise upon the existing emergency, which will give them a part of the force they require.

I am also certain that, if the British army should not be obliged to evacuate Portugal, the French army must withdraw from Andalusia. I think it not improbable, therefore, that a large part of it, if not the whole of the

French army in Andalusia, will be introduced into the southern parts of this kingdom.

I do not despair of holding my ground against this accumulation of force, and I have taken measures to prevent the only inconvenience which it can produce, viz., a deficiency of supplies. But as these troops are all within a few marches of me, and an order from Paris would not only put them in motion, but they could be in this country almost before the transports could arrive in England, I cannot think it advisable, in the existing situation of affairs, to send them out of my reach.

The question whether I should attack the enemy in the position which he now occupies has been well considered by me. I have a superior army, I think, by 10,000 men, or one sixth, including the Spaniards; and, notwithstanding some defects in its composition, I think I should succeed. But the loss must necessarily be very great in killed and wounded; and the necessity which would exist of exposing the troops to the weather for some days and nights would throw a great proportion of this convalescent army into the hospital. Then what is to be gained in this action, in which failure would be the loss of the whole cause? Nothing at present that I know of, excepting to relieve the northern provinces and Andalusia from the presence of the enemy; which relief it is probable that the course of events will bring about, without the risk and loss of an action.

But there is another view of this question, which is a very serious one, and has made much impression upon my mind. If the northern provinces of Spain and Andalusia should be relieved from the pressure and presence of the enemy by the course of events, or by exertions in Portugal, what will the cause gain by this relief? In the last year I cannot forget that I brought upon myself and General Cuesta not less than 5 *corps d'armée*, and the King's guards and reserve, more than equal to a 6th corps; and that when the whole of Castille and the north of Spain was cleared of the enemy, not a man was put in the field by those provinces, nor even one raised!

In this year I have had 3 *corps d'armée*, the most numerous and efficient in Spain, upon my hands for 8 months. The kingdom of Galicia has been entirely free from the enemy, and Castille partially relieved. The Spanish army in Galicia have made no movement whatever, as General Mahy says, for want of great coats; but in fact, because they want pay, clothing, means of subsistence, transport, discipline, and every thing which can keep a body of men together in an operation. In Castille nothing has been done, excepting that the guerrillas have been more daring and successful in their robberies.

The relief of Andalusia would, I fear, make no difference in the situation of affairs there. I do not think it quite certain that the enemy would be obliged to raise the siege of Cadiz, although it is probable that he would. But if the siege of Cadiz were not raised, the general cause would derive no advantage from the relief of Andalusia; and even if the raising the siege of Cadiz were the consequence of the relief of Andalusia, I doubt that there are means at Cadiz of putting into the field the troops now composing the garrison of that place, so as to render them a disposable force for the cause of the allies, or that any benefit would be derived from that event, excepting that it would place at the disposal of the allies the means which the enemy



have collected for the siege of Cadiz, and retard, and probably prevent, the operation.

Your Lordship will probably deem this a melancholy picture of prospect, in the Peninsula, but you may rely upon its truth. This state of affairs in Spain is the result of some defects in the national character, aggravated by the false principles on which all the affairs of the country have been conducted since it attempted to shake off the yoke of France. The Spaniards have consequently no army; no means of raising one; no authority to discipline an army if they could raise one; no means to arm, equip, clothe, or feed any thing which could be collected under that name. The war in the Peninsula, therefore, as far as the Spaniards are concerned in it, cannot take a regular shape. It must be confined to the operations of the guerrillas, upon which the calculations are very different from those which would be made in respect to the operations of a more regular force.

If all this be true, our business is not to fight the French army, which we certainly cannot beat out of the Peninsula, but to give occupation to as large a portion of it as we can manage, and to leave the war in Spain to the guerrillas. As long as the French do not interfere with our supplies, or the resources of the Portuguese Government, or any point of our security, I think it very immaterial whether they are in Spain or Portugal. Indeed, advert- ing to the greater difficulties they have in subsisting in the latter country and in keeping up their communications, I believe it is more advantageous that they should be where they are. Their numbers are certainly diminishing daily, while they do us no mischief; on the contrary, we are nearer to our resources than ever we were, and they leave the whole of the north of Spain open to the operations of the guerrillas.

But if the army now in Portugal is to be assisted by other corps, operating north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, before I can have secured the supplies of provisions I require, I must then seek to dislodge them by more determined means than I have tried hitherto. These means, God knows, may fail; or I may be prevented from trying them by the weather, or by other circumstances over which I can have no control. In all these cases it would be terrible not to have transports at hand, and I cannot advise that they should be sent away.

It is certainly astonishing that the enemy have been able to remain in this country so long; and it is an extraordinary instance of what a French army can do. It is positively a fact that they brought no provisions with them, and they have not received even a letter since they entered Portugal. With all our money, and having in our favor the good inclinations of the country, I assure you that I could not maintain one division in the district in which they have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals for more than 2 months. This time last year I was obliged to move the British cavalry only from the district which they now occupy with their whole army, because it could not be subsisted. But they take every thing, and leave the unfortunate inhabitants to starve.'

G. O.

Cartaxo, 23rd Dec. 1810.

'1. The Commander of the Forces has frequently been obliged to request the officers of the army would not shoot the deer in the Royal or other parks, without having leave to do so; but he is concerned to learn, that the practice still continues in a great degree, in the Duchess da La Foés' park, near the cantonments of the army.

## 473.

To Major General the Hon. C. Colville.

Cartaxo, 27th Dec. 1810.

‘ I have to observe, in respect to the second plea, that the officer styled “ Provost Marshal,” in the sentence of the Court, is the Assistant Provost attached to the division, (whose evidence, by the bye, Surgeon —— might have produced to the Court preferably to that of his trumpeter,) whose business it is to enforce the orders of the army, and preserve discipline among the soldiers and their followers, and not to administer justice between the officers of the army and the inhabitants of the country, nor to act as counsel to the officers of the army. The Assistant Provosts are not commissioned officers; and the General Court Martial will, by this part of their sentence, give them an authority in the concerns of the officers of the army which they certainly do not otherwise possess.

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It gives me much concern to differ with this General Court Martial; and as several of the officers composing it have but lately joined this army, I shall conclude this address by assuring them that I have no personal knowledge of Surgeon ——; that I brought him to trial before a General Court Martial, as an act of duty, almost exclusively upon his own statement; and that, as far as he is concerned, I am indifferent as to the result.

I have a feeling, however, for the honor of the army and for the character of the country for justice; and I hope that the members of this General Court Martial will see the necessity of supporting the discipline and character of the army, by marking their own disapprobation of the transaction which has been brought under their consideration.’

## 474.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 27th Dec. 1810.

‘ You are quite right in tracing all the failures of the Government to the want of money, which want could be supplied, I am convinced, by the means in their own power; but they will do nothing unless forced. I am very much dissatisfied with them; and unless they adopt a new system entirely, I shall state my opinion to our own Government that the war cannot be carried on as long as things remain as they are.’

## 475.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 29th Dec. 1810.

‘ I have before informed your Lordship that it was my opinion that plunder was the original motive for the expedition into Portugal; and it is that for its continuance against every military principle, and at an immense sacri-

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2. The Commander of the Forces will avoid to name the regiments, by the officers of which this has been done; but he requests those officers to reflect, that their continuing to shoot the deer in these parks, is not only a breach of military discipline, but shows an entire forgetfulness of the rights of property, which they would be obliged to respect in their own country, and which they ought to respect in this, where every individual of the British army has been so well treated.

3. The Commander of the Forces is not desirous of preventing the officers of the army from amusing themselves, in any manner they may think proper, or which may be consistent with their duty, but he requests them to respect the parks and preserves of the Prince, and other inhabitants.’



fice of men. Whatever may be Massena's opinion of his chance of success in an attack upon the allied army, I am convinced he will make it if he receives the order from Paris, whatever may be the amount of the reinforcement which will be sent to him.

Under these circumstances, and having such an enemy to contend with, and knowing as I do, that there is no army in the Peninsula capable of contending with the enemy, excepting that under my command; that there are no means of repairing any large losses I may sustain; and that any success acquired by a large sacrifice of men would be followed by the most disastrous consequences to the cause of the allies, I have determined to persevere in the system which has hitherto saved all, and which I hope must end in the defeat of the enemy. Parts of Portugal have suffered, and continue to suffer from the invasion; but their sufferings have been occasioned in a great degree, and have been aggravated in every case, by the neglect or delay to adopt measures which I had recommended; and at all events, it is better that a part of the country should suffer than that the whole should be lost.

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Upon the whole, I entertain no doubt of the final success of the measures which I am carrying on; and, at all events, I am certain that they are the only measures which can be entirely successful.'

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476.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 31st Dec. 1810.

'I have received your letter of the 30th December. I have already had great difficulty in arranging the business of quartering the officers of the army at Lisbon, and have given orders upon this subject in respect to that town and other parts of Portugal, of which I enclose copies. I cannot be certain that these orders have in every instance been obeyed; but it is difficult to have orders obeyed by the officers which affect their own convenience, when the inhabitants of the towns do not attend to any regulations upon the same subject; and I receive innumerable complaints, particularly of the conduct of the inhabitants of Lisbon.

In respect to Dom M. Forjaz's regulations, they look very well upon paper, but who will attend to them; The officers of the British army in England are not billeted upon private houses, but upon inns. There is not an inn in Portugal, in which an officer could be billeted, and it would follow that, owing to the deficiency of inns, the officers must go into the streets. The soldiers also, where there are no convents to cover them, must be exposed to the open air, because there are no public houses in which they can be billeted: but Dom M. Forjaz will probably have no objection to their being billeted where we like in the country, contrary to the proposed regulation and our own law, which is to be introduced here, provided Lisbon is not disturbed by either officers or soldiers! I do not see what further steps I can take in the business; and I only desire that when my order is disobeyed complaint may be made, stating the name of the person, and that the complainant may be prepared to prove his story before a Court Martial.

I declare that I think it disgraceful to the Portuguese Government, and to the people of Lisbon in particular, that such a proposition should have been

made as has come from Dom M. Forjaz. They have now part of one battalion in Lisbon, and some convalescents at Belem; some of the officers attached to whom must be lodged in the town. They have besides some sick and wounded officers there, and occasionally a regiment passes a night or two in Lisbon, when it lands from England or from Cadiz. Are the people of Lisbon so inhospitable that the officers of these corps must be put, on their landing, into cold, damp, and dark empty houses, without the chance of getting any thing to eat? Is there an inn or tavern at Lisbon to which an officer can go in such circumstances?

But I forgot, the General Officers of the army, those upon the staff, the officers of the Guards (for the others can but ill afford the expense), do occasionally go to Lisbon for a day or two for their amusement. Is Dom M. Forjaz serious in expressing a wish that officers of this description should go into empty houses, or into the street? Is this the mode in which the cause of Portugal is to be made popular in the British army? Is every consideration to be sacrificed to the caprice and ease of the people of Lisbon? Are officers of this class, and I and Marshal Beresford, to be provided with a lodging upon billet; but the others who go there upon duty, and who can less afford, or bear the hardship, be put into the empty houses or into the street? For my part, I do not go often to Lisbon; but if the rule is made for one class it must for all, and I will have no lodging upon billet any more than any other officer of the army. The circumstances stated by Dom M. Forjaz, respecting the mode of lodging the British officers formerly, suit neither the circumstances of the army, nor of the times. I declare that I have no patience with the constant efforts which I see made by the Government to indulge the caprice and ease of the people of Lisbon, at the expense of every other consideration; and they prefer to have recourse to any expedients rather than oblige them to do what they dislike, which is, when they make a complaint of an officer, to appear before a Court and prove it.'

477.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 3rd Jan. 1811.

'I never entertained a doubt that Dom M. Forjaz would make the best arrangement, and give all the necessary orders for the performance of any service: but there exists in the people of Portugal an unconquerable love of

G. O.

Cartaxo, 2nd Jan. 1811.

2. The Commander of the Forces experiences great difficulty in expressing his sense of the conduct of Surgeon ———, 2nd batt. —th regt., consistently with the respect which is due to the opinion of the General Court Martial by which he was tried.

3. The Commander of the Forces has frequently urged the officers and soldiers of the army to treat kindly the inhabitants of this country, from whom they have received every assistance, and upon every occasion the most cordial good treatment. But Surgeon ———, forgetful of these orders, and of the common justice due from one man to another, confined Germano Baretta, in the regimental guard house, contrary to the orders of the army, and the laws of this and every other civilised country.

4. The officers and soldiers of the army are again warned, that they have no more right to confine in a military guard, an inhabitant of Portugal, than they would have, to confine one of His Majesty's subjects in Great Britain, and he forbids the practice.

5. The release of Germano Baretta, without orders from the commanding officer of the regiment, was as unmilitary a proceeding, as his confinement in the guard house was improper;—and for the whole of this conduct, the Commander of the Forces directs that this reprimand may be read to Surgeon ———, at the head of the troops stationed at Torres Vedras.'



their ease, which is superior even to their fear and detestation of the enemy. Neither will they, or their magistrates, or the Government, see that the temporary indulgence of this passion for tranquillity must occasion the greatest misfortunes to the state and hardships to the individuals themselves; and no person in the country likes to have his tranquillity and habits disturbed for any purpose, however important, or to be the instrument of disturbing those of others. Thus every arrangement is defeated, and every order disobeyed with impunity. The magistrate will not force the inhabitants to adopt a measure, however beneficial to the state and himself, which will disturb his old habits; and the Government will not force the magistrate to do that which will be disagreeable to him and to the people: thus we shall go on to the end of time.'

478.

To P. Rawlings, Esq., Dep. Com. Gen.

Cartaxo, 4th Jan. 1811.

'It is expected from every officer at the head of an army, that he will oblige the officers attached to the several departments to do their duty, and that he will not allow them to absent themselves excepting for sufficient cause. The public acknowledge no cause sufficient for the absence of any officer from his duty, excepting health, which must be certified by the regular medical authorities.

Besides this cause of absence, I have admitted of another in this army, which I believe never before was admitted in an army upon actual service, and for which I am scarcely justifiable; and that is, business, the settlement of which requires the presence of the officer in England, and is paramount to every other consideration in life.'

479.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 5th Jan. 1811.

'My opinion is, that there is a plot on foot against the English, at the head of which are the Bishop and Sousa; and that they want to be able to show that they protested against our pretensions to command their army. I think also that the continued absence of the Bishop and Sousa from the Council is in consequence, or rather a branch of this plot. The Bishop has, I understand, absented himself since the day on which it was agreed to new model and increase the taxes, and to introduce various economical reforms into the different departments of the Government. We may depend upon it that neither the one nor the other, however beneficial to the country, can be effected without creating much discontent, particularly among those who will be the objects of the reforms, or from whose pockets the increased taxes will be taken. This discontent will spread to those who (although they may not feel the effects of these measures, excepting in the general good they will do) feel the distresses of the times, or pretend they suffer from the existing situation of affairs.

The Bishop and Sousa, and the anti-Anglican party, will take advantage of this discontent to point out their own differences with us upon military and other measures. They desire to prevent us from assuming the exclusive control over the national army; and their absence from the Council, after they found that we were determined to increase the burthens of the people,

and to dismiss the old servants of the Government: all this will go to the ruin of the country, I acknowledge; but what is there that ambition and folly will not meditate and undertake!

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480.

To Dr. Frank.

Cartaxo, 7th Jan. 1811.

‘I hope that the opinions of the people in Great Britain are not influenced by paragraphs in newspapers, and that those paragraphs do not convey the public opinion or sentiment upon any subject. Therefore I (who have more reason than any other public man of the present day to complain of libels of this description) never take the smallest notice of them; and have never authorised any contradiction to be given, or any statement to be made in answer to the innumerable falsehoods, and the heaps of false reasoning, which have been published respecting me and the operations which I have directed.

I admit, however, that others may entertain a different opinion of the effect of these libels, and that they may not have nerves or temper to hear or to see their conduct misrepresented and their actions vilified; and if you should not be convinced that these paragraphs have made no impression, and are not the representation of the public opinion in England, I have no objection to your making any use you think proper of this and my former letters; and you may be assured that I shall be happy to avail myself of every opportunity of bearing testimony to the zeal, ability, and success with which the duties of the medical department of this army have been invariably carried on under your superintendence.’

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481.

To T. Rowcroft, Esq.

Cartaxo, 11th Jan. 1811.

‘You will observe that this state of things is very different from that which has been represented in the newspapers, which have undoubtedly been the cause that I have been honored with a letter from you. But the British public have been deceived on this, as well as on many other subjects relating to this country, by their newspapers. I am, however, much obliged to you for the interest you take in our concerns; and I shall communicate your letter to the proper authorities, in order that advantage may be taken of the information it affords, if circumstances should change.’

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482.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 13th Jan. 1811.

‘That is the neglect of duty of which I complain, and which, in the usual course, remains unpunished and even unnoticed.

The danger which I have long foreseen, and of which I have frequently warned the Portuguese Government, is now approaching the province of Alentejo, and I am apprehensive that it is but little prepared for it.

It is really impossible for me to send British officers to perform the duties of the officers of the civil Government. All that I can do is to form the best military system I can, for the defence of the country, with the means which are in my power, and to suggest to the Government those measures to be carried into execution by the civil authorities to correspond with the military operations, either in the way of supplying our own troops, or of with-



drawing supplies from the grasp of the enemy, or of saving the persons and moveable and valuable property of the inhabitants of the country, whose safety would be exposed by the course of the operations. It rests with the civil Government to adopt or reject these suggestions, and to carry them into execution by their own officers, if they adopt them.

It is quite impossible for me to interfere in any manner in the execution of these measures, notwithstanding that the neglect of them must give me the greatest concern.'

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483.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 16th Jan. 1811.

'There is something very extraordinary in the nature of the people of the Peninsula. I really believe them, those of Portugal particularly, to be the most loyal and best disposed, and the most cordial haters of the French, that ever existed: but there is an indolence and a want even of the power of exertion in their disposition and habits, either for their own security, that of their country, or of their allies, which baffle all our calculations and efforts.'

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484.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 18th Jan. 1811.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th inst., to the greater part of which I shall give an answer at a future opportunity; but it is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the Portuguese Government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the meetings of the Regency.

It appears that his Eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, "which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the Kingdom." It must be recollected that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly: they can scarcely be deemed of the nature of those of a ministerial council; but they are those of the persons whom H. R. H. the Prince Regent has called to govern his Kingdom, in the existing crisis of his affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his Eminence the Patriarch as one of those in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices ought to be made, provided the Kingdom could preserve its independence; and I think it most important that the British Government, and the Government of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived if we have been hitherto mistaken.

His Eminence objects to the adoption of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds for the maintenance of His Royal Highness' armies, because a war may exist in the heart of the Kingdom; but I am apprehensive that the Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered this Kingdom in the year 1807; that in which they were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it, in 1808; and that they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the Kingdom, in 1809; and the mode in which they were expelled from those provinces.

He forgets that it was stated to him, in the month of February, 1810, in presence of the Marquez d'Olhão, of Senhor Dom M. Forjaz, and of Senhor Dom J. A. Salter de Mendouça, and of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, that it

was probable that the enemy would invade this Kingdom with such an army as that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any chance of success; and that this concentration could be made with safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only; and that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him, which went to bring the enemy into the heart of the Kingdom; and that he expressed before these persons his high approbation of it.

If he recollected these circumstances, he would observe that nothing had occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, whose consequences he now disapproves.

The Portuguese nation are involved in a war, not of aggression or even defence on their part, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political system; for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems, in order to propitiate the enemy: the inhabitants of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant, whose Government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and properties. They chose this lot for themselves, principally at the instigation of his Eminence the Patriarch; and they called upon His Majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal (whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy), to aid them in the glorious effort which they wished to make to restore the independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants.

I shall not state the manner in which His Majesty has answered this call, nor enumerate the services rendered to this nation by his army. Whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget them: but when a nation have adopted the line of resistance to the tyrant, under the circumstances under which it was unanimously adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the miseries of war, or that their Government act consistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, "which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the Kingdom." The Patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions, which have principally involved his country in this contest, when he talks of discontinuing it, because it has again, for the third time, been brought "into the heart of the Kingdom."

Although the Patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing Government, approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, according to which it was probable that this Kingdom would be made the seat of the war, which has since occurred, I admit that his Eminence, or any of those members, may fairly disapprove of the operations of the campaign and of the continuance of the enemy in Portugal.

I have pointed out to the Portuguese Government, in more than one dispatch, the difficulties and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy's position in this country; and the probable success, not only to ourselves, but to our allies, of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description; and their army is at this moment more



complete than it was at the opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have suffered, and are continuing to suffer: but, without entering into discussions, which I wish to avoid upon this occasion, I repeat that, if my counsel had been followed, those sufferings would at least have been alleviated; and I observe that it is the first time that I have heard that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part, of any nation have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which has for its object the deliverance of the whole.

The Patriarch may, however, disapprove of the system which I have followed; and I conceive that he is fully justified in desiring His Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of their armies. This would be a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion; but this measure is entirely distinct from his refusal to concur in laying those burthens on the people, which are necessary to carry on and secure the objects of the war.

It must be obvious to his Eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of the affairs of Portugal, that, unless a great effort is made by the Government to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure, all plans and systems of operations will be alike; for the Portuguese army will be able to carry on none. At this moment, although all the corps are concentrated in the neighbourhood of their magazines, with means of transport easy by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions, because there is no money to defray the expenses of transport; and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure and to perform their duty. These deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army; and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, stores, and funds destined for the maintenance of the British army. It may likewise occur to his Eminence, that, in proportion as operations of the armies would be more extended, the expense would increase; and the necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become more urgent, unless indeed the course of these operations should annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objections, then, to adopt measures to improve the resources of the Government, go to decide the question whether the war shall be carried on, or not, in any manner.

By desiring His Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of their armies, his Eminence would endeavor to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of the country, he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up the independence of his country, and the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation.

In my opinion, the Patriarch is in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, on the part of His Majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the funds to enable this country to carry on the war. At all events,

I request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency ; and that a copy of it may be forwarded to H. R. H. the Prince Regent, in order that His Royal Highness may see that I have given his Eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives, either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes in respect to the independence of his country.'

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485.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 23rd Jan. 1811.

'It appears that these three gentlemen carried on a very active private correspondence in the course of the last summer, in which each of them appears to have delivered his opinion in very free terms of his neighbour. This conduct is very blameable, and these gentlemen might as well have spent their time in a manner more advantageous to the public.

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I do not think it proper to employ the time of the officers of the army in investigating the truth or falsehood of all the nonsense which these letters contain, nor even whether Dr. ——— deserved the appellation of a Judas among the doctors attached to the Portuguese army, which has been applied to him ; nor do I think it expedient to expose to the Portuguese army and to the world in Portugal, by such an investigation, the weakness and the little futility of the disputes of those who, to be of any use to them, or to do credit to the British army and to their own country, must command the respect of the natives of this.

In my opinion, these gentlemen should be desired to reconcile their differences, and to carry on the service together as men ought who make the good of the service their object. I am also of opinion that you should recommend to the Prince Regent to dismiss from his service the gentleman who does not attend to this admonition ; and you may depend upon it, that I shall take care not to admit such a firebrand into the medical department attached to this army.'

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486.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 23rd Jan. 1811.

'But before they carry this determination into execution, it is necessary to be just : it is necessary to put a stop to the system of violence, which unfortunately prevails under the authority of the Government, and to provide means of paying the poor man, whose boat, whose cart, or whose mule is required for the public service, and whose time might otherwise be profitably employed.

My own opinion is, that the existing law is the best and fairest that could be devised ; and I declare most solemnly that I believe it has not in any one instance been infringed by the British Commissariat, and that we have practically got rid of the odious system of embargo. When it is considered that the British Commissary General feeds the Spanish army and the Portuguese militia in the Lines, besides the whole British army, and that he affords not a little occasional assistance to the Portuguese regular troops, it may be doubted whether he employs more boats than are necessary to him. I shall, however, make inquiry upon this subject, and shall direct him to discharge from the service as many as can be spared.

I cannot conclude this subject without reflecting upon the practical proof,



which this discussion affords, of the impracticability of carrying on the war elsewhere than in the heart of the Kingdom. The records of Dom M. Forjaz's office must contain many discussions on this same subject. When the army was on the Mondego the same difficulties occurred, the Portuguese troops were frequently in want, and the same discussions took place.

The troops are now upon the Tagus, with the supplies of the whole world open to them, and with water communication almost to their cantonments, and yet difficulties are experienced, and the Portuguese troops are not regularly supplied. It must occur to any man who has any knowledge of military affairs, that, till resources are found to defray the necessary expenses of the army, these difficulties must occur; and must increase in proportion as the troops are further removed from their magazines and from the convenience of water carriage.'

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 487.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 24th Jan. 1811.

'I must observe upon all this, that if nobody is to remain in a situation which he does not like, or is to do only what he likes, we have undertaken a task which is too great for us. But I declare that, notwithstanding all my practice, I have not health or spirits to go through all the difficulties of carrying on the service, crossed and thwarted as it is by the wants of the Portuguese and Spanish armies; the obstinacy with which they persevere in opposing and rendering fruitless all measures to set them right or save them; and the difficulties thrown in the way by our own Government and Officers.'

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 488.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 24th Jan. 1811.

'The organization of this army has been formed upon certain principles of general convenience, as I believe you are aware, and it is desirable that it should not be altered upon light grounds, particularly without reference to head quarters.'

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 489.

To General Mendizabal.

Cartaxo, 24th Jan. 1811.

You will have been made acquainted with the irreparable loss sustained by the Spanish army, by your country, and the world, by the unexpected death of the Marques de la Romana yesterday, after a short illness. I have lost a colleague, a friend, and an adviser, with whom I had lived on the happiest terms, of friendship, intimacy, and confidence; and I shall revere and regret his memory to the last moment of my existence. During his indisposition I had frequent conversations with him on the situation of affairs in Estremadura, and by his desire I put my opinions in writing in the form of a memorandum, in order to give him a more convenient opportunity of considering them. He transmitted this memorandum to you, and I earnestly recommend it to your attention.

Although we are both placed in an arduous situation, I have no doubt that, by prudent management and by a cordial union of views and actions, we shall extricate ourselves from all our difficulties; and you may depend upon my disposition to communicate with you with the same frankness and sincerity as I did with your respectable predecessor, and to give you such assistance as the means in my power will enable me to afford.'

490.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 26th Jan. 1811.

‘ It may also be asked why we should spend our money, and why these troops should not go on as the French troops do, without pay, provisions, magazines, or any thing? The answer to this question is as long as what I have already written. The French army is certainly a wonderful machine; but if we are to form such a one, we must form such a Government as exists in France, which can with impunity lose one half of the troops employed in the field every year, only by the privations and hardships imposed upon them. Next, we must compose our army of soldiers drawn from all classes of the population of the country; from the good and middling, well as in rank as in education, as from the bad; and not as all other nations, and we in particular, do, from the bad only. Thirdly, we must establish such a system of discipline as the French have; a system founded upon the strength of the tyranny of the Government, which operates upon an army composed of soldiers, the majority of whom are sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.

When we shall have done all this, and shall have made these armies of the strength of those employed by the French, we may require of them to live as the French do, viz., by authorised and regulated plunder of the country and its inhabitants, if any should remain; and we may expose them to the labor, hardships, and privations which the French soldier suffers every day; and we must expect the same proportion of loss every campaign, viz., one half of those who take the field.

This plan is not proposed for the British army, nor has it yet been practised in any great degree by the Portuguese; but I shall state the effect which, in my opinion, the attempt has had upon the Spaniards.

There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army, among either officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as indeed it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It has, in my opinion, been the cause of the dastardly conduct which we have so frequently witnessed in the Spanish troops; and they have become odious to their country; and the peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph’s Government, to be protected from the outrages of their own troops. These armies, therefore, must be paid and supported, if any service is expected from them; and at present, at least, I see no chance of their being paid, except by British assistance.

There is but little that is new in this letter; but the subject to which it relates requires the early consideration, decision, and interference of the British Government, or the cause must suffer.’

491.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 26th Jan. 1811.

‘ I am concerned to have to report to your Lordship that the Marques de la Romana died in this town on the 23rd instant, after a short illness. His talents, his virtues, and his patriotism were well known to His Majesty’s Government. In him the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall



always acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I received from him, as well by his operations as by his counsel, since he had been joined with this army.'

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 492.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

'I see no reason why I should depart from the rule which I have laid down for myself in these cases. Officers (General Officers in particular) are the best judges of their own private concerns; and, although my own opinion is that there is no private concern that cannot be settled by instruction and power of attorney, and that after all is not settled in this manner, I cannot refuse leave of absence to those who come to say that their business is of a nature that requires their personal superintendence. But entertaining these opinions, it is rather too much that I should not only give leave of absence, but approve of the absence of any, particularly a General Officer, from the army.

It is certainly the greatest inconvenience to the service that officers should absent themselves as they do, each of them requiring, at the same time, that when it shall be convenient to return he shall find himself in the same situation as when he left the army. In the mean time, who is to do the duty? How am I to be responsible for the army? Is Colonel —— a proper substitute for General Craufurd in the command of our advanced posts? or General —— for Sir S. Cotton in command of the cavalry?

I may be obliged to consent to the absence of an officer, but I cannot approve of it. I repeat that you know the situation of affairs as well as I do, and you have my leave to go to England, if you think proper.'

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 493.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

'I think the Portuguese Government are still looking to assistance from England, and I have written to the King's Government strongly upon the subject in their favor. But I should deceive myself if I believed we should get any thing, and them if I were to tell them we should. They must, therefore, look to their own resources. I shall not enter upon the political crisis now existing in England; but I believe you will agree with me that, if the change which is probable should be made, the chance is less than it was.

It is quite nonsense their quarrelling with me, whether the system of operations I have followed was the best or not. I believe I am not only the best, but the only friend they have ever had, who has had the power of supporting them for a moment in England; and I now tell them that the only chance they have is to endeavor to bring their revenue equal to their expenses. It is ridiculous to talk of the efforts they have made. They have, hitherto, produced neither men in proportion to their population, nor money in proportion to their commerce and riches, nor by any means in proportion to their gains by the war. They talk of the war in their country: was Portugal ever involved seriously in any war without having it in the heart of the country? I think I can save them from their enemy, if they will make

an exertion to maintain their army; but they are now come to that situation between the enemy, the people, and us, that they must decide either to raise an adequate revenue from the people, in earnest, or to give themselves over to the enemy.

Now, upon this point, I can only tell them one thing; and that is, that although they may find causes for not levying a revenue upon the people to continue the contest against the enemy, the enemy will allow of none for not raising every shilling that can be drawn from the people, when they may come into possession. They should have thought of the miseries endured by the people, which they describe so feelingly, before they commenced the war; though, by the bye, I would observe upon these miseries, that the enemy occupy only a part of one province, and that they had only passed through another: this is bad enough, God knows! but is better than that the whole should be in their possession, as it was, and as it will be, if a real effort is not made.

I shall be obliged to you if you will mention these sentiments to Dom M. Forjaz and Salter, and others in the Regency, who are well inclined, but are not aware of their real situation, or exactly equal to surmount its difficulties.'

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494.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

'In respect to recruiting the army, my own opinion is that the Government have never taken an enlarged view of the subject. It is expected that people will become soldiers in the line, and leave their families to starve, when, if they become soldiers in the militia, their families are provided for. This is an inconsistency that must strike the mind of even the least reflecting of mankind. What is the consequence? That none but the worst description of men enter the regular service.

\* \* \* \* \*

But admitting the truth of the expense, I say that the country has not a choice between army and no army, between peace or war. They must have a large and efficient army, one capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or they must expect to meet him at home; and then farewell to all considerations of measures of greater or lesser expense, and to the ease, the luxury, and happiness of England. God forbid that I should see the day on which hostile armies should contend within the United Kingdom; but I am very certain that I shall not only see that day, but shall be a party in the contest, unless we alter our system, and the public feel in time the real nature of the contest in which we are at present engaged, and determine to meet its expense. I have gone a little beyond the question of recruiting; but depend upon it that you will get men when you provide for the families of soldiers in the line and not in the militia, and not before.

\* \* \* \* \*

P.S. I am much annoyed by the General and other Officers of the army going home. They come to me to ask leave of absence, under pretence of business, which they say it is important to them to transact; and indeed I go so far as to make them declare that it is paramount to every other consideration in life. At the same time, I know that many of them have no business, and that there is no business which cannot be, and that every



business is, transacted by instruction and power of attorney. But how is leave to be refused upon such an application? I shall be very much obliged to you, however, if you will tell any General Officer who may come out in future, to settle all his business before he comes out, for that he will get no leave to go home. The inconvenience of their going is terrible, and the detail it throws upon me greater than I can well manage; for I am first to instruct one, then a second, and afterwards, upon his return, the first again, upon every duty. At this moment we have 7 General Officers gone or going home; and, excepting myself, there is not one in the country who came out with the army, excepting General Alex. Campbell, who was all last winter in England.'

495.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 29th Jan. 1811.

'Government are really in earnest in sending Officers to serve with the Spaniards under Colonel Downie; and they appear inclined to say that this measure is adopted in consequence of my approbation of it, notwithstanding my protest, which I showed you.'

496.

To General Don Martin de la Carrera.

Cartaxo, 30th Jan. 1811.

'I earnestly recommend to you the greatest attention to preserve good order among your troops. There is no reason why they should plunder the country under existing circumstances; and the warfare between them and the Portuguese peasantry, which will be the consequence of such conduct, will be the greatest misfortune that can happen to us.'

497.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 2nd Feb. 1811.

'Unfortunately, answers and returns from the *Junta de Viveres* are not provisions! I have never yet made a complaint to the Portuguese Government that I did not receive in answer volumes of papers.

If they mean to dispute the facts stated, by the Officers commanding the troops through me, by these returns, which do not bear upon the question at all, it is useless for me, and I shall discontinue, to give myself any further trouble about the matter. They might just as well pretend that the paper was provision, as that it contained any reasonable answer to the complaints; and the framing and writing them only takes up the time of the clerks, and increases your trouble and mine.'

498.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 2nd Feb. 1811.

'It is impossible for me to say what will be the effect of such an arrangement now. It will certainly not answer any purpose whatever, excepting to throw upon me additional trouble, and the blame and odium of certain ultimate failure, if measures are not taken to feed and pay the Spanish troops. If these measures are taken, some advantage would undoubtedly be derived to the cause, from combining in one system, at least, all the troops on this side of the Peninsula.'

I shall answer, if this offer should be made, that I cannot take upon me such a charge without the consent of His Majesty; and that, at all events, I am convinced that no good can result from the arrangement, unless effectual measures should be adopted to feed, pay, clothe, and discipline the Spanish troops; that I have been in the habit of constant communication with the General Officers commanding the Spanish troops, and have obtruded my opinions upon them occasionally; that I shall continue to do so; and that the offer which has been made to me of the command by the Government will probably give more weight to my recommendations than they have had hitherto; but that the acceptance of the command must depend upon His Majesty's commands. This will leave the question open for the decision of Government; and in the mean time I request to have, by return of post, your Lordship's direction what I shall do, if this offer should be made.'

499.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 4th Feb. 1811.

'A very trifling degree of education and practice will enable an Officer to string together a few words in a letter, in a manner and conveying a meaning which a superior cannot and an inferior will be unwilling to bear. But this ability is a most dangerous qualification to the possessor, unless he has sense to guide his pen, and discretion to restrain him from the use of intemperate and improper language.'

500.

To the Adjt. Gen. of the Forces.

Cartaxo, 6th Feb. 1811.

'This is the only mode in which, in my opinion, we can touch these meetings. The meeting of soldiers in their cantonments to sing psalms, or hear a sermon read by one of their comrades, is, in the abstract, perfectly innocent; and it is a better way of spending their time than many others to which they are addicted; but it may become otherwise: and yet, till the abuse has made some progress, the Commanding Officer would have no knowledge of it, nor could he interfere. Even at last his interference must be guided by discretion, otherwise he will do more harm than good; and it can in no case be so effectual as that of a respectable clergyman. I wish,

G. O.

Cartaxo, 5th Feb. 1811.

1. In order to remedy the inconvenience which results from the officers of the army who are sick absent, being returned absent without leave, after the expiration of the term specified in the original sick certificate, and order for leave of absence,

The Commander of the Forces desires that a Medical Board may be assembled at each of the hospital stations, at which there may be sick officers, on the 5th, the 12th, and the 20th of every month.

2. Any officer who is absent from his duty on leave, forwarded upon a sick certificate, whose term of leave will expire by the time the next state will be made up, and sent in from his regiment, after any of those days, is to take care to attend this Medical Board, and to obtain their opinion and certificate of his case.

4. The Commander of the Forces trusts therefore that officers will take measures to avoid the inconvenience which they must feel under the operation of these orders; and that those who shall have recovered sufficiently to return to their duty before the expiration of the period of their leave of absence will take care to return in time; and that those whose health shall require a longer stay at the hospital station will take care to appear before the Medical Board and obtain a certified copy of their certificate, and transmit it by the earliest opportunity to the commanding officer of their regiment.'



therefore, you would turn your mind a little more to this subject, and arrange some plan by which the number of respectable and efficient clergymen with the army may be increased.'

501.

To Gen. Ballesteros.

Cartaxo, 16th Feb. 1811.

'I am concerned to be under the necessity of forwarding to your Excellency the enclosed letter, which has been sent to me, regarding the conduct of the troops under your command. Whatever may be the military qualities of any body of troops, there is no doubt whatever, that if they commit disorders they are a curse instead of a benefit to the nation which they are employed to defend. In the cause in which we are engaged, above all others, it is incumbent upon us to show the people of the country the difference between the conduct of their defenders and of their oppressors; and we should take care to avoid doing them unnecessary injury, lest we should weaken their attachment to the cause, and its defenders, and decrease their hatred of the enemy.

These motives, exclusive of those which have a reference to the discipline, subordination, and good order of the soldiers, which qualities are invariably deteriorated by their being permitted to commit disorders with impunity, should induce any Officer who is charged with the command of a body of troops to do every thing in his power to repress and punish such acts as those complained of in the enclosed letter. I trust, therefore, that your Excellency will have adopted the measures which never fail to prevent the recurrence of similar disorders. Their repetition will lead to a contest between your troops and the inhabitants of the country, which will infallibly bring disgrace and disaster upon the cause in which we are engaged; and I have now to inform you, that I send copies of this letter, and the enclosed communication, to be laid before the Spanish Government, in order that the in-

G. O.

Cartaxo, 11th Feb. 1811.

'2. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be under the necessity of pardoning this soldier, notwithstanding the enormity of the crime he has committed; for it appears that owing to the irregularity of the mode in which the interior duty of the — was conducted at that period, not only was this soldier brought to trial for this crime before a Regimental Court Martial, as a matter of course, but owing to similar irregularity and want of attention he was released from confinement, and actually engaged with the enemy.

Evidence of these facts appearing upon the minutes, it is quite impossible for the Commander of the Forces to order the execution of the sentence of the General Court Martial; but nothing but these circumstances should have induced the Commander of the Forces to pardon the prisoner, who is to be released and return to his duty.

The Commander of the Forces has directed that an extract of the minutes of the General Court Martial may be sent to the General Officer commanding the 2nd division of infantry, in which he will see an account of the irregularities which have prevailed in the —, both in the mode of guarding prisoners, and of bringing them to trial before a Regimental Court Martial.

It appears that for a considerable period while Major — commanded the regiment, prisoners were not left in charge of a guard, but were sent to the companies on a march, or when the regiment should fall in for any service, and that when a Regimental Court Martial was assembled for the trial of prisoners, they were brought before it, not in consequence of any order from the commanding officer, founded upon the consideration of each individual case, but apparently as a matter of course, and without any authority whatever. Where such irregularities and want of attention prevail, acts of disorder, and even mutiny, must be expected, and they cannot be punished if the soldiers should have been released from confinement, and particularly not if they should have been on duty and engaged with the enemy.'

fluence of their authority may be added to the reasoning and entreaties which this letter contains, to induce your Excellency to keep the troops under your command in order.'

## 502.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 20th Feb. 1811.

' I do not trouble you now upon this subject in order to justify this soldier, or to obtain any mitigation of any punishment he ought to receive, as no punishment can, in my opinion, be at all adequate to the offence he has committed; but to point out to you how very improper it is, and indeed unfriendly, and contrary to the principles of the alliance, that British subjects and soldiers, put in jail without notice to any Officer, should be detained in jail, as this man has been, for nearly 2 years, without any intimation being given to any body of his being in existence. In the same manner I found a soldier in jail last January, who had been there nearly 8 months.'

## 503.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 23rd Feb. 1811.

' I now enclose my dispatch to the Secretary of State of this day, giving an account of the defeat of the Spaniards at Badajoz; and I enclose for your private information copies of two letters from Madden, who you will observe, is not better pleased with the Portuguese cavalry than he is with the Spanish troops. Few troops will bear a surprise and a general panic; and at all events young cavalry are much more easily affected by these circumstances, and the effect upon them is much more extensive and more sensibly felt by the whole army, than similar circumstances operating upon infantry in the same state of discipline. Their horses afford them means of flight, and when once cavalry lose their order it is impossible to restore it. For this reason I am always inclined to keep the cavalry out of action as long as possible.

The defeat of Mendizabal is the greatest misfortune, which was not previously expected, that has yet occurred to us. As soon as our reinforcements would have arrived I intended to have detached a British force to Badajoz, with which the Spaniards would have been sufficient to have beaten Sout and raise the siege; which event, without exposing matters to a general action in a position chosen by the enemy, would have had the most important consequences throughout the Peninsula. As it is, I cannot venture to detach a sufficient force to do the business alone, and I must try something else of greater risk and more doubtful result. In short, this defeat goes to the vitals of the cause, and it would certainly have been avoided if the Spaniards had been any thing but Spaniards. But Mendizabal, knowing that the French force were preparing means to cross the Guadiana, was surprised in his camp, which he had neglected to fortify, although repeatedly advised to fortify it, and which he delayed to quit. If he had not been surprised, although he had not been intrenched; if he had been intrenched, and still had been surprised; or if he had withdrawn from the position, as he said he would, this misfortune could not have happened. I know the ground as well as I know my own room. It is really the strongest position in the country!'



504.

## ' MEMORANDUM OF OPERATIONS IN 1810.

*The Notes to this Memorandum are in the Manuscript.*

23rd Feb. 1811.

' The last memorandum, on the operations of the British army in the Peninsula, ended with the breaking up of the British army from its position on the frontiers of Estremadura and Alentejo, and its march to a position in Upper Beira, between the Mondego and the Tagus, in the middle of December, 1809.

The reasons for this movement were the following:—

First; it was believed that the French were aware that, till they could dislodge the British army from Lisbon and the Tagus, they could not hope to make any successful invasion of Andalusia, or any progress in obtaining possession of that country. This belief was confirmed by their conduct after the battle of Ocaña, in the month of November. The events of that battle, and the state to which it reduced the Spanish army, afforded them the best opportunity of entering Andalusia unopposed, and of taking possession even of Cadiz itself; but instead of pursuing their advantages, they turned their troops back immediately into Old Castille, and gave ground for belief that their line of operations would be in that quarter.

Secondly; there was every reason to believe that large reinforcements would enter Spain during the winter, which might be thrown immediately upon the frontier of Portugal.

Thirdly; the swelling of the rivers Tagus and Guadiana, which had occurred in some degree, had opposed a material obstacle to the advance of the French through Estremadura, and the expected rains were likely to render the roads quite impracticable; which, added to the means of defence remaining in the province, under the Duque de Albuquerque, left it in a state of apparent safety from invasion.

The British army had completed its march by the 15th January, and had taken up its cantonments with their right at Guarda, their left extending towards the Douro, and the advanced posts on the Coa. The head quarters were placed at Viseu. At this time the strength of the British army was 19,500 rank and file; 2800 of that number were cavalry, leaving 16,700 infantry, of which 800 were at Lisbon. A division of infantry of 4400 men had been left on the Tagus at Abrantes, under the command of Lieut. General Hill, as the foundation of the corps to be formed under his command, to carry on operations on the frontiers of Alentejo and Estremadura, if, contrary to all appearances and expectation, the enemy should invade that part of the country.\* With the exception of the hussars, the cavalry also were left upon the Tagus for the convenience of receiving forage, which we were informed that the province of Upper Beira could not supply.

The Portuguese army was at this time in a state not fit for service,† owing principally to the want of clothing, and those equipments which are necessary to all soldiers in a winter campaign. Their discipline, organization, and equipment had been in some degree thrown back by their operations in

\* ' See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, 15th January, 1810.'

† ' See letter of 4th January to Lord Liverpool, and letter to Mr. Frere, 30th January, enclosed to Lord Liverpool.'

the preceding summer; and it was determined, if possible, not to move them from the cantonments which they occupied in the interior of the country till the last moment, in order to give them as much time to be formed and equipped as might be possible, while the British troops should occupy the frontiers.

The force and position of the allies at that time were as follow: about 24,000 men, which had been collected of the fugitives from the battle of Ocaña, were at La Carolina, occupying the principal passes of the Sierra Morena;\* about 12,000 men, under the Duque de Alburquerque, were at Medellin, upon the Guadiana; and about 20,000 men,† which had been collected together after the Duque del Parque's action at Alba, were at San Martin de Trebejo, in the Sierra de Gata. There were 6000 or 8000 men, under General Mahy, at Astorga and Villa Franca, in Galicia; and there was a garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo. It had been repeatedly recommended to the Spanish Government to reinforce the corps under the Duque de Alburquerque. If this corps had been stronger, and the operations of the Spanish troops could have been reckoned upon, it could have defended the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and if the enemy, instead of attempting that operation, had pushed their whole force through La Mancha, as they afterwards did, this corps might have been thrown upon their right flank by the valley of the Guadiana. The enemy's force consisted of, and was disposed as follows: the corps of Sebastiani (the 4th), Victor (the 1st), and Mortier (the 5th), were disposed of about the Tagus and Madrid;‡ and Soult, the King's guards, and Dessolle's reserve, composed an army of about 65,000 men. Soult's corps was at Talavera de la Reyna and in that neighbourhood, and consisted of about 12,000 men. Ney's corps (the 6th) was in Old Castille; and, by the time the British army arrived in Beira, it had been joined by the reinforcements, and consisted of 32,000 men;§ and towards the middle of the month of January, the Duc d'Abrantes, or the 8th corps, consisting of 27,000 men, also entered Spain. ||

Besides these corps, which are immediately the subject of this memorandum, there was the 3rd corps, under Suchet, in Aragon, and the army of Catalonia, put under Augereau, and then under Macdonald, in Catalonia, which have been engaged in the operations of the campaign against the Spanish armies of Valencia and Catalonia; but the operations are quite distinct from those which have been carried on on the western and southern side of the Peninsula, and they will not be noticed any further.

The first operation which the enemy undertook, as soon as their reinforcements entered Spain, was to force the passes of the Sierra Morena.¶ After manœuvring for some days at the foot of the mountains they carried the passes almost without opposition on the part of the Spanish army, which

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of December, 1809, and January, 1810.'

† 'They were stated to be 20,000 men, but I doubt that they ever collected 15,000.'

‡ 'See letters to Lord Liverpool, of the 14th, 21st, and 28th December, 1809, and 4th, 15th, 24th, and 31st January.'

§ 'See letter of 21st February, to Lord Liverpool.'

|| 'We had no knowledge of the arrival of reinforcements till a later period; but see letter to Lord Liverpool, of 24th January, and to Mr. Frere, 30th January, that their arrival was suspected. It was supposed at that time that the enemy could bring together in Old Castille about 40,000 men, including Soult's corps from Talavera.'

¶ 'See letter of 31st January, to Lord Liverpool.'



retired in several directions. The greater part, under General Areyzaga himself, retired to Jaen, and thence to Granada, which towns they successively abandoned, and thence into Murcia; and this body has since formed the army of Murcia. A part retired into the Sierra de Ronda, and thence to Gibraltar, from whence it was removed to Cadiz; and a part, under the Visconde de Grand, retired to Seville, and thence into the Condado de Niebla, where it has since remained, under the command of General Copons; and one division, and the artillery, crossed the Guadalquivir at Seville, and went to Monasterio, in Estremadura; from whence the artillery was sent to Badajoz, and the troops went and embarked at Ayamonte. After passing the Sierra Morena the French pushed their left, the corps of Sebastiani, towards Jaen; and the 1st corps, with the King's guards and reserve, went, under the King, to Seville and Cadiz. The Duque de Alburquerque, however, passed the Sierra Morena from his position on the Guadiana, by Guadalcanal, nearly at the same time with the French, and arrived at Xerez, and occupied the Isla de Leon, before the French approached the place.

While these movements were making, the Central Junta was dissolved. Previous to the dissolution of that body they had ordered the march of the corps under the command of the Duque del Parque from Castille into Estremadura; and, with the exception of 3000 men under General Carrera, it marched on the . . . \* Nearly at the same time the Marques de la Romana was appointed to resume the command of this corps.

The wants and the situation of the Portuguese army at that period of time have been already pointed out. It would have been impossible to move them, without incurring the risk of rendering them useless during the campaign. Including the cavalry (with the exception of General Slade's brigade, attached to General Hill's corps), the whole British army that could be brought into operation on the frontiers of Castille, between the middle and end of January, was less than 15,000 men, to which the Portuguese army might have added 10,000 or 12,000 men, if it had been deemed expedient to draw these troops into the field at that time, notwithstanding the considerations above referred to. Against this force was Ney's corps at Salamanca; and Junot's, or the 8th, was on its march within the Spanish frontier; and, at all events, it was known in the end of January that the effect had been produced in Andalusia, which it would have been the object of any diversion to prevent. The passes of the Sierra had been carried without opposition; the Spanish army had been dispersed; Seville, the seat of Government, with its arsenals and establishments, was in the possession of the French; and Cadiz itself was threatened. No operation, which should not have been performed by a most powerful and superior body of troops well supported, could have produced any diversion to avert the consequences of this state of things.

It was obvious that the French were in an error when they entered Andalusia. They should have begun by turning their great force against the English in Portugal, holding in check the Spanish force in Andalusia, as they had done in the preceding spring. Andalusia would then have fallen.

\* 'The Duque del Parque stated that he should march on the 24th January. See letter, &c. to Mr. Frere, 30th January: but they did not march till later in the month and the beginning of February.'

an easy conquest to them; but in the manner in which they have proceeded, they have been obliged to bring corps after corps out of Andalusia against Portugal; Cadiz, &c., have in the mean time become strengthened, as has Portugal; and it is doubtful whether they will ever obtain possession of either.

This view of the subject, and the knowledge that the cause would eventually be fought for in Portugal, and the certainty that the enemy had the means of collecting a superior force to ours, even if he had not already been reinforced, prevented us from incurring any risk to create a diversion in January. Besides, the weather was such as to prevent all operations; and the suspicion which was always entertained that the reinforcements were within reach when the enemy made their movements to the southward, were the principal reasons.

As soon as it was known in Portugal that the French had entered Andalusia, and that the Spanish Government desired to have assistance to defend Cadiz, the 79th, 87th, and 94th regts., and 2 companies of artillery, were detached there in the beginning of February, under Major General Stewart, and the 20th Portuguese regt. Nearly at the same time accounts were received that the 2nd corps of the French army were entering Estremadura, in concert with, and supported by the 5th corps (Mortier's), from Andalusia. The 5th corps had left Seville on the 2nd and 3rd February, apparently to disperse a fugitive division of Areyza's army, which had crossed the Guadalquivir; but these retired towards Ayamonte, sending their artillery to Badajoz. It appears that the French Government had imagined that the invasion of Andalusia, the possession of Seville and its arsenals, &c., and the dissolution of the Central Junta, would be deemed misfortunes of such magnitude, as that all resistance would cease; and on the same day, the 12th of February, they summoned the places of Cadiz, Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Astorga.

Immediately upon receiving information of the entry of the French into Estremadura, General Hill was put in motion on the 12th February, with his own British division; two brigades of Portuguese infantry, about 4000 strong, under Major General Hamilton; one brigade of British cavalry, about 1000, under Major General Slade; and 4th regt. of Portuguese cavalry; and one brigade of German, and two of Portuguese, artillery. This corps was ordered, in the first instance, to Portalegre; and General Hill was directed to co-operate with the Spanish troops lately under the command of the Duque del Parque, then supposed to have crossed the Tagus; and to prevent the enemy, if possible, from carrying on any serious operation against Badajoz. The enemy retired from Badajoz when they heard of General Hill's arrival at Portalegre. Ciudad Rodrigo was summoned by Marshal Ney with 2 divisions of his corps, and he retired again upon the Tormes, upon finding the advanced guard of the British army crossing the Coa;\* and Astorga was summoned by General Loison, with the third division of Ney's corps, who remained in that neighbourhood for some time. Loison was afterwards relieved by the 8th corps, under Junot; and he approached nearer to Salamanca.

From this time no movement of importance was made by either party, till

\* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of 21st February.



towards the middle of March, when the French corps in Estremadura broke up, and Mortier marched to the southward; and Regnier, with Soult's corps, remained in the neighbourhood of Merida. The allied British and Spanish troops on the frontiers of Portugal and Estremadura were then in some degree superior in numbers to the French corps remaining in Estremadura, and the question whether the latter should be attacked or not was then well considered. In the consideration of every question of this description there are certain topics which must be reviewed, and the following are of the number:—

First, the object in this case would have been, if possible, to cripple, or entirely destroy, the 2nd corps of the army which remained in Estremadura; but it is apprehended that this object would have been impracticable. Even supposing that General Hill's and the Marques de la Romana's corps joined had been deemed sufficiently strong to attempt to remove the 2nd corps from its position on the Guadiana, they could not have prevented its retreat either to the Sierra Morena, or along the valley of the Guadiana to Ciudad Real, or between the Tagus and the Guadiana towards Arzobispo. The attack must have been made in one concentrated body, on one side or the other of the Guadiana; and the allies would have been able only to choose which way the enemy should retreat, supposing them to have been able to force his retreat.

Secondly, the means to effect this object consisted in about 12,000 men, cavalry and infantry, half British and half Portuguese, under General Hill, and about 10,000 Spanish troops, under the Marques de la Romana, whose corps had been much reduced by sickness and want; and General Carrera, with 3000 men, had remained in Old Castille. Against these the enemy had not less than 16,000 men; for the 2nd corps, as well as the others, had received reinforcements.

Thirdly, the risks to be incurred in this expedition consisted in the probability that the 2nd corps would be joined by the 5th corps again, before any serious impression could have been made upon the 2nd corps. The Marques de la Romana had at this time but little of any cavalry, and the Spanish cavalry is notoriously bad. The Portuguese cavalry was but newly formed; and the reliance in respect to that arm, in that open country, would have been upon the 1100 British cavalry. The 2nd corps was always stronger in cavalry than the allies in Estremadura; but if the 2nd corps had been rejoined by the 5th, not only would the enemy's superiority in cavalry have been increased, but in infantry also; and the retreat of the allies to the strong places would have been hurried at least, if not difficult.

Fourthly, the difficulties in the undertaking, besides those of the season, are of the same description with those which have attended, and invariably must attend, every operation which has been attempted in the Peninsula.

There is an old military proverb respecting these operations which is strictly and invariably true, and that is, that "if they are attempted with small numbers they must fail; if with large, the army must starve." The inhabitants of Spain and Portugal will not part with their provisions, even for money. There are no great markets for corn in any part of the Peninsula, excepting the seaports, and some of the very large and populous cities, and the inhabitants subsist generally upon stores formed in their own houses, or buried under ground; and if they are deprived of any considerable por-

tion of their supply for the year, they must either starve or must go to seek for a fresh supply at a great distance, as no neighbour has any to sell. These circumstances account at the same time for the difficulties which the allied armies experienced, while the enemy can subsist with facility. The force used by the allies to obtain subsistence from the country consists in the influence of the civil magistrates: that used by the French is terror. They force from the inhabitants, under pain of death, all that they have in their houses for the consumption of the year, without payment, and are indifferent respecting the consequences to the unfortunate people. The British armies cannot, and the natives will not, follow this example, although the latter go nearest to it. Still, however, no Spanish Officer could venture to carry his requisitions for provisions on any town much further than the influence of the civil magistrates would go to procure them; and the Spanish troops have always been in want, where the French armies have afterwards found subsistence. When the Marques de la Romana and his Officers were asked whether they would insure the subsistence of the troops upon this expedition, supposing it were undertaken, they answered that they could not; and indeed their own army was at this moment in the utmost distress in their cantonments, and literally perishing for want.\* Upon the whole, then, comparing the only object which could be acquired by this expedition with the risk to be incurred, and the difficulty of the undertaking, it was thought best not to attempt it.

The next event of any importance that occurred was in the commencement of April; the formal attack of Astorga by the 8th corps under the Duc d'Abrantes. At this time the expediency of attempting a diversion in favor of the Spaniards, by making a forward movement into Castille, was again considered. In the end of March the British army in Portugal consisted of about 22,000 rank and file, of which 2733 were cavalry. Of the cavalry, 1072, and of the infantry, 5112, were with General Hill in Alentejo, and 400 men at Lisbon, leaving in Beira about 15,000 effective rank and file, cavalry and infantry. About this time the Portuguese army were becoming in a better state of equipment, and we might have drawn 12 regiments of regular infantry, and 4 of chasseurs, making about 14,000 effective rank and file, to the army, exclusive of the Portuguese troops with General Hill. This would have made the allied army in Beira about 30,000 men.

With this force we should have had to attack Marshal Ney at the head of his own corps, which was more numerous than ours † (infinitely superior in cavalry), in a strong position at Salamanca; having it in his power to draw towards either the whole or any part of Junot's corps, or of the body of troops under Kellermann in Old Castille, between the time at which he would have heard of our passing the Agueda and that of our arrival at Salamanca, supposing that he had ever allowed us to reach that place. It may be supposed that we might have drawn a part, if not the whole, of Hill's corps into Beira for this operation; ‡ but even with the whole of that corps we were not equal

\* 'See the instruction from Lord Liverpool, of the 2nd January, 1810, marked "Secret."'

† 'Ney's corps, according to the returns, was 32,000 men.'

‡ 'Upon more than one occasion, after Mortier withdrew from Estremadura, General Hill was obliged to move to protect Badajoz, and the divisions of the Marques de la Romana's troops, from the operations of Regnier's corps. These movements invariably succeeded. See letters to Lord Liverpool, of the 2nd and 23rd May.'



to the operation, and should not have succeeded in obliging the French to raise the siege of Astorga. But if the whole of that corps had been brought from the frontiers of Alentejo to those of Beira,\* the enemy would have entered the former province, and there was nothing between them and Lisbon.† To this add, that all the arguments respecting the difficulties for subsistence in the proposed expedition into Estremadura in March were stronger in respect to that in contemplation into Castille in the end of that month and beginning of April, and the weather rendered all operations at that time impracticable. Astorga fell on the 22nd April, the magazine having been kept in a church, and it blew up.‡ On the 24th, the 3rd division of Marshal Ney's corps was put in motion from its cantonments towards Ciudad Rodrigo; and it took up its ground on the 26th, and blockaded the place, on the right of the Agueda. On the same day the British advanced guard went to Gallegos, and the communication with the place was open from that time till the 10th June.§

The British army in Beira was put in motion on the 26th April, and their cantonments were closed up to the front. The head quarters were moved on that day to Celorico from Viseu. There is no doubt but that if the British army had been moved forward to the Agueda in the end of April, Loison's division must have moved from its position in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, or the whole of the 6th corps must have been brought up to its support. But the temporary removal of Loison's division could not prevent the French from making the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, when the state of the weather and rivers would permit them. They had then 57,000 effective men in the 6th and 8th corps in Castille, besides the troops under Kellermann, and some under Serras; and if Loison had been obliged to retire by our troops, it would have only been for a time. Ciudad Rodrigo would have gained nothing by this retreat, for the communication with the town by the left of the Agueda was open as long as it could be under any circumstances; || while our troops would have suffered all the inconvenience and sickness which would have resulted from drawing them out of their cantonments before the rains were over. Ciudad Rodrigo could have been saved only by such a diversion on the part of General Mahy in Galicia, and of the inhabitants and guerrillas of Castille, when the French armies were drawn together for the siege, as should have obliged the French to detach troops to quell the insurrection, or to force Mahy to retreat again to his mountains, and thus render the besieging army of such a strength as that we might have ventured to attack it. But General Mahy made no movement; the inhabitants looked on with apathy, only abusing us that we did not involve ourselves in the same peril with Ciudad Rodrigo.

The British army in Portugal, on the 1st June, consisted of 25,000 rank and file, of which number 3261 were cavalry; 5381 infantry, and 449

\* 'If General Hill had been withdrawn, the Marques de la Romana would have been entirely destroyed.'

† 'See the instructions, marked A, from Lord Liverpool, of the 27th February, 1810.'

‡ 'It is ridiculous to talk of Astorga as a fortified place. It was a walled town, which, excepting in these times, could not have stood one day against a regular attack.'

§ 'See letter to Lord Liverpool, of 11th July.'

|| 'We sent ammunition and stores into Ciudad Rodrigo to the last moment; I believe as late as the 9th, or even the 10th of June, at night.'

cavalry, were with General Hill ; and about 2000 infantry were at Lisbon ; leaving in Beira about 17,000 men, of which number about 14,000 were infantry. Of the 2000 men at Lisbon about 1500 belonged to the Royal, the 9th and 38th regts., which regiments had been in Walcheren, and it was not deemed expedient to move them from Lisbon till the season should have entirely settled ; and they were not moved till the end of June.

The Portuguese army, on the 1st June, consisted of 29,200 effective rank and file, cavalry, infantry, and artillery. Of this number about 1200 cavalry, and 5000 infantry, and 300 artillery, were with General Hill, leaving about 23,000 effective men. There were 5 regiments of infantry in garrisons, one at Cadiz, 3 regiments and 2 battalions of the Lusitanian legion unfit to be brought into the field ; making, with the cavalry, also unfit, not less than 10,000 effective men, which would leave about 14,000 in Beira ; making, in June, our army in Beira, including artillery, of about 32,000 effective men, which was the largest we were ever able to collect upon that frontier.

The 3 Walcheren regiments, the 3 inefficient regiments of Portuguese infantry, the 2 battalions of the Lusitanian legion, and 3 battalions of militia, and 3 brigades of Portuguese artillery, were collected as a reserve upon the Zezere in the beginning of July, under the command of General Leith ; but these corps were not fit to be joined to the army till the end of September. I had sent Colonel M'Mahon's brigade of infantry away from it in May, as being unfit.

On the 25th June the head quarters were removed to Almeida, in order to be nearer the scene of action ; and on the 1st July they were moved to Alverca, as being more centrally situated in respect to our own troops. Every thing was done which could enable the British army to save Ciudad Rodrigo, if it had been practicable ; but it was impracticable to attempt it, unless it could be supposed that we should beat an army nearly double the strength of the allied army, having nearly four times the number of cavalry, in a country admirably adapted to the use of that arm. The place surrendered on the 11th July. After the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, the enemy's movements were for some time uncertain, and we could not learn from them his intentions. We knew that Regnier had been ordered to cross the Tagus ; and to manœuvre upon Alcantara, with a view to support the attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. But he did not carry that measure into execution till about the 18th July ; and his movement was followed immediately by that of General Hill, who crossed the Tagus likewise at Villa Velha, and took up a position in Regnier's front, in Lower Beira.

At length, on the 24th July, the enemy attacked General Craufurd's division, near Almeida, with the whole of Ney's corps, and obliged it to cross the Coa with some loss. It had been desirable to maintain our posts beyond the Coa as long as possible, as well to observe the movements of the enemy as to keep up the communication with Almeida ; but it was not intended to fight an action beyond the Coa. It was necessary to withdraw the troops from the bridge of Almeida that night ; and the enemy's advanced guard passed it in the morning, and Almeida was invested. The enemy having passed the Coa in force, it was necessary to withdraw the division of infantry which was at Pinhel, which was liable to be attacked in front by



the 8th corps, and on its flank by the 6th; and on the 26th the advanced guard was drawn back to Freixedas, and the army was concentrated between Guarda and Trancoso.

The enemy's designs were still uncertain. From the movements of the 2nd and 8th corps, and from the delay to make any preparations for the siege of Almeida, and from the advanced state of the season,\* it was thought most probable that he could not attempt that operation, but would advance into Portugal by the roads which lead through Lower Beira, forcing back General Hill's corps, and turning the right of that under my command; or that he would fall with his concentrated force upon both the flanks and the centre of the corps under my command, and hurry them in their retreat, which must have been made by one road only. The infantry of the army was therefore thrown back one march into the valley of the Mondego, still keeping a division upon Guarda; and General Hill was ordered to Sarzedas, in Lower Beira; Colonel Le Cor's division of militia keeping the communication between General Hill and the army.

At length, on the 15th August, the enemy's design to attack Almeida became manifest; and the army was concentrated again between Trancoso and Guarda; and the advanced guard was moved to Freixedas, as well to oblige the enemy to concentrate his army for the siege, and thus give scope and opportunity to the guerrillas and other troops in Spain to carry on their operations, as to be in a situation to take advantage of any opportunity which offered to strike a blow against the enemy. The place surrendered on the 27th August, owing to the magazine having been blown up; and on the 28th the infantry of the army was again thrown into the valley of the Mondego.

In order to render more clear the nature of these and the subsequent operations, it is necessary to point out that the two great entrances into Portugal, between the Tagus and the Douro, are on different sides of the great range of mountains called the Estrella. The rivers Zezere and Mondego rise in the Estrella, and take their course on different sides of that mountain. The former runs a considerable distance to the southward and westward, and then to the southward, and falls into the Tagus at Punhete; the latter runs first to the northward as far as Celorico, where it turns to the westward and falls into the sea at Figueira. Guarda stands upon the eastern extremity of the Estrella, and there the mountain can be passed; and there is no road by which troops can pass the mountains from the valley of the Zezere and the valley of the Mondego, excepting nearly as far to the westward as the Ponte da Murcella, over the Alva. This river likewise rises in the Estrella, and runs in a north westerly direction into the Mondego, into which it falls about 5 leagues above Coimbra.

From this general description, it will be obvious that the British army could not be concentrated for any operation to the eastward of the Alva, without laying open to the enemy one of the great entrances into the country. General Hill's corps could not have joined that under my command, without passing by or to the eastward of Guarda. Regnier was always in his front, and he might immediately have occupied the passes of Lower Beira; and

\* 'See letters to Lord Liverpool in July and August.'

then the safety of the army, and of the capital, would have depended upon the operations of the reserve on the Zezere.

If the reserve had been joined to the army, it would not have been sufficiently strong to undertake any operation of importance; and any accident to General Hill, who was not so strong as Regnier, would have exposed all our interests to ruin. If we could have collected the reserve, which consisted of about 1500 British infantry, and 4000 Portuguese troops, and General Hill's corps of about 12,000 men, and the corps in Beira of about 32,000, making a total of less than 50,000 men, we should have had less by 7000 men than the 6th and 8th corps, without including Seras, Bonet, or Kellermann; and the 2nd corps, consisting of 16,000 or 17,000, might either have been thrown upon us, or might have been moved through Lower Beira at once upon Lisbon, as there would have been nothing between them and Lisbon in the supposed case. It was therefore determined to observe the movements of the enemy, and to concentrate the army in the first favorable situation that should be found, after they should manifest their line of attack. If they had made their attack by two lines, most probably the army could not have been concentrated till it reached the neighbourhood of Lisbon; but it was thought probable, from their movements, that they were to make it in one concentrated body by the valley of the Mondego, and measures were taken to concentrate the army on the Serra da Murcella, on the Alva. It was never imagined that they could make the march they did across the Mondego, through Upper Beira. The ground, however, on the north of the Mondego, was not unknown; and the measures which had been taken, with a view to the concentration of the British army on the Alva, facilitated the movement of the troops across the Mondego and their concentration on Busaco.

On the 4th September the head quarters, which had been moved to Celorico on the 28th August, were moved to Gouvea, in consequence of the collection of the enemy's force upon the Upper Coa and his movements towards Alverca. They remained there till the 16th, on which day the heads of two corps (the 2nd and 6th) of the enemy entered Celorico, and the third (the 8th) Trancoso; the former crossed the Mondego again to Fornos.\* The army was then put in motion, and took up a position, and was concentrated upon the position of Busaco.

The British army in Portugal, at the time of the battle of Busaco, consisted of 27,188 rank and file, of which number 2839 were cavalry: 2200 infantry were at Lisbon, 1900 of which just arrived: 1350 infantry were on their march to join, leaving in the battle not quite 24,000 men. The Portuguese army at the same time consisted of 26,800 effective rank and file of infantry, and 3375 cavalry. Of the infantry, 1350 were at Elvas, 1142 at Cadiz, and 563 at Abrantes; leaving 23,800 infantry in the battle. Of the cavalry, 500 were at Elvas, 600 at Badajoz, 500 north of the Douro, and 200 at Lisbon, leaving 1375 with the army; making a total of 25,175. The two armies, amounting to about 49,000 men, besides artillery, of which there were 4 brigades and 2 troops of British, and 6 brigades of Portuguese.

\* 'See letters to Lord Liverpool, of the 20th and 30th September.'



The French army consisted of 89 battalions of infantry, which, according to the latest returns, consisted of 56,000 men; 54 squadrons of cavalry, of 8000 men; and about 6000 artillery. The whole army, including sappers, &c., was not less than 72,000 men.

It would have been impossible to detach a corps from the army to occupy the Serra de Caramula after the action of the 27th September, when it was found that Colonel Trant had not arrived at Sardão. But that corps might have been hard pressed, and obliged to retreat; in which case it must have made its retreat upon Sardão and the north of Portugal.\* It could not have rejoined the army; and its services would have been wanting in the fortified position near Lisbon. It was therefore determined to rely upon Colonel Trant to occupy the Serra de Caramula, whose line of operations and of retreat was to the northward. Nothing that could have been done (excepting to detach a large corps) could have prevented the French from throwing a large force into the Serra de Caramula. Even after their loss on the 27th, they had at least 12,000 or 14,000 men more than we had, and, good as our position was, their's was equally good. When they took the road of the Serra de Caramula, therefore, there was nothing for it but to withdraw from Busaco. After quitting Busaco, there was no position which we could take up with advantage, in which we could be certain that we could prevent the enemy from getting to Lisbon before us, till we reached the fortified positions in front of that place, in which we arrived on the 8th October; and we finally took up our ground on the 15th. Shortly after we arrived, the Marques de la Romana joined us with about 5000 effective rank and file.

In the beginning of the month of November the British army in Portugal consisted of 29,497 rank and file, of which 2479 were cavalry; and 465 infantry were at Lisbon. The effectives of the Portuguese army consisted as follows: infantry 26,500, of which were at Elvas 1500, at Cadiz 1173, and at Abrantes 1500, leaving 22,400 with the army. The effective cavalry consisted of 2637, of which were at Elvas 163, Abrantes 76, in the north 130, and Estremadura 600; † leaving about 1500 cavalry with the army and at Lisbon; making the Portuguese army about 24,000 men. The British army was 29,000, and the Spanish army 5000, and the artillery made altogether about 60,000 men of the allies.

The French army, at this time, could not have consisted of more than from 50,000 to 55,000 effective men. Their losses by death, desertion, and sickness, must have been considerable; but still they could not, in the beginning of November, be reduced lower than the numbers above stated.

The question of attacking them was then well considered, and it was determined not to carry the measure into execution. ‡ In fact, the chances of success were much against us. The enemy's force, but little inferior in

\* 'This is the great difficulty in Portugal. The frontier is very long, and the country very narrow. The whole country is frontier; and every road in it leads to Lisbon.'

† 'In these numbers the present fit for duty only are included. There were of course many cavalry detached from Elvas, Abrantes, and the head quarters of the corps in the north, but they had nothing to do with the operating army; and as the total of the fit for duty was 2637, they are accounted for accordingly.'

‡ 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 3rd November, for the state of the different armies, and for the reasoning upon an attack.'

numbers, was much superior in quality to a large part of ours. Their position, as is the case in all strong countries, was nearly as good as our own. We could not have used our artillery against it. We could not have attempted to turn it without laying open some of the roads to Lisbon, of which the enemy would infallibly have taken advantage. The French have shown, throughout the war in the Peninsula, but particularly in the last campaign in Portugal, that they invariably operate upon the flanks and rear, and communications of their enemy, never having any anxiety about their own; and in fact, till they have beaten their enemy in the field they never possess more than the ground they stand upon. This fact is proved in Portugal by their having lost their hospital and every thing belonging to it at Coimbra, only on the day their head quarters left that place; by the difficulty they have, and the constant losses they incur in sending Officers and messengers *en courier*, and by their total want of intelligence.

This system is the consequence of the mode in which they subsist their armies. They plunder every thing they find in the country. Every article, whether of food or raiment, and every animal, and vehicle of every description, is considered to belong of right, and without payment, to the French army; and they require a communication with their rear only for the purpose of conveying intelligence and receiving orders from the Emperor.

Other armies cannot exist without a communication with their rear. The British army, in particular, must not lose its communication with its port of embarkation; and this is the principal cause of the great difficulties experienced in a contest with the French.

On the 14th November the French broke up from their position in front of the allies, with their right upon Sobral, and their left upon the Tagus, and retired by different routes to Santarem. They here took a strong position, occupying the hill of Santarem with the 2nd corps as the head of their cantonments, having the 8th corps to support it on its right; and the 6th corps, in a second line, at Torres Novas, Golegão, or towards the Zezere, over which river they had bridges; and they occupied Punhete as a *tête de pont*. They were followed closely by the allied army; and from the intelligence received on the 17th from the left of the Tagus, of the movements of the enemy from Santarem, it was believed that the army was in full retreat; and that nothing remained at Santarem excepting, at the utmost, the 2nd corps as a rear guard. The intelligence (which was received from Major General Fane) was confirmed by the probability that a retreat was the enemy's intention. It was obvious that, as a military body, it was the measure which it was most expedient for them to adopt.

By a retreat into Spain, they would, First, have been able to provide their army with plenty of food during the winter.

Secondly; they would have been able to have put them into good and quiet cantonments.

Thirdly; they would have been able to provide their numerous sick with surgeons, medicines, &c., the whole of which they had lost.

Fourthly; they would have been able to clothe and re-equip their troops with shoes, &c., which they required.

Fifthly; they must have been perfectly aware that even should they be of

\* 'See letter to Lord Liverpool, of 21st November.'



insufficient strength to hope to make any impression upon the position of the allies in Portugal, they would experience no difficulty in regaining the position of Santarem from the frontier.

And sixthly; they must have been aware that as long as they remained in the country, its cultivation would be impeded; and that by remaining they cut up by the roots the resources which were to enable them to attack the allies upon a future occasion.

These reflections confirmed the intelligence which had been received, that the enemy were in full retreat; and it was believed that the only troops on Santarem were of the 2nd corps.

General Hill was therefore detached across the Tagus with the corps which had been under his command on the 18th, and head quarters were moved to Cartaxo;\* and, on the 19th, when a sufficient body of troops to support the advanced guard had arrived, the orders were given, not, as is supposed, to attack the position of Santarem, but to cross the Rio Mayor river at different points, and attack the enemy's outposts upon it, to enable us to reconnoitre more closely the position of Santarem, and see whether it was practicable to attack the post, and what the enemy's real object was in maintaining himself there. Owing to a mistake of the road by a brigade of guns, the attack could not be made as was intended, and in fact ordered; and in the course of that night and the following morning so much rain had fallen as to render it impracticable to cross the Rio Mayor, or indeed scarcely to move the troops at all. We still, however, continued to work on with our troops on the right of the position of Santarem, on which side it appeared most practicable to approach it, till the 22nd, when the enemy brought up troops of the 8th corps from their rear, and drove in our piquets beyond the bridge of Calhariz.†

From this circumstance, and others of which we obtained a knowledge at about the same time, it was then obvious that they had their whole army between Santarem and the Zezere. The question of attacking the enemy on Santarem was then well considered; and the notion was relinquished, as the plan was impracticable at that moment, on account of the state of the roads and rivulets, as well as because it was obvious that the enemy had their whole army collected in certainly the strongest position in Portugal. We could not succeed without immense loss; and we could not make the attempt at that time without incurring the risk of having some of our detachments insulated and cut off from all communication with the others.

About this time we heard of the movements of the enemy's reinforcements on the frontier; and General Silveira had, in November, been successful in an affair with an advanced guard which had been pushed across the Coa.‡

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of 21st November.'

† 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of 24th November.'

‡ 'See letter to Lord Liverpool, of the 1st December. When the disposition was formed for the defence of Portugal the troops of the line and British troops were brought to the most vulnerable points between the Douro and the Tagus, and to the south of the Tagus. The northern provinces were entrusted to the northern militia, about 15,000 in number, which were the best in Portugal; and they were divided into 3 divisions, one under General Silveira, another under General Miller, and another under Colonel Trant, each division being aided by a body of regular cavalry and artillery; and the whole under the command of General Bacellar. When the enemy's attack upon Portugal was decided between the Douro and the Tagus, these corps all crossed the Douro, and have continued ever since on this side of that river, engaged in various operations on the enemy's communications; but their principal object is to defend the northern provinces.'

This was the advanced guard of a division formed under General Gardanne, consisting of convalescents belonging to the 3 corps in Portugal; of 1500 men, which had been sent into Spain in October, as an escort to General Foy; and of 2 or 3 battalions belonging to the 8th corps, which had been detached to General Seras by order of the Emperor, and were exclusive of the 89 battalions which entered Portugal. The whole were supposed to amount to 8000 men.

After the affair with Silveira, the enemy retired across the Coa again, and went by the Upper Coa by Sabugal, and entered Portugal through Lower Beira, leaving the Estrella to the north on their right hand.\* They advanced till they reached the Tagus, when they suddenly turned about, on the 25th November, and retired into Spain, more in the manner of the flight of a mob than of the march of troops. The *Ordenanza* of Lower Beira followed them and did them much mischief; and they suffered much from the badness of the weather.

On the 13th December a division of the 9th corps (which consisted of about 26 battalions of infantry, and had entered Spain in September) broke up from Ciudad Rodrigo with this same division of Gardanne, in consequence of an order received from Paris, to make another attempt to enter Portugal. This division consisted of 11 battalions, and, with Gardanne's, was supposed to be from 13,000 to 16,000 men: they must have been at least 10,000 men.† They reached the army about the 27th or 29th December, having been attacked by Colonel Wilson's division of militia on their passage of the Alva, and suffered some loss. They brought no provisions or stores with them.

Since that period, and indeed ever since they took up the position of Santarem, the attention of the enemy has been principally devoted to discover the means of passing the Tagus; and they view our corps on the left of the Tagus, which has continued there, with the utmost jealousy. The general report in their army, when they retired from Sobral, was, and my opinion is, that they intended immediately to cross the Tagus, and establish themselves in Alentejo, from which they were prevented by the passage of General Hill over that river on the 18th November; and they are still prevented by the position of his corps, now under the command of Sir W. Beresford, on the left of the Tagus.

From this memorandum, which applies to events up to the close of the year 1810, it will appear that we had done every thing in our power for the allies. Till lately, we have always been inferior in number, and infinitely inferior in description of troops to the enemy; and, adverting to the instructions which I received, and their spirit and meaning as explained by other letters, I do not think that I should have been justified in attempting more than I have done. Indeed, since the enemy have occupied the position of Santarem, it would have been impossible to attempt any thing, owing to the bad state of the roads and the swelling of the rivulets by the rain.

NOTE.—When Regnier passed the Tagus in July, we were aware that Mortier would replace him in Estremadura; but the Marques de la Romana

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of 8th December.'

† 'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool, 15th, 21st, and 29th December.'



considered his corps to be sufficient not only to keep him in check, but to beat him out of the province. In this last expectation he was disappointed very much by the misconduct of his officers; and a large part of his army was defeated by Mortier on the 11th August.\* The Marques, however, still continued to hold his ground; and a brigade of Portuguese dragoons soon joined him, which had been detached to reinforce him in cavalry from the reserve which I had formed on the Tagus. †

After Mortier had defeated this corps he withdrew again into Andalusia, and the Marques de la Romana followed him, and had some successes against his small posts. Mortier then advanced again into Estremadura, and the Marques de la Romana retired; and on the 14th September the Portuguese cavalry defeated that of the enemy near Fuente de Cantos. ‡

The state of affairs in Portugal had induced the Marques de la Romana to turn his attention to this side at about this time; and he had determined to join the allied army with a part of his corps, leaving the divisions of Mendizabal and Ballesteros, and the cavalry, and all the garrisons in Estremadura.

Mortier, upon hearing of the battle of Busaco, retired again into Andalusia on the 8th October; and the Marques de la Romana was entirely at liberty to break up in Estremadura, and to join the allies without risk to the interests of that province.'

## 505.

To Don Martin de la Carrera.

Cartaxo, 26th Feb. 1811.

'I cannot conclude this letter without again endeavoring seriously to impress upon your mind the necessity of enforcing discipline among the officers and soldiers of the army, and obliging them not to injure the property of the inhabitants of the country. The most serious misfortunes will be the consequence of not attending to my repeated recommendations on this subject.'

## 506.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 3rd March, 1811.

'I have repeatedly represented to the Government the necessity of providing for the wants of their troops, if they intended that their discipline should be preserved, or that they should exist in the state of a military body at all. It is impossible to punish soldiers, who are left to starve, for outrages committed in order to procure food; and, at all events, no punishment, however severe, will have the desired effect of preventing the troops from seizing what they can get to satisfy their appetite, when neglected by those whose duty it is to supply their wants. There is certainly no want of cattle, but the Government will not adopt the measures to procure funds to purchase them; and the troops are left to plunder any property which may unfortunately fall in their way.'

## 507.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villa Seca, 14th March, 1811.

'The enemy retired from the position which they had occupied at San-

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 22nd August.'

† 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 15th August.'

‡ 'See dispatch of the 20th September.'

tarem and the neighbourhood on the night of the 5th instant. I put the British army in motion to follow them on the morning of the 6th. Their first movements indicated an intention to collect a force at Thomar; and I therefore marched upon that town, on the 8th, a considerable body of troops, formed of a part of Marshal Sir W. Beresford's corps, under Major General the Hon. W. Stewart, which had crossed the Tagus at Abrantes, and afterwards the Zezere, and of the 4th and 6th, and part of the 1st, divisions of infantry, and 2 brigades of British cavalry.

The enemy, however, continued his march towards the Mondego, having one corps, the 2nd, on the road of Espinhal, General Loison's division on the road of Ançião, and the remainder of the army towards Pombal. These last were followed, and never lost sight of, by the Light division, and the Royal dragoons and 1st hussars, who took from them about 200 prisoners.

On the 9th, the enemy having collected in front of Pombal the 6th corps, with the exception of General Loison's division, the 8th corps, and the 9th corps, and General Montbrun's division of cavalry, the hussars, which, with the Royal dragoons and Light division, were immediately in front of the enemy's lines, distinguished themselves in a charge which they made on this occasion, under the command of Colonel Arentschildt. A detachment of the 16th Light dragoons, under Lieut. Weyland,\* which had been in observation of the enemy near Leyria, made prisoners a detachment consisting of 30 dragoons on that morning, and had followed the enemy from Leyria, and arrived on the ground just in time to assist their friends, the hussars, in this charge.

I could not collect a sufficient body of troops to commence an operation upon the enemy till the 11th. On that day the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th, and the Light divisions of infantry, and General Pack's brigade, and all the British cavalry, joined upon the ground immediately in front of the enemy, who had commenced their retreat from their position during the night. They were followed by the Light division, the hussars and Royals, and Brig. General Pack's brigade, under the command of Major General Sir W. Erskine and Major General Slade, and made an attempt to hold the ancient castle of Pombal, from which they were driven; but the 6th corps, and General Montbrun's cavalry, which formed the rear guard, supported by the 8th corps, held the ground on the other side of the town, the troops not having arrived in time to complete the dispositions to attack them before it was

\* Lieut. Colonel Weyland, late M.P. for Oxfordshire.

G. O.

Cartaxo, 4th March, 1811.

1. As the object in assembling the troops in any station to witness a punishment, is to deter others from the commission of the crime for which the criminal is about to suffer, the Commander of the Forces requests, that upon every occasion on which the troops are assembled for this purpose, the order may be distinctly read and explained to them, and that every man may understand the reason for which the punishment is inflicted.

2. As during the two years, during which the brigade of Guards have been under the command of the Commander of the Forces, not only no soldier has been brought to trial before a General Court Martial, but no one has been confined in a public guard, the Commander of the Forces desires that the attendance of this brigade, at the execution tomorrow may be dispensed with.



dark. Upon this occasion Lieut. Colonel Elder's battalion of Portuguese caçadores distinguished themselves.

The enemy retired in the night; and on the 12th, the 6th corps, with General Montbrun's cavalry, took up a strong position at the end of a defile, between Redinha and Pombal, with their right in a wood upon the Soure river, and their left extending towards the high ground above the river of Redinha. This town was in their rear. I attacked them in this position on the 12th, with the 3rd and 4th divisions of infantry, and Brig. General Pack's brigade, and the cavalry, the other troops being in reserve.

The post in the wood upon their right was first forced by Sir W. Erskine, with the Light division. We were then able to form the troops in the plain beyond the defile; and the 3rd division, under Major General Picton, were formed in two lines, in the skirts of the wood, upon the right; the 4th division, under Major General Cole, in two lines, in the centre, having General Pack's brigade supporting their right, and communicating with the 3rd division; and the Light division, in two lines, on the left. These troops were supported in the rear by the British cavalry; and the 1st, 5th, and 6th divisions were in reserve. The troops were formed with great accuracy and celerity; and Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer led the line against the enemy's position on the heights, from which they were immediately driven, with the loss of many men killed and wounded, and some prisoners.

Major General Sir W. Erskine particularly mentioned the conduct of the 52nd regt., and Colonel Elder's caçadores, in the attack of the wood; and I must add that I have never seen the French infantry driven from a wood in a more gallant style.

There was but one narrow bridge, and a ford close to it, over the Redinha river, over which our light troops passed with the enemy; but as the enemy commanded these passages with cannon, some time elapsed before we could pass over a sufficient body of troops, and make a fresh disposition to attack the heights on which they had again taken post. The 3rd division crossed, however, and manœuvred again upon the enemy's left flank, while the light infantry and cavalry, supported by the Light division, drove them upon their main body at Condeixa. The light infantry of General Picton's division, under Colonel Williams, and the 4th caçadores, under Colonel do Rego, were principally concerned in this operation.

We found the whole army yesterday, with the exception of the 2nd corps, which was still at Espinhal, in a very strong position, at Condeixa; and I observed that they were sending off their baggage by the road of Ponte da Murcella. From this circumstance I concluded that Colonel Trant had not given up Coimbra, and that they had been so pressed in their retreat, that they had not been able to detach troops to force him from that place. I therefore marched the 3rd division, under Major General Picton, through the mountains upon the enemy's left, towards the only road open for their retreat, which had the immediate effect of dislodging them from the strong position of Condeixa; and the enemy encamped last night at Casal Novo, in the mountains, about a league from Condeixa.

We immediately communicated with Coimbra, and made prisoners a detachment of the enemy's cavalry which were upon the road. We found the 6th and 8th corps formed in a very strong position near Casal Novo, this

morning, and the Light division attacked and drove in the outposts. But we could dislodge them from their positions only by movements on their flanks. Accordingly I moved the 4th division, under Major General Cole, upon Pancella, in order to secure the passage of the river Deixa and the communication with Espinhal, to which place Major General Nightingall had been in observation of the movements of the enemy's corps since the 10th; and the 3rd division, under Major General Picton, moved immediately round the enemy's left; while the Light division, and Brig. General Pack's brigade, under Major General Sir W. Erskine turned their right; and Major General Alex. Campbell, with the 6th division, supported the light troops, by which they were attacked in front. These troops were supported by the cavalry, and by the 1st and 5th divisions, and Colonel Ashworth's brigade in reserve. These movements obliged the enemy to abandon all the positions which they successively took in the mountains, and the *corps d'armée* composing the rear guard were flung back upon the main body, at Miranda do Corvo, upon the river Deixa, with considerable loss of killed, wounded, and prisoners.

In the operations of this day, the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regts., and 3rd caçadores, under the command of Colonels Drummond and Beckwith, and Major Patrickson, Lieut. Colonel Ross, and Majors Gilmour and Stewart, and Lieut. Colonel Elder, particularly distinguished themselves; as also the light infantry of General Picton's division, under Lieut. Colonel Williams, and the 4th caçadores, under Colonel do Rego; and the troops of horse artillery under the command of Captains Ross and Bull.

The result of these operations has been that we have saved Coimbra and Upper Beira from the enemy's ravages; we have opened the communications with the northern provinces; and we have obliged the enemy to take for their retreat the road by Ponte da Murcella, on which they may be annoyed by the militia acting in security upon their flank, while the allied army will press upon their rear. The whole country, however, affords many advantageous positions to a retreating army, of which the enemy have shown that they know how to avail themselves. They are retreating from the country, as they entered it, in one solid mass, covering their rear on every march by the operations of either one or two *corps d'armée* in the strong positions which the country affords; which *corps d'armée* are closely supported by the main body. Before they quitted their position they destroyed a part of their cannon and ammunition, and they have since blown up whatever the horses were unable to draw away. They have no provisions, excepting what they plunder on the spot, or, having plundered, what the soldiers carry on their backs, and live cattle.

I am concerned to be obliged to add to this account, that their conduct throughout this retreat has been marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed. Even in the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, in which the head quarters of some of the corps had been for 4 months, and in which the inhabitants had been invited, by promises of good treatment, to remain, they were plundered, and many of their houses destroyed, on the night the enemy withdrew from their position; and they have since burnt every town and village through which they have passed. The convent of Alcobaca was burnt by order from the French head quarters. The Bishop's palace, and the whole town of Leyria, in which General Drouet



had had his head quarters, shared the same fate ; and there is not an inhabitant of the country of any class or description, who has had any dealing or communication with the French army, who has not had reason to repent of it and to complain of them. This is the mode in which the promises have been performed, and the assurances have been fulfilled, which were held out in the proclamation of the French Commander in Chief, in which he told the inhabitants of Portugal that he was not come to make war upon them, but with a powerful army of 110,000 men to drive the English into the sea. It is to be hoped that the example of what has occurred in this country will teach the people of this and of other nations what value they ought to place on such promises and assurances ; and that there is no security for life, or for any thing which makes life valuable, excepting in decided resistance to the enemy.

I have the honor to enclose returns of killed and wounded in the several affairs with the enemy since they commenced their retreat.

I have received the most able and cordial assistance throughout these operations from Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer, and Marshal Sir W. Beresford, whom I had requested to cross the Tagus, and who has been with me since the 11th instant ; from Major Generals Sir W. Erskine, Picton, Cole, Campbell ; Major General Slade, and Major General the Hon. C. Colville, and the General and other Officers commanding brigades under their orders respectively. I am particularly indebted to the Quarter Master General, Colonel Murray, for the assistance I have received from him, and to the Deputy Adjutant General, Colonel the Hon. E. Pakenham ; and the Officers of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General's departments, as also those of my personal Staff, have given me every assistance in their power.

I am sorry to inform your Lordship that Badajoz surrendered on the 11th instant. I have not yet received the particulars of this event, but I have no doubt of the fact. Since the enemy entered Estremadura, and has directed his efforts against that place, my attention has been drawn to the means of saving it ; and Mr. Wellesley will have transmitted to England the copies of the correspondence which I have had with the Spanish Officers upon this subject.

Before the unfortunate battle of the 19th February I had intended to reinforce the Spanish Army with about 14,000 men from that under my command ; and thus to force the enemy to raise the siege, as soon as I should have been joined by the reinforcement which I expected would arrive in the Tagus by the end of January. I could not detach with safety till that reinforcement should arrive.

The battle of the 19th February destroyed the Spanish troops upon whose assistance and co-operation I relied ; and then it would have been impossible to detach a body of troops sufficient to effect the purpose, even after the arrival of the reinforcements, till the enemy should be removed from the Tagus. I had therefore determined to attack the enemy in his positions as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, if the weather should be such as to render the roads at all passable.

The reinforcements arrived in the first days of March, but have not yet joined the army ; and on the 5th, at night, the enemy withdrew from their positions.

On the 6th, General Leite, the governor of Elvas, began to inform the governor of Badajoz, by signal or otherwise, that Massena had retired, and that he might expect assistance as soon as it was in my power to give it to him; and that he must hold out to the last extremity. I had made all the arrangements for detaching the force immediately upon the enemy's quitting the Tagus and Zezere, and some of the troops actually marched from Thomar on the morning of the 9th; and others, that part of Sir W. Beresford's corps which had not crossed the Tagus, were put in motion; and their head has arrived within 3 marches of Elvas.

I received at Thomar, on the morning of the 9th, accounts of a most favorable nature from Badajoz, from which I was induced to believe, not only that the place was in no danger, but that it was in fact untouched; that its fire was superior to that of the enemy, and that it was in no want of provisions or ammunition, had sustained no loss, excepting that of the governor, Menache, and was able and likely to hold out for a month. General Imaz, a person of equally good reputation, succeeded to the command; and the greatest confidence was reposed in him. On the same afternoon of the 9th, I was with the British advanced guard at Pombal, and saw in front of that town the collection of the enemy's troops which I have above recited to your Lordship. It appeared to me then, that I must decide either to allow the enemy to retreat from Portugal unmolested, by the road he should prefer, and expose Coimbra and Upper Beira to be ravaged; or that I must draw to the army some of the troops, cavalry particularly, which I had allotted for the expedition to Badajoz, and which still remained at Thomar. I accordingly called to the army the 4th division of infantry and a brigade of heavy cavalry, under the conviction that Badajoz would hold out for the time during which it should be necessary to employ them. Experience has shown me that I could not have done without these troops; and it is also very clear, that if I had left them behind, they could not have saved Badajoz, which place the governor surrendered on the day after he received my assurances that he should be relieved, and my entreaty that he would hold out to the last moment.

It is useless to add any reflection to these facts. The Spanish nation have lost Tortosa, Olivença, and Badajoz, in the course of 2 months, without sufficient cause; and in the same period, Marshal Soult, with a corps never supposed to be more than 20,000 men, has taken, besides the last two places, or destroyed, above 22,000 Spanish troops.'

G. A. O.

Louzaõ, 16th March, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General and Staff Officers, and troops, for their excellent conduct in the operations of the last 10 days, against the enemy.

He requests the commanding officers of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regts., to name a serjeant of each regiment, to be recommended for promotion to an ensigncy, as a testimony of the particular approbation of the Commander of the Forces of these 3 regiments.

4. The Commander of the Forces is unwilling, at this moment, to order the punishment of any soldier of the 1st Hussars, but he desires private \_\_\_\_\_ may be discharged from the 1st Hussars, as being unworthy to serve in the ranks of that regiment.

6. The Commander of the Forces is happy to avail himself of this opportunity to pardon these 3 soldiers, who are to be released from confinement and return to their duty; he hopes that the sentence which has been passed upon them will have the effect of deterring them and others from committing similar crimes in future.

7. The Commander of the Forces requests that for route marches each company in every battalion of infantry may be told off in threes; when the column is to be formed for the



508.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

'I cannot avoid adverting to the disposition recently manifested by the Government to complain of the conduct of the British troops, certainly, in this instance, without foundation. Acts of misconduct, and even outrage, I admit, have been committed, but never with impunity in any instance in which the complaint could be substantiated; and I have not yet been able to obtain the punishment of any individual of this country, be his crimes what they may.

If the British soldiers have committed, as all soldiers do commit, acts of misconduct, they have at least fought bravely for the country. They have besides recently shown that commiseration for the misfortunes of the people of this country, which I am convinced will be equally felt by their countrymen at home, and actually fed the poor inhabitants of all the towns in which they were cantoned on the Rio Mayor river. Yet I have not heard that the Portuguese Government have expressed their approbation of this conduct, very unusual in people of this class and description; nor do I find that either their bravery in the field, or their humanity, or their generosity, can induce those whom they are serving to look with indulgence at their failings, or to draw a veil over the faults of the few, in consideration of the military and other virtues of the many.'

509.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

'Considering that this gentleman is a man of high family, who it is supposed will save his property from robbery and confiscation, and his person from slavery, and his family from violation and outrage, by the measures adopted for the salvation of the country, it might have been expected that he would not have been the first to demand from the Government payment for the damage which those measures do to him.'

510.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

'In answer to your letter of the 16th February, regarding publications in the newspapers, I assure you that I did not mean to say that the information in the newspapers, to which I referred, was received either from your Lordship's office or from that of the Commander in Chief; for I know that neither have the information, at least from me. But I wished to point out to you under what disadvantages we carried on our operations. Foy brought from Paris not only the paper containing that information, but copies of all my dispatches; from which Massena knew all that I had

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march the companies must be wheeled up or backward, by threes, and each stand in column of 3 men in front, which is as large a number as the greater proportion of the roads in Portugal will admit. This front can easily be increased or diminished as circumstances may render expedient.

8. The Commander of the Forces refers the officers particularly to his orders regarding the march of companies or smaller divisions through a defile or any other difficulty; the soldiers cannot make the march with ease to themselves, if they are obliged or allowed to close up intervals the difficulties of the road may occasion, by running.

The same orders are applicable to the cavalry.'

intended to do in November against his positions, and he knew accurately every inch of mine, by how many guns defended, for what purpose, &c. It may be very right to give the British public this information; but if they choose to have it, they ought to know the price they pay for it, and the advantages it gives to the enemy in all their operations.

I am sure your Lordship does not expect that I, or any other officer in command of a British army, can pretend to prevent the correspondence of the officers with their friends. It could not be done if attempted, and the attempt would be considered an endeavor by an individual to deprive the British public of intelligence, of which the Government and Parliament do not choose to deprive them. I have done every thing in my power by way of remonstrance, and have been very handsomely abused for it; but I cannot think of preventing officers from writing to their friends. This intelligence must certainly have gone from some officer of this army, by whom it was confidentially communicated to his friends in England; and I have heard that it was circulated from one of the offices with a plan.'

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511.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

'Major General Cole joined Major General Nightingall at Espinhal on the afternoon of the 13th; and this movement, by which the Deixa was passed, and which gave us the power of turning the strong position of Miranda do Corvo, induced the enemy to abandon it on that night. They destroyed at this place a great number of carriages, and burned and otherwise destroyed, or consumed, the ammunition which they had carried; they likewise burned much of their baggage; and the road throughout the march from Miranda is strewed with the carcasses of men and animals, and destroyed carriages and baggage.

We found the enemy's whole army yesterday in a very strong position on the Ceira, having one corps as an advanced guard in front of Foz d'Arouce, on this side of the river. I immediately made arrangements to drive in the advanced guard, preparatory to the movements which it might be expedient to make to cross the Ceira this morning.

Brig. General Pack's brigade had been detached in the morning through the mountains to the left, as well to turn the enemy in his position at Miranda do Corvo as in view to any others they might take up on this side of the Ceira. The Light division, under Major General Sir W. Erskine, was ordered to possess some heights immediately above Foz d'Arouce, while Major General Picton's division was moved along the great road to attack the left of the enemy's position and of the village. The 6th division, under Major General Campbell, and the hussars and 16th dragoons, supported the Light division; and the 1st division, and the 14th, and Royal dragoons, the 3rd.

These movements succeeded in forcing the enemy to abandon his strong positions on this side of the Ceira with considerable loss. The Colonel of the 39th regt. was made prisoner.

The light troops of General Picton's division under Colonel Williams, and those of General Nightingall's brigade were principally engaged on the right; and the 95th regt. in front of the Light division. The troops



behaved in the most gallant manner. The horse artillery likewise, under Captains Ross and Bull, distinguished themselves upon this occasion. The troops took much baggage and some ammunition carriages in Foz d'Arouce.

I had been prevented from moving till a late hour in the morning by the fog; and it was dark by the time we gained possession of the last position of the enemy's advanced guard. In the night the enemy destroyed the bridge on the Ceira, and retreated, leaving a small rear guard on the river. The destruction of the bridge at Foz d'Arouce, the fatigue which the troops have undergone for several days, and the want of supplies, have induced me to halt the army this day.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford and I had repeatedly urged the Governors of the Kingdom to adopt measures to supply the troops with regularity, and to keep up the establishments while the army was in cantonments on the Rio Mayor river; which representations were not attended to; and when the army was to move forward, the Portuguese troops had no provisions, nor any means of conveying any to them. They were to move through a country ravaged and exhausted by the enemy; and it is literally true, that General Pack's brigade, and Colonel Ashworth's had nothing to eat for 4 days, although constantly marching or engaged with the enemy.

I was obliged either to direct the British Commissary General to supply the Portuguese troops, or to see them perish for want; and the consequence is, that the supplies intended for the British troops are exhausted, and we must halt till more come up, which I hope will be this day.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 14th instant, I have heard further particulars respecting the surrender of Badajoz. It appears that, on the 9th, the enemy had made a breach in the place about 18 feet wide, but which was by no means practicable. On the same day the Governor acknowledged by signal the receipt of the message which I had sent him; on the 10th he suspended hostilities, and on the 11th surrendered the place, the garrison being prisoners of war, and marching out with the honors of war, to the number of 9000, to an army which at the period of the surrender amounted only to 9600 infantry, and 2000 cavalry. The garrison wanted neither ammunition nor provisions.

In my letter of the 6th I had desired the Governor of Elvas to urge the Governor of Badajoz to keep secret the intelligence of Massena's retreat, lest, by means of deserters it should reach the enemy, whom I was in hopes that I should have found engaged in this siege. But he published the intelligence as soon as he received it, stating at the same time that he did not believe it. He likewise communicated it to the French General.

Since the fall of Badajoz the enemy have turned their attention to Campo Mayor, and have moved in that direction.'

G. O.

Loução, 17th March, 1811.

'2. It has been reported to the Commander of the Forces that the —th regt. plundered a village in the neighbourhood of the camp, yesterday, of 112 alquiers of Indian corn.

The Commander of the Forces desires that the rolls of the —th regt. may be called every hour, every officer being present, till further orders.

The obedience of this order must be reported daily to Head Quarters.'

G. O.

Pombeiro, 18th March, 1811.

'1. The Commander of the Forces requests the General Officers commanding divisions will

512.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pombeiro, 18th March, 1811.

'It is useless to propose any arrangement for this or any other purpose, if the Portuguese Government will execute nothing. I repeat, that matters cannot go on as they are; there must be a radical change in the whole of the system of the Government, in respect to the resources for carrying on the war, or I shall recommend to His Majesty's Government to withdraw his army.

It is a favorite notion with some members of the Government, that the Portuguese troops can do with very little or no food. Among other good qualities, they possess that of being patient under privations in an extraordinary degree. But men cannot perform the labor of soldiers without food. Three of General Pack's brigade died of famine yesterday on their march, and above 150 have fallen out from weakness, many of whom must have died from the same cause.'

513.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

'However unfortunate the Spanish armies have been in the field, the de-

will place safeguards in the villages in the neighbourhood of their encampments, to prevent the soldiers from carrying off the furniture, poles of the vines, and other property of the inhabitants.

The Commander of the Forces desires that at the same time with this Order, the Articles of War regarding forcing safeguards may be read to the troops.

2. Some instances have occurred lately of delay in obeying orders issued, and in some instances the mode of execution has been altered.

Exact obedience to orders issued is the foundation of military discipline. It is impossible to carry on any operation with certainty, or to attempt any movement, if all the parts into which the army is divided do not execute exactly what is ordered, in the mode, by the route, and at the hour appointed.

It may be depended on that the relative inconveniences of each mode of execution is weighed by the Commander of the Forces, and that what is ordered for each part of the army is to make the whole combine in one general operation and movement.

It is also very important that the departure and placing of the baggage of the troops, as directed, should be accurately attended to; unless this is done, officers and troops must frequently suffer personal inconvenience.'

G. O.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

'4. The Commander of the Forces likewise requests the attention of the officers of the cavalry particularly, and of the officers at the heads of columns, to a discrimination between what is taken from the enemy, and what has been left by the enemy; and by the inhabitants of the country, and is still their property.

5. The Commander of the Forces has always given to the soldiers that which they take from the enemy, such as horses, cattle, &c.; but they must not take cattle or sheep, or other property which they find on the road along which they are marching in pursuit of the enemy. This property belongs to the people of the country, and if taken for the use of the troops, it must be in the regular manner, and the owners must have a receipt and must be paid for it.'

G. A. O.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

'1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to hear that some of the regiments coming up in the rear have forcibly seized on the supplies on the march for those in front, in consequence of which these last have been deprived of them.

2. Those who stopped and seized those supplies should reflect that it is most easy to supply the troops nearest to the magazine, while those nearest the enemy require the supplies with the greatest urgency. It is besides quite irregular, and positively contrary to the orders of this army, for any commanding officer to seize supplies of any description: there is a Commissary attached to every part of the army, and there is no individual, much less regiment, for whom some Commissary is not obliged to provide.

3. It is necessary that this practice should be avoided in future, otherwise it will become impossible to carry on any regular operation.'



fences which they have made of several places were calculated to inspire confidence in the exertions of the troops at Badajoz; particularly considering their numbers relatively with those of the enemy; the little progress made by the enemy in making a practicable breach; that they had plenty of provisions and ammunition; their cannon still mounted on the works; and, above all, that they were certain of being relieved. This confidence has, however, been disappointed; and this place, the third so surrendered in 2 months, has been surrendered without sufficient cause. It is useless now to speculate upon the consequences which would have resulted from a more determined and protracted resistance at Badajoz.'

## 514.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Oliveira do Hospital, 21st March, 1811.

'The enemy suffered much more in the affair of the 15th than I was aware of, when I addressed you on the 16th instant. The firing was not over till dark; and it appears that great numbers were drowned in attempting to ford the Ceira.

The enemy withdrew his rear guard from that river in the course of the 16th, and we crossed it on the 17th, and had our posts on the Serra da Murcella; the enemy's army being in a strong position on the right of the Alva. They moved a part of their army on that night, but still maintained their position on the Alva, of which river they destroyed the bridges. We turned their left by the Serra de S<sup>ta</sup> Quiteria, with the 1st, 3rd, and 5th divisions, on the 18th, while the Light division and the 6th manœuvred in their front from the Serra da Murcella. These movements induced the enemy to bring back to the Serra da Moita the troops which had marched the preceding night, at the same time that they withdrew their corps from the Alva; and in the evening their whole army were assembled upon Moita; and the advanced posts of our right were near Arganil, those of our left across the Alva. The enemy retired from the position of Moita in the night of the 18th, and have continued their retreat with the utmost rapidity ever since: I imagine their rear guard will be at Celorico this day. We assembled the army upon the Serra da Moita on the 19th, and our advanced posts are this day beyond Pinhanços. The militia, under Colonels Wilson and Trant, are at Fornos. We have taken great numbers of prisoners, and the enemy have continued to destroy their carriages and their cannon, and whatever would impede their progress. As the greatest number of the prisoners taken on the 19th had been sent out on foraging parties towards the Mondego, and had been ordered to return to the position on the Alva, I conclude that the enemy had intended to remain in it for some days.'

## 515.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

S<sup>ta</sup> Marinha, 23rd March, 1811.

'My opinion has invariably been, that it was the interest of Great Britain to employ in Portugal the largest army that could be spared from other services; and that no more than 2000 or 2500 men ought to have been stationed at Cadiz, which would not have cost a shilling more than their pay. The expense at Cadiz, which I imagine will amount to no trifle, out of the 6 or 9 millions, has been, in my opinion, entirely thrown away, equally with

the services of the troops, which would have made a great difference here early in the last summer.

In respect to offensive or defensive operations here, if they are left to me, I shall carry on either the one or the other, according to the means in my power, compared at the time with those of the enemy, and bearing in mind always your Lordship's instructions of the 27th February, 1810, marked A.

I would recommend to Government to increase the force here as much as possible, putting down the establishments elsewhere, and of course decreasing the expense in those parts of the empire from which they draw the troops. By this measure they will put it in the power of the officer here to avail himself of every opportunity; they will be sure of holding this country as long as they please; and they will save the whole expense of transports.

I shall be sorry if Government should think themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from this country, on account of the expense of the contest. From what I have seen of the objects of the French Government, and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have no doubt that if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the Peninsula, and the French Government were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the Continent, they would incur all risks to land an army in His Majesty's dominions. Then indeed would commence an expensive contest; then would His Majesty's subjects discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants would be destroyed, whatever might be the result of the military operations. God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor in the scene; and I only hope that the King's Government will consider well what I have above stated to your Lordship; will ascertain as nearly as is in their power the actual expense of employing a certain number of men in this country beyond that of employing them at home or elsewhere; and will keep up their force here on such a footing as will at all events secure their possession without keeping the transports, if it does not enable their Commander to take advantage of events, and assume the offensive.'

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516.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

S<sup>ta</sup> Marinha, 23rd March, 1811.

'I assure you that the departure of the General Officers from the army was as much against my inclination as their arrival in England was injurious to the public interests. I did every thing in my power to prevail upon them not to go, but in vain; and I acknowledge that it has given me satisfaction

G. O.

S<sup>ta</sup> Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

'3. The Commander of the Forces has had frequent occasion to advert to the conduct of officers remaining sick at Lisbon, and he now requests the commandant at Lisbon to forbid all officers of the British army, absent from their corps on account of their health, to frequent the theatres at Lisbon, if cause of complaint should again be given similar to that reported in his letter of the 20th March.

The guards and sentries in the theatres are placed there to preserve good order, and to ensure obedience to the rules of the theatre. The officers of the British army know that they dare not insult an audience in their own country by any irregularity of conduct, or breach of rule; and the Commander of the Forces cannot allow those who are absent from their duty to be guilty of those irregularities at Lisbon, and to add to them the military offence of violating the public authority of a sentry and a guard.'



to find that they have been roughly handled in the newspapers. The consequence of the absence of some of them has been, that in the late operations I have been obliged to be General of Cavalry, and of the advanced guard, and the leader of 2 or 3 columns, sometimes on the same day.

I have requested Colonel Torrens not to allow any General Officer to come out in future, who is not willing to declare that he has no private business to recall him to England, and that he will remain with the army as long as it shall stay in the Peninsula.'

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517.

To Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

S<sup>ta</sup> Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

'The French retired from Celorico yesterday, and they appear to intend to take up a line on the Coa. Their left has gone by Guarda, apparently for Sabugal.

I enclose Graham's dispatches on his action.'

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Lieut. General Graham to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

MY LORD,

Isla de Leon, 6th March, 1811.

'Captain Hope, my first aide de camp, will have the honor of delivering this dispatch, to inform your Lordship of the glorious issue of an action fought yesterday by the division under my command, against the army commanded by Marshal Victor, composed of the 2 divisions, Ruffin's and Leval's.

The circumstances were such as compelled me to attack this very superior force. In order as well to explain to your Lordship the circumstances of peculiar disadvantage under which the action was begun, as to justify myself from the imputation of rashness in the attempt, I must state to your Lordship, that the allied army, after a night march of 16 hours from the camp near Vejer, arrived in the morning of the 5th on the low ridge of Barrosa, about 4 miles to the southward of the mouth of the Santi Petri river. This height extends inland about a mile and a half, continuing on the north the extensive heathy plain of Chiclana. A great pine forest skirts the plain, and circles round the height at some distance, terminating down to Santi Petri; the intermediate space between the north side of the height and the forest being uneven and broken.

A well-conducted and successful attack on the rear of the enemy's lines near Santi Petri, by the vanguard of the Spanish army, under Brig. General Lardizabal, having opened the communication with the Isla de Leon, I received General La Peña's directions to move down from the position of Barrosa to that of the Torre de Bermeja, about half way to the Santi Petri river, in order to secure the communication across the river, over which a bridge had been lately established. This latter position occupies a narrow woody ridge, the right on the sea cliff, the left falling down to the Almanza creek, on the edge of the marsh. A hard sandy beach gives an easy communication between the western points of these 2 positions.

My division, being halted on the eastern slope of the Barrosa height, was marched about 12 o'clock through the wood towards the Bermeja (cavalry patrols having previously been sent towards Chiclana, without meeting with the enemy). On the march I received notice that the enemy had appeared in force on the plain, and was advancing towards the heights of Barrosa.

As I considered that position as the key of that of Santi Petri, I immediately countermarched, in order to support the troops left for its defence; and the alacrity with which this manœuvre was executed served as a favorable omen. It was, however, impossible in such intricate and difficult ground to preserve order in the columns, and there never was time to restore it entirely.

But before we could get ourselves quite disentangled from the wood, the troops on the Barrosa hill were seen returning from it, while the enemy's left wing was rapidly ascending. At the same time, his right wing stood on the plain, on the edge of the wood, within cannon shot. A retreat in the face of such an enemy, already within reach of the easy communication by the sea beach, must have involved the whole allied army in all the danger of being attacked during the unavoidable confusion of the different corps arriving on the narrow ridge of Bermeja nearly at the same time.

Trusting to the known heroism of British troops, regardless of the numbers and position of their enemy, an immediate attack was determined on. Major Duncan soon opened a powerful battery of 10 guns in the centre. Brig. General Dilkes, with the brigade of Guards, Lieut. Colonel Browne's (of the 28th) flank battalion. Lieut. Colonel Norcott's 2 companies of the 2nd rifle corps, and Major Acheson, with a part of the 67th foot (separated from the regiment in the wood), formed on the right.

Colonel Wheatley's brigade, with 3 companies of the Coldstream Guards under Lieut. Colonel Jackson (separated likewise from his battalion in the wood), and Lieut. Colonel Barnard's flank battalion, formed on the left.

As soon as the infantry was thus hastily got together, the guns advanced to a more favorable position, and kept up a most destructive fire.

The right wing proceeded to the attack of General Ruffin's division on the hill, while Lieut. Colonel Barnard's battalion, and Lieut. Colonel Bushe's detachment of the 20th Portuguese, were warmly engaged with the enemy's tirailleurs on our left.

General Leval's division, notwithstanding the havoc made by Major Duncan's battery, continued to advance in very imposing masses, opening his fire of musketry and was only checked by that of the left wing. The left wing now advanced, firing. A most determined charge by the 3 companies of Guards and the 87th regt., supported by all the remainder of the wing, decided the defeat of General Leval's division.

The eagle of the 8th regt. of light infantry, which suffered immensely, and a howitzer, rewarded this charge, and remained in possession of Major Gough, of the 87th regt. These attacks were zealously supported by Colonel Belson with the 28th regt., and Lieut. Colonel Prevost with a part of the 67th.

A reserve formed beyond the narrow valley, across which the enemy was closely pursued, next shared the same fate, and was routed by the same means.

Meanwhile, the right wing was not less successful. The enemy, confident of success, met General Dilkes on the ascent of the hill, and the contest was sanguinary; but the undaunted perseverance of the brigade of Guards, of Lieut. Colonel Browne's battalion, and of Lieut. Colonel Norcott's, and Major Acheson's detachment, overcame every obstacle, and General Ruffin's division was driven from the heights in confusion, leaving 2 pieces of cannon.

No expressions of mine could do justice to the conduct of the troops throughout. Nothing less than the almost unparalleled exertions of every officer, the invincible bravery of every soldier, and the most determined devotion to the honor of His Majesty's arms in all, could have achieved this brilliant success against such a formidable enemy so posted.

In less than an hour and a half from the commencement of the action the enemy was in full retreat. The retiring divisions met, halted, and seemed inclined to form; a new and more advanced position of our artillery quickly dispersed them.

The exhausted state of the troops made pursuit impossible. A position was taken on the eastern side of the hill; and we were strengthened on our right by the return of the 2 Spanish battalions that had been attached before to my division, but which I had left on the hill, and which had been ordered to retire



These battalions (Walloon guards and Ciudad Real) made every effort to come back in time, when it was known that we were engaged.

I understand, too, from General Whittingham, that, with 3 squadrons of cavalry, he kept in check a corps of infantry and cavalry that attempted to turn the Barrosa height by the sea. One squadron of the 2nd hussars, K. G. L., under Captain Busche, and directed by Lieut. Colonel Ponsonby (both had been attached to the Spanish cavalry), joined in time to make a brilliant and most successful charge against a squadron of French dragoons, which were entirely routed.

An eagle, 6 pieces of cannon, the General of Division Ruffin, and the General of Brigade Rousseau, wounded and taken; the chief of the staff, General Bellegarde, an aide de camp of Marshal Victor, and the Colonel of the 8th regt., with many other officers, killed; and several wounded and taken prisoners; the field covered with the dead bodies and arms of the enemy attest that my confidence in this division was nobly repaid.

Where all have so distinguished themselves, it is scarcely possible to discriminate any as the most deserving of praise. Your Lordship will, however, observe how gloriously the brigade of Guards, under Brig. General Dilkes, with the commanders of the battalions, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. C. Onslow, and Lieut. Colonel Sebright (wounded), as well as the 3 separate companies under Lieut. Colonel Jackson, maintained the high character of His Majesty's household troops. Lieut. Colonel Browne, with his flank battalion, Lieut. Colonel Norcott, and Major Acheson, deserve equal praise.

And I must equally recommend to your Lordship's notice Colonel Wheatley, with Colonel Belson, Lieut. Colonel Prevost, and Major Gough, and the officers of the respective corps composing his brigade.

The animated charges of the 87th regt. were most conspicuous. Lieut. Colonel Barnard (twice wounded) and the officers of his flank battalion executed the duty of skirmishing in advance with the enemy in a masterly manner, and were ably seconded by Lieut. Colonel Busche, of the 20th Portuguese, who likewise (twice wounded) fell into the enemy's hands, but was afterwards rescued. The detachment of this Portuguese regiment behaved admirably throughout the whole affair.

I owe too much to Major Duncan, and the officers and corps of the Royal Artillery, not to mention them in terms of the highest approbation: never was artillery better served.

The assistance I received from the unwearied exertions of Lieut. Colonel Macdonald, and the officers of the Adjutant General's department; of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. C. Cathcart, and the officers of the Quarter Master General's department; of Captain Birch and Captain Nicholas, and the officers of the Royal Engineers; of Captain Hope, and the officers of my personal Staff (all animating by their example), will ever be most gratefully remembered. Our loss has been severe: as soon as it can be ascertained by the proper return, I shall have the honor of transmitting it; but much as it is to be lamented, I trust it will be considered as a necessary sacrifice, for the safety of the whole allied army.

Having remained some hours on the Barrosa heights, without being able to procure any supplies for the exhausted troops, the commissariat mules having been dispersed on the enemy's first attack on the hill, I left Major Ross, with the detachment of the 3rd batt. of the 95th, and withdrew the rest of the division, which crossed the Santi Petri river early the next morning.

I cannot conclude this dispatch without earnestly recommending to His Majesty's gracious notice for promotion, Brevet Lieut. Colonel Browne, Major of the 28th foot; Brevet Lieut. Colonel Norcott, Major of the 95th; Major Duncan, Royal Artillery; Major Gough, of the 87th; Major the Hon. E. Acheson, of the 67th; and Captain Birch, of the Royal Engineers, all in the command of corps or

detachments on this memorable service; and I confidently trust that the bearer of this dispatch, Captain Hope (to whom I refer your Lordship for further details), will be promoted, on being permitted to lay the eagle at His Majesty's feet.

I have the honor to be, &c.

THOMAS GRAHAM, Lieut. Gen.

P. S. I beg leave to add, that 2 Spanish officers, Captains Miranda and Naughton, attached to my Staff, behaved with the utmost intrepidity.

T. G.'

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Lieut. General Graham to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD,

Isla de Leon, 10th March, 1811.

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship the return of the killed and wounded in the action of the 5th instant, and I have the satisfaction to add, that the wounded in general are doing well.

By the best account that can be collected from the wounded French officers, the enemy had about 8000 men engaged. Their loss, by reports from Chiclana, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, is supposed to amount to 3000: I have no doubt of its being very great.

I transmit, too, a return of the ordnance in our possession, and also the most accurate note that can be obtained of prisoners, most of whom are wounded. They are so dispersed in different hospitals, that an exact return has not yet been obtained.

I have the honor to be, &c.

THOMAS GRAHAM, Lieut. Gen.

P. S. Detachments of cavalry and infantry have been daily employed in carrying off the wounded, and burying the dead, till the evening of the 8th instant, by which time all the enemy's wounded that could be found among the brushwood and heath were brought in.

T. G.'

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518.

To Lieut. General Graham.

S<sup>ta</sup> Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

I beg to congratulate you, and the brave troops under your command, on the signal victory which you gained on the 5th instant. I have no doubt whatever that their success would have had the effect of raising the siege of Cadiz, if the Spanish corps had made any effort to assist them; and I am equally certain, from your account of the ground, that if you had not decided with the utmost promptitude to attack the enemy, and if your attack had not been a most vigorous one, the whole allied army would have been lost. You have to regret that such a victory should not have been followed by all the consequences which might reasonably be expected from it; but you may console yourself with the reflection that you did your utmost, and, at all events, saved the allied army; and that the failure in the extent of benefit to be derived from your exertions is to be attributed to those who would have derived most advantage from them.

The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be. They march the troops night and day, without provisions or rest, and abusing every body who proposes a moment's delay to afford either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion, or to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed; and then, when the moment of action arrives, they are totally incapable of movement, and they stand by to



see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them, because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human nature is not equal.

I concur in the propriety of your withdrawing to the Isla on the 6th, as much as I admire the promptitude and determination of your attack of the 5th; and I most sincerely congratulate you, and the brave troops under your command, on your success.'

## 519.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

'When I found that the enemy retired with such celerity from Moita, I continued the pursuit of them with the cavalry, and the Light division under Major General Sir W. Erskine only, supporting these troops with the 6th and 3rd divisions of infantry, and by the militia on the right of the Mondego; and I was induced to halt the remainder of the army, till the supplies which had been sent round from the Tagus to the Mondego should arrive. This halt was the more desirable, as nothing could be found in the country; every day's march, increasing the distance from the magazines on the Tagus, rendered the supply of the troops more difficult and precarious; and the farther advance of the main body for a few days did not appear to be necessary.

The cavalry and light troops continued to annoy the enemy's rear, and to take prisoners; and the militia, under Colonel Wilson, had an affair with a detachment of the enemy on the 22nd, not far from Celorico, in which they killed 7 and wounded several, and took 15 prisoners. The militia under General Silveira also took some prisoners on the 25th.

The enemy retired his left, the 2nd corps, by Gouvea, through the mountains upon Guarda, and the remainder of the army by the high road upon Celorico. They have since moved more troops upon Guarda, which position they still hold in strength. Our advanced guard is in front of Celorico, towards Guarda, and at Alverca; and the 3rd division in the mountains, and occupying Miserelha and Prados. The allied troops will be collected in the neighbourhood of Celorico tomorrow. Marshal Beresford's corps assembled at Portalegre on the 22nd; but I have reason to believe that the enemy had made a practicable breach in Campo Mayor on the 21st, and that the Spanish garrison was obliged to capitulate. I have not yet heard the details of the capitulation. The enemy, while engaged in the attack of Campo Mayor, had also obtained possession of the Spanish forts of Alburquerque and Valencia de Alcantara. They had made prisoners part of the garrison of the former.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 21st, I have received letters from Cadiz to the 13th instant, from which I have been made acquainted with the details of the proceedings of the expedition which left that place in the latter end of February, and of the glorious action fought on the 5th instant, and of the result of the expedition. I am convinced that H. R. H. the Prince Regent will duly appreciate the promptitude with which Lieut. General Graham decided to attack the enemy in the important position of which they had obtained possession, the vigor with which he carried that decision into execution, and the gallantry displayed by all the officers and troops upon that glorious occasion.

From the accounts which I have received of the ground, and from what I

know of the nature and disposition of the allied army, I have no doubt that if General Graham had not determined to make this attack immediately, the allied army would have been lost.

I feel equally confident that His Royal Highness will approve of Lieut. General Graham's decision in retiring to the Isla de Leon on the 6th instant, adverting to the losses which the troops had sustained, the fatigues they had undergone, and the omission of the Spanish Commander in Chief to afford them any support in the action which they had fought on the preceding day.'

## 520.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

'I wish you would call together the officers of the dragoons, and point out to them the mischiefs which must result from the disorder of the troops in action. The undisciplined ardor of the — dragoons, and — regt. of Portuguese cavalry, is not of the description of the determined bravery and steadiness of soldiers, confident in their discipline and in their officers. Their conduct was that of a rabble, galloping as fast as their horses could carry them over a plain, after an enemy to whom they could do no mischief after they were broken, and the pursuit had continued to a limited distance; and sacrificing substantial advantages, and all the objects of your operation, by their want of discipline. To this description of their conduct, I add my entire conviction, that if the enemy could have thrown out of Badajoz only 100 men regularly formed, they would have driven back these 2 regiments in equal haste and disorder, and would probably have taken many whose horses would have been knocked up. If the —th dragoons are again guilty of this conduct, I shall take their horses from them, and send the officers and men to do duty at Lisbon. I beg that you will tell De Grey how well satisfied I was with the conduct of his brigade.'

## 521.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

'It always gives me pleasure to attend to any suggestion of your's; but it is very desirable that, as I am now at a great distance from Lisbon, and the communication is so slow that a reference to me must take 8 days, the directions which I give to the inferior departments of the army should be carried into execution without reference, as I generally consider well the various conveniences and inconveniences of any orders before I give them.

When I know that the present Ministers complain of the expense of the war in the Peninsula, that their opponents declare that they would withdraw the army, and that the conduct of the Spaniards affords a good reason for so doing, I consider it my duty not to be unprepared to obey such an order if I should receive it; and to be able to obey it without exposing to insult, by the

G. O.

Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

'2. The Commander of the Forces has received frequent representations from the agents of transports respecting the great quantity of baggage on board the transports belonging to each of the regiments, much of which, it is stated, consists of old clothing, empty boxes, and packing cases, which take up great space and must be entirely useless.

The Commander of the Forces requests the commanding officers of regiments will send to Lisbon an officer belonging to each, in order to arrange the baggage and to destroy such as may be useless, or may be of the description above referred to.'



populace at Lisbon, the King's Minister, yourself, and those of His Majesty's Officers and subjects who should reside there. On this ground I have determined that the regimental baggage should remain in the transports, or otherwise afloat; and I have directed the Commanding Officers of the regiments to send an officer of each down to Lisbon to arrange it, and to destroy such of it as is useless; and I shall be obliged to you if, till that is done, you will allot a transport to hold the baggage of one, two, or three battalions belonging to the same division.'

## 522.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

'The demand for shoes increases to such a degree that it is desirable that 150,000 pairs should be sent to the Tagus as soon as it may be practicable. It is very desirable that the shoes sent to the army should be of the best quality for wear, and should be made of the largest size.

The destruction of this necessary article to a soldier is very much increased by the bad quality of the shoes sent out, and by their being in general too small: and as the operations of the army have now been removed to a distance from Lisbon, the inconvenience and difficulty of supplying their consumption are much increased; at the same time, that, as the soldiers pay for the shoes they receive, it is but just towards them that they should be of the best quality for their purpose, and should fit them.'

## 523.

To the Earl of Liverpool

Marmeleiro, 2nd April, 1811.

'The allied army were collected in the neighbourhood and in front of Celorico on the 28th, with a view to dislodge the enemy from the position which they had taken upon Guarda, which they still occupied in force, and of which they apparently intended to retain possession. On that day a patrol of light infantry from Major General Alex. Campbell's division, commanded by Colonel the Hon. J. Ramsay, had some success against a detachment of the enemy at Avelans; and a patrol of the light cavalry, with a detachment of the 95th, with which was Major General Slade, obliged the enemy to retire from Freixedas. Both took many prisoners; but I am concerned to add, that Brigade Major Stewart, of the 95th, was killed with the last.

On the morning of the 29th, the 3rd, 6th, and Light divisions, and the 16th light dragoons and hussars, under the command of Major General Pictou, Major General Alex. Campbell, and Major General Sir W. Erskine, moved upon Guarda in 5 columns, which were supported by the 5th division in the valley of the Mondego, and by the 1st and 7th from Celorico; and the militia, under Colonel Trant and Colonel Wilson, covered the movement at Alverca, against any attempt which might have been made on that side to disturb it.

The enemy abandoned the position of Guarda without firing a shot, and retired upon Sabugal, on the Coa. They were followed by our cavalry, who took some prisoners from them. On the 30th Sir W. Erskine, with the cavalry and horse artillery, fell upon the rear guard of the 2nd corps, which had been near Belmonte, and had marched for the Coa during the night;

and he killed and wounded several and took some prisoners. The enemy have since taken a position upon the Coa, having an advanced guard on this side; and the allied troops have this day been collected on the left of that river.'

## 524.

To Major Ridewood,\* 52nd Light Infantry.

Villar Mayor, 6th April, 1811.

'It is impossible for me to enter into an explanation with any body on the contents of a public dispatch; but I am very certain that it is misunderstood by you, if you suppose that it contains any expression which can convey a notion that I was not convinced you had done your duty in the affair to which it relates, or that I was not satisfied with your conduct, or that any expression is omitted by which omission such meaning is conveyed.'

## 525.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

'I recommend to them to advert seriously to the nature of the task which they have to perform. Popularity, however desirable it may be to individuals, will not form, or feed, or pay an army; will not enable it to march and fight; will not keep it in a state of efficiency for long and arduous services. The resources which a wise Government must find for these objects must be drawn from the people, not by measures which will render those popular who undertake to govern a country in critical circumstances, but by measures which must for a moment have the contrary effect. The enthusiasm of the people in favor of any individual never saved any country. They must be obliged, by the restraint of law and regulation, to do those things, and to pay those contributions, which are to enable the Government to carry on this necessary contest.'

## 526.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villa Ferosa, 9th April, 1811.

'When I last addressed your Lordship the enemy occupied the Upper Coa, having his right at Rovina, and guarding the post of Rapoula de Coa with a detachment at the bridge of Ferrerias,† and his left at Sabugal, and the 8th corps was at Alfayates.

The right of the British army was opposite Sabugal, and the left at the bridge of Ferrerias. The militia, under General Trant and Colonel Wilson, crossed the Coa below Almeida, in order to threaten the communication of that place with Ciudad Rodrigo and the enemy's army.

The river Coa is difficult of access throughout its course; and the position which the enemy had taken was very strong, and could be approached only by its left. The troops were therefore put in motion on the morning of the 3rd to turn the enemy's left above Sabugal, and to force the passage of the bridge and town; with the exception of the 6th division, which remained opposite the 6th corps, which were at Rovina, and one battalion of the 7th division, which observed the enemy's detachment at the bridge of Ferrerias.

\* Afterwards Lieut. Colonel Ridewood, of the 45th, in command of which regiment he received a mortal wound at the battle of Vitoria.

† Below the bridge of Sequeiros.



The 2nd corps were in a strong position with their right upon a height immediately above the bridge and town of Sabugal, and their left extending along the road to Alfayates, to a height which commanded all the approaches to Sabugal from the fords of the Coa above the town. The 2nd corps communicated by Rendo with the 6th corps at Rovina. It was intended to turn the left of this corps, and with this view the Light division and the cavalry, under Major General Sir W. Erskine, and Major General Slade, were to cross the Coa by two separate fords upon the right; the cavalry upon the right of the Light division; the 3rd division, under Major General Picton, at a ford on their left, about a mile above Sabugal; and the 5th division, under Major General Dunlop, and the artillery, at the bridge of Sabugal.

Colonel Beckwith's brigade of the Light division was the first that crossed the Coa, with 2 squadrons of cavalry upon their right. Four companies of the 95th, and 3 companies of Colonel Elder's caçadores, drove in the enemy's piquets, and were supported by the 43rd regt. At this moment a rain storm came on, which rendered it impossible to see any thing; and these troops, having pushed on in pursuit of the enemy's piquets, came upon the left of their main body, which it had been intended they should turn. The light troops were driven back upon the 43rd regt.; and, as soon as the atmosphere became clear, the enemy having perceived that the body which had advanced were not strong, attacked them in a solid column, supported by cavalry and artillery. These troops repulsed this attack, and advanced in pursuit upon the enemy's position, where they were attacked by a fresh column on the left, and were charged by the hussars on their right. They retired, and took post behind a wall, from which post they again repulsed the enemy, and advanced a second time in pursuit of them, and took from them a howitzer. They were, however, again attacked by a fresh column, with cavalry, and retired again to their post, where they were joined by the other brigade of the Light division, consisting of the 2 battalions of the 52nd, and the 1st caçadores. These troops repulsed the enemy; and Colonel Beckwith's brigade and the 1st batt. 52nd again advanced upon them. They were attacked again by a fresh column, supported by cavalry, which charged their right, and they took post in an enclosure upon the top of a height, from whence they could protect the howitzer which the 43rd had taken; and they drove back the enemy.

The enemy were making arrangements to attack them again in this post, and had moved a column on their left, when the light infantry of Major General Picton's division, under Lieut. Colonel Williams, supported by Major General the Hon. C. Colville's brigade, opened their fire upon them.

At the same moment the head of Major General Dunlop's column crossed the bridge of the Coa, and ascended the heights on the right flank of the enemy, and the cavalry appeared on the high ground in rear of the enemy's left; the enemy then retired across the hills towards Rendo, leaving the howitzer in the possession of those who had so gallantly gained and preserved it, and about 200 killed on the ground, 6 officers, and 300 prisoners in our hands.

Although the operations of this day were, by unavoidable accidents, not performed in the manner in which I intended they should be, I consider the

action that was fought by the Light division, by Colonel Beckwith's brigade principally, with the whole of the 2nd corps, to be one of the most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in. The 43rd regt., under Major Patrickson, particularly distinguished themselves; as did that part of the 95th regt., in Colonel Beckwith's brigade, under the command of Major Gilmour, and Colonel Elder's caçadores. The 1st batt. 52nd regt., under the command of Lieut. Colonel Ross, likewise showed great steadiness and gallantry when they joined Colonel Beckwith's brigade. Throughout the action the troops received great advantage from the assistance of 2 guns of Captain Bull's troop of horse artillery, which crossed at the ford with the Light division, and came up to their support. It was impossible for any officer to conduct himself with more ability and gallantry than Colonel Beckwith.

The action was commenced by an unavoidable accident, to which all operations are liable; but having been commenced, it would have been impossible to withdraw from the ground, without risking the loss of the object of our movements; and it was desirable to obtain possession, if possible, of the top of the hill, from which the enemy had made so many attacks with advantage on the first position taken by the 43rd regt. This was gained before the 3rd division came up. I had also great reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Colonel Drummond, who commands the other brigade in the Light division.

When the firing commenced the 6th corps broke up from their position at Rovina, and marched towards Rendo. The two corps joined at that place, and continued their retreat to Alfayates, followed by our cavalry, part of which was that night at Soito. The enemy continued their retreat that night and the next morning, and entered the Spanish frontier on the 4th. They have since continued their retreat; and yesterday the last of them crossed the Agueda.

I have the honor to enclose the returns of killed and wounded from the 18th March. I am concerned to have to report that Lieut. Colonel Waters was taken prisoner on the 3rd, before the action commenced. He had crossed the Coa to reconnoitre the enemy's position, as had been frequently his practice, without having with him any escort; and he was surrounded by some hussars, and taken. He had rendered very important services upon many occasions in the last 2 years, and his loss is sensibly felt.

I sent 6 squadrons of cavalry, under Sir W. Erskine, on the 7th, towards Almeida, to reconnoitre that place, and drive in any parties which might be in that neighbourhood, and to cut off the communication between the garrison and the army. He found a division of the 9th corps at Junça, which he drove before him across the Turones and Dos Casas; and he took from them many prisoners. Captain Bull's troop of horse artillery did great execution upon this occasion. The enemy withdrew in the night across the Agueda.

The allied army have taken up the position upon the Dos Casas which Brig. General Craufurd occupied with his advanced guard in the latter part of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, having our advanced posts at Gallegos and upon the Agueda. The militia are at Cinco Villas and Malpartida.'



527.

## PROCLAMATION.

10th April, 1811.

'The Portuguese nation are informed that the cruel enemy who had invaded Portugal, and had devastated their country, have been obliged to evacuate it, after suffering great losses, and have retired across the Agueda. The inhabitants of the country are therefore at liberty to return to their occupations.

The Marshal General refers them to the Proclamation which he addressed to them in August last, a copy of which will accompany this Proclamation.

The Portuguese nation now know by experience that the Marshal General was not mistaken, either in the nature or the amount of the evil with which they were threatened, or respecting the only remedies to avoid it, viz., decided and determined resistance, or removal and the concealment of all property, and every thing which could tend to the subsistence of the enemy, or to facilitate his progress.

Nearly 4 years have now elapsed since the tyrant of Europe invaded Portugal with a powerful army. The cause of this invasion was not self defence; it was not to seek revenge for insults offered or injuries done by the benevolent Sovereign of this Kingdom; it was not even the ambitious desire of augmenting his own political power, as the Portuguese Government had, without resistance, yielded to all the demands of the tyrant; but the object was the insatiable desire of plunder, the wish to disturb the tranquillity, and to enjoy the riches of a people who had passed nearly half a century in peace.

The same desire occasioned the invasion of the northern provinces of Portugal in 1809, and the same want of plunder the invasion of 1810, now happily defeated; and the Marshal General appeals to the experience of those who have been witnesses of the conduct of the French army during these three invasions, whether confiscation, plunder, and outrage, are not the sole objects of their attention, from the General down to the soldier.

G. O.

Villa Fermosa, 10th April, 1811.

'1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the commanding officers of regiments, will take pains to prevent the soldiers from committing any depredations in the country.

The soldiers may depend upon it, that the inhabitants will bring nothing for sale, and that they will be deprived of many comforts and conveniences they would otherwise enjoy, if they commit any depredations on the inhabitants.

2. These orders are to be particularly explained to the Portuguese troops, who, the Commander of the Forces is sorry to observe, have been guilty of many acts of plunder. The Portuguese soldiers must be informed that the Commander of the Forces will not allow of this conduct, and that those guilty of it shall be punished in the most exemplary manner.

3. The Commander of the Forces desires that the commanding officers of regiments of Portuguese troops may be directed to oblige their men to keep themselves clean, and to have their clothes and shoes mended. The Commander of the Forces particularly observed the shameful state in which the —d and —th regts. are; and he now gives notice that unless there shall be an immediate amendment in the discipline, as well as appearance of those two regiments, the Commander of the Forces will turn them out of the army, as being unfit to do duty with the other troops.

4. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers commanding brigades will send a steady soldier as an escort with the mules attached to their brigades, going to the rear for supplies, if the Commissary or Capitaz of the mules should require this protection. The soldier, however, must be made to understand that he goes with them only as a protection, and not to force them to march faster or further than the Capitaz is inclined to go.'

Those countries which have submitted to the tyranny have not been better treated than those which have resisted. The inhabitants have lost all their possessions, their families have been dishonored, their laws overturned, their religion destroyed, and, above all, they have deprived themselves of the honor of that manly resistance to the oppressor of which the people of Portugal have given so signal and so successful an example.

The Marshal General, however, considers it his duty, in announcing the intelligence of the result of the last invasion, to warn the people of Portugal, that, although the danger is removed, it is not entirely gone by. They have something to lose, and the tyrant will endeavor to plunder them; they are happy under the mild government of a beneficent Sovereign, and he will endeavor to destroy their happiness; they have successfully resisted him, and he will endeavor to force them to submit to his iron yoke. They should be unremitting in their preparations for decided and steady resistance; those capable of bearing arms should learn the use of them; or those whose age or sex renders them unfit to bear arms should fix upon places of security and concealment, and should make all the arrangements for their easy removal to them when the moment of danger shall approach. Valuable property, which tempts the avarice of the tyrant and his followers, and is the great object of their invasion, should be carefully buried beforehand, each individual concealing his own, and thus not trusting to the weakness of others to keep a secret in which they may not be interested.

Measures should be taken to conceal or destroy provisions which cannot be removed, and every thing which can tend to facilitate the enemy's progress; for this may be depended upon, that the enemy's troops seize upon every thing, and leave nothing for the owner. By these measures, whatever may be the superiority of numbers with which the desire of plunder and of revenge may induce, and his power may enable, the tyrant again to invade this country, the result will be certain; and the independence of Portugal, and the happiness of its inhabitants, will be finally established to their eternal honor.'

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528.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villa Fermosa, 11th April, 1811.

'I have given notice to the Government, and now I give you directions, that if the army cannot be supplied in its operations on the frontier, or in Estremadura, it shall withdraw to its magazines. In respect to Ballesteros, I beg you not to undertake or refrain from any operations, in consequence of any movements or designs of his, as he is not to be depended upon for one moment. Be guided by your own view of your own situation, referring to his only as far as it may affect your's, and do not do any thing, or leave any thing undone, because it may affect him or his situation. Depend upon it, he will not operate in conjunction with you.'

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529.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villa Fermosa, 11th April, 1811

'I beg that you will inform the Portuguese Government that I propose by the next packet to inform His Majesty's Ministers that it is my opinion that they cannot with propriety continue to risk a British army in this



country, unsupported by any exertion of any description on the part of the Portuguese Government.'

530.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villa Fermosa, 13th April, 1811.

'I am very much concerned that I cannot allow money to be given by the Commissariat for the use of the Portuguese Government without my consent. My first care must be of the British troops, on whom all our hopes depend; and Marshal Beresford is not less ready to cry out when those with him experience any deficiency, than he is when the resources of the Portuguese Government fail him.

I have but one answer to give to all the statements of the inconveniences resulting from the delays of reference to me, which is, that I cannot be in two or three places at the same time; and if Government choose to undertake large services, and not supply us with sufficient pecuniary means, and to leave to me the distribution of the means with which they do supply us, I must exercise my own judgment upon the distribution, for which I am to be responsible. Mr. Dummore has only to let us know, from time to time, what money he has in his hands, and I shall order issues to be made of it, to the chest of aids, when I find I can do so without inconvenience.'

531.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Elvas, 21st April, 1811.

'I have not written to Lord Liverpool on the subject on which I told you I should, because I was desirous of giving the concern a farther trial before I should communicate an opinion to Government, which would certainly

G. O.

Villa Fermosa, 13th April, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that if possible the green corn may not be cut for the horses, &c. belonging to the army, and that they may, if possible, be turned into the grass fields in preference to the green corn. It must be understood, however, that the horses, &c. attached to the army, must be fed, and must have the green corn, if they cannot get grass.

2. The Commander of the Forces again calls the attention of General Officers, commanding divisions and brigades, and the officers commanding regiments, to the necessity of preventing the troops from plundering and molesting the inhabitants of the country bringing articles for sale to the different cantonments.

The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe that the Portuguese troops principally are guilty of this conduct, and if he should receive another complaint of them, he will order that the rolls of every Portuguese regiment in the army may be called over every hour, all officers being present.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the commanding officers of regiments, will communicate in their several cantonments by patrols constantly going from one to the other, in order to prevent these depredations, which will end in depriving the troops of all the supplies which they now receive from the country.'

G. O.

Villa Fermosa, 15th April, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers commanding those divisions not employed in investing Almeida or on the duty of the outposts, will exercise the troops under their command occasionally. It is particularly desirable that the soldiers should be kept in the habit of marching, and the Commander of the Forces requests the attention of General Officers commanding divisions to the Orders which have been issued regarding route marching.

2. As soon as the states of the stores will admit of it, the Commissary General will complete the reserves of biscuit with the several corps, and the Commander of the Forces requests the commanding officers to adopt some regimental arrangement for taking care of what will be issued by the Commissaries of Brigades for the soldiers, and to deliver to them only the quantity for their daily consumption till they shall be ordered to march.'

put an end to it. Besides, I think it not impossible, but that if we adhere strictly to our objects, and carry on our operations in conformity to directions and plans laid down, we shall preserve our superiority over the French throughout the campaign; particularly if they should be involved in disputes in the north of Europe.

But I am decidedly of opinion that, unless the Portuguese Government alter their system entirely, it will be impossible for the British army to remain in the country, if we are not able to preserve the superiority; and I should incur a very serious responsibility, if I did not communicate that opinion to the Regent's Ministers. Has any magistrate been yet punished or even dismissed from his office for neglecting his duty? Has any alteration been made of any description in the old system of allowing every booby to do as he pleases, provided only that he cries "*Viva*," and attends the levees of the members of the Government and of the Ministers? Have any of the really efficient measures been adopted which have been recommended, either to bring money into the treasury, which is most wanted; to raise recruits for the army or militia; or to render the former a force efficiently equal to its numbers; or to force the latter to attend to their duty? A fresh invasion would find us exactly where we were last year; and I do not think it would be safe to trust the King's army in this country, after such discouraging circumstances, and after the experience which the enemy have acquired of the country, its roads, &c. &c.

However, although affairs are in a very bad state with the Portuguese part of us at present, they are worse with the French, and the opinion would not at this moment be true, and therefore I shall not communicate it; and I will send it to you, to be shown to the Regency when I shall do so.

I am afraid that we have lost some valuable time here; and I am come here principally to put matters in the right road; and to come to an understanding with Castaños, and if possible, with Blake, respecting our future operations.'

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532.

To Lieut. General Graham.

Elvas, 23rd April, 1811.

'I attribute this disposition of all foreign recruits to desert from our armies to the regularity of system and to the strictness of discipline which exist, and which must be upheld, in order to keep a British army in the field in a state of efficiency for any length of time. They prefer the profits they derive from the plunder they acquire on their marauding parties, even though attended by extreme labor, and hardships, and privations, to the plenty and comfort of the British army, accompanied as these must be by regularity of habit and by the maintenance of strict discipline; and their desertion is frequently very inconvenient, as affording to the enemy the only information which he could acquire.

Under these circumstances, I am not desirous of increasing the number of foreign troops with this army, although I think that every thing ought to be done that is possible to distress the enemy, by enticing his foreign troops to desert; and that when these have deserted they should be equally well treated with our own troops, and formed into battalions, and prepared for service in stations in which they would not be exposed to the same temp-



tations, and would not have the same facilities, to desert again, as they must have in an army close to the enemy in the field.'

## 533.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Elvas, 23rd April, 1811.

'When you first apprised me of the possibility that the command of the Spanish armies might be offered to me, I considered it my duty to inform the Secretary of State of this circumstance; and to request to be made acquainted with the sentiments of His Royal Highness' Government respecting the line which I should adopt in regard to this offer, if it should be made. The answer which I received from the Earl of Liverpool disapproved of my acceptance of the offer; and I now lament that the constant occupation which I have had since I received his letter prevented me from making you acquainted with its contents, which would have saved you the pain which you must have felt in your recent discussions upon this subject with the Spanish Government. Besides, I acknowledge that I never imagined that the proposition would be made which you had expected; and it appeared to me to be useless to write to you to convey the opinion of His Royal Highness' Ministers upon an offer which it was probable would never be made. I beg you will make the use which you may think proper of this communication.

Although I have not yet had any personal communication with General Castaños, I have had every reason to be satisfied with him, and I hope for the best effects from his appointment.

It is impossible for me to enter into the military convention proposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, having no authority from H.R.H. the Prince Regent to make such a convention. I propose, under the instructions which I have received, to carry on such military operations as may be in my power, adverting to the means of the enemy compared with those at my disposal. I shall communicate confidentially, as I have hitherto invariably done, with the Spanish officers and authorities in the neighbourhood of the seat of the operations of the allied British and Portuguese armies, and shall continue to recommend to them such operations and measures as may accord with my views and may forward the general cause. They will be the best judges of the expediency of attending to the counsels and suggestions which I shall make to them; and I can only say that, whether they do or not, I shall continue to do the enemy all the mischief which the means at my own disposition will enable me to do him.'

## 534.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

'It is very desirable that you should not publish the details of my dispatches to your Lordship. You cannot conceive how very deficient the French are in information. All the dispatches from me which are published are sent to Massena from Paris, and they thus acquire the information of what is going on.

When an army is engaged in defensive operations, or in sieges or blockades, or in any other in which it is long in the same position, the enemy acquire all the information they desire, if they obtain a knowledge of its

position and numbers of the date of a month old. Information of this date Massena can and always does acquire, and it is a serious disadvantage to us.'

535.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villa Fermosa, 7th May, 1811.

'All that I can say is, therefore, that I shall carry on offensive operations against the enemy as far as it may lie in my power, and as my instructions will allow me, on one or the other of the plans which I have above detailed to you, according to the best judgment which I may be able to form of the situation of affairs at the time. It will be necessary that you should continue to reinforce us, and that you should send out to us particularly good horses for the cavalry and artillery.

I earnestly recommend to you not to undertake any of the maritime operations on the coast of Spain upon which you have desired to have my opinion. Unless you should send a very large force, you would scarcely be able to effect a landing, and maintain the situation of which you might obtain possession. Then that large force would be unable to move, or to effect any object at all adequate to the expense or to the expectation which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships must be deficient.

It is in vain to hope for any assistance, even in this way, much less military assistance, to such expeditions from the Spaniards. The first thing they would require uniformly would be money; then arms, ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, means of transport, and every thing which your expedition would have a right to require from them; and, after all, this extraordinary and perverse people would scarcely allow the commander of your expedition to have a voice in the decision on the plan of operations to be followed, when the whole should be ready to undertake one.

Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be; upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commanders must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone they will be enabled to draw some resources from the country, and some assistance from the Spanish armies.'

536.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villa Fermosa, 8th May, 1811.

'The enemy's whole army, consisting of the 2nd, 6th, and 8th corps, and all the cavalry which could be collected in Castille and Leon, including about 900 of the Imperial Guard, crossed the Agueda at Ciudad Rodrigo

G. O.

Villa Fermosa, 7th May, 1811.

'1. The Commander of the Forces requests that when an officer makes a report of the movements of the enemy, he will specify whether consisting of cavalry, infantry, or artillery; the number, as far as he could judge; the time when seen, and the road on which moving; from what place, and towards what place, if the officer can state it; and if reference should be made to the right or the left, in the report, care should be taken to state whether to the right of our own army or that of the enemy.'



on the 2nd instant. The battalions of the 9th corps had been joined to the regiments to which they belonged in the other 3 corps; excepting a division consisting of battalions belonging to regiments in the corps doing duty in Andalusia; which division likewise formed part of the army.

As my object in maintaining a position between the Coa and the Agueda, after the enemy had retired from the former, was to blockade Almeida, which place I had learned from intercepted letters, and other information, was ill supplied with provisions for its garrison, and as the enemy were infinitely superior to us in cavalry, I did not give any opposition to their march, and they passed the Azava on that evening, in the neighbourhood of Espeja, Carpio, and Gallegos. They continued their march on the 3rd, in the morning, towards the Dos Casas, in 3 columns; two of them, consisting of the 2nd and 8th corps, to the neighbourhood of Almeida and Fort Concepcion, and the third column, consisting of the whole of the cavalry, and the 6th and that part of the 9th corps which had not already been drafted into the other three.

The allied army had been cantoned along the river Dos Casas, and on the sources of the Azava, the Light division at Gallegos and Espeja. This last fell back upon Fuentes de Oñoro, on the Dos Casas, with the British cavalry, in proportion as the enemy advanced, and the 1st, 3rd, and 7th divisions were collected at that place; the 6th division, under Major General Campbell, observed the bridge at Alameda; and Major General Sir W. Erskine, with the 5th division, the passages of the Dos Casas at Fort Concepcion and Aldea del Obispo. Brig. General Pack's brigade, with the Queen's regiment from the 6th division, kept the blockade of Almeida; and I had prevailed upon Don Julian Sanchez to occupy Nave d'Aver with his corps of Spanish cavalry and infantry. The Light division were moved in the evening to join Major General Campbell, upon finding that the enemy were in strength in that quarter; and they were brought back again to Fuentes de Oñoro on the morning of the 5th, when it was found that the 8th corps had joined the 6th on the enemy's left.

Shortly after the enemy had formed on the ground on the right of the Dos Casas, on the afternoon of the 3rd, they attacked with a large force the village of Fuentes de Oñoro, which was defended in a most gallant manner by Lieut. Colonel Williams, of the 5th batt. 60th regt., in command of the light infantry battalion belonging to Major General Picton's division, supported by the light infantry battalion in Major General Nightingall's brigade, commanded by Major Dick of the 42nd regt., and the light infantry battalion in Major General Howard's brigade, commanded by Major M'Donnell of the 92nd, and the light infantry battalion of the King's German Legion, commanded by Major Aly, of the 5th battalion of the line, and by the 2nd batt. 83rd regt., under Major Carr.

The troops maintained their position: but having observed the repeated efforts which the enemy were making to obtain possession of the village, and being aware of the advantage which they would derive from the possession in their subsequent operations, I reinforced the village successively with the 71st regt. under Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan, and the 79th under Lieut. Colonel Cameron, and the 24th under Major Chamberlain. The former, at the head of the 71st regt., charged the enemy, and drove them

from a part of the village of which they had obtained a momentary possession. Nearly at this time Lieut. Colonel Williams was unfortunately wounded, but I hope not dangerously; and the command devolved upon Lieut. Colonel Cameron of the 79th.

The contest continued till night, when our troops remained in possession of the whole.

I then withdrew the light infantry battalions, and the 83rd regt., leaving the 71st and 79th regts. only in the village, and the 2nd batt. 24th regt. to support them.

On the 4th the enemy reconnoitred the position which we had occupied on the Dos Casas river; and during that night they moved the Duc d'Abrantes' corps from Alameda to the left of the position occupied by the 6th corps, opposite to Fuentes de Oñoro.

From the course of the reconnoissance on the 4th, I had imagined that the enemy would endeavor to obtain possession of Fuentes de Oñoro, and of the ground occupied by the troops behind that village, by crossing the Dos Casas at Pozo Velho; and in the evening I moved the 7th division, under Major General Houstoun, to the right, in order, if possible, to protect that passage.

On the morning of the 5th, the 8th corps appeared in 2 columns, with all the cavalry, on the opposite side of the valley of the Dos Casas and Pozo Velho; and as the 6th and 9th corps also made a movement to their left, the Light division, which had been brought back from the neighbourhood of Alameda, were sent with the cavalry, under Sir S. Cotton, to support Major General Houstoun; while the 1st and 3rd divisions made a movement to their right, along the ridge between the Turones and Dos Casas rivers, corresponding to that of the 6th and 9th corps, on the right of the Dos Casas. The 8th corps attacked Major General Houstoun's advanced guard, consisting of the 85th regt., under Major Macintosh, and the 2nd Portuguese caçadores, under Lieut. Colonel Nixon, and obliged them to retire; and they retired in good order, although with some loss. The 8th corps being thus established in Pozo Velho, the enemy's cavalry turned the right of the 7th division, between Pozo Velho and Nave d'Aver, from which last place Don Julian Sanchez had been obliged to retire; and the cavalry charged.

The charge of the advanced guard of the enemy's cavalry was met by 2 or 3 squadrons of the different regiments of British dragoons, and the enemy were driven back; and Colonel La Motte, of the 13th chasseurs, and some prisoners, taken. The main body were checked and obliged to retire by the fire of Major General Houstoun's division; and I particularly observed the Chasseurs Britanniques, under Lieut. Colonel Eustace, as behaving in the most steady manner; and Major General Houstoun mentions in high terms the conduct of a detachment of the Duke of Brunswick's light infantry. Notwithstanding that this charge was repulsed, I determined to concentrate our force towards the left, and to move the 7th and Light divisions and the cavalry from Pozo Velho towards Fuentes de Oñoro, and the other two divisions.

I had occupied Pozo Velho and that neighbourhood, in hopes that I should be able to maintain the communication across the Coa by Sabugal, as well as provide for the blockade, which objects it was now obvious were incompatible



with each other; and I therefore abandoned that which was the least important, and placed the Light division in reserve in the rear of the left of the 1st division, and the 7th division on some commanding ground beyond the Turones, which protected the right flank and rear of the 1st division, and covered the communication with the Coa, and prevented that of the enemy with Almeida by the roads between the Turones and that river.

The movement of the troops upon this occasion was well conducted, although under very critical circumstances, by Major General Houstoun, Brig. General Craufurd, and Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton. The 7th division was covered in its passage of the Turones by the Light division, under Brig. General Craufurd; and this last, in its march to join the 1st division, by the British cavalry.

Our position thus extended on the high ground from the Turones to the Dos Casas. The 7th division, on the left of the Turones, covered the rear of the right; the 1st division, in two lines, were on the right; Colonel Ashworth's brigade, in two lines, in the centre; and the 3rd division, in two lines, on the left; the Light division and British artillery in reserve; and the village of Fuentes in front of the left. Don Julian's infantry joined the 7th division in Freneda; and I sent him with his cavalry to endeavor to intercept the enemy's communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.

The enemy's efforts on the right part of our position, after it was occupied as I have above described, were confined to a cannonade, and to some charges with his cavalry, upon the advanced posts. The piquets of the 1st division, under Lieut. Colonel Hill of the 3rd regt. of Guards, repulsed one of these; but as they were falling back, they did not see the direction of another in sufficient time to form to oppose it, and Lieut. Colonel Hill was taken prisoner, and many men were wounded, and some taken, before a detachment of British cavalry could move up to their support. The 2nd batt. 42nd regt., under Lord Blantyre, also repulsed a charge of the cavalry directed against them.

They likewise attempted to push a body of light infantry upon the ravine of the Turones, to the right of the 1st division, which were repulsed by the light infantry of the Guards under Lieut. Colonel Guise, aided by 5 companies of the 95th under Captain O'Hare.\* Major General Nightingall was wounded in the course of the cannonade, but I hope not severely.

The enemy's principal effort was throughout this day again directed against Fuentes de Oñoro; and, notwithstanding that the whole of the 6th corps were at different periods of the day employed to attack this village, they could never gain more than a temporary possession of it. It was defended by the 24th, 71st, and 79th regts., under the command of Lieut. Colonel Cameron; and these troops were supported by the light infantry battalions of the 3rd division, commanded by Major Woodgate; the light infantry battalions of the 1st division, commanded by Major Dick, Major M'Donald, and Major Aly; the 6th Portuguese caçadores, commanded by Major Pinto; by the light companies in Colonel Champelmond's Portuguese brigade, under Colonel Sutton; and those in Colonel Ashworth's Portuguese brigade, under Lieut. Colonel Pynn, and by the piquets of the 3rd division, under the command of Colonel the Hon. R. Trench. Lieut. Colonel Cameron was

\* Afterwards killed in the assault of Badajoz in 1812.

severely \* wounded in the afternoon, and the command in the village devolved upon Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan.

The troops in Fuentes were besides supported, when pressed by the enemy, by the 74th regt., under Major Russell Manners, and the 1st batt. 88th regt., under Lieut. Colonel Wallace, belonging to Colonel Mackinnon's brigade; and on one of these occasions, the 88th, with the 71st and 79th, under the command of Colonel Mackinnon, charged the enemy, and drove them through the village; and Colonel Mackinnon has reported particularly the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Wallace, Brigade Major Wilde, and Lieut. and Adjutant Stewart. The contest again lasted in this quarter till night, when our troops still held their post; and from that time the enemy have made no fresh attempt on any part of our position.

The enemy manifested an intention to attack Major General Sir W. Erskine's post at Aldea del Obispo on the same morning, with a part of the 2nd corps; but the Major General sent the 2nd batt. Lusitanian Legion across the ford of the Dos Casas, which obliged them to retire.

In the course of last night the enemy commenced retiring from their position on the Dos Casas; and this morning, at daylight, the whole was in motion. I cannot yet decide whether this movement is preparatory to some fresh attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida, or is one of decided retreat; but I have every reason to hope that they will not succeed in the first, and that they will be obliged to have recourse to the last. Their superiority in cavalry is very great, owing to the weak state of our horses, from recent fatigue and scarcity of forage, and the reduction of numbers in the Portuguese brigade of cavalry with this part of the army, in exchange for a British brigade sent into Estremadura with Marshal Sir W. Beresford, owing to the failure of the measures reported to have been adopted to supply horses and men with food on the service. The result of a general action, brought on by an attack upon the enemy by us, might, under those circumstances, have been doubtful; and if the enemy had chosen to avoid it, or if they had met it, they would have taken advantage of the collection of our troops to fight this action, and throw relief into Almeida.

From the great superiority of force to which we have been opposed upon this occasion, your Lordship will judge of the conduct of the officers and troops. The actions were partial, but very severe, and our loss has been great. The enemy's loss has also been very great, and they left 400 killed in the village of Fuentes, and we have many prisoners. I particularly request your attention to the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Williams, and Lieut. Colonel Cameron, and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan; and to that of Colonel Mackinnon, and Lieut. Colonel Kelly, 24th regt.; of the several Officers commanding battalions of the line and of light infantry, which supported the troops in Fuentes de Oñoro; likewise to that of Major Macintosh of the 85th, and of Lieut. Colonel Nixon of the 2nd caçadores, and of Lieut. Colonel Eustace, of the Chasseurs Britanniques, and of Lord Blantyre.

Throughout these operations I have received the greatest assistance from Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer, and all the General Officers of the army; and from the Adjutant and Quarter Master General, and the officers of their several departments, and those of my personal Staff.

\* Mortally.



## 537.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villa Fermosa, 11th May, 1811.

'I have had two conversations with —; and I am concerned to say that, notwithstanding his abilities, he appears to me but little calculated to do the business I require from him. I want him to assist me in obtaining a knowledge of the mode in which the connection between the troops and the several civil departments is regulated; to know how all that business is now going on here; and to see how we can make the matter work better than it does under the existing regulations. He thinks of nothing but new regulations and establishments, which are very necessary perhaps; but it is not his business to propose them, nor mine to carry them into execution. I hope that we shall understand each other better, and that I may be able to put every thing on a good footing here.'

## 538.

To Captain General Don F. X. Castañón.

Villa Fermosa, 13th May, 1811.

'The alteration which your Excellency has made in the propositions made by me meets with my concurrence. It was my duty to make a proposition upon so delicate a subject as that of the command of allied troops acting in co-operation, which should be so reasonable in itself as to meet with the concurrence of all those to whom it should be made; but it is consistent with the mainly good sense, and candor, and knowledge of the state of affairs, which characterise your Excellency, to amend that proposition, by one calculated to give satisfaction to those of the allies who have most to lose in the contest for which it is our object to provide. It is impossible but that what you have proposed should be approved by all parties; and I assure you, that the disinterested forbearance of your conduct is highly appreciated by me.'

## 539.

To Major General Cameron, 79th regt.

Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

'When I wrote to you last week I felt that I conveyed to you information which would give you great pain; but I hoped that I had made you acquainted with the full extent of the misfortune which had befallen you. Unfortunately, however, those upon whose judgment I relied were deceived: your son's wound was worse than it was then supposed to be: it was mortal, and he died on the day before yesterday, at 2 in the morning.

I am convinced that you will credit the assurance which I give you, that I condole with you most sincerely upon this misfortune, of the extent of which no man is more capable than myself of forming an estimate, from the knowledge which I had, and the just estimate which I had formed, in my own opinion, of the merits of your son. You will always regret and lament his loss, I am convinced; but I hope that you will derive some consolation from the reflection that he fell in the performance of his duty, at the head of your brave regiment, loved and respected by all that knew him, in an action in which, if possible, the British troops surpassed every thing they had ever done before, and of which the result was most honorable to His Majesty's arms. At all events, Providence having deprived you of your son, I cannot conceive a string of circumstances more honorable and glorious than those under

which he lost his life, in the cause of his country. Believe me, however, that, although I am fully alive to all these honorable circumstances attending his death, I most sincerely condole with you upon your loss.'

## 540.

To Major General Alex. Campbell.

Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

'I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers and soldiers of the army to advance upon the enemy; but it is my duty, and that of every General and other Officer in command, to regulate this spirit, and not to expose the soldiers to contend with unequal numbers in situations disadvantageous to them; and, above all, not to allow them to follow up trifling advantages to situations in which they cannot be supported, from which their retreat is not secure, and in which they incur the risk of being prisoners to the enemy they had before beaten. The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army; but that quality which I wish to see the officers possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool, discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude how far they can and ought to go with propriety; and to convey their orders, and act with such vigor and decision, that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity. The officers of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed are not less prudent than they are powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience of any officer realised the stories, which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry or dragoons.

I trust that this letter, copies of which I propose to circulate to the General Officers commanding divisions, with directions to circulate it among the officers of the army, will have the effect of inducing them to reflect seriously upon the duties which they have to perform before the enemy, and to avoid the error which is the subject of it, which is really become one of serious detriment to the army and to the public interests.'

## 541.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

'No part of the enemy's army remained on the left of the Aguada on the evening of the 10th instant, excepting one brigade of cavalry, close to the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo. The 2nd corps had crossed at Barba de Puerco and the ford of Val de Espino, and were cantoned in that neighbourhood; and our advanced posts were upon the Azava and the Lower Aguada.

The 6th division resumed the duty of the blockade of Almeida on that evening; and Major General Sir W. Erskine was ordered to send a battalion to Barba de Puerco to guard the bridge there, which had been previously ordered, and had been posted, to observe the passages of the Dos Casas between Aldea del Obispo and Barba de Puerco. The enemy blew up some mines which they had constructed at the works of Almeida at a little before 1 of the morning of the 11th, and immediately attacked the piquets by which the place was observed, and forced their way through them. They fired but little; and they appear to have marched between the



bodies of troops posted to support the piquets; and in particular could not have passed far from the right of the Queen's regt.

Upon the first alarm Brig. General Pack, who was at Malpartida, joined the piquets, and continued to follow and to fire upon the enemy, as a guide for the march of the other troops employed in the blockade; and Major General Campbell marched from Malpartida with a part of the 1st batt. 36th regt. But the enemy continued their march in a solid, compact body, without firing; and were well guided between the positions occupied by our troops.

The 4th regt., which was ordered to occupy Barba de Puerco, unfortunately missed the road, and did not arrive there till the enemy had reached the place, and commenced to descend to the bridge, and at the same moment with the 36th regt. with Major General Campbell, and the light battalions of the 5th division, which Major General Sir W. Erskine had detached from Aldea del Obispo to Barba de Puerco, as soon as he had heard that the enemy had come out from Almeida.

The enemy suffered very considerable loss, both in prisoners and in killed and wounded, as well in the march from Almeida as in the passage of the Agueda. It appears that that part of the 2nd corps which were in San Felices formed upon the river, to protect their passage, as soon as they heard the firing; and Lieut. Colonel —— of the ——th, who had crossed with a detachment of the ——th and ——th regts., was obliged to retire with some loss.

I enclose the reports of Major General Campbell, Brig. General Pack, and other officers employed, upon the transactions of this night; to which I add the reports of General Regnier, and of General Brenier to the Prince d'Essling, which have been intercepted and brought to me. From the former your Lordship will observe that the arrival of the garrison at Barba de Puerco was entirely unexpected; and that it was, as reported in my letter of the 10th instant, left to its fate by the enemy.

The enemy are indebted for the small part of the garrison which they have saved, principally to the unfortunate mistake of the road to Barba de Puerco by the 4th regt. During the whole period of the blockade, but particularly during the period that the enemy's army were between the Dos Casas and the Azava, the garrison were in the habit of firing cannon during the night; and the piquets near the place were frequently attacked. On the night of the 7th there had been a very heavy fire of cannon from the place, and the piquets were attacked; and another on the night of the 8th; and the Queen's regt. in particular, and the other troops employed in the blockade, were induced to believe that the explosion which they heard on the morning of the 11th, was of the same description with those which they had heard on the preceding nights; and the Queen's regt. did not move at all, nor the other troops, till the cause of the explosion had been ascertained.

Since the 11th instant the enemy have continued their retreat towards the Tormes; and it has been reported to me that they have crossed that river, and are on their march towards the Douro. But I have not received this report from any authority on which I can rely.

I have detached from this army, into the Alentejo, the 3rd and 7th divisions of infantry; and I have ordered the 2nd hussars, which have arrived

at Celorico, to march in that direction likewise. My reason for making this detachment is to be able to support Sir W. Beresford in strength, if the enemy should attempt to interrupt the siege of Badajoz; and as all is now quiet on this frontier, I propose to return to the Alentejo in the course of a few days. Sir W. Beresford invested Badajoz on both sides of the Guadiana on the 8th, and broke ground on both sides on that night. The enemy made a sortie, and endeavored to prevent our troops from occupying the ground, from which they were to direct their attack against the outwork of San Christoval, but the enemy were driven in. They had made another sortie on the morning of the 10th, in large force, and were driven in again by our troops; but I am concerned to add that our loss upon this occasion was very severe, owing to the gallant but imprudent advance of the troops quite to the glacis of San Christoval, and to a situation in which they were exposed to the fire of musketry and grape from that outwork, as well as from the body of the place. I have not received the official reports of Sir W. Beresford of these transactions, nor of his opening his fire, which, I have reason to believe, commenced on the Pardaleras, Picurina, and San Christoval, on the morning of the 11th.

Your Lordship will observe from Major General Campbell's report of the transaction at Barba de Puerco, that the same imprudence to which I have above referred was the cause of the loss sustained upon that occasion; and all the loss of prisoners in the action at Fuentes de Oñoro on the 3rd and 5th instant was to be attributed to the impetuosity of the officers and troops, which could not be kept within bounds.

The corps of Spanish troops under General Blake, which had been landed in the Guadiana, had drawn near the frontiers of Estremadura, in order to co-operate with Sir W. Beresford in the attack of Badajoz; and I understand that Marshal Soult is employed in fortifying Seville, where he has collected a large body of troops.'

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542.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

'Possibly I have to reproach myself for not having been on the spot; but really, when the enemy's whole army had crossed the Agueda, with the exception of one brigade of cavalry, in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, I did not think it probable that the attempt to escape would be made; and having employed 2 divisions and a brigade, to prevent the escape of 1400 men, who I did not think it likely would attempt to escape, the necessity of my attending personally to this operation, after I had been the whole day on the Azava, did not occur to me. However, it is that alone in the whole operation in which I have to reproach myself, as every thing was done that could be done in the way of order and instruction. I certainly feel, every day, more and more the difficulty of the situation in which I am placed. I am obliged to be every where, and if absent from any operation, something goes wrong. It is to be hoped that the General and other Officers of the army will at last acquire that experience which will teach them that success can be attained only by attention to the most minute details; and by tracing every part of every operation from its origin to its conclusion, point by point, and ascertaining that the whole is understood by those who are to execute it.'



## 543

To Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Sabugal, 16th May, 1811

‘ Although the cavalry may at times be joined to one or more divisions of the army for particular services, and that the senior officer present would of course command the whole, still each division, as well as the cavalry, must be considered as a separate body, under its own Commanding Officer, for all matters of interior regulation, having its Staff Officers and departments exclusively attached to it, and employed under the directions of the General Officer commanding the division, in the duties of the division to which they are attached. In all duties of a general nature, of course the senior Officer of the two or three divisions acting together, would give his directions, and would be responsible, leaving the execution of the duty to be performed by each division, under the direction of its Commanding Officer, who would be responsible to him for it. As the Light division and the cavalry were a good deal jumbled together on the late service, I had determined to draw this line, but I forgot it before I came away; and I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate this letter to Sir S. Cotton and General Craufurd.

As for our advanced guard, at present I think it ought to consist of the Light division and 4 squadrons of cavalry; and Pack ought to have 2 squadrons of Portuguese cavalry with his post at Barba de Puerco, &c. Sir Stapleton will decide whether he will remain forward with these 4 squadrons, taking the command of the advanced guard on the principle above laid down; or whether the 4 squadrons shall be employed, also on the principle above laid down, with the Light division under the orders of General Craufurd. In either case Sir Stapleton will of course relieve the 4 squadrons as often as he may think it expedient.’

## 544.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

‘ You will have heard of the Marshal’s action on the 16th: the fighting was desperate, and the loss of the British has been very severe; but, adverting to the nature of the contest, and the manner in which they held their ground against all the efforts the whole French army could make against them, notwithstanding all the losses which they had sustained, I think this action one of the most glorious and honorable to the character of the troops of any that has been fought during the war.’

## 545.

To Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 22nd May, 1811.

‘ I went yesterday to Albuera, and saw the field of battle. We had a very good position, and I think should have gained a complete victory in it, without any material loss, if the Spaniards could have manœuvred; but unfortunately they cannot. The French are retiring; but I do not think it clear that they are going beyond the Sierra Morena. As I know you have plenty of correspondents, I do not give you any details of the action here, or of our loss. I think the action, upon the whole, to be the most honorable to the troops that they have been engaged in during the war.’

546.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Elvas, 22nd May, 1811.

'The Spanish troops, I understand, behaved admirably; they stood like stocks, both parties at times firing on them, but they were quite immoveable; and this is the great cause of all our losses. After they had lost their position, the natural thing to do would have been to attack it with the nearest Spanish troops, but they could not be moved; the British troops were the next, and they were brought up, and must always in these cases be brought up; and they suffered accordingly.

The battle of Talavera was an example of the same defect in the Spanish troops; they could not be moved, however advantageous this movement might have been; and I suspect that the battle of Barrosa was something of the same kind.

It is scarcely to be believed, that any officer, who could depend upon the discipline of his troops in their movements, would have remained the quiet spectator of such an action at such a moment.

From these circumstances, you will believe that I am not very easy about the result of another action, if we should be obliged to fight one. What a pity it is that the Spaniards will not set to work seriously to discipline their troops! We do what we please now with the Portuguese troops; we manœuvre them under fire equally with our own, and have some dependence on them; but these Spaniards can do nothing, but stand still, and we consider ourselves fortunate if they do not run away.'

547.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 22nd May, 1811.

'On the night of the 15th instant I received from Marshal Sir W. Beresford letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which reported that Marshal Soult had broken up from Seville, and had advanced towards Estremadura, about the 10th, notwithstanding the reports which had been previously raised, that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville, and the approaches to that city, by works; and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia.'

I therefore set out on the following morning from Villa Ferrosa; and having received further information of the 14th from Sir W. Beresford, of the enemy's movements, I hastened my progress, and arrived here on the 19th, and found that Sir W. Beresford had raised the siege of Badajoz, without the loss of ordnance or stores of any description, had collected the troops under his command, and had formed a junction with Generals Castaños and Blake, at Albuera, in the course of the 15th instant. He was attacked there on the 16th, by the French army under the command of Marshal Soult; and after a most severe engagement, in which all the troops conducted themselves in the most gallant manner, Sir W. Beresford gained the victory. The enemy retired in the night of the 17th instant, leaving between 900 and 1000 wounded on the ground. Sir W. Beresford sent the allied cavalry after them, and on the 19th in the morning re-invested Badajoz.

I enclose the reports of Sir W. Beresford of the 16th and 18th instant, on the operations of the siege to the moment of raising it, and on the battle at Albuera; and I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the ability, the



firmness, and the gallantry manifested by Marshal Sir W. Beresford throughout the transactions on which he has written. I shall add nothing to what he has said of the conduct of all the officers and troops, excepting to express my admiration of it, and my cordial concurrence in the favorable reports made by Sir W. Beresford of the good conduct of all.

As Sir W. Beresford frequently refers in the enclosed dispatches to the instructions from me, and to the correspondence between General Castaños and me; and as I think it possible that the papers may not have reached England from Cadiz, I now transmit copies of my instructions to Marshal Sir W. Beresford, and of my letter to General Castaños, on the plan of co-operation for the allied troops in the siege of Badajoz.

I likewise enclose General Castaños' answer to my letter upon this subject, agreeing to carry into execution the plan proposed; and I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to that part of the General's letter in which, with great delicacy and propriety, he declines to agree to that part of the proposed plan which would have given him the command of the allied army in the action, for which it was the object of the plan to provide, and proposes another mode of settling this delicate question, by which the command would rest with Marshal Sir W. Beresford.

I likewise enclose the copy of my answer to this last letter.

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Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B., to Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B.

MY LORD,

Albuera, 18th May, 1811.

I have infinite satisfaction in communicating to your Lordship that the allied army, united here under my orders, obtained, on the 16th instant, after a most sanguinary contest, a complete victory over that of the enemy, commanded by Marshal Soult; and I shall proceed to relate to your Lordship the circumstances.

In a former report I have informed your Lordship of the advance of Marshal Soult from Seville, and I had in consequence judged it wise entirely to raise the siege of Badajoz, and prepare to meet him with our united forces, rather than, by looking to two objects at once, to risk the loss of both.

Marshal Soult, it appears, had been long straining every nerve to collect a force which he thought fully sufficient to his object for the relief of Badajoz; and for this purpose he had drawn considerable numbers from the corps of Marshal Victor and General Sebastiani, and also, I believe, from the French army of the centre. Having thus completed his preparations, he marched from Seville on the 10th instant, with a corps then estimated at 15,000 or 16,000 men, and was joined on descending into Estremadura by the corps under General Latour Maubourg, stated to be 5000 men.

His Excellency General Blake, as soon as he learned the advance of Marshal Soult, in strict conformity to the plan proposed by your Lordship, proceeded to form his junction with the corps under my orders, and arrived at Valverde in person on the 14th instant, where, having consulted with his Excellency and General Castaños, it was determined to meet the enemy and to give him battle.

On finding the determination of the enemy to relieve Badajoz, I had broken up from before that place, and marched the infantry to the position in front of Valverde, except the division of Major General the Hon. G. L. Cole, which, with 2000 Spanish troops, I left to cover the removal of our stores.

The cavalry, which had, according to orders, fallen back as the enemy advanced, was joined at Santa Marta by the cavalry of General Blake; that of General Castaños, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, had been always with it.

As remaining at Valverde, though a stronger position, left Badajoz entirely

open, I determined to take up a position (such as could be got, in this widely open country) at this place, thus standing directly between the enemy and Badajoz. The army was therefore assembled here on the 15th instant. The corps of General Blake, though making a forced march to effect it, only joined in the night, and could not be placed in its position till the morning of the 16th instant, when General Cole's division, with the Spanish brigade under Don Carlos de España, also joined, and a little before the commencement of the action. Our cavalry had been forced on the morning of the 15th instant to retire from Santa Marta, and joined here.

In the afternoon of that day the enemy appeared in front of us. The next morning our disposition for receiving the enemy was made, being formed in two lines, nearly parallel to the river Albuera, on the ridge of the gradual ascent rising from that river, and covering the roads to Badajoz and Valverde, though your Lordship is aware that the whole face of this country is every where passable for all arms. General Blake's corps was on the right in two lines; its left, on the Valverde road, joined the right of Major General the Hon. W. Stewart's division, the left of which reached the Badajoz road, where commenced the right of Major General Hamilton's division, which closed the left of the line. General Cole's division, with one brigade of General Hamilton's, formed the second line of the British and Portuguese army.

The enemy, on the morning of the 16th, did not long delay his attack. At 8 o'clock he was observed to be in movement, and his cavalry was seen passing the rivulet of Albuera, considerably above our right; and shortly after he marched out of the wood opposite to us a strong force of cavalry, and two heavy columns of infantry, pointing them to our front, as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera. During this time, under cover of his vastly superior cavalry, he was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river beyond our right; and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that flank, and to cut us off from Valverde.

Major General Cole's division was therefore ordered to form an oblique line to the rear of our right, with his own right thrown back; and the intention of the enemy to attack our right becoming evident, I requested General Blake to form part of his first line, and all his second, to that front, which was done,

The enemy commenced his attack at 9 o'clock, not ceasing at the same time to menace our left; and after a strong and gallant resistance of the Spanish troops, he gained the heights upon which they had been formed. Meanwhile the division of Major General the Hon. W. Stewart had been brought up to support them, and that of Major General Hamilton brought to the left of the Spanish line, and formed in contiguous close columns of battalions, to be moveable in any direction. The Portuguese brigade of cavalry, under Brig. General Otway, remained at some distance on the left of this, to check any attempt of the enemy below the village.

As the heights the enemy had gained raked and entirely commanded our whole position, it became necessary to make every effort to retake and maintain them; and a noble one was made by the division of General Stewart, headed by that gallant officer.

Nearly at the beginning of the enemy's attack a heavy storm of rain came on, which, with the smoke from the firing, rendered it impossible to discern any thing distinctly. This, with the nature of the ground, had been extremely favorable to the enemy in forming his columns, and in his subsequent attack.

The right brigade of General Stewart's division, under Lieut Colonel Colborne, first came into action, and behaved in the most gallant manner; and finding that the enemy's column could not be shaken by fire, proceeded to attack it with the bayonet; and, while in the act of charging, a body of Polish lancers (cavalry), which the thickness of the atmosphere and the nature of the ground had concealed



(and which was, besides, mistaken by those of the brigade, when discovered, for Spanish cavalry, and therefore not fired upon), turned it; and, being thus attacked unexpectedly in the rear, was unfortunately broken, and suffered immensely. The 31st regt., being the left one of the brigade, alone escaped this charge, and, under the command of Major L'Estrange, kept its ground until the arrival of the 3rd brigade, under Major General Houghton. The conduct of this brigade was most conspicuously gallant; and that of the 2nd brigade, under the command of Lieut. Colonel the hon. A. Abercromby, was not less so. Major General Houghton, cheering on his brigade to the charge, fell pierced by wounds.

Though the enemy's principal attack was on this point of the right, he also made a continual attempt upon that part of our original front at the village and bridge, which were defended in the most gallant manner by Major General Baron C. Alten, and the light infantry brigade of the German legion, whose conduct was, in every point of view, conspicuously good. This point now formed our left, and Major General Hamilton's division had been brought up there; and he was left to direct the defence of that point, whilst the enemy's attack continued on our right, a considerable proportion of the Spanish troops supporting the defence of this place.

The enemy's cavalry, on his infantry attempting to force our right, had endeavored to turn it; but, by the able manœuvres of Major General the Hon. W. Lumley, commanding the allied cavalry, though vastly inferior to that of the enemy in number, his endeavors were foiled. Major General Cole, seeing the attack of the enemy, very judiciously bringing up his left a little, marched in line to attack the enemy's left, and arrived most opportunely to contribute, with the charges of the brigades of General Stewart's division, to force the enemy to abandon his situation, and retire precipitately, and to take refuge under his reserve. Here the Fusilier brigade particularly distinguished itself.

He was pursued by the allies to a considerable distance, and as far as I thought it prudent, with his immense superiority of cavalry; and I contented myself with seeing him driven across the Albuera.

I have every reason to speak favorably of the manner in which our artillery was served, and fought; and Major Hartmann, commanding the British, and Major Dickson, commanding the Portuguese, and the officers and men, are entitled to my thanks. The 4 guns of the horse artillery, commanded by Captain Le Fevre, did great execution on the enemy's cavalry; and one brigade of Spanish artillery (the only one in the field) I saw equally gallantly and well served. We lost in the misfortune which occurred to the brigade commanded by Lieut. Colonel Colborne (whom General Stewart reports to have acted, and was then acting, in a most noble manner, leading on the brigade in admirable order) one howitzer, which the enemy, before the arrival of the gallant General Houghton's brigade, had time to carry off with 200 or 300 prisoners of that brigade. After he had been beaten from this, his principal attack, he still continued that near the village, on which he never could make any impression, or cross the rivulet, though I had been obliged to bring a very great proportion of the troops from it, to support the principal point of attack; but the enemy seeing his main attack defeated, relaxed in his attempt there also. The Portuguese division of Major General Hamilton in every instance evinced the utmost steadiness and courage, and manœuvred equally well with the British. Brig. General Harvey's Portuguese brigade, belonging to General Cole's division, had an opportunity of distinguishing itself when marching in line across the plain, by repulsing, with the utmost steadiness, a charge of the enemy's cavalry.

It is impossible to enumerate every instance of discipline and valor shown on this severely contested day; but there never were troops that more valiantly or more gloriously maintained the honor of their respective countries. I have not been able to particularise the Spanish divisions, brigades, or regiments, that were

particularly engaged, because I am not acquainted with their denominations or names; but I have great pleasure in saying that their behavior was most gallant and honorable: and though, from the superior number and weight of the enemy's force, that part of them that were in the position attacked were obliged to cede the ground, it was after a gallant resistance, and they continued in good order to support their allies; and I doubt not his Excellency General Blake will do ample justice on this head, by making honorable mention of the deserving.

The battle commenced at 9 o'clock, and continued without interruption till 2 in the afternoon, when, the enemy having been driven over the Albuera, for the remainder of the day there was but cannonading and skirmishing.

It is impossible by any description to do justice to the distinguished gallantry of the troops; but every individual most nobly did his duty, which will be well proved by the great loss we have suffered, though repulsing the enemy; and it was observed that our dead, particularly the 57th regiment, were lying as they had fought in ranks, and every wound was in front.

Major General the Hon. W. Stewart most particularly distinguished himself, and conduced much to the honor of the day; he received two contusions, but would not quit the field. Major General the Hon. G. L. Cole is also entitled to every praise; and I have to regret being deprived for some time of his services by the wound he has received. Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercromby, commanding the 2nd brigade, 2nd division, and Major L'Estrange, 31st regt., deserve to be particularly mentioned; and nothing could exceed the conduct and gallantry of Colonel Inglis\* at the head of his regiment. To Major General the Hon. W. Lumley, for the very able manner in which he opposed the numerous cavalry of the enemy, and foiled him in his object, I am particularly indebted. To Major General Hamilton, who commanded on the left during the severe attack upon our right, I am also much indebted; and the Portuguese brigades of Brig. Generals Fonseca and Archibald Campbell deserve to be mentioned. To Major General C. Alten, and to the excellent brigade under his orders, I have much praise to give; and it is with great pleasure I assure your Lordship that the good and gallant conduct of every corps, and of every person, was in proportion to the opportunity that offered for distinguishing themselves. I know not an individual who did not do his duty. I have, I fear, to regret the loss to the service of Colonel Collins, commanding a Portuguese brigade, his leg having been carried off by a cannon shot. He is an officer of great merit; and I deeply lament the death of Major General Houghton, and of those two promising officers, Lieut. Colonel Sir W. Myers and Lieut. Colonel Duckworth.

It is most pleasing to me to inform your Lordship, not only of the steady and gallant conduct of our allies, the Spanish troops under his Excellency General Blake, but also to assure you that the most perfect harmony has subsisted between us; and that General Blake not only conformed in all things to the general line proposed by your Lordship, but in the details; and in whatever I suggested to his Excellency, I received the most immediate and cordial assent and co-operation; nothing was omitted on his part to ensure the success of our united efforts; and during the battle, he most essentially, by his experience, knowledge, and zeal, contributed to its fortunate result. His Excellency the Captain General Castaños, who had united the few troops he had in a state to be brought into the field to those of General Blake, and placed them under his orders, assisted in person in the field; and not only on this, but on all occasions, I am much indebted to General Castaños, who is ever beforehand in giving whatever can be beneficial to the success of the common cause. Though I unfortunately cannot point out the corps, or many of the individuals of the Spanish troops, that distinguished themselves, yet I will not omit to mention the names of General Ballesteros, whose gallantry

\* The late Lieut. General Sir H. Inglis, K.C.B.



was most conspicuous, as of the corps he had under his command; and the same of General Zayas and of Don Carlos de España. The Spanish cavalry have behaved extremely well; and the Conde de Penne Villemur is particularly deserving to be mentioned.

I annex the return of our loss in this hard contested day: it is very severe; and in addition to it is the loss of the troops under his Excellency General Blake, who are killed, missing, and wounded, but of which I have not the return. The loss of the enemy, though I cannot know what it is, must be still more severe. He has left on the field of battle about 2000 dead, and we have taken from 900 to 1000 prisoners. He has had 5 Generals killed and wounded: of the former, Generals of Division, Werle and Pesim; and Gazan and two others amongst the latter. His force was much more considerable than we had been informed of, as I do not think he displayed less than from 20,000 to 22,000 infantry, and he certainly had 4000 cavalry, with a numerous and heavy artillery. His overbearing cavalry cramped and confined all our operations, and, with his artillery, saved his infantry after its rout. He retired after the battle to the ground he had been previously on, but occupying it in position; and on this morning, or rather during the night, commenced his retreat on the road he came, towards Seville, and has abandoned Badajoz to its fate. He left a number of his wounded on the ground he had retired to, and to whom we are administering what assistance we can. I have sent our cavalry to follow the enemy; but in that arm, he is too powerful for us to attempt any thing against him in the plains he is traversing.

Thus we have reaped the advantage we proposed from opposition to the attempts of the enemy; and, whilst he has been forced to abandon the object for which he has almost stripped Andalusia of troops, instead of having accomplished the haughty boasts with which Marshal Soult harangued his troops on leaving Seville, he returns there with a curtailed army, and, what perhaps may be still more hurtful to him, with a diminished reputation.

In enumerating the services received from the officers of my own Staff, I must particularly call your Lordship's attention to those of Brig. General d'Urban, Quarter Master General to the Portuguese army; and which I cannot sufficiently praise, though I can appreciate. On all occasions I have felt the benefits of his talents and services, and more particularly on this, where they very essentially contributed to the success of the day: and I cannot here omit the name of Lieut. Colonel Hardinge, Deputy Quarter Master General to the Portuguese troops, whose talents and exertions deserve my thanks. To Brig. General Mozinho, Adjutant General of the Portuguese army, and to Lieut. Colonel Rooke, Assistant Adjutant General to the united British and Portuguese force, and to Brig. General Lemos, and to the officers of my own personal Staff, I am indebted for their assistance.

To the services of Lieut. Colonel Arbuthnot (Major in His Majesty's service) I am also much indebted; and he is the bearer of this to your Lordship, and is fully enabled to give you any further information you may desire, and is most deserving of any favor your Lordship may be pleased to recommend him for to H.R.H. the Prince Regent.

I have the honor to be, &c.

W. C. BERESFORD,  
Marshal and Lieut. Gen.

P.S. Major General Hamilton's division, and Brig. General Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, march tomorrow morning to reinvest Badajoz on the south side of the Guadiana.

W. C. B.'

548.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 23rd May, 1811.

' I should feel no anxiety about the result of any of our operations, if the Spaniards were as well disciplined as the soldiers of that nation are brave, and if they were at all moveable ; but this is, I fear, beyond all hope ; all our losses have been caused by this defect. At Talavera, the enemy would have been destroyed, if we could have moved the Spanish army ; at Albuera, the natural thing would have been to support the Spaniards on the right with the Spaniards who were next to them ; but any movement of that body would have created inextricable confusion ; and it was necessary to support the right with British, and thus the great loss fell upon our troops : in the same way, I suspect, the difficulty and danger of moving the Spanish troops was the cause that General La Peña did not support General Graham at Barrosa.

I am glad to hear such good accounts of affairs in the north. God send that they may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting tyranny : however, of this I am very certain, that whether true or not at present, something of the kind must occur before long, and, if we can only hold out, we shall yet see the world relieved.'

549.

To S. Whitbread, Esq.

Elvas, 23rd May, 1811.

' I was most highly gratified by your letter of the 29th April, which I received last night ; and I beg leave to return my thanks for the mode in which you have taken the trouble of informing me of the favorable change of your opinion respecting affairs in this country.

I acknowledge that I was much concerned to find that persons, for whom I entertained the highest respect, and whose opinions were likely to have great weight in England and throughout Europe, had delivered erroneous opinions, as I thought, respecting affairs in this country ; and I prized their judgments so highly, at the same time that I was certain of the error of the opinion which they had delivered, that I was induced to attribute their conduct to the excess of the spirit of party.

I assure you that, highly as I am gratified and flattered by the approbation of ———, and yourself and others, that which gives me most pleasure in the account which I received last night from England, is to be convinced that such men could not be unjust towards an officer in the service of the country abroad ; and that the opinions which they had delivered, however unfavorable to him, were the real dictates of their judgments, upon a fair view of all the circumstances which had come to their knowledge. To the gratification arising from this conviction to one who appears destined to pass his life in the harness, you have added that which I received from your obliging letter ; and I assure you that I am very sensible of the kindness towards me which induced you to write to me.'

550.

To the Right Hon. J. Villiers.

Elvas, 25th May, 1811.

' I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of yesterday, and I am very much obliged to you for it.



No man can appreciate better than yourself the difficulties with which I have had to contend; but I believe that you are not aware of all of them. I persevered in the system which I thought best, notwithstanding that it was the opinion of every British Officer in the country that I ought to embark the army; while, on the other hand, the Portuguese civil authorities contended that the war ought to be maintained on the frontier, for which they wanted not only physical force, but the means of providing for the force which they could produce in the field. I believe nothing but something worse than firmness could have carried me through the 9 months' discussion with these contending opinions. To this add that people in England were changing their opinions almost with the wind, and you will see that I had not much to look to, excepting myself.

I am concerned to tell *you*, who are interested in every thing concerning this country, that we are in rather an uncomfortable state with the Portuguese Government. In August last, Principal Sousa was appointed to the Government; and, at the same time, we learned that he was a kind of agent of an intrigue to remove Beresford from the command of the army, and to give it to the Duke of Brunswick, which you will readily believe was not very agreeable to me. He then began the persecution of French partisans, and nobody was exempt from his accusation. Mozinho, Lemos, even Sodré, were accused, and would have been sent off, if I had not set my face against such proceedings, of which, by the bye, he afterwards said we were the authors; and, as he was appointed with a view to curb "the despotism of the Secretariat," as ———— calls it, he immediately made a dart at Forjaz, the instrument of which, since you had arrived at Lisbon, the servants of the British Government had availed themselves to manage the affairs of Portugal.

Then there was no subject in which the mischievous activity of his mind did not interfere, and he was the most active partisan of carrying on the war on the frontier; and, in his conversations upon this subject, was so indiscreet as to infuse into the militia of Lisbon opinions so dangerous, that Beresford and I thought it expedient to *honor these corps* by calling them to the army, providing others for the duties of the city. Then, by his influence in the Regency, he delayed, by the discussions on this point, all the measures which had been recommended early in the summer for the removal of persons, property, and provisions, and rendering useless the mills, till it was too late; and to him is to be attributed the length of time which the French were enabled to remain in the country.

These circumstances brought me into direct discussion with this gentleman; and I complained of him to the Prince, in a letter which I wrote in December last, and sent open to the Regency, in which I told the Prince that it was my opinion that it would not be to his advantage to retain Principal Sousa and me in his service at the same time. To this letter the Prince has sent an answer which shows that intrigue is hard at work in Brazil.

However, upon all this I should be indifferent, as it must be indifferent to me who are the Governors of the Kingdom, only that things are growing to such a state as to threaten the existence of the country, if the French should be able again to invade it. We can get the Government to do

nothing. All the departments of the army are worse than useless. The army is not near complete; indeed we have not 20,000 Portuguese troops in the field; and some circumstances have occurred lately which have demonstrated the positive danger resulting from the system on which we are acting to such a degree, as to induce me to tell our Government that it was my opinion that the British army ought not to be exposed to it, if the French should again be able to get the superiority in the country.

Forjaz has sent in his resignation; Mr. Stuart no longer attends the Regency. I have no intercourse with them; and I think the country will be lost, if we cannot re-establish the influence of Great Britain (not of ———) in the councils of Brazil, if the French should be again able to attack it. After all that you have done here, this account will not be very pleasing to you; but it is perfectly true, and I assure you that I have not exaggerated the consequences which are likely to follow from this state of things. The worst is, that I do not know how they can be remedied. The removal of Principal Sousa from the Government would not now answer; and I do not know what will, excepting a radical change of system in the Government, as well here as in Brazil.

P. S. I hope that the people in England will not be out of temper with the loss in Beresford's action with Soult: it was owing to the Spaniards, who could not be moved. Beresford was rather in a hurry in making his returns, and nearly all the men returned missing have since joined their regiments.'

551.

To Brig. General Peacocke.

Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

'Orders will go by this occasion for the 11th light dragoons to march to this place, as soon as they shall be disembarked and prepared to move.'

I am excessively anxious that this regiment should reach the army in good order; and I particularly request you to point out to the Commanding Officer how much the condition of his horses will depend upon the attention paid to them by the officers and men on their first arrival, and on the care with which they are at first moved.

Great attention should likewise be paid to the mode of feeding and watering the horses, as pointed out repeatedly in General Orders; and I recommend that inquiry should be made from the officers of dragoons, and veterinary surgeons at Lisbon, regarding the mode of treating the prevailing disorder among the horses in this country, in case those of the 11th should be attacked with it on the march.

Great attention should likewise be paid to the backs of the horses; they will otherwise suffer very materially.'

552.

To Deputy Commissary General ———.

Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

'It is proper that I should inform you that the report of you, which I made to Colonel Gordon, was not founded on any complaint received of you from Mr. Kennedy. I made that report because the service had suffered, and is now suffering, the greatest inconvenience, owing to delays in that part of the department of which you were the head; and from which post



I ordered that you might be removed, from a thorough conviction, which has since proved to be well founded, that the service would be still further embarrassed if you continued to conduct it. As I made no reflection upon your character, excepting it can be called a reflection to report that you were not able to conduct a very complicated branch of business, to which you were entirely unaccustomed, I do not think that any necessity existed for informing you that you were removed at my suggestion; but as you have been so informed, I have no objection to state to you that I had no wish to do you an injury, and that I have no doubt that you are perfectly competent to conduct those branches of the commissariat to which you have been accustomed, in those scenes in which you have hitherto served.

His Majesty's Government, and the British public, will not hear excuses for failures in this country; and it is my business to take care, where there is any failure in any department, not to employ again the person who is the cause of it; and in instances in which the officer who fails is of high rank and standing in respect to others, as you are, there is no remedy excepting to remove him from this country to one in the service of which he may be better acquainted, and in which failure may be less critical than it is in this.'

## 553.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, 30th May, 1811.

'The unfortunate desire to acquire and retain a low and vulgar popularity, and to please and flatter the lower orders, which has characterised almost every man who has appeared in a conspicuous situation throughout the recent events in Spain and Portugal, prevented the adoption of any of these measures till very lately; and I believe that some inefficient measures have been adopted upon these subjects, which, if they should ever produce any, can produce no effect for some months; and in the mean time the pecuniary distresses of the Government are increasing daily, are undermining their strength and authority, and will end by overwhelming every thing.'

## 554.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de Granicha, 4th June, 1811.

'This is my sincere opinion, which I could not with propriety any longer conceal from the Regent's Government; and the Ministers will determine

G. O.

Quinta in front of Elvas, 2nd June, 1811.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests to have by return of post, from the several regiments addressed to the Adjutant General, returns, stating what number of these men are mounted, and dismounted, and the names of the several General and Staff Officers to whom they are attached.

4. The General Orders upon this subject are perfectly well known, and it must be obvious that if they had been attended to, so many men could not have been taken from the ranks of the cavalry; and the Commander of the Forces requests the General and Staff Officers of the army will send back to the regiments of cavalry the men they may have beyond the numbers allowed by the orders of the army, and Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton is requested hereafter to report immediately the detention of any soldier of the cavalry by any officer of the army.

5. It is not the intention of the Commander of the Forces to prevent the General and Staff Officers of the army from having the assistance of dismounted *bât-men* from the cavalry, if the General Officer commanding the cavalry is of opinion that they can be spared from the service of their regiments, and the officers commanding regiments of cavalry are disposed to allow them this convenience, but they must be prepared to forego it, if the soldiers of the cavalry are wanted for any cavalry service whatever.'

what they shall do upon it. I have no objection to the Portuguese Government being informed of its existence, in order that they may be prepared with their *documentos* in answer to it ; but nothing but a change of system can induce me to change it, or to recommend to the King's Government to support the contest one moment beyond that at which I shall see in the Government, not only verbal professions, but a cordial desire and corresponding exertions to carry it on, and to save their own country. That has been my invariable sentiment, and upon that sentiment I shall evacuate the country as readily as I have defended it. The Government are quite mistaken if they suppose that any selfish desire of acquiring character has, or ever will, actuate my conduct. I come here to perform my duty ; and I neither do nor can enjoy any satisfaction in any thing, excepting the performance of my duty to my own country, of which a principal part is the communication of my opinions to the Government of Great Britain.'

G. O.

Quinta in front of Elvas, 3rd June, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces has been in the constant habit of allowing those soldiers, who make any capture from the enemy, to receive the value of their capture ; but he is concerned to have observed, and to have received reports from several of the General Officers, that this indulgence has had the effect of inducing some of the soldiers to look for, and secure captures, rather than to engage and destroy the enemy, and he is induced therefore to give the following orders :—

2. The Order of the 19th May, 1809, Nos. 7 and 8, must be understood to be in full force, and all horses, &c. captured from the enemy, not purchased by the Commissary, must be sold by public auction, at Head Quarters, or such other place as the Commander of the Forces may select, as that in which it is most likely they will bring the largest price.

3. It is the intention of the Commander of the Forces to order that the value of any animal taken from the enemy, the contents of baggage, knapsacks, saddle bags, &c. captured, shall be divided among those present at the capture, whoever may be the individual who may happen to make it.

4. Any men, or number of men, who shall secure and bring in a number of prisoners or captured horses, shall not be allowed to share in this benefit, unless he or they shall be ordered by the officer under whose immediate command he or they are serving, to secure the prisoners or horses captured.

5. Any man who leaves his ranks in order to secure prisoners or horses, or other articles captured, without orders from his commanding officer, must be brought before a Court Martial on a charge of disobedience of orders when before the enemy.

6. These orders must be read to every regiment in the army at two different parades, and afterwards at the same period with the Articles of War.

7. The Commander of the Forces has had occasion to notice in the General Orders of the 30th March, No. 2, the inconvenience that was felt from the great quantities of baggage in the transports, and having referred to the Commander in Chief upon this subject, the Commander of the Forces has been informed that the regiments which embarked at different times for Portugal had left regimental depôts of their heavy baggage behind them, where they certainly should have deposited all articles not required in the field.

8. Under these circumstances the quantities of heavy baggage which are now on board the transports in the Tagus ought not to be there ; and the Commander in Chief has been pleased to give directions that the Storekeeper General at Portsmouth may receive them into his stores, from whence they can be sent to the regimental deposits.

9. The Commander of the Forces is not disposed to deprive any regiment, or any individual officer, of what may be necessary or convenient to them ; but from all the accounts he has received, much of the baggage at Lisbon must be entirely useless to the regiments as well as to the officers, while, on the other hand, it is very inconvenient and expensive to keep it where it is.

10. The Commander of the Forces therefore requests the officers commanding regiments will give directions to the officers of their several regiments sent to Lisbon, under the General Orders of the 30th March, on the concerns of the baggage, to select that baggage, as well belonging to the regiment as to individual officers, which it will be convenient to them to retain in the country, and to apply to the Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon for tonnage to send the remainder to Portsmouth to the stores of the Storekeeper General.

11. Every package thus sent is to be marked "Regimental Baggage of — Battalion, — regt., to be lodged in the stores of the Storekeeper General."



555.

To Colonel Gordon.

Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

‘ These unfortunate Governments in the Peninsula had been reduced to such a state of decrepitude, that I believe there was no authority existing within Spain or Portugal before the French invaded these countries. The French invasion did not improve this state of things; and since what is called in Spain the revolution, and in Portugal the restoration, no crime that I know of has been punished in either, excepting that of being a French partisan. Those malversations in office; those neglects of duty; the disobedience of orders; the inattention to regulation, which tend to defeat all plans for military operation, and ruin a state that is involved in war, more certainly than the plots of all the French partisans, are passed unnoticed; and notwithstanding the numerous complaints which Marshal Beresford and I have made, I do not know that one individual has yet been punished, or even dismissed from his office. The cause of this evil is the mistaken principle on which the government have proceeded. They have imagined that the best foundation for their power was a low, vulgar popularity, of which the evidence is the shouts of the mob of Lisbon, and the regular attendance at their levees, and the bows and scrapes, of people in office, who ought to have other modes of spending their time; and to obtain this bubble the Government of Portugal, as well as the successive Governments in Spain, have neglected to perform those essential duties of all Governments, viz., to force those they are placed over to do their duty, by which, before this time, these countries would have been out of danger.

The other evil is connected very materially with the first. The Government will not regulate their finances, because it will interfere with some man’s job. They will not lay on new taxes, because in all countries those who lay on taxes are not favorites with the mob. They have a general income tax called 10 per cent., and in some cases 20 per cent., which they have regulated in such a manner as that no individual, I believe, has paid a hundredth part of what he ought to have paid. Then, from want of money, they can pay nobody, and of course have not the influence which they ought to have over the subordinate departments.

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In addition to embarrassments of all descriptions surrounding us on all sides, I have to contend with an ancient enmity between these two nations, which is more like that of cat and dog than any thing else, of which no sense of common danger, or common interest, or any thing, can get the better, even in individuals.

Our transport, which is the great lever of the commissariat, is done, principally, if not entirely, by Spanish muleteers; and, to oblige Mr. Kennedy, they would probably once or twice carry provisions to a Portuguese regiment, but they would prefer to quit us, and attend the French, to being obliged to perform this duty constantly.’

556.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

‘ In consequence of a report from the Chief Engineer, Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, that the fire from San Christoval might occasion the loss of many

lives in the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and the breach in that outwork having been apparently much improved by the fire throughout the 6th, I directed that an attempt might be made to carry San Christoval by storm that night. Major General Houstoun, who conducted the operations of the siege on the right of the Guadiana, accordingly ordered a detachment under Major Macintosh, of the 85th regt., to make the attempt. The men advanced under a very heavy fire of musketry and hand grenades from the outworks, and of shot and shells from the town, with the utmost intrepidity, and in the best order, to the bottom of the breach; the advanced guard being led by Ensign Dyas, of the 51st regt., who volunteered to perform this duty; but they found that the enemy had cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp; and, notwithstanding that they were provided with ladders, it was impossible to mount it. They retired with some loss.

The fire upon San Christoval, as well as upon the place, continued on the 7th, 8th, and 9th, on which day the breach in the wall of San Christoval appeared practicable, and I directed that a second attempt should be made on that night to obtain possession of that outwork. Major General Houstoun ordered another detachment for this service, under the command of Major M'Geechy, of the 17th Portuguese regt., who, with the officers destined to command the different parties composing the detachment, had been employed throughout the 8th and 9th in reconnoitring the breach, and the different approaches to it. They advanced at about 9 at night, in the best order, though opposed by the same means, and with the same determination as had been opposed to the detachment which had made the attempt on the 6th. Ensign Dyas again led the service, and the storming party arrived at the foot of the breach; but they found it impossible to mount it, the enemy having again cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp. The detachment suffered considerably, and Major M'Geechy, the Commanding Officer, was unfortunately killed, and others of the officers fell; but the troops continued to maintain their station till Major General Houstoun ordered them to retire.

When the reinforcements had arrived from the frontiers of Castille, after the battle of Albuera, I undertook the siege of Badajoz, entertaining a belief that the means of which I had the command would reduce the place before the end of the second week in June, at which time I expected that the reinforcement for the enemy's southern army, detached from Castille, would join Marshal Soult. I was unfortunately mistaken in my estimate of the quality of these means.

The ordnance belonging to the garrison of Elvas is very ancient and incomplete; unprovided with the improvements adapted by modern science to facilitate and render more certain the use of cannon; and although classed generally as 24 pounders, the guns were found to be of a calibre larger than the shot in the garrison of that weight. The fire from this ordnance was therefore very uncertain, and the carriages proved to be worse even than we supposed they were; and both guns and carriages were rendered useless so frequently by the effect of our own fire as to create delay, in consequence of the necessity which existed for exchanging both in the advanced batteries. Those who are accustomed to observe the effect of the fire of artillery will be astonished to learn that fire was kept up from the 2nd to the 10th instant



from fourteen 24 pounders, upon the walls of the castle of Badajoz, constructed of rammed earth and loose stones, of which the foot was seen at the distance of from 400 to 600 yards, and that it had not at last effected a practicable breach. It was impossible to estimate the length of time which would elapse before a practicable breach could have been effected in this wall; and, even if one had been effected, it was the opinion of the engineers and others, as well as my own, that although the breach could have been stormed, we could not have formed our troops to attack the enemy's entrenchment within, unless we had possession of Fort San Christoval.

We had failed in 2 attempts to obtain possession of Fort San Christoval, and it was obvious to me that we could not obtain possession of that outwork without performing a work which would have required the labor of several days to accomplish it.

On the morning of the 10th instant, I received the enclosed intercepted dispatch, from the Duc de Dalmatie to the Duc de Raguse, which pointed out clearly the enemy's design to collect in Estremadura their whole force; and I had reason to believe that Bonet's corps, which had marched from Toledo on the 28th and 29th May, and was expected at Cordova on the 5th and 6th instant, would have joined the southern army by the 10th; and it was generally expected in the country that the southern army would have moved by that time. The movement of this army alone would have created a necessity for raising the siege; but on the same morning, I received accounts from the frontiers of Castille, which left no doubt of the destination of the army of Portugal to the southward, and gave ground for belief that they would arrive at Merida on the 15th instant. I therefore ordered that the siege should be raised. I am concerned to add that this measure was rendered expedient, not only by the military considerations to which I have above referred, but by others relative to the security of Elvas.

If the siege had been continued only for 2 days longer there would have remained in Elvas only 10,000 24 pound shot; a quantity by no means sufficient for its defence, if the course of events should enable the enemy to attack that place; and I learn that there are none at Lisbon, and if there were any, the Government, under present circumstances, have not the power of procuring means of transport to send it up.

Since the troops under Sir W. Beresford have been in this part of the country, General Hamilton's division of Portuguese troops, consisting of 3 brigades, had been supplied with provisions generally from the stores of Elvas, as well as the troops of the garrison; and the stores of Elvas had been very inadequately, if at all, upheld to answer these demands. The consequence is that there are not at this moment in the fort supplies for the garrison for one fortnight.

All the means of transport which could be collected in this neighbourhood were employed in aid of the operations of the siege, from which they could not be relieved till the siege should be raised, and the ordnance and stores returned to Elvas.

The application of these means of transport, to bring a supply to Elvas from the British magazines at Abrantes (which is the resource from which at last it must be drawn), and the eventual safety of that place, depended upon the early discontinuance of the operations against Badajoz; and

this, independent of the circumstances above referred to, and the military considerations resulting from them, was a principal motive with me for raising the siege on the 10th instant. From this circumstance, your Lordship will see additional reason to lament the state of inefficiency of all the Portuguese departments attached to the army. It affords an additional proof of the embarrassments which meet me at every turn, from wants and deficiencies for which the Portuguese Government ought to provide, but which invariably at last fall, at the most critical moments, upon the resources which have been provided, with great difficulty and labor, and at great expense, by the departments of the British army.

I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the officers and troops employed at the siege of Badajoz, whose labors and exertions deserved a very different result. Major General Picton directed the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and Major General Houstoun on the right; and I am much indebted to those officers, as well as to Major General Hamilton, and the other General and Staff Officers, and the officers and troops under their command respectively. Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, of the Royal engineers, was the directing engineer, and immediately superintended the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and Captain Squire those on the right of that river; and these officers, and the corps of Royal engineers, have, by their conduct on this occasion, augmented their claims to my approbation.

Lieut. Colonel Framingham commanded the artillery, having under his orders Major Dickson,\* attached to the Portuguese service, who, during the absence of Lieut. Colonel Framingham with the troops which were employed to cover the operations, conducted all the details of this important department. I had every reason to be satisfied with these officers, and most particularly with Major Dickson, from whose activity, zeal, and intelligence, the British service has derived great advantage in the different operations against Badajoz. Captain Cleves, of the Hanoverian artillery, conducted that department on the right of the Guadiana with great success. The service of the batteries was performed by detachments from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regts. of Portuguese artillery, who conducted themselves remarkably well. They were aided by Captain Rainsford's company of the Royal artillery, who were indefatigable; some of them having never quitted the batteries.

I am much indebted to General Leite, the Governor of the province of Alentejo and of Elvas, for the assistance which he again afforded me in this operation.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded throughout the siege, from which your Lordship will observe that, excepting in the attempts to obtain possession of San Christoval, our loss has not been severe. We still maintain the blockade of Badajoz; and I know from an intercepted letter, that the enemy had in the place, on the 28th May, only 3 weeks' provisions.

I have not yet heard that the enemy have moved from their position at Llerena, and I imagine that the arrival of the 9th corps has been delayed longer than was expected; and it is probable that Soult will be unwilling to

\* The late Major General Sir Alex. Dickson, G.C.B., then Captain Dickson, R.A., and Major in the Portuguese service. The details and superintendence of the sieges were principally confided to him.



move, till he hears of the movements of the army of Portugal. They broke up from the Tormes on the 3rd, and their advanced guard arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo on the evening of the 5th. They moved forward again on the 6th, and Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer withdrew the advanced guard of the troops under his command, first to Nave d'Aver, and thence to Alfayates; having his main body on the high ground behind Soito; and on the following morning, he retired behind the Coa at Sabugla. The enemy patrolled on the 6th into Fuentes de Oñoro, and into Nave d'Aver.

I enclose Sir B. Spencer's report of these operations, from which it appears that the Royal dragoons, under Colonel Clifton, and a squadron of the 14th, the whole directed by Major General Slade, distinguished themselves.

I imagine that the enemy's march in this direction was intended as a reconnoissance, and to cover the march of a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, as on the following day, the 7th, the whole moved from thence to Morasverdes, in the direction of the Puerto de Baños; near which pass, General Regnier had been with two divisions of the army of Portugal since the 5th. On the 8th, in the evening, one division of General Regnier's troops had come through Baños; and I expect that those divisions will have arrived at Plasencia on the 9th, and the whole army on the 10th.

I had directed Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer to make a movement corresponding with those of the enemy, if they should move to the southward; and the greatest part of his corps is now at Castello Branco and Villa Velha; and a part of it on this side of the Tagus, at Niza.

The Commissary General has thrown a sufficient quantity of provisions into all the places on the frontier, and measures are in progress to improve the defence of them all.

P.S. Since writing this dispatch, I have received accounts that General Drouet's troops joined on the enemy's right at Berlanga and Azuaga yesterday, and a report that their cavalry were in movement towards Los Santos this morning. The British cavalry and the 2nd and 4th divisions were about to march from Villa Franca and Almendralejo, towards Albuera; and I have ordered there General Hamilton's division; and I shall proceed there this night myself, if I should find this report confirmed.'

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557.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Elvas, 17th June, 1811.

'Under these circumstances I should, and shall, avoid a general action if I can; but I must put a countenance upon the state of affairs, and matters must be risked till provisions be placed in Elvas.

\* \* \* \* \*

I also beg that whatever is thus given in charity may be given on the

G. O.

Quinta in front of Elvas, 16th June, 1811.

'3. The General Officers commanding divisions are requested to give particular directions that the General Orders may be strictly attended to, which require that all men unable to march on account of sickness should be sent into the general hospital immediately.

4. No officer can be enabled to form an opinion of the moment at which the troops under his command may be called upon to move; and although the means of transport with the army may be sufficient to remove those who may by accident fall sick, if they should be removed immediately, they cannot be sufficient, if the numbers are allowed to accumulate, and if the sick are not removed till the order for a march shall actually have arrived.'

ground of the wants of the several districts, and by no means in reference to the wants of the means of transport for the military operations. The Government have it in their power to collect these means of transport whenever we may require them, and ought to do their duty; and I do not think that the charity of the people of England ought to be laid out to aid in the operations of the war, or to save the Government the trouble of forcing those parts of the people, who have not suffered, to do their duty by their country.

The quantity of 24 pound shot, we understand, that could be sent from Lisbon, was 480, which we fired in about 2 hours!!!

## 558.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

Quinta de St. João, 29th June, 1811.

‘ I have had a conversation with General C. Stewart respecting your wish to quit the army for a short time, and conceived that he had communicated with you, which is the reason that you have not received an earlier answer to your letter.

We experienced so much inconvenience, last spring, from the absence of the General Officers from the army, that I have received orders, which leave very little discretion with me to give leave of absence on private concerns. Your case, however, appears to me to be of a different description; for, at the same time that you have private affairs to settle, the state of your health renders your absence desirable; and I think that, at this period, it will be more convenient that you should absent yourself than it would be at any other. Under these circumstances I have no objection to your going: but, as I think it not improbable that others will desire the same indulgence, who have neither the same claims nor the same reasons for going as you have, I wish you would send me a certificate, in the usual form, of the state of your health.’

## 559.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Quinta de St. João, 30th June, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th June, with its enclosures. I am sorry to say that, under existing circumstances, no confidence can be placed in the parole of any French Officer. I know many who have been allowed to quit England on their parole not to serve till exchanged, who are now serving in the armies in Spain, although no British Officers, or others, have been sent from France in exchange for them. This practice will be continued till the allies determine to adopt a system of rigor and punishment towards the prisoners in their power, in proportion to that followed by the enemy, and in reference to the conduct of the prisoners themselves. I have invariably experienced the greatest inconvenience from allowing any persons to return to the enemy’s army.

As nothing is believed in England that is written by persons in authority in this country, it is not believed that the Generals commanding the French armies have no communication with each other, and that they are entirely ignorant of all that is passing around them; and that they have, in fact, no information, excepting what they derive from deserters from the foreign regiments in our service, of whom there are, I am sorry to say, too many, and from the prisoners occasionally sent back to them, in exchange for some of our officers and soldiers.

Adverting to the superiority of the enemy’s numbers over the allied Bri-



tish and Portuguese armies, and to the inefficiency of the Spanish troops, I attribute the success which we have had hitherto in a great degree to the want of information by the enemy's General Officers. At this moment, though the whole army are within a few miles of them, they do not know where they are; but, if disabled prisoners are to be sent to them, they will get all the information they require, if not directly from themselves, from their friends in the French interest at Lisbon, from Portuguese or English newspapers, &c. &c. I am therefore of opinion that the disabled, as well as the other prisoners, ought to be sent to England, and thence to France, if the Government are desirous of getting rid of them.'

## 560.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quinta de St. João, 3rd July, 1811.

'I have no doubt but that the letter which I sent to you was written by the Patriarch; but, as you entertain a doubt upon the subject, I am much obliged to you for stopping it. To send an anonymous letter to any body is to accuse him of writing it, the meanest action certainly of which any man can be guilty. It is not very proper, perhaps, to accuse a man in the Patriarch's situation of being guilty of such an action; but he positively ought not to be accused of it, if there is any, the slightest, doubt of his guilt. I therefore acquiesce entirely in your retaining the letter.'

## 561.

To the Rev. J. Owen, Chaplain General.

Quinta de St. João, 4th July, 1811.

'I have already, upon a former occasion, made General Calvert acquainted with the opinion respecting the establishment on which the army Chaplains are placed, in a letter which, I believe, you saw; and I now assure you, that the opinions which that letter contains have been confirmed by the experience which I have since had. The remuneration, in the shape of half pay, is not sufficient to induce respectable persons in a good state of health, who have any prospect in the profession, to accept the situation of Chaplains to the army; and adverting to the general expense of the establishment, compared with that of the old regimental establishment, of which, after many years, it is intended to be an efficient substitute, I cannot see why the remuneration, particularly in the shape of half pay, should not be made more liberal. My decided opinion is, that until that is done, the Government will not insure a religious establishment for the army on foreign service; and it is obvious that all that could be done in that way would not amount to one third part of the expense of the old regimental establishment.'

## 562.

To General Dumouriez.

Quinta de St. João, ce 5 Juillet, 1811.

'J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 6 Juin; et je suis bien aise d'avoir l'avantage de votre opinion sur les affaires de ce pays-ci.

Il y a presque 3 ans, à présent, que je conduis les opérations de la guerre la plus extraordinaire qu'il y eut jamais. Quoique les alliés soient chez eux, et que tout le monde (en Portugal sans exception quelconque, et presque sans exception en Espagne) soit ennemi des Français, les alliés ont rarement eu plus que la moitié de la force de l'ennemi, et jamais, même à présent, plus que les deux tiers. A ce désavantage il faut ajouter que nous

sommes alliés ; que nous n'avons pas de tête, qu'il n'y a ni généraux, ni officiers d'état-major, ni troupes disciplinées, et point de cavalerie parmi les Espagnols : que ces deux Gouvernemens ont commencé la guerre sans magasins ou ressource militaire d'aucune espèce, et sans argent ou ressource de finance ; et que ceux qui ont été à la tête des affaires sont des individus aussi faibles que les ressources à leur disposition sont pauvres ; et vous serez étonné que nous puissions continuer la lutte, même avec espérance de succès définitif.

Je crois que ni Buonaparte, ni le monde, n'ont compté sur les difficultés à subjuguier la Péninsule, étant opposé par une bonne armée en Portugal. Il a fait des efforts gigantesques, dignes de sa réputation, et des forces dont il a la disposition ; mais il n'en a pas fait assez encore ; et je crois que l'ancien *dictum* de Henri Quatre, que " quand on fait la guerre en Espagne avec peu de monde on est battu, et avec beaucoup de monde, on meurt de faim," se trouvera vérifié de nos jours ; et que Buonaparte ne pourra jamais nourrir, même de la manière Française moderne, une armée assez grande pour faire la conquête des Royaumes de la Péninsule, si les alliés ont seulement une armée assez forte pour arrêter ses progrès.

Pour ce qui est d'aujourd'hui, les Français ont réuni en Estremadure toutes les forces qu'ils avaient en Andalousie, et dans La Vieille et La Nouvelle Castille, pour m'obliger à lever le siège de Badajoz ; à quoi ils ont nécessairement réussi. J'ai rassemblé mon monde à 2 lieues de-là dans une assez bonne position, près de Campo Mayor ; et ils n'ont pas voulu me toucher : et j'ai prié le Général Blake avec les Espagnols, 10,000 à 12,000, de repasser la Guadiana à Mertola et de se porter sur Seville, où sont l'arsenal, la fonderie, les magasins, et tout ce qui leur est nécessaire pour le siège de Cadix, qu'après ce coup ils auraient été obligés de lever. Il passa la Guadiana le 22 Juin, le jour même que Soult et Marmont m'ont reconnu à Campo Mayor. Mais il n'a rien fait jusqu'au 30 au soir, quand il a essayé de s'emparer de Niebla, qui n'est rien comme place forte, et où il n'y avait que 300 hommes de garnison ; mais le coup a manqué. En même temps les Français se sont retirés d'ici. Ils ont envoyé une division d'infanterie et quelque cavalerie en Andalousie ; et je crois que Blake va s'embarquer pour retourner à Cadix.

On croirait que quand toute la force disponible de l'ennemi est rassemblée en Estremadure, on couperait la gorge aux Français éparpillés dans les autres parties de l'Espagne ; et que tout le monde étant ennemi des Français (comme je le crois vraiment), il y aurait insurrection générale. Pas du tout ! voilà l'extraordinaire de cette guerre ! Voici la troisième fois, en moins de 2 ans, que toute la force Française disponible s'est réunie sur moi ; mais personne n'y gagne excepté les guerrillas, qui, pour un moment, prennent possession du pays ouvert de la Castille ; les administrateurs Français tenant toujours les grandes villes. Cette fois-ci cependant ils ont été obligés d'abandonner quelques points importans, comme les Asturies et Astorga ; et les guerrillas, ayant plus de force et d'expérience, leur ont porté quelques coups qui doivent leur faire du mal.

Par ce petit exposé des faits, vous verrez quelle est l'espèce de guerre que nous faisons. Il faut de la patience, de la grande patience, pour la faire ; mais j'attends tout du temps, que donnera l'expérience, des généraux, et des armées, à mes amis les Espagnols ; et il n'est pas possible que l'Europe



puisse se soumettre bien plus long-temps à la tyrannie dégoûtante dont elle est opprimée.

A moins que Soult et Marmont ne se séparent, de manière que je puisse porter un coup à l'un ou à l'autre, je ne crois pas qu'il y ait à espérer que les Français se porteront sur l'Ebre; et si Blake s'embarque, il n'y a pas de raison pour qu'ils se séparent, à moins que Soult ne veuille tâcher de s'emparer de Carthagene, à quoi il vise, ou veuille pousser vigoureusement le siège de Cadiz.

Je suis bien aise d'avoir pu faire ce qui vous était agréable sur le sujet du Comte de —, que j'ai mis au service Portugais, conservant toujours sa commission Anglaise.'

563.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de St. João, 8th July, 1811.

'I shall be much concerned if my unwillingness to pledge myself, or the British departments, to perform that for which I can have not only no certainty, but upon which I can have no grounds of calculation, should delay your arrangements; but I will not involve myself in concerns in which I have nothing to do; and I know well, that if the Portuguese Ministers choose to work, and to make others work, the arrangement can be made without calling upon me for such a pledge.'

564.

To Major General Dunlop.

Quinta de St. João, 9th July, 1811.

'I have received your letter of the 6th. The affairs of the Peninsula have always been, and are still, in such a state of uncertainty, that it is impossible for me to give any opinion, whether it would be convenient, or otherwise, for the General Officers of the army to go home; they must decide this matter for themselves; and if they wish to go, fix the period at which they will apply for leave. I must inform you, however, that not only the

G. O.

Quinta dos Baños, 8th July, 1811.

'7. The Commander of the Forces refers the General Officers of the army and the commanding officers of regiments to the orders of the 17th June, 1809, No. 5, and to those of the 11th August, 1810, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, regarding the cutting and carrying away the forage.

8. That which the country produces must be realised for the use of the army, but it must be done without waste and with regularity, and the owners of what is taken must be paid for their property.'

G. O.

Quinta dos Baños, 9th July, 1811.

'3. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers commanding divisions will have the troops under their command exercised occasionally in divisions as well as brigades. He refers them to the circular letter and memorandum addressed to General Officers commanding divisions from the Adjutant General's Office at Cartaxo, 28th Feb., 1811. He requests, however, that unless it should be necessary, the troops should not be kept out in the sun after 8 o'clock in the morning.

4. The celerity and accuracy of the officers and troops in manœuvring are however so essential in all operations, the Commander of the Forces particularly requests that no battalion in this army may at any time be dismissed from a parade, without performing some one or other of the manœuvres prescribed by His Majesty's regulations.

6. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the General Officers commanding divisions to make arrangements for the preservation of the reserves of biscuit in charge of the several regiments under their command respectively. When the army broke up from the Rio Mayor in March last, it was found that the soldiers had in general consumed the 3 day's advance of biscuit which had been given them to keep.

7. Whenever the troops shall halt, this advance ought to be kept in custody of the quarter master of the regiment, or of the pay serjeants of companies, and it should not be issued to the soldiers till the day previous to the march. Thus, excepting immediately previous to a march, no soldier should receive more in any one day than one day's provisions.'

public, but the Commander in Chief, and Government, were highly displeased that so many General Officers were absent from the army during the last winter; and that it will be desirable to me, as well as to the General officers who may wish to leave in future, that I should consult the Commander in Chief, before I allow of the departure of any one in future, excepting on account of ill health.'

565.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de St. João, 9th July, 1811.

'What I object to in the plan which came to me yesterday was, that, under pretence of forming a commissariat arrangement, it threw all the labor and all the responsibility upon the British army and British commissariat; while, at the same time, we were to supply, that which is the most difficult, the greatest part of the subsidy in money; and the Portuguese Government, who alone can get the money which is necessary to carry on their affairs, and who are most interested in carrying them on, were not to make every exertion in their power. I shall make no exertion, and come into no arrangement which is not founded upon the positive stipulation that all the powers of the Government are to be really and duly exerted, and all their means fairly applied to carry on the war: when that is done, they will find me ready to labor in the cause, and to make every sacrifice, and do every thing else to forward it.'

566.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de St. João, 11th July, 1811.

'I wish that I could report to your Lordship that some more beneficial advantage had resulted from the collection of the enemy's troops in Estremadura to raise the siege of Badajoz, and better calculated to reconcile us to the disappointment upon that occasion. But I am apprehensive that, till the Spanish Government shall reform their military system; till the officers shall be instructed and the troops disciplined; till regular resources shall be found, and faithfully applied to the support of their armies on an

G. O.

Quinta dos Baños, 11th July, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces being desirous of having a daily state of the army, each regiment will send in every morning to the Commanding Officer of the brigade a morning state, in the form of a weekly state, without the proof table, and accounting for the regiment or battalion, in one line.

2. The Brigade Major of each brigade will make up, from the regimental morning states sent to him, a morning state of the brigade, accounting for the strength of the brigade, in one line, to the Assistant Adjutant General of the division.

3. The Assistant Adjutant Generals of divisions are, from the daily states of the brigades, to send to the Adjutant General a daily state of the division to which each is attached, made up as follows:—

The British troops, in one line.

The Portuguese do., in another.

The third line, total of the division.

4. If there are troops of only one nation in the division, the Assistant Adjutant Generals will make up the morning state of the division, accounting for every body, in one line.

6. The Assistant Adjutant Generals of divisions must send their states by mounted officers from the divisions or brigades, so as to arrive at the Adjutant General's office as soon as possible each day; the object being to give the Commander of the Forces a knowledge of the daily strength. In case of delay, the Assistant Adjutant Generals of divisions will be called on to account for the cause of it.

7. On the back of each divisional state the return of the artillery, in one line, is to be stated.

8. It must be clearly understood, these daily states are in no degree to interfere with the other regular returns of the army, which are to be made up and sent in as usual.'



expedition ; and till the armies shall be equipped, as they ought, for the service required from them, the history of every attempt on our part to alter the nature of the war, on any general combined plan, will be the same as the last. The enemy will collect to oppose us a larger body of troops than the allied British and Portuguese army can bring into the field, and will oblige us to take the defensive ; and they will experience no danger, or even inconvenience, from their weakness in all other parts of the Peninsula, in consequence of their collecting their whole force to oppose us, because the Spanish armies are neither disciplined, nor provided or equipped in such a manner, as that they can perform any operation, even of the most trifling nature, if there should be any opposition on the part of the enemy. The only chance therefore, is to watch for opportunities of undertaking important operations of short duration, with the means at our own disposal, till the Spanish armies shall be in a better state.'

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567.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de St. João, 11th July, 1811.

' My opinion has always been, that the grant of a medal to an individual officer ought to have been founded originally, partly on the importance of the occasion or action which it was intended to commemorate, and partly on the share which the individual officer had had in the action to be commemorated ; and that medals should have been granted for important actions only, and to those engaged in them in a conspicuous manner, whatever might be their rank in the service. It was decided, however, that medals should be granted on the same principle only, but following strictly the example of the grant of medals to the Navy, notwithstanding that an action on shore is very different to an action at sea ; and the merit of the different classes of individuals are likewise entirely different. At the same time, this principle was departed from in some of the grants made.

If the principle adopted in the grant of medals to the Navy is adhered to in the grant of medals to officers of the Army, and that medals are to be granted to General Officers, and Lieutenant Colonels commanding regiments, on an occasion to be commemorated, because, on a similar occasion, they would be granted to Admirals and Captains of ships of the line, it is difficult to restrict the grant, or to make a selection of officers to whom they should be granted, to commemorate the battles of Busaco and Fuentes de Oñoro, if Government determine that these actions should be commemorated in that manner. If, however, that principle is departed from, it is not difficult to make out a list of the names of officers already reported to your Lordship, who were at the head of corps or detachments upon these occasions, and who had a conspicuous share in the event which it is the intention of the Government to commemorate in this manner. It is not probable, however, that the adoption of this principle will decrease the number of those to whom the honor would be granted ; but, as I have already represented to your Lordship, I do not think this important : that which is important in the establishment of the principle on which the grant of this honor should be made, is, that every officer should feel that he shall receive the mark of distinction, if he should be in the place to distinguish himself, and should act in the manner to deserve to be distinguished, whatever may be his military rank. It may be contended by me, that the officers of the British

Army do not require an honor of this description to stimulate their exertions, and that the grant of the medal is therefore useless ; but, however, those who contend for this principle must admit that a selection of those who have had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves in an action is a less objectionable mode of granting it than the grant of it by classes, whether the individuals composing those classes have distinguished themselves or not.

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I mention these circumstances only to point out to your Lordship that, in every action on shore, however severe, there must be some to whose lot it does not fall to have an opportunity to distinguish themselves ; and that the principle of selection, without reference to ranks, ought to be adopted in every instance of the grant of medals to the Army.'

568.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Quinta de St. João, 14th July, 1811.

' My opinion has invariably been, that, in all the concerns of Spain, Great Britain ought to take the liberal line of policy, and to lay aside, at least during the existing war, all considerations of mercantile profit ; and it appeared to me that, in this question of the colonies particularly, this line would suit equally with the military policy and the mercantile interests of Great Britain, and add greatly to the general estimation of our character.

I am, and have always been, of opinion, that the notions of our merchants of the vast profits, to be made by an immediate direct intercourse with the Spanish colonies, were erroneous. That profit was to be made by this intercourse there is no doubt, and that eventually the extent and value of the commercial intercourse with the colonies will be very great, I am certain ; but this value must be the effect of time, of the increase of riches, and of the growth of luxury in the colonies, and the period of its arrival at its highest state is likely to be checked by the extravagant speculations of our merchants.

I think that, whatever may be the final relative situation between Spain and her colonies, Great Britain must be the gainer. The result must be the relaxation, if not annihilation of the colonial commercial system, and a direct allowed intercourse between the colonies, and all other countries, in which Great Britain must be a partaker and the greatest gainer. In expectation of this ultimate gain, the policy of Great Britain ought to have been liberal throughout, as I hope it will turn out upon examination to have been. The wild speculations of the colonies ought to have been checked ; the authority of the mother country ought to have been countenanced ; and the endeavors of our traders and captains of ships, to separate the colonies from Spain, ought to have been suppressed.

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When the colonies, at least some of them, had manifested an inclination to separate from the mother country, it was necessary for the British Government to consider, not only what Spain could do, but what Great Britain could assist Spain in effecting. Knowing what I do of the Spanish Government and its means and resources, and the employment for them, I am certain that they have not the power to reduce to obedience even one of the weakest of the colonies which is disposed to separate. I am equally certain that to make the attempt would be the grossest folly and misapplication of means ; and I will go further, and declare, that I believe that Great Britain



could not, in justice to the greater object in the Peninsula, give Spain any assistance from which any good effect can be expected.

I am afraid that it is but too true, that if distant colonies choose to separate from the mother country, they will effect their object; and at all events it would have been the height of madness, in these times, for Spain to have endeavored, by force, to prevent such a separation, or for Great Britain to have encouraged and aided in such an attempt. The conduct which Great Britain ought to have followed was to endeavor, by influence and advice, to prevent matters from coming to extremities, if possible; and at all events not to direct her force to an object which was quite unattainable.

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With a system thus formed, Great Britain might have gone to work, with some prospect of success, in making an arrangement which would have permanently united the colonies to the mother country, by providing for their mutual interests on just and fair principles; and which at all events, by putting an end to the existing disputes, would have removed the uneasiness which they occasion, and would have increased the means and resources of Spain to carry on the war against the common and *only* enemy. And you will observe that in the establishment of this system, Great Britain would have done, in every point, that which suits her own interest.

But I am apprehensive that the Spanish Government have not taken an enlarged view, either of their own situation or that of the colonies, or of the two, relatively with each other; and till they do so, matters will only grow worse and worse daily, and it is useless for us to interfere in them; and after a long contest, which will only tend to the weakness of the mother country, and will deprive her of all the resources which she could otherwise derive from the colonies in her war with France, the business will end in the separation of the colonies from Spain.'

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569.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de St. João, 18th July, 1811.

'With the fine and well-equipped army which we have, and with our cavalry in such good order as it is, and with the prospect of the renewal of hostilities in the north of Europe, I am most anxious not to allow this moment of the enemy's comparative weakness to pass by, without making an effort to improve the situation of the allies in the Peninsula; and I proceed to inform your Lordship of what I think of the different courses of operation which we may pursue.

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Under all these circumstances I am tempted to try this enterprise. But I beg your Lordship to observe that I may be obliged to abandon it. In a case in which the relative force of the two armies will be so nearly balanced as in this, and particularly in an operation in the Peninsula of Spain, it is impossible for me to see all the events which may lead to this result. But the arrival of reinforcements to the enemy, or farther information of the enemy's force, which should show them to be stronger than I now imagine them to be, or the falling off of the strength of our army, owing to the sickness of the troops, which I do not now expect, would necessarily oblige me to abandon the enterprise.

My intention, now, is to canton the army on the two banks of the Tagus, until the reinforcements have joined. In the mean time the train will be

moved up the Douro, and the preparations will be made for transporting it to Ciudad Rodrigo; and, when these are completed, I propose to put the army in motion to attempt the siege of that place, if I should find that circumstances afford a chance of success.'

## 570.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Quinta de St. João, 20th July, 1811.

'In the existing situation of affairs I think it not impossible that I may be able to make the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, although the prospect that I should be able to effect that operation is become less favorable, since the accounts have arrived of the fall of Tarragona. However, we shall have a very fine army of little less than 60,000 men, including artillery, in the course of about a fortnight; and I do not see what I can do with it, to improve the situation of the allies, during the period in which it is probable that, the enemy's attention being taken up with the affairs of the north of Europe, we shall be more nearly on a par of strength with him, excepting we undertake this operation. I have, therefore, at all events, ordered the battering train up the Douro, and the preparations to be made for moving it from Lamego; and Dickson goes to Oporto to-morrow to superintend these arrangements. There would be no difficulty in them, if we had been able to save Almeida: however, it is useless to lament what cannot be easily remedied.'

## 571.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quinta de St. João, 20th July, 1811.

'I would beg to recommend on this point the adoption of the rule which I have made in respect to Staff appointments attached to the British army, viz., that those who hold them shall receive no emolument on account of them, if absent from their duty on account of their health, for a greater length of time than 2 months, unless their absence should have been occasioned by wounds. However severe it may appear to deprive an officer of his emoluments, whose absence may be occasioned by illness acquired in the performance of his duty in a bad climate, still, adverting to the abuse of sick certificates, and considering the right which the public have to expect that those paid for performing the duty of a Staff appointment shall be efficient, I conceive that the justice of the rule will be found to preponderate over its severity.'

## 572.

To Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Quinta de St. João, 22nd July, 1811.

'In regard to ———, surely no man can contend that the want of a daily state for so many days was not a ground of complaint. Upon that

G. O.

Quinta dos Baños, 19th July, 1811.

'6. One of the motives for the repeated orders which have been issued that the soldiers might not be employed in pressing articles from the country, is to avoid the abuse of which they are generally guilty, in forcing money from the inhabitants for the release of what they have taken by violence; but whatever may be the cause of the issue of any Order, obedience is the safe mode of proceeding in every instance, and the officers of the army must, long before this time, have been aware of the necessity of attending to the General Orders of the Commander of the Forces.

7. Inconvenience may be felt at times by some individuals by their operation, but it must be suffered in an extended service as that is on which the army is employed; and it is trifling in comparison with the general interests and individual convenience for which these Orders are calculated to provide.'



ground I ordered the person responsible to the Adjutant General (of whom, in the first instance, I complained) to be put in arrest; and, upon being informed that ———'s inferiors were in fault (for fault there was), I said, "let them be put in arrest." I do not think there is any thing unreasonable or harsh in all this; and with very good disposition towards ———, he must not expect that I shall recall any thing I have ever authorised to be written respecting any body, on any omission of duty.'

573.

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

'An army under the command of your Excellency might be more successful in all these respects: but your Excellency may depend upon the truth of what I have repeatedly had the honor of stating to you in conversation, and that is, that until the Spanish armies shall possess regular resources, by which they can be supplied during any operation which they may undertake; until they are equipped in such a manner that casual or trifling difficulties will not impede their operations; and until the troops are disciplined, as all other troops are which are produced to meet an enemy in the field, it is useless to think of plans of co-operation between this army and those of Spain, which must be founded on the active offensive operations of all parts of the armies of all the nations. I should deceive myself, and you, and the Governments of both nations, if I were to encourage such a notion; and, if I were to undertake the execution of such a plan, I should incur the risk of the loss of my army for no object whatever.'

574.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

'The inhabitants of Portugal have duties to perform, and obligations have been imposed upon them by the law, in the critical situation in which their country is placed, of which one is to furnish lodging to the officers and soldiers of the army upon the orders, called billets, of a magistrate. I beg

G. O.

Portalegre, 23rd July, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces recalls to the recollection of General Officers commanding divisions and brigades the orders which have been repeatedly given out respecting the use of bullock cars to convey baggage; he trusts that he shall not have occasion to observe any deviation from the Orders in future.

2. The medicine panniers of the surgeons of regiments are not to be carried on the cart destined to carry the packs of any man who may be taken ill on a march. The surgeons of regiments are allowed for a mule to carry the medicine panniers, which must be used for this and no other purpose.

3. The officers commanding regiments are requested to take care not to require more clothing, &c. from their stores at Lisbon than they can deliver out to the soldiers; and the carts employed to bring up these articles must, forthwith on their arrival at the cantonment of the regiment, be delivered over to the Commissary attached to the brigade.

4. It is impossible to supply carts to draw after the regiments the superfluous clothing, which they may have had brought up from Lisbon.

5. The Commander of the Forces again requests the attention of the General Officers commanding the divisions and brigades of cavalry, as well as of infantry, to the discipline of the troops, Portuguese as well as British.

6. The accuracy of all formations and movements of large bodies depends upon the officers of the Staff; and the Commander of the Forces expects, when he sees any division of troops exercise, (and he will take every opportunity of seeing them,) to find the mounted officers of all ranks are able to take ground for them, in all situations in which it may be necessary to place them.'

to know from the Government whether the performance of these duties and obligations is to be enforced ; or whether the people of Lisbon in particular are to be exempt from them, and are to be encouraged by the magistrates to resist the law and the performance of these obligations, where the convenience of a British General Officer is concerned.

I have long seen the inutility of complaining to the Government on the conduct of any of the public servants. Indeed I have found it an useless waste of time to address them on any subject whatever ; and therefore I shall not trouble you to make any complaint of the conduct of the Judge of the Police in this transaction, who, instead of endeavoring to conciliate in a case in which a General of the ally of the Prince was concerned, or, as was his duty, instead of enforcing the necessary law of the billets, has done every thing in his power, in his report, to aggravate the supposed cause of complaint, and has become an advocate instead of a judge. The case, however, is so flagrant, and the conduct of the magistrate has been so improper, and there has been manifested a spirit so hostile to the alliance, and so different from that which ought to exist, that, if I could entertain any hopes that the truth would reach the Prince Regent of Portugal, I would address His Royal Highness upon the subject.

I only hope that the time is not far distant when the British army, tired of such conduct, will impart to the British nation the disgust which it must occasion, as well as the desire to leave to its fate a country in which, by the Government and the higher orders, they have been so unworthily treated.'

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 575.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

'While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid observing, that the persons in authority at Lisbon have appeared to me lately to encourage these frivolous, and generally groundless complaints, from the officers of the Government, to which I am induced to attribute the number of them which I have lately received ; at the same time that those who make them manifest the usual disinclination to substantiate them. I have strong reason to believe that they are generally without foundation ; as I have for some time observed a visible improvement in the conduct of the soldiers towards the people of the country, and certainly, those crimes, for which so many soldiers of this army have been executed, now occur but rarely. It cannot be credited that the soldiers who shared their provisions with the inhabitants of the country, to save them from starving, should afterwards ill-treat the same inhabitants ; and I am therefore very apprehensive that the frequency of groundless complaints, lately, is to be attributed to the excitement of the spirit of complaint by the Government.

However, I shall continue, as I have hitherto done, to inquire into every case brought forward which appears to afford ground for inquiry ; and I hope that the Portuguese Government will discover, before it is too late, that the mode of saving their country is not to excite discontent against the British nation, by whose assistance alone they can be saved.'

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576.

To Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Portalegre, 30th July, 1811.

‘ I am very much annoyed by ——’s conduct. By this unfortunate obstinacy he will be in a bad scrape, and he deserves that an effort should be made to save him ; but no man can be allowed to insult his Commanding Officer.’

577.

To Major General R. Crauford.

Portalegre, 30th July, 1811.

‘ Obedience to this order may sometimes be attended by inconveniences, but they are trifling in comparison with the inconveniences which all would suffer from a disobedience of it. If the troops in the Light division are to disobey these orders, others will do the same ; and we shall end by being obliged to employ the means of conveyance which we can get in removing sick, when the General Officers commanding divisions should choose that they should be sent away ; and in carrying clothing, which the Commanding Officers of regiments may find it convenient to bring with their regiments ; and the movements of the army must be cramped.

It is very desirable that the General Officers commanding divisions should understand that the divisions under their command respectively are only parts of an army, which must be governed by system and rule ; and that every departure from the system ordered, and the rule laid down, however convenient to the particular division, must be inconvenient to the army at large, and therefore detrimental to the service.’

578.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Castello Branco, 2nd Aug. 1811.

‘ The opinion which you say prevails at Cadiz is very little promising ; but I do not see in what manner you can combat it, or if you could, that it is any concern of yours.

Great Britain did not bring Spain into the contest. On the contrary, the war, in its commencement, and throughout its progress, has been carried

G. O.

Portalegre, 27th July, 1811.

‘ The Commander of the Forces is happy to have it in his power to pardon ——, ——, and ——, not only because these men have made every restitution in their power to the owners of the property stolen, but likewise because he has great satisfaction in stating that offences of this description are now but rarely committed.

3. The conduct of the 57th regt. also at the battle of Albuera, on the 16th May, has likewise rendered the Commander of the Forces anxious to be able to pardon these men, in order that the regiment might avoid the disgrace of their public execution.

G. O.

Portalegre, 28th July, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that means may be adopted in all the cantonments of the troops to keep them clean and healthy.

2. The offal of the animals killed for food should be destroyed by slack lime, and if that article cannot be procured, it should be buried.

3. One or more necessaries should be made for each regiment, to which all the men should be obliged to resort, and slack lime should be thrown into them every second day.

4. The streets occupied by each regiment, and the communications with them should be swept every morning, and the heaps of dung and filth in the unoccupied spaces in all the towns in Portugal should be destroyed by slack lime.

5. Sentries should be placed over the several fountains in the towns, in order to prevent persons from dirtying the water, or from accumulating dirt in their neighbourhood.

6. The Commissaries attached to the several brigades are requested to procure a quantity of slack lime, for which the quarter masters of the several regiments are to make requisitions for these purposes.’

on by the Spaniards without reference to our opinions, and generally in direct contradiction to our recommendation; and then we are to be blamed and abused, because, contrary to our own judgments and the plain dictates of military expediency, we do not choose to enter upon wild and visionary schemes which we have not the means of accomplishing.

The Spaniards forget that, by the folly and treachery of their own officers, they have been brought to the state in which they now find themselves; and we do not remind them sufficiently often of these circumstances, and that the cause for which we are contending is theirs essentially, whatever may be the degree of interest which we feel in it. Who lost the battle of Ocaña, contrary to our advice and intreaties, and consequently Andalusia? Who gave up Badajoz treacherously, when we were moving to their assistance? Are we to blame, if the Spanish armies are not in such a state as that they can be opposed to the enemy? or if the Cortes have neglected their duty, have usurped the powers of the executive government, and have mis-spent their time in fruitless debates? Are we in fault because, by the mismanagement of the American colonies, the world has been deprived of its usual supply of specie, and Great Britain in particular cannot find money to carry on her own operations, or aid the allies?

Let any one Spanish transaction be examined, and the inexperience and folly of the principal people in Spain will be manifest. I apprised —— of my intention and plan for attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, and him alone; the success of which depends principally upon the length of time during which I can keep it concealed from the enemy. Some Spanish women at Portalegre were apprised of the plan by him, and it must reach the enemy!!! Yet —— is one of the best of them.

Look at Abadia's conduct in respect to Galicia. Examine any transaction in which they have been concerned, and it will be found characterised by delay, weakness, folly, or treachery! And then we are to be told that our political object is to ruin Spain!

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579.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pedragão, 4th Aug. 1811.

' I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 17th July, in which you have enclosed the copy of a memorandum of the 13th July, which you had received from H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, in regard to the enlistment of Portuguese recruits for the British regiments.

The people of Portugal agree remarkably well with the British soldiers. I have never known an instance of the most trifling disagreement among the soldiers or officers of the two nations. The Portuguese soldiers eat the same food, and, as military men, adopt the same habits as our soldiers, including, in some instances, their disposition to intoxication; and therefore I should think it a preferable mode of introducing them into the British service, to place them indiscriminately in the same companies with recruits raised in His Majesty's dominions. Each individual would then be more likely to conduct himself on every occasion, and in all circumstances, as a British soldier. However, there is no reason to believe that the Portuguese soldiers, if collected in separate companies, would behave otherwise than well in any situation: and, if that mode of incorporating them be preferred, I see no objection to it.



I am apprehensive, however, that your Lordship is much mistaken if you imagine that you could increase your numbers, to any great extent, by the adoption of this measure. It could not be adopted without the consent of the Portuguese Government; and I do not think that they could be prevailed upon to give their consent to our enlisting a single man.

Your Lordship is probably not aware that the whole military force of Portugal is raised by a conscription, not very different from that which prevails in France; and that, according to the ancient constitution of Portugal, every individual is obliged to serve in the regular army, in the militia, or in the *ordenanza*, as an officer or a soldier. Those who might enlist to serve in the British army therefore, would, in proportion to their numbers, decrease the number of those liable to be called upon to serve in one of the Portuguese military establishments; and this plausible reason would afford the Portuguese Government ground for a refusal to grant permission to enlist recruits in Portugal, to which they would adhere. But if the Portuguese Government should, contrary to my expectation, grant permission to enlist recruits, I believe that we should get but very few, notwithstanding the known attachment of the people to us.

The people of Portugal, in general, are agriculturists, and, like those of the same description in all other countries, are very little disposed to military service. As I have before stated, they are obliged by the ancient law of their country to serve, otherwise I believe that very few of them would be found in the ranks; and they are very much addicted to desertion (not to the enemy) in their own country, as well as in Spain. In Lisbon and Oporto some recruits might be got; but, to show your Lordship how few, I may mention that an attempt was made, under the patronage of the present Patriarch, to raise the Lusitanian Legion, by enlistment instead of by conscription, and two battalions were never completed; and their losses by desertion were so great, and their gains by recruiting by the mode of enlistment so small, that in a very few months after they were raised, it was necessary to give up the mode of recruiting by enlistment, and to allot the Lusitanian Legion to one of the provinces, to be completed with recruits raised within the same by conscription. The recruits for the Lusitanian Legion, however, were raised principally at Oporto, and some might be raised at Lisbon; but to show your Lordship how few, and how difficult it would be to detain in the service those enlisted there, and how unlike the Government would be to consent to our enlisting recruits there, I may mention that, even with the assistance of the conscription, they have never been able to keep the Lisbon regiments complete, notwithstanding that, with their usual partiality to that city, they have not allotted the number of regiments, which it ought to keep complete, according to any fair comparative estimate of its population; and the recruits sent to those regiments desert as soon as they reach them.

‘From this statement your Lordship will be able to judge of the expediency of pressing this subject on the Portuguese Government.’

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580.

To \_\_\_\_\_.

Penamacor, 6th Aug. 1811.

‘I have just received your letter of the 20th July, in which you apprise

me of the impression so unfavorable to me in a certain quarter, from my having omitted to make my acknowledgments of the support I had received, and particularly for having been allowed to recommend a certain number of officers for promotion.

You were quite correct in stating that I had expressed my acknowledgments to the office from whence the communication had proceeded; and, if reference is made to the office of the Commander in Chief, it will be found that on the 14th May, I did express what I felt upon the particular subject of the promotion of the officers, not in cold terms.

It may be wrong to consider public arrangements not as matters of favor to any individual, and therefore not fit subjects for the acknowledgments of that individual; and, at all events, I do not see in what manner, or in what terms, an individual like me is to address the head of the nation upon such an occasion.

Even if I had received a mark of personal favor, I should doubt the propriety of my addressing my acknowledgments direct to so high an authority; and, if it be true that the support of the war in the Peninsula is a public arrangement, I should be apt to consider an address of acknowledgment from me as misplaced, if not something very near impertinence.

It appears to me to be now too late to write any thing more on the subject of the recommendations for promotion; but you may depend upon it, if another occasion should offer, I shall not fail to do what you have informed me would be well received.

I hope that His Royal Highness will believe that he has not in his service a more zealous, or a more faithful, servant than myself. I shall serve him to the best of my ability, as long as he may think I can promote his service; and His Royal Highness will find that I shall not ask for his favor at all for myself, and, I hope, not unreasonably for those under my command, who have a right to expect that I should make known their pretensions.'

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581.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 12th Aug. 1811.

'I received last night your letter of the 6th; and I am concerned to find that the Government persist in an erroneous system of taxation, notwithstanding all that we can represent to them upon the subject. However, the Government of Brazil being determined to annihilate the influence of the servants of the British Government in the concerns of Portugal, it is almost useless to remonstrate; and, in my opinion, you should confine yourself to the limit of telling them individually and privately, that unless they introduce the reforms in all the branches of the administration which have been recommended to them, they must not expect the increased assistance of Great Britain. This intimidation will have, at all events, the effect of strengthening the hands of our friends.

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G. O.

Casillas de Flores, 9th Aug. 1811.

'6. The Commander of the Forces requests that whenever a soldier is sent with a letter, the person who sends it will require a receipt for it. He also requests that officers will recollect the cover of a letter is not a receipt; and that by the practice of giving soldiers the covers of letters which they have brought as the evidence to be produced of the delivery, they afford opportunities for neglect of duty, and frauds to conceal the neglect.'



' You are quite in the right to adhere strictly to the orders you have received respecting the settlement of the accounts of the subsidy.

I believe there was some mismanagement on the part of the gentlemen who ordered the preparations for the feast at Mafra: but I was intolerably cheated, as will appear when I state that I found the meat, fowls, wine, &c., and the Commissary General carried the things to Mafra for me, and yet the feast, in addition to these, cost me £1200. I referred the bills to the police. I do not know what their decision was; but, as they were certainly exorbitant beyond measure, I determined to defer the payment till it should be perfectly convenient to me. I do not know whether it is yet so, not having had time to look into my accounts; but I should imagine not, as the situation which I fill is not only not a sinecure, but not remarkably well paid. I cannot, however, think it any hardship to oblige people to wait for their money who have asked three times at least more than they ought; and, at all events, I cannot allow you to incur an inconvenience which I cannot at present incur myself. I can certainly pay some of the money, and I shall make Sodré begin the settlement immediately.

I desired Mackenzie to remove my wine from Bandeira's because Bandeira, after having invited me and all my family to consider his house as our own, and to go there when we pleased without billet, had a breeze with Campbell the other day, because he went to live there without a billet, and was nearly coming to blows in the street. I was very glad to have so good an opportunity of divorcing myself from Bandeira. I desired that a house might be taken for me, in order in some degree to mortify the Government and the principal people of Lisbon, and, if possible, to make them feel a little respecting their conduct about billets. I am slaving like a negro for them: I have saved the people, in Lisbon particularly, from the enemy, and I take nothing from them, while they continually torment me with their frivolous complaints on subjects on which they ought to have no feeling.

I shall not make use of the palace of Bemposta, or of any thing else belonging to the Prince; nor will I lie under any obligation to any Portuguese for my private convenience. I shall pay rent for the house, which I want only to hold my wine, and to receive the officers of my family when they go to Lisbon. I shall not be sorry if the Government and principal people of Lisbon know the reason why I take this house; viz., that I will not lay myself under an obligation to any of them.'

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582.

To Lieut. General Hill.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Aug. 1811.

' It distresses me much to find that, notwithstanding the pains which I have taken for such a length of time, the troops cannot be detached from under the immediate view of their General Officers, without doing some damage to the buildings in which they may be quartered, or mischief to some individual. I cannot but attribute the cause which is thus given for these constant complaints to the inattention of the officers of the regiments.'

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583.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Aug. 1811.

' I do not understand your meaning in one part of your letter, in which you say that our Government will have to decide whether "to take up the

cause of the people, and abandon the Government altogether, or continue to support a system which must in the end prove fatal to the cause." I have always thought that we supported the existing Government in Spain because it was the choice of the people: if that is not the case, we are acting on a very mistaken principle.'

584.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Aug. 1811.

' I agree with the Spanish Government, that it would be very desirable to them that we should be bound by certain stipulations to perform certain operations for them, which they cannot, or will not, perform for themselves; but, in general, there are two sides to a bargain or contract of this description; and it would be very desirable that the Spanish Government, who will be one side in this contract, should state which part they will perform in any one operation which can be undertaken. When they come forward with a statement of this description, which will satisfy my mind, and in which I can have confidence, the Government will not find me backward in engaging myself in any operation.'

585.

To \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, —th Regt.

Cesmiro, 18th Aug. 1811.

' Major General Campbell has informed me that he had placed you in arrest, on charges, copies of which will be transmitted to you in the usual course by the Adjutant General, and he has communicated to me a correspondence which has passed, upon which he has founded those charges. I am very desirous, if possible, to prevent these charges coming under the consideration of a General Court Martial; and as it appears to me that you have not considered the subject in its true light, I trouble you with this letter; and I send it direct to yourself, because your Commanding Officer is the other party in the question, and I am desirous to avoid influencing the final decision by a Court Martial, by any opinion of mine, in case I should not succeed in convincing you that you have taken a mistaken view of your case.

It appears that you imagine that you have reason to complain of an order issued by your Commanding Officer, Major General Campbell, and you have remonstrated upon this order. I put out of the question, for the present, the consideration of the justice and the injustice of this order; or whether you had ground, or otherwise, to remonstrate, as bearing in no manner upon the case. It is obvious that if you address your superior officer, upon any subject, you must make use of respectful terms, and must avoid the use of those which are offensive. This necessity exists in the common intercourse of life, in which nothing offensive is tolerated, either by the rules of society or by the law; much less is any thing offensive allowed in the intercourse among military men, particularly in the communications of an officer, of whatever rank, to his Commanding Officer. I observe that in your letter of the 9th August, addressed to the Assistant Adjutant General, you state that from the papers you transmitted, "it must appear that the orders of that day, as applicable to the regiment and yourself, are *totally destitute of foundation*;" that it is "proved that it is the reverse of what has been stated;"



and that, if allowed to remain on record, it will be a *gross injustice to yourself* and the regiment. You sent the letter containing these expressions, notwithstanding that the Assistant Adjutant General and Major General Burne had refused to forward it to the Major General, because it contained offensive expressions.

I believe it will be admitted that the use of such expressions would not be tolerated in private life; nay, the law would protect any individual from them, whatever might be the ground afforded for the use of them; much less can the use of them be allowed from an officer to his superior, upon an order issued by such superior. I would also observe, that the use of these expressions was entirely unnecessary for the purpose of your remonstrance: your legitimate object in that remonstrance was to show Major General Campbell that he was mistaken, and that his order ought not to have referred to the —th regiment; you were to effect this object by the papers which you enclosed; and to add your comments upon these papers was not necessary for your purpose: but when those comments were conveyed in offensive terms, it would appear that they were added only for the purpose of offending. On this ground, I am most anxious that you should not appear before a General Court Martial on such a subject. The discussion of it cannot lead to any good effect, whatever may be the result; and if the General Court Martial should view it in the light which I do, in concurrence with the opinion of Major General Burne, and of the Assistant Adjutant General, you will be in a situation in which I shall be concerned to see any officer of your rank. I request you, therefore, to reconsider the subject, on the ground on which I have placed it; and I assure you that nothing will give me more satisfaction than to have succeeded in prevailing upon you to recall expressions, which nothing should have provoked you to use to your Commanding Officer.'

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586.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th Aug. 1811.

'I have the honor to enclose to you an extract of a letter of the 14th August, which has been transmitted to me by Marshal Sir W. Beresford; from one paragraph of which it appears that the Portuguese Government has decided a question respecting recruiting persons in the employment of the departments of the British army, upon which I intended to address you as soon as I should have ascertained exactly how the law stood upon this subject.

It is impossible for any army to keep the field without having some assistance from the country; and assistance of this description is particularly necessary to the British army in this country. It might have appeared desirable to the Portuguese Government to know how far we could do without this assistance, particularly as the greatest part of the Portuguese army are fed by the British departments.

I beg likewise to mention that the Spanish Government, to whose troops we do not at all times give this assistance, have exempted from the laws of the conscription all the persons in the employment of the British army.

I am far from wishing to interfere with the laws for recruiting the army; but I beg you to inform the Portuguese Government that, if they do

not recall the words marked in pencil in the enclosed letter, I beg that they will take measures to feed their own troops, as the British departments can feed them no longer.

The inconvenience which the army will feel from the want of the services of these people would be so great, and the conduct of the Government in depriving us of their services in this sudden manner, without previous notice, is so unfriendly, compared with the conduct of the Spanish Government on the same subject, that I must submit it to the consideration of H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Great Britain.'

587.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Aug. 1811.

'The Portuguese Government are, or ought to be, aware of the difficulties in which Great Britain is involved, in order to procure not money's worth, but money,—specie,—to maintain the contest, of which the probable want alone renders the result doubtful. In order to avoid this want they are making the most gigantic efforts, at an enormous expense, to send to this country every article that an army can require, in hopes to save the demand for, and expenditure of, specie in the purchase of these articles in the country; and the Portuguese Government, instead of seconding their laudable efforts, set themselves against them, and, for the sake of a dirty job in Lisbon, purchase there the articles with which the commissariat have been supplied from England, and which were tendered to them.

Either the Portuguese Government are entirely ignorant of what is going on in the world, or they are the friends and partisans of the enemy to the utmost of their power. I defy them, in their situation, to aid the enemy so much as by increasing the demands of specie upon the British Government. I declare that I have no patience with such conduct.'

588.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 27th Aug. 1811.

'I am almost certain that I shall not be able to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, and I think it is doubtful whether I shall be able to maintain the blockade of that place. However, I shall not give up my intention, until I am certain that the enemy are too strong for me in an action in the field. The place, although weak in itself, and though the ground on which it stands is badly occupied (the French have improved it in some degree), is in the best chosen position of any frontier fortress that I have seen. It is impossible to do any thing against it, either in the way of siege or blockade, excepting by crossing the Agueda, and of all the ravines that I have ever seen this is the most difficult to cross, excepting close to the fort; and in winter it cannot be crossed at all, excepting at the bridges, of which the only practicable one

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th Aug 1811.

'1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to learn, that the Portuguese troops plunder the people going with provisions to the different villages, in which the divisions are cantoned; he desires that the General and other officers, in command of Portuguese brigades and regiments, will prevent this practice.

If it should be continued, the Commander of the Forces will be under the necessity of directing that the rolls of the Portuguese troops may be called every hour of the day and night.'



for carriages is under the guns of the fort. We must fight the battle therefore, to maintain this blockade, with our backs to this river, over which we should have to retire in case of check: and this would be an awkward position, in which I ought not to involve the army, unless the numbers are so nearly equal as to render success probable. You will observe that these circumstances all favored the French when they attacked the place from Spain. However, there is one thing very clear, that if we cannot maintain this blockade, the enemy must bring 50,000 men to oblige us to raise it; and they can undertake nothing else this year, for they must still continue to watch this place, and we shall so far save the cause. In the mean time, if they offer me a favorable opportunity of bringing any of them to action, I shall do it.

I hear reports of peace from all parts of Spain, and it is a subject of common conversation and general joy among the French officers. I know that some of them have received accounts from Paris, stating that peace was likely to take place. We have certainly altered the nature of the war in Spain; it has become, to a certain degree, offensive on our part. The enemy are obliged to concentrate large corps to defend their own acquisitions; they are obliged to collect magazines to support their armies (Marmont says he can do nothing without magazines, which is quite a new era in the modern French military system); and I think it probable, from all that I hear, that they are either already reduced, or they must soon come, to the resources of France for the payment of those expenses which must be defrayed in money. As soon as this shall be the case, and as soon as the war will not produce resources to carry itself on, your Lordship may be certain that Buonaparte will be disposed to put an end to it, and will submit to any thing rather than draw from France the resources which must be supplied in order to keep together his armies. I think it not unlikely, therefore, that peace is speculated upon in France.'

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589.

To General Dumouriez.

à Fuente Guinaldo, ce 25 Août, 1811.

'Ainsi vous voyez que votre perspective d'une guerre offensive n'est pas encourageante; mais je ne perds pas courage. Tant que nous ne serons pas battus, les Français ne peuvent rien faire de ce côté-ci; et à la fin les Espagnols verront qu'il est nécessaire d'organiser et discipliner leurs armées et de leur fournir de ressources; et alors les affaires iront mieux.

Je serais bien aise d'avoir le plaisir de vous voir, si vous passiez dans ce pays-ci; mais je ne vous le conseille pas. Vous verriez bien des choses qui vous dégoûteraient de ces guerres révolutionnaires, malgré que les malheurs de notre temps les rendent peut-être nécessaires.'

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590.

To H. S. H. the Duke of Brunswick.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th Aug. 1811.

'My reason for entertaining this opinion is, that the instances of want of spirit among the officers of the army are very rare, and the example of punishment for this crime is not required. This being the case, I should wish to avoid giving the soldiers, and the world, a notion that an officer, particularly one belonging to a foreign nation, can behave otherwise than

well in the presence of the enemy; and if there should be an unfortunate person who fails in this respect, I would prefer to allow him to retire to a private station, rather than expose his weakness.

On these grounds, I would still recommend to your Highness to accept the resignation of his commission, which Lieut. —— has offered.'

## 591.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Fuente Guinaldo, 29th Aug. 1811.

'I am quite convinced that the majority of the officers of the Spanish army would prefer submitting to the French to allowing us to have any thing to say to their troops. In truth, they are by no means convinced, or at all events will not allow, that our officers know any more of their profession than they do themselves; and we may depend upon it that we should always have them acting against us, and that all of their class in this country would follow their example.

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You will then say, what is Great Britain to do? I answer, persevere in the contest, and do the best she can, while she endeavors to prevail upon the Spaniards to improve their military system.

The contest is expensive, and affords but little or no hopes of success, excepting by tiring the French out. After all, military success probably could not reasonably be expected in a contest between the powers of the Peninsula and Great Britain on one side, and the French on the other, which had begun by the French seizing the armies, the fortified places, the arms, and the resources of the Peninsula. These are circumstances to which the people do not advert in general, but they bear upon every event of the contest; and the folly and treachery of the Spaniards in the loss of battles and strong places have increased our difficulties, but still I am not without hopes. We have already, in some degree, altered the nature of the war and of the French military system. They are now in a great measure on the defensive, and are carrying on a war of magazines. They will soon, if they have not already, come upon the resources of France; and, as soon as that is the case, you may depend upon it the war will not last long.

We may spend 10 millions a year in this country; but it is a very erroneous notion to suppose that all that expense is incurred by the war in the Peninsula. Our establishments which we have here would cost very near half that sum if they were kept at home, and the surplus only should be charged as the expense of this war. I do not mean to say that that expense is not great, but it must be borne as long as the Spaniards and Portuguese can hold out, or we must take our leave of our character as a great country.'

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th Aug. 1811.

'4. The Commander of the Forces is happy to have it in his power to pardon ——, who, it appears, was taken prisoner when absent from his regiment, without leave, in search of wine. The same misfortune has happened to other soldiers; and the Commander of the Forces trusts the soldiers will at last discover that it is better to be satisfied with their allowance of wine than to absent themselves from their regiment in search of more, and thus incur the risk of being taken by the enemy, and to lose their reputation as soldiers, by being deemed deserters.'



592.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd Sept. 1811.

'Having considered it my duty to urge the local Portuguese Government, almost with importunity, to increase the disposable revenue of the state to the utmost, by every measure in their power, as well of increased taxation as of reform of abuses in the collection and management of the revenue, and of economy in the grant of salaries and in every branch of the expenditure, as the only measures by which the expenses of the war could be provided for by the necessary sums of specie, I have thought it proper not to accept of any allowance from the Portuguese Government for the office of Marshal General of the army, which I fill.

In case H.R.H. the Prince Regent should think proper to allow me to accept the favors conferred upon me by H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal, I propose in like manner to decline the acceptance of the pension offered to me, during the continuance of the existing war for the independence of the country.'

593.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept. 1811.

'I say "found upon experience," because I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I entertained against Dom M. Forjaz prejudices of the same description, as appear to be entertained against him in Brazil; but I altered my opinion of him upon experience of his abilities, his zeal, and his integrity; and I think I have reason to complain that this officer, who is thus

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 1st Sept. 1811.

'Which sentence has been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. The Commander of the Forces regrets that an officer of the rank of Lieut. Colonel ——— should have placed himself in the situation in which that officer now finds himself, and should have persevered in the error which he had committed, notwithstanding that its nature and the consequences likely to result from his conduct were repeatedly represented to him, and that he was earnestly urged by those whose opinions ought to have had an influence over him to recal the improper letters which he had addressed to his commanding officer, Major General Campbell.

3. If the extreme sensibility to the censure of his commanding officer, which was the pretext for the disrespectful and offensive conduct, of which Lieut. Colonel ——— has been found guilty, had been of that good description which induces those who feel it to avoid censure by attending strictly to their duty,—by obeying with zeal and precision the orders which they receive,—and by upholding the discipline and subordination of the army, Lieut. Colonel ——— would have attended to the advice he had received to withdraw his offensive letters, rather than incur the risk of receiving a stronger censure under the sentence of the General Court Martial.

4. The Commander of the Forces hopes, however, that that sentence will convince the Hon. Lieut. Colonel ——— that whatever may be his feelings, he cannot with impunity express them to his commanding officer in terms of disrespect and offence, even when he thinks he has reason to complain of his commanding officer's conduct; and that he will recollect that in future that a General Court Martial will enforce the rules of the service which protect every officer from disrespect and insult on every occasion, but most particularly when in the execution of his duty.'

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 2nd Sept. 1811.

'5. The Commander of the Forces observes that both ——— and ——— were made prisoners going in search of wine, and afterwards enlisted into the service of the enemy, in order, if possible, to make their escape.

6. This is a dangerous experiment: and very possible those who attempt it may find themselves engaged with their countrymen and comrades before they can carry this design into execution. The soldiers will thus see the disgraceful situation in which they are liable to fall, by their irregular endeavors to get more wine than their allowance, or than can do them any good.'

preferred by me, after a prejudice against him, and upon trial, has not received the support of His Majesty's Government in Brazil, and that he is consequently at this moment on the point of being driven from his office in disgrace, and all the details of the military department to be placed in the hands of a person certainly less capable, but probably entirely incapable, of conducting them, and this in the middle of a campaign.

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The accusations against him also are so inconsistent with each other; and so contemptible, that it is obvious they are only the effect of malice and of the spirit of party, which could have been contended against successfully on the spot alone.'

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594.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th Sept. 1811.

'As soon as those soldiers join the army they shall be tried for the alleged offence, and whatever sentence may be passed upon them shall be carried into execution; but I request you again to represent to the Portuguese Minister, that unless the witnesses attend the trial of the offenders, and give their testimony upon oath, *vivâ voce*, the offenders will not be convicted, and it will not be in my power to punish them.

The feelings which induce the people of Portugal to refrain from giving evidence against criminals are those of false humanity. They prevent the punishment of the robber and the murderer, who is thus by impunity encouraged to continue his depredations, and many innocent people suffer because those who complain will not come forward to prosecute. I have frequently represented this circumstance, but in vain. I should be glad to have proof that either officer or soldier of the British army embargoes carriages and demands money for their release. I know the latter do so; but without proof of the fact I cannot punish them.'

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595.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 13th Sept. 1811.

'Since I wrote to you on the 11th, on the return of the Prince of Brazil to this country, I have received from Mr. Stuart a letter, of which I enclose an extract, which speaks volumes on the subject on which you desired to have my opinion.

These complaints of ours, referred to by the Conde de Linhares, are of want of provisions and means of transport for the Portuguese troops, and of the latter to assist the British troops in defence of the Kingdom of Portugal; and the confidential Minister of the Prince of Brazil, upon reading these complaints, instead of urging the Local Government to adopt energetic measures to prevent the existence of ground for these complaints, recommends "greater energy in their replies to them," and that the King's servants here (that is to say, I) should be made responsible for the failure of the Portuguese departments.

After obtaining a knowledge of the sentiments of Conde de Linhares, I cannot recommend that the Prince of Brazil should be invited back to Portugal. Bad as things are now, they would certainly be worse if he were in the country; and unless the British Government take up the subject, and



bring these gentlemen to a proper understanding of the nature of their situation and of their duties, we must only jog on as we can, exposed to all the inconveniences and risks, and incurring all the expenses, of this contest.

If Government would follow my advice, however, they would make the Prince of Brazil understand, that great as is the interest of the British Government in maintaining the contest for the preservation of his dominions, his own interest is greater; and that if he and his Ministers, and his servants in this country, did not exert themselves, the assistance of the British, both in money and troops, should be withdrawn.

I have already fought one battle on this frontier with defective equipments of all kinds, owing to the neglect of the Portuguese Government, and I am on the eve of another; but this will not do: there is not another officer in the service who would go through what I daily endure to keep the machine together, and it cannot last.

Your Lordship may depend upon it, that with all our efforts and good will we cannot save this country, if the sentiment of the Conde de Linhares and of the Government should become the prevalent sentiment of the country, and it should be imagined for a moment that the interest in the contest is ours, and that the Prince of Brazil and the Portuguese nation have but a minor interest in it, and need make no exertion. This is exactly what I have been contending against since I first landed in Portugal, and that one sentence which I enclose is sufficient to undo all the good that we have done to this moment.

Whatever measure Government may adopt upon this subject, I trust that they will not make it known that the intelligence of the existence of this dispatch from the Conde de Linhares was received from ———.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Sept. 1811.

1. The frequent complaints which the Commander of the Forces receives of the conduct of the officers, principally of the Commissariat and Medical departments, both in the mode of taking their quarters and in their conduct towards their landlords, when employed at a distance from the army, obliges the Commander of the Forces to publish over again the Orders which have been repeatedly given and enforced upon this subject.

2. Those who do their duty with their regiments or with the army, are well aware that at times they can have no quarters at all, and at others very indifferent quarters; and the Commander of the Forces is happy to say that he has received no complaints of them, but exclusively of those at a distance, who cannot be satisfied even with the better accommodation, which the circumstances in which they are placed enable the inhabitants to give them.

3. It is obvious that the Orders above referred to can be applicable only to the city of Lisbon; and in regard to other large towns, the Commander of the Forces requested by his Orders of the 25th Dec., 1809, that the General Officers commanding divisions would settle with the magistrates in what houses General Officers, field officers, captains, and subalterns respectively should be quartered, and those of the departments of the army of corresponding ranks; and he has written to the government of the Kingdom to request, that as far as may be practicable, the magistrates will carry this arrangement into execution.

4. No officer whatever is allowed to quarter himself, if marching with a body of troops; he must receive his quarters from an officer of the Quarter Master General's Department, or from the quarter master of his regiment. If proceeding alone on any duty, or on account of sickness, or with a detachment in which there is no quarter master, he must receive his quarters, by billet, from the magistrates of the town or village in which he may be.

5. The officers of the Quarter Master General's Department, or the quarter masters of regiments must, in every case, in which they require quarters for either officers or soldiers, receive them from the magistrates of the towns or villages, and afterwards allot them to the several regiments or to the several officers and troops as the case may be.

6. It is to be clearly understood that no officer has a right to demand more from his landlord than house room and stabling for his horses, if the building shall afford any; and it is

obvious

596.

To Major General Alex. Campbell.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Sept. 1811.

'We have no chance with Colonel ———, excepting we proceed regularly, and you may depend upon it that at last he will be brought to act as he ought. He will give me a great deal of trouble, but that is my misfortune, and I should have much more trouble by departing from the regular mode pointed out by the regulations. When he sends his statement of injuries to you, you will of course write your observations, your answer, and the defence of yourself, on each injury stated, and forward it to me; when that paper shall reach me, I shall determine what I will do.'

597.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept. 1811.

'I have lately had an opportunity of seeing how the French conduct these concerns in Castille, in which kingdom neither the Spanish nor the British army could ever procure adequate means of transport, any more than the British or the Portuguese army can now in Portugal. The Prefect issues his orders to the several heads of districts, directing that a certain number of carts, drawn in a certain manner, and a certain number of mules, belonging to the district, each cart and each mule attended by its owner or his servant, shall be at a certain place, at a certain hour, on a named day. The head of the district either sends a similar order to the heads of villages, or makes the detailed distribution by name throughout the district.

This is the mode of proceeding pointed out by the law of Portugal, but the difference in the mode of executing the law is the cause of the difference of effect. Notwithstanding the dislike to the French, and the reluctance with which the people of the country serve them, and that they are never paid, not a cart or mule required is missing at the named hour, not an owner of a cart or mule is absent. But in Portugal, where the Government will not carry into execution their own laws, means of transport are always deficient, the service is always cramped, and so it will continue until some dreadful misfortune happens, and the French enabled to establish themselves in Portugal, to carry into execution the law, as they do in Spain.'

598.

To Major General Alex. Campbell.

Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Sept. 1811.

'It would undoubtedly be better if language of this description were never used, and if officers placed in the situation in which you were on the mori-

obvious that in no town in Portugal or Spain can officers expect the accommodation allowed by the Orders of the Commander of the Forces of the 14th March, 1809, at Lisbon, to the several ranks; and they must be satisfied with what the town or village, in which they may be quartered, can afford to those of their rank, and must not on any account seize more than is given to them.

7. The Commander of the Forces has always found, and believes the inhabitants of both countries to be disposed to give to every officer and soldier of the British army such accommodation and comfort as their houses will afford; but it must be clearly understood that every accommodation and comfort beyond houses and stable room must be the result of the good will of the inhabitants, and nothing like compulsion must be used.

8. The Commander of the Forces declares it to be his intention to bring under the consideration of a General Court Martial every complaint which he may receive of the conduct of an officer in his quarters, and to carry the sentence of the Court Martial, whatever it may be, into execution.



ing of the 11th May, could correct neglects and errors likely to be attended by consequences fatal to the public interests, in language which should not hurt the feelings of the person to whom it is addressed ; and with a manner divested of vehemence.

But, unfortunately, there are some of us who cannot avoid to feel warmly for the success of the operation of which we have the charge ; and to express ourselves with vehemence, and in language not perfectly correct, on the mistakes and neglects which are likely to impede it ; and although I consider every officer responsible for language of this description, the complaint of the person to whom it is addressed ought to be made immediately, in order that all the circumstances under which it was used may come fairly before those whose duty it may be to inquire into the subject : and that it may be seen whether there was any and what provocation in error or neglect for the language used.'

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 599.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Quadragesis, 29th Sept. 1811.

' I recommended the measure of arming the forts, not on any suspicion of the enemy's intentions founded on intelligence, but from the suggestions of my own mind, reflecting upon what it was probable the enemy might attempt. I am certain, that if Buonaparte does not remove us from the Peninsula, he must lower his tone with the world : and I am equally certain that he will make every effort to avoid this necessity. He has a fleet, and does not want for armies ; and he is just the man to sacrifice his fleet, and to make a great effort with his armies to effect this object. I fear the results of neither the one nor the other, if we are prepared. But as we are not prepared with a fleet at Lisbon, which, in my opinion, we ought always to be, I thought it proper to desire that the sea forts might be armed, as the only measure in my power at the time it was supposed probable that he was coming himself to take command of his armies.'

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 600.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Quadragesis, 29th Sept. 1811.

' The enemy commenced their movements towards Ciudad Rodrigo with the convoys of provisions from the Sierra de Bejar, and from Salamanca on the 21st instant, and on the following day I collected the British army in positions, from which I could either advance or retire without difficulty, and which would enable me to see all that was going on, and the strength of the enemy's army.

The 3rd division, and that part of Major General V. Alten's brigade of cavalry, which was not detached, occupied the range of heights which are on the left of the Agueda : having their advanced guard, under Lieut. Colonel Williams, of the 60th, on the heights of Pastores, within 3 miles of Ciudad Rodrigo ; the 4th division was at Fuente Guinaldo, where I had strengthened a position with some works ; the Light division on the right of the Agueda, having their right resting upon the mountains which separate Castille and Estremadura. Lieut. General Graham commanded the troops on the left of the army, which were posted on the Lower Azava ; the 6th division, and Major General Anson's brigade of cavalry, being at Espeja, and occupying

Carpio, Marialva, &c. Don Carlos de España observed the Lower Agueda with Don Julian Sanchez's cavalry and infantry.

Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, with Major General Slade's, and Major General de Grey's brigades of cavalry, were on the Upper Azava, in the centre, between the right and left of the army, with General Pack's brigade at Campillo; and the 5th division was in observation of the Pass of Perales, in the rear of the right, the French General Foy having remained and collected a body of troops in Upper Estremadura, consisting of part of his own division of the army of Portugal, and a division of the army of the centre; and the 7th division was in reserve at Alamedilla.

The enemy first appeared in the plain near Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 23rd, and retired again in a short time; but on the 24th, in the morning, they advanced again in considerable force, and entered the plain by the roads of Santi-espíritu and Tenebron; and before evening they had collected there all their cavalry, to the amount of about 6000 men, and 4 divisions of infantry, of which one division was of the Imperial Guard; and the remainder of the armies were encamped on the Guadapero, immediately beyond the hills which surround the plain of Ciudad Rodrigo.

On the morning of the 25th the enemy sent a reconnoissance of cavalry towards the Lower Azava, consisting of about 14 squadrons of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard. They drove in our posts on the right of the Azava, but having passed that river, the Lanciers de Berg were charged by 2 squadrons of the 16th, and one of the 14th light dragoons, and driven back; they attempted to rally and to return, but were fired upon by the light infantry of the 61st regt., which had been posted in the wood on their flank, by Lieut. General Graham; and Major General Anson pursued them across the Azava; and afterwards resumed his posts on the right of that river. Lieut. General Graham was highly pleased with the conduct of Major General Anson's brigade; and Major General Anson particularly mentions Lieut. Colonel Hervey, and Captain Brotherton, of the 14th, and Captain Hay, and Major Cocks, of the 16th.

But the enemy's attention was principally directed during this day to the position of the 3rd division, in the hills between Fuente Guinaldo and Pastores. About 8 in the morning, they moved a column, consisting of between 30 and 40 squadrons of cavalry, and 14 battalions of infantry, and 12 pieces of cannon, from Ciudad Rodrigo, in such a direction, that it was doubtful whether they would attempt to ascend the hills by La Encina, or by the direct road of El Bodon, towards Fuente Guinaldo; and I was not certain by which road they would make their attack, till they actually commenced it upon the last.

As soon as I saw the direction of their march, I had reinforced the 2nd batt. 5th regt., which occupied the post on the hill over which the road passes to Guinaldo, by the 77th regt., and the 21st Portuguese regt., under the command of Major General the Hon. C. Colville, and Major General V. Alten's brigade, of which only 3 squadrons remained which had not been detached, drawn from El Bodon; and I ordered there a brigade of the 4th division from Fuente Guinaldo, and afterwards from El Bodon, the remainder of the troops of the 3rd division, with the exception of those at Pastores, which were too distant.



In the mean time, however, the small body of troops in this post sustained the attack of the enemy's cavalry and artillery. One regiment of French dragoons succeeded in taking 2 pieces of cannon which had been posted on a rising ground on the right of our troops; but they were charged by the 2nd batt. 5th regt., under the command of Major Ridge, and the guns were immediately retaken.

While this operation was going on on the flank, an attack was made on the front by another regiment, which was repulsed in a similar manner by the 77th regt.; and the 3 squadrons of Major General V. Alten's brigade charged repeatedly different bodies of the enemy which ascended the hill on the left of the 2 regiments of British infantry, the Portuguese regiment being posted in the rear of their right.

At length, the division of the enemy's infantry which had marched with the cavalry from Ciudad Rodrigo, were brought up to the attack on the road of Fuente Guinaldo, and seeing that they would arrive and be engaged before the troops could arrive either from Guinaldo or El Bodon, I determined to withdraw our post, and to retire with the whole on Fuente Guinaldo. The 2nd batt. 5th regt., and the 77th regt., were formed into one square, and the 21st Portuguese regt. into another, supported by Major General V. Alten's small body of cavalry and the Portuguese artillery.

The enemy's cavalry immediately rushed forward, and obliged our cavalry to retire to the support of the Portuguese regiment; and the 5th and 77th regts. were charged on 3 faces of the square by the French cavalry, but they halted and repulsed the attack with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. We then continued the retreat, and joined the remainder of the 3rd division, also formed in squares, on their march to Fuente Guinaldo, and the whole retired together in the utmost order, and the enemy never made another attempt to charge any of them; but were satisfied with firing upon them with their artillery, and with following them.

Lieut. Colonel Williams with his light infantry, and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Trench with the 74th regt., retired from Pastores across the Agueda; and thence marched by Robleda, where they took some prisoners, and re-crossed the Agueda, and joined at Guinaldo in the evening.

I placed the 3rd and 4th divisions, and General Pack's brigade of infantry, and Major General V. Alten's, Major General de Grey's, and Major General Slade's brigades of cavalry in the position at Fuente Guinaldo on the evening of the 25th, and ordered Major General R. Craufurd to retire with the Light division across the Agueda, the 7th division to form at Albergueria, and Lieut. General Graham to collect the troops under his command at Nave d'Aver, keeping only posts of observation on the Azava; and the troops were thus formed in an *écheleon*, of which the centre was in the position at Guinaldo; and the right upon the pass of Perales; and the left at Nave d'Aver; Don Carlos de España was placed on the left of the Coa; and Don Julian Sanchez was detached with the cavalry to the enemy's rear.

The enemy brought up a second division of infantry from Ciudad Rodrigo in the afternoon of the 25th; and in the course of that night, and of the 26th, they collected their whole army in front of our position at Guinaldo; and not deeming it expedient to stand their attack in that position, I retired about 3 leagues, and on the 27th formed the army as follows: viz., the 5th

division on the right, at Aldea Velha ; the 4th, and light dragoons, and Major General V. Alten's cavalry, at the convent of Sacaparte, in front of Alfayates ; the 3rd and 7th divisions in second line, behind Alfayates ; and Lieut. General Graham's corps on the left at Bismula, having their advanced guard beyond the Villar Mayor river ; and Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton's cavalry near Alfayates, on the left of the 4th division, and having General Pack's and General M'Mahon's brigades at Rebolosa, on their left. The piquets of the cavalry were in front of Aldea da Ponte, beyond the Villar Mayor river, and those of General V. Alten's brigade beyond the same river, towards Forcalhos.

It had been the enemy's intention to turn the left of the position of Guinaldo by moving a column into the valley of the Upper Azava, and thence ascending the heights in the rear of the position by Castillejos ; and from this column they detached a division of infantry and 14 squadrons of cavalry to follow our retreat by Albergueria, and another body of the same strength followed us by Forcalhos. The former attacked the piquets of the cavalry at Aldea da Ponte, and drove them in ; and they pushed on nearly as far as Alfayates. I then made General Pakenham attack them with his brigade of the 4th division, supported by Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole, and the 4th division, and by Sir S. Cotton's cavalry ; and the enemy were driven through Aldea da Ponte, back upon Albergueria, and the piquets of the cavalry resumed their station.

But the enemy having been reinforced by the troops which marched from Forcalhos, again advanced about sunset and drove in the piquets of the cavalry from Aldea da Ponte, and took possession of the village.

Lieut. General Cole again attacked them with a part of General Pakenham's brigade, and drove them through the village ; but night having come on, and as General Pakenham was not certain what was passing on his flanks, or of the numbers of the enemy, and he knew that the army were to fall back still further, he evacuated the village, which the enemy occupied, and held during the night.

On the 28th, I formed the army on the heights behind Soito ; having the Serra de Meras on their right, and the left at Rendo, on the Coa ; about a league in rear of the position which they had occupied on the 27th. The enemy also retired from Aldea da Ponte, and had their advanced posts at Albergueria ; and as it appears that they are about to retire from this part of the country, and as we have already had some bad weather, and may expect more at the period of the equinoctial gales, I propose to canton the troops in the nearest villages to the position which they occupied yesterday.

I cannot conclude this report of the occurrences of the last week, without expressing to your Lordship my admiration of the conduct of the troops engaged in the affairs of the 25th instant. The conduct of the 2nd batt. 5th regt., commanded by Major Ridge, in particular, affords a memorable example of what the steadiness and discipline of the troops, and their confidence in their officers, can effect in the most difficult and trying situations. The conduct of the 77th regt., under the command of Lieut. Colonel Bromhead, was equally good, and I have never seen a more determined attack than was made by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, with every advantage of the assistance of a superior artillery, and repulsed by these 2



weak battalions. I must not omit also to report the good conduct on the same occasion, of the 21st Portuguese regt., under the command of Colonel Bacellar, and of Major Arentschildt's artillery. The Portuguese infantry were not actually charged, but were repeatedly threatened, and they showed the utmost steadiness and discipline, both in the mode in which they prepared to receive the enemy, and in all the movements of a retreat made over 6 miles of plain, in front of a superior cavalry and artillery. The Portuguese artillerymen attached to the guns, which were for a moment in the enemy's possession, were cut down at their guns.

The infantry upon this occasion were under the command of Major General the Hon. C. Colville; Lieut. General Picton having remained with the troops at El Bodon; and the conduct of Major General Colville was beyond all praise.

Your Lordship will have observed by the details of the action which I have given you, how much reason I had to be satisfied with the conduct of the 1st hussars and 11th light dragoons of Major General V. Alten's brigade. There were not more than 3 squadrons of the 2 regiments on the ground, this brigade having for some time furnished the cavalry for the outposts of the army, and they charged the enemy's cavalry repeatedly; and notwithstanding the superiority of the latter, the post would have been maintained if I had not preferred to abandon it to risking the loss of these brave men by continuing the unequal contest under additional disadvantages, in consequence of the immediate entry of 14 battalions of infantry into the action, before the support which I had ordered up could arrive. Major General V. Alten, and Lieut. Colonels Cumming and Arentschildt, and the officers of these regiments, particularly distinguished themselves upon this occasion.

I have also to mention that the Adjutant General, Major General the Hon. C. Stewart, being upon the field, gave his assistance as an officer of cavalry with his usual gallantry.

In the affair of the 27th, at Aldea da Ponte, Brig. General Pakenham and the troops of the 4th division, under the orders of Lieut. General the Hon. G. L. Cole, likewise conducted themselves remarkably well.

H.S.H. the Hereditary Prince of Orange, accompanied me during the operations which I have detailed to your Lordship, and was for the first time in fire; and he conducted himself with a spirit and intelligence which afford a hope that he will become an ornament to his profession.

The enemy having collected for the object of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo the army of the north, which were withdrawn from the attack they had commenced on General Abadia in Galicia, in which are included 22 battalions of the Imperial Guard, and General Souham's division of infantry, composed of troops recently arrived in Spain from the army of Naples, and now drawn from the frontier of Navarre, where they had been employed in operations against Mina, together with 5 divisions and all the cavalry of the army called 'of Portugal,' composing altogether an army of not less than 60,000 men, of which 6000 cavalry and 125 pieces of artillery, I could not pretend to maintain the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, nor could any effort which I could make prevent or materially impede the collection of the supplies or the march of the convoy for the relief of that place. I did all that I could expect to effect without incurring the risk of great loss for no object; and

as the reports as usual were so various in regard to the enemy's real strength, it was necessary that I should see their army, in order that the people of this country might be convinced that to raise the blockade was a measure of necessity, and that the momentary relief of Galicia, and of Mina, were the only objects which it was in my power immediately to effect.

I have had no reports from the north, since I addressed your Lordship last, nor from the south of Spain.

General Girard had collected at Merida a small body of troops, I believe with the intention of making an incursion into Portugal, under the notion that I had withdrawn Lieut. General Hill's corps from the Alentejo, for the purpose of maintaining the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. But I imagine that he will break up this collection again, as soon as he shall hear that General Hill is at Portalegre.'

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 601.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Richoso, 1st Oct. 1811.

'Colonel Downie, and particularly General Carroll, are more fit to command corps than many, or perhaps than any, of the officers to be found in the Spanish service; and I conceive that the British Government cannot apply their resources allotted for the support of the cause in Spain better than by supplying arms, clothing, accoutrements, and necessaries for the troops to be raised and commanded by those officers. I have no doubt that they will make as good use of this assistance as it is possible to make, and that the result will be as beneficial to the cause as it has been under any other mode of distributing this description of assistance.

But I beg to observe to your Lordship, that when a number of soldiers have been raised, armed, and accoutred, and even disciplined, but half the business to be done, in order to derive any effectual service from them, is effected. Means must be found of paying and supporting them, at least of supporting them while engaged in operations against the enemy in the field; and, till these means are found, the other expense incurred cannot produce much of the benefit expected from it. The employment of British officers would make no difference in this respect. The corps of troops to which they should be attached would be better disciplined possibly; but it would be equally useless as a military body in large operations; and indeed it is doubtful whether these officers could attempt to discipline, or even to command soldiers neither paid nor fed, even if they were willing to serve without pay themselves.

In whatever way British officers are employed with the Spanish troops, the measure will be viewed with jealousy, and will occasion some disgust among the national officers. If it should not be completely successful, as it appears to me impossible that it should be, unless means of paying and feeding the troops are provided, it is certain that the want of success will not be concealed, and that it will be attributed to the want of skill in the British officers, or to any rather than the real cause. Under these circumstances, I recommend it to your Lordship not to allow British officers to serve with the Spanish troops, till adequate means of paying and providing for those troops, at least when engaged in operations with the enemy, shall be found.



But there is another view of this subject to which I wish to draw your Lordship's attention. When the British officers would enter the Spanish service, they would have prejudices and opposition of all descriptions to contend with, as well on the part of the soldiers as of the officers of the national service. They could perform their duty only by receiving the steady support of their own commander, whose character must be of that description to command the respect of the Spanish authorities. If their commander should omit, or should not be able to support them in their exertions and their authority, they must fail.

I must also observe that British officers require to be kept in order, as well as the soldiers under their command, particularly in a foreign service. The experience which I have had of their conduct in the Portuguese service has shown me that there must be an authority, and that a strong one, to keep them within due bounds, otherwise they would only disgust the soldiers over whom they should be placed, the officers whom they should be destined to assist, and the country in whose service they should be employed.'

G. O.

Richoso, 2nd Oct. 1811.

3. The Commander of the Forces is desirous of drawing the attention of the army to the conduct of the 2nd batt. 5th and 77th regts., and the 21st Portuguese regt., and Major Arentschildt's Portuguese artillery, under the command of the Hon. Major General Colville, and of the 11th light dragoons and 1st Hussars under Major General V. Alten, in the affair with the enemy on the 26th ult. These troops were attacked by between 30 and 40 squadrons of cavalry, with 6 pieces of cannon, supported by a division consisting of 14 battalions of infantry, with cannon.

4. The Portuguese artillerymen were cut down at their guns before they quitted them; but the 2nd batt. 5th regt. attacked the cavalry which had taken the guns, and retook them. At the same time the 77th regt. were attacked in front by another body of cavalry, upon which body they advanced, and repulsed them.

5. While these actions were performed, Major General V. Alten's brigade, of which there were only 3 squadrons on the ground, were engaged on the left, with numbers infinitely superior to themselves. These squadrons charged repeatedly, supporting each other, and took above 20 prisoners; and notwithstanding the immense superiority of the enemy, the post would have been maintained, if the Commander of the Forces had not ordered the troops to withdraw from it, seeing that the action would become still more unequal, as the enemy's infantry were likely to be engaged in it, before the reinforcement ordered to the support of the post could arrive.

6. The troops then retired with the same determined spirit, and in the same good order with which they had maintained their post,—the 2nd batt. 5th regt., and 77th in one square, and the 21st Portuguese regt. in another, supported by Major General V. Alten's cavalry, and the Portuguese artillery. The enemy's cavalry charged 3 faces of the square of the British infantry, but were beaten off; and finding from their repeated fruitless efforts, that these brave troops were not to be broken, they were contented with following them at a distance, and with firing upon them with their artillery, till the troops joined the remainder of the 3rd division, and were afterwards supported by a brigade of the 4th division.

Although the 21st Portuguese regt. were not actually charged by the cavalry, their steadiness and determination were conspicuous; and the Commander of the Forces observed with pleasure the order and regularity with which they made all their movements, and the confidence they showed in their officers.

7. The Commander of the Forces has been particular in stating the details of this action in the General Orders, as in his opinion it affords a memorable example of what can be effected by steadiness, discipline, and confidence. It is impossible that any troops can, at any time, be exposed to the attack of numbers relatively greater than those which attacked the troops under Major General Colville, and Major General V. Alten, on the 25th Sept.; and the Commander of the Forces recommends the conduct of those troops to the particular attention of the officers and soldiers of the army, as an example to be followed in all such circumstances.

8. The Commander of the Forces considers Major General V. Alten and Major General Colville, and the commanding officers of the regiments under their command respectively, viz. Lieut. Colonel Cummings, Lieut. Colonel Arentschildt, Lieut. Colonel Broomhead, Major Ridge, and Colonel Bacellar of the 21st Portuguese regt., and the officers and soldiers

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 6th Oct. 1811.

'I have received your letter. I have not leisure to read Senhor ——'s works, nor have I inclination to contend with him, whether he or my officers have the merit of the plans by which Lisbon and the country were saved from the enemy.

I think that I have reason to complain of Senhor ——'s plans and memoirs as having misled me, and occasioned inconveniences and expenses which would not have been incurred, if I had not had them in my hands. I am not desirous of making any complaint of Senhor ——, and I give him credit for being a good draftsman, and for having taken some pains to acquire information in the country, which was the object of our researches; but it would be just as possible to discover the longitude in his papers and plans, as that degree of accuracy and information on which alone any good system could be founded.

If Senhor —— wants a reward for his plan and memoir, I have no

soldiers under their command, to be entitled to his particular thanks; and he assures them that he has not failed to report his sense of their conduct, in the action of the 25th Sept., to those by whom he trusts that it will be duly appreciated and recollected.

9. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the officers commanding regiments, will take measures to prevent the soldiers from eating the unripe grapes and other fruit; the old soldiers must be aware how pernicious it is to their health; but those lately arrived are not aware of it, and he begs that measures may be taken to prevent their getting it.'

G. O.

Freneda, 3rd Oct. 1811.

'1. The Commander of the Forces refers the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the commanding officers of regiments, to the General Orders of the 17th June, 1809; 11th August, 1810; and 8th July, 1811; regarding the mode of foraging.

2. The Commander of the Forces is convinced that there is not an officer or soldier in the army, who adverting to what the people of this part of the country suffered from the enemy in the summer of 1810, would wish to deprive them of any part of their property without paying for it, or to take more from them than is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the equipment of the army in an efficient state.

3. The Commander of the Forces trusts that the officers in the several cantonments will take care that the orders above referred to are regularly carried into execution, in order that the people may receive payment for what is taken from them.

4. A sense of the interests of the army, combined with feelings for the distresses of the people, should prevent all waste of forage or of any other articles, and the Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the officers to this point.'

G. O.

Freneda, 5th Oct. 1811.

'3. The Commander of the Forces observes however, from the perusal of the General Court Martial, that his orders regarding the removal of sick men from the regiments to the General Hospital have not been carried into execution by the regiments in the — division of infantry.

4. When a soldier is so sick as that he cannot march, he should invariably be sent to the General Hospital, for which there are always means of transport by the daily communications with the commissariat stores in the rear. If the sick are kept with the regiments, contrary to these orders repeatedly issued, and the regiment should receive an order to move upon a short notice, either the sick must be left behind, or the whole business of the commissariat must be deranged, by pressing means of transport, and applying those intended to supply the consumption of the troops, to carry sick soldiers on the march with their regiments, who ought to have been sent to the hospitals long before.

5. In this case it was necessary to press the mules attached to supply the consumption of the 13th light dragoons, to carry the sick detained with the regiments of infantry contrary to orders; and the 13th light dragoons and other troops, even some of these very same sick soldiers being at Montforte, had consequently bread for 2 days.

6. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the commanding officers of regiments to this subject, and they will see the inconvenience and derangement which are the consequences of disobedience of orders.'



objection to his getting it, and I shall be silent, or even recommend it. But if he pretends to have any thing to say to what has been done by our officers, I must expose his ignorance, and the negligence with which he made his survey and report, and the consequences which would have resulted by attending to either, whatever trouble such exposition may cost me.

I can only tell you that I reconnoitred the ground in October, and depended for some facts upon his report, and formed my plans accordingly. Afterwards Fletcher and our engineers found that these facts were represented erroneously; and I was obliged to travel again to Lisbon in February, 1810, and to alter the whole plan, and to undo all that had been done, in consequence of the erroneous information in ——'s memoir. You know that I was at Lisbon in February, 1810, as you followed me to Thomar; and that was the reason of the journey. From this statement, which refers only to one point, you will judge of ——'s merits.'

## 603.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 9th Oct. 1811.

'I am perfectly aware of the consequence of the measure which I shall adopt upon this occasion; of the want of confidence and terror which it will create at Lisbon, throughout Portugal, and even throughout the Peninsula. But if those, under whose immediate directions this violation of all the decent forms of civility has been committed, do not think it necessary to advert to these consequences, there is no reason why I should; and I shall certainly endeavor to prevent these sudden and arbitrary arrests of persons confidentially employed by the departments of the British army, without cause assigned; and shall take measures to make known to the public my reasons for the adoption of these measures of precaution and security.

I beg to be understood as not giving any opinion on the cause of the arrest of Mr. Borel. This gentleman, equally with others in the British service who have been arrested and imprisoned, either by the Portuguese Government with notice to me, or by me in consequence of the desire of the Portuguese Government, may have been guilty of crimes which deserve punishment. But I complain of the insult, of the mode in which this measure has been carried into execution, to which, as the Commanding Officer of His Majesty's troops, I will not submit.'

G. O.

Freneda, 7th Oct. 1811.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers commanding divisions will take the opportunity of the fine weather of the present moment to exercise the troops under their command respectively, according to his former directions.

3. It would tend materially to improve the health of the troops, and would keep them in the habit of marching, if, besides the exercise, they were to march a few miles on the road once or twice a week.'

G. O.

Freneda, 10th Oct. 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces has great satisfaction in publishing to the army the following extract of a letter, with which H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal has honored him, expressing H. R. H.'s approbation of the conduct of the troops during the late operation in Portugal.

'I desire you to make known to the army how highly I appreciate their merits and services, as having under your command accomplished that happy result with which Divine Providence has crowned with glory the arms of the allied nations.'

## 604.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 11th Oct. 1811.

'I have already repeatedly pointed out the only remedy to all these evils. It is for the Government to enforce their own regulations, by adequate punishment of the magistrate who refuses or neglects to issue his warrant or order to the owner of a boat or cart, at a particular time and place for the service of the army; and by adequate punishment of the owner of a boat or cart, who shall refuse to attend and to continue to attend so long as his services shall be required.

This is the law and practice in Great Britain and in all parts of the world; it is the practice in those parts of Spain occupied by the enemy, and the consequence is, that although they do not pay, they never want means of transport of all kinds; and until the Portuguese Government shall abandon their view of false popularity, and shall protect the people over whom they are placed from the horrible tyranny and oppression under which they are laboring, by enforcing their own regulations by adequate punishments, the system of embargo, with all its evil consequences, including these corruptions, disputes, &c., &c., must be continued, or the army must go down to Lisbon.'

## 605.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 11th Oct. 1811.

'That which would be desirable is, if possible, to aid laborious exertions to procure a subsistence, by small advances of money; and I propose to keep this principle in view in the distribution of the money intrusted to me, by which not only it will subsist those to whom it will be given for a longer period, but it may be hoped that the people will resume their habits of industry, and that they will soon again be able to provide for their own subsistence.'

## 606.

To Lieut. General Hill.

Freneda, 13th Oct. 1811.

'The ignorance of their duty of the officers of the army who are every day arriving in this country, and the general inattention and disobedience to orders by many of those who have been long here, increase the details of the duty to such an extent as to render it almost impracticable to carry it on; and owing to this disobedience and neglect, I can depend upon nothing, however well regulated and ordered.'

G. O.

Freneda, 14th Oct. 1811.

'The Commander of the Forces pardons \_\_\_\_\_ upon the recommendation of the General Court Martial. He likewise pardons \_\_\_\_\_, because that soldier told the truth to the General Court Martial, and thereby saved his comrades, who were by mistake charged with the offence of which he has been convicted.'

5. The Commander of the Forces is concerned however to observe the commencement of the practice of robbing houses. The soldiers must be aware that the unfortunate inhabitants of this country, having been twice pillaged by the enemy, have but few of the conveniences, or even the necessaries of life. And the Commander of the Forces had hoped that the British soldiers would have endeavored to alleviate rather than aggravate their sufferings.

6. Although the circumstances which have appeared, and have occurred at the trial, have induced the Court Martial to recommend one of the soldiers convicted, and the Commander of the Forces to pardon both, he desires it may be clearly understood that he will spare no pains to discover and bring to trial those who may injure the inhabitants of the country, and that whatever punishment the Court Martial may sentence shall in every case be inflicted.'



607.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 21st Oct. 1811.

'As I wish to put an end to the whole difference between the Portuguese Government and me, and am not desirous of carrying on the war in Brazil when peace has been made in Portugal, I beg you not to transmit to England my letter on the subject of ————'s charge against Dom M. Forjaz, which is certainly now unnecessary, and would tend only to revive old disputes; and that if you have sent it, you will write to Mr. Hamilton to request that it may be retained.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will speak to the members of the Regency regarding the case of Borel. I shall be sorry to commence the era of peace by a *coup d'état*, such as that which I had in contemplation on this subject. But it must be obvious to the Government that the Prince did not mean that this person should be arrested; and even if he did, the mode in which the arrest was made was such that I cannot submit to it, and I must adopt some measures which shall show to the public my sense of it. *Among friends* this is better avoided.'

G. O.

Freneda, 1st Nov. 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe that the power of the assistants of the provost marshal of the army has, in more than one instance, been abused; and that officers have thought themselves authorised to send orders to the assistant provosts, under which orders abuses have been committed, contrary to the established usages and rules of the service, and the intention and orders of the Commander of the Forces.

2. The office of provost marshal has existed in all British armies in the field. His particular duties are to take charge of the prisoners confined for offences of a general description; to preserve good order and discipline; to prevent breaches of both by the soldiers and followers of the army, by his presence at those places in which breaches of either are likely to be committed; and, if necessary, he has, by constant usage in all armies, the power to punish those whom he may find in the act of committing breaches of orders and discipline.

3. The authority of the provost marshal to punish must be limited by the necessity of the case; and whatever may be the crime of which a soldier may be guilty, the provost marshal has not the power of inflicting summary punishment for it, unless he should see him in the act of committing it. If he should not see the soldier in the act of committing the offence of which he may have been guilty, a report must be made to the Commander in Chief of the army, who would give such orders upon the case as might be deemed expedient, either for further inquiry for the trial of the soldier or for the infliction of summary punishment, according to the nature of the case, the degree of evidence of the soldier's guilt, and the existing necessity for an immediate example.

4. The duties and authorities of the assistants of the provost marshals, attached to the several divisions and stations of the army are the same as those of the provost; but the conduct of these officers and the exertion of their authority, require the constant and watchful attention of the General Officers commanding divisions, and of the officers commanding stations, and of the Staff Officers attached to them, as that of the provost marshal does of the Commander of the Forces and of the officers of the general Staff.

5. They should attend particularly to the nature of the offences against good order and military discipline of which the soldiers and followers of the army may be guilty at different times and under different circumstances; and to allow the assistant provosts to punish them in a summary manner, only when committed under those circumstances when summary punishment may be necessary for the sake of example, and in which the prevalent and continual commission of the particular crime may be injurious to the public service.

6. The Commander of the Forces desires that it may be clearly understood that no officer whatever has a right to order the provost marshal, or his assistants, to exercise the authority entrusted to them; nor can the provost marshal, nor his assistants, inflict corporal punishment on any man, excepting they should see him in the act of committing a breach of orders and discipline. Their duty is by vigilance and activity to prevent those breaches which the Commander of the Forces is sorry to observe are too common, and to punish those they may catch in the fact.'

608.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 6th Nov. 1810.

'I beg to refer your Lordship, for the details of Lieut General Hill's operations to the 30th October, to his dispatch to me of that date from Merida, a copy of which I enclose. I have frequently had the pleasure to report to your Lordship the zeal and ability with which Lieut. General Hill had carried into execution the operations intrusted to his charge; and I have great satisfaction in repeating my commendations of him, and of the brave troops under his command, upon the present occasion, in which the ability of the General, and the gallantry and discipline of the officers and troops, have been conspicuous.'

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Lieut. General Hill to General Viscount Wellington, K.B.

MY LORD,

Merida, 30th Oct. 1811.

'In pursuance of the instructions which I received from your Excellency to drive the enemy out of that part of Estremadura which lies between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and to replace the corps under the command of Brig. General the Conde de Penne Villemur, in Caceres, (from which town it had been obliged to retire by the superior force of the enemy,) I put a portion of the troops under my orders in motion on the 22nd instant, from their cantonments in the neighbourhood of Portalegre, and advanced with them towards the Spanish frontier.

On the 23rd the head of the column reached Alburquerque, where I learned that the enemy, who had advanced to Aliseda, had fallen back to Arroyo del Puerco, and Caceres, and that the Spaniards were again in possession of Aliseda.

On the 24th I had a brigade of British infantry, half a brigade of Portuguese artillery (6 pounders), and some of my cavalry at Aliseda, and the remainder of my cavalry, another brigade of British infantry, and half a brigade of Portuguese 6 pounders at Casa de Castellana, about a league distant.

On the 25th the Conde de Penne Villemur made a reconnaissance with his cavalry, and drove the enemy from Arroyo del Puerco; the enemy retired to Malpartida, which place he occupied as an advanced post with about 300 cavalry and some infantry, his main body being still at Caceres.

On the 26th, at day break, the troops arrived at Malpartida, and found that the enemy had left that place, retiring towards Caceres, followed by a small party of the 2nd hussars, who skirmished with his rear guard. I was shortly afterwards informed that the whole of the enemy's force had left Caceres, but the want of certainty as to the direction he had taken, and the extreme badness of the weather, induced me to halt the Portuguese and British troops at Malpartida for that night. The Spaniards moved on to Caceres.

Having received certain information that the enemy had marched on Torremocha, I put the troops at Malpartida in motion on the morning of the 27th, and advanced by the road leading to Merida, through Aldea del Cano and Casas de Don Antonio, being a shorter route than that followed by the enemy, and which afforded a hope of being able to intercept and bring him to action, and I was here joined by the Spaniards from Caceres. On the march I received information that the enemy had only left Torremocha that morning, and that he had again halted his main body at Arroyo Molinos, leaving a rear guard at Albala, which was a satisfactory proof that he was ignorant of the movements of the troops under my command. I therefore made a forced march to Alcuescar that evening, where the troops were so placed as to be out of sight of the enemy, and no fires were allowed to be made.

On my arrival at Alcuescar, which is within a league of Arroyo Molinos, every



thing tended to confirm me in the opinion that the enemy was not only in total ignorance of my near approach, but extremely off his guard; and I determined upon attempting to surprise, or at least to bring him to action, before he should march in the morning, and the necessary dispositions were made for that purpose.

The town of Arroyo Molinos is situated at the foot of one extremity of the Sierra de Montanches, the mountain running from it to the rear in the form of a crescent, almost every where inaccessible, the two points being about 2 miles asunder. The Truxillo road runs round that to the eastward.

The road leading from the town to Merida runs at right angles with that from Alcuescar, and the road to Medellin passes between those to Truxillo and Merida, the grounds over which the troops had to manœuvre being a plain thinly scattered with oak and cork trees. My object, of course, was to place a body of troops so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy by these roads.

The troops moved from their bivouac near Alcuescar about 2 o'clock in the morning of the 28th, in one column, right in front, direct on Arroyo Molinos, and in the following order: Major General the Hon. K. Howard's brigade of infantry (1st batt. 50th, 71st, and 92nd regts., and one company of the 60th); Colonel Wilson's brigade (1st batt. 28th, 2nd batt. 34th and 39th regts., and one company of the 60th); 6th Portuguese regt. of the line, and 6th çaçadores, under Colonel Ashworth; the Spanish infantry under Brig. General Morillo; Major General Long's brigade of cavalry (2nd hussars, 9th and 13th light dragoons); and the Spanish cavalry, under the Conde de Penne Villemur. They moved in this order until within half a mile of the town of Arroyo Molinos, where under cover of a low ridge the column closed, and divided into 3 columns. Major General Howard's brigade, and three 6 pounders under Lieut. Colonel Stewart, supported by Brig. General Morillo's infantry, the left; Colonel Wilson's brigade, the Portuguese infantry under Colonel Ashworth, two 6 pounders and a howitzer, the right, under Major General Howard; and the cavalry the centre.

As the day dawned a violent storm of rain and thick mist came on, under cover of which the columns advanced in the direction and in the order which had been pointed out to them. The left column, under Lieut. Colonel Stewart, marched direct upon the town. The 71st, one company of the 60th, and 92nd regts., at quarter distance, and the 50th in close column, somewhat in the rear with the guns as a reserve.

The right column, under Major General Howard, having the 39th regt. as a reserve, broke off to the right so as to turn the enemy's left; and having gained about the distance of a cannon shot to that flank, it marched in a circular direction upon the further point of the crescent, on the mountain above mentioned.

The cavalry under Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine moved between the 2 columns of infantry, ready to act in front or move round either of them as occasion might require.

The advance of our column was unperceived by the enemy until they approached very near, at which moment he was filing out of the town upon the Merida road; the rear of his column, some of his cavalry, and part of his baggage being still in it. One brigade of his infantry had marched for Medellin an hour before daylight.

The 71st and 92nd regts. charged into the town with cheers, and drove the enemy every where at the point of the bayonet, having a few men cut down by the enemy's cavalry.

The enemy's infantry, which had got out of the town, had, by the time these regiments arrived at the extremity of it, formed into 2 squares, with the cavalry on their left; the whole were posted between the Merida and Medellin roads, fronting Alcuescar; the right square being formed within half musket shot of the town, the garden walls of which were promptly lined by the 71st light infantry,

while the 92nd regt. filed out and formed line on their right, perpendicular to the enemy's right flank, which was much annoyed by the well directed fire of the 71st. In the mean time one wing of the 50th regt. occupied the town and secured the prisoners, and the other wing along with the three 6 pounders skirted the outside of it; the artillery as soon as within range firing with great effect upon the squares.

Whilst the enemy was thus occupied on his right, Major General Howard's column continued moving round his left, and our cavalry advancing and crossing the head of the column, cut off the enemy's cavalry from his infantry, charging it repeatedly, and putting it to the rout. The 13th light dragoons, at the same time, took possession of the enemy's artillery: one of the charges made by 2 squadrons of the 2nd hussars and one of the 9th light dragoons was particularly gallant; the latter commanded by Captain Gore, and the whole under Major Busche of the hussars. I ought previously to have mentioned that the British cavalry having, through the darkness of the night and the badness of the road, been somewhat delayed, the Spanish cavalry under the Conde de Penne Villemur was on this occasion the first to form upon the plain and engage the enemy, until the British were enabled to come up.

The enemy was now in full retreat, but Major General Howard's column having gained the point to which it was directed, and the left column gaining fast upon him, he had no resource but to surrender, or to disperse and ascend the mountain. He preferred the latter, and ascending near the eastern extremity of the crescent, and which might have been deemed inaccessible, was followed closely by the 28th and 34th regts., whilst the 39th regt. and Colonel Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry, followed round the foot of the mountain by the Truxillo road, to take him again in flank. At the same time Brig. General Morillo's infantry ascended at some distance to the left with the same view.

As may be imagined, the enemy's troops were by this time in the utmost panic, his cavalry was flying in every direction, the infantry threw away their arms, and the only effort of either was to escape. The troops under Major General Howard's immediate command, as well as those he had sent round the point of the mountain, pursued them over the rocks, making prisoners at every step, until his own men became so exhausted and few in number, that it was necessary for him to halt and secure the prisoners, and leave the further pursuit to the Spanish infantry under Brig. General Morillo, who from the direction in which they had ascended had now become the most advanced; the force General Girard had with him at the commencement, which consisted of 2,500 infantry and 600 cavalry, being at this time totally dispersed. In the course of these operations Brig. General Campbell's brigade of Portuguese infantry (the 4th and 10th regts.), and the 18th Portuguese infantry, joined from Casas de Don Antonio, where they had halted for the preceding night; and as soon as I judged they could no longer be required at the scene of action, I detached them with the brigade consisting of the 50th, 71st, and 92nd regts., and Major General Long's brigade of cavalry, towards Merida; they reached San Pedro that night, and entered Merida this morning; the enemy having in the course of the night retreated from hence in great alarm to Almendralejo. The Conde de Penne Villemur formed the advanced guard with his cavalry, and had entered the town previous to the arrival of the British.

The ultimate consequences of these operations I need not point out to your Lordship; their immediate result is the capture of one General of cavalry (Brun), one Colonel of cavalry (the Prince d'Artemberg), one Lieutenant Colonel (*chef d'État Major*), one aide de camp of General Girard, 2 Lieutenant Colonels, one *commissaire des guerres*, 30 Captains and inferior Officers, and upwards of 1000 men, already sent off under an escort to Portalegre; the whole of the enemy's artillery, baggage, and commissariat, some magazines of corn, which he had collected at Caceres and



Merida, and the contribution of money which he had collected on the former town, besides the total dispersion of General Girard's corps. The loss of the enemy in killed must also have been severe, while that on our side was comparatively trifling, as appears by the accompanying return, in which your Lordship will lament to see the name of Lieut. Strenuwitz, aide de camp to Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine, whose extreme gallantry led him into the midst of the enemy's cavalry, and occasioned his being taken prisoner.

Thus has ended an expedition which, although not bringing into play to the full extent the gallantry and spirit of those engaged, will, I trust, give them a claim to your Lordship's approbation. No praise of mine can do justice to their admirable conduct, the patience and good-will shown by all ranks during forced marches in the worst weather, their strict attention to the orders they received, the precision with which they moved to the attack, and their obedience to command during the action. In short, the manner in which every one has performed his duty, from the first commencement of the operations, merits my warmest thanks, and will not, I am sure, pass unobserved by your lordship.

To Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine I must express my obligations for his assistance and advice upon all occasions. To Major General the Hon. K. Howard, who dismounted and headed his troops up the difficult ascent of the Sierra, and throughout most ably conducted his column; and to Major General Long, for his exertions at the head of his brigade, I feel myself particularly indebted. I must also express my obligations to Colonel Wilson, Colonel Ashworth, and Lieut. Colonel Stewart, commanding brigades, for the able manner in which they led them.

Lieut. Colonel Cameron, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercromby, and Lieut. Colonels Fenwick, Muter, and Lindsay, Majors Harrison and Busche, Major Park (commanding the light companies), and Captain Gore, commanding the 9th light dragoons, Major Hartmann, commanding the artillery, Lieut. Colonel Grant and Major Birmingham of the Portuguese service, Captain Arriaga of the Portuguese artillery (whose guns did so much execution), severally merit my warmest approbation by their conduct; and I must not omit to mention the exertions made by Brig. General Campbell and his troops to arrive in time to give their assistance. General Giron, the chief of General Castaños' staff, and second in command of the 5th Spanish army, has done me the honor to accompany me during these operations, and I feel much indebted to him for his assistance and valuable advice. Brig. General the Conde de Penne Villemur, Brig. General Morillo, Colonel Downie, and the Spanish Officers and soldiers in general have conducted themselves in a manner to excite my entire approbation.

Having now, I hope, accomplished the object of your Lordship's wishes with the troops under my command, I shall give them one day's rest at this place, and then return towards the Portuguese frontier for the purpose of replacing them in cantonments.

To Lieut. Colonel Rooke, Assistant Adjutant General, and Lieut. Colonel Offeny, Assistant Quarter Master General, for the able manner in which they have conducted their departments, and also for the valuable assistance and advice which I have at all times received from them; to the Officers of the Adjutant and Quarter Master Generals' Department; to Captain Squire, Royal Engineers, for his intelligence and indefatigable exertions during the whole operations; and to Captain Currie and my personal staff, my warmest thanks are due.

This dispatch will be delivered to your Lordship by Capt. Hill, my first aide de camp, to whom I beg to refer your Lordship for all further particulars.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROWLAND HILL, Lieut. General.

P. S. Since writing the above report a good many more prisoners have been made, and I doubt not but the whole will amount to 1300 or 1400.

Brig. General Morillo has just returned from the pursuit of the dispersed, whom he followed for 8 leagues. He reports that, besides those killed in the plains, upwards of 600 dead were found in the woods and mountains.

General Girard escaped in the direction of La Serena with 200 or 300 men, mostly without arms, and is stated by his own aide de camp to be wounded.

R. H.'

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609.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 6th Nov. 1811.

'It would be particularly agreeable to me, if some mark of the favor of H.R.H. the Prince Regent were conferred upon General Hill; his services have been always meritorious, and very distinguished in this country, and he is beloved by the whole army.

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In recommending him, as I do most anxiously, I really feel that there is no officer to whom an act of grace and favor would be received by the army with more satisfaction than on General Hill.'

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610.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 8th Nov. 1811.

'In respect to Dom M. Forjaz, it is my opinion that he ought to confine himself, in his letter of justification to the Prince, to the charges contained in the Prince's letter to me, without alluding to private reports, &c. of his being the cause of my being on a bad footing with the Government. It is difficult to say what will be successful and what otherwise, in these Governments of intrigue; but in my opinion, the broad distinct line is the best. The Prince accuses him of want of zeal and love for his service, and of disobedience to his orders; and not of fomenting differences.

It is difficult, excepting by protestation, to prove the negative of the first 2 charges; and in respect to the last, I should recommend him to defend himself as I have defended him, by saying that he is the officer of this Government, and can neither obey nor disobey, excepting by their orders, and beg that His Royal Highness will descend to facts, or justify him.'

G. O.

Freneda, 14th Nov. 1811.

'10. The Commander of the Forces trusts that the example of Lieut. — will induce the officers of the army to consider the performance of their duty as their first object, from which their attention ought not to be diverted by any idle views of amusement at Lisbon or elsewhere.

11. A moment's reflection on these subjects on which it was Lieut. —'s duty to reflect, would have convinced him, that the soldiers of his company would suffer the greatest inconvenience from his taking with him from the regiment their money; and the Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe from the whole of Lieut. —'s conduct, and from his having omitted to this moment to replace the money which he had improperly taken away, that he had determined in the first instance to avail himself of any idle excuse to go to Lisbon for his amusement, for which the company's money was to give him the means of paying the expenses.

12. Lieut. —'s proceeding from Abrantes to Lisbon, on the alleged recommendation of Doctor —, was equally irregular and consistent with the rest of his conduct; he ought to have known that he could not, with propriety, remain absent from his regiment on account of sickness without the permission of the Commander of the Forces, founded on the proceedings of a Medical Board ordered to assemble in consequence of a report to the Commander of the Forces of the bad state of his health.'



611.

To Major General Alex. Campbell.

Freneda, 22nd Nov. 1811.

‘I was very much obliged to you for the kindness of the letter which you wrote to me on your departure from this part of the world; and I assure you, that I lament the chance which certainly exists that I may never meet you again. I acknowledge, that with this chance before your eyes, I am astonished that you should think, at your time of life, of returning to the East Indies. With the income of your regiment, and on the staff in England or Ireland, or at Gibraltar, or Malta, or Sicily, or in America, you might live with your family. I do not think that any man’s family have a right to expect that he should die a few years sooner to put a little more money in their pockets after his death: and I should think that your wife, who, in a pecuniary way, would be the person most interested in your return to the East Indies, would prefer your prolonged life to increase of pounds. After all, I am not certain that increase of pounds would be the result of your voyage there, and I think it very little doubtful, I am sorry to say, that if you do return, it will be in a state of health in which you will be very little capable of any enjoyment. God bless you, my dear Campbell.’

G. O.

Freneda, 15th Nov. 1811.

‘1. The frequent well-founded complaints made by officers commanding regiments of the detention of non-commissioned officers and soldiers at the hospital stations as attendants upon the hospitals, induce the Commander of the Forces to refer the Commanding Officers of the several hospital stations to his General Orders of the 23rd Oct., 1810, and to desire that the principles of that order may be applied to the stations under their command respectively.

2. They are immediately to make out a list of the names of those non-commissioned officers and soldiers, whom it is necessary should be employed as ward masters, storekeepers, and attendants upon the several hospitals, which lists are to be sent to the Adjutant General, and they will be published in General Orders, for the information of the regiment to which the non-commissioned officers and soldiers belong, if the Commander of the Forces should approve of them.

3. The Commanding Officers at the several hospital stations are forbid to detain any non-commissioned officers or soldiers, whose names shall not appear in those lists as attendants upon the hospitals. If an additional number of attendants of any description are required upon the hospital, application must be made for them, specifying their names, and if the Commander of the Forces should concur in the necessity of this additional attendance, his orders will be given in the General Orders for the information of all concerned.’

G. O.

Freneda, 16th Nov. 1811.

‘5. The Commander of the Forces has seldom read the details of an officer’s conduct, which has given him so much cause for disapprobation and disgust as those which appear respecting the conduct of Mr. —, on the proceedings of the General Court Martial.

6. Having been employed on duty at the fort of Peniche, he set at defiance the Governor, and all the Portuguese authorities in that place; he beat the people employed under him, and insulted the inhabitants of the fort, by conduct and language which a gentleman ought not to have used.

7. The people of Portugal have in no instance shown their forbearance and good nature, their gratitude for the benefits they have received from the British nation, and their consideration for the follies of an individual, to a greater degree than in the case of Mr. —. But the Commander of the Forces is determined that these qualities shall not be taken advantage of by any individual to their annoyance and injury; and he declares that if he did not attribute much of the conduct of Mr. — to thoughtlessness and levity, he would recommend that he should be dismissed from His Majesty’s service.

8. The Commander of the Forces requests Major General Peacocke to read to Mr. — this reprimand for his conduct; his suspension from rank and pay is to take place from this day; and the Commander of the Forces requests the Commissary General will hereafter employ Mr. — in a situation in which his conduct will be under the inspection of one of the superior officers of the Commissariat.

9. He likewise requests that Mr. —, of the Commissariat, may be removed from Peniche.’

## 612.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1811.

‘ However, notwithstanding this misfortune, if it should have occurred, and its probable consequences, I do not despair of the result of the contest. Buonaparte is still far from making the conquest even of that part of the Peninsula of which he has the military possession, and the people of the country are still disposed to resist whenever they see a prospect of advantage: we shall soon find new modes of communicating with, and supplying, the guerrillas, even if the old should be cut off; and, in truth, the devastation which attends the progress of the enemy’s arms, and is the consequence of their continuance in any part of the country, is our best friend, and will in the end bring the contest to a conclusion.

The whole country between Madrid and the Alentejo is now a desert, and a still smaller proportion of the land has been cultivated this winter. The argument of the people of the country is, that it is better to rob than to sow and have the produce of their harvests taken from them; and the French begin to find that they cannot keep their large armies together for any ope-

G. O.

Freneda, 1st Dec. 1811.

‘ 3. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the officers of the army to the sentence of the General Court Martial above published, and to this order, and he repeats that they have no more right to order a cart or any thing else to be “embargoed,” as it is called, or pressed in this country, than they have in England.

4. The orders of the army are positive upon this subject. If an officer requires a cart or other means of transport or any article of supply of any description, he is to make a regular application to a Commissary; if there should be no Commissary near to whom he can conveniently apply, he must make an application to a magistrate in writing; and if the magistrate should refuse or omit to comply with his application, he must report in writing to his superior officer for the information of the Commander of the Forces, and the magistrate will be responsible for his omission to perform his duty, and to supply what is required.

5. The exigence of the service can seldom be of a nature to require that an officer should require to take upon himself to embargo or press means of transport or articles of supply, &c. without the intervention of a magistrate; and any officer who does take upon himself such an authority will be obliged to prove that the service rendered such an assumption of authority necessary, and that the magistrate, to whom he had applied, had omitted or refused to perform his duty: he must in that case go himself in command of the party which will be employed to embargo or press what is required, and he will in this, as in every other case, be held responsible for the conduct of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers under his command.

6. These orders are rendered necessary by the disgraceful irregularities of which the soldiers are guilty while employed on these duties, by the cruel oppression which they inflict on the inhabitants of the country, and by the misfortunes to themselves which are the consequences of their conduct. In the course of the month of October, there were 2 other soldiers killed and 3 wounded, besides corporal —, of the —nd regt., who, while employed in “embargoing,” as it is called, carts, committed every description of irregularity, and levied contributions on the people for the release of the same carts which had been pressed, under pretence of the necessities of the service. The Commander of the Forces, therefore, trusts that the officers of the army will aid him in putting an end to this fertile source of these disgraceful irregularities by a due attention to these orders; and he desires that every officer who marches with a detachment, whether from the army, from Lisbon, or from any other station, may be supplied with a copy of them.

7. The Commander of the Forces likewise requests the attention of the officers of the Commissariat to these orders; and he desires that they will understand that they have no more authority to embargo or press any thing for the service than any other officer of the army. If they cannot procure what they require by hire or purchase, they must apply to a magistrate; and if the magistrate should refuse or omit to perform his duty, they must make a report in writing, specifying all the circumstances; and if the necessities of the service require that they should proceed on their own authority to press or embargo by military force, an officer of the commissariat must proceed with the party.’



ration that will take time, and that when we can reach them they can do nothing with small bodies.

The misfortune is that we experience nearly the same difficulties; we cannot venture to undertake any thing with a small body, and a large body would starve. But we have advantages in the Peninsula which the French cannot enjoy; we have possession of all the navigable rivers, of which we make use to convey our supplies, as far as they will carry; and the naval power of Great Britain protects the arrival of these supplies, and the formation of our magazines on the coast.'

G. O.

Freneda, 7th Dec. 1811.

'2. The Commander of the Forces has received frequent complaints from officers, as well of the Portuguese as of the British army, belonging to the civil as well as the military department, and to the regiments, of the uncivil, and in various instances, insulting language, in which some of the communications in writing with each other, are carried on. It is impossible that the service should not suffer, if those who are to assist each other do not agree; and it cannot be expected that they should agree, if harsh, uncivil, and insulting terms, are used in their necessary communications.

3. The Commander of the Forces is unwilling now to take further notice of this subject, or to draw the attention of the army to those complained of.

4. The Commander of the Forces has likewise, upon more than one occasion, received complaints of the disgraceful conduct of British officers towards the Portuguese authorities, particularly the commanders of forts, and in provinces. He trusts that this has proceeded from inexperience; but he desires that an officer in the Portuguese service in command may be treated in every respect as an officer in His Majesty's service in command. All officers and others belonging to the British army, passing through the limits of his command, and the place of his residence, are to wait upon him, and acquaint him with the nature of the service, or business on which they are going.'

G. O.

Freneda, 9th Dec. 1811.

'1. The Commander of the Forces observes, by the returns which he has lately examined of the means of transport attached to the several divisions to convey to them supplies, that some are attached to regimental or divisional hospitals, that others are attached to regiments, others posted for the purpose of keeping up the communications of the divisions, all of which distributions diminish the means in the hands of the Commissaries to supply the troops, and are very inconvenient to the service.

2. When it is necessary that soldiers should be removed to the hospitals, and that the roads are of a description that the spring waggons cannot be used, the mules returning to the magazines for supplies must be employed to carry them to the hospitals, which have been stationed on the roads to the magazines with a view to this convenience.

3. A regiment can have no service for mules, which is not provided for by the General Orders of the army.

4. The communications of the several divisions, with Head Quarters, are provided for by the arrangements of the Quarter Master General; the internal communications of the divisions must be carried on by men on foot, unless on extraordinary occasions; to provide for which, orderlies of the cavalry have been attached to the General Officers commanding divisions, besides the officers of their staff.

5. Under these circumstances, the Commander of the Forces requests, that all the mules employed in any manner, except in carrying supplies from the magazines, or in the carriage of ammunition, may be returned to those services.

6. If the General Officer commanding a division, finds it necessary to order that the means of transport attached to the brigades under his command should be employed in any manner different from that for which they are provided, he is requested to report it.

7. Notwithstanding that every brigade in the army is provided with the means of transport sufficient for the supply of the officers and troops with bread and forage, it is possible that owing to the great distance of the magazines, and the accidents to which the transport of stores is liable, the supply of corn for the horses and mules attached to the infantry in particular, may at times fail.

8. There are substitutes, however, to be provided in the country, which will keep these animals in condition, even though they should not be regularly supplied with corn; and having ascertained the price of a ration of corn, before any expense of transport is incurred, the Commander of the Forces has directed, that from the 1st Dec., to the 1st March, the officers of the infantry of the army, and of the staff of the infantry, may receive 280 *reis* for each horse for every day the horses receive no corn from the Commissariat, and 140 *reis* for each mule for every day their mules receive no corn.

613.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 10th Dec. 1811.

‘I beg the Government to advert to my first letter to them on the 3rd October, on the subject of the interest on paper money, which is the foundation of all their proceedings on this subject. I repeat, that unless they can improve the credit of the circulating credit in Portugal, Great Britain cannot maintain the contest in the Peninsula, not for want of means, because, thank God! Great Britain was never in so prosperous a state; but because the state of the world will not allow her to procure a sufficient quantity of specie.

If Great Britain should be obliged to withdraw from the contest, or if I should think proper to adopt the measure which I have above pointed out in regard to paper money, (and I must adopt some measure of the kind, if the circulating value of the paper money is not improved,) what will become of their fine spun and stock jobbing theories for the improvement of their credit?

I can give no opinion respecting the taxes on the farmers, till I know exactly what they are. Generally speaking, it is a gross error to believe that the country is so much distressed as is stated. I would also observe upon all Principal Sousa’s plans, that they are drawn with a view to a state of peace. Portugal is at war, and must be at war; and great sacrifices must be made, and every nerve and resource must be strained to carry the country through its difficulties. It will afterwards be time to think of improvements. This is the only country in the world which, having such an enemy to oppose, and such a cause to fight for, would think of leaving any resource unapplied to the purposes of war.’

9. No officer is to draw for more than he actually keeps.

10. The charges on this account will be paid monthly, or as soon after as possible, by the Assistant Commissaries attached to the brigade; the bills for them must be made out for each day, and the Commanding Officer of the regiment must certify, that the officers for whose horses and mules the charges have been made, have, to the best of his knowledge, received no corn from the Commissariat on that day, and none from any other source for which a charge can come against the public; this certificate must be countersigned by the quarter master of the regiment, and by the Assistant Commissary attached to the brigade.

11. The officers of the army will understand that the efforts made to supply corn to the regimental horses and mules will not be discontinued, and the expenses incurred for that object will not cease, notwithstanding that this allowance is granted.

12. The Commander of the Forces hopes that these efforts will be more successful hereafter than they have been, and this allowance is given only to enable the officers during the winter to provide a substitute in case they should fail.’

G. O.

Freneda, 15th Dec. 1811.

‘The claims sent to the Military Secretary will be referred to this Board for their consideration and decision.

2. Major General Le Marchant and any 2 of the officers above named may constitute the Board.

3. The principles on which such claims are to be considered and decided, are as follow:—

No claim for a loss can be allowed which has been occasioned by a disobedience of orders, or by neglect or omission in the party claiming for the loss, or his servant or bat-man.

No claim can be allowed for a loss sustained by the ordinary occurrences of the service, such as deaths of horses or mules of fatigue occasioned by the ordinary marches of the army, the loss of accoutrements and necessaries in hospital, or by the breaking down of carts, fatigue of oxen, &c. &c.

4. As the principle on which the compensation for losses by the public is founded is, that the claimant may replace his loss, and the public may not lose his services, claims for losses on behalf of officers or soldiers who are dead cannot be admitted.

5. As the officers of the army have been restricted in the amount of their baggage by different



614.

To Lieut. General Lord W. Bentinck.

Freneda, 24th Dec. 1811.

'I had heard generally of these affairs before, but I have had no opportunities of acquiring information upon them, and have turned my attention but little to them; and if I could form an opinion upon them, I should mistrust it. I have, however, long considered it probable, that even *we* should witness a general resistance throughout Europe to the fraudulent and disgusting tyranny of Buonaparte, created by the example of what has passed in Spain and Portugal; and that *we* should be actors and advisers in these scenes; and I have reflected frequently upon the measures which should be pursued to give a chance of success.

Those who embark in projects of this description should be made to understand, or to act as if they understood, that having once drawn the sword they must not return it, till they shall have completely accomplished their object. They must be prepared and must be forced to make all sacrifices to the cause. Submission to military discipline and order is a matter of course; but when a nation determines to resist the authority, and to shake off the government of Buonaparte, they must be prepared and forced to sacrifice the luxuries and comforts of life, and to risk all in a contest, which, it should be clearly understood before it is undertaken, has for its object to save all or nothing.

The first measure for a country to adopt is to form an army, and to raise a revenue from the people to defray the expense of the army. Above all, to form a Government of such strength, as that army and people can be forced by it to perform their duty. This is the rock upon which Spain has split; and all our measures in any other country which should afford hopes of resistance to Buonaparte should be directed to avoid it. The enthusiasm of the people is very fine, and looks well in print; but I have never known

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different orders, by the late and by the present Commander of the Forces, it would be inconsistent with every principle on which compensation for losses is granted, and with the practice of former Boards of Claims, if the full amount of the whole of an officer's baggage, as allowed by His Majesty's regulations, was granted to replace the baggage allowed to be carried, or actually carried, by any officer on the service in Spain or Portugal.

6. The value of the whole, and of the different proportions of officers' baggage lost, is to be rated at two thirds of the sum allowed by His Majesty's regulations.

7. The claims for regimental baggage, accoutrements, and horse appointments lost, are likewise to be considered and decided upon by the Board upon the same principle.

8. But it is to be observed that clothing, accoutrements, and horse appointments lost, can be paid for according to the practice of the service, only when they shall be replaced by new, and then only three fourths of the price.'

G. O.

Freneda, 18th Dec. 1811.

'1. The Commander of the Forces begs that the soldiers of the regiments of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and Light divisions, and Brig. General Pack's brigade, may be employed in making fascines and gabions and piquets of the following dimensions:—

2. Fascines of 1 foot thick and 6 feet in length.

3. Gabions 3 feet in height by 2 feet 3 inches diameter, of the same number that there will be of the fascines.

4. Twice as many piquets as there will be fascines, 3 feet 6 inches long.

5. These articles, when made, are to be kept at the Head Quarters of the several regiments; an officer of engineers will be sent round to inspect them, and will pay those who shall have made them, for the larger fascines 2 vintees each, for the gabions 4 vintees each, and for the piquets  $\frac{1}{2}$  a vintee each.

6. Lieut. Colonel Fletcher will send with the engineer officer to the Head Quarters of each division a proportion of tools for the purpose of making fascines and gabions, which will be distributed to the several regiments to be returned when the work shall be finished.'

it produce any thing but confusion. In France, what was called enthusiasm was power and tyranny, acting through the medium of popular societies, which have ended by overturning Europe, and in establishing the most powerful and dreadful tyranny that ever existed. In Spain, the enthusiasm of the people spent itself in *vivas* and vain boasting. The notion of its existence prevented even the attempt to discipline the armies; and its existence has been alleged, ever since, as the excuse for the rank ignorance of the officers, and the indiscipline and constant misbehaviour of the troops.

I therefore earnestly recommend you, wherever you go, to trust nothing to the enthusiasm of the people. Give them a strong and a just, and, if possible, a good, government; but, above all, a strong one, which shall enforce upon them to do their duty by themselves and their country; and let measures of finance to support an army go hand in hand with measures to raise it.

I am quite certain that the finances of Great Britain are more than a match for Buonaparte, and that we shall have the means of aiding any country that may be disposed to resist his tyranny. But those means are necessarily limited in every country by the difficulty of procuring specie. This necessary article can be obtained in sufficient quantities only by the contributions of the people; and although Great Britain can and ought to assist with money, as well in other modes, every effort of this description, the principal financial as well as military effort ought to be by the people of the resisting country.'

## 615.

## MEMORANDUM OF OPERATIONS IN 1811.

*The Notes to this Memorandum are in the Manuscript.*

Freneda, 28th Dec. 1811.

'The last memorandum on the operations in the Peninsula, brought them down to the end of the year 1810, when a division of the 9th corps, with other troops, which had before endeavored to join Massena from the frontiers of Castille, through Lower Beira, arrived, and took their station on the right of the enemy's army at Leyria. These troops, supposed to be from 8000 to 10,000 men, had been annoyed on their march by Colonel Wilson's detachment on the Alva.\*

The other division of the 9th corps under Claparède, amounting also to about 10,000 men, remained on the frontier, and by their manœuvres kept General Silveira in check during the march of the division under Drouet, by the valley of the Mondego. Silveira attacked their advanced guard at Ponte do Abade, on the 30th December, 1810, and was defeated; and he was himself attacked and defeated at Villa da Ponte on the 11th January; and he retired, first to Lamego, and thence across the Douro.† Claparède advanced upon Lamego, but General Bacellar having placed the divisions of militia, under the command of General Miller and of Colonel Wilson, on his flanks and his communications, he was obliged to retire, and went to Guarda, to which place he had been ordered by Massena.‡

\* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 3rd January.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 17th January.

‡ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the end of January and beginning of February.



But the principal occurrence in the commencement of this year was the movement, from Andalusia, of a large force into Estremadura, in order to create a diversion in favor of Massena.

The army of the south, under the command of Soult, consisted of the 1st corps, which was engaged in the operations of the siege of Cadiz; of the 4th corps, which was at Granada; and of the 5th corps, one division of which, under Gazan, could with difficulty maintain its ground in Estremadura against the Spanish division of Mendizabal and Ballesteros, whilst the other division, under Girard, was employed in the Condado de Niebla, and in keeping open the communication between Seville and the besieging army of Cadiz. The whole amount of the army of the south could not be less in the beginning of the year than 50,000 men.\*

Soult broke up from Cadiz with about 5000 men on the 21st December, and collected at Seville the troops destined for the invasion of Estremadura. He had with him about 20,000 men,† including a very large body of cavalry; to oppose which there were the Spanish divisions of Mendizabal and Ballesteros, which amounted to about 10,000 men, a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and about 1500 Spanish cavalry, making altogether about 2300 cavalry. There were, besides, Spanish garrisons in Badajoz and Campo Mayor, Albuquerque, and Valencia de Alcantara; and Don Carlos de España's brigade, about 2000 men, which was on the right of the British army near Abrantes, was considered disposable for service in Estremadura.

If this corps had been left entire, and had been prudently managed, it would have been fully sufficient, even though not joined by the other troops belonging to the army of the Marques de la Romana, incorporated with the British army, to prevent the enemy from passing the Guadiana, which was full at that season of the year.

But the first measure adopted by the Spanish Government, on the same day, the 21st December, that Soult broke up from Cadiz, was to order Ballesteros, with a part of his division, into the Condado de Niebla. Notwithstanding that we received at Cartaxo, on the 29th December, the accounts of Soult having broken up from before Cadiz, the Spanish General Mendizabal did not hear of this circumstance for some days afterwards; and the first he heard of it was from us. He was quite unprepared for his retreat, which was hurried; and he retired in a manner different, and making a different disposition from that which was recommended and ordered.

He had been ordered to break the bridges of Merida and Medellin, and to defend the passages of the Guadiana. He retired upon Badajoz and Olivença; and the engineer officer who was sent to destroy the bridge of Merida, instead of obeying the orders he received, made a report which was sent to Cartaxo to the Marques de la Romana, and asked for orders. The town of Merida itself was not defended; and the consequence was, that an

\* 'By a return of the 25th March, it appears that this army then consisted of 48,619 men; of which number 7744 were cavalry. This was after the battle of Barrosa, and after the siege of Badajoz, the battle of the 19th February, &c. It may be presumed that it was more than 50,000 men in the beginning of the year.'

† 'The 5th corps alone had about 12,000 infantry; and 5000 brought from the siege of Cadiz and the cavalry, would make his army 20,000 men.'

advanced guard of French cavalry took Merida, which post 400 French troops had held in June in the year 1809, against the whole Spanish army, with this additional disadvantage, that the river Guadiana was then fordable, and that the Spanish troops were in possession of all the avenues to the town.\*

General Mendizabal, in making his retreat upon Badajoz and Olivença, threw 3000 men of General Ballesteros' division into the latter, the others having marched under General Ballesteros, by order of the Government, into the Condado de Niebla. The division of General Mendizabal retired upon Badajoz, with all the cavalry, excepting a small body which marched upon Merida.

There were various reports of the movements of the French; and in fact it was but little known in what direction, and with what object, they were moving. It was at one time positively stated, that they had passed the bridge of Merida on the 15th January, and that they were moving towards the bridge of Almaraz on the Tagus; at another time it was reported that they were encamped at Caceres; but at last it was found that they did not cross the Guadiana in any force, but blockaded the troops of General Ballesteros' division in Olivença.

This blockade was made on the 15th, and continued till the 23rd January, when the garrison surrendered. Two or three attempts were made by General Mendizabal to raise the blockade, but without success; and as the garrison at last surrendered, before the enemy had attacked the place, and without being distressed for provisions, it is believed that the place was sold.

During the month of January, the Marques de la Romana was taken very ill at Cartaxo, of which illness he died on the 23rd of that month. He had ordered Don Carlos de España's brigade to march as soon as he heard of the danger of Ballesteros' detachment from the advance of the French troops, and he afterwards ordered that the remainder of the troops which had been incorporated with the British army should move from Villa Franca, where they had been cantoned. They moved on the 20th January.

From the period at which we had heard of the movement of the French from Cadiz, and particularly, latterly, I had frequent conversation with him regarding the situation of affairs in Estremadura; and as he was unwell, I wrote, in the shape of a memorandum, my opinions on the plan of operations to be pursued, as well for the objects of the war in general, as for the particular purpose of saving Olivença, or rather for relieving the troops in that place, respecting whom the Marques was particularly anxious.†

The Marques died 3 days after he had received this memorandum; but not till after he had circulated it among the officers under his command, and had desired them to attend to it. A reference to the memorandum, and to the letters and dispatches of that day, will show how far they attended either to the first or to the last.‡

\* 'See the reports of that period.'

† 'See memorandum of the 20th January, in letter to Mr. Wellesley, of the 23rd January, in the Foreign Office.'

‡ 'See correspondence with Mr. Wellesley in the months of January and February, 811, with enclosures in the Foreign Office, viz.: January 6th, 13th, 26th, 23rd, and 28th, all private.'

'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of January 5th, 12th, 19th, 26th, and 28th, and February 2nd.'



After two attempts were made to raise the blockade of Olivença, the place surrendered on the 23rd January; and the enemy invested Badajoz, on both sides of the Guadiana, on the 27th January, and broke ground on the left of the river on the 29th.\* The Spanish Generals were not decided respecting the measures which they should adopt in the circumstances in which they stood. But at length the troops, which had quitted the allied army on the 20th January, were ordered to advance to Badajoz. They immediately re-established the communication between Elvas and Badajoz, obliging the French cavalry to retire beyond the Gevora; and then having entered the town, they attempted to raise the siege by making a sortie upon the enemy's works. They were driven back with loss; and having remained in the town, the communication between Elvas and Badajoz was again cut off by the enemy's cavalry.†

The Spanish troops however came out of the town again on the 9th February, and at last took the position on the heights of San Christoval, which was recommended to them. They did not however adopt any measure to fortify this position, nor did they adopt any of the other measures recommended to them, particularly that of sending away from Badajoz the bridge of boats, the want of which was afterwards found to be so fatal to the cause.

The Spanish army, about 10,000 strong, and having besides about 2000 cavalry, including General Madden's Portuguese brigade, remained in the position at San Christoval, till the 19th February, having the Gevora in their front, and that river and the Guadiana between them and the enemy, on which day they were surprised by between 5000 and 6000 French troops, and totally destroyed as a military body; their camp and artillery being taken, and the whole body not killed or taken dispersed, except the Portuguese brigade of cavalry, and a few hundred Spaniards. About 2000 of the troops escaped into Badajoz.‡

An examination of the letters written at this period to Mr. Wellesley and the Secretary of State, will show my anxiety for the relief of Badajoz, and the measures which I recommended for that object. The most effectual measure of any would, undoubtedly, have been to detach a body of British troops to that part of the country; but a moment's reflection on the relative numbers of the two armies at that time on the Tagus, and on the extent and nature of the positions which we had to occupy, will show that it was impossible to venture to detach, from our army at least, till the reinforcements then expected should have arrived in the Tagus.

Massena had come into Portugal with 72,000 men, of which he had lost 10,000 at the battle of Busaco, and its consequences; and it is a large allowance to suppose that he had in January lost 10,000 more by deaths, prisoners, deserters, and killed, in various little affairs which had occurred. This would reduce his original number to 52,000 men; and an aide de

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 9th February.'

† 'If the French had sent a sufficient body of cavalry to the right of the Guadiana, they would have taken the whole army without firing a shot. See the memorandum of the 20th January.'

‡ 'See dispatches to Mr. Wellesley, and their enclosures, of the 2nd, 3rd, 10th, 17th, and 23rd February, all in the Foreign Office.'

'Those to Lord Liverpool of the 2nd, 9th, 16th, and 28th February.'

camp of his, who was taken in December, reported that the army had that number before Drouet joined.\*

To this number Drouet, in December, and Foy, in January, added about 12,000 men, making 64,000; and Claparède was at Guarda with between 8000 and 10,000 men; of the 64,000, about 14,000 may have been sick, as the army were very sickly; and there would have remained on the Tagus, fit for service, about 50,000 men.

The British army, on the 20th January, consisted of 41,040 men; of which number there were sick, 6715; on command, 1974; prisoners of war, 1586; and there remained present, fit for duty, 30,765. Of this number, the 2nd batt. 88th (485) were at Lisbon, and the 2nd batt. 58th, at Torres Vedras; leaving about 30,000 for service; of which number 2655 were cavalry.

The Portuguese army, joined with the British for service in the field, at the same time amounted to about 32,000 effective men, exclusive of the garrisons of Abrantes and Elvas, in each of which there were 2 regts. of infantry, one regt. of infantry at Cadiz, and one regt. of infantry (24th) with General Silveira. The object of the French General at this time was undoubtedly to pass the Tagus; and he had his choice of making the attempt in a course of about 30 miles from Santarem to the Zezere, and even higher than the junction of that river. It was necessary to guard that whole course of the river; for which it is conceived that 14,000 men could not be deemed more than sufficient.

The remainder of the army, about 40,000 men, was on the right of the Tagus, opposed to the whole French army; and it must be observed, that if the enemy had been able to advance, either with their 50,000 men, or after being joined by Claparède, they would have been opposed by very unequal numbers, as some days must have elapsed before the troops on the left of the Tagus could have been brought across the river.

The detachment which it would have been necessary to make, in order to effect any good at Badajoz, or even to have been in safety, diverting to the mode in which the Spanish troops have usually conducted themselves, ought to have been about 13,000 men; which numbers, it is obvious, could not be spared from the army from the end of January to the 19th February.

Reinforcements to the amount of 6000 or 7000 men were daily expected, which afterwards arrived in the beginning of March. It was hoped that the Spaniards would risk nothing, and would be able to hold out till these reinforcements should arrive, when it was intended to detach a sufficient force to effect the object at Badajoz, before any thing else should be attempted against Massena.†

The delay of all measures against Massena's position continued to be absolutely necessary on account of the state of the roads and rivers in the country; even if our force had been deemed sufficient to attack him.

The result of the battle of the 19th February, however, destroyed all hopes of being able, even when the reinforcement should arrive, to make such a detachment from the army as should be able to relieve Badajoz;

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 29th December, 1810.'

† 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 14th March.'



more particularly as the Spaniards, having neglected to remove the bridge from Badajoz to Elvas, the troops which should attempt to relieve Badajoz had no choice left, in respect to the mode of crossing the Guadiana. They must have passed by the bridge of Badajoz.

It was then determined to attack Massena as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, by which time it was hoped that the roads and rivulets would become practicable. In the mean time the governor of Badajoz was requested to hold out to the last moment. Massena, however, retired from his position on the night of the 5th March, before our troops, which had arrived at Lisbon on the 1st March, could join the army. The British troops were immediately put in motion in pursuit of the French army; those on the left of the Tagus, by Abrantes and the Zezere; and those on the Rio Mayor river, by the different routes leading in the direction which the enemy had taken.

A letter was written to General Leite, the governor of Elvas, from Santarem on the 6th, to request him to apprise the governor of Badajoz of Massena's retreat, and to assure him that support and relief would be sent to him without loss of time. This support was accordingly ordered to march on the 8th, as soon as the enemy's retreat was found to be decided.\*

When the enemy retired, it appeared at first that their intention was to go by the road of Thomar and Espinhal, leaving Coimbra on their left; and it was not certain that they had taken the high road by Pombal, till the 9th. On that morning a most favorable report was received of the state of affairs at Badajoz. It appeared that the garrison had not suffered; that the fire of the place was superior to that of the enemy; and that one of the enemy's 6 battering guns had been dismounted by the fire of the place. Under these circumstances, when it was found on the afternoon of the 9th, that the enemy had collected their army in a strong position at Pombal, it was deemed expedient to order the 4th division, and General de Grey's brigade of cavalry (which had been ordered to march on the 10th to join the 2nd and General Hamilton's division, on the left of the Tagus, as soon as the bridge should be laid for them), to march upon Pombal, to co-operate in the attack which it was intended to make upon the enemy on the 11th. These troops accordingly joined, and the enemy retired; but the garrison of Badajoz surrendered on the 10th March.

The mode of the enemy's retreat on the 11th, and the fact that they were still stronger than we were, and might have taken up the position of Coimbra and the Mondego, unless hurried beyond that town, caused the continued detention of the 4th division, and General de Grey's brigade of cavalry, till the operations of the 13th forced the enemy past Coimbra, and enabled us to communicate with that town.

The troops for Badajoz were immediately put in motion to return to the south, but unfortunately we that night heard of the fall of that fortress on the 10th. These accounts were accompanied by reports of the enemy immediately threatening Campo Mayor; and even if it had not been desirable to prevent them from extending their conquests on that side, the fall of Badajoz facilitated to such a degree their entry into Portugal, and Badajoz was so much nearer to Lisbon than the point at which we then

\* See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th March.

found ourselves, that it would have been impossible to continue the pursuit of Massena even for one march, without providing for the security of our right flank, by placing a large corps on the Tagus. Thus, then, it was still necessary to make this detachment, notwithstanding that the original object for which it was destined was lost.\*

The pursuit of Massena was continued with uniform success from that period till he had finally crossed the Agueda on the 9th April. Our reinforcements, however, were not all arrived in Portugal, and those which had arrived did not join the army till the end of March. Even then we were infinitely inferior to the enemy in numbers, particularly when he approached the frontier, and was joined by Claparède's division of the 9th corps from Guarda. Our movements were, therefore, necessarily cramped, and we were obliged to proceed with caution, when the utmost activity would have been desirable.

Let any body now advert to the difference of the result of Massena's invasion of Portugal, if the operations on the Guadiana in the month of January had been carried on as they ought; if the Spanish Regency had not drawn Ballesteros from Estremadura at the moment that province was attacked; if his troops had not been shamefully sold in Olivença; if the battle of the 19th February had not been lost, and the Spanish army annihilated; and, finally, if Badajoz itself had not been shamefully sold to the enemy on the day after the governor was informed that relief would be sent to him.

As soon as the French were driven across the Agueda, Almeida was invested; and it will be seen in a subsequent part of this memorandum that the enemy made an attempt in May to relieve the place. What would have been the result of that attempt, nay more, would it ever have been made, if we had had 22,000 men in the ranks, which were at that time in Estremadura?

If our attention had not been preferably, and with part of our army necessarily, carried into Estremadura, in consequence of the events in that province, in the months of January, February, and March, what would have been the result of an attempt to obtain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo in May, after the fall of Almeida, by the concentrated force and resources of the allied army?

But other circumstances occurred, not yet adverted to in this memorandum, which show still more clearly the fatal effects of the Spanish system of military operations. Notwithstanding that General Ballesteros was weak, and that he ought never to have been removed from Estremadura, he held his ground against a French corps which attacked him on the 25th January. A part of the French force in Estremadura was consequently withdrawn from that province, and the force engaged in the siege of Badajoz was reduced.†

Another event occurred highly advantageous in all its circumstances to the state of affairs in Estremadura. In consequence of the diminution of

\* 'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th, 16th, 21st, 27th March; 2nd, 9th, 18th April.'

† 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 9th February.'

'He had further successes in an action fought in the end of February.—See dispatch to Mr. Wellesley of the 3rd March.'



the force before Cadiz in December, 1810, the British and Spanish authorities conceived that a fair opportunity offered of making an attack upon the blockading army by the besieged. This attack was fixed for the 28th February, but owing to contrary winds, and a variety of circumstances, could not take place till the 6th March.\* On that day the battle of Barrosa was fought, 4 days before the surrender of Badajoz; and in all probability, if Badajoz had held out one day longer, the enemy would not have remained to take possession of the place.†

The troops which were detached from the army at Condeixa on the 14th March, did not arrive at Portalegre till the 22nd of that month. Campo Mayor, which had been regularly attacked by the enemy on the 14th, surrendered on the 22nd. Marshal Sir W. Beresford, having collected his corps, advanced against the enemy, surprised them at Campo Mayor on the 25th, which place they abandoned. Their cavalry fled into Badajoz, leaving behind them a regiment of infantry, and all their cannon. Unfortunately the excessive impetuosity of the troops (the 13th light dragoons in particular) prevented Sir W. Beresford from taking the advantage which he intended to take of these events. Some of the 13th dragoons were taken on the bridge, between the *tête de pont* and the gate of Badajoz. ‡

The instructions to Sir W. Beresford were to pass the Guadiana, as soon as he should have possession of Campo Mayor, and to blockade Badajoz, till the means for attacking the place regularly could arrive. Unfortunately here again our operations were frustrated by the conduct of the Spaniards. One of the objects particularly recommended to their attention was to send to Elvas the bridge of boats that was in Badajoz.§ This had been repeatedly desired before, and the reasons for urging the measure again were particularly stated in that memorandum. This was the only bridge in the possession of the allies; and if it had been at Elvas, Marshal Beresford could have passed the Guadiana, and have blockaded Badajoz on the 26th March, and in all probability the place would have fallen into our hands as Campo Mayor had, or as Almeida subsequently did, as it was at that time unprovided with stores or with provisions. As it was, he could not pass the Guadiana till the 4th April, and could not advance till the 6th or 7th; and in the intermediate time the enemy threw into the place all the provisions and stores which it required to last till the enemy were enabled finally to relieve it in the middle of June.

When the French crossed the Agueda on the 9th April, they left Almeida to its fate, and it was immediately invested and blockaded by our troops. The enemy retired beyond the Tormes, some of them even beyond the Duero, and abandoned Ciudad Rodrigo as well as Almeida. Our army, however, was scarcely strong enough to maintain the blockade of Almeida, and certainly could not have maintained that of Ciudad Rodrigo.|| Indeed

\* 'See letter to General Ballesteros, enclosed in a letter to Mr. Wellesley, of the 2nd February.'

† 'All the enclosures in these dispatches to Mr. Wellesley of the 2nd, 3rd, 10th, 17th, 23rd February, of the 3rd, 26th March, and 20th April, are worth reading on this subject.'

‡ 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 2nd April, with enclosures.'

§ 'See memorandum of the 20th January, in the letter to Mr. Wellesley of the 23rd.'

|| 'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 9th and 15th April.'

the state of the Agueda rendered it impossible for us to draw supplies across that river.

The enemy having passed the Duero, Almeida being invested, and matters appearing tolerably quiet on the frontiers of Castille, the head quarters were moved on the 15th April into Alentejo, and arrived at Elvas on the 20th. Sir W. Beresford had crossed the Guadiana on the 4th April, and had blockaded both Badajoz and Olivença. The garrison of the latter place having refused to surrender, guns were brought from Elvas, and Lieut. General Cole forced the place to surrender on the 15th April.\*

In the mean time Sir W. Beresford advanced with the 2nd division of infantry, and General Hamilton's division, and the cavalry, as well to force the enemy to retire from Estremadura entirely, as to give support to General Ballesteros, who had been obliged to retire into that province from the Condado de Niebla. Marshal Beresford surprised the enemy's cavalry on the 16th April, at Los Santos, and defeated them with considerable loss.† Badajoz was reconnaitred on the 22nd, and the general plan for the attack was fixed. But unfortunately the rain which had fallen in the third week in April swelled the Guadiana considerably; and the bridge which Marshal Sir W. Beresford had constructed under Jurumenha, with great trouble and difficulty, and after much delay, was swept away in the night of the 23rd April. Marshal Sir W. Beresford was consequently instructed to delay the operations of the siege till he should have re-established the bridge, or till the river should become fordable. The Marshal was likewise instructed and authorised to fight a battle, in case he should think it expedient, in order to save the siege of Badajoz; and these instructions applied as well to the corps under General Blake, which landed about this time at Ayamonte.‡

All these arrangements being made, the head quarters were again transferred to the frontiers of Castille. They quitted Elvas on the 25th April, and arrived at Alameda on the 28th. Intelligence had been received that orders had arrived from Paris, for Massena to make an attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida; in which attempt Marshal Bessières was to cooperate with part of the army of the north.§

The enemy's army was collected at Ciudad Rodrigo in the end of April, but the same fall of rain which had swelled the rivers in Estremadura, likewise swelled those in Castille, and they did not advance till the 2nd May. || They attacked us at Fuentes de Oñoro on the 3rd and 5th, but could make no impression upon us, and at length retired on the 10th, and the whole were across the Agueda on that night.¶

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 25th April.'

† 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 25th April.'

‡ 'See instructions to Sir W. Beresford in dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22nd May (A).'

§ 'See letter to General Castaños in the same dispatch.'

|| 'It is a curious circumstance, and shows what good intelligence we had, that these accounts were received at Elvas, together with accounts of the day Massena was to set out from Salamanca, and our head quarters arrived at Alameda in Castille on the day before Massena arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo.'

¶ 'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 1st, 8th, 10th, and 15th May.'

¶ 'The enemy never had such a superiority of numbers opposed to the British troops as in this action. They had all the infantry of the 4 corps which had been in Portugal, and



In the middle of the night of the 10th, after the blockade was completely resumed in force, General Brenier, the governor of Almeida, blew up the place, and made his escape with his garrison across the bridge of Barba de Puerco. This event was to be attributed to a variety of unfortunate circumstances.

First; the officer commanding the Queen's regt., who was close to the place, was not aware of the nature of the explosion which he heard, or that the garrison escaped, and made no movement.

Secondly; the officer commanding the 4th regt., who had been ordered to Barba de Puerco, at 1 o'clock on the 10th, when the French retired, missed his road; and although the distance he had to march was only 3 miles, he did not reach Barba de Puerco till the morning of the 11th, after the French had arrived there.

Thirdly; the 8th Portuguese regt. had been ordered to march from its cantonments at Junça to Barba de Puerco, in case an explosion should be heard. These orders were obeyed; the regiment marched to Barba de Puerco, and arrived before the French, and before Major General Campbell, with the 4th and 36th regts.; but finding nothing there but a piquet of cavalry, and the Commanding Officer believing that he had mistaken the nature of the explosion, returned again to his cantonments.\*

The 3rd and 7th divisions were ordered off to Estremadura on the 13th and 14th; and accounts having been received on the 15th that Soult was about to advance from Seville, the head quarters were again removed on the following day to Elvas, where they arrived on the 19th. Sir W. Beresford had invested Badajoz on both sides of the Guadiana on the 4th, and he broke ground on the 8th. He lost some men on the right of the river, in front of the *tête de pont*, on the first day, and a considerable number in a sortie made by the enemy on the 10th. On the 12th, the Marshal heard of the collection of a large body of troops by Marshal Soult, in the neighbourhood of Seville, and of their march towards Estremadura, and he immediately raised the siege; and, according to the instructions and recommendation left with them, he and the Spanish Generals collected their troops on the Albuera rivulet.†

The battle of Albuera was fought on the 16th May, on the ground pointed out in those instructions. That which was most conspicuous in the battle of Albuera was the want of discipline of the Spaniards. These troops behaved with the utmost gallantry, but it was hopeless to think of moving them. In the morning the enemy gained an eminence which commanded the whole extent of the line of the allies, which either was occupied, or was intended to all the cavalry. In addition to which they had 3 fresh regiments of cavalry, which could not have less than 1,200 men, and 900 cavalry of the guard.

' We had, cavalry British . . . .	1,331
infantry " . . . .	18,000
cavalry Portuguese . . . .	300
infantry " . . . .	10,142

But we had 2 divisions, the 5th and 6th, and General Pack's brigade, and the Portuguese cavalry on the left, either forming or protecting the blockade, and these troops were not engaged. The enemy had about 5 to 1 of cavalry, and more than 2 to 1 of infantry engaged.'

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 15th May.'

† 'See reports of Sir W. Beresford, enclosed in a dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22nd May.'

be occupied, by the Spanish troops. The natural operation would have been to re-occupy this ground by means of the Spanish troops; but that was impossible. The British troops were consequently moved there; and all the loss sustained by those troops was incurred in regaining a height which ought never for a moment to have been in possession of the enemy.\* After the battle of Albuera, the enemy retired leisurely to Llerena and Guadalcanal.†

It was obvious, from the immense superiority of cavalry which they showed in that battle, and that, as the allies were but little superior in total strength, and had beaten them with difficulty, and could derive no great advantage from their success, it was hopeless to attack Soult in the position which he had taken at Llerena. There was nothing to prevent him from retiring upon Seville, or even upon the troops engaged in the blockade of Cadiz, if he should have found himself so pressed as to render that measure necessary; and the arrival of reinforcements, which it will appear he had reason to expect, would have placed in a state of risk the troops which would have obliged him to take this step. But this reasoning supposes that Soult would have considered himself under the necessity of retiring from the strong position of Llerena and Guadalcanal, in consequence of the measures which we might have adopted in Estremadura in the end of May. I believe there is no foundation for this hypothesis.

The allied troops, which were sent from the frontiers of Castille, and arrived at Campo Mayor on the 23rd and 24th May, were rather more than equal to the loss sustained in the battle of Albuera, and in the first siege of Badajoz. It had been obvious in the battle of Albuera, that we could not reckon upon the Spaniards in any affair of manœuvre, and therefore that we could not rely upon them in such an operation as the attack of Soult's army in the positions of Guadalcanal and Llerena.‡

But the effect of these operations, even if well executed, could only be to force Soult to fall back for a time; and here the question arose whether it was worth while to attempt it. It was known that Drouet had marched with 17 or 19 battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to the army of Portugal, from Salamanca, on the 16th or 17th May, destined for a reinforcement to Soult; and it was calculated that these battalions would join Soult on or about the 8th June.§

Under these circumstances, it was deemed better not to lose the time between the 25th May and the 8th June by an attempt to attack Soult, which appeared hopeless; and to take advantage of our superiority in the battle of Albuera, and in the early arrival of our reinforcements, to make a vigorous attack upon Badajoz. Accordingly, the place was reinvaded on the 25th May, and the fire was opened on the 2nd June.||

There appeared every ground for belief that we should have been able to

\* 'This is stated, because it has been matter of dispute whether the Spaniards had or had not occupied the height before the French were on it. They were certainly ordered to occupy the ground, and their piquets were on it; but it is not clear that they had occupied it in sufficient strength before the French troops were on it.'

† 'See dispatches from Marshal Beresford, enclosed in dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th May.'

‡ 'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 22nd and 24th May.'

§ 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22nd May.'

|| 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 30th May.'



obtain possession of the place before the day on which it was possible that Soult could advance for its relief. It is certain that its possession depended upon the possession of the outwork of San Christoval, which commanded the point of attack in the castle. This outwork was deemed to be in a state to be taken by storm on the 6th, and again on the 9th. Both attempts failed; and the question whether Badajoz could be taken or not in the time which remained, during which the allied army could be applied to that operation, came to be one of means, upon which we were decidedly of opinion that we had it not in our power to take the place; and therefore we raised the siege on the 10th, although we continued the blockade till the 17th.\*

While the operations of the second siege of Badajoz were going on, accounts were received that Marshal Marmont was about to move from Salamanca into Estremadura, in order to aid Soult in his operations for the relief of Badajoz.† The first movements of the army were upon Ciudad Rodrigo, into which place Marmont introduced a convoy on the 6th June. Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer retired across the Coa; and Marmont then turned about, and marched through the Puerto de Baños to Plasencia. Lieut. General Sir B. Spencer made a corresponding movement on Castello Branco, at which place he received intelligence of the enemy having had posts on the Alagon, and the cavalry in Coria, and some doubts were entertained of their intention to cross the Tagus. The head of their army, however, crossed that river on the 12th, and arrived at Truxillo on the 13th; and the advanced guard was at Merida, and in communication with Soult, on the 15th.

Soult had broken up from Llerena and Guadalcanal on the 12th, as soon as he was joined by Drouet; and he moved upon Zafra, and his advanced guard to Los Santos, on the 13th. The allied army were immediately concentrated upon Albuera, with the exception of the 3rd and 7th divisions, which kept the blockade of Badajoz. But the accounts of the arrival at Truxillo of the advanced guard of the army of Portugal having arrived at Albuera, and Soult ‡ having made a movement from Zafra on Almendralejo, having thus shown that he knew of the arrival of that army, it was deemed expedient to retire across the Guadiana.

As far as we could form a judgment, the French had at that time assembled in Estremadura 60,000 men, of which 7000 were cavalry.

The British army consisted of

Cavalry,	1671	Infantry,	11,812
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The Portuguese,

Cavalry,	900	Infantry,	12,885
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and General Blake had about 8000 men.

The head of Sir B. Spencer's column did not join till the 20th, the 5th

\* 'I believe the failure in the attack upon San Christoval is, like many other events, to be attributed to the want of experience in the British army. First, the battery to breach the wall ought to have been placed on the crest of the glacis. Secondly, if it was not, care ought to have been taken from the commencement to prevent the enemy from clearing the rubbish while the fire was continued upon the wall.'

† 'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 6th, 13th, and 20th June.'

‡ 'Soult brought to Zafra little more than his advanced guard and cavalry. The main body of the army marched direct from Llerena upon Almendralejo and Merida.'

division not till the 24th. The strength of the whole army,\* when collected together, was,

British infantry,	25,123
Portuguese infantry,	18,926
British cavalry,	3,197
Portuguese cavalry,	1,200

It would have been impossible for the allies to maintain the blockade of Badajoz with the strength which they could produce against that of the enemy, in the days which intervened between the 17th and 24th June; nor could the allies pretend to attack the enemy in Estremadura, composed as they were, being, after all, even including the Spaniards and Sir B. Spencer, inferior in numbers, particularly of cavalry, and very inferior in composition.

These circumstances were stated in a conference with General Blake on the 14th June, at Albuera, and in a previous letter to him; and he was urged either to co-operate with the allied British and Portuguese army; or, having crossed the Guadiana at Jurumenha, to move down the right bank, and to cross that river at Mertola, and to endeavor to obtain possession of Seville, while the enemy's attention should be drawn to us on the frontier of Alentejo. General Blake preferred the last operation, and he recrossed the Guadiana on the 22nd June.†

But, instead of moving at once upon Seville, he attempted to obtain possession of Niebla on the 30th June, where the enemy had only 300 men, in which attempt he failed; ‡ and Soult having, towards the end of the month of June, discovered General Blake's movement, and detached a body of troops into Andalusia, General Blake embarked at Ayamonte on the 6th July.§ While this was going on, the allied British and Portuguese army took a position on the 19th June between Elvas and Campo Mayor. The particular object in taking this position was to protect those places, and to insure the arrival into them of the convoys of provisions and stores destined for their supply.|| The enemy reconnoitred the position of the army on the 22nd June, but they never showed any inclination to attack it.¶

The armies remained opposite to each other till the 14th July, when Marmont retired across the Tagus, and cantoned his army about Plasencia, &c., and along the Tagus to Talavera; and Drouet removed the 5th corps to Zafra. Before these troops separated, the allies were certainly stronger than the enemy, in infantry: the enemy were strongest in cavalry; but the attack of the enemy would have answered no purpose, excepting to oblige them to retire from Estremadura. That object was likely to be accomplished without incurring the risk of an attack with inferior numbers of cavalry, and without exposing the troops to the inconvenience of making long marches in Estremadura in that season.

\* 'This account includes the 5th division, and Barbacena's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, which did not arrive at Portalegre till the 24th June. The 5th division consisted of about 5000 men. In this account the artillery is not included.'

† 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22nd June.'

‡ 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 11th July.'

§ 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 18th July.'

|| 'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 20th and 27th June, and 4th July.'

¶ 'See dispatches of the 18th July and 25th July.'



The enemy having retired from Estremadura, the question regarding the future operations of the army was maturely considered, and it was determined to remove the seat of the war to the frontiers of Castille.\* The grounds of that decision were,

First; that in that season we could not venture to undertake any thing against Badajoz.

Secondly; that we were not strong enough to venture into Andalusia.

Thirdly; that from all the information I had received, the strength of the northern army was less than that of the south; and that the army of Portugal, which was destined to oppose us in whatever point we should direct our operations, was not likely to be so strongly supported in the north as in the south.

In this supposition I was mistaken. The army of the north, even before the reinforcements arrived, was stronger than that in the south; but it must be observed that there is nothing so difficult as to obtain information of the enemy's numbers in Spain. There is but little communication between one town and another; and although the most minute account of numbers which have passed through one town can always be obtained, no information can be obtained of what is passing in the next. To this add, that the disposition of the Spaniards naturally leads them to exaggerate the strength and success of themselves and their friends, and to despise that of the enemy, and it will not be matter of surprise that we should so often have been misinformed regarding the enemy's numbers.

The first intention was to remain in the cantonments of the Alentejo, which had been taken up as soon as Marmont had retired, till the train and stores should have been brought up from Oporto, to make the attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. The march of the troops would consequently not have taken place till the beginning of September. The movement was made in the end of July and beginning of August, for the following reasons.

In the end of July it was discovered, that notwithstanding Marshal Bessières had evacuated the Asturias and Astorga when Marmont moved into Estremadura in the beginning of July, and had thereby increased the disposable force under his command, Don Julian had been so successful in the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, that up to that moment the enemy had not been able to keep open any communication with the place, or to supply it at all with provisions.

A return of the supplies in the place, when it was left by Marmont in the beginning of June, had likewise been intercepted, from which it appeared that the provisions would be exhausted by the 20th August.† It was therefore determined to send the army across the Tagus immediately, and to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, if it should not have been supplied; and if it should, to canton the army in Lower Beira, till the train and stores should have arrived.‡ We did not receive intelligence that the place had been supplied till we went so forward as to disclose our design against the place. But there were two other reasons for taking up cantonments for the summer in Castille rather than in Lower Beira: one was, that in Castille we could

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 18th July.'

† 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 1st August.'

‡ 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 8th August.'

procure supplies of provisions, which we much wanted, and we could procure none in Beira; the other was, that by threatening Ciudad Rodrigo, we were likely to relieve Galicia, and General Abadia's army, from the attack with which both were threatened by the army of the north.

We accordingly made the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo in the first week in August, and continued it from that time forward. The train for the siege would have arrived at Almeida in the first week of September.\* But before that period, accounts were received of the arrival in Spain of the enemy's reinforcements. It was also discovered, by an intercepted return of the army of the north, that they were much stronger than they had been supposed in July, when the plan was determined upon to make the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.† Under these circumstances, and as Almeida was not in a state to give security to the heavy train and its stores, it was determined not to bring the equipment forward, and to confine our efforts to the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo.‡

In the third week of September, the enemy collected the whole army of the north, (with the exception of Bonet's division, which observed Abadia's movements on the side of Galicia,) and 2 divisions from Navarre, which had recently come from Calabria, and 5 divisions, and all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, to escort a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo.§ They had not less than 60,000 men,|| of which more than 6000 were cavalry, to which we could oppose about 40,000. If we had fought a battle to maintain a blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, we must have had the river Agueda, and the place in our rear; and if defeated, a retreat was impossible.

Although we did not fight a battle to protect the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, the army was assembled on the left of the Agueda, and a partial engagement, highly honorable to the troops, was fought at El Bodon on the 25th September. The object of taking a position so near to the enemy was to force them to show their army. This was an object, because the people of the country, as usual, believed and reported that the enemy were not so strong as we knew them to be; and if they had not seen the enemy's strength, they would have entertained a very unfavorable opinion of the British army, which it was desirable to avoid. This object was accomplished by the operations at the close of September.

Although the removal of the army from the Alentejo did not accomplish all the objects which were in view when the movement was made, it had the effect of obliging the enemy to collect their whole force for the relief of

\* 'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th and 21st August.'

† 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 28th August, for the accounts of the enemy's reinforcements and strength. See dispatches written to Lord Liverpool in September.'

‡ 'For the account of all that passed in respect to putting Almeida in a state of repair, see dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 5th August. The place is now nearly entirely re-established as a *place d'armes*.'

§ 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 29th September.'

|| 'Besides these 60,000 men, General Foy was at Plasencia with one division of the army of Portugal, and some troops of the army of the centre, with which he co-operated with Marmont, and actually ascended the mountains by the Pass of Perales and Poyo on our right. For the state of the strength of the allied army in the field, see the *Morning Star*, sent to Lord Liverpool every week since the month of July. The 2nd and General Hamilton's divisions of infantry, and the 2nd division of cavalry, have always been in the Alentejo, with the exception of General de Grey's brigade of the latter, while it continued on the strength of that division of cavalry.'



Ciudad Rodrigo, and to abandon all their other operations and objects.\* The army of the north were obliged to discontinue their operations against Abadia, and still further, to call to their assistance 2 divisions which had recently arrived from Calabria, and were employed in Navarre against the guerrilla Mina. Mina's success in Navarre has consequently been extraordinary, and his numbers have rapidly increased.

After the operations for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, it was determined to persevere in the same system till the enemy should make some alteration in the disposition of their force, and to continue to threaten Ciudad Rodrigo with an attack, in order to keep a large force of the enemy employed to observe our operations, and to prevent them from undertaking any operation elsewhere.

To this system we were forced, not less by the relative force of the 2 armies, than by the extraordinary sickness of our own troops. All the soldiers who had recently arrived from England, and all those who had been in Walcheren, and vast numbers of officers, were attacked by fever, not of a very violent description, but they were rendered unable to perform any duty, and those who recovered relapsed upon making any exertions. Even if an opportunity had offered, therefore, for undertaking any thing on this side, the unfortunate state of the army would have prevented it.

It would not have answered to remove the army to the frontiers of Estremadura, where a chance of effecting some important object might have offered; † as in that case General Abadia would have been left to himself, and would have fallen an easy sacrifice to the army of the north. We availed ourselves of the opportunity which offered of striking a blow against Girard in Estremadura, by which the country between the Tagus and the Guadiana was relieved from the enemy.‡

But little notice has been taken in this memorandum of the operations of the Spaniards, which, having been confined principally to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, have been but little influenced by those on the western side. Tortosa was surrendered by treachery on the 2nd January, as Lerida had been but a short time before. The troops under Suchet then prepared to attack Tarragona, which place was taken by storm on the 28th June.

In the course of the winter it had appeared, by an intercepted letter, to be Soult's intention to attack Carthagena, in order to be prepared to attack

\* 'See dispatch from Sir H. Douglas, of 5th September.

† There is nothing more comical than the lies published in the *Moniteur* about the expedition to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, excepting that our newspapers do not notice them. It is not possible that either Marmont or Dorsenne could have written such nonsense as has appeared with their names affixed to it. They say that they heard of our approach to the Coa in the beginning of September; we approached the Coa on the 6th August, and they knew it at Salamanca on the 14th. They then say, that in consequence of this knowledge, acquired in the beginning of September, Dorsenne attacked Galicia; he attacked Abadia in Galicia on the 25th August. Marmont then took 4 guns on the 25th September; but he forgets to say that we retook the only 2 which he had taken for a moment. The comical part of that story is, that Major Gordon, who was in the French head quarters on the 26th, offered to lay a wager that the *Moniteur* would mention that the guns had been taken, but would omit the sequel of the story.

‡ 'See the dispatches and *Morning States* sent to Lord Liverpool in October, November, and December.'

† 'See Sir H. Douglas's dispatch of 29th October, in answer to a question upon that point.'

‡ 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 6th November.'

Valencia on both sides in concert with Suchet. He attempted to carry this intention into execution in the month of July, after he had obliged General Blake to embark at Ayamonte. General Blake, however, went with his army by sea to the coast of Murcia, and landed it there in August, while Soult moved in that direction by Granada. It appears that General Blake quitted the army as soon as it had formed a junction with the army of Murcia, called the 3rd army, and he proceeded to Valencia, leaving General Freyre in the command of the troops in Murcia. The French advanced from Granada, but the Spaniards did not retreat in time, and their loss was very great. They had time, however, to re-assemble their dispersed divisions, and the people in Murcia took arms, and partly on this account, partly on account of the prevalence of the yellow fever at Carthagená, and throughout Murcia, and partly because the movement of the allied British and Portuguese army upon Ciudad Rodrigo rendered necessary a concentration of the French forces in the Peninsula, Soult returned to the westward, and arrived at Seville on the 17th September.†

In the mean time, Suchet, having been joined by reinforcements from France, and having dispersed the troops which General Lacy had attempted to collect in Catalonia, penetrated into the kingdom of Valencia.‡ General Blake had been since August preparing for the defence of that city, and he collected there the army of Valencia, and others from Aragón and Catalonia; and latterly, General Mahy marched from Murcia to join him with the troops which General Blake had brought from Cadiz, and a part of the 3rd army, *i. e.*, that of Murcia. Suchet having gained possession of Orpesa, commenced an attack on the castle of Saguntum on the 29th September.§ He made several attempts to obtain possession of the castle by storm, in all of which he failed; and at last, having brought up a few heavy guns, he broke ground regularly before the place, and made a breach in its wall. He made several attempts to carry the breach by storm, in all of which he failed.

As soon as General Blake was joined at Valencia by the troops from Murcia, under General Mahy,|| he moved out from Valencia on the 24th October, and on the 25th attacked Suchet, and was defeated, with the loss of some prisoners and 8 pieces of cannon. The French immediately summoned the garrison of Saguntum to surrender, which they did, upon capitulation. Suchet advanced upon Valencia, and it is understood that he opened his fire upon a part of the intrenched position occupied by Blake in front of the town on the 25th November.¶ It is likewise stated, that on the 2nd December, there was a severe action at Valencia, in which the French suffered considerably.

These circumstances, and the movement of Marmont's army towards Toledo, as is supposed, to aid Suchet, have induced us to make preparations for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. By these measures we shall bring Marmont back, and probably oblige the army of the north to re-assemble.

\* 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 18th September.'

† 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 9th October.'

‡ 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 23rd October.'

§ 'See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 6th November.'

|| 'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of 13th, 20th, and 27th November.'

¶ 'See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of 4th, 12th, 18th, and 25th December.'



Since Suchet has been in Valencia, the guerrillas have been very active and enterprising in Aragon and Navarre. Mina defeated a detachment of 1100 men, sent against him, only 3 of whom escaped; and besides other advantages of small amount, he and the Empecinado, and Duran, having joined, it is reported that they had taken the garrison of Daroca, consisting of 2400 men.

When General Blake embarked on the 6th July from the mouth of the Guadiana, he left there General Ballesteros with a division of troops, which likewise embarked, and went to the Sierra de Ronda on the 24th August.\* He has been very successful against the French by his light operations in rear of the army, blockading Cadiz; and he has always a secure retreat open upon Gibraltar.† In order to aid General Ballesteros, and to give additional security to Tarifa, Colonel Skerrett, with about 1200 men, was detached thither from Cadiz on the 10th October. By this measure the French were obliged to retire from San Roque on the night of the 21st October, in which position they had kept Ballesteros blockaded under the guns of Gibraltar; and Ballesteros did them much mischief in their retreat, and in a subsequent attack which he made upon one of their detachments at Bornos.‡ He was afterwards again obliged to retire in the end of November under protection of the guns of Gibraltar; and Colonel Skerrett, and the Spanish General Copons, to Tarifa. The object of the French on this occasion was to attack Tarifa, while they should keep Ballesteros blockaded.§ But they had commenced to retire on the 12th December.

From this memorandum it will be seen, that if the Spaniards had behaved with common prudence, or if their conduct had been even tolerably good, the result of Massena's campaign in Portugal must have been the relief of the south of the Peninsula.

We had to contend with the consequences of the faults of some, the treachery of others, and the folly and vanity of all. But although our success has not been what it might and ought, we have at least lost no ground, and with a handful of British troops fit for service, we have kept the enemy in check in all quarters since the month of March. Till now they have gained nothing, and have made no progress on any side. It is to be apprehended that they will succeed in Valencia; but I believe there is no man who knows the state of affairs in that province, and has read Suchet's account of his action with Blake on the 25th October, who does not believe that, if Blake had not fought that action, Valencia would have been safe. Are the English Ministers and Generals responsible for the blunders of Blake?

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616.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Freneda, 2nd Jan. 1812.

‘I am clearly of opinion that a country, in the situation in which Portugal is, should consider the maintenance of her military establishments, and the defence of the country, the first objects, because upon these depend not

\* ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 4th September.’

† ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 23rd October.’

‡ ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 13th November.’

§ ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 25th December.’

only the credit of the Government, but the existence of the inhabitants. But after a sufficient revenue has been raised to defray the expense of the military establishments, then the pecuniary credit of the Government becomes an object of anxiety. The measures to find funds to support that credit then take their natural station in the order of the duties of the Government of the Kingdom; and when once it is determined to pay the interest of the debts of the state, and on the paper money in circulation, the funds to pay that interest must be first provided for.'

## 617.

To Lieut. General Hill.

Gallegos, 6th Jan. 1812.

'It appears to me that you have nothing to apprehend at present from the army of Portugal. It is very desirable that you should endeavor to discover the state of the enemy's works, and their force, at the Puente de Almaraz; it would aid all my plans very much, if we could destroy their bridge and works at that point. You will recollect that the top of the Sierra de Mirabete, where there is a tower, commands the ground the whole way down to the river.

I am about to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, in which enterprise I shall succeed, or I shall bring back towards this frontier the whole army which had marched towards Valencia and Aragon. By these means I hope to save Valencia, even if I should not succeed in getting this place; if I should get this place, we shall, I hope, make a fine campaign in the spring.'

## 618.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 7th Jan. 1812.

'What do you think of empty carts taking 2 days to go 10 miles on a good road? After all I am obliged to appear satisfied, or they would all desert!

I shall not write my weekly report till I shall return from investing the place tomorrow. At this season of the year, and depending upon Portuguese and Spaniards for means of having what is required, I can scarcely venture to calculate the time which this operation will take, but I should think not less than 24 or 25 days. If we do not succeed, we shall at least bring back upon ourselves all the force which has marched away; and I hope we may save Valencia, or at all events afford more time to the Asturians, Galicians, &c. If we do succeed, we shall make a fine campaign in the spring.'

G. O.

Freneda, 1st Jan. 1812.

'6. The Commander of the Forces requests the Officer commanding the —th regt., and the Officers commanding regiments in general, to call the attention of the troops in a very particular manner to the crime of which serjeant — and a party of soldiers of the —th regiment under his command were guilty. It has given the Commander of the Forces the greatest concern to receive frequent reports lately of the outrages committed by the soldiers of the army on the inhabitants of the country; he is happy however to find, that these outrages have, in general, been committed by those who have been a short time with the Army, and he trusts that when they will become acquainted with the good qualities of the inhabitants, and when they will have found that they cannot commit these crimes with impunity, they will cease to commit them. The Commander of the Forces is determined to carry into execution, in every instance, the sentence of a General Court Martial, whatever it may be, on any soldier who does any injury to an inhabitant of the Peninsula.'



619.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 9th Jan. 1812.

‘ According to the intention which I informed your Lordship that I entered, I invested Ciudad yesterday.

Since the enemy had possession of the place, they have constructed a palisaded redoubt on the hill of San Francisco, and have fortified 3 convents in the suburbs, the defences of which are connected with the work on the hill of San Francisco, and with the old line by which the suburb was surrounded. By these means the enemy have increased the difficulty of approaching the place; and it was necessary to obtain possession of the work on the hill of San Francisco before we could make any progress in the attack. Accordingly, Major General Craufurd directed a detachment of the Light division, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Colborne of the 52nd, to attack the work, shortly after it was dark. The attack was very ably conducted by Lieut. Colonel Colborne, and the work was taken by storm in a short time. Two Captains and 47 men were made prisoners, the remainder of the garrison being put to the sword in the storm. We took 3 pieces of cannon.

I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Colborne, and of the detachment under his command, upon this occasion. I am happy to add that our loss in this affair has not been severe: 6 men having been killed; Captain Mein of the 52nd, Lieut. Hawkesly, 95th, and Lieut. Woodgate, 52nd, and 14 men, having been wounded.

The success of this operation enabled us immediately to break ground within 600 yards of the place, notwithstanding that the enemy still hold the fortified convents; and the enemy’s work has been turned into a part of our first parallel, and a good communication made with it.

It is impossible for me to conjecture the length of time which will be required to bring the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo to a successful conclusion. Our means of transporting our stores and materials depend upon the Portuguese and Spanish carters and muleteers, and the movements of this description of persons are very uncertain. The weather, also, which may be expected at this season of the year, may interrupt or retard our progress; and the enemy may have time to bring back to this part of the country the troops which had been removed from hence in order to aid the operations of Marshal Suchet in Valencia, and I may be obliged to raise the siege. If this effect alone should be produced, we shall have rendered a great service to the Spaniards.

I think it probable that Marmont will return immediately, as I understand that great doubts were entertained by the Ministers and Generals at Madrid of the expediency of his movements to the eastward, in consequence of intelligence which had been received that I had constructed a bridge on the Agueda; and that in the end of last month he had not left Madrid.

I have arranged our operation in such a manner as that, I hope, the troops will not suffer from the inclemency of the weather.’

620.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 15th Jan. 1812.

‘ We opened our fire from 22 pieces of ordnance, in 3 batteries in the

first parallel, yesterday afternoon ; and we opened an approach to, and established ourselves in our second parallel, 150 yards from the place, last night.

This measure has been facilitated by Lieut. General Graham having surprised the enemy's detachment in the convent of S<sup>ta</sup> Cruz, close to the body of the place, on the night of the 13th. The right of our approaches was protected and secured by this operation. Major General the Hon. C. Colville, who commands the 4th division in the absence of Lieut. General the Hon. G. L. Cole, likewise attacked the enemy's post in the convent of San Francisco last night, and obtained possession of that post, and of the other fortified posts in the suburbs, where our troops are now lodged. Our left is protected and secured by this operation. Two pieces of cannon were taken in the convent of San Francisco.

It appears that the preparations and movements which I first made with a view to the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo had the effect of inducing the enemy to move back from La Mancha.

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 621.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 20th Jan. 1812.

'I informed your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 9th, that I had attacked Ciudad Rodrigo, and in that of the 15th, of the progress of the operations to that period, and I have now the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that we took the place by storm yesterday evening after dark.

We continued, from the 15th to the 19th, to complete the second parallel, and the communications with that work, and we had made some progress by sap towards the crest of the glacis. On the night of the 15th we likewise advanced from the left of the first parallel down the slope of the hill towards the convent of San Francisco, to a situation from which the walls of the *fausse braie* and of the town were seen, on which a battery for 7 guns was constructed, and these commenced their fire on the morning of the 18th. In the mean time the batteries in the first parallel continued their fire ; and, yesterday evening, their fire had not only considerably injured the defences of the place, but had made breaches in the *fausse braie* wall, and in the body of the place, which were considered practicable ; while the battery on the slope of the hill, which had been commenced on the night of the 15th, and had opened on the 18th, had been equally efficient still farther to the left, and opposite to the suburb of San Francisco.

I therefore determined to storm the place, notwithstanding that the approaches had not been brought to the crest of the glacis, and the counterscarp of the ditch was still entire. The attack was accordingly made yesterday evening, in 5 separate columns, consisting of the troops of the 3rd and Light divisions, and of Brig. General Pack's brigade. The 2 right columns, conducted by Lieut. Colonel O'Toole of the 2nd caçadores, and Major Ridge of the 5th regt., were destined to protect the advance of Major General Mackinnon's brigade, forming the 3rd, to the top of the breach in the *fausse braie* wall ; and all these, being composed of troops of the 3rd division, were under the direction of Lieut. General Picton.

The fourth column, consisting of the 43rd and 52nd regts., and part of the 95th regt., being of the Light division, under the direction of Major Ge-



neral Craufurd, attacked the breaches on the left in front of the suburb on San Francisco, and covered the left of the attack of the principal breach by the troops of the 3rd division ; and Brig. General Pack was destined, with his brigade, forming the fifth column, to make a false attack upon the southern face of the fort.

Besides these 5 columns, the 94th regt., belonging to the 3rd division, descended into the ditch in 2 columns, on the right of Major General Mackinnon's brigade, with a view to protect the descent of that body into the ditch and its attack of the breach in the *fausse braie*, against the obstacles which it was supposed the enemy would construct to oppose their progress.

All these attacks succeeded ; and Brig. General Pack even surpassed my expectations, having converted his false attack into a real one ; and his advanced guard, under the command of Major Lynch, having followed the enemy's troops from the advanced works into the *fausse braie*, where they made prisoners all opposed to them.

Major Ridge, of the 2nd. batt. 5th regt., having escalated the *fausse braie* wall, stormed the principal breach in the body of the place, together with the 94th regt., commanded by Lieut. Colonel Campbell, which had moved along the ditch at the same time, and had stormed the breach in the *fausse braie*, both in front of Major General Mackinnon's brigade. Thus, these regiments not only effectually covered the advance from the trenches of Major General Mackinnon's brigade by their first movements and operations, but they preceded them in the attack.

Major General Craufurd, and Major General Vandeleur, and the troops of the Light division, on the left, were likewise very forward on that side ; and, in less than half an hour from the time the attack commenced, our troops were in possession, and formed on the ramparts of the place, each body contiguous to the other ; the enemy then submitted, having sustained a considerable loss in the contest.

Our loss was also, I am concerned to add, severe, particularly in officers of high rank and estimation in this army. Major General Mackinnon was unfortunately blown up by the accidental explosion of one of the enemy's expense magazines, close to the breach, after he had gallantly and successfully led the troops under his command to the attack. Major General Craufurd likewise received a severe wound,\* while he was leading on the Light division to the storm, and I am apprehensive that I shall be deprived for some time of his assistance.

Major General Vandeleur was likewise wounded in the same manner, but not so severely, and he was able to continue in the field.

I have to add to this list Lieut. Colonel Colborne of the 52nd regt., and Major G. Napier,† who led the storming party of the Light division, and was wounded on the top of the breach.

I have great pleasure in reporting to your Lordship the uniform good conduct, and spirit of enterprise, and patience, and perseverance in the performance of great labor, by which the General Officers, officers, and troops of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and Light divisions, and Brig. General Pack's brigade, by

\* The wound was mortal.

† Major General Sir G. Napier, K.C.B., Governor of the Cape of Good Hope.

whom the siege was carried on, have been distinguished during the late operations.

Lieut. General Graham assisted me in superintending the conduct of the details of the siege, besides performing the duties of the General Officer commanding the 1st division; and I am much indebted to the suggestions and assistance I received from him for the success of this enterprise.

The conduct of all parts of the 3rd division,\* in the operations which they performed with so much gallantry and exactness on the evening of the 19th in the dark, afford the strongest proof of the abilities of Lieut. General Picton and Major General Mackinnon, by whom they were directed and led; but I beg particularly to draw your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Lieut. Colonel O'Toole, of the 2nd çadores, of Major Ridge of the 2nd batt. 5th foot,† of Lieut. Colonel Campbell of the 94th regt.,‡ of Major Manners of the 74th, and of Major Grey of the 2nd batt. 5th foot,§ who has been twice wounded during this siege.

It is but justice also to the 3rd division to report that the men who performed the sap belonged to the 45th, 74th, and 88th regts., under the command of Captain Macleod of the Royal Engineers, and Captain Thompson of the 74th, Lieut. Beresford of the 88th, and Lieut. Metcalfe of the 45th, and they distinguished themselves not less in the storm of the place than they had in the performance of their laborious duty during the siege.

I have already reported, in my letter of the 9th instant, my sense of the conduct of Major General Craufurd, and of Lieut. Colonel Colborne, and of the troops of the Light division, in the storm of the redoubt of San Francisco, on the evening of the 8th instant. The conduct of these troops was equally distinguished throughout the siege; and in the storm, nothing could exceed the gallantry with which these brave officers and troops advanced and accomplished the difficult operation allotted to them, notwithstanding that all their leaders had fallen. I particularly request your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Major General Craufurd, Major General Vandeleur,|| Lieut. Colonel Barnard of the 95th,¶ Lieut. Colonel Colborne,\*\* Major Gibbs,†† and Major Napier of the 52nd, and Lieut. Colonel Macleod of the 43rd.‡‡ The conduct of Captain Duffy of the 43rd,§§ and that of Lieut. Gurwood ||| of the 52nd regt., who was wounded, have likewise been particularly reported to me. Lieut. Colonel Elder and the 3rd çadores were likewise distinguished upon this occasion. The 1st Portuguese regt., under Lieut. Colonel Hill, and the 16th, under Colonel Campbell, being Brig. General Pack's brigade, were likewise distinguished in the storm under the command of the Brig. General, who particularly mentions Major Lynch.

\* Lieut. Mackie, 88th regt., commanded the 'forlorn hope' of the assault of the great breach. Major Mackie died of fever in 1840, at Gambia, to which colony he had been lately appointed Governor.

† Killed in the assault at Badajoz.

‡ The late Lieut. General Sir James Campbell, K.C.B.

§ Major General Grey, C.B.

|| General Sir J. Vandeleur, G.C.B.

¶ Lieut. General Sir A. Barnard, G.C.B.

\*\* Lieut. General Lord Seaton, G.C.B.

†† Major General Sir E. Gibbs, K.C.B.

‡‡ Lieut. Colonel Macleod was subsequently killed in the assault of Badajoz.

§§ Colonel Duffy, C.B.

||| Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, the compiler of this work.



In my dispatch of the 15th, I reported to your Lordship the attack of the convent of S<sup>ta</sup> Cruz by the troops of the 1st division, under the direction of Lieut. General Graham, and that of the convent of San Francisco, on the 14th instant, under the direction of Major General the Hon. C. Colville. The first mentioned enterprise was performed by Captain Laroche de Starkerfels, of the 1st line batt. K. G. L., the last by Lieut. Colonel Harcourt, with the 40th regt. This regt. remained from that time in the suburb of San Francisco, and materially assisted our attack on that side of the place.

Although it did not fall to the lot of the troops of the 1st and 4th divisions to bring these operations to a successful close, they distinguished themselves throughout their progress by the patience and perseverance with which they performed the labor of the siege. The brigade of Guards, under Major General H. Campbell, were particularly distinguished in this respect.

I likewise request your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, the chief Engineer, and of Brigade Major Jones,\* and the officers and men of the Royal Engineers. The ability with which these operations were carried on exceeds all praise; and I beg leave to recommend these officers to your Lordship most particularly.

Major Dickson of the Royal Artillery, attached to the Portuguese artillery, has for some time had the direction of the heavy train attached to this army, and has conducted the intricate details of the late operation, as he did that of the two sieges of Badajoz in the last summer, much to my satisfaction. The rapid execution produced by the well directed fire kept up from our batteries affords the best proof of the merits of the officers and men of the Royal Artillery, and of the Portuguese artillery, employed on this occasion; but I must particularly mention Brigade Major May,† and Captains Holcombe, Power, Dynely, and Dundas, of the Royal Artillery, and Captains Da Cunha and Da Costa, and Lieut. Silva, of the 1st regt. of Portuguese artillery. I have likewise particularly to report to your Lordship the conduct of Major Sturgeon of the Royal Staff corps.‡ He constructed and placed for us the bridge over the Agueda, without which the enterprise could not have been attempted; and he afterwards materially assisted Lieut. General Graham and myself in our reconnoissance of the place, on which the plan of the attack was founded; and he finally conducted the 2nd batt. 5th regt., as well as the 2nd caçadores, to their points of attack.

The Adjutant General, and the Deputy Quarter Master General, and the officers of their several departments, gave me every assistance throughout this service, as well as those of my personal Staff; and I have great pleasure in adding that notwithstanding the season of the year, and the increased difficulties of procuring supplies for the troops, the whole army have been well supplied, and every branch of the service provided for during the late operations, by the indefatigable exertions of Commissary General Bissett, and the officers belonging to his department.

The Mariscal de Campo, Don Carlos de España, and Don Julian Sanchez.

\* Major General Sir J. T. Jones, Bart.

† Major General Sir J. May, K.C.B.

‡ Killed near Vic Bigorre in 1813.

observed the enemy's movements beyond the Tormes during the operations of the siege; and I am much obliged to them, and to the people of Castille in general, for the assistance I received from them. The latter have invariably shown their detestation of the French tyranny, and their desire to contribute, by every means in their power, to remove it.

I shall hereafter transmit to your Lordship a detailed account of what we have found in the place; but I believe that there are 153 pieces of ordnance, including the heavy train belonging to the French army, and great quantities of ammunition and stores. We have the Governor, General Barrié, about 78 officers, and 1700 men, prisoners.'

## 622.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gallegos, 29th Jan. 1812.

'You will see from my dispatch that we are hard at work at Ciudad Rodrigo, and that place, as well as Almeida, will be quite secure for the end of next month.

I now propose to attack Badajoz as soon as I can. I have ordered all the preparatory arrangements to be made, and I hope that every thing will be in readiness to enable me to invest the place by the second week in March. We shall have great advantages in making the attack so early, if the weather will allow of it.

First; all the torrents in this part of the country are then full, so that we may assemble nearly our whole army on the Guadiana, without risk to any thing valuable here.

Secondly; it will be convenient to assemble our army at an early period in Estremadura, for the sake of the green forage, which comes in earlier to the south than here.

Thirdly; we shall have advantages, in point of subsistence, over the enemy, at that season, which we should not have at a later period.

Fourthly; their operations will necessarily be confined by the swelling of the rivers in that part as well as here.

The bad weather, which we must expect, or other circumstances, may, however, prevent us from carrying our plan into execution, but I can only assure you that I shall not abandon it lightly; and I have taken measures to have the best equipments for this enterprise.

I enclose the weekly and morning states. I am happy to say that the troops employed in the siege have not suffered in their health; indeed the divisions which were not there have sent most men to the hospitals lately.'

G. O.

Gallegos, 22nd Jan. 1812.

'1. The Commander of the Forces congratulates the General Officers, officers, and troops engaged in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, upon the brilliant result of their labors and gallantry, achieved on the night of the 19th instant; he assures them all that he will not fail to report their conduct to H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, and to the Secretary of State, for the information of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, in the terms which it merits.'

A. G. O.

Gallegos, 22nd Jan. 1812.

'Which sentence has been confirmed by His Excellency the Commander of the Forces.  
3. In consideration of the good conduct of the 88th regt. in the recent operations of the army, the Commander of the Forces remits that part of the sentence of the General Court Martial, under which the prisoners — and — are to receive a corporal punishment; but they must be put under stoppages to repay the money which they took respectively.'



## 623.

To Baron Constant.\*

Gallegos, 31st Jan. 1812.

‘ I return Sir F. D’Ivernois’ books, which I have perused with the greatest satisfaction. I had never read any of his works, excepting a pamphlet upon Finance, in a book called “ Offrandes à Buonaparte ;” but I have long come to the same conclusion as he has, respecting the state of the French finances, and respecting the plunder resulting from the war being the cause for its continuance. I enclose the drafts of my proclamations to the Portuguese nation on this last subject, which show my opinion upon it.

In the early days of the revolutionary war, the French, at the recommendation, I believe, of Brissot, adopted a measure which they called a *levée en masse* ; and put every man, animal, and article in their own country in requisition for the service of the armies. This system of plunder was carried into execution by the popular societies throughout the country. It is not astonishing that a nation, among whom such a system was established, should have been anxious to carry the war beyond their own frontiers. This system both created the desire and afforded the means of success ; and with the war they carried, wherever they went, the system of requisition ; not, however, before they had, by these and other revolutionary measures, entirely destroyed all the sources of national prosperity at home.

Wherever the French armies have since gone, their subsistence at least, the most expensive article in all armies, and means of transport, have been received from the country for nothing. Sometimes, besides subsistence, they have received clothing and shoes ; in other instances, besides these articles they have received pay ; and from Austria and Prussia, and other parts of Germany and Italy, they have drawn, besides all these articles of supply for their troops, heavy contributions in money for the supply of the treasury at Paris. To this enumeration ought to be added the plunder acquired by the Generals, officers and troops ; and it will be seen that the new French system of war is the greatest evil that ever fell on the civilised world.

The capital and the industry of France having been destroyed by the Revolution, it is obvious that the Government cannot raise a revenue from the people of France, adequate to support the large force which must be maintained in order to uphold the authority of the new Government, particularly in the newly conquered or ceded states ; and to defend the widely extended frontier of France from all those whose interest and inclination must lead them to attack it. The French Government, therefore, under whatever form administered, must seek for support for their armies in foreign countries. War must be a financial resource ; and that appears to me to be the greatest misfortune which the French Revolution has entailed upon the present generation.

I have great hopes, however, that this resource is beginning to fail ; and I think there are symptoms of a sense in France either that war is not

\* Baron Constant de Rebecque, C.B., &c., afterwards Lieutenant General in the service of the King of the Netherlands. He had been some time at the Head Quarters of the army under Lord Wellington, attached to the Prince of Orange.

so productive as it was, or that nations who have still something to lose may resist, as those of the Peninsula have; in which case, the expense of collecting this resource becomes larger than its produce.

One symptom of a sense of the failure of these resources is, that Napoleon has recently seized upon the territories of Rome, Holland, and the Hanse Towns, and has annexed these States to France. By these measures he has departed from a remarkable principle of his policy. In the early periods of his government he had not extended the dominions of France beyond what were called her natural limits of the Rhine, the Ocean, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. It appeared that he was aware of the dangers to which all widely extended empires are liable; and he was satisfied with governing by his influence all these States, and those of the Confederation of the Rhine. He must at the same time have made up his mind to draw no resources from these States, excepting those of a military nature, stipulated by treaty; and, indeed, the hopes of avoiding future plunder could have been the only inducement to those several States to enter into the Confederation. The futile disputes with his brother, the Pope, or the Senates of the Hanse Towns, cannot have been the cause of this departure from a remarkable principle of his early policy. He might easily have settled these disputes in any manner he pleased. Neither was it the dictate of a wild and extravagant ambition. If it was, why did he not seize upon poor Switzerland? The fact was, it was not safe or convenient to plunder Austria, Prussia, Russia, or Denmark; but he wanted the resources of Holland, the Hanse Towns, and Rome for his treasury, and therefore he seized them to himself.

As to Spain, it is completely plundered from one end to the other. The cultivation in some parts, as you must have seen, is entirely annihilated; and in all parts, by the accounts of the French officers, has much decreased. There is no commerce; and I have but little doubt that another year of diminished produce will have the effect of distressing the French armies exceedingly, and, possibly, may be attended with more important consequences. I know that the French officers were of opinion, last September, that they could not last much longer.

I do not believe that the French armies in Spain have ever drawn from the country much more than their subsistence and means of transport. In some parts of the country, more productive than others, they levy from the people more subsistence than the troops there stationed can consume, and they sell the overplus, by retail, at low prices; and this money defrays some of the necessary expenses for hospitals, intelligence, &c., or is carried to other parts, where, on account of the small number of troops and the difficulty of procuring provisions by requisition, they are obliged to pay for them. In other parts also they levy contributions in money; but generally in small sums, and not more than sufficient to defray the expenses which in all armies must necessarily be defrayed in money.

It appears by a letter from the Duque de Santa Fé of the 19th June, 1810, that the French army in Spain had, up to that period, cost the Imperial treasury 200 millions of *livres*. I think it probable that the whole pay of the army has, within the last year at least, been sent from Paris in specie; and I believe that it has for some time before; and I know that the extra allowances to General Officers, and other expenses which are laid upon the



*Contributions d'Espagne*, are as much in arrear as other expenses; and I have in my possession warrants to the Intendant General of Marmont's army, signed by Marmont, directing him to take, by force if it was necessary, money for the necessary expenses of the army, from the *Payeur Général*, in whose hands is the pay alone.

I have not read Sir F. D'Ivernois' former works, and I have not had an opportunity of acquiring the accurate knowledge which we all ought to have, at least of that part of the French finance of which the French Government will allow us to have any at all. I do not agree, however, with Sir F. D'Ivernois, either in his estimate of the French force, or in his estimate of its expense. I think both higher than he has stated them.

I know that the French Government had in 1810, before the annexation of Holland and the Hanse Towns, 700 battalions of infantry, and 600 squadrons of cavalry, besides artillery and the Guard. A battalion cannot be averaged less than 500 men, nor a squadron less than 100 men. Many of both are much more numerous. This would make 350,000 infantry, and 60,000 cavalry. I know that the Guard consist of 50,000 men. I have a return of July last of those in Spain only, which makes them 22,000. The artillery cannot be less than 40,000; making the active army in effectives 500,000 men.

In this estimate the Dutch troops and those of the Confederation of the Rhine, those of Naples and the Duchy of Warsaw are not included. The Dutch troops have since been added to the French army; and I should think there are now in that army 800 battalions. Besides these troops *en activité*, there are *gendarmérie Imperiale, garde nationale, gardes côtes, &c.*

It is impossible to reason upon any assertion in the truth of which confidence cannot be placed. When the Duc de Gaete, however, said that the Emperor had in his service 800,000 or 900,000 men, it may be supposed that he included the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, of Naples, of Holland, and of Warsaw, as well as those French and foreign troops immediately paid by the Emperor. The uncertainty upon this point, which doubtless prevails at Paris, as well as among us, shows the state to which affairs have been brought in France.

In respect to the expense of the French army, I calculate that which must be paid in money to amount to about £20,000,000 sterling, or 500,000,000 *livres*. I calculate the mere pay of the number of men I have above mentioned as existing in the service to amount to about £6,000,000 sterling, without including hospitals, or the pay of the officers of regiments, or of the general Staff. To this sum, add the clothing, the arms, accoutrements, the horses for the cavalry and artillery, the ordnance expenses, the provisions and forage, and means of transport in France and Italy for the troops in France and Italy, repairs and constructions of fortifications, &c., and it will be found that the sum to be provided does not fall short of what I have stated. I do not include in this sum the provisions and forage, and means of transport, for the troops stationed in Germany and Spain, as those are taken without payment; but I include the pay of these troops, as being provided for from Paris, or by the *recettes extérieures*.

If I am right in my notions of the numbers of the French army, as I believe I am, I do not think I am wrong in my estimate of the expenses to

be paid in money; and it will be seen that the French Government are more distressed than even Sir F. D'Ivernois supposed.

I cannot state exactly what sums are now due to the troops in Spain. Large sums have recently arrived from France; but before these arrived, they were in arrear from 9 to 12 months.

As Sir F. D'Ivernois expressed a desire that I should see his work, and to receive information from me on the interesting subject to which it relates, I have troubled you with this long letter, which I hope may prove satisfactory to him, as showing that I agree entirely with him in his principle and all the main points, although I differ from him in some of the details.

I have omitted to mention, that I believe the French armies in Spain to amount to nearer 200,000 than 150,000 men. They have received in this year reinforcements to the amount of about 50,000 men.'

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 624.

To Major General Cooke.

Gallegos, 1st Feb. 1812.

'We have a right to expect that His Majesty's Officers and troops will perform their duty upon every occasion, but we had no right to expect that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in every direction, and unprovided with artillery, and the walls scarcely cannon proof.

The enemy, however, retired with disgrace, infinitely to the honor of the brave troops who defended Tarifa, and it is useless to renew the discussion.'

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 625.

To — — —.

Freneda, 4th Feb. 1812.

'Portugal requiring the assistance of an army to defend the country, the Portuguese must submit to the inconvenience of having officers and soldiers billeted on their houses, and I only hope they do not believe that we quit our houses in England for the *pleasure* of being billeted in their's in Portugal.'

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 626.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 9th Feb. 1812.

'There is nothing new here; we are going on with the works at Ciudad Rodrigo, of which, as well as of the magazines in the place, we are not only defraying all the expense, but our soldiers are the laborers who execute them. This is what is called Spanish enthusiasm! But I have no doubt of the good will of the people; only of the abilities of their chiefs to call it into action.

I enclose a number of a newspaper which has lately made its appearance; and I wish particularly to draw your attention to the paragraph inserted in the last page. The license to publish any thing upon military operations, whether true or not, which results from the liberty of the press, is a very great inconvenience, particularly to an army comparatively small, which must seize opportunities to avail itself of favorable circumstances, &c. &c. But that inconvenience is increased tenfold when a military official body publish a newspaper, containing statements and observations upon military transactions. Any editor may happen to stumble upon a fact or reason-



ing of which it would be important for the enemy to have information; but the Staff, the official editors, must be supposed to have the information which they publish.

The contents of the paragraph marked in the enclosed paper are positively false; but under existing circumstances, the publication is not less likely to have mischievous consequences than if the contents were true. There is no person who knows any thing of the state of affairs in this country, who doubts, that if the French believe that paragraph, and choose to make the exertion, they must prevent us from carrying into execution our design, whatever may be the extent of the force which I shall collect. Surely therefore, it is worthy of the attention of the Government at least to prevent official bodies from publishing such mischievous nonsense.'

627.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 11th Feb. 1812.

'While on the subject of the artillery, I would beg to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of adding to the Engineers' establishment a corps of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantage we undertake any thing like a siege for want of assistance of this description. There is no French *corps d'armée* which has not a battalion of sappers and a company of miners. But we are obliged to depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the line; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the knowledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties among them consequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the siege.'

G. O.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces has frequently had occasion to notice the misconduct of the soldiers in destroying the houses, and other buildings, in or near which they may be quartered, by burning, as fire-wood, the beams and other timbers of which they are built, to the great inconvenience of themselves, of the soldiers of other regiments, and of the service in general, and to the injury of the property of the inhabitants of the country.

2. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have to observe, that the regiments in the — division of infantry have been frequently guilty of this practice. They burnt the town of Alcentre in December, 1810: they destroyed the cantonments of the 3rd division at Aldea da Ponte, when the army were closed up in November, 1811; and they have lately burnt the timbers in the roof of the convent of San Francisco, to the great inconvenience of the service.

3. But the troops in the — division are not alone guilty of this practice: the Commander of the Forces has received complaints of the conduct of the British soldiers on this subject from all parts of the country; and very recently, the troops on their passage through Coimbra to the army, have burnt the timber of the convent which was allotted for their accommodation.

4. Experience has shown, that when the non-commissioned officers, and particularly the officers of regiments, do their duty, these crimes cannot be committed. It is impossible that a soldier, or any number of soldiers, can take down the large beams of the roof of a convent, or even of a house, and burn them, without the knowledge of the non-commissioned officers of their companies, and even of the officers, if the latter do their duty, and attend to their men as they ought, not upon the parade only, but in their quarters, at various hours of the day and night; by this attention on the part of the officers, the authority of the non-commissioned officers would be maintained, and they would be obliged to exert it. And as the soldiers would be prevented from committing the irregularities and crimes, which render punishment necessary, the necessity for these would be avoided.

5. The Commander of the Forces now declares his intention of ordering, that, when any building shall be destroyed by the soldiers of the army, it shall be repaired, and the expense of the repairs shall be charged against the subsistence of the regiment or detachments, which shall be quartered in or near the building, which shall have been destroyed.'

628.

To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s dispatch of the 31st January, in which you have enclosed a letter of the 29th, from the Secretary of State, Don E. de Bardaxi, in which the Secretary of State has conveyed to the officers and troops under my command, and to myself, the thanks of the Cortes for the services which they had rendered to the cause in the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo.

I beg that you will request the Secretary of State to adopt the most respectful mode of assuring that august assembly, that the officers and soldiers under my command are highly sensible of the distinguished honor which has thus been conferred upon them, by the approbation expressed by the Cortes of their services; and I trust that by a zealous discharge of our duty, and by our exertions in the good cause in which we are engaged, we shall continue to merit the approbation of the Cortes.’

629.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1812.

‘ All my arrangements preparatory to the attack of Badajoz are in train, and I believe getting on well; some of the troops have marched for the Alentejo, and others will follow soon; and I intend to go myself the last, as I know that my removal from one part of the country to the other will be the signal for the enemy that the part to which I am going is to be the scene of active operations.’

630.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Elvas, 12th March, 1812.

‘ The Spaniards, and O’Donnell in particular, have long pressed for a military convention for the execution of a particular plan of operations. It has always appeared to me, that as I was the only person in the Peninsula who really commanded an army, and that I command it under restrictions

G. O.

Freneda, 17th Feb. 1812.

‘ 5. Till further orders, the rolls of the —th caçadores are to be called every hour, all officers attending; and if the officers do not discover the men who have committed the disgraceful outrages which have been reported of that battalion, the Commander of the Forces will turn the —th caçadores out of the army under his command.’

G. O.

Freneda, 2nd March, 1812.

‘ 1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe that notwithstanding his repeated orders, references are frequently made to him of requisitions and receipts for provisions and forage, made in an irregular manner by the officers of the army; and his time, as well as that of the Commissary General, and of the officers under him, is unnecessarily taken up in inquiries into the justice of the claims of the holders of these irregular vouchers, solely because the officers who give them, omit to obey the orders of the army.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests the General Officers, commanding divisions, will give orders that the General Orders of the 4th May, 1809, Nos. 4, 5, and 6, and of the 7th October, 1809, Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11, and of the 8th December, 1809, No. 5, may be again issued to the several regiments.’

G. O.

Freneda, 4th March, 1812.

‘ 1. The Commander of the Forces begs to call the attention of the gentlemen of the Medical department, and of the officers about to be removed into the hospital at Santarem, to his orders regarding quarters.

2. He declares it to be his intention to order that the whole should inhabit their tents, if he should receive any reports of disagreements with the inhabitants, or of unreasonable demands on the part of the officers above mentioned.’



and instructions by your Lordship, I ought not to consent to lend myself to such a convention, unless I should see an army formed in Spain capable, by its numbers, its equipment, and efficiency, to effect some important object in our common operations. Now there is no such army; and the consequence of entering into such a convention would be, that I should bind myself, for no reason, to perform a certain operation, even after my own judgment should have convinced me that, under your Lordship's instructions, I ought to discontinue it: in other words, I should give, but receive nothing. Accordingly, your Lordship will find, in all my correspondence with the Ambassador, that I state to the Spanish Government the plan which I propose to follow, and suggest that which the Spanish troops should follow to aid my operations; but I do not bind myself to persevere to the last; nor have I suggested any plan to them to aid me, in which it will be necessary for them to persevere so as to endanger the safety of any of their armies.'

## 631.

To Viscount Melville.

Elvas, 13th March, 1812.

'I say that the evil has been the weakness of the government, occasioned by the contending pretensions of the Governor and the Commander in Chief, and by the undue interference of the Company's authorities at home in the government and patronage abroad. What would become of the government if the Commander in Chief had the whole army at his back, and obeyed no authority in India? Have Commanders in Chief never advanced extravagant pretensions on the subject of lucre, and advanced those pretensions in such a manner as to endanger the public authority? Let the records be looked at, and see what would have been the consequence, upon more than one occasion, if the army had been entirely and exclusively the King's, and the Commander in Chief had chosen to carry matters to extremities, as he did, having only a part of the army exclusively under his command.

If this arrangement is adopted, the Commander in Chief of the army must invariably be the Governor of the settlement, which might be a very proper arrangement; but let it be adopted on its own ground, and not as the consequence of, and prop to, another arrangement, which I am convinced can never be adopted with advantage till the Crown shall take the exercise of the sovereignty into its own hands.'

## 632.

To General Don Carlos de España.

Badajoz, 20th March, 1812.

'I should not have been told by your Excellency, that for want of the assistance of 15 or 20 British soldiers, who are artificers, and whose services are required for other objects essential to the cause of Spain, the whole business is at a stand. Is it possible that your Excellency can be in earnest? Is it possible that Castille cannot furnish 15 or 20 stone cutters, masons, and carpenters, for the repair of this important post? How have all the great works been performed which we see in the country?

But your Excellency's letter suggests this melancholy reflection, that every thing, as well of a military as of a laborious nature, must be performed by British soldiers, and it becomes my duty to bring this fact distinctly under the view of the allied Governments.'

## 633.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Badajoz, 20th March, 1812.

'According to the intention which I announced to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 13th instant, I broke up the cantonments of the army on the 15th and 16th instant, and invested Badajoz, on the left of the river Guadiana, on the 16th instant, with the 3rd, 4th, and Light divisions of infantry, and with a brigade of Lieut. General Hamilton's division on the right. These troops are under the command of Marshal Sir W. Beresford and Lieut. General Picton. We broke ground on the following day, and have established a parallel within 200 yards of the outwork called La Picurina, which embraces the whole of the south-east angle of the fort. The work has continued ever since with great celerity, notwithstanding the very bad weather which we have had since the 17th.

The enemy made a sortie yesterday from the gate called La Trinidad, on the right of our attack, with about 2000 men. They were almost immediately driven in, without effecting any object, with considerable loss, by Major General Bowes, who commanded the guard in the trenches.'

## 634.

To Lieut. General Lord W. Bentinck.

Badajoz, 24th March, 1812.

'In forming a plan for attacking a strong place, it will not answer to reckon upon the exertions of the population within against the garrison, at the same time that the inclination of such a population, as there is at Barcelona, must not be thrown aside entirely.

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The great object in all sieges is to gain time. The preparation and collection of materials for a siege necessarily take many days, which might be employed in carrying on the operations, if those materials were collected and prepared beforehand.

Whatever may be the point which you may determine to attack, it is obvious that you must reach it by sea, and there can be no inconvenience in transporting with you all the materials which you may require.

\* \* \* \* \*

In all the sieges which I have carried on in this country, I have used only the fire of guns, principally from entertaining an opinion that the fire of mortars and howitzers has an effect upon the inhabitants of a town alone, and that a French garrison, in a Spanish or Portuguese town, would be but little likely to attend to the wishes or feelings of its inhabitants. By this measure I have diminished considerably the expense and difficulty of these operations: and, at all events, whether successful or not, I have done no injury to the Spanish or Portuguese inhabitants. If your Lordship should be inclined to try the effect of a bombardment, I imagine that it will be necessary that you should bring the ordnance and stores for it from Sicily or Malta.'

## 635.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Badajoz, 27th March, 1812.

'The operations of the siege of Badajoz have continued since I addressed you on the 20th instant, notwithstanding the badness of the weather, till the



25th instant. On that day we opened our fire from 28 pieces of ordnance, in 6 batteries in the first parallel, 2 of which were intended to fire upon the outwork called La Picurina, and the other 4 to enfilade or destroy the defences of the fort on the side attacked. I directed Major General Kempt, who commanded in the trenches on that afternoon, to attack La Picurina by storm, after it was dark that night, which service he effected in the most judicious and gallant manner.

The attack was made by 500 men of the 3rd division, formed into 3 detachments, the right under the command of Major Shaw, of the 74th, the centre under Captain the Hon. H. Powys, of the 83rd, and the left under Major Rudd, of the 77th. The communication between the outwork and the body of the place was entered on its right and left by the right and left detachments, each consisting of 200 men; half of each which detachments protected the attack from sallies from the fort, while the others attacked the work in its gorge. It was first entered, however, by the centre detachment of 100 men, under the command of Captain the Hon. H. Powys, of the 83rd regt., who escalated the work at the salient angle, at a point at which the palisades had been injured by our fire. The detachment which attacked the work by the gorge had the most serious difficulties to contend with, as it was closed by no less than 3 rows of palisades, defended by musketry, and a place of arms for the garrison, musket proof, and loopholed throughout. When the attack upon the salient angle, however, succeeded, the whole got into the work.

The enemy's garrison in the outwork consisted of 250 men, with 7 pieces of artillery, under the command of Colonel Gaspard Thiéry, of the *état major* of the army of the South. But very few if any escaped: the Colonel, 3 other officers, and 86 men have been taken prisoners, and the remainder were either killed by the fire of our troops or drowned in the inundation of the river Rivillas. The enemy made a sortie from the ravelin called San Roque, either with a view to recover La Picurina, or to protect the retreat of the garrison, but they were immediately driven in by the detachment stationed in the communication to protect the attack.

Major General Kempt mentions in high terms in his report the cool and persevering gallantry of the officers and troops; of which indeed the strength of the work which they carried affords the best proof. He particularly mentions Lieut. Colonel Hardinge, of the Staff of the Portuguese Army, who attended him on this occasion, Captain Burnet, his aide de camp, and Brigade Major Wilde, who was unfortunately killed by a cannon shot, after the work was in our possession. Likewise Captain Holloway, Lieuts. Gipps and Stanway, of the Royal Engineers, who conducted the several detachments to the points of attack; and Majors Shaw and Rudd, and Captain the Hon. H. Powys, who commanded the several detachments: these 3 officers were wounded, the latter on the parapet of the work, which he had been the first to mount by the ladders.\* I have to add to this account the high sense I entertain of the judicious manner and the gallantry with which Major General Kempt carried into execution the service which I had entrusted to him. We thus established ourselves in La Picurina on the night of the

\* He died of his wounds.

25th, and opened the second parallel within 300 yards of the body of the place, in which batteries were commenced last night.

It is impossible that I can do justice to the zeal, activity, and indefatigable labor of the officers and soldiers, with which these operations have been carried on in the most unfavorable weather. The Guadiana swelled so considerably that, notwithstanding all precautions, our bridge of pontoons was carried away on the 22nd instant, and the flying bridges were so much injured as almost to become useless. But still the operations have been carried on without interruption.

I cannot, however, avoid taking this opportunity of calling the attention of your Lordship, and of His Majesty's Government, to the neglect of the Portuguese authorities to furnish the means of transport necessary for the success of this or any other operation. My own anxiety, and the detail into which I am obliged to enter, in order to find resources to overcome difficulties which occur at every moment, I put out of the question, although I believe no officer at the head of an army was ever so hampered, and it is desirable that the attention of one in that situation should be turned to other objects. But the serious inconveniences to which the troops are exposed, and the difficulties and risks which attend the execution of all services, for want of means of transport, become of such a magnitude, that no officer can venture to be responsible for them. If there was any want of means of transport in the country I should not complain, but I know there is no want; and I attribute the deficiency entirely to the defect of the Portuguese law upon the subject, and to the unwillingness of the magistrates to carry it into execution. In every country the supply of carriages for the service of the army is an obligation upon the owners of carriages; and I have repeatedly urged the Portuguese Government to frame a law upon the subject, with sufficient penalties to insure obedience to it, and that the army should have means of transport. Instead of doing that, the object of the law lately made by the Government, would appear to be to prevent the army from getting carriages, and the consequence is that every service becomes a matter of difficulty and risk; and as the carriages of the poor alone are forced into the service by the magistrates, they suffer all the hardships which result from the law.

I had intended to commence the operations against Badajoz between the 6th and 8th March, and all the arrangements were made accordingly; but because the large and rich town of Evora, which has suffered in no manner by the war, would supply no carriages, I could not commence till the 17th, and thus the troops have been exposed to, and have been obliged to carry on the works of the siege during the rains of the equinox, which I had intended to avoid. At this moment the powder for the siege, and much of the shot, and many of the engineers' stores, are not arrived at Elvas, and we are obliged to consume the stores of that garrison. I am destroying the equipments of the army in transporting the stores from Elvas to the ground of the siege, because no assistance is given by the country, or assistance that is quite inadequate to the demand and wants of the service.

I hope that His Majesty's Government will exert their influence with the Prince Regent of Portugal, to order the Local Government not only to frame a law which shall have for its object the equipment of the armies in such a



manner as to enable them to defend the country, but to carry that law into execution, so that the people of the country shall understand that they must comply with its provisions.'

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636.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Badajoz, 27th March, 1812.

'When I received your letter of the 27th September, 1811, in which you announced to me that the committee for the management of the money raised in Great Britain and Ireland by subscription, for the relief of the suffering Portuguese, had determined to place the sum of 15,000 dollars at my disposal for the relief of the people inhabiting the country on the banks of the Coa, and Pinhel rivers, I employed the Rev. S. Briscall, the chaplain to head quarters, and the chaplains to the several divisions of the army, to make inquiries regarding the state of the people in the neighbourhood of the cantonments occupied by the troops, to which these gentlemen were attached, in order to enable me to form a judgment regarding the best mode of laying out the money with which I had been entrusted for the benefit of the people. Mr. Briscall was unfortunately taken ill before he had completed his task, but not before he and the other gentlemen had made reports which, at the same time that they showed the general distress of the district, proved that no information could be obtained, according to which a distribution of the money could be made, which would satisfy my mind that I had done that which was most beneficial to the people.

I am sorry to say that I could not get from the curates of the villages, the fair source of information regarding the distresses of the poor, any account of the number in real distress, or a list of the names. All had suffered from the invasion, but not equally. The distinction of rich and poor still remained, and the former, although in a reduced state, possessed generally means of subsistence and to improve their situation, while the latter was really in want. Yet I am concerned to add that the rich in every village insisted upon their names being inserted in the list of distressed persons, in order to participate equally with the poor in the distribution of money or food; and the curates of the villages were apprehensive of the consequences of resisting these unreasonable pretensions; and the list of the persons in absolute want furnished by the curates, were lists of the inhabitants of the villages. It would have been impossible for me to attempt to distribute the money excepting through the medium of the curates, and it was quite clear that the sum distributed to the whole population in equal proportions, would have relieved the distresses of none.

Under these circumstances I had at one time determined to return the money to the committee, to which determination I was further induced, from observing that the people were likely to overcome the distress of the winter by attending the troops in their cantonments with various articles for sale, by which they gained a subsistence, much more beneficial to them than any which charity might give them.

Nearly about this time (in the end of October) I had an interview with the Bishop of Pinhel, and having mentioned to him the difficulties which I met with in distributing the money in question, and an idea which I had of returning it to the committee, or of purchasing cattle with it, to be afterwards

distributed to the people, he entirely concurred with me regarding the impossibility of distributing the money in a satisfactory manner, so as to be of use to any body; and he observed that it was not then wanted, as the people gained much from the troops, and he earnestly recommended that I should adopt the measure which I had in contemplation, and that I should buy cattle to be distributed to the people in March.

I determined accordingly to carry that plan into execution, and I enclose the account of the purchase of 276 bullocks, and the receipts for that number by the vicar-general of Pinhel. I likewise enclose the distribution of 200 dollars which I gave to General Pack, to be divided among the inhabitants of Freixo and the neighbouring villages, when the troops commanded by him had quitted the villages; and the people had no longer the means of gaining a livelihood by supplying the troops with what they wanted.

I likewise enclose a copy of the paper given to the Bishop of Pinhel, containing the plan according to which the bullocks are to be distributed to the villages of the district. In adopting this plan I also acted in communication with the Bishop. I was informed that the temptation of a large price had induced many to whom the bullocks had been given to sell them; and the Bishop concurred with me in opinion that the plan which I proposed, and which is detailed in the enclosed paper, would be more likely to promote the renewal of industry and agriculture throughout the district than any other; at the same time that if those entitled to the use of the bullocks should not be in possession of seed corn, or should not be inclined to make use of them, they would acquire a profit by selling their right to the use of the bullocks to the more wealthy proprietors.

I beg you to lay this letter and the enclosed papers before the committee.'

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637.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

'My dispatch of the 3rd instant will have apprised your Lordship of the state of the operations against Badajoz to that date; which were brought to a close on the night of the 6th, by the capture of the place by storm.

The fire continued during the 4th and 5th against the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of S<sup>a</sup> Maria; and on the 4th,

G. O.

Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General Officers, officers and soldiers of the 3rd, 4th, and Light divisions, to the Royal Engineers and Artillery, and to the Portuguese Artillery, for their persevering patience, and laborious industry, and the gallantry which they have uniformly manifested throughout the late siege of Badajoz.

In thanking them for the uncommon gallantry displayed last night in the assault of the place, under the most trying circumstances, the Commander of the Forces must include among those, the General Officers, officers and soldiers of the 5th division.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the men's arms may be immediately got into order again, as he hopes that another occasion of meeting the enemy will before long occur.'

A. G. O.

Badajoz, 7th April, 1812.

'It is now full time that the plunder of Badajoz should cease, and the Commander of the Forces requests that an officer and 6 steady non-commissioned officers may be sent from each regiment, British and Portuguese, of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and Light divisions, into the town tomorrow morning, at 5 o'clock, in order to bring away any men that may be straggling there.

2. The Commander of the Forces has ordered the Provost Marshal into the town, and he has orders to execute any men he may find in the act of plunder, after he shall arrive there.

This order is to be communicated to the Portuguese, as well as to the British troops.'



in the morning, we opened another battery of 6 guns in the second parallel against the shoulder of the ravelin of San Roque, and the wall in its gorge.

Practicable breaches were effected in the bastions above mentioned on the evening of the 5th; but as I had observed that the enemy had entrenched the bastion of La Trinidad, and the most formidable preparations were making for the defence, as well of the breach in that bastion, as of that in the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, I determined to delay the attack for another day, and to turn all the guns in the batteries in the second parallel on the curtain of La Trinidad; in hopes that by effecting a third breach, the troops would be enabled to turn the enemy's works for the defence of the other two; the attack of which would besides be connected by the troops destined to attack the breach in the curtain. This breach was effected in the evening of the 6th, and the fire of the face of the bastion of S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, and of the flank of the bastion of La Trinidad being overcome, I determined to attack the place that night.

I had kept in reserve in the neighbourhood of this camp, the 5th division under Lieut. General Leith, which had left Castille only in the middle of March, and had but lately arrived in this part of the country; and I brought them up on that evening. The plan for the attack was, that Lieut. General Picton should attack the castle of Badajoz by escalade with the 3rd division; and a detachment from the guard in the trenches furnished that evening by the 4th division, under Major Wilson of the 48th regt., should attack the ravelin of San Roque upon his left, while the 4th division under Major General the Hon. C. Colville, and the Light division under Lieut. Colonel Barnard, should attack the breaches in the bastions of La Trinidad and S<sup>ta</sup> Maria, and in the curtain by which they are connected. The 5th division were to occupy the ground which the 4th and Light divisions had occupied during the siege; and Lieut. General Leith was to make a false attack upon the outwork called the Pardaleras; and another on the works of the fort towards the Guadiana, with the left brigade of the division under Major General Walker, which he was to turn into a real attack, if circumstances should prove favorable; and Brig. General Power, who invested the place with his Portuguese brigade on the right of the Guadiana, was directed to make false attacks on the *tête-de-pont*, the Fort San Christoval, and the new redoubt called Mon Cœur.

The attack was accordingly made at 10 at night; Lieut. General Picton preceding by a few minutes the attacks by the remainder of the troops. Major General Kempt led this attack, which went out from the right of the first parallel. He was unfortunately wounded in crossing the river Rivillas below the inundation; but notwithstanding this circumstance, and the obstinate resistance of the enemy, the castle was carried by escalade, and the 3rd division established in it at about half past 11. While this was going on, Major Wilson of the 48th carried the ravelin of San Roque by the gorge, with a detachment of 200 men of the guard in the trenches; and with the assistance of Major Squire, of the engineers, established himself within that work.

The 4th and Light divisions moved to the attack from the camp along the left of the river Rivillas, and of the inundation. They were not per-

ceived by the enemy, till they reached the covered-way; and the advanced guards of the 2 divisions descended without difficulty into the ditch protected by the fire of the parties stationed on the glacis for that purpose; and they advanced to the assault of the breaches led by their gallant officers, with the utmost intrepidity. But such was the nature of the obstacles prepared by the enemy at the top and behind the breaches, and so determined their resistance, that our troops could not establish themselves within the place. Many brave officers and soldiers were killed or wounded by explosions at the top of the breaches; others who succeeded to them were obliged to give way, having found it impossible to penetrate the obstacles which the enemy had prepared to impede their progress. These attempts were repeated till after 12 at night; when, finding that success was not to be attained, and that Lieut. General Picton was established in the castle, I ordered that the 4th and Light divisions might retire to the ground on which they had been first assembled for the attack.

In the mean time, Lieut. General Leith had pushed forward Major General Walker's brigade on the left, supported by the 38th regt. under Lieut. Colonel Nugent, and the 15th Portuguese regt. under Colonel Do Rego, and he had made a false attack upon the Pardaleras with the 8th caçadores under Major Hill. Major General Walker forced the barrier on the road of Olivença, and entered the covered way on the left of the bastion of San Vicente, close to the Guadiana. He there descended into the ditch, and escalated the face of the bastion of San Vicente. Lieutenant General Leith supported this attack by the 38th regt., and 15th Portuguese regt.; and our troops being thus established in the castle, which commands all the works of the town, and in the town; and the 4th and Light divisions being formed again for the attack of the breaches, all resistance ceased; and at daylight in the morning, the Governor, General Philippon, who had retired to Fort San Christoval, surrendered, together with General Vieland, and all the Staff, and the whole garrison. I have not got accurate returns of the strength of the garrison, or of the number of prisoners. But General Philippon has informed me that it consisted of 5000 men at the commencement of the siege, of which 1200 were killed or wounded during the operations; besides those lost in the assault of the place. There were 5 French battalions, besides 2 of the regiment of Hesse Darmstadt, and the artillery, engineers, &c.; and I understand there are 4000 prisoners.

It is impossible that any expressions of mine can convey to your Lordship the sense which I entertain of the gallantry of the officers and troops upon this occasion. The list of killed and wounded will show that the General officers, the Staff attached to them, the commanding and other officers of the regiments, put themselves at the heads of the attacks which they severally directed, and set the example of gallantry which was so well followed by their men.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford assisted me in conducting the details of this siege; and I am much indebted to him for the cordial assistance which I received from him, as well during its progress, as in the last operation which brought it to a termination. The duties in the trenches were conducted successively by Major General the Hon. C. Colville, Major General Bowes, and Major General Kempt, under the superintendence of Lieut. General



Picton. I have had occasion to mention all these officers during the course of the operations; and they all distinguished themselves, and were all wounded in the assault. I am particularly obliged to Lieut. General Picton for the manner in which he arranged the attack of the castle; for that in which he supported the attack, and established his troops in that important post.

Lieut. General Leith's arrangements for the false attack upon the Pardaleras, and that under Major General Walker, were likewise most judicious; and he availed himself of the circumstances of the moment, to push forward and support the attack under Major General Walker, in a manner highly creditable to him. The gallantry and conduct of Major General Walker, who was also wounded, and that of the officers and troops under his command, were conspicuous.

The arrangements made by Major General the Hon. C. Colville for the attack by the 4th division, were very judicious; and he led them to the attack in the most gallant manner. In consequence of the absence on account of sickness, of Major General Vandeleur, and of Colonel Beckwith, Lieut. Colonel Barnard commanded the Light division in the assault, and distinguished himself not less by the manner in which he made the arrangements for that operation, than by his personal gallantry in its execution.

I have also to mention Brig. General Harvey of the Portuguese service, commanding a brigade in the 4th division, and Brig. General Champelmond, commanding the Portuguese brigade in the 3rd division, as highly distinguished. Brig. General Harvey was wounded in the storm.

Your Lordship will see in the list of killed and wounded a list of the Commanding Officers of regiments. In Lieut. Colonel Macleod of the 43rd regt., who was killed in the breach, His Majesty has sustained the loss of an officer who was an ornament to his profession, and was capable of rendering the most important services to the country. I must likewise mention Lieut. Colonel Gibbs of the 52nd, who was wounded, and Major O'Hare of the 95th, unfortunately killed in the breach; Lieut. Colonel Elder of the 3rd, and Major Algeo of the 1st caçadores. Lieut. Colonel Harcourt of the 40th, likewise wounded, was highly distinguished; and Lieut. Colonels Blakeney of the Royal Fusiliers, Knight of the 27th, Erskine of the 48th, and Captain Leaky, who commanded the 23rd Fusiliers, Lieut. Colonel Ellis having been wounded during the previous operation of the siege.

In the 5th division I must mention Major Hill of the 8th caçadores, who directed the false attack upon the fort Pardaleras. It was impossible for any men to behave better than these did.

I must likewise mention Lieut. Colonel Brooke of the 4th regt., and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. G. Carleton of the 44th, and Lieut. Colonel Gray of the 30th, who was unfortunately killed. The 2nd batt. 38th regt., under Lieut. Colonel Nugent, and the 15th Portuguese regt., under Colonel Luiz do Rego, likewise performed their part in a very exemplary manner.

The officers and troops in the 3rd division have distinguished themselves as usual in these operations. Lieut. General Picton has reported to me particularly the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Williams of the 60th, Lieut. Colonel Ridge of the 5th, who was unfortunately killed in the assault of the castle; Lieut. Colonel Forbes of the 45th, Lieut. Colonel Fitzgerald of the 60th,

Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Le P. Trench, and Lieut. Colonel Manners of the 74th; Major Carr of the 83rd, and Major the Hon. H. Pakenham, Assistant Adjutant General to the 3rd division. He has likewise particularly reported the good conduct of Colonel Campbell of the 94th, commanding Major General the Hon. C. Colville's brigade, during his absence in command of the 4th division, whose conduct I have so repeatedly had occasion to report to your Lordship.

The officers and men of the corps of engineers and artillery were equally distinguished during the operations of the siege and in its close.

Lieut. Colonel Fletcher continued to direct the works, (notwithstanding that he was wounded in the sortie made by the enemy on the 19th March,) which were carried on by Major Squire and Major Burgoyne, under his directions. The former established the detachments under Major Wilson, in the ravelin of San Roque, on the night of the storm; the latter attended the attack of the 3rd division on the castle. I have likewise to report the good conduct of Major Jones, Captain Nicholas, and Captain Williams, of the Royal Engineers.

Major Dickson conducted the details of the artillery service during the siege, as well as upon former occasions, under the general superintendance of Colonel Framingham, who, since the absence of Major General Borthwick, has commanded the artillery with the army.

I cannot sufficiently applaud the officers and soldiers of the Royal and Portuguese Artillery during the siege; particularly that of Lieut. Colonel Robe, who opened the breaching batteries; Major May, Captain Gardiner, Major Holcombe, and Lieut. Bouchier of the Royal Artillery; Captain de Rettberg of the German, and Major Tulloh of the Portuguese Artillery.

Adverting to the extent of the details of the ordnance department during this siege, to the difficulties of the weather, &c., with which Major Dickson had to contend, I must mention him most particularly to your Lordship.

The officers of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General's departments rendered me every assistance on this occasion, as well as those of my personal Staff; and I have to add that I have received reports from the General Officers commanding divisions, of the assistance they have received from the officers of those departments attached to them, the greatest number of whom, and of their personal Staff, are wounded.

In a former dispatch I reported to your Lordship the difficulties with which I had to contend, in consequence of the failure of the civil authorities of the province of Alentejo to perform their duty and supply the army with means of transport. These difficulties have continued to exist; but I must do Major General Victoria, the Governor of Elvas, the justice to report that he, and the troops under his command, have made every exertion, and have done every thing in their power to contribute to our success.

Marshal Soult left Seville on the 1st instant, with all the troops which he could collect in Andalusia; and he was in communication with the troops which had retired from Estremadura, under General Drouet, on the 3rd, and he arrived at Llerena on the 4th. I had intended to collect the army on the Albuera rivulet, in proportion as Marshal Soult should advance; and I had requested Lieut. General Sir T. Graham to retire gradually upon Albuera, while Lieut. General Sir R. Hill should do the same on Talavera,



from Don Benito and the upper parts of the Guadiana. I do not think it certain that Marshal Soult has made any decided movement from Llerena since the 4th, although he has patrolled forward with small detachments of cavalry, and the advanced guard of his infantry have been at Usagre. None of the army of Portugal have moved to join him.

According to the last reports which I have received of the 4th instant, from the frontier of Castille, it appears that Marshal Marmont had established a body of troops between the Agueda and the Coa, and he had reconnoitred Almeida on the 3rd. Brig. General Trant's division of militia had arrived upon the Coa, and Brig. General Wilson's division was following with the cavalry, and Lieut. General the Conde de Amarante was on his march, with a part of the corps under his command, towards the Douro.

It would be very desirable that I should have it in my power to strike a blow against Marshal Soult before he could be reinforced: but the Spanish authorities having omitted to take the necessary steps to provision Ciudad Rodrigo, it is absolutely necessary that I should return to the frontiers of Castille within a short period of time. It is not very probable that Marshal Soult will risk an action in the province of Estremadura, which it would not be difficult for him to avoid, and it is very necessary that he should return to Andalusia, as General Ballesteros was in movement upon Seville on the 29th of last month, and the Conde de Penne Villemur moving on the same place from the Lower Guadiana.

It will be quite impossible for me to go into Andalusia till I shall have secured Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore propose to remain in the positions now occupied by the troops for some days; indeed a little time is required to take care of our wounded; and if Marshal Soult should remain in Estremadura, I shall attack him; if he should retire into Andalusia, I must return to Castille.

I have the honor to enclose returns of the killed and wounded from the 31st March, and in the assault of Badajoz, and a return of the ordnance, small arms, and ammunition found in the place. I shall send the returns of provisions in the place by the next dispatch. This dispatch will be delivered to your Lordship by my aide de camp Captain Canning, whom I beg leave to recommend to your protection. He has likewise the colors of the garrison, and the colors of the Hesse Darmstadt's regiment, to be laid at the feet of H.R.H. the Prince Regent. The French battalions in the garrison had no eagles.'

G. O.

Badajoz, 8th April, 1812.

1. The rolls must be called in camp every hour, and all persons must attend till further orders.

2. Brig. General Power is ordered and held responsible, that no British or Portuguese soldiers, excepting those belonging to the place, or having a passport from a Field Officer, shall go into Badajoz, till further orders.

3. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to learn that the brigade in Badajoz, instead of being a protection to the people, plunder them more than those who stormed the town.

4. Brig. General Power's brigade are to be put under arms tomorrow morning, at daylight, and to continue under arms till further orders. The Brig. General is to send a state to Head Quarters every 6 hours, of the number of men under arms, in the form of the daily morning state.

5. The ladders in the counterscarp and scarp of the fort are to be taken out of the ditch tomorrow morning, at daylight, by fatigue parties of Brig. General Power's brigade, and the Brig. General will report when this order is obeyed.

## 638.

To Lieut. General Lord W. Bentinck.

Niza, 16th April, 1812.

'In respect to time, the period in which your operations would be of most use there, would be in the months of June, July, and August; say from the third week in June to the second week in September: this is the period during which the harvest is on the ground, and we may be certain that the French will collect their armies in one body. All the preparations, therefore, which depend upon me shall be made; and every thing at its place early in June.'

## 639.

To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Penamacor, 22nd April, 1812.

'I always feel much concern in being obliged to refuse officers who wish to quit the army; indeed it is the most painful duty I have to perform. But it must be performed; otherwise, between those absent on account of wounds and sickness, and those absent on account of business or pleasure, I should have no officers left.'

## 640.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Penamacor, 22nd April, 1812.

'It is not necessary that I should here enter into a justification of this order. Unfortunately, the difficulty of procuring specie renders it impossible to pay in ready money for all the supplies required by the army; but, whether I have it or not, I have assumed an authority to decide which of the creditors of the army shall be paid last.

I do not think I have exercised that authority unjustly in determining that those shall be paid last who do not, themselves, furnish any supplies or assistance to aid our exertions, and to forward the just cause in which we are engaged; but who, on the contrary, do us and the country all the mischief of which they are capable, by endeavoring to make money of the public difficulties, and to destroy our credit by purchasing our securities from the holders of them at a depreciated price.

It is impossible that this rule can be attended by half the injurious effects

6. The Commander of the Forces calls upon the Staff Officers of the army, and the Commanding and other officers of regiments, to assist him in putting an end to the disgraceful scenes of drunkenness and plunder which are going on at Badajoz.

7. The Provost Marshal of the army, and the Assistant Provosts of the several divisions, are to attend there tomorrow at daylight, and throughout the day.

8. Brig. General Power is requested to place 50 men, with officers in proportion, on guard at the gate of Elvas, and another of the same number at the breaches; and to prevent soldiers from entering the town, or from quitting it with bundles of any description.

9. British and Portuguese soldiers are forbid to go into Badajoz, and the provosts are to punish those they may find there, as being guilty of disobedience of orders, unless they should have a pass signed by a Field Officer, or the commanding officer of the regiment.'

G. O.

Niza, 15th April, 1812.

'1. The Commander of the Forces observes that there are several carts on the march loaded with private baggage, and other articles, which ought not to be so carried; to which subject he calls the attention of General Officers commanding brigades and divisions.

He likewise observes that the carts are very much overloaded, in consequence of which several are broken: he begs that the knapsacks of the soldiers may be inspected, and all articles not necessary for a soldier may be destroyed.

2. When troops in the same or neighbouring cantonments, or in the same column, are to separate on the march, the officer commanding each part of the column which separates, should leave a steady non-commissioned officer at the point of separation, in order to direct the baggage of the troops to follow by the right road.'



that must be the consequences of encouraging the purchase of these securities ; the least of which must be to raise the price of all commodities throughout the country to more than the amount of the profit which these purchasers would choose to make by this traffic.'

## 641.

To Dom M. Pereira Forjaz.

Alfayates, 24th April, 1812.

'It has never been my practice to refrain from giving applause to those officers under my command to whom applause is due, or to omit to recommend them to the notice and generosity of their superiors and their Sovereign ; but I solemnly protest against its being understood that Major Das Neves, or Colonel Caula, either formed the plan, or conceived the idea of the system which was carried into execution for the safety of Lisbon under my direction. I never saw Major Das Neves in my life, nor Colonel Caula, till I saw him at Almeida. Your Excellency gave me in 1809 a plan of the country in question, and a memoir by Major Das Neves ; I am now obliged to declare, that when I came to examine the ground, I found both so inaccurate, that I could place no reliance upon them ; and it is a fact that having trusted in one instance to the plan and memoir, without reconnoitring the ground, I was obliged to make a second journey to Lisbon, in February, 1810, and to destroy the works which had been commenced.'

## 642.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th April, 1812.

'The real nature of the war has never been fairly brought before the people by the Government, and instead of being informed that it was a war on their part for every thing that was valuable in life, if not for life itself ; and instead of being called upon and encouraged to make corresponding sacrifices to carry it on, the people have been flattered and cajoled, and the resources of the country, which consist essentially in the sacrifices of the people, have never been fairly called forth to provide for any of the emergencies of the war.

On this same principle of deceiving the people, the sole reliance of the Local Government of Portugal, on every occasion, is on the resources and aid of Great Britain. With these views, when reforms of abuses in the customs, or any other branch of the revenue, or the abolition of useless establishments and the saving of their expenses are recommended, with a view to enable the Portuguese Government to carry on the war, they are objected

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th April, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests, that the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the commanding officers of regiments, will attend to the General Orders which have been issued regarding the cutting of green forage.

2. It is very desirable that where grass can be cut, the green corn should not be used as forage ; but where it is necessary to use the green corn, the Commander of the Forces requests that the field may be regularly valued, in the manner pointed out in the General Orders ; and that the bñt men and other foragers may be confined to the use of that field only, and that care may be taken there is no waste.

3. The horses and other animals of the army must not be turned out to graze in the green corn ; and the Commander of the Forces having made arrangements to have the meadows cut for the service of the army at a late period of the season, requests the Generals, and Commanding Officers of regiments, will prevent the horses and other animals from being turned to graze in the meadows, if there should be any other place in which they can be turned, where they will find food.

4. The attention of the General Officers and Commanding Officers of regiments in the Portuguese service to be particularly called to this order.'

to, or not carried into execution, and fresh demands of loans or subsidies are made upon Great Britain. And in the same view of deceiving the people as to the real nature of the war, all the measures recommended with the hope to enable the army to avail themselves of the resources of the country have been frustrated. They would have been objected to and refused, if under the late orders of the Prince Regent, that had been possible; but they have been adopted in such a manner as to render all their enactments nugatory. Then, on the same principle, the magistrates have carried these measures into execution according to the spirit in which they have been adopted by the Government.'

## 643.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd May, 1812.

'I am tolerably well acquainted with the sentiments of some of these officers, among others, of Alava himself, regarding the employment of British officers in any Spanish concern; and I am thoroughly convinced that this proposal does not proceed from any desire to improve the Spanish military system, but that it is to be attributed solely to the desire to get out of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. They dislike the restraint which must prevail soon in a Spanish garrison; they dislike being exposed to my view in the occasional visits which I make to the place, and to my remonstrances on their indolence, and want of discipline, which I have assumed a right to make, on the ground of the assistance which I have given them of different descriptions; and, above all, they dislike the prospect of, some day or other, being attacked in Ciudad Rodrigo. This last feeling is common to all Spaniards. I refer you upon this point to Roche, who says very truly, that when a Spanish officer or soldier is running away, the last place he will run to is a fortified town, although he should be certain of receiving there assistance of every description. It is very desirable that you, and the Spanish Government, should be clearly informed of my opinions and intentions on this point.

First, I consider the British troops the best we have, and I will not put

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd May, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades in this army, to the Orders, page 279 of the printed General Regulations and Orders, containing directions respecting the Half-Yearly Confidential Reports, which are required to be made by the General Officers employed upon the staff of the army, at home and abroad, and the Circular letter from the Adjutant General of the army, of the 18th Jan., 1812, on the same subject.

2. As notwithstanding the various occasions on which the Commander of the Forces has called the attention of the officers of the army, to the orders which he has had occasion to issue on various branches of the service, he is concerned to observe, that in many instances they are still unattended to. He particularly requests the General Officers commanding brigades, in reporting upon the qualifications of the officers of the regiment, as directed in page 280 of the printed Regulations, and in the letter from the Adjutant General of the 18th Jan., 1812, will specify whether or not they are acquainted with the General Orders of the army, particularly those which relate to the mode of sending soldiers to the hospital, to the march of detachments through the country; to the care and inspection of their men, and of their conduct in cantonments, on a march or stationary; and to the mode of making requisitions for supplies of all descriptions required from the country. These points, as well as others referred to, particularly in the General Regulations of the 12th Aug., 1811, and in the letter from the Adjutant General of the 18th Jan., 1812, can be ascertained only by the General Officer, who will make and report on the inspection, conversing with the officers on the object and meaning of the several orders referred to.'



them in garrison. Secondly; I consider the Portuguese troops, next to the British, the best in the Peninsula, and I will not put more of them in garrisons than I am under the necessity of employing in that manner. I am obliged to employ some Portuguese regular troops in Elvas, and one regiment in Abrantes, but the Portuguese forts in general are occupied by the Portuguese militia, who, like other militia, cannot regularly be marched beyond the Portuguese frontier; and if they should be sent beyond the frontier for any length of time, they would desert.

I insist upon it, that Spanish troops are the proper garrisons for Spanish forts. If the Spanish Government differ with me upon this point, and insist upon my placing garrisons in these forts which we have taken from the enemy, and I have made over to them; or if they do not adopt measures to place, and support, in them proper garrisons, I now give notice that I will destroy both Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo. It will not answer their purpose or mine, that I should be tied by the leg to guard these 2 places against the evils to be apprehended from the want of provisions, or sufficient supplies in them.

The Spanish troops, however, will be no more fit to garrison these places, unless they should be disciplined, paid, and fed, than they are for other military services, and I see no chance of their being the first, unless they should be the two last.

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In regard to the employment of British officers with the Spanish troops, I entertain the same opinion which I have always held upon this subject. British officers will be worse than useless, if they have not the support to their exertions of the authority of the Commander in Chief, who must have the cordial support of the Government, or he will have no authority. British officers, besides, require an authority of no mean description, exercised with considerable strictness to keep them in order and within due bounds. The history of our service in Portugal will afford many instances of the truth of both these opinions. British officers would have more difficulties to contend with in Spain than they had in Portugal, and more temptations and opportunities of abusing their authority.

I retain likewise the same opinions regarding my having the command of the Spanish armies. I consider troops that are neither paid, fed, nor disciplined, (and they cannot be disciplined, and there can be no subordination among them, unless they are paid and fed,) to be dangerous only to their friends when assembled in large bodies: as guerrillas they might be of some use, but it would be better, probably, if the same men were employed under the guerrilla officer, who is much better acquainted with his trade, than what is called the officer of the regular Spanish service, knows the country better, which is the seat of his operations, knows better and is better known to the inhabitants, and, above all, has no pretensions to military character.

I never will voluntarily command troops who cannot, and will not obey; and therefore I am not desirous of having any thing to say to the command of the Spanish troops, till I shall see the means provided for their food and pay, and till I shall be certain that the regular issue of these has been the effect of introducing among them a regular system of subordination and discipline.'

## 644.

To Major General Cooke.

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th May, 1812.

‘ I should be sorry to be bound myself, and I do not wish to bind others, by positive orders which may not be applicable to circumstances as they may arise.

The Spanish nation and troops, particularly the common soldiers, entertain an opinion that our soldiers are invincible; and that it is only necessary that they should appear, in order to insure success; and they are so ignorant of the nature of a military operation, that they attribute our refraining from interfering upon many occasions, to disinclination to the cause, and frequently to the want of the requisite military qualities in the General Officer, who directs our operations. It may be depended upon, that where there are British troops, there will be no want of invitations for their co-operation; but I am convinced that there is no officer who can believe that 500 or 600 men can perform any thing essential; or that it is proper to employ the King’s troops, or to risk their safety in the execution of plans which have really no essential object in view, which are adopted without consideration, and relinquished without cause; and for the execution of which, there do not exist, even in the opinion of those who propose them, any adequate means excepting the military virtues of the British troops.’

## 645.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 14th May, 1812.

‘ But, in my opinion, those take an erroneous view of what an army is, if they suppose that well drilled recruits are all that is required for it. Subordination and habits of obedience are more necessary than mechanical discipline acquired at the drill; and these can be acquired by soldiers to any useful purpose, only in proportion as they have confidence in their officers; and they cannot have confidence in officers who have no knowledge of their profession, even of that lowest part of it acquired at the drill, who have no subordination among themselves, and never obey an order. The plans for improving such an army should have for their first object the officers, and principally those belonging to the regiments; and it may be depended upon, that there would be no want of drill, or of that military expertness acquired at the drill, if habits of subordination and obedience, and some information, were given to the officers.

I will go one step farther, and express my doubts whether, to launch a number of well drilled recruits into regiments, such as I have seen in the Spanish service, can ever answer any practical good purpose. The object of all drill must be to practice and form individuals to perform that which it is thought expedient they should perform when part of a body before an enemy, under the command of their officers: and it is supposed that all of the body are equally, or nearly equally expert; and that, at all events, the officer can not only order what is to be performed, but know whether the body under his command performs it well or ill. Is this the case in one of a hundred instances in which recruits well drilled might be sent from a dépôt to a Spanish company or regiment? Certainly not. The consequence is, that the well drilled recruit in the day of action is no better than the



rabble with whom he is mixed up; and he either very soon forgets all that he has learnt for want of practice, or despises it as useless, as he finds that the boasters among whom he comes have none of the acquirements which he has gained with so much trouble; or he despises the ignorance both of his officers and comrades, and has no confidence in either, or in himself. The money then, which I should lay out in a depôt of recruits, I should, under present circumstances, consider as thrown away.'

646.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 26th May, 1812.

'I propose, therefore, as soon as ever the magazines of the army are brought forward, which work is now in progress (the troops continuing in dispersed cantonments for that purpose,) to move forward into Castille, and to endeavor, if possible, to bring Marmont to a general action. I think I can make this movement with safety, excepting always the risk of the general action. I am of opinion also that I shall have the advantage in the action, and that this is the period of all others in which such a measure should be tried.

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G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 23rd May, 1812.

'1 The Commander of the Forces requests that when any of the General Officers of the army pass through or near a town in which an hospital may be stationed, they will be so kind as to visit it, and see that it is conducted as it ought to be, and according to the regulations of the service and orders of the army.

2. He likewise requests they will see on the parade, the convalescents in charge of the Military Commandant, and will receive from him a return of their numbers, and a report on their state: they are requested to report their observations to the Commander of the Forces.

3. The great inconvenience which is felt by the service in consequence of the soldiers losing or making away with their necessaries and camp equipments, on their marches from the hospitals, or from Lisbon, to join their regiments, induces the Commander of the Forces to order that when a detachment shall march from any hospital station, or from Lisbon, the officer in command of it shall receive a return of the soldiers' necessaries and equipments from the officer in charge of the depôt or station from which he will march, and he is to inspect the necessaries and equipments of the soldiers every day after the march will be concluded. If the necessaries or equipments of any soldier should be found deficient, he is forthwith to be tried and punished, if there should be a sufficient number of officers present for that purpose—if not, the soldier, whose necessaries shall be found, on inspection, deficient, must be marched a prisoner to the regiment, in order to be tried by a Regimental Court Martial.

4. The officer in charge of a detachment, on its march to the army, will, for this purpose, divide his detachment into as many divisions as there are officers, and will employ an officer to make the inspection ordered of each division.

5. This order is to be added to those directed to be given to the officers commanding detachments of troops, on their march from the hospital stations, or Lisbon, to the army; and the officers are requested to observe that if a soldier should make away with his necessaries or equipments on a march, under their command, that they should not discover it and bring him to punishment, they will be responsible for a neglect of duty.

6. The Commander of the Forces desires that it may be understood that when new blankets, or camp equipments of any description, are issued to any regiments, in consequence of their requisition, they will be called upon to pay for them, not only their actual cost, but the expense of their carriage from Lisbon, unless they shall be able to prove that the want and requisition for them has been occasioned by fair wear, or by unavoidable accident.

7. The Commander of the Forces is, however, convinced, that all the evils and inconveniences occasioned by the sale of their necessaries and their camp equipments by the soldiers, would be avoided if the non-commissioned officers were to do their duty, which cannot be expected without the constant inspection and control of the officers of the regiment.'

In respect to the general action, I believe there is no man in this army who entertains a doubt of its result, and that sentiment alone would do a great deal to obtain success. But we possess solid physical advantages over the enemy, besides those resulting from recent successes. Our infantry are not in bad order; our cavalry more numerous in relation to the enemy, and the horses in better condition than I have known them since I have commanded the army, and the horses of the artillery in the same good condition and complete in numbers; whereas the enemy are, I know, terribly deficient in that equipment.

Strong as the enemy are at present, there is no doubt that they are weaker than they have been during the war, or than they are likely to be again, as they will certainly be in some degree reinforced after the harvest, and very largely so, after Buonaparté's projects in the north shall have been brought to a conclusion. We have a better chance of success, now, therefore, than we have ever had; and success obtained now would produce results not to be expected from any success over any single French army in the Peninsula upon any other occasion.

The certainty of the loss in every action, and the risk which always attends such an operation, ought not, therefore, in my opinion, to prevent its being tried at present. I am not insensible to these losses and risks, nor am I blind to the disadvantages under which I shall undertake this operation. My friends in Castille (and I believe that no officer ever had better) assure me that we shall not want provisions, even before the harvest will be reaped; that there exist concealed granaries which will be opened to us; and that if we can pay for a part, credit will be given us for the remainder. They have long given me hopes that we should be able to borrow money in Castille upon British securities; and it was with a view to loans from the people of the interior principally, that I applied to your Lordship for the forms of the securities.

In case we should be able to maintain ourselves in Castille, the general action and its result being delayed by the enemy's manœuvres, which I think not improbable, I have in contemplation other resources for drawing supplies from the country, and I shall at all events have our own magazines at Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. But with all these prospects, I cannot reflect without shuddering upon the probability that we shall be distressed, nor upon the consequence which may result, from our wanting money in the interior of Spain.

I have thought it proper to make your Lordship acquainted with the course of my reflections, and the plan according to which I propose to proceed for the campaign, which I hope at all events will be a successful one.'

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647.

To General Don Carlos de España.

Fuente Guinaldo, 25th May, 1812.

'When I make this last condition, however, I admit that I have no right nor have I the intention, of criticising the conduct of others. But His Majesty's Ambassador having confided to me the distribution of a part of His Majesty's aid to the Spanish Government, it is my duty to satisfy myself, at least, that I shall dispose of it for the benefit of the cause of Spain and her allies; and I do not conceive that I should perform this duty,



if I were to throw away money to pay officers and soldiers who should have no knowledge of their duty, and among whom there should exist no subordination, no discipline, or no knowledge of or attention to the Orders and Regulations of their Sovereign.'

648.

To Major General G. Murray.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

'You will have appreciated the difficulty and importance of our late operations. The siege of Badajoz was a most serious undertaking, and the weather did not favor us. The troops were up to their middles in mud in the trenches; and in the midst of our difficulties, the Guadiana swelled and carried away our bridge, and rendered useless for a time our flying bridge. However, we never stopped, and a fair day or two set all to rights. The assault was a terrible business, of which I foresaw the loss when I was ordering it. But we had brought matters to that state that we could do no more, and it was necessary to storm or raise the siege. I trust, however, that future armies will be equipped for sieges, with the people necessary to carry them on as they ought to be; and that our engineers will learn how to put their batteries on the crest of the glacis, and to blow in the counter-scarp, instead of placing them wherever the wall can be seen, leaving the poor officers and troops to get into and cross the ditch as they can.'

649.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

'I have the honor to enclose Sir R. Hill's report of this brilliant exploit; and I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the difficulties with which he had to contend, as well from the nature of the country, as from the works which the enemy had constructed, and to the ability and characteristic qualities displayed by Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, in persevering in the line, and confining himself to the objects chalked out by his instructions, notwithstanding the various obstacles opposed to his progress.

I have nothing to add to Lieut. General Sir R. Hill's report of the conduct of the officers and troops under his command, excepting to express my concurrence in all he says in their praise. Too much cannot be said of the brave officers and troops who took by storm, without the assistance of cannon, such works as the enemy's forts on both banks of the Tagus, fully garrisoned, and in good order, and defended by 18 pieces of artillery.'

Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B., to General the Earl of Wellington, K.B.

My Lord,

Truxillo, 21st May, 1812.

'I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship, that your instructions relative to the capture and destruction of the enemy's works at Almaraz have been most fully carried into effect by a detachment of troops under my orders, which marched from Almendralejo on the 12th instant.

The bridge was, as your Lordship knows, protected by strong works, thrown up by the French on both sides of the river, and farther covered on the southern side by the castle and redoubts of Mirabete, about a league off, commanding the pass of that name, through which runs the road to Madrid, being the only one passable for carriages of any description, by which the bridge can be approached.

The works on the left bank of the river were a *tête de pont*, built of masonry,

and strongly intrenched; and on the high ground above it, a large and well constructed fort, called Napoleon, with an interior intrenchment and loopholed tower in its centre. This fort contained 9 pieces of cannon, with a garrison of between 400 and 500 men, there being also on the opposite side of the river, on a height immediately above the bridge, a very complete fort, recently constructed, which flanked and added much to its defence.

On the morning of the 16th, the troops reached Jaraicejo, and the same evening marched in 3 columns; the left column, commanded by Lieut. General Chowne, (28th and 34th regts., under Colonel Wilson, and the 6th Portuguese caçadores), towards the castle of Mirabete; the right column, under Major General Howard, (50th, 71st, and 92nd regts.,) which I accompanied myself to a pass in the mountains, through which a most difficult and circuitous footpath leads by the village of Romangordo to the bridge; the centre column, under Major General Long, (6th and 18th Portuguese infantry, under Colonel Ashworth, and the 13th light dragoons, with the artillery,) advanced upon the high road to the pass of Mirabete.

The 2 flank columns were provided with ladders, and it was intended that either of them should proceed to escalate the forts against which they were directed, had circumstances proved favorable; the difficulties, however, which each had to encounter on its march were such, that it was impossible for them to reach their respective points before daybreak; I judged it best, therefore, as there was no longer a possibility of surprise, to defer the attack until we should be better acquainted with the nature and position of the works; and the troops bivouacked on the Sierra.

On further examination of the Mirabete works, I was satisfied that any attempt to force that pass, however successful, must be attended by so serious a loss, that I determined on endeavoring to penetrate to the bridge by the mountain path leading through the village of Romangordo, although, by that means, I should be deprived of the use of my artillery.

On the evening of the 18th, I moved with Major General Howard's brigade and the 6th Portuguese regt., for the operation, provided with scaling ladders, &c. Although the distance marched did not exceed 5 or 6 miles, the difficulties of the road were such, that, with the united exertions of officers and men, the column could not be formed for the attack before daylight. Confiding, however, in the valor of the troops, I ordered the immediate assault of Fort Napoleon. My confidence was fully justified by the event.

The 1st batt. of the 50th, and one wing of the 71st regt., regardless of the enemy's artillery and musketry, escalated the work in 3 places, nearly at the same time. The enemy seemed at first determined, and his fire was destructive, but the ardor of our troops was irresistible, and the garrison was driven at the point of the bayonet through the several intrenchments of the fort and *tête de pont*, across the bridge, which, having been cut by those on the opposite side of the river, many leaped into the river, and thus perished.

The impression made upon the enemy's troops was such, that panic soon communicated itself to those on the right bank of the river, and Fort Ragusa was instantly abandoned, the garrison flying in the greatest confusion towards Naval-moral.

I cannot sufficiently praise the conduct of the 50th and 71st regts., to whom the assault fell. The cool and steady manner in which they formed and advanced, and the intrepidity with which they mounted the ladders and carried the place, were worthy of those distinguished corps and the officers who led them.

Could the attack have been made before day, the 92nd regt., under Lieut. Colonel Cameron, and the remainder of the 71st, under Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan, were to have escalated the *tête de pont*, and effected the destruction



of the bridge at the same time that the attack was made on Fort Napoleon. The impossibility of advancing deprived them of this opportunity of distinguishing themselves, but the share which they had in the operations, and the zeal which they displayed, entitle them to my warmest commendation; and I cannot avoid to mention the steadiness and good discipline of the 6th Portuguese infantry, and 2 companies of the 60th regt., under Colonel Ashworth, which formed the reserve to this attack.

Our operations in this quarter were much favored by a diversion made by Lieut. General Chowne, with the troops under his orders, against the Castle of Mirabete, which succeeded in inducing the enemy to believe that we should not attack the forts near the bridge until we had forced the pass, and thus have made way for our artillery. The Lieut. General conducted this operation, as well as his former advance, entirely to my satisfaction. I regret much that the peculiar situation of Mirabete should have prevented my allowing the gallant corps under his orders to follow up an operation which they had commenced with much spirit, and were so anxious to complete; but the possession of these forts would not have made amends for the valuable blood which must have been shed in taking them.

I cannot too strongly express how much I am satisfied with the conduct of Major General Howard through the whole of this operation, the most arduous part of which has fallen to his share; and particularly with the manner in which he led his brigade to the assault. He was ably assisted by his staff, Brigade Major Wemyss, of the 50th, and Lieut. Battersby, of the 23rd light dragoons. To Major General Long I am also indebted for his assistance, although his column was not immediately engaged. Lieut. Colonel Stewart, and Major Harrison, of the 50th, and Major Cother, of the 71st, commanded the 3 attacks, and led them in a most gallant and spirited manner.

I have received the greatest assistance from Lieut. Colonel Dickson, of the Royal Artillery, whom, with a brigade of 24 pounders, a company of British, and one of Portuguese artillery, your Lordship was pleased to put under my orders. Circumstances did not permit his guns to be brought into play, but his exertions, and those of his officers and men during the attack and destruction of the place, were unwearied. In the latter service, Lieut. Thiele, of the Royal German Artillery, was blown up; and we have to regret in him a most gallant officer. He had particularly distinguished himself in the assault. Lieut. Wright, of the Royal Engineers, has also rendered me very essential service. He is a most intelligent, gallant, and meritorious officer; and I must not omit also to mention Lieut. Hillier, of the 29th regt., whose knowledge of this part of the country (in which he has been for some time in observation) proved of great assistance.

Your Lordship will observe from the return of ordnance and stores, which I have the honor to enclose, that Almaraz has been considered by the enemy in the light of a most important station; and I am happy to state that its destruction has been most complete. The towers of masonry which were in forts Napoleon and Ragusa have been entirely levelled, the ramparts of both in great measure destroyed, and the whole apparatus of the bridge, together with the workshops, magazines, and every piece of timber which could be found, entirely destroyed.

A color belonging to the 4th battalion of the *Corps Étranger* was taken by the 71st regt.; and I shall have the honor of forwarding it to your Lordship.

Our loss has not been severe, considering the circumstances under which the attack was made. I enclose a list of the killed and wounded. Captain Candler, of the 50th regt., (the only officer killed in the assault,) has, I am sorry to say, left a large family to deplore his loss. He was one of the first to mount the ladder, and fell upon the parapet after giving a distinguished example to his men.

I have had frequent occasions to mention to your Lordship, in terms of the highest praise, the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Rooke, Assistant Adjutant General.

During the whole period I have had a separate command in this country, that officer has been with me, and rendered most essential service to my corps; on the present expedition he has eminently distinguished himself, and I beg leave particularly to notice his conduct. Your Lordship is also aware of the merits of Lieut. Colonel Offeney, my Assistant Quarter Master General, of whose valuable aid I have been deprived during the latter part of this expedition. Though laboring under severe illness, he accompanied me, to the serious detriment of his health, and until it was totally impracticable for him to proceed. Captain Thorn, D. A. Q. M. G., succeeded to his duties, and I am indebted to him for his assistance, and also to Major Hill and my personal Staff.

The Marques de Almeida, Member of the Junta of Estremadura, has done me the honor to accompany me since I have been in the province; I have received from him, as well as from the people, the most ready and effectual assistance which it was in their power to bestow.

Major Currie, my aide de camp, will deliver to your Lordship this dispatch, and the color taken from the enemy, and will be able to give you any further particulars. I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship.

I have the honor to be, &c.

R. HILL, Lieut. General.

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650.

To Major General H. Clinton.

Fuente Guinaldo, 30th May, 1812.

‘I observe in the reports of the Courts Martial of the —st regt., it is stated that there are 5 men, —, —, —, —, —, and —, whose punishment is “remitted, to depend upon their future behaviour.” This appears to me to be irregular.

It is impossible that these soldiers can be put on duty in the situation of convicted criminals; and I conclude that the Commanding Officer does not propose to make their punishment depend upon their behaviour while in confinement. These men should have been either punished or pardoned; but as I should imagine they have been on duty since they were convicted of the crimes with which they were severally charged, they ought now to be pardoned; and this irregular practice must be avoided in future.’

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651.

To Lieut. Colonel Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

Fuente Guinaldo, 2nd June, 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 24th, in regard to the letter to be written to the guerrilla chiefs, with the swords and pistols to be presented to them in my name.

I have found that the shortest and most simple mode of expression is the most agreeable to the Spaniards, and has most effect; and it appears that, particularly since the assembly of the Cortes, they have felt that they were to look for their happiness in the independence of their country, rather than in the internal institutions. If, therefore, the letter is to be written to them in my name, I request that they may be informed that I obey with great satisfaction the commands of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, in transmitting to them these presents, as a small mark of the estimation in which their conduct is held by His Royal Highness, and by His Majesty’s subjects in general; in having, notwithstanding the reverses of all the regular armies in



Spain, the misfortunes of the country, and in the face of difficulties of all descriptions, continued to maintain successfully the contest against the enemy. That I, having been employed by His Majesty in the Peninsula since the commencement of the contest for the independence of the nations inhabiting this part of the world, have been fully aware of the difficulties of their situation, and of the benefit which the cause has derived from their constant perseverance and valor; and that I trust that the applause which their conduct has gained, of which what is now sent them is a small token, the consciousness that they have done their duty, and the hopes which there are now good grounds for entertaining, that their labors and exertions will be crowned by the attainment of their object, the independence and the happiness of their country, will be their inducement for continuing, and, if possible, increasing their exertions.'

## 652.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 3rd June, 1812.

'As far as I am concerned, I certainly should prefer that no officer should be sent out. There are few officers who understand the situation of the officer second in command of these armies. Unless he should be posted to command a division of cavalry or infantry, and perform that duty, he has really, on ordinary occasions, nothing to do; and at the same time that his opinion relieves me but little from responsibility, and that after all I must act according to my own judgment in case of a difference of opinion: there are but few officers who might be sent from England as second in command, who would not come here with opinions formed, probably on very bad grounds, and with very extravagant pretensions. To this add, that when necessary to detach a body of troops in any situation, but few would be satisfied to remain with the detachment, unless indeed it should consist of nearly the whole army.'

## 653.

To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th June, 1812, 9 A.M.

'It must be observed upon this force, however, that it is not exactly of the description I should wish to see with you, and it must not be depended upon to manœuvre in presence of an enemy on ground which should not give you an advantage. It must be placed on a strong position, in which I entertain no doubt of the result of any general action. The best position in the country, in my opinion, particularly as Badajoz is now in some degree repaired, is that of Albuera. Whether the enemy attempt to turn it by the right or by the left, there is an easy movement to the right or to the left, and the position continues equally good, and there is always an easy retreat upon Badajoz, or upon Jurumenha, or such passage of the Guadiana as it might be thought expedient to adopt. It is better at this season than any position, on the north side of the Guadiana, because it covers more country, and because the enemy cannot, without forcing the position, pretend to turn the defences of Portugal, and to enter that Kingdom by the passages of the Guadiana about Jurumenha, and by the roads of Villa Viçosa, and Estremoz. I therefore recommend the position of Albuera to your attention in the first instance, in case Soult should move into Estremadura in force. If

you should determine to occupy the position of Albuera, you should appear to determine to hold the wood and the position in front of the wood towards S<sup>ra</sup> Marta, and throw up a little ground there, in order to induce the enemy to believe that you have fortified it; you will then have an opportunity of seeing his whole force in and about S<sup>ra</sup> Marta, and probably of judging on which side he proposes to manœuvre, and you can always retire before him across the Albuera rivulet, the passages of which should, however, be well reconnoitred.

If you should find Soult inclined to manœuvre by your right, and to enter Portugal by the roads above mentioned, you should place Morillo in Badajoz, and with the remainder of the troops cross the Guadiana, and take a position near Jurumenha. If you should find that he intends to manœuvre by your left, you should move upon Badajoz, and take a position there, or according to circumstances, take the position of San Christoval. If you should find Soult advancing, write to the Marques de Monsalud to throw into Badajoz all the troops lately arrived from Cadiz, and all that he can collect in the province; and likewise to General Leite at Estremoz, and desire him to collect the militia again at Elvas, and to occupy Campo Mayor and Ouguela.'

654.

To Dr. M<sup>c</sup>Grigor.\*

Fuente Guinaldo, 9th June, 1812.

'You will likewise see in the General Order that the attention of commanding officers of regiments has been frequently called to the expediency of supplying the soldiers with breakfast; and I believe that in every well regulated regiment they are so supplied when the means can be procured.

Their rations are *invariably* delivered to the soldiers daily, except on

\* Sir James M<sup>c</sup>Grigor, Bart., Director General of the Army Medical Board.

G. O.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

4. The Commander of the Forces requests the particular attention of the General Officers of the army, and of the Commanding Officers of regiments, to his orders of the 28th April last, referring to the former orders of the army respecting cutting green forage.

5. The soldiers must not be allowed to quit their camps or cantonments to plunder vegetables in the gardens or fields; if vegetables are wanted and can be procured, regular parties under officers must be sent to get them, and the officer must see that the quantity taken is paid for.

6. The assistant provosts attached to the divisions must see that the orders of the army on this subject are not disobeyed.

7. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to observe that the outrages so frequently committed by the soldiers when absent from their regiments, and the disgraceful scenes which occurred upon the storming of Badajoz, have had the effect of rendering the people of the country the enemies, instead of being the friends of the army.

8. It is the duty of all officers to prevent the soldiers from plundering; and the Commander of the Forces calls upon them to perform it.

9. He declares his determination to punish any person who may be found plundering on any occasion, and to make the soldiers give up any money, or other valuable articles that they may have plundered.

10. As these acts of outrage are generally committed by parties of men, the parties shall be put under stoppages to make good the damage which they shall do upon any occasion.

11. The Commander of the Forces will be sorry to be under the necessity of having recourse to any measure of severity or restraint to prevent those evils; and he is convinced that the officers and non-commissioned officers, and the good soldiers, will do every thing in their power to restrain the ill disposed, and to avoid the disgrace which must be the consequence of these continued irregularities and crimes; and he earnestly hopes that there will be in future but little ground for complaint.'



marches ; and the army would be incapable of all movement, if I were to order that the soldiers should carry no provisions. The British soldiers, on such an occasion, carry 3 days' bread ; the Portuguese soldiers, 6 days' bread ; the French soldiers, 15 days' bread.

The only mode that I know of removing sick to the rear is in spring waggons, which are all applied to this service, and in aid of them, bullock carts. I am aware that the drivers of the spring waggons are very irregular, and take but little care of their horses ; but this, like many other evils in the service, which, although equally the cause of mortality, you have not noticed, and, among others, the irregularities of the soldiers themselves, it is impossible for me to remedy, till the Mutiny Law and the whole system of the service are altered.'

## 655.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente Guinaldo, 10th June, 1812.

'The outrages committed by the British soldiers belonging to this army have become so enormous, and they have produced an effect upon the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so dangerous to the army itself, that I request your Lordship's early attention to the subject.

I am sensible that the best measures to be adopted on this subject are those of prevention, and I believe there are few officers who have paid more attention to the subject in this view of it than I have done ; and I have been so far successful, that few outrages are committed by the soldiers who are with their regiments, after the regiments have been a short time in this country. But in the extended system on which we are acting, small detachments of soldiers must be marched long distances through the country, either as escorts, or returning from being escorts to prisoners, or coming from hospitals, &c. ; and notwithstanding that none of these detachments are ever allowed to march excepting under the command of an officer, or more, in proportion to its size, and that every precaution is taken to provide for the regularity of their subsistence, there is no instance of the march of one of these detachments that outrages of every description are not committed ; and, I am sorry to say, with impunity.

The foundation of every system of discipline, which has for its object the prevention of crimes, must be the non-commissioned officers of the army. But I am sorry to say, that notwithstanding the encouragement which I have given to this class, they are still as little to be depended upon as the private soldiers themselves ; and they are just as ready to commit irregularities and outrages. I attribute this circumstance very much to the lowness of their pay in comparison with that of the soldiers.

Within my recollection, the pay of the soldiers of the army has been increased from sixpence to one shilling *per diem*, with other advantages ; while that of the corporals was eightpence, has in the same period been raised only to one shilling and twopence ; and that of the serjeants, which was one shilling, has been raised only to one shilling and sixpence, both with the same advantages as the private soldiers. Your Lordship will observe that the old proportions have not been preserved ; and the non-commissioned officers of the army not only feel no inclination to preserve a dis

inction between them and the private soldiers, but they feel no desire to incur the responsibility, and take the trouble, and submit to the privations of their situation for so trifling a difference in their pay, as that of twopence in fourteen pence to corporals, and that of sixpence in eighteen pence to sergeants; and they are indifferent whether they continue non-commissioned officers or not.

The remedy for this evil is to increase the pay of the corporals and sergeants, so as at least to restore the old proportions between non-commissioned officers and soldiers before the first increase of pay to the army at the commencement of the last war. This measure becomes particularly necessary, in consequence of the opinions generally prevalent in respect to the punishment of soldiers; which are certainly so far well founded, that it must be admitted by all, that the best mode of insuring regularity among soldiers is to prevent the commission of crimes.

Then, not only is it difficult, if not impossible, to preserve order in one of these detachments upon a march, owing to the badness of the non-commissioned officers of the army, but the crimes which the soldiers commit remain unpunished.'

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656.

To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Fuente Guinaldo, 11th June, 1812.

'It is very difficult to manage the defence of the Kingdom of Portugal, the whole country being frontier.'

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657.

To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 18th June, 1812.

'I have never been more annoyed than by ——'s affair, and I entirely concur with you in the necessity of inquiring into it. It is occasioned entirely by the trick our officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping at every thing, and their galloping back as fast as they gallop on the enemy. They never consider their situation, never think of manœuvring before an enemy—so little that one would think they cannot manœuvre, excepting on Wimbledon Common; and when they use their arm as it ought to be used, viz., offensively, they never keep nor provide for a reserve.

All cavalry should charge in two lines, of which one should be in reserve; if obliged to charge in one line, part of the line, at least one-third, should be ordered before hand to pull up, and form in second line, as soon as the charge should be given, and the enemy has been broken and has retired. The Royals and the 3rd dragoon guards were the best regiments in the cavalry in this country, and it annoys me particularly that the misfortune has happened to them. I do not wonder at the French boasting of it; it is the greatest blow they have struck.'

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658.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Salamanca, 18th June, 1812.

'It is impossible to describe the joy of the people of the town upon our entrance. They have now been suffering for more than 3 years; during which time the French, among other acts of violence and oppression, have destroyed 13 of 25 convents, and 22 of 25 colleges, which existed in this celebrated seat of learning.'



659.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Salamanca, 25th June, 1812.

'People appear to me to be as wild now in their notions of the security of the Portuguese territory, as they were desponding 2 years ago. But I, who, from repeated reflection, must have a tolerably accurate notion of the real state of this country, and those who will be called upon to lay out their capital upon this banking scheme, and know well the relative force of the contending armies in the Peninsula, and the advantages and disadvantages attending each, and particularly those attending the Portuguese frontier as a line of defence, will not be so ready as Senhor de Sousa (with his 90,000 men) thinks they will, to take their money out of their chests to lodge it in those of the bank, and eventually in those of the Portuguese Treasury.

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I have been uniform, and, I believe, correct, in my opinions upon this subject. When a nation is desirous of establishing public credit, or, in other words, of inducing individuals to confide their property to its government, they must begin by acquiring a revenue equal to their fixed expenditure; and they must manifest an inclination to be honest, by performing their engagements in respect to their debts. This is what I have invariably recommended to the Portuguese Government, and if they had attended to my recommendations, instead of flattering themselves with idle hopes of loans to be raised from England, the deficit in the revenue for the great war expenditure of last year, which I calculate at 15 millions of *cruzados*, would have been covered. I do not ask for new taxes: on the contrary, I would repeal many; but I want a real and fair collection of those which should be allowed to exist. This is the only measure which can relieve Portugal and us; and it is that one of which we ought not to lose sight for one moment.

Honesty in the payment of debts has likewise been attended to. After a great deal of trouble and discussion I, at last, *forced* the Portuguese Government to pay the interest on the paper money in circulation, and on the *apolicies grandes*, by giving notice that I would order the Commissary General to take no more in payment of his bills on the Treasury, if the measure was not adopted. In the mean time the Government jobbed the question of the interest on the *apolicies*.

There is no doubt but that the payment of the interest has had a most material effect in restoring the credit of the paper money securities, notwithstanding that their nominal value in the market has not been materially altered. But let it be recollected that when this measure was adopted, we had in the chest nearly £500,000 in paper money, which had accumulated there, and of which we could not dispose; and that we have never more now than the sum received in the month for bills, and that we experience no difficulty in disposing of the paper money to make our payments, particularly in the capital and large towns; and it will be seen that the measure has had a very important effect.

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Upon the whole, I am convinced that the only measure to be adopted to relieve the Portuguese from their financial difficulties, is never to cease urging them to discontinue all their useless expenses and establishments, and to set to work in earnest to reform the gross abuses which exist in the collection of their revenue.'

660.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Salamanca, 25th June, 1812.

'The siege of the forts of Salamanca has not advanced with the rapidity which I expected when I addressed your Lordship last. Although, from the pains taken, and the expense incurred in their construction, and the accounts which I had received of them, I was prepared to meet with some difficulties, and provided an equipment accordingly; the difficulties are of a more formidable nature than they were represented; and the forts, 3 in number, each defending the other, are very strong, although not of a regular construction, and the equipment which I had provided for their attack was not sufficient; and I have been obliged to send for more, which has created some delay in the operations.'

661.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

'The ammunition to enable us to carry on the attack of the forts having arrived at Salamanca in the afternoon of the 26th, the fire was immediately recommenced upon the gorge of the redoubt of San Cayetano, in which a practicable breach was effected at about 10 o'clock in the morning of the 27th; and we had succeeded nearly about the same time in setting fire to the buildings in the large fort of San Vicente, by the fire from which the approach to San Cayetano by its gorge was defended.

Being in Salamanca at this moment, I gave directions that the forts of San Cayetano and La Merced should be stormed; but some little delay occurred in consequence of the commanding officer of these forts in the first instance, and afterwards the commanding officer of San Vicente, having expressed a desire to capitulate after the lapse of a certain number of hours.

As it was obvious that these propositions were made in order to gain time till the fire in San Vicente should be extinguished, I refused to listen to any terms, unless the forts should be instantly surrendered; and having found that the commanding officer of San Cayetano, who was the first to offer to surrender, was entirely dependent upon the Governor of San Vicente, and could not venture to carry into execution the capitulation which he had offered to make, I gave directions that his fort and that of La Merced might be stormed forthwith.

These operations were effected in the most gallant manner by a detachment of the 6th division, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Davis of the 36th regt., under the direction of Major General Clinton. The troops entered the fort of San Cayetano by the gorge, and escalated that of La Merced; and I am happy to add that our loss was but trifling.

The Governor of San Vicente then sent out a flag of truce to ratify the surrender of that fort on the terms I had offered him, viz., the garrison to march out with the honors of war; to be prisoners of war, and the officers to retain their personal military baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks; and notwithstanding that the 9th regt. of caçadores had actually stormed one of the outworks of San Vicente, and were in possession of it, I deemed it expedient to accept the fort by capitulation on those terms, and to stop the attack. I have already informed your Lordship that Major General Clinton commanded the attack against these forts, which was carried on with great



vigor and ability; and he mentions in strong terms of commendation the conduct of the General Officers, officers, and troops employed under his command; particularly Colonel Hinde of the 32nd regt., Lieut. Colonel Davis of the 36th regt., Captain Owen of the 61st regt., Brigade Major Hobart, and Ensign Newton of the 32nd regt., who distinguished himself in the attack of the night of the 23rd instant, and volunteered to lead the advanced party in the attack of the 27th. He likewise mentions in strong terms Lieut. Colonel May, who commanded the artillery under the direction of Colonel Framingham, and the officers and soldiers of the Royal Portuguese Artillery under his command, and Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne, Lieut. Reid, and the officers of the Engineers, and Major Thompson of the 74th regt., who acted as an engineer during these operations.

The enemy had been employed for nearly 3 years in constructing these works, but with increased activity for the last 8 or 9 months. A large expense had been incurred; and these works, sufficiently garrisoned by about 800 men, and armed with 30 pieces of artillery, were of a nature to render it quite impossible to take them, excepting by a regular attack; and it is obvious that the enemy relied upon their strength, and upon their being sufficiently garrisoned and armed, as they had left in San Vicente large depôts of clothing, and military stores of every description. I was mistaken in my estimate of the extent of the means which would be necessary to subdue these forts; and I was obliged to send to the rear for a fresh supply of ammunition. This necessity occasioned a delay of 6 days.

The enemy withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes as soon as they heard of the fall of the forts of Salamanca; and I have ordered that the works at both places may be destroyed.

The operations against the forts of Salamanca were carried on in sight of Marshal Marmont's army, which remained in its position with the right at Cabeza Velloso, and the left at Huerta, till the night of the 27th instant, when they broke up, and retired in 3 columns towards the river Duero; one of them directing its march upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas. The allied army broke up the following day, and are this day encamped upon the Guareña.

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662.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

' I am quite convinced that I shall never be able to impress on the minds of the people of this country, from whom I expected to derive some resources by the grant of these certificates, that they have any security for their money, if it is to be optional with the British authorities whether they are to be paid in the Peninsula or in England by bills, valuing the dollar at 5 shillings.

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At the same time, I beg leave to point out to your Lordship how impossible it is to expect that this or any other army can carry on operations in Spain so ill supplied, as this is, with money. We can get nothing from the country without payment in ready money, and every day's march increases our distance from our magazines and the difficulty of communicating with them. The troops are 4 months in arrears of pay; the Staff of the army 6 months; and the muleteers nearly 12 months; and we are in debt for every article of supply, of every description.

I beg your Lordship to advert to the impossibility of remaining any length of time in the forward position which our successes have enabled us to assume, and to reflect upon the consequences which, under these circumstances, would result from any misfortune.'

663.

To ———.

Rueda, 7th July, 1812.

'I am very much concerned to be obliged to do any thing unpleasant to Captain ———, who is an officer for whom I entertain a very high respect; but his conduct has been of such an improper description on this occasion, that if he does not make an apology for it, I must remove him from his situation on the Staff, and send him to join his regiment.

I enclose you Mr. \*\*\*\*'s report on this transaction; and I am sorry to say that I differ with you upon it. But I must act upon my own views, or I cannot carry on the service; and I only hope that Captain ——— will have the good sense to see the impropriety of his conduct, and make that atonement for it which every man who is aware that he has conducted himself improperly, ought to make.'

664.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 14th July, 1812.

'I have this day received a letter from Lieut. General Lord W. Bentinck, of the 9th June, in which he has enclosed the copy of one of the same date to the Earl of Liverpool, from which I am concerned to observe that his Lordship does not propose to carry into execution the operations on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, which had been in contemplation, until he shall have tried the success of another plan on the coast of Italy. I am apprehensive that this determination may bring upon us an additional force of the army of Aragon, but I still hope that I shall be able to retain at the close of the campaign those acquisitions which we made at its commencement.'

665.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Rueda, 15th July, 1812.

'I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention this subject to Lord Castlereagh, as I have to Lord Liverpool and Lord Bathurst. War cannot be carried on without money. We are to find money as we can, at the most economical rate of exchange, and then comes Lord W. Bentinck

G. O.

Villa Verde, 2nd July, 1812.

3. The Commander of the Forces has had reason frequently to urge the officers of the army to treat with respect the authorities of the country, and with kindness the people.

4. All must be sensible that no people will submit to be treated with contempt, particularly not, those in authority; and there is no officer who is not aware, that in his own country, he dare not conduct himself towards either magistrates or people in the manner of which there are too frequent instances in this country.

5. Yet there are laws here to protect persons in authority from insult, as well as in England, and it is not generous or manly to take advantage of the good nature of the people, and of their gratitude for the services rendered to them by the army, to insult them.

6. The Commander of the Forces is determined he will never pass, unnoticed, conduct of this description, and he hopes that Lieut. ——— will take warning from what has passed at this Court Martial, and from this reprimand, not to insult or amuse himself at the expense of the terrors of the people of the country in future.'



to Gibraltar, and carries off 4 millions of dollars, giving one shilling for each more than we give; and after all, he sends his troops upon some scheme to some part of Italy, and not to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, as ordered by Government, and arranged with me.

I have never been in such distress as at present, and some serious misfortune must happen if the Government do not attend seriously to the subject, and adopt some measures to supply us regularly with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese Government are a joke to ours, and if our credit were not better, we should certainly starve. As it is, if we do not find means of paying our bills for butchers' meat, there will be an end to the war at once.'

## 666.

To Major General H. Clinton.

La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

'There is no solid foundation for his plan. He has not even fixed the degrees of latitude for his operations, much less the place of his landing, nor arranged any of the circumstances which ought to be settled before such a service should be entered on. The French cannot have less than 15,000 men in Italy, and I fear that he will be obliged to re-embark. If he were again to alter his determination, and now to appear upon the coast of Spain, I believe the army of the Centre would do us but little harm; at the same time that he would succeed in his objects.'

G. O.

La Nava del Rey, 16th July, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the attention of the Commissariat, attached to divisions and brigades of infantry and to regiments of cavalry, and of the General Officers of the army, and commanding officers of regiments, to the Orders which have been issued, regarding the cutting of forage.

2. He desires that whenever it is possible, grass may be given to the horses and other animals, instead of straw with corn in the ear.

3. The assistant provosts must be employed to prevent the plunder of the corn fields, and their destruction by turning cattle into them.

4. In consequence of the number of foreign troops serving in the allied army, the practice of giving out a parole or countersign has been discontinued, but all out sentries and vedettes should be particularly instructed to allow no person whatever to pass their post, after night fall.

5. All persons attempting to pass their post should be stopped, till the guard can be turned out, and each person can be examined. This order is referable of course only to the out sentries.'

G. O.

Fuente la Peña, 17th July, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces is anxious that during the period that the army will be so near the enemy as at present, an arrangement should be adopted respecting the baggage, ammunition, and commissariat with the troops, which shall give them and their officers all the convenience of having the baggage with them, and shall provide that it shall not impede the movements of the army.

2. During the continuance of the hot weather the Commander of the Forces requests, that the troops shall be cantoned in a town during the day if that is practicable; but they invariably must be out of the town at night, and the Staff Officers must make themselves acquainted with all the roads round the town, so as to be able to conduct the troops to any road by which it may be necessary to order them to march without passing through the town.

3. All baggage and stores of all descriptions, must be packed every evening at sunset, and must be placed in a convenient situation out of the town, excepting the baggage of the General Officers who may reside in the town, and the animals to carry the baggage must be near it.

4. All baggage and stores, every morning at the hour the troops turn out, must be loaded till the troops shall be dismissed.'

667.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cabrerizos, near Salamanca, 21st July, 1812.

‘ In the course of the 15th and 16th the enemy moved all their troops to the right of their position on the Duero, and their army was concentrated between Toro and San Roman. A considerable body passed the Duero at Toro, on the evening of the 16th; and I moved the allied army to their left on that night, with an intention to concentrate on the Guareña.

It was totally out of my power to prevent the enemy from passing the Duero at any point at which he might think it expedient, as he had in his possession all the bridges over that river, and many of the fords; but he recrossed that river at Toro in the night of the 16th, moved his whole army to Tordesillas, where he again crossed the Duero on the morning of the 17th, and assembled his army on that day at La Nava del Rey; having marched not less than 10 leagues in the course of the 17th.

The 4th and Light divisions of infantry, and Major General Anson’s brigades of cavalry, had marched to Castrejon on the night of the 16th, with a view to the assembly of the army on the Guareña, and were at Castrejon under the orders of Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton on the 17th, not having been ordered to proceed further, in consequence of my knowledge that the enemy had not passed the Duero at Toro, and there was not time to call them in between the hour at which I received the intelligence of the whole of the enemy’s army being at La Nava and daylight of the morning of the 18th. I therefore took measures to provide for their retreat and junction, by moving the 5th division to Torrecilla de la Orden; and Major General Le Marchant’s, Major General Alten’s, and Major General Bock’s brigades of cavalry to Alaejos.

The enemy attacked the troops at Castrejon at the dawn of the day of the 18th, and Sir S. Cotton maintained the post without suffering any loss till the cavalry had joined him. Nearly about the same time the enemy turned, by Alaejos, the left flank of our position at Castrejon.

The troops retired in admirable order to Torrecilla de la Orden, having the enemy’s whole army on their flank, or in their rear, and thence to the Guareña, which river they passed under the same circumstances, and effected their junction with the army.

The Guareña, which runs into the Duero, is formed by 4 streams, which unite about a league below Cañizal, and the enemy took a strong position on the heights on the right of that river; and I placed the 5th, 4th, and Light divisions on the opposite heights, and had directed the remainder of the army to cross the Upper Guareña at Vallesa, in consequence of the appearance of the enemy’s intention to turn our right.

Shortly after his arrival, however, the enemy crossed the Guareña at Castrillo, below the junction of the streams, and manifested an intention to press upon our left, and to enter the valley of Cañizal. Major General Alten’s brigade of cavalry, supported by the 3rd dragoons, were already engaged with the enemy’s cavalry, and had taken, among other prisoners, the French General de Carrié; and I desired Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole to attack with Major General W. Anson’s and Brig. General Harvey’s brigades of infantry, the latter under the command of Colonel Stubbs, the enemy’s infantry, which were supporting their cavalry. He immediately



attacked and defeated them with the 27th and 40th regts., which advanced to the charge with bayonets, Colonel Stubbs' Portuguese brigade supporting; and the enemy gave way; many were killed and wounded; and Major General Alten's brigade of cavalry having pursued the fugitives, 240 prisoners were taken.

In these affairs, Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole, Major General V. Alten, Major General W. Anson, Lieut. Colonels Arentschildt of the 1st hussars, and Hervey of the 14th light dragoons; Lieut. Colonel Maclean of the 27th, and Major Archdall of the 40th; Colonel Stubbs, Lieut. Colonel Anderson, commanding the 11th, and Major de Azeredo, commanding the 23rd Portuguese regts., distinguished themselves.

The enemy did not make any further attempt on our left, but having reinforced their troops on that side, and withdrawn those which had moved to their left, I brought back ours from Vallesa.

On the 19th, in the afternoon, the enemy withdrew all their troops from their right, and marched to their left by Tarazona, apparently with an intention of turning our right. I crossed the Upper Guareña at Vallesa and El Olmo, with the whole of the allied army, in the course of that evening and night; and every preparation was made for the action which was expected on the plain of Vallesa on the morning of the 20th. But shortly after daylight the enemy made another movement, in several columns, to his left along the heights of the Guareña, which river he crossed below Cantalapedra, and encamped last night at Babila-fuente and Villorueta; and the allied army made a corresponding movement to its right to Cantalpino, and encamped last night at Cabeza Velloso, the 6th division and Major General Alten's brigade of cavalry being upon the Tormes at Aldea Lengua. During these movements, there have been occasional cannonades, but without loss on our side.

I have this morning moved the left of the army to the Tormes, where the whole are now concentrated; and I observe that the enemy have also moved towards the same river near Huerta. The enemy's object hitherto has been to cut off my communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, the want of which, he knows well would distress us very materially. The wheat harvest has not yet been reaped in Castille, and even if we had money, we could not now procure any thing from the country, unless we should follow the example of the enemy, and lay waste whole districts, in order to procure a scanty subsistence of unripe wheat for the troops.

It would answer no purpose to attempt to retaliate upon the enemy, even if it were practicable. The French armies in Spain have never had any secure communication beyond the ground which they occupy; and provided the enemy opposed to them is not too strong for them, they are indifferent in respect to the quarter from which their operations are directed, or on which side they carry them on.

The army of Portugal has been surrounded for the last 6 weeks, and scarcely even a letter reaches its commander; but the system of organised rapine and plunder, and the extraordinary discipline so long established in the French armies, enable it to subsist at the expense of the total ruin of the country in which it has been placed; and I am not certain that Marshal Marmont has not now at his command a greater quantity of provisions and

supplies of every description than we have. Any movement upon his flank, therefore, would only tend to augment the embarrassments of our own situation, while it would have no effect whatever upon that of the enemy; even if such a movement could have been made with advantage as an operation purely military: this, however, was not the case, and when the French attempted to turn our right, I had the choice only of marching towards Salamanca, or of attacking the enemy in a position highly advantageous to him, which, for several reasons, I did not think expedient.

I have invariably been of opinion, that unless forced to fight a battle, it is better that one should not be fought by the allied army, unless under such favorable circumstances as that there would be reason to hope that the allied army would be able to maintain the field, while those of the enemy should not. Your Lordship will have seen by the returns of the two armies that we have no superiority of numbers, even over that single army immediately opposed to us; indeed, I believe that the French army is, of the two, the strongest; and it is certainly equipped with a profusion of artillery, double ours in numbers, and of larger calibres. It cannot be attacked therefore in a chosen position, without considerable loss on our side.

To this circumstance, add that I am quite certain that Marshal Marmont's army is to be joined by the King's, which will be 10,000 or 12,000 men, with a large proportion of cavalry, and that troops are still expected from the army of the North, and some are ordered from that of the South; and it will be seen that I ought to consider it almost impossible to remain in Castille after an action, the circumstances of which should not have been so advantageous as to have left the allied army in a situation of comparative strength, while that of the enemy should have been much weakened.

I have therefore determined to cross the Tormes, if the enemy should; to cover Salamanca as long as I can; and above all, not to give up our communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and not to fight an action, unless under very advantageous circumstances, or it should become absolutely necessary.'

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668.

To Earl Bathurst.

Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

'My aide de camp, Captain Lord Clinton, will present to your Lordship this account of a victory which the allied troops under my command gained in a general action, fought near Salamanca on the evening of the 22nd inst., which I have been under the necessity of delaying to send till now, having been engaged ever since the action in the pursuit of the enemy's flying troops.

In my letter of the 21st, I informed your Lordship that both armies were near the Tormes; and the enemy crossed that river with the greatest part of his troops, in the afternoon, by the fords between Alba de Tormes and Huerta, and moved by their left towards the roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo.

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G. O.

Tordillas, 23rd July, 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General Officers, officers and troops for their conduct in the action with the enemy, on the 22nd instant, which he will not fail to make to H. R. H. the Prince Regent, the favorable report that it deserves.

2. He trusts that the events of yesterday have impressed all with a conviction that military success depends upon troops obeying the orders which they receive, and preserving the order of their formation in action, that upon no occasion they will allow themselves to depart from it for one moment.'



The allied army, with the exception of the 3rd division, and General D'Urban's cavalry, likewise crossed the Tormes in the evening by the bridge of Salamanca and the fords in the neighbourhood; and I placed the troops in a position, of which the right was upon one of the 2 heights called Dos Arapiles, and the left on the Tormes, below the ford of S<sup>ra</sup> Marta.

The 3rd division, and Brig. General D'Urban's cavalry, were left at Cabrerizos, on the right of the Tormes, as the enemy had still a large corps on the heights above Babilafuente, on the same side of the river; and I considered it not improbable that, finding our army prepared for them in the morning on the left of the Tormes, they would alter their plan, and manœuvre by the other bank.

In the course of the night of the 21st, I received intelligence, of the truth of which I could not doubt, that General Chauvel had arrived at Pollos on the 20th with the cavalry and horse artillery of the army of the North, to join Marshal Marmont; and I was quite certain that these troops would join him on the 22nd or 23rd at latest.

There was no time to be lost therefore; and I determined that, if circumstances should not permit me to attack him on the 22nd, I would move towards Ciudad Rodrigo without further loss of time, as the difference of the numbers of cavalry might have made a march of manœuvre, such as we have had for the last 4 or 5 days, very difficult, and its result doubtful.

During the night of the 21st, the enemy had taken possession of the village of Calvarassa de Arriba, and of the heights near it called N. S. de la Peña, our cavalry being in possession of Calvarassa de Abaxo; and shortly after daylight, detachments from both armies attempted to obtain possession of the more distant from our right of the 2 hills called Dos Arapiles. The enemy, however, succeeded; their detachments being the strongest, and having been concealed in the woods nearer the hill than we were; by which success they strengthened materially their own position, and had in their power increased means of annoying ours.

In the morning the light troops of the 7th division, and the 4th caçadores belonging to General Pack's brigade, were engaged with the enemy on the height called N. S. de la Peña, on which height they maintained themselves with the enemy throughout the day. The possession by the enemy, however, of the more distant of the Arapiles rendered it necessary for me to extend the right of the army *en potence* to the height behind the village of Arapiles, and to occupy that village with light infantry; and here I placed the 4th division, under the command of Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole; and although, from the variety of the enemy's movements, it was difficult to form a satisfactory judgment of his intentions, I considered that upon the whole his objects were upon the left of the Tormes. I therefore ordered Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham, who commanded the 3rd division in the absence of Lieut. General Picton, on account of ill health, to move across the Tormes with the troops under his command, including Brig. General D'Urban's cavalry, and to place himself behind Aldea Tejada; Brig. General Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry, and Don Carlos de España's infantry, having been moved up likewise to the neighbourhood of Las Torres, between the 3rd and 4th divisions.

After a variety of evolutions and movements, the enemy appears to have

determined upon his plan about 2 in the afternoon ; and, under cover of a very heavy cannonade, which, however, did us but very little damage, he extended his left, and moved forward his troops, apparently with an intention to embrace, by the position of his troops, and by his fire, our post on that of the two Arapiles which we possessed, and from thence to attack and break our line, or, at all events, to render difficult any movement of ours to our right.

The extension of his line to his left, however, and its advance upon our right, notwithstanding that his troops still occupied very strong ground, and his position was well defended by cannon, gave me an opportunity of attacking him, for which I had long been anxious. I reinforced our right with the 5th division, under Lieut. General Leith, which I placed behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th division, and with the 6th and 7th divisions in reserve ; and as soon as these troops had taken their station, I ordered Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham to move forward with the 3rd division and General D'Urban's cavalry, and 2 squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, under Lieut. Colonel Hervey, in 4 columns, to turn the enemy's left on the heights ; while Brig. General Bradford's brigade, the 5th division, under Lieut. General Leith, the 4th division, under Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole, and the cavalry, under Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, should attack them in front, supported in reserve by the 6th division, under Major General Clinton, the 7th, under Major General Hope, and Don Carlos de España's Spanish division ; and Brig. General Pack should support the left of the 4th division, by attacking that of the Dos Arapiles which the enemy held. The 1st and Light divisions occupied the ground on the left, and were in reserve.

The attack upon the enemy's left was made in the manner above described, and completely succeeded. Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham formed the 3rd division across the enemy's flank, and overthrew every thing opposed to him. The troops were supported in the most gallant style by the Portuguese cavalry, under Brig. General D'Urban, and Lieut. Colonel Hervey's squadrons of the 14th, who successfully defeated every attempt made by the enemy on the flank of the 3rd division. Brig. General Bradford's brigade, the 5th and 4th divisions, and the cavalry under Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton attacked the enemy in front, and drove his troops before them from one height to another, bringing forward their right, so as to acquire strength upon the enemy's flank in proportion to the advance. Brig. General Pack made a very gallant attack upon the Arapiles, in which, however, he did not succeed, excepting in diverting the attention of the enemy's corps placed upon it from the troops under the command of Lieut. General Cole in his advance.

The cavalry under Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton made a most gallant and successful charge against a body of the enemy's infantry, which they overthrew and cut to pieces. In this charge Major General Le Marchant was killed at the head of his brigade ; and I have to regret the loss of a most able officer.

After the crest of the height was carried, one division of the enemy's infantry made a stand against the 4th division, which, after a severe contest, was obliged to give way, in consequence of the enemy having thrown some troops on the left of the 4th division, after the failure of Brig. General Pack's



attack upon the Arapiles, and Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole having been wounded. Marshal Sir W. Beresford, who happened to be on the spot, directed Brig. General Spry's brigade of the 5th division, which was in the second line, to change its front, and to bring its fire on the flank of the enemy's division; and, I am sorry to add that, while engaged in this service, he received a wound which I am apprehensive will deprive me of the benefit of his counsel and assistance for some time. Nearly about the same time Lieut. General Leith received a wound which unfortunately obliged him to quit the field. I ordered up the 6th division, under Major General Clinton, to relieve the 4th, and the battle was soon restored to its former success.

The enemy's right, however, reinforced by the troops which had fled from his left, and by those which had now retired from the Arapiles, still continued to resist; and I ordered the first and Light divisions, and Colonel Stubbs' Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, which was reformed, and Major General W. Anson's brigade, likewise of the 4th division, to turn the right, while the 6th division, supported by the 3rd and 5th, attacked the front. It was dark before this point was carried by the 6th division; and the enemy fled through the woods towards the Tormes. I pursued them with the 1st and Light divisions, and Major General W. Anson's brigade of the 4th division, and some squadrons of cavalry under Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, as long as we could find any of them together, directing our march upon Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, by which the enemy had passed on their advance; but the darkness of the night was highly advantageous to the enemy, many of whom escaped under its cover who must otherwise have been in our hands. I am sorry to report that, owing to the same cause, Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton was unfortunately wounded by one of our own sentries after we had halted.

We renewed the pursuit at break of day in the morning with the same troops, and Major General Bock's and Major General Anson's brigades of cavalry, which joined during the night; and, having crossed the Tormes, we came up with the enemy's rear of cavalry and infantry near La Serna. They were immediately attacked by the 2 brigades of dragoons, and the cavalry fled, leaving the infantry to their fate. I have never witnessed a more gallant charge than was made on the enemy's infantry by the heavy brigade of the King's German Legion, under Major General Bock, which was completely successful; and the whole body of infantry, consisting of 3 battalions of the enemy's 1st division, were made prisoners. The pursuit was afterwards continued as far as Peñaranda last night, and our troops were still following the flying enemy. Their head quarters were in this town, not less than 10 leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours last night; and they are now considerably advanced on the road towards Valladolid, by Arevalo. They were joined yesterday on their retreat by the cavalry and artillery of the army of the North, which have arrived at too late a period, it is to be hoped, to be of much use to them.

It is impossible to form a conjecture of the amount of the enemy's loss in this action; but, from all reports, it is very considerable. We have taken from them 11 pieces of cannon,\* several ammunition waggons, 2 eagles, and

\* The official returns only account for 11 pieces of cannon, but it is believed that 20 have fallen into our hands.

6 colors ; and 1 General, 3 Colonels, 3 Lieut. Colonels, 130 officers of inferior rank, and between 6000 and 7000 soldiers are prisoners ;\* and our detachments are sending in more at every moment. The number of dead on the field is very large.

I am informed that Marshal Marmont is badly wounded, and has lost one of his arms ; and that 4 General Officers have been killed, and several wounded.

Such an advantage could not have been acquired without material loss on our side ; but it certainly has not been of a magnitude to distress the army, or to cripple its operations.

I have great pleasure in reporting to your Lordship that, throughout this trying day, of which I have related the events, I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the General Officers and troops. The relation which I have written of its events will give a general idea of the share which each individual had in them ; and I cannot say too much in praise of the conduct of every individual in his station.

I am much indebted to Marshal Sir W. Beresford for his friendly counsel and assistance, both previous to, and during the action ; to Lieut. Generals Sir S. Cotton, Leith, and Cole, and Major Generals Clinton, and the Hon. E. Pakenham, for the manner in which they led the divisions of cavalry and infantry under their command respectively ; to Major General Hulse, commanding a brigade in the 6th division ; Major General G. Anson, commanding a brigade of cavalry ; Colonel Hinde ; Colonel the Hon. W. Ponsonby, commanding Major General Le Marchant's brigade after the fall of that officer ; to Major General W. Anson, commanding a brigade in the 4th division ; Major General Pringle, commanding a brigade in the 5th division, and the division after Lieut. General Leith was wounded ; Brig. General Bradford ; Brig. General Spry ; Colonel Stubbs ; and Brig. General Power, of the Portuguese service : likewise to Lieut. Colonel Campbell of the 94th, commanding a brigade in the 3rd division ; Lieut. Colonel Williams of the 6th foot ; Lieut. Colonel Wallace of the 88th, commanding a brigade in the 3rd division ; Lieut. Colonel Ellis of the 23rd, commanding Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham's brigade in the 4th division, during his absence in the command of the 3rd division ; Lieut. Colonel the Hon. C. Greville of the 38th regt., commanding Major General Hay's brigade in the 5th division, during his absence on leave ; Brig. General Pack ; Brig. General the Conde de Rezende of the Portuguese service ; Colonel Douglas of the 8th Portuguese regt. ; Lieut. Colonel the Conde de Ficalho of the same regt. ; and Lieut. Colonel Bingham of the 53rd regt. ; likewise to Brig. General D'Urban and Lieut. Colonel Hervey of the 14th light dragoons ; Colonel Lord E. Somerset, commanding the 4th dragoons ; and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. F. Ponsonby, commanding the 12th light dragoons.

I must also mention Lieut. Colonel Woodford, commanding the light battalion of the brigade of Guards, who, supported by 2 companies of the Fusiliers, under the command of Captain Crowder, maintained the village

\* The prisoners are supposed to amount to 7000 ; but it has not been possible to ascertain their number exactly, from the advance of the army immediately after the action was over.



of Arapiles against all the efforts of the enemy, previous to the attack upon their position by our troops.

In a case in which the conduct of all has been conspicuously good, I regret that the necessary limits of a dispatch prevent me from drawing your Lordship's notice to the conduct of a larger number of individuals; but I can assure your lordship that there was no officer or corps engaged in this action who did not perform his duty by his Sovereign and his country.

The Royal and German Artillery, under Lieut. Colonel Framingham, distinguished themselves by the accuracy of their fire wherever it was possible to use them; and they advanced to the attack of the enemy's position with the same gallantry as the other troops.

I am particularly indebted to Lieut. Colonel De Lancy, the Deputy Quarter Master General, the head of the department present, in the absence of the Quarter Master General, and to the officers of that department and of the Staff corps, for the assistance I received from them, particularly Lieut. Colonel the Hon. L. Dundas and Lieut. Colonel Sturgeon of the latter, and Major Scovell of the former; and to Lieut. Colonel Waters, at present at the head of the Adjutant General's department at head quarters; and to the officers of that department, as well at head quarters as with the several divisions of the army; and Lieut. Colonel Lord Fitz Roy Somerset, and the officers of my personal Staff. Among the latter I particularly request your Lordship to draw the attention of H.R.H. the Prince Regent to H.S.H. the Hereditary Prince of Orange, whose conduct in the field, as well upon every other occasion, entitles him to my highest commendation, and has acquired for him the respect and regard of the whole army.

I have had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Mariscal de Campo Don Carlos de España, and of Brigadier Don Julian Sanchez, and with that of the troops under their command respectively; and with that of the Mariscal de Campo Don Miguel de Alava, and of Brigadier Don José O'Lawlor, employed with this army by the Spanish Government, from whom, and from the Spanish authorities and people in general, I received every assistance I could expect.

It is but justice likewise to draw your Lordship's attention upon this occasion to the merits of the officers of the civil departments of the army. Notwithstanding the increased distance of our operations from our magazines, and that the country is completely exhausted, we have hitherto wanted nothing, owing to the diligence and attention of the Commissary General, Mr. Bissett, and the officers of the department under his direction. I have likewise to mention that, by the attention and ability of Dr. M'Grigor, and of the officers of the department under his charge, our wounded, as well as those of the enemy, left in our hands, have been well taken care of; and I hope that many of these valuable men will be saved to the service.

Captain Lord Clinton will have the honor of laying at the feet of H.R.H. the Prince Regent the eagles and colors taken from the enemy in this action.'

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669.

To Earl Bathurst.

Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

'I hope that you will be pleased with our battle, of which the dispatch contains as accurate an account as I can give you. There was no mistake;

every thing went on as it ought; and there never was an army so beaten in so short a time. If we had had another hour or two of daylight, not a man would have passed the Tormes; and as it was, they would all have been taken if —— had left the garrison in Alba de Tormes as I wished and desired; or, having taken it away, as I believe before he was aware of my wishes, he had informed me that it was not there. If he had, I should have marched in the night upon Alba, where I should have caught them all, instead of upon the fords of the Tormes. But this is a little misfortune, which does not diminish the honor acquired by the troops in the action, nor, I hope, the advantage to be derived from it by the country; as I do not believe there are many soldiers who were in that action, who are likely to face us again till they shall be very largely reinforced indeed.

I am very anxious that a mark of His Royal Highness' favor should be conferred upon Sir S. Cotton. I believe he would be much gratified at receiving the Red Riband. No cavalry could act better than ours did in the action; and I must say for Sir Stapleton, that I do not know where we should find an officer that would command our cavalry in this country half so well as he does.'

## 670.

To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Flores de Avila, 25th July, 1812.

'I took up the ground which you were to have taken during the siege of Salamanca, only the left was thrown back on the heights, it being unnecessary, under the circumstances, to cover the ford of S<sup>a</sup> Marta. We had a race for the large Arapiles, which is the more distant of the 2 detached heights which you will recollect on the right of your position; this race the French won, and they were too strong to be dislodged without a general action.

I knew that the French were to be joined by the cavalry of the army of the North on the 22nd or 23rd, and that the army of the Centre was likely to be in motion. Marmont ought to have given me a *pont d'or*, and he would have made a handsome operation of it. But instead of that, after manœuvring all the morning in the usual French style, nobody knew with what object, he at last pressed upon my right in such a manner, at the same time without engaging, that he would have either carried our Arapiles, or he would have confined us entirely to our position. This was not to be endured, and we fell upon him, turning his left flank; and I never saw an army receive such a beating.

I had desired the Spaniards to continue to occupy the castle of Alba de Tormes. —— had evacuated it, I believe, before he knew my wishes; and he was afraid to let me know that he had done so; and I did not know it till I found no enemy at the fords of the Tormes. When I lost sight of them in the dark, I marched upon Huerta and Encinas, and they went by Alba. If I had known there had been no garrison at Alba, I should have marched there, and should probably have had the whole.'

## 671.

To Earl Bathurst.

Flores de Avila, 25th July, 1812.

'I will try the remedy proposed in your dispatch and letter of the 3rd, for the inconvenience of the Attorney and Solicitor General's opinion on the



24th Section of the Articles of War. But I am afraid it will not answer the purpose entirely. I do not know of any thing that annoys me so much, as the misbehaviour of a few of the troops (those coming up from hospitals, or those just arrived from England) to the inhabitants of the country, who invariably behave with kindness to them.

I trust entirely to Mr. Sutton to choose a proper person to be sent out here. But besides a knowledge of his profession, he should have some little knowledge of the world, and indulgence for the manners of the class of people among whom he is coming to live.

I concur with you in thinking that it is not likely to make the measure worse, to make the full increase of pay to non-commissioned officers depend upon their having been in the situation for 2 years. The enjoyment of some increase, and the hopes of the further increase, will keep them on their good behaviour, and it does not much signify how men acquire good habits; when once acquired, they do not easily abandon them. I should wish, however, if the public could afford the expense, to see the old proportions of pay re-established.

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I am much obliged to you for the intelligence from the North. If the Emperor of Russia has any resources, and is prudent, and his Russians will really fight, Buonaparte will not succeed.'

### 672.

To Lieut. General Lord W. Bentinck.

Boecillo, near Valladolid, 30th July, 1812.

'I received this morning your letter of the 28th June, with all the en-

G. O.

Aldea Seca, 26th July, 1812.

1. When it is possible, it is desirable to get the troops into the towns in the day time. If that should not be possible, and there should be wood conveniently situated in respect to the water, they should be placed in the wood. But the Commander of the Forces is most anxious that they should be placed on the high grounds every night, clear of the woods and marshy grounds, and rivulets.

2. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the attention of the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades to this subject, as one likely to have great influence on the health of the troops.'

G. O.

Olmedo, 28th July, 1812.

1. The number of soldiers of infantry who stay behind their regiments on a march is so very large, the practice is so unmilitary in itself, and leads to such inconveniences and losses when the troops are moving near an enemy, and is at all times so prejudicial to the health of the soldiers, that the Commander of the Forces begs to draw the attention of the General Officers of the army to the General Orders upon this subject.

2. Under these orders no soldier ought to be out of the ranks on a march without the knowledge of the officer commanding his company, and the officer commanding the regiment should report all absentees at the end of the march to the General Officers commanding the brigades.

3. The object of these orders is to ensure the attention of these several authorities to the absence from the ranks of every soldier, and to make it certain that this evil will not exist in any instance without sufficient cause.

4. But if it takes place without notice from the officers of the regiment, or the General Officer of the brigade, it is time some further measures should be adopted.

5. The Commander of the Forces declares his intention to have the name taken down of every soldier whom he may find straggling from his regiment on the march, and if he should find upon inquiry that the soldiers' names have not been reported, according to the General Orders of the army, he will bring to trial before a General Court Martial the officer of his company, or the commanding officer of his regiment, if he should not have noticed the neglect of the commanding officer of his company.

6. The Commander of the Forces requests the General Officers commanding divisions, and the officers of the General Staff, will pay attention to this subject.'

closures you refer to, excepting your instructions to Lieut. General Maitland; and I am happy to find that, although it appears that you do not expect any successful result from the operations of the Sicilian army on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, to which point I shall advert presently, you had resumed the intention of sending them there. I acknowledge that I thought that, upon consideration, you would find the grounds for your intended expedition to the coast of Italy so little satisfactory, that you would resume the plan for the Eastern coast which had been concerted and arranged; and every thing remains in exactly the state in which it was in the beginning of June, excepting that the first division of the Sicilian army has gone, according to your former directions, to Sardinia. I should hope, however, that there will be no inconvenience in bringing it back from thence.

In regard to the aid to Spain to be derived from this expedition, I am concerned to find that you have altered your opinion upon it since you first proposed the measure to Government; and if I did not hope that General Maitland and the Staff and other officers of the Sicilian army would alter their opinion upon a nearer view of what they have to accomplish, and its effect upon the contest, I should despair of any success from persons coming on a service holding such opinions.

I am quite certain that they can succeed in taking Tarragona, and in opening a communication between the fleet and the Spanish army by Tarragona—which is in itself a service of the greatest importance. I am likewise quite certain that they can take the city of Valencia; that they will thereby give to the Spaniards, and deprive the French of, an important resource; that the war will revive again in Valencia; and that, if matters are well arranged in that quarter, the enemy will never again gain possession of that city.

But if I should be mistaken in my expectations of their success in these operations, I cannot be mistaken in their effect upon my own. I have lately, on the 22nd, beaten Marshal Marmont in a general action, fought near Salamanca, and I have pursued him beyond the Duero; and our troops have this day entered Valladolid.

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Then, if Suchet's attention should not be diverted from me, and, notwithstanding Marmont's defeat, the French should become too strong for me in Old Castille, I shall at least have the satisfaction of reflecting, while I am retiring, that General Maitland's progress will be unopposed, and that we shall take Tarragona and Valencia.

But it is not impossible, that neither my success in Castille, nor General Maitland's on the Eastern coast, will eventually give any aid to Spain; upon which point I have nothing to say. That is a subject for the consideration of politicians; and, as a military officer, I can advert to any plan only as being likely to be attended with military success, or otherwise; but I beg to remark, that the same observation is applicable by politicians, not only to every military plan, but to the general operations of every war, and even to the objects of the war itself.

I have taken up so much of your attention upon this subject, because, in my opinion, without intending it, you have, by a few words, thrown upon



the King's Ministers a larger share of the responsibility for the success of General Maitland's expedition than belongs to them. I am certain he will succeed; and, at all events, he will do good to my operations. But much as I wish for their success, I assure you that I should not give my advice that General Maitland's credit, or the safety of the troops, should be risked for that object only.'

673.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cuellar, 3rd Aug. 1812.

'It is perfectly true that His Majesty's Government had at first in contemplation only a short service on the East coast; and that I reckoned upon the co-operation of the troops from Sicily, only till the period of the equinoctial gales. Circumstances, however, have now materially altered; and either my position in Castille must be supported by the continuation of the appearance of the troops on the eastern as well as on the northern coast of the Peninsula, or it must be expected that I shall be obliged to withdraw into Portugal at an early period after those troops shall have withdrawn.

If Lieut. General Maitland should succeed in taking Valencia, there appears no reason for which he should quit the coast, unless, indeed, the enemy's army in the Kingdom of Naples should be so reinforced, as that the island of Sicily shall be in danger. If he should not succeed in taking Va-

G. O.

Mojados, 31st July, 1812.

'2. The Commander of the Forces requests to have returns of the several men missing from their regiments on the march of the 10th instant.

3. It is reported to the Commander of the Forces, that the enemy have in their power above 100 men, British soldiers, taken on that day, straggling in the rear and in the flanks of the army.

4. As the army did not march more than 10 or 11 miles on that day, and the country was perfectly open, the straggling of these soldiers, and their being prisoners, must be attached to the neglect of the officers of their regiments.

5. It is quite obvious that if the soldiers cannot be made to march in their ranks at all times, the army cannot effect a march in the face of an enemy, and it is so far unfit for service.

6. The Commander of the Forces calls upon the General Officers of the army, and commanding officers of regiments, to take measures to prevent the too prevalent practice of falling out.'

G. O.

Cuellar, 1st Aug. 1812.

'2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers and the Commanding Officers of regiments, and of the depôts at the several hospital stations, and the commanding officers of detachments on their march, will take measures to prevent the soldiers from plundering and eating the unripe grapes.

3. The followers of the army, the Portuguese women, in particular, must be prevented by the provost from plundering the gardens and fields of vegetables: the women must be informed that they must obey orders, or they will be turned out of the army.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that, till further orders, there may be issued to each soldier daily an eighth of a pound of rice, if it can be procured; if it cannot, the same quantity of wheaten flour, or of barley, or of wheat, which the officers are requested to see that the soldiers boil up with their soup. If barley or wheat should be issued, the husk should be beat off before it is boiled.

5. As much of the sickness of the troops is attributed to the use of raw spirits by the soldiers in the hot season, the Commander of the Forces desires that the officers will see that the men of each mess in their companies mix their spirits with four times the quantity of water, as soon as the spirits are issued by the Commissary.

If the Commander of the Forces should find, that the officers of any regiments omit to carry into execution this order, he will not only give directions that all issues of wine and spirits to such regiments may be discontinued entirely, but he will find himself under the necessity of taking other means to enforce obedience to orders, which have for their object the health of the soldiers.'

lencia, as long as the allies shall remain in possession of Minorca, Alicante, and Carthagena, there appears no reason why the fleet of transports and troops under the command of Lieut. General Maitland should quit the coast, or should discontinue their efforts to alarm the enemy for the safety of their possession of Valencia. The expedition to the northern coast might likewise remain on the coast to keep up the alarm which has already been so useful to this army. This is my view of these operations at the present moment; and I hope that, if your Lordship should concur in it, you will send orders accordingly to Lieut. General Maitland, and to Sir H. Popham.

Circumstances may put it in my power to acquire fresh successes, particularly against the army of the Centre; and this army may by its own efforts secure its position in Castille at least till the French shall evacuate Andalusia. It will then remain to be considered what ought to be done with the Sicilian troops; but in the mean time, I trust that your Lordship will not allow them to withdraw from the Peninsula, as ordered, in the second week in September.'

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674.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 13th Aug. 1812.

'It is impossible to describe the joy manifested by the inhabitants of Madrid upon our arrival;\* and I hope that the prevalence of the same sen-

\* In the 'Précis Historique de la Guerre de la Peninsule de 1807 à 1810, servant d'introduction aux Journaux des Sièges faits ou soutenus par les Français dans cette Guerre, par Belmas, chef de bataillon de Génie,' vol. i. p. 235, is the following passage: "Lord Wellington fit son entrée à Madrid le 12 Août avec 30 mille hommes. L'ivresse avec laquelle il fut reçu fit bientôt place à d'autres sentimens, lorsqu'il frappa cette ville d'une forte contribution." This last assertion is untrue; Lord Wellington never raised, or permitted to be raised, any contribution at Madrid, or elsewhere in the Peninsula.

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G. O.

Mogoncillo, 6th Aug. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to have to inform the army, that he has received a report that 2 British soldiers were murdered at Medina del Campo, on the instant; and that he has reason to apprehend that this misfortune is to be attributed to the misconduct of the British soldiers in that and other towns on the road between Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, and the army.

2. The Commander of the Forces now gives notice, that he has directed that no officer or soldier may be supplied with provisions or forage on his road to or from the army, between Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca and the army, excepting at the places at which it will be specified in his route that he is to receive provisions and forage; and any officer who shall apply for either at any other place is to be reported to Head Quarters, and any soldier who shall apply for provisions is to be confined, and sent a prisoner to the nearest British post, and will undoubtedly be brought to trial before a Court Martial, for a disobedience of orders.

3. The Commander of the Forces hoped that the kind treatment which the officers and soldiers of the army have received from the Spaniards, would have had the effect of inducing them to treat the inhabitants of the country with kindness, to respect their property, and to refrain from making demands upon them, which they have no right to make.

4. He now warns them of the consequence which will attend their misconduct; they may depend upon it that the Spaniards will not submit to be ill treated; and the Commander of the Forces recommends to the soldiers to behave towards the inhabitants of the country as they have deserved by their conduct to the army, since they have passed the frontiers of Portugal.

5. This order is to be printed; it must be read to every detachment which will pass Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, and a printed copy must be delivered to the officer or non-commissioned officer commanding it. And it must likewise be read to every detachment which will leave the army for Salamanca, or will leave Salamanca to go to Ciudad Rodrigo.'



timents of detestation of the French yoke, and of a strong desire to secure the independence of their country, which first induced them to set the example of resistance to the usurper, will induce them again to make exertions in the cause of their country, which being more wisely directed, will be more efficacious than those formerly made.'

G. O.

Madrid, 13th Aug. 1812.

'1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the soldiers may not be allowed to walk about the streets of Madrid, unless regularly dressed in their uniforms with side arms.

2. Those going to work or on fatigue in their fatigue dresses, will of course be under the orders of officers, or of non-commissioned officers.

3. In case any officers are desirous of seeing the Palace, they are requested to apply at the entrance for some of the servants of the household to attend them.'

G. O.

Madrid, 15th Aug. 1812.

'1. The Commander of the Forces desires that all the officers, as well Portuguese as English, on duty in the Palace of the Retiro since yesterday at noon, may be put in arrest, and their names reported, for having allowed the stores in that Palace to be plundered, notwithstanding the orders they received, and that they and their men under their command were placed on duty there purposely to prevent the plunder.

2. The Commander of the Forces ordered on the 13th instant, that the soldiers should not be allowed to walk about the streets of Madrid, unless regularly dressed as soldiers with their side arms. It has always hitherto been understood it was incumbent on the officers and non-commissioned officers of the army to see that the orders of the Commander of the Forces are obeyed; but he has seen soldiers walking with non-commissioned officers, in presence of officers, not dressed as ordered, and all kinds of irregularities going on in presence of and unnoticed by the officers.

3. No army can continue long together and successful, if orders are not strictly obeyed. And the Commander of the Forces holds the officers responsible for their soldiers; and in case of misbehaviour of the latter, he will call the former to account.'

G. O.

Madrid, 17th Aug. 1812.

'2. The Commander of the Forces has been induced to order into arrest the following officers, viz. \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, For neglect of their duty while on guard in the Palace of the Retiro, in allowing their sentries to permit persons to carry out clothing and stores during the day and night of the 14th instant while they were on guard over that Palace purposely to prevent these depredations.

3. The Commander of the Forces is always concerned to be under the necessity of observing upon the conduct of officers who have invariably conducted themselves well in the field; but the officers of the army must recollect, that to perform their duty with gallantry in the field is but a small part of what is required from them; and that obedience to order, regularity, accuracy in the performance of duties, and discipline, are necessary to keep any military body together, and to enable them to perform any military operation with advantage to their country or service to themselves.

4. The Commander of the Forces now desires that these officers may be released from their arrest, and may return to their duty.

5. The Commander of the Forces knows that all the regiments of the army, Portuguese as well as English, have got carts with them which they have pressed: he desires that before tomorrow morning these carts may be delivered over to the Commissariat attached to these regiments, and that the Commissaries will send the owners of the carts to their homes with their carts, paying them their hire.

6. This order does not refer to carts which have been with the regiments before the 22nd of July last.

7. The Commander of the Forces in publishing, for the information and guidance of the army, the following letter from the Secretary of War, is concerned to observe that he experiences too frequently the inconvenience from the lamentable inattention of the officers of the army, not to be sensible of the truth of the observation of the Secretary at War: officers of all ranks and in all situations are too much in the habit of leaving to their inferiors the performance of the most important duties, without taking the trouble even of superintending their conduct; and the consequence is, that all duties are negligently and inaccurately, if at all, performed, and the most serious inconveniences are felt by the service.'

G. O.

Madrid, 18th Aug. 1812.

'1. The Commander of the Forces has frequently requested that regular foraging parties might be sent out from each regiment and brigade, and the mode is clearly pointed out in Orders, in which the receipt for forage is to be given to the owner, whether it should be dry or green, thrashed, cut, or otherwise.

2. The

675.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 18th Aug. 1812.

‘I do not expect much from the exertions of the Spaniards, notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry *viva*, and are very fond of us, and hate the French; but they are, in general, the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have known; the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own country. I can do nothing till General Castaños shall arrive, and I do not know where he is. I am afraid that the utmost we can hope for is, to teach them how to avoid being beat. If we can effect that object, I hope we might do the rest.’

2. The object of these Orders is, first, to ensure regularity, and that there shall be no waste: secondly, to render it certain that every body obtains his due proportion of forage: and thirdly, to ensure to the owners the value of what is taken from them.

3. Notwithstanding the repeated Orders given on this subject, and that they are so easy of execution, the time of the Commander of the Forces is occupied in receiving complaints from the inhabitants of all the villages in the neighbourhood of every station of the troops, of the outrages committed to obtain forage, and of their total ruin, in consequence of their having been left without receipt, or any evidence that their property had been taken from them on account of the public service.

4. The constant disobedience of Orders, in points on which obedience is so easy, and obviously so beneficial to all concerned, would lead to a belief that it was intentional, if the long acquaintance of the Commander of the Forces with the army did not convince him, that it is the effect of the inattention to and inaccuracy in the obedience of Orders, of which the officers are too much in the habit.

5. The Commander of the Forces intreats the General Officers to attend to their divisions and brigades, and to see that the orders above referred to, and all others, are strictly obeyed and carried into execution with accuracy, by the officers and troops under their command: if this is not done, they may depend upon it, that the army cannot perform the service of which it would otherwise be capable.

6. The General Officers commanding the Portuguese troops must take care that the Orders of the army are obeyed by them, as well as by others.’

G. O.

Madrid, 22nd Aug. 1812.

‘The Commander of the Forces requests that the several divisions of infantry may be marched the distance of between 6 and 8 miles every third morning at dawn of day; and that the regiments may be exercised in some of the manœuvres ordered for the troops, every day on which they are not marched as above ordered.’

G. O.

Madrid, 23rd Aug. 1812.

‘1. The Commander of the Forces requests that orders may be given to the Commanding Officers of regiments to the officers under their command, the *bât*-men, muleteers, &c. &c. attached to the several regiments, to prevent them from riding on the public walks. There are roads for horses and carriages, which must be used; and horses and carriages must not be allowed to go on the walks with those on foot.’

A. G. O.

Madrid, 23rd Aug. 1812.

‘The following regulations relative to the issue of *bât* and forage money, published in the General Orders of the 1st Sept., 1809, are now republished for general information. No. 3. Regimental officers having brevet rank to receive the proportion allotted to that rank, and not according to their regimental commissions.

No. 4. Any officer holding 2 commissions, or 2 employments of any kind, to receive for one only.

No. 5. To enable them to equip themselves for field service, all officers (staff or regimental) ordered for the first time to join an army on foreign service, if they embark during the period on which 200 days’ *bât*, baggage, and forage money was issued to the troops on that service, to be permitted to receive that allowance, whatever the period of their arrival may be; in like manner if they embarked during the period of the issue of 165 days’ forage money, to be permitted to receive that allowance, unless however they shall have received at any time previous to their embarking, or are to receive any outfit money, or sums by any other name or denomination on the above account; in which case, such sums are to be deducted: but officers (either staff or regimental) being absent on leave on account of ill health or private affairs, on their returning to their duty, are not to receive *bât*, baggage, and forage money, unless they shall produce proper certificates that they have embarked



## 676.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Madrid, 23rd Aug. 1812.

‘What can be done for this lost nation? As for raising men or supplies, or taking any one measure to enable them to carry on the war, that is out of the question. Indeed, there is nobody to excite them to exertion, or to take advantage of the enthusiasm of the people, or of their enmity against the French. Even the guerrillas are getting quietly into the large towns, and amusing themselves, or collecting plunder of a better and more valuable description; and nobody looks forward to the exertions to be made, whether to improve or to secure our advantage.

This is a faithful picture of the state of affairs; and though I still hope to be able to maintain our position in Castille, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder when I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with inadequate powers myself to do any thing, and without assistance of any kind from the Spaniards, or I may say, from any individual of the Spanish nation.

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I am apprehensive that all this will turn out but ill for the Spanish cause. If, for any cause, I should be overpowered, or should be obliged to retire, what will the world say? What will the people of England say? What will those in Spain say? That we had made a great effort, attended by some glorious circumstances; and that from January, 1812, we had gained more advantages for the cause, and had acquired more extent of territory by our operations than had ever been gained by any army in the same period of time, against so powerful an enemy; but that, being unaided by the Spanish officers and troops, not from disinclination, but from inability on account of the gross ignorance of the former, and the want of discipline of the latter, and from the inefficiency of all the persons selected by the Government for great employment, we were at last overpowered, and compelled to withdraw within our own frontier.

What will be Lord Castlereagh’s reply to the next proposition for peace? Not that we will not treat if the Government of Joseph is to be the guaranteed Government, but he will be too happy to avail himself of any opportunity of withdrawing with honor from a contest in which it will be manifest that, owing to the inability of those employed to carry it on on the part of the Spaniards, there is no prospect of military success. Thus the great

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embarked not later than 61 days after the period when such allowance commences, and it shall appear to the officer commanding that they have used due diligence in repairing to their duty.

6. In *bât* and forage allowance given to each company, the *bât* money and 2 rations of forage being allowed for the service of the company, the officer actually commanding the company is to receive it, in the first instance; and any officer taking the command during the period of their issue, is entitled to receive from him a due proportion of that money, for the remainder of the period: this regulation also applies to the *bât* money, and 2 rations of forage, issued to the paymasters and surgeons.

7. Officers who may obtain promotion, or be appointed to Staff situations, provided it is notified in Orders to the army to which they belong before half the period for which *bât* and forage money has been issued expires, to be entitled to receive the difference between the sums paid to them in their former rank, and the rank or situation to which they are promoted or appointed in Staff situations, are not to receive any difference of *bât* or forage money, if their promotions or appointments are notified subsequent to half the period for which *bât* and forage money has been issued.’

cause will be lost, and this nation will be enslaved for the want of men at their head capable of conducting them.

Pray represent these matters to the Government and the leading men in the Cortes, and draw their attention seriously to the situation of their affairs?

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677.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 24th Aug. 1812.

' I have been going on for more than 3 years upon the usual allowance of a Commander in Chief, that is £10 *per diem*, liable to various deductions, among others of income tax, reducing it to about 8 guineas; but it will be necessary that Government should now either give me an additional pay under the head of table money, or any other they please, or that they should allow me to charge some of the expenses, such as charities, &c., which I am obliged to incur, in the existing state of this country, or I shall be ruined.

It is not proper, probably, to advert to other services, but I believe there is no service in which a Commander in Chief with such a charge as I have, is so badly paid as in the British service. Indeed, as far as I can learn there is no instance of an officer holding a permanent command in the British service, whose receipts have been confined to £10 *per diem*, with deductions. They all receive either the allowance of a Government, with that of a Commander in Chief, or an allowance of some other description; but I doubt that the trouble or responsibility or the expenses of any at all equal mine. However, I should not have mentioned the subject, knowing that the public expect in these days to be well served at the lowest possible rate of expense, if I did not find that I was in a situation in which I must incur expenses which I cannot defray without doing myself an injury.'

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678.

PROCLAMATION.

Madrid, 29th Aug. 1812.

' Spaniards! It is unnecessary to take up your time by recalling to your recollection the events of the last 2 months, or by drawing your attention to the situation in which your enemies now find themselves.

Listen to the accounts of the numerous prisoners daily brought in, and deserters from their army; hear the details of the miseries endured by those who, trusting to the promises of the French, have followed the vagabond fortunes of the Usurper, driven from the capital of your monarchy; hear these details from their servants and followers who have had the sense to quit this scene of desolation, and if the sufferings of your oppressors can soften the feeling of those inflicted upon yourselves, you will find ample cause for consolation.

But much remains still to be done to consolidate and secure the advantages acquired. It should be clearly understood that the pretended King is an usurper, whose authority it is the duty of every Spaniard to resist; that every Frenchman is an enemy, against whom it is the duty of every Spaniard to raise his arm.

Spaniards! you are reminded that your enemies cannot much longer resist; that they must quit your country if you will only omit to supply



their demands for provisions and money, when those demands are not enforced by superior force. Let every individual consider it his duty to do every thing in his power to give no assistance to the enemy of his country, and that perfidious enemy must soon entirely abandon in disgrace a country which he entered only for the sake of plunder, and in which he has been enabled to remain only because the inhabitants have submitted to his mandates, and have supplied his wants.

Spaniards! resist this odious tyranny, and be independent and happy.'

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 679.

To Earl Bathurst.

Magaz, 12th Sept. 1812.

'I assure your Lordship that you can depend no more upon the reports of ——— than you can upon those of any body else; and I earnestly recommend to Government to publish respecting the army only what comes from myself. I write a report once a week, which contains all occurrences, and I should think that the public might be satisfied with these reports.'

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 680.

To Colonel Torrens.

Torquemada, 13th Sept. 1812.

'It is a great error to suppose that the lower orders are always right in their complaints, and the higher orders always in the wrong. My experience has taught me, that nine times in ten, the soldiers loudest in their complaints and claims have no ground for either the one or the other; and are generally in debt to their Captains. Those who are wounded invariably either throw away or sell their necessaries; and whether the ground is held or not by the army, they claim compensation from the public. Their claim can be settled only by a Board.

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There is no point in the service to which I have at all times paid so much attention as to the settlement of the soldiers' accounts: I consider early settlements to be essential to discipline.'

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 681.

To Lieut. General Maitland.

Villa Toro, 20th Sept. 1812.

'His Majesty and the public have a right to expect from us that we should place a reasonable confidence in the gallantry and discipline of the troops under our command; and I have the satisfaction of reflecting that, having tried them frequently, they have never failed me; and in a position particularly on the flanks of which the enemy cannot manœuvre with the advantage of a superior cavalry, their success may be relied upon.

With a full knowledge of the defects of the Spanish troops, I feel the same confidence in them when placed on a position, and having the advantage of the co-operation and example of the British troops; and I entertain so little doubt of your success, if you be attacked, that there is nothing I wish for so much, for your own honor, and the advantage of the cause, as that the enemy should attack you *de vive force*.

If they should proceed by a regular attack upon your field positions, or upon those fortified posts with which they are connected, you will at least

have time to estimate your danger, and leisure to make all your arrangements, and embark at the moment such a measure may be necessary.

I assure you that your facilities for embarkation are much greater, and your prospects better, even if left by yourself, than mine were in the year 1810.

I advert to this subject in order to inspire you with confidence in your own situation; which you may depend upon it is so good, that I only fear that the enemy will not think of touching you.'

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682.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 21st Sept. 1812.

'I continued to follow the enemy with the troops under my command till the 16th, when I was joined at Pampliega by 3 divisions of infantry and a small body of cavalry of the army of Galicia, his Excellency the Captain General Castaños having arrived at head quarters on the 14th. The enemy had on the 16th taken a strong position on the heights behind Celada del Camino, and arrangements were made to attack them on the morning of the 17th; but the enemy retired in the night; and they were driven on the 17th to the heights close to Burgos. They retired through the town in the night, leaving behind them some clothing and other stores, and a large quantity of wheat and barley; and have since continued their retreat to Briviesca, where it is reported that they have been joined by 7000 conscripts. It is likewise reported that the Prince of Essling has been ordered by the local government in France to come and take the command of the army.

The castle of Burgos commands the passages of the river Arlanzon in the neighbourhood and the roads communicating with them so completely, that we could not pass the river till the 19th; when we effected that operation in 2 columns, the 5th division and General Bradford's brigade above, and the 1st division and General Pack's brigade and General Anson's cavalry below the town. Burgos is situated in that division of Spain allotted to the army of the north; and General Caffarelli, who had been here on the 17th, had placed in the castle a garrison of the troops of that army, consisting, as is reported, of 2500 men. The enemy had taken considerable pains to fortify the castle of Burgos; and had occupied with a horn work the hill of San Miguel, which has a considerable command over some of the works of the castle at the distance of 300 yards. They had likewise occupied other parts of the hill with flèches and other works for the protection of their piquets and out-posts.

As soon as the first division crossed the Arlanzon on the 19th, the enemy's out-posts were driven in by the light infantry battalion of Colonel Stirling's brigade, under the command of Major the Hon. C. Cocks, supported by Brig. General Pack's brigade; and the enemy's outworks on the hill of San Miguel, with the exception of the horn work, were occupied by our troops, which were posted close to the horn work.

As soon as it was dark, the same troops, with the addition of the 42nd regt., attacked and carried by assault the horn work which the enemy had occupied in strength. In this operation Brig. General Pack, Lieut. Colonel Hill of the 1st Portuguese regt., Colonel Campbell of the 16th Portuguese regt., Major Williams of the 4th caçadores, Major Dick of the 42nd regt.,



and Major the Hon. C. Cocks of the 79th, commanding the light infantry battalion, distinguished themselves. The latter, in particular, led the attack of the enemy's posts in the morning, and entered the horn work by the gorge at night. We took 3 pieces of cannon and one Captain and 62 prisoners; but I am sorry to add that our loss was severe, as appears by the enclosed return.

It was impossible to ascertain the exact state of the works of the castle of Burgos till we had obtained possession of the hill of San Miguel; and as far as I can judge of them, I am apprehensive that the means which I have are not sufficient to enable me to take the castle. I am informed, however, that the enemy are ill provided with water; and that their magazines of provisions are in a place exposed to be set on fire. I think it possible, therefore, that I may have it in my power to force them to surrender, although I may not be able to lay the place open to assault.

Since the 19th we have been employed in establishing ourselves on the hill of San Miguel, and in constructing those works which are best calculated to forward our future operations. The whole of the army have crossed the Arlanzon, with the exception of the 6th division and one division of Spanish infantry.'

G. O.

Villa Toro, 26th Sept. 1812.

'1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe, from a perusal of the proceedings of a General Court Martial on the trial of Captain ———, of the —rd regt., that the Orders which he has repeatedly issued to this army, regarding the conduct of officers in quarters and cantonments—regarding their conduct on a march—regarding the inspections of the soldiers' necessaries, and particularly their ammunition, have not been attended to in the ———; and as Lieut. Colonel ———, their late commanding officer, was very attentive to his duty, the Commander of the Forces is apprehensive that the want of attention to these Orders is more general than he has hitherto imagined.

2. He intreats the commanding and other officers of regiments to peruse, with attention, the General Orders of the army, and to make themselves masters of the duties which those Orders impose upon them, and to perform them with strictness and regularity.

3. They may depend upon it that unless the duties, prescribed in these Orders, are performed with regularity, the regiments cannot be kept in the order in which they ought to be for the service required from them.'

G. O.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

'1. From the quantity of musket ammunition called for by the several divisions, since the commencement of the siege of the Castle of Burgos, the Commander of the Forces is persuaded that his orders on this subject have not been obeyed.

2. These orders prescribed, that the officers commanding companies shall inspect the ammunition of every soldier in his company at every parade, and see that it is complete. The object of these Orders is to prevent waste, the sale of ammunition, and that requisitions may be made on the stores at the moment any deficiency occurs.

3. The stores of musket ammunition are necessarily limited; and the state of them is founded upon the certainty that every soldier in the ranks has at all times in his possession 60 rounds: but this certainty cannot exist, and the stores must be insufficient, if the officers commanding companies neglect their duty, and do not inspect their ammunition at every parade, according to orders; and the consequence is, as happened in a late instance, that before the soldiers are engaged for 5 minutes, ammunition is wanting, and the stores are unnecessarily exhausted, at a great distance from all means of supplying them.

4. It gives the Commander of the Forces the greatest concern to be obliged to complain so frequently of disobedience of his orders by the officers of the army; but the instances are so constant and so glaring, and so likely to be attended by consequences of the utmost importance, that he should not perform his duty if he did not notice them.

5. He now desires that the commanding officers of every regiment will report on the back of the daily state, the number of times each day that the regiment or battalion paraded, and that the musket ammunition was inspected at each parade, and whether complete or not. The General Officer commanding the division is to report daily, on the back of the daily state from the division, at what hour on the preceding day each regiment had paraded, and that the musket ammunition had been reported to have been inspected, and whether it was complete or not.'

683.

To the Earl of Mulgrave.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

‘ We have a difficult job in hand, that is, to take a very strong castle well provided with artillery, and with a numerous garrison, without incurring a large loss of men, if possible, and without being provided with sufficient artillery, and without a large expenditure of ammunition. We are getting on, however, and I hope we may succeed. But I wish I could be a little more certain of success.’

684.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

‘ The operations against the castle of Burgos have been continued, since I addressed you on the 20th; and on the night of the 22nd, I directed that an attempt might be made to take by storm the exterior line of the enemy’s works, one of the batteries destined to support our position within them having been in such a state of preparation as to afford hopes that it would be ready to open on the morning of the 23rd. The attack was to have been made by detachments of Portuguese troops belonging to the 6th division, which occupied the town of Burgos, and invested the castle on the S.W. side on the enemy’s left, while a detachment of the 1st division, under Major Lawrie of the 79th, should scale the wall in front. Unfortunately, the Portuguese troops were so strongly opposed that they could not make any progress on the enemy’s flank; and the escalade could not take place. I am sorry to say that our loss was severe. Major Lawrie was killed, and Captain Frazer, who commanded a detachment from the brigade of Guards, was wounded.\* Both these officers, and indeed all those employed on this occasion, exerted themselves to the utmost; but the attack on the enemy’s flank having failed, the success of the escalade was impracticable. We have since established ourselves close to the exterior wall, and have carried a gallery towards it; and I hope that a mine under it will be completed in the course of tomorrow. In the mean time our batteries are completed, and ready to open upon the enemy’s interior lines, as soon as we shall have established our troops within the exterior lines.

The enemy’s army are about Pancorbo, and at Miranda on the Ebro, with their advanced posts at Briviesca. They have made no movement to interrupt our operations.’

685.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

‘ I likewise beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to the practice of the Medical Board in promoting to vacancies in this army. Instead of promoting the officers on the spot, who deserve promotion highly from their merits and services, officers are selected in England, the Mediterranean, or elsewhere, to be promoted. The consequence is, increased delay in their arrival to perform their duty; and all who do arrive are sick in the first instance.

It would be but justice to promote those on the spot, who are performing the duty; and we should enjoy the advantage, and the seniors of the depart-

\* Now Colonel of the Ross-shire militia, son of the late Lieut. General Alex. Mackenzie Frazer. His leg was amputated.



ment at least would have experience in the disorders of the climate, and of the troops serving in this country; to which climate they would have become accustomed.'

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686.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

'We are getting on, but not so rapidly as I could wish; and I wish I could be more certain of final success. It is not easy, however, to take a strong place, well garrisoned, when one has not a sufficient quantity of cannon; when one is obliged to save ammunition on account of the distance of our magazines; and when one is desirous of saving the lives of soldiers. Then, nothing in the way of assault can be done excepting by a British soldier; and we cannot afford to lose them at this distance from England and the sea. I shall know in a day or two whether I can take the place, and how soon.'

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687.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Villa Toro, 1st Oct. 1812.

'It will be very inconvenient, and increase the difficulties of my situation very much, if the communication by sea along the coasts of Portugal and Galicia should not be secure. I had written to ——— on the subject, and have received an answer, which proves how clear it is that in our country it is better to suffer any public inconvenience, than to venture to suggest a measure as a remedy which is to be carried into execution by another public department. In future, therefore, I shall complain of inconveniences when they shall be severely felt, and shall not trouble Government with my expectations of them, and with suggestions of remedies or preventatives.

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The danger of Portugal is lessened, but it is not entirely removed. The fate of that Kingdom may still depend upon the result of military operations, upon which I, who conduct them, would not recommend to any body to rely entirely. If the war in Russia should fail, Portugal may again become the seat of war in the Peninsula. Who would be desirous of having property in Portugal under such circumstances?'

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688.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Villa Toro, 2nd Oct. 1812.

'I am most earnestly desirous of doing every thing in my power to forward and attain the legitimate objects of the Spanish nation in their just contest with France; and I feel no objection to taking upon myself the additional labor and responsibility which must attend my exercise of the command of the Spanish armies. But I cannot announce my acceptance of the

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G. O.

Villa Toro, 1st Oct. 1812.

'1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to state that the working parties in the trenches do not perform their duty, notwithstanding the pains that have been taken to relieve them every 6 hours.

2. He desires that Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne will report to him every morning, who commanded the working parties in the trenches during the preceding 24 hours, and whether each of the parties performed the work allotted to it with due diligence.'

honor conferred upon me by the Cortes and Government until I shall receive the consent of H.R.H. the Prince Regent, for which I shall make an immediate application.

I feel the less regret on account of this delay, because having long been in the habit of communicating confidentially with the General Officers commanding the different corps in which the Spanish army is divided, of making them acquainted with the general view of the operations which I hoped to carry on with the allied British and Portuguese army under my command, and of suggesting to them the line of operations which they should adopt, in order to forward the objects which I had in view, I have invariably received from them the utmost attention, and every support and assistance which it was in their power to give; and I am convinced they will continue the same practice even though I am not invested with the supreme command. The public interests, therefore, can suffer no inconvenience by my reference to H.R.H. the Prince Regent, of the decision on my acceptance of the honor conferred on me by the Cortes.

This mark of the confidence of the Cortes and Government, and the terms in which it has been conveyed to me, afford the most satisfactory proof to my mind that those authorities are convinced that in the command with which I have already been intrusted by two members of the alliance, I have done my utmost to forward the general cause of all the allies. It is not necessary to make any professions on this subject; and I hope that in the new and more prominent situation in which I shall be placed, as the Commander in Chief of the armies of all the allies in the Peninsula, I shall have not only the full support, but the confidence of the Spanish Government, Cortes, and nation, that the measures which I shall adopt are dictated by an honest and correct view of what is best for the general cause in which all are so deeply interested.'

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689.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 5th Oct. 1812.

'One of the mines which had been prepared under the exterior line of the castle of Burgos was exploded at midnight of the 29th, and effected a breach

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G. O.

Villa Toro, 3rd Oct. 1812.

'1. The Commander of the Forces noticed in General Orders on the 1st instant, the complaints he had received of the working parties, and he is concerned to have again to notice, that he has received complaints of the working parties ordered for last night.

4. The Commander of the Forces is concerned likewise to have to notice, that the working party ordered last night for the commanding officer of the artillery, did not perform their duty.

5. All the officers, and the whole of the Portuguese detachments absented themselves, and of course when such an example was set by the officers, much was not to be expected from the soldiers.

7. At the same time that the Commander of the Forces notices this misconduct of the working parties, he is happy to make an exception in favor of the Guards, who he is informed have invariably performed this duty, as they have every other in this army, in the most exemplary manner.

8. The officers and soldiers of the army should know that to work during a siege is as much part of their duty, as it is to engage the enemy in the field; and they may depend upon it, that unless they perform the work allotted to them with due diligence, they cannot acquire the honor which their comrades have acquired in former sieges.

9. The siege of the castle of Burgos has afforded more than one instance of the fatal effects of the omission of the working parties to perform their duty. And the Commander of the Forces hopes that he shall have no reason to complain of any in future.'



in the wall, which some of the party, destined to attack it, were enabled to storm; but owing to the darkness of the night, the detachment who were to support the advanced party missed their way, and the advance were driven off the breach again before they could be effectually supported. The breach effected by the mine was not of a description to be stormed except at the moment of the explosion, and it was necessary to improve it by fire, before the attempt could be repeated. But all our endeavors to construct batteries in the best situation to fire upon the wall failed, in consequence of the great superiority of the enemy's fire. One of the only 3 battering guns we had and 2 carriages were destroyed, and another gun was much injured. In the mean time another mine had been placed under the wall, which was ready yesterday, and a fire was opened yesterday morning from a battery constructed under cover of the horn work.

The fire from this battery improved the breach first made; and the explosion of the mine, at 5 o'clock yesterday evening, effected a second breach. Both were immediately stormed by the 2nd batt., 24th regt., under the command of Captain Hedderwick, which I had ordered into the trenches for that purpose; and our troops were established within the exterior line of the works of the castle of Burgos. The conduct of the 24th regt. was highly praiseworthy; and Captain Hedderwick and Lieut. Holmes and Fraser, who led the two storming parties, particularly distinguished themselves. I am happy to add, the operation was effected without suffering a very severe loss.'

## 690.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 5th Oct. 1812.

'I am sorry that I cannot say that the Spanish troops are at all improved in their discipline, their equipment, their organization, or their military spirit. I entertain but little doubt that in the same field with our troops they will behave well; and it may be possible, by good management, to prevent a repetition of those terrible disasters to detached corps by which the enemy were enabled to overrun the country, and to bring the contest almost to a conclusion. But the means of effecting this object, and my power over the army, will be much increased, and the army itself will be much improved, by the adoption of measures by His Majesty's Government to insure the application of whatever subsidy may be advanced to the Spanish Government to the payment of those troops actually employed in co-operation with the allied British and Portuguese army, in operations against the common enemy.'

## 691.

To Lord Somers.

Villa Toro, 11th Oct. 1812.

'Your son fell, as he had lived, in the zealous and gallant discharge of his duty. He had already distinguished himself in the course of the operations

A. G. O.

Villa Toro, 7th Oct. 1812.

'4. The Commander of the Forces desires that officers in command of detachments of convalescents or recruits on their march to join the army, will report to the commanding officer of every station through which they will pass, the state of their detachments, and whether they have or not obeyed the General Orders in regard to the march of detachments to join the army, particularly those of the 29th May, 13th, 17th, and 24th June, 4th Sept., and 17th Dec., 1809, 1st Dec. 1811, 23rd May and 6th Aug., 1812, and these reports are to be forwarded to Head Quarters, together with the report ordered to be sent from every station of the passage of troops.'

of the attack of the castle of Burgos to such a degree as to induce me to recommend him for promotion; and I assure your Lordship that if Providence had spared him to you, he possessed acquirements, and was endowed with qualities, to become one of the greatest ornaments of his profession, and to continue an honor to his family, and an advantage to his country.

I have no hope that what I have above stated to your Lordship will at all tend to alleviate your affliction on this melancholy occasion; but I could not deny myself the satisfaction of assuring you that I was highly sensible of the merits of your son, and that I most sincerely lament his loss.'

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692.

To Lieut. Colonel Gore, 33rd regt.\*

Villa Toro, 14th Oct. 1812.

'I am very anxious that no alteration should be made in the uniform or appointments of the regiment, which is not required by the orders of the army and the regulations of the service. Every thing is now, I believe, as I found it 20 years ago; and if once we begin to alter, we shall have nothing fixed, as there are no bounds to fancy.'

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693.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 18th Oct. 1812.

'Since I have had the honor of commanding His Majesty's troops in the Peninsula, I have never made any demand upon the Government, but have always considered it my duty to do the best I could with the means placed at my disposal; being certain that the Government were desirous of making them as large as circumstances would permit. As the same desire still exists in the ordnance, as well as other departments, I should wait till Government should deem it expedient to increase our means of this description; but finding those at my disposal to be very inadequate to the numbers even of the British army, and by no means sufficient in a view to the circumstances in which we are placed, I think it proper to bring the whole subject under your view.'

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694.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cabezon, 26th Oct. 1812.

'I have been so much occupied by the movements and operations of the army since the 18th instant, that I have not been able to write to your Lordship. The operations of the siege of the castle of Burgos continued nearly in the state in which they were when I addressed your Lordship on the 11th instant, until the 18th. Having at that time received a supply of musket ammunition from Santander, and having, while waiting for that necessary article, completed a mine under the church of San Roman, which stood in an outwork of the second line, I determined that the breach which we had effected in the second line should be stormed that evening, at the moment this mine should explode; and that at the same time the line should be attacked by escalade.

The mine succeeded, and Lieut. Colonel Brown lodged a party of the 9th caçadores and a detachment of Spanish troops of the regiment of Asturias

\* Major General Gore, killed at Bergen op Zoom.



in the outwork. A detachment of the King's German Legion under Major Wurmb carried the breach, and a detachment of the Guards succeeded in escalading the line; but the enemy brought such a fire upon these 2 last detachments from the 3rd line and the body of the castle itself, and they were attacked by numbers so superior, before they could receive the support allotted to them, that they were obliged to retire, suffering considerable loss. Major Wurmb was unfortunately killed.

It is impossible to represent in adequate terms my sense of the conduct of the Guards and German Legion upon this occasion; and I am quite satisfied, that if it had been possible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, those troops would have maintained them. Some of the men stormed even the 3rd line, and one was killed in one of the embrasures of that line; and I had the satisfaction of seeing, that if I could breach the wall of the castle, we should carry the place.

Sir H. Popham had succeeded in an experiment which he had tried for the removal of guns from Santander for the siege of Santoña; and knowing our wants of ordnance and stores, and that our battering guns and carriages had been destroyed by the enemy's fire, he sent two 24 pounders and stores from Santander, and I intended, as soon as they should arrive, to endeavor to breach the wall of the castle.

In the mean time, another mine was commenced under the second line from the church of San Roman, of which we remained in possession. The enemy had on the 13th moved forward a considerable body of infantry and 6 squadrons of cavalry from Briviesca, to reconnoitre our outpost at Monasterio. They attacked the piquet at the bridge in front of the town, but were repulsed by the fire of a detachment of the infantry of the Brunswick Legion. In this affair Lieut. Colonel the Hon. F. Ponsonby, who commanded at Monasterio, was wounded, but not severely; and I hope I shall soon again have the benefit of his assistance.

I had long had reports of the enemy's intention to advance for the relief of the castle of Burgos with the army of Portugal, reinforced by troops recently arrived from France, and with that part of the army of the North which was disposable; and they did advance in considerable force against the post of Monasterio, on the evening of the 18th. Lieut. Liznewsky of the Brunswick Legion, who commanded a piquet in S<sup>m</sup> Olalla, disobeyed his orders in remaining in that village upon the approach of the enemy; and he was taken with his piquet. The enemy consequently obtained possession of the heights which command the town of Monasterio, and our outpost was obliged to retire, on the morning of the 19th, to the Burgos side of the town.

I assembled the troops, excepting those necessary for carrying on the operations of the siege, as soon as it appeared, by the enemy's movement of the 18th, that they entertained serious intentions of endeavoring to raise it; and placed the allied army on the heights, having their right at Ibeas, on the Arlanzon, the centre at Riobena and Mijaradas, and the left at Soto Palacios. The enemy's army likewise assembled in the neighbourhood of Monasterio.

They moved forward on the evening of the 20th with about 10,000 men, to drive in our outposts from Quintana-palla and Olmos. The former with-

drew by order ; but the latter was maintained with great spirit by the Chasseurs Britanniques. Seeing a fair opportunity of striking a blow upon the enemy, I requested Lieut. General Sir E. Paget to move with the 1st and 5th divisions upon the enemy's right flank ; which movement having been well executed, drove them back upon Monasterio ; and our posts were replaced in Quintana-palla.

On the morning of the 21st, I received a letter from Sir R. Hill of the 17th, in which he acquainted me with the enemy's intention to move towards the Tagus, which was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was likely to become so by an army.

The castle of Chinchilla had surrendered on the 9th instant, and General Ballesteros, although he had entered Granada on the 17th September, had not assumed the position in La Mancha which he had been ordered to assume by the Spanish Government, at my suggestion.

The enemy's force in Valencia was supposed to amount to not less than 70,000 men, a very large proportion of which, it was expected, would be disposable for service out of that kingdom.

I had desired Lieut. General Sir R. Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that he could not maintain himself in it with advantage, and it was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the corps under my command might not be insulated in consequence of the movements which he should find himself under the necessity of making. I therefore raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 21st, and moved the whole army back towards the Duero.

I felt severely the sacrifice I was obliged to make. Your Lordship is well aware that I never was very sanguine in my expectations of success in the siege of Burgos, notwithstanding that I considered that success was attainable, even with the means in my power, within a reasonably limited period. If the attack on the first line, made on the 22nd or the 29th, had succeeded, I believe we should have taken the place, notwithstanding the ability with which the Governor conducted the defence, and the gallantry with which it was executed by the garrison. Our means were very limited ; but it appeared to me that if we should succeed, the advantage to the cause would be great, and the final success of the campaign would have been certain.

I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops during the siege of Burgos, particularly with the brigade of Guards. During the latter part of the siege, the weather was very unfavorable, and the troops suffered much from the rain. The officers at the head of the Artillery and Engineer departments, Lieut. Colonel Robe, and Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne, and Lieut. Colonel Dickson, who commands the reserve artillery, rendered me every assistance, and the failure of success is not to be attributed to them. By their activity we carried off every thing in the course of one night, excepting the three 18 pounders destroyed by the enemy's fire, and the 8 pieces of cannon which we had taken from the enemy on the night of the 19th ultimo, in the storm of the horn work, not having cattle to move them.

The enemy were not aware of our movements, and did not follow us till late on the 22nd, when 10,000 men encamped on this side of Burgos.



The British army encamped at Celada del Camino and Hornillos, with the light cavalry at Estepar and Buniel. We continued our march the following day; the right of the army to Torquemada, the left to Cordovilla, at which places we crossed the Pisuerga.

The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear guard consisted of the 2 light battalions K. G. L., under Colonel Halkett, and of Major General Anson's brigade of cavalry; and Major General Bock's brigade was halted at the Venta del Pozo, to give them support; the whole under the command of Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton. Don Julian Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzon: and the party of guerrillas heretofore commanded by the late Marquinez, in the hills on the left of our rear guard.

Major General Anson's brigade charged twice, with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy were detained above 3 hours by the troops under Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that village.

The rear guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the guerrillas on the left having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear guard of Major General Anson's brigade, and 4 or 5 squadrons of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss; and Lieut. Colonel Pelly, of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse shot, was taken prisoner.

The delay occasioned by this misfortune enabled the enemy to bring up a very superior body of cavalry, which was charged by Major General Bock's and Major General Anson's brigades, near the Venta del Pozo, but unsuccessfully; and our rear guard was hard pressed. The enemy made 3 charges on the 2 light battalions of the King's German Legion, formed in squares, but were always repulsed with considerable loss by the steadiness of these 2 battalions. They suffered no loss, and I cannot sufficiently applaud their conduct, and that of Colonel Halkett, who commanded them.

The exertions and conduct of Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, and of the officers and Staff attached to him, throughout this day, were highly meritorious; and although the charge made by the cavalry was not successful, I had the satisfaction of observing great steadiness in their movements. Major Bull's troop of horse artillery, under Major Downman and Captain Ramsay, distinguished themselves.

The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Dueñas, and left at Villa-muriel; and the 1st batt. 1st Guards joined us from Coruña. I halted there on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa-muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the 5th division of infantry, under the command of Major General Oswald, in the absence of Lieut. General Leith, on account of indisposition.

I had directed the 3rd batt. of the Royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over the Carrion at that place; but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point, that Lieut. Colonel Campbell thought it necessary to retire upon Villa-muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed Major General Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion with the right

of the 5th division. The bridge of Villa-muriel was destroyed, but the enemy discovered a ford, and passed over a considerable body of cavalry and infantry. I made Major General Pringle and Brig. General Barnes attack these troops, under the orders of Major General Oswald; in which attack the Spanish troops co-operated, and they were driven across the river with considerable loss. The fire upon the left had been very severe throughout the day, from which we suffered a good deal; and Major General Don M. de Alava was unfortunately wounded while urging on the Spanish infantry in the pursuit of the enemy.

I broke up this morning from the Carrion, and marched upon Cabezon del Campo, where I have crossed the Pisuerga.

The enemy appear to be moving in this direction from Dueñas. I propose to halt here tomorrow.'

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695.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Rueda, 31st Oct. 1812.

'Sir C. Stuart will show you my letter of this day and the accompanying dispatches, and you will see what a scrape we have been in, and how well we have got out of it. I say we have got out of it, because the enemy show no inclination to force the passage of the Duero.'

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696.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 31st Oct. 1812.

'The enemy crossed the Carrion on the 26th and 27th, and formed their army on the heights near Cigales on the last of those days, opposite our position on the left of the Pisuerga, and their advanced guard, about 2 miles in front of their main body, and half that distance from Cabezon.

On the 28th they extended their right, and endeavored to force the bridges of Simancas and Valladolid; the former of which was defended by Colonel Halkett, with his brigade of the 7th division, and the latter by the Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie, with the remainder of the 7th division. At length Colonel Halkett, being hard pressed, blew up the bridge. He at the same time detached the Brunswick light infantry regiment to Tordesillas, towards which quarter the enemy detached troops on the evening of the 28th. As soon as I found that this was the case, I thought it proper to break up from the Pisuerga, and to cross the Duero; which object was effected without difficulty on the 29th instant by the bridges of Puente de Duero and Tudela.

The bridge of Tordesillas was destroyed on the enemy's approach to that town on the evening of the 28th; and I had sent orders to the regiment of Brunswick Oels to take post on its ruins in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from repairing the bridge. I had the mortification, however, of learning, on the night of the 29th, that this regiment had been obliged to abandon its post; and as I had seen the enemy's whole army in march towards Tordesillas on that evening, it was obvious that no time was to be lost.

I therefore marched the army at an early hour yesterday morning to their left, and posted the troops on the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas, immediately opposite and near the bridge of Tordesillas. We found the



bridge nearly repaired on our arrival ; but the enemy have made no attempt to pass it ; and they have now no large assembly of troops in this neighbourhood.

I learn that some of them marched last night towards Valladolid, and others towards Toro. I have destroyed the bridge at Toro ; and I understand that it cannot be repaired for some days ; and it is obvious that the enemy cannot prevent the junction of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill's corps with mine ; and it is probable that when that shall be effected they will not be anxious to cross the Duero.

I have received letters from Lieut. General Hill to the 29th. The Tagus was every where fordable, and the enemy had passed a small body of troops over at Fuentidueña. Sir R. Hill collected his troops on the Jarama, thinking that that river afforded the most favorable line for defence.'

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 697.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Rueda, 1st Nov. 1812.

'The plans for raising brigades and for supplying the armies are nonsense.

I am very much afraid that the little experience which the country have had of the Government of the Cortes, has done that body no good. They are very unpopular every where, and in my opinion deservedly so. Nothing can be more cruel, absurd, or impolitic, than their decrees respecting the persons who have served the enemy. In fact, it deprives the state of some of the ablest and most honest of its servants, and submits to an inquiry the conduct of persons who have rendered the most important services of a secret and therefore an invidious nature.

It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not have produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation of the country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and thinking and talking of any other subject but Spain. How it is to end, God knows !'

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 698.

To Earl Bathurst.

Pitiegua, 7th Nov. 1812.

'It is scarcely necessary to consider what we shall do with our army after the French withdraw from Spain ; as that event is not at present very probable, unless Buonaparte should be so pressed in the north as to be induced to weaken his force. We have at present in operation against us, at least all the troops which were in the Andalusias, and the armies of the Centre and North, besides that of Portugal, without any effective addition to our force, excepting the little garrison of Cadiz.

My opinion is, however, that if we should get the French out of Spain, and the war should continue, we should carry on our operations on the southern frontier of France. I think so because we should have the hearty co-operation, and probably the direction of a Spanish and of a Portuguese army, besides our own ; and our means would be much greater than they would be on any other scene, would be applicable at a much earlier period, and would, moreover, be applied on the most vulnerable part of France.

In regard to all schemes in Italy and the north of Europe, founded on

this army; First, I would observe that you must reckon that 6 months would elapse, after you should decide on the measure and should issue your orders in Downing Street, before the army would be fit to engage in an operation in the new scene: Secondly, it would be but a small army, incapable of acting alone; and at the same that it would not be easy to connect it with any other: Thirdly, it must not be expected that any of the Powers in the north of Europe would give us the direction and management of their concerns, as we now have of those of the Portuguese, at least, if not of the Spaniards. The Powers of the north would willingly avail themselves of the bravery of our troops; they would share in our riches, partake of the plenty in our camps, which our good arrangements and money should procure for us; but they would share with us nothing but their distresses. Believe me, that you could not keep a British army long in a state of efficiency under such circumstances.

As for Italy, I have never seen any ground on which I could venture even to think of a military operation in that country. However, as I said before, unless I can beat Soult and the armies of Portugal and of the North united, we have no chance at present of getting the French out of Spain. I think Buonaparte will at last give up Spain; but that is a different question, not worth discussing now.'

## 699.

To Earl Bathurst.

Pitiegua, 8th Nov. 1812.

'The 2 corps of this army, particularly that which has been in the north, are in want of rest. They have been in the field, and almost constantly marching since the month of January last; their clothes and equipments are much worn, and a short period in cantonments would be very useful to them. The cavalry likewise are weak in numbers, and the horses rather low in condition. I should wish therefore to be able to canton the troops for a short time, and I should prefer the cantonments on the Tormes to those further in the rear.'

## 700.

To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 10th Nov. 1812.

'By all accounts, these are not practicable for troops. When I call a ford impracticable for troops, I do not mean to say that a single horseman cannot get over; but that cavalry, infantry, and artillery cannot. The river has certainly fallen since yesterday evening; but I believe no infantry soldier can pass now, even if a cavalry soldier can; and small piquets guarding the fords, and charging resolutely the first men who pass, or firing upon them, if they are piquets of infantry, will effectually prevent the passage of the fords.'

G. O.

Aldehuela de la Boveda, 16th Nov. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the General Officers commanding divisions will take measures to prevent the shameful and unmilitary practice of soldiers shooting pigs in the woods, so close to the camp and to the column of march, as that 2 dragoons were shot last night. And the Commander of the Forces was induced to believe this day on the march, that the flank patrols were skirmishing with the enemy.

2. He desires that notice may be given to the soldiers, that he has this day ordered 2 men to be hanged who were caught in the fact of shooting pigs; and he now orders that  
the



## 701.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 19th Nov. 1812.

'The troops under the command of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill crossed the Tormes at Alba on the 8th instant, and those under my command took the position on the heights of San Christoval de la Cuesta on the same day; Brig. General Pack's brigade occupying Aldea Lengua, and Brig. General Bradford's Cabrerizos, on our right, and the British cavalry covering our front. I had desired Lieut. General Sir R. Hill to occupy the town and castle of Alba with Major General Howard's brigade of the 2nd division, leaving Lieut. General Hamilton's Portuguese division on the left of the Tormes to support those troops, while the 2nd division was posted in the neighbourhood of the fords of Encinas and Huerta, and the 3rd and 4th divisions remained at Calvarrasa de Arriba in reserve.

On the 9th, the enemy drove in the piquets of Major General Long's brigade of cavalry in front of Alba; and Major General Long was obliged to withdraw his troops through Alba on the morning of the 10th. In the course of the day, the enemy's whole army approached our positions on the Tormes; and they attacked the troops in Alba with 20 pieces of cannon and a considerable body of infantry. They made no impression on them, however, and withdrew the cannon and the greatest part of the troops in the night, and this attack was never renewed.

I enclose Lieut. General Hamilton's report to Sir R. Hill of the transactions at Alba, which were highly creditable to the troops employed. From the 10th to the 14th, the time was passed in various reconnaissances, as well of the fords of the Tormes, as of the position which the troops under my command occupied, on the right of that river in front of Salamanca; and, on the 14th, the enemy crossed that river in force at the fords near Encinas, about 2 leagues above Alba.

I immediately broke up from San Christoval, and ordered the troops towards the Arapiles; and as soon as I had ascertained the direction of the enemy's march from the fords, I moved with the 2nd division of infantry, and all the cavalry I could collect, to attack them, leaving Lieut. General Sir R. Hill with the 4th, and Lieut. General Hamilton's divisions in front of Alba, to protect this movement, and the 3rd division in reserve on the Arapiles, to secure the possession of that position.

The enemy, however, was already too strong, and too strongly posted at Mozarbes to be attacked; and I confined myself to a cannonade of their cavalry, under cover of which I reconnoitred their position.

In the evening I withdrew all the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba to the Arapiles, leaving a small Spanish garrison in the castle, with

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the assistant provosts may attend their divisions on the march, and that they will do their duty, as well in respect to this as other offences.

3. The number of soldiers straggling from their regiments, for no reason excepting to plunder, is a disgrace to the army, and affords a strong proof of the degree to which the discipline of the regiments is relaxed, and of the inattention of the commanding and other officers of regiments to their duty, and to the repeated Orders of the army.

4. The Commander of the Forces considers the commanding officer of any regiment, from which there are men absent on a march, to be responsible; and he now desires that the Hon. Lieut. General Cole will put in arrest the commanding officer of the —rd regt., for having allowed soldiers to straggle from the ranks of the —rd regt., on the marches of yesterday and this day.'

directions to evacuate it, if they should find that the enemy retired, and having destroyed the bridge. In the course of the night and following morning I moved the greatest part of the troops through Salamanca, and placed Lieut. General Sir E. Paget with the 1st division of infantry on the right at Alda Tejada, in order to secure that passage for the troops over the Zurguen, in case the movements of the enemy on our right flank should render it necessary for me to make choice either of giving up my communication with Ciudad Rodrigo or Salamanca.

On the morning of the 15th, I found the enemy fortifying their position at Mozarbes, which they had taken up the night before, at the same time that they were moving bodies of cavalry and infantry towards their own left, and to our communications with Ciudad Rodrigo. It was obvious that it was the enemy's intention to act upon our communications; and as they were too strong, and too strongly posted for me to think of attacking them, I determined to move upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore put the army in march in 3 columns, and crossed the Zurguen, and then passed the enemy's left flank, and encamped that night on the Valmuza. We continued our march successively on the 16th, 17th, 18th, and this day, when part of the army crossed the Agueda, and the whole will cross that river tomorrow, and canton between the Agueda and Coa.

The enemy followed our movement on the 16th with a large body, probably the whole of the cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry; but they did not attempt to press upon our rear. They took advantage of the ground to cannonade our rear guard, consisting of the Light division, under Major General Alten, on the 17th, on its passage of the Huebra at San Muñoz, and occasioned some loss.

The troops have suffered considerably from the severity of the weather: which, since the 13th, has been worse than I have ever known at this season of the year. The soldiers, as usual, straggled from their regiments in search of plunder, and I am apprehensive that some may have fallen into the enemy's hands.

I am sorry to add, that we have had the misfortune to lose Lieut. General Sir E. Paget, who was taken prisoner on the 17th. He commanded the centre column, and the fall of rain having greatly injured the roads, and swelled the rivulets, there was an interval between the 5th and 7th divisions of infantry. Sir Edward rode alone to the rear to discover the cause of this interval, and as the road passed through a wood, either a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had got upon the road, or he missed the road, and fell into their hands in the wood. I understand that Sir Edward was not wounded, but I cannot sufficiently regret the loss of his assistance at this moment.

In my dispatch of the 7th inst., I communicated to your Lordship my opinion of the strength of the enemy as far as I could judge of it from the reports I had received, and from what I had seen. I have since learnt that General Caffarelli, with the army of the North, certainly remained joined with the army of Portugal. King Joseph left Madrid on the 4th inst., and arrived at Peñaranda on the 8th, leaving at Madrid the civil authorities of his Government, and a small garrison. These authorities and troops evacuated Madrid on the 7th, and marched for Castille; and Colonel Don J. Palecca took possession of that city.



Your Lordship will have seen General Ballesteros' letter of the 24th October to the Regency, from which you will observe that he disobeyed the orders of the Government given to him at my suggestion, to march his troops into La Mancha, and hang upon the enemy's left flank, because the Regency and Cortes had offered me the chief command of the Spanish armies. General Virues, who succeeded to the command upon General Ballesteros being removed, had not advanced farther than Jaen, when I last heard from that quarter on the 8th instant.

The whole of the enemy's disposable force in Spain was therefore upon the Tormes in the middle of this month, and they were certainly not less than 80,000 men, but more probably 90,000. Of these, 10,000 were cavalry; and as the army of Portugal alone had 100 pieces of cannon, it is probable that they had not less in all than 200 pieces.

I had 52,000 British and Portuguese troops, of which, 4000 were British cavalry, on the Tormes, and from 12,000 to 16,000 Spaniards; and, although I should have felt no hesitation in trying the issue of a general action on ground which I should have selected, I did not deem it expedient to risk the cause on the result of an attack of the enemy in a position which they had selected and strengthened.

I entertained hopes that I should have been able to prevent the enemy from crossing the Tormes, in which case, they must have attacked me in the position of San Christoval, or must have retired, leaving us in possession of the line of the Tormes. I considered either to be likely to be attended by so many advantages to the cause, that I deemed it expedient to delay my march from the Tormes till the enemy should be actually established on the left of that river; and if the weather had been more favorable, we should have made the movement without inconvenience or loss.

It is difficult to form a judgment of the enemy's intentions at present. They have not pushed any troops beyond the Yeltes, and very few beyond the Huebra. But it is obvious, and a general sense is said to prevail among the French officers, that until they can get the better of the allied army, it is useless to attempt the conquest and settlement of Spain; and as far as I can form a judgment from one of Marshal Soult's letters to the King in cipher, which was intercepted, and fell into my hands some time ago, it was his opinion, and he urged that Portugal should be made the seat of the war.

The result of the campaign, however, though not so favorable as I at one moment expected, or as it would have been, if I could have succeeded in the attack of the castle of Burgos, or if General Ballesteros had made the movement into La Mancha which was suggested, is still so favorable, that this operation appears out of the question.

The strong places of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz being in our possession, and Almeida being re-established, it is not easy for the enemy to penetrate by either of the great entrances into Portugal; and although the 2 former of these places (particularly the first mentioned) are neither in the state of defence nor garrisoned as I should wish to see them, having deprived the enemy of their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines in Andalusia, at Madrid, at Salamanca, and Valladolid, it does not appear possible that these places should be attacked.

I conclude, therefore, that for the present they will canton their army in

Old Castille, and in the valley of the Tagus, and will wait for the arrival of fresh reinforcements and means from France.'

## 702.

To —, Esq., late Lieut. —th Dragoons.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 21st Nov. 1812.

' You are much mistaken if you suppose that any thing which occurred to you in this country was occasioned by any feeling of irritation on my part, or any thing but a desire to uphold the discipline and subordination of the army.

I was very sorry that you fell the victim of great and persevering indiscretion and misapplication of very good talents; and I am happy to find that you are sensible of your error, and desirous of beginning your career again with a determination to avoid the conduct in future which has occasioned your misfortunes.

It is quite impossible that you can be restored to your rank in the service; and I wish you would consider well, whether, at your time of life, with your talents and your prospects in other professions, it is worth your while to serve as a volunteer in a regiment of dragoons, in order eventually to be appointed a Cornet, thence to continue to rise to an officer. At all events, it will be necessary that you should have the permission of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief to serve even as a volunteer.'

## 703.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 23rd Nov. 1812.

' I received by the last post your letter of the 27th October. When one army is so inferior in numbers to another as ours is to the French army, now assembled in Castille, its operations must depend in a great degree upon those of its opponent. It is impossible therefore for me at this period to point out what line I shall follow. The enemy have abandoned Madrid, and having given up all their communications with the north, solely with a view to collect a still larger force against us, there is no diversion which would answer at present to effect an alteration in our relative numbers, even if I could depend upon the Spaniards to do any thing. But I am quite in despair about them. The only man among them who ever did any thing (Ballesteros) is gone; and I am apprehensive that it will be quite impossible to employ him again. But even he never did more than give employment for a short period to one or at most 2 divisions of the enemy's army. Then there is another circumstance which must be attended to, and that is the situation of our own army. It has been actively employed since the beginning of last January, and requires rest. The horses of the cavalry, and artillery in particular, require both that and good food and care during the winter; and the discipline of the infantry requires to be attended to as is usual in all armies after so long a campaign, and one of so much activity.

I believe that the enemy require repose as much, if not more than we do; and that their immense numbers are rather embarrassing to them in a country already exhausted. But I am not quite certain that they do not propose to penetrate into Portugal this winter. I hope the enterprise will end fatally to them; but our troops will suffer a good deal if they are to



have a winter campaign, and if the weather should continue as severe as it has been since the 15th of this month.

I believe that I have under-rated rather than over-rated the enemy's force. They say themselves at Salamanca that they have 90,000 infantry and 14,000 cavalry; and their demand for provisions from the country is 140,000 rations daily. I think they have 90,000 men altogether, including from 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry. The morning state will show what we have.

It is not easy to form a judgment in Spain of the strength of the enemy's armies. The disposition of the Spaniards to exaggerate their own advantages induces the best intentioned among them to deceive; and no individual will ever allow that the French have more men than he has seen himself. The numbers of the army now in Castille have been stated to me at 15,000, and at almost every number from 15,000 to 90,000. I have never found myself mistaken in my estimate of the numbers of the enemy, when I relied upon the returns, making a reasonable abatement for losses during the period elapsed since their date. The only occasion on which I have been seriously mistaken was at Burgos, when I relied upon the reports of the country; and was induced to believe that Sir H. Popham's operations would continue to give employment to Caffarelli. But I afterwards found that the army of Portugal had been very largely reinforced in cavalry as well as in infantry, to a larger amount even than I stated in my dispatch to Lord Bathurst, as it was 31 battalions instead of 23, as I stated, and the 130th regt. There were besides 2 divisions of infantry, and from 1000 to 1400 cavalry of the army of the North; and most certainly when I saw the whole drawn out near Cigales, they were not less than 46,000, of which 5000 are cavalry. Soult has 6 divisions of infantry, and 16 regiments of cavalry. The gross numbers of his army last April were 65,000. He has since sustained no great loss excepting the garrison of Badajoz, 5000 men. But I strike off from his gross strength, for losses, sickness, and men on his strength who were employed principally in the siege of Cadiz, 25,000 or 30,000, including the garrison of Badajoz; and I believe his army consists of 35,000 men, of which from 4000 to 5000 are cavalry. The army of the King, when it quitted Madrid in August, was from 20,000 to 22,000 men, including *Juramentados*, and an Italian division belonging to Suchet's army, under General Palombini, and the 16th regt., likewise belonging to Suchet. Supposing the King to have lost by desertion, or to have sent away, all the *Juramentados*, and that the troops belonging to Suchet's army were left in Valencia, there will still remain the French troops of the King's guard, 5000 men, about 3500 more French and German infantry (I know the numbers of the regiments), which belong to the army of the Centre, and from 2000 to 3000 good French cavalry. I believe all this put together will amount to 90,000 men.

What are our prospects against this army? At present none certainly. In the spring, as soon as the green forage shall appear, I shall be able to take the field with a very large British and Portuguese force, probably larger than we have yet produced, and more efficient I hope in cavalry and artillery. I have sent the army of Galicia home; and I hope advantage will be taken of the winter to do something with them; but unless some changes are effected I shall certainly be disappointed. There are besides, applicable

to the *guerra* in Castille, the Spanish army lately under the command of Ballesteros, and the troops under the command of Elio.

If I should find that the French remain quiet during the winter, I propose to go to Cadiz for a short time, to endeavor to put matters upon a better footing, at least as far as regards the armies of Galicia, and that lately under the command of Ballesteros, which must be brought forward in co-operation with us. It will likewise be necessary to apprise the Government of the inconvenience and danger of the system on which they have been acting in the provinces which have been freed from the enemy; and of the inefficiency of all the persons selected for public trusts; and of the inconvenience of loading the resources of the provinces with the maintenance of such people. It is useless to trouble your Lordship with a detail of these facts; but I can only say that, if I cannot by the exercise of fair influence in concert with my brother produce some alteration, it is quite hopeless to continue the contest in the Peninsula with the view of obliging the French to evacuate it by force of arms. After this detail of facts, your Lordship will see that it is very useless to trouble you with my opinion of what ought to be done after the French shall leave the Peninsula, more particularly as I have already communicated that opinion to Lord Bathurst.

From what I see in the newspapers I am much afraid that the public will be disappointed at the result of the last campaign, notwithstanding that it is in fact the most successful campaign in all its circumstances, and has produced for the cause more important results than any campaign in which a British army has been engaged for the last century. We have taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and Salamanca; and the Retiro surrendered. In the mean time the allies have taken Astorga, Guadalaxara, and Consuegra, besides other places taken by Duran and Sir H. Popham. In the months elapsed since January, this army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners; and they have taken and destroyed, or have themselves the use of, the enemy's arsenals in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga, Seville, the lines before Cadiz, &c.; and upon the whole we have taken and destroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3000 pieces of cannon. The siege of Cadiz has been raised, and all the countries south of the Tagus have been cleared of the enemy.

We should have retained still greater advantages I think, and should have remained in possession of Castille and Madrid during the winter, if I could have taken Burgos, as I ought early in October; or if Ballesteros had moved upon Alcaraz as he was ordered, instead of intriguing for his own aggrandizement.

The fault of which I was guilty in the expedition to Burgos was, not that I undertook the operation with inadequate means, but that I took there the most inexperienced instead of the best troops. I left at Madrid the 3rd, 4th, and Light divisions, who had been with myself always before; and I brought with me that were good the 1st division, and they were inexperienced. In fact the troops ought to have carried the exterior line by esca-  
lade on the first trial on the 22nd September, and if they had we had means sufficient to take the place. They did not take the line because — — —, the field officer, who commanded, did that which is too common in our army. He paid no attention to his orders, notwithstanding the pains I took



in writing them, and in reading and explaining them to him twice over. He made none of the dispositions ordered; and instead of regulating the attack as he ought, he rushed on as if he had been the leader of a forlorn hope, and fell, together with many of those who went with him. He had my instructions in his pocket; and as the French got possession of his body, and were made acquainted with the plan, the attack could never be repeated. When he fell, nobody having received orders what to do, nobody could give any to the troops. I was in the trenches, however, and ordered them to withdraw. Our time and ammunition were then expended, and our guns destroyed in taking this line; than which at former sieges we had taken many stronger by assault.

I see that a disposition already exists to blame the Government for the failure of the siege of Burgos. The Government had nothing to say to the siege. It was entirely my own act. In regard to means, there were ample means both at Madrid and Santander for the siege of the strongest fortress. That which was wanting at both places was means of transporting ordnance and military stores to the place where it was desirable to use them.

The people of England, so happy as they are in every respect, so rich in resources of every description, having the use of such roads, &c., will not readily believe that important results here frequently depend upon 50 or 60 mules, more or less, or a few bundles of straw to feed them; but the fact is so, notwithstanding their incredulity. I could not find means of moving even one gun from Madrid. ——— is a gentleman who piques himself upon his overcoming all difficulties. He knows the length of time it took to find transport even for about 100 barrels of powder and a few hundred thousand rounds of musket ammunition which he sent us. As for the 2 guns which he endeavored to send, I was obliged to send our own cattle to draw them; and we felt great inconvenience from the want of those cattle in the subsequent movements of the army.'

## 704.

To Officers commanding Divisions and Brigades.

Freneda, 28th Nov. 1812.

'I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c., which are already in progress by different lines of communication to the several divisions of brigades.

G. O.

Freneda, 25th Nov. 1812.

'3. It is very desirable that the General Officers of the army, and the commanding officers of regiments of cavalry and infantry, should endeavor to economise the forage and other resources of the country, otherwise they must expect that the troops and horses will suffer very serious privations during the winter.

4. The Commander of the Forces has taken the precaution of having the grass mowed and saved as hay in many parts of the country in which the troops are now, or may be cantoned, which resource is ample for the food of all the animals of the army during the winter, if duly taken care of and distributed under the regulations of the service.

5. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to learn, however, that much of what was thus provided in this part of the country, has been already wasted or trampled upon and destroyed, and in particular 35,000 rations of hay, which were at Espeja, and of which Lieut. ——— took possession, have been destroyed.

He entreats the attention of General Officers and commanding officers of regiments to these Orders, as they relate not only to the hay provided by the orders of the Commander of the Forces, but to the forage and other resources of the country.'

But besides these objects, I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the general and other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late campaign to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

It must be obvious however to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which the troops had such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy.

We must look therefore for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army, to some cause besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers of the army; and I am quite certain that if their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

Unfortunately the in-experience of the officers of the army has induced many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which of all others every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments; for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions; and the regulation of all that belongs to his food and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

These are the points then to which I most earnestly intreat you to turn your attention and the attention of the officers of the regiments under your



command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The Commanding Officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant inspection and superintendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments; and they must endeavor to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority; and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to punishments by the sentence of courts martial, will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of which there are too many complaints, when they well know that their officers and their non-commissioned officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them.

The Commanding Officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant, real inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view both should be inspected daily.

In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and lamented in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the French soldiers cooked in comparison with those of our army. The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of every other description, the want of attention of the officers to the orders of the army, and the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c. to be cooked; and it would soon be found that if this practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named, as it ought to be, equally as for parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.

You will of course give your attention to the field exercise and discipline of the troops. It is very desirable that the soldiers should not lose the habits of marching, and the division should march 10 or 12 miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the division should be dry.

But I repeat that the great object of the attention of the General and Field Officers must be to get the Captains and Subalterns of the regiments to understand and perform the duties required from them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored and maintained during the next campaign.'

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G. O.

Freneda, 30th Nov. 1812.

'16. Great inconvenience arising in consequence of surgeons leaving their regiments for the purpose of paying into the military chest the hospital surpluses, or receiving therefrom the amount of deficiencies, it is directed in future, that the Paymaster shall settle their accounts at the time they receive the subsistence of their respective regiments.'

705.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 2nd Dec. 1812.

'I have received your letter of the 28th November, and although there are other points on which I have to write to you, and on which I have proposed to write this day, I shall not delay to answer that letter immediately. The way in which I have always considered your situation in the army, was as Marshal of the Portuguese army, and of course next in command to myself, as long as I should be in a situation to exercise any command at all.

An officer has been from time to time appointed second in command to this army, upon whom it was the intention of the King's Ministers that the command of the allied army should devolve, in case any circumstance should deprive me of the command of the army.

I imagined that it had been explained to, and understood by, the Portuguese Government, when you were sent to command the Portuguese army, that the officer appointed to command the British army was to command both; and I was not aware, till there was a discussion with the Regency upon this point, I believe in the beginning of 1811, that this point had not been explained, and that I commanded the allied army as Marshal General. This point not having been explained, it follows of course either that the British General Officer, second in command, must, in the event of my being deprived of the command, be made Marshal General; or the awkwardness must occur to which you refer, in regard to your own situation; or you must take the command of the allied army, and not the General Officer sent out by Government specially for the purpose of taking the command, in case circumstances should deprive me of it.

I have always felt the inutility and inconvenience of the office of second in command. It has a great and high sounding title, without duties or responsibility of any description; at the same time that it gives pretensions, the assertion of which are, and I believe you know I found them in one instance to be, very inconvenient. Every officer in an army should have some duty to perform, for which he is responsible; and I understand a General Officer commanding a division or larger body of troops to be in this situation. The second in command has none that any body can define; excepting to give opinions for which he is in no manner responsible, and which I have found one at least most ready to relinquish, when he found that they were not liked in England.

Having made known these sentiments to Lord Bathurst, Sir E. Paget was lately sent out with the explanation that he was coming as a Lieut. General in this army, but that Government looked to his succeeding to the command, in case circumstances should deprive me of it; so that the matter would stand in respect to any General Officer who should now be sent to fill his situation. In regard to your own situation in the army, what I have always felt was, that you had too many duties of a general nature to perform, and it was necessary to refer to you too often, to charge you with the details of command; and excepting on the occasion on which I requested you to take the command in the Alentejo in 1811, (which Hill had held,) during his absence, I have not desired you to take upon you such details.

The convenience of the service might, however, lead to a different deci-



sion ; and I have always felt that you were ready to take upon you any duty which might be imposed upon you whenever it should be necessary. From the contents of this letter you will observe that the conversation between us to which you refer, as having passed immediately previous to the battle of Salamanca, related on my part to the situation of the next in British rank to me, solely in the event of any circumstance depriving me of the command ; as I never entertained a doubt, particularly after the decision of the Commander in Chief, in which I entirely concurred, that you took your rank next to me in the allied army as Marshal.'

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 706.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 2nd Dec. 1812.

' I enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, in relation to his rank in the allied army, to which I beg to draw your attention.

The Commander in Chief having decided, upon reference to him in the year 1809, that officers in the service of His Majesty and the Prince Regent of Portugal should rank with each other according to the dates of their several commissions ; there is no doubt whatever that Marshal Sir W. Beresford, holding the rank of a Marshal, ranks next me in the allied army. I hold the rank of Marshal General in the allied army.

His Majesty's Government have thought proper from time to time to appoint a General Officer to be second in command to the British army, senior in rank in the British service to Sir W. Beresford, on which officer it has been the intention of His Majesty's Government that the command of the allied army should devolve, in case any circumstance should deprive me of the command.

It does not appear, however, that any explanation in regard to command has ever been had with the Portuguese Government, in order to remove the awkwardness which Marshal Sir W. Beresford notices ; and in point of fact I command the allied army now as Marshal General of the Portuguese army. In case circumstances should deprive me of the command, therefore, either the second in command of the British army must be made Marshal General likewise, or Marshal Beresford must quit the army at a moment when his absence might be interpreted to his disadvantage ; or he must assume the command of the allied army and not the officer selected by His Majesty's Government as the person on whom they wish it should devolve.

In case Government should think proper to send any General Officer out to replace Lieut. General Sir E. Paget, it is desirable they should advert to the circumstances affecting his situation, stated by Marshal Sir W. Beresford.'

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 707.

To Don J. de Carvajal, Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1812.

' Your Excellency and the Government have a right to expect from me an accurate representation of facts as they shall appear to me ; and you may depend upon it that I will perform this duty.

I am concerned to have to inform you that the discipline of the Spanish armies is in the very lowest state ; and their efficiency is, consequently, much deteriorated. Neither officers nor troops having been paid for months, nay,

some for years, it cannot be expected that the troops should be in very good order, or that there should exist much subordination in the service.

But circumstances have come to my knowledge, and under my view, lately, which show that the evil has taken deep root; and that it requires a stronger remedy than the mere removal of the causes, viz., want of pay, clothing, and necessaries, which have originally occasioned it. Not only are your armies undisciplined and inefficient, and both officers and soldiers insubordinate from want of pay, provisions, clothing, and necessaries, and the consequent endurance of misery for a long period of time, but the habits of indiscipline and insubordination are such, that even those corps which have been well clothed and regularly paid by my directions, and have, to my knowledge, seldom, if ever, felt any privations for more than a year, are in as bad a state, and as little to be depended upon as soldiers, as the others. The desertion is immense, even from the troops last adverted to. I can assure your Excellency, that the officers of the army in general (with some exceptions of officers, General and on the Staff, as well as attached to regiments) take but little pains to apply a remedy to these evils; and, upon the whole, I am sorry to acknowledge to your Excellency, that I consider that I have undertaken a task of which the result is as little promising as that which was ever undertaken by any individual.

I certainly was not aware, till very lately, of the real state of the Spanish army, or I should have hesitated before I should have charged myself with such an Herculean labor as its command; but having accepted the command, I will not relinquish the task because it is laborious and the success unpromising; but will exercise it as long as I shall possess the confidence of the authorities who have conferred it upon me. It will be necessary, however, that the Government should arm me with powers to enable me to perform this task. It is my opinion,

First; that officers should be promoted, and should be appointed to command solely at my recommendation.

Secondly; that I should have the power of dismissing from the service those whom I should think deserving such punishment.

Thirdly; that those resources of the State which are applicable to the payment or equipment, or supply of the troops, should be applied in such manner as I might recommend.

Fourthly; in order to enable me to perform my duties, it will be necessary that the Chief of the Staff, and such limited number of the Staff Officers of the army as may be thought necessary, should be sent to my head quarters; and that the Government should direct that all military reports of all descriptions should be sent to me; and I shall, of course, make my reports to your Excellency.

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I should wish also to defer to a future opportunity, to draw your attention to the alterations which the existing state of the country requires should be made in the powers of the Captain General of the provinces, and the Intendants respectively. We must not conceal from ourselves that there is but little authority of any description whatever in the provinces which have been occupied by the enemy; and even that little depends on the exercise of



military power. It is vain to expect that a gentleman called an Intendant will exercise the power to realise the resources of the country for the state, or even for the military, without the assistance of a military force; which military force, in the existing state of the army, will destroy more than its efforts would produce, even supposing that the military chief should be at all times disposed and ready to assist in supporting the civil authority of the Intendant.

I am aware that it is wrong in principle to invest military men with civil powers; but when the country is in danger that must be adopted which will tend most directly to save it; when the enemy is in the country that must be done which tends most directly to drive him out, whatever may be the constitutional principles which may be invaded by those measures. I throw this out at present for your consideration, reserving myself to a future time to make a distinct proposition on this subject.'

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708.

To H. R. H. the Duke of York.

Freneda, 6th Dec. 1812.

'My reason for adopting this arrangement is, that I have for the service in this country the whole number of men of which these provisional battalions will be composed, all of whom are seasoned to the service and climate. Experience has shown that they could not be replaced by three times their numbers brought from England, or any other part of the world. However, if your Royal Highness disapproves of the arrangement, it will be easy to break up these battalions, and to send the officers and men home, upon receiving your Royal Highness' orders to that effect.'

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709.

To Colonel Torrens.

Freneda, 6th Dec. 1812.

'I have frequently mentioned to you the great inconvenience which I felt from the constant change of officers in charge of every important department, or filling every situation of rank or responsibility with this army. No man can be aware of the extent of this inconvenience who has not got this great machine to keep in order and to direct; and together with the British army, the Spanish and Portuguese concerns, the labor which these constant changes occasion is also of the most distressing description. No sooner is an arrangement made, the order given, and the whole in a train of execution than a gentleman comes out who has probably but little knowledge of the practical part of his duty in any country, and none whatever in this most difficult of all scenes of military operation. Nobody in the British army ever reads a regulation or an order as if it were to be a guide for his conduct, or in any other manner than as an amusing novel; and the consequence is, that when complicated arrangements are to be carried into execution (and in this country the poverty of its resources renders them all complicated), every gentleman proceeds according to his fancy; and then, when it is found that the arrangement fails (as it must fail, if the order is not strictly obeyed), they come upon me to set matters to rights, and thus my labor is increased ten fold.

The officers on the Staff of the British army are effectives in regiments

and considering that it is most important to every army to have good and efficient Staff officers, I do not know that the Colonels of regiments have any right to interfere to prevent the appointment of officers to the Staff from their regiments, or to occasion by their influence the relinquishment of their offices on the Staff when they think proper. If they have this power of interference, it is one which may very materially affect the public interests, and it ought not to be exercised lightly or with caprice. At the same time I admit the necessity of keeping regiments well officered, but I should wish to know who is more interested in keeping regiments well officered than the officer who commands the army?

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710.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 10th Dec. 1812.

'It is certain that Government have always thought it necessary to have an officer here, selected by them to succeed to the command, in case I should be deprived of it; and there are some of the Government so partial to old practice and precedent, that they do not like a departure from either, in not calling this officer "second in command." This officer might have been very useful in the days of councils of war, &c.; it may look well in a newspaper to see that such a General Officer is "second in command." But there is nobody in a modern army who must not see that there is no duty for the second in command to perform, and that this office is useless. It is at the same time inconvenient, as it gives the holder pretensions which cannot be gratified except at the public inconvenience.

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I propose to get into fortune's way if I should be able to assemble an army sufficiently strong; and we may make a lucky hit in the commencement of next campaign. But it is obvious that we cannot expect to save the Peninsula by military efforts, unless we can bring forward the Spaniards in some shape or other; and I want to see how far I can venture to go, in putting the Spanish army in a state to do something. In your life you never saw any thing so bad as the Galicians. Yet they are the finest body of men and best movers I have ever seen. God knows the prospect of success from this journey of mine is not bright; but still it is best to try something.'

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711.

To Colonel Torrens.

Badajoz, 20th Dec. 1812.

'I enclose some letters which I have received from Dr. M'Grigor, regarding certain promotions made by the Medical Board. I entirely agree with Dr. M'Grigor in opinion, that it is no encouragement to those who are performing their duty with the army in this country to see, that when by their merits and exertions they have attracted the notice of their immediate superiors, and of the officers under whose command they are serving, and have been recommended for promotion, others have been preferred to them who have quitted the arduous service on which these have remained, probably to solicit from the Medical Board the promotion which these have been found to deserve by their exertions. The officers promoted by the Medical Board (one of them Mr. Higgins I know is) are meritorious; but neither deserve promotion equally with either Dr. Tyce or Mr. Guthrie.



I have frequently made you acquainted with my sense of the inconvenience felt by the constant change of the officers employed in every branch of the service in this country. One of the principal causes of these changes is the practice of going to England to apply for promotion which ought to be acquired by service here ; and I acknowledge that I do not see the utility of my forwarding the recommendations of the heads of departments of those officers whom they deem deserving of promotion, if to these recommendations are to be preferred the claims and applications of those who quit the service here, to go home to make them.'

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 712.

To Don J. de Carvajal.

Cadiz, 25th Dec. 1812.

'Fourthly : I required that, in order to enable me to perform my duties, the Chief of the Staff, and such limited number of the Staff Officers of the army as might be thought necessary, should be sent to my head quarters ; and that the Government should direct that all military reports, of all descriptions, should be sent to me ; and that I should, of course, make my reports to your Excellency.

I consider myself as the Commander in Chief of the Spanish armies, under the Government, with whom I am to correspond, through the medium of your Excellency. No officer, according to the *Ordenanzas*, should address himself to the Government, excepting through me, and the answer and orders of the Government should reach him through the same channel. The Chief of the Staff would be the channel through which I should receive the reports of the army, and should convey to the army the orders of the Government and my own. This mode of transacting business is conformable to the common practice of all armies, and the adoption of it is essentially necessary in that of which it is desired I should take the command.'

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 713.

To H. R. H. the Duke of York.

Cadiz, 26th Dec. 1812.

'Experience has shown us in the Peninsula that a soldier who has got through one campaign is of more service than 2, or even 3, newly arrived from England ; and this applies to the cavalry equally with every other description of troops. Under these circumstances, if it should meet with your Royal Highness' approbation, I should prefer to keep as many of the old regiments as I can with the army, reducing the establishments of those which could not mount more than 2 complete squadrons to that number, and to send home the officers and non-commissioned officers of the third squadrons.'

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 714.

To Don J. Carvajal.

Cadiz, 27th Dec. 1812.

'Experience has shown that, wherever there exist authorities independent of each other, they must clash, and the service must suffer, unless their acts should be vigilantly controlled by the superintending authority of the Government. I shall not contend for the expediency of the contrary practice in a well regulated state, but it cannot be expected that any province of Spain

should be in a state fit to be governed according to the best principle, viz., the separation of the local authorities. Even in countries where these systems and principles are perfectly understood, and have been put in practice for centuries, and of which the tranquillity has not been lately disturbed by a foreign enemy, it has frequently been necessary to place the political and military authority in one hand. How much more necessary, therefore, must it be in provinces just recovered from the usurpation of the enemy, in which the authority of the Government is imperfectly established, with which the Government has but little if any communication, to provide against the clashing of independent authorities in the administration of the local affairs?’

## 715.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cadiz, 29th Dec. 1812.

‘In regard to the ladies, they have certainly no *right* to be lodged in billets; but it would be cruel to deprive them of that accommodation. I do not believe I can authorise their having this advantage by an order; and the point can be settled only in communication with the Government. If the matter could be allowed to go on, as it is now, I would write a letter to Peacocke to be circulated among the ladies, which would give them a little advice on this subject, and make them better behaved.’

## 716.

SPEECH IN THE CORTES.

Cadiz, 30th Dec. 1812.

‘I should not have requested to be permitted to pay my respects in person to this august body, if I had not been encouraged to make the application by the honor which the Cortes conferred upon me on the 27th instant, in sending a deputation to congratulate me on my arrival in this city; a distinction which I attribute to the favor and partiality with which they have on every occasion received the services which it has fallen to my lot to render to the Spanish nation.

I beg leave to repeat my acknowledgments to the Cortes for this honor, as well as for the various marks of their favor and confidence which I have received; and to assure them that my efforts shall be unceasingly directed to forward the just and interesting cause of the Spanish nation.

I shall not take up, with further professions, the time of this assembly, upon the wisdom, discretion, and firmness of whose conduct, under the will of Divine Providence, the result of all our exertions depends. Not only your own countrymen have their eyes fixed on you, Gentlemen, but the whole world is interested in the success of your endeavors to save this nation from the general wreck; and in the establishment within it of a system of government founded on just principles, which shall promote and secure the happiness and prosperity of your countrymen, and the greatness of your country.’

## 717.

ADDRESS TO THE SPANISH ARMY.

Cadiz, 1st Jan. 1813.

‘The army have been already informed that the Command in Chief of



the armies of Spain has been conferred on the Captain General Lord Wellington, Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo. Although this is the first time that his Excellency has the honor of addressing the army as its Commander, he has long been acquainted with its merits, its sufferings, and its state; and in taking upon himself the exercise of a command so highly honorable to him, he wishes to assure the General Officers, officers, and troops, of his earnest desire that his arrangements may tend to enable them to serve their country with advantage, and that while under his command the honor of their profession may be advanced.

It is necessary, however, that at the same time that the utmost attention will be paid by the Government to what will tend to the comfort of the soldiers and the convenience of the officers of the army, the discipline established by the Royal *Ordenanzas* should be maintained; as without discipline and order, not only is an army unfit to be opposed to an enemy in the field, but it becomes a positive injury to the country by which it is maintained. The Commander in Chief trusts, therefore, that every effort will be made by the General and other officers to enforce and maintain in every particular the discipline ordered by the Royal *Ordenanzas*; and he assures them that, at the same time that he will be happy to draw the notice of the Government, and to extol their good conduct, he will not be backward in noticing any inattention on the part of the army to the duties required from them by the Royal *Ordenanzas*, or any breach of discipline and order by the soldiers.'

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 718.

To Major General the Hon. C. Stewart.

Cadiz, 2nd Jan. 1813.

'I have come here to try "to organise the poles," which appears to be a work something of the same kind with that which Dumouriez describes so well in his life. I have made some progress; but the libellers have set to work, and I am apprehensive that the Cortes will take the alarm, and that I shall not be able to do all the good I might otherwise.'

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 719.

To Major General Campbell, commanding at Alicante.

Cadiz, 4th Jan. 1813.

'You appear to be aware of the effect produced on the enemy's situation, by the measure of putting the allied British and Portuguese armies in cantonments for the winter. It is unfortunate that the necessity for this measure existed, but the disparity of numbers was so great, and so much to our disadvantage, that I could not keep the field in Castille in November; and not being able to keep the field, it was better that I should place the allied army in cantonments, in which it was likely they would recover their strength and efficiency, even though the enemy should by this measure enjoy the advantage of which he has availed himself.

It is evident, however, that till the allied British and Portuguese army under my immediate command shall again take the field, no operation of any consequence can be undertaken by any of the allied corps in other parts of the Peninsula. In the mean time I have come here to endeavor to organise the Spanish armies, and to come to an understanding with the Govern-

ment regarding the means of their support in the field ; and upon my return to head quarters, in which direction I shall set out in a day or two, I shall send you directions respecting the operations which you are to undertake when the campaign shall commence, and the period at which you are to undertake them. If, however, before you shall receive the directions, you should consider yourself sufficiently strong, and circumstances should enable you to strike an important blow against the French force opposed to you, or against their possessions on the east coast, I beg that you will strike it.'

720.

To Colonel Torrens.

Niza, 22nd Jan. 1813.

' I do not understand what responsibility attaches to the removal of officers from situations which they are supposed incapable of filling, particularly from situations of comparatively subordinate rank. Odium may attach to the person who removes them without otherwise providing for them ; but I do not believe that either His Royal Highness or I could ever be called upon, as public men, to account for the removal of any of them.

I feel strongly, and others under my command feel still more strongly, the inconvenience of being obliged to employ some at least of the officers above mentioned ; but, in every letter which I have written upon a subject of this description, I have protested against any thing harsh being done to the officer who I wished should be removed. I have not by me at present the copy of my letter to you upon the subject of these officers, and I cannot be certain that it did not contain the same request, and I keep His Royal Highness' orders by me till I shall see whether it does or not. If it does not, I beg to refer the order for his further consideration, and to request that none of these officers should be removed unless His Royal Highness has it in his power to employ them on the home Staff or elsewhere.

I do not mean to alter my report of them in any degree when I state that I believe them all to be zealous in the service ; but in my opinion, and in the opinion of those under me, and who are more immediately in communication with them, they are not fit for their situations ; at the same time I wish they should not be removed unless they can be otherwise provided for. I beg that it may be understood that I am ready to bear all the responsibility or odium which can attach to the person who causes their removal.

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In regard to the latter part of your letter, respecting " the difficulty of setting aside these General Officers from serving with the army in the field, who have creditably risen to high rank," it is impossible to reconcile it with the former part, in which you talk of the responsibility, or rather odium, attaching to the removal of officers found or supposed to be incapable of performing service in the field. I request that General Officers should not be sent out ; and when those are sent out whom I conceive not to be fit for their situations, I request that they may be removed. I am then to bear the responsibility or odium of their removal.

What a situation then is mine ! It is impossible to prevent incapable men from being sent to the army ; and, when I complain that they are sent, I am to be responsible. Surely the responsibility or odium for the removal of such persons ought to attach to " the difficulty of setting them aside," and



not to the person to whom it belongs officially to represent that they are not capable of filling their situations.'

## 721.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

'I see that Lord Temple has given notice of a motion in the House of Commons after the holidays, respecting the affairs of the Peninsula, which is intended, I conclude, to collect all the independent parties in one attack upon the Government. If I were in England, I should certainly do the Government the justice they deserve; and I hope, that let who will be the assailants, the Government will feel no scruple in making every use of my letters to you and Lord Liverpool in their own defence; particularly parts of a private letter to Lord Liverpool of the 23rd November, and a dispatch to yourself on the Sicilian expedition of the 3rd August last.'

## 722.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

'In the year 1809 I had a correspondence on the relative rank of British and Portuguese officers with the late Commander in Chief, who decided on the 10th July on queries put to him by me on the 7th June, that British and Portuguese officers were to rank with each other according to the dates of their several commissions; and that British officers holding superior Portuguese commissions, were to rank in the allied army according to the dates of those commissions, their British commissions being dormant, although their rank in the British service should be progressive. I refer you to this correspondence, which, although it does not refer to the commission of the Marshal, is, in my opinion, decisive on the question of his rank, and directly contrary to the practice stated by His Royal Highness to prevail in the Austrian service.

With this decision the question comes to be decided, who is to command the allied British and Portuguese army in the Peninsula, in case I, the Marshal General, should be deprived of it by any of the accidents of the service. Marshal Sir W. Beresford, or a Lieut. General of the British army, sent out by the British Government specially to take the command in case of the occurrence of this event? The statement of the question is sufficient to decide it. The Marshal bears the higher commission, and according to the deliberate decision of the late Commander in Chief, he must take the command; unless the British Government should come to some understanding with the Portuguese Government, that the officer whom they will send out shall take the command of the allied army, in case I should be deprived of it. If such an agreement should be made, it will, of course, preclude the operation, in regard to the command of the army, of the principle broadly laid down by the late Commander in Chief, and invariably acted upon in respect to all the other ranks of the army.

What Marshal Beresford and I ask for, is a settlement of the question; not in his favor, if Government should deem it expedient that it should be otherwise; but that he should not be in the awkward predicament of being obliged to claim the command of the army against the wishes of his own Government, or of quitting the army at a critical moment, in case of the oc-

currence of the event for which it is intended to provide. I cannot state positively, but I do not think he has any intention to retire, if the question should be decided against his rank; I know that I would not retire, and I shall exert all the influence I can possess over his judgment to induce him to remain. But the point must be settled between the two Governments, if it is intended to depart from the principle laid down by the late Commander in Chief, in his letter of the 10th July, 1809.

In my opinion the office of second in command of an army in these days, in which the use of councils of war has been discontinued, and the Chief in command is held severely responsible for every thing that passes, is not only useless, but injurious to the service. A person without defined duties, excepting to give flying opinions, from which he may depart at pleasure, must be a nuisance in moments of decision; and whether I have a second in command or not, I am determined always to act according to the dictates of my own judgment, being quite certain that I shall be responsible for the act, be the person who he may, according to whose opinion it has been adopted. One person in that situation may give me a little more trouble than another; but substantially I must be indifferent as to whether it is the Marshal, or any of the Lieut. Generals who have been named on the occasion. I must be out of the way when any one of them should be called upon to act in command; and, excepting that feeling which every man must have for what is to occur after he is gone, which is not of a personal nature, I can have no preference to one officer over another as my successor.

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The opinion which I have entertained, that as long as I remained in command of the allied army, Marshal Beresford was next to myself, is, as I have shown, consistent with the decision of the late Commander in Chief, and it is not inconsistent with the appointment of a British Lieut. General to take the command of the army, to the exclusion of Marshal Beresford, when I should be removed from the command. It is not my business to start difficulties in the way of the arrangements of Government, and of the Commander in Chief, particularly on such a point as the appointment of a successor to myself; but when the difficulty is started by another person interested, I must give my opinion to Government, and I must say that they will place Marshal Beresford in an awkward situation if the case should occur, unless the decision of the late Commander in Chief should be altered, and the question should be settled with the Portuguese Government.'

723.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

'I am desirous, if possible, not to reduce this army in old soldiers. One soldier who has served one or two campaigns, will render more service than two recently sent from England; at the same time that, probably, if the old soldiers of this army were sent to other climates, they would be found equally inefficient with the recruits sent out here.'

724.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

'I got on tolerably well till unfortunately the trumpet of alarm was



sounded in a libel in one of the daily newspapers, respecting the danger to be apprehended from the union of powers in the hands of military officers at the suggestion of a foreigner; and then I could get the Cortes to do nothing more than you will see in their decree of the 7th instant. It appears to me, however, that this decree goes sufficiently far to enable me to act. I saw enough of the state of affairs at Cadiz to be quite convinced that I should not be able to prevail upon the Cortes to do more; and I had no alternative excepting to resign the command, which I was aware would have had the worst effects, at that moment, in Spain, as well as throughout Europe. If the system is not fairly acted upon by the Government, or for any reason whatever should fail, it will always be time enough to resign the command: and affairs cannot be in a worse state than that in which I found them, or than they would have been if I had resigned when the Cortes modified my proposition. In the mean time I have the merit of having submitted to the Cortes; and if the system should fail, the responsibility will rest with them, and I have given them to understand that I shall take care to let Spain and the world know why it has failed. I trust, however, that it will not fail; and that I shall still be able to place in the hands of the Generals of the Spanish armies those powers which must secure the resources of the country for the troops.

It is impossible to describe the state of confusion in which affairs are at Cadiz. The Cortes have formed a constitution very much on the principle that a painter paints a picture, viz., to be looked at; and I have not met one of the members, or any person of any description, either at Cadiz or elsewhere, who considers the constitution as the embodying of a system according to which Spain is, or can be, governed. They, the Cortes, have in terms divested themselves of the executive power, and have appointed a Regency for this purpose. This Regency are in fact the slaves of the Cortes; yet Cortes and Regency have so managed their concerns, as that they have no communication or contact, excepting of that kind which our Sovereign has, by speech or message to Parliament, or the Parliament by address to His Majesty; neither knows what the other is doing, or what will be done upon any point that can occur. Neither the Regency nor Cortes have any authority beyond the walls of Cadiz; and I doubt whether the Regency have any beyond the walls of the room in which they meet. Each body, I know, suspects the other, notwithstanding, as I have above stated, the Regency are the creatures of the Cortes. The Regency suspect that the Cortes intend to assume the executive power; and the Cortes are so far suspicious of the Regency, that although the leading members admit the expediency, nay necessity, of their removal from Cadiz, the principal reason alleged for remaining there is, that they know the people of Cadiz are attached to them; but that if they were to go elsewhere, to Seville or Granada for instance, they are apprehensive that the Regency would raise the mob against them!!!

I wish that some of our reformers would go to Cadiz to see the benefit of a sovereign popular assembly, calling itself "Majesty;" and of a written constitution; and of an executive Government called "Highness," acting under the control of "His Majesty" the assembly! In truth there is no authority in the state, excepting the libellous newspapers; and they certainly ride over both Cortes and Regency without mercy.

I am astonished at the patience of my brother, and that he has been able to do any thing with such people. I am quite certain that if I had not threatened them with my resignation, and had not kept aloof from all questions, excepting those relating to my immediate business at Cadiz, I should have done nothing. It appears to me, however, that we must not allow these people to go to ruin as they are doing. Hitherto, having been confined within the walls of Cadiz, and the whole of Spain having been occupied by the enemy, their follies have been of little importance; but they will now become a serious misfortune, in proportion as the military misfortunes of France will increase the means of communication of the Cortes with the country. Several of the leading members with whom I conversed are aware of the folly of the constitution, and are desirous of changing it, but do not know how to set about the change, and are terribly afraid of the Cadiz newspapers. In fact, if we allow matters to go on as they are, we shall lose the benefit of all that we have done, even if the result of the war should be to force the French to evacuate Spain; and I propose to try if I cannot prevail upon some of the leaders to propose an alteration of the constitution, so as to connect the legislative assembly with the executive government, as our Houses of Parliament are, by the Ministers of the Crown being members.

This will be one step towards putting the machine of Government in motion; and it may be followed by other improvements essentially necessary for the establishment of any Government, or for the preservation of any system of order in the country.'

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725.

To Don Andres Angel de la Vega, Infanzon.\*

Freneda, 29th Jan. 1813.

'I enclose you the extract of a letter from King Joseph to Napoleon, which was in cipher, and which we have deciphered, which is well deserving your attention and that of your friends in the Cortes. It is in few words, but it contains a text upon which much may be written.†

I am not an advocate for King Joseph's judgment, or for his veracity; but although we rarely find the truth in the public reports of the French Government or of their officers, I believe we may venture to depend upon the truth of what is written in cipher; and we may believe at least that Joseph thought that he was making an accurate representation to his brother of the sentiments of the people of Spain. Unfortunately I know, as I believe I told you, not that this representation is accurate (that is to say, that the people of Spain do not prefer the house of Napoleon to the theories of the Cortes), but it is so far true as that the people do not like those theories.

You have no Executive Government; and the people feel that that which you have established as such has neither authority to control them nor to protect them. You have a Legislative Assembly, which has proclaimed itself supreme, and has divested itself of all interference with the Executive Government: yet the Executive Government is its creature; at the same time that, by a refinement of theory, it is not possible either that the Legislative Assembly should have a knowledge of the measures of the Executive Govern-

\* A deputy in the Cortes, of great and acknowledged merit.

† "Les habitans préfèrent aux théories des Cortes les ordres d'un souverain de votre maison."



ment, or that the Executive Government should know what are the feelings and the sentiments of the Legislative Assembly. The Government and the Assembly, instead of drawing together, are like two independent powers, jealous and afraid of each other; and the consequence is, that the machine of Government is at a stand. To this add that the whole system is governed by little local views, as propounded by the daily press of Cadiz, of all others the least enlightened and the most licentious.

All countries which begin, as yours did, incur some risks of failure; and I acknowledge that I was in hopes that the blockade of Cadiz would have at least this good effect, that it would allow time and opportunity for the fever of theory in the Cortes to evaporate; and that, when the communication with the interior of Spain should be opened, the Cortes would have passed through the ordeal of inexperience, and that Spain would eventually have the advantage of a free constitution and of an enlightened Government. We have still to look out for these blessings; and, unfortunately, I am apprehensive that the Cortes have immersed themselves to such a degree in theory, that they cannot be looked for under the existing system.

I have certainly nothing to say to your system of government, and I never interfere in concerns with which I have nothing to do. I will fight for Spain as long as she is the enemy of France, whatever may be her system of government; but I cannot avoid seeing and lamenting the evils which await the country if you do not retrace your steps, let what will be the result of the military operations of the war; and I make you acquainted with my private opinion, as a person of whose judgment I entertain a high opinion, leaving it to you to make such use of it as you may think proper. But I am not one of those who discover faults without proposing remedies; and I now tell you what in my opinion you ought to do.

First; you ought to establish the Regency permanently, with all the powers allotted by the constitution to the King, in the hands of one person. This person ought to be of the blood Royal, if it should be possible to find one, whether male or female of the blood Royal, capable of exercising the office; if not, it should be the person in the country of the highest authority from character, conduct, &c. The Regent should be assisted by a Council of Regency, consisting of five persons to be chosen by himself from the members of the Cortes, or otherwise, as he should think proper. The Council of Regency, if members of the Cortes, should receive no salaries for the performance of this duty. One of them should superintend the Department de Estado; another that of the Interior and Ultramar; another that of Gracia y Justicia; another that of Hacienda; and another that of War and of Marine. These persons should be responsible each for the department under his superintendence; and the whole Council for the general operations of the Government. The Council would, of course, attend the Cortes in their places.

By these measures you would give authority and respect to the Government; you would connect the offices of the Government together, and the Government with the Cortes. You may depend upon it that the same benefits will not be produced by the attendance of the Ministers in the Cortes, and by giving them the faculties of joining in the deliberations of the Cortes. In that situation they will not have the influence over the

Assembly which ought to belong to their character, their talents, and their situation ; and, if the members of the Cortes resemble in character and sentiment the members of the House of Commons, not only will Ministers in that degraded situation possess no influence, but they will be despised and shunned, and intercourse with them avoided, as if they were the means of communicating an epidemical disorder. You may depend upon it, therefore, that you will never have good and able Ministers, and will never connect the Executive Government with the Cortes as it ought to be, till those who administer the government are members of the Cortes, whether they administer it as a Council of Regency, or as Ministers at the head of departments under the Constitution.

Secondly ; the next thing to do will be to repeal the 110th Article of the Constitution, which prevents deputies from being re-elected. Indeed that appears to be necessary at all events, if it is intended that there should be any experience in the future Cortes ; and likewise the 129th and 130th Articles, if it is supposed that these Articles would prevent the Council of Regency, being members of the Cortes, from recommending to the Regent persons for offices. But they ought to be repealed eventually at all events, if those are the Articles which now prevent the Regent or King from choosing his Ministers from the members of the Cortes.

Thirdly ; I would recommend to you to repeal the whole of the 7th Chapter of the Constitution. The Council of State, as thereby established, answers no good purpose, either of a Council for the Executive Government, or of a balance between the Executive Government and the popular Assembly. If the Government, as proposed to be established under the Constitution, should ever really come into operation, which I believe to be impossible, the Council of State, which cannot be responsible, must come in collision with the Minister of Grace and Justice, who is responsible ; and in the mean time the country must suffer by the nomination of bad bishops, and bad judges, by the intrigues of the Council of State. But the greatest objection which I have to the whole system established by the Constitution is that, in a country in which almost all property consists in land, and there are the largest landed proprietors which exist in Europe, no measures should have been adopted, and no barrier should have been provided, to guard landed property from the encroachments, injustice, and violence to which it is at all times liable, but particularly in the progress of revolutions. The Council of State affords no such guard ; it has no voice in legislation ; it cannot possess the confidence of, and it can have no influence over, the public mind. Such a guard can only be afforded by the establishment of an assembly of the great landed proprietors, such as our House of Lords, having concurrent powers of legislation with the Cortes ; and you may depend upon it that there is no man in Spain, be his property ever so small, who is not interested in the establishment of such an assembly.

The theory of all legislation is founded in justice ; and, if we could be certain that legislative assemblies would on all occasions act according to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems. Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals ; when unchecked, they are tyrannical and



unjust ; nay, more : it unfortunately happens too frequently that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties, under the pretence of the public advantage ; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers.

You should, therefore, either turn the Council of State into a House of Lords, or make a House of Lords of the Grandees, giving them concurrent powers of legislation with the Cortes ; and you should leave the patronage now in the hands of the Council of State in the hands of the Crown.

By these measures you will give your Government some chance of standing, and your country some chance of avoiding farther revolutions. This is not to be expected, even under the most successful result of the war, unless some measures are adopted of the kind of which I have above sketched the outline.

I have written you a very long letter, which at least shows that I take an interest in the future welfare of Spain. I should be sorry if, after all, you were to fail in establishing a system of government founded on principles of justice, which should secure the liberty of your country, and should again fall under the degrading despotism from which you have had a chance of escaping. But you may depend upon it that, whatever may be your wishes, and however good the intentions of the greater number of persons of whom the Cortes is composed, this misfortune will happen to you, if you are not guided by experience, and by the example of those countries in which freedom exists, instead of by the wild theories of modern days.

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I have written to you in English, because I write in this language with more ease ; but, if you should answer me, write in Spanish, which I can read perfectly.'

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726.

To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Freneda, 31st Jan. 1813.

' I was happy to learn from Lord FitzRoy Somerset that you were able to return to us ; and I hope that we shall be able to make a good campaign of it.

Affairs are exactly in the state in which they were at the end of November. I think that if there is any change, Soult has collected more of his army on the Tagus, about Toledo ; but he has made no movement which could at all indicate his object ; neither has any movement been made on this side. I propose to take the field as early as I can, and, at least, to put myself in Fortune's way.

Many of the regiments are already very healthy ; others, particularly the new comers, remarkably otherwise. We have, as usual, lost many men in the last 2 months of cold weather ; but the troops are all well cantoned ; and I hope that a continuation of rest for a month or two in the spring will set us up entirely. I hoped to take the field with 70,000 British and Portuguese. I think I shall have 40,000 British, and possibly 25,000 Portu-

guese; and I shall be better equipped in artillery, and much stronger in cavalry, than we have yet been.

I have been at Cadiz, where I have placed military affairs on a better footing than they were before, in the way of organization; and I have provided some means to pay and subsist the armies; and we are beginning with discipline. I am not sanguine enough, however, to hope that we shall derive much advantage from Spanish troops early in the campaign. O'Donell is certainly an able and well intentioned man, of whom a great deal is to be made.

I believe that, upon your arrival, you had better direct your steps towards this village, which we have made as comfortable as we can, and where we shall all be happy to see you. The hounds are in very good trim, and the foxes very plentiful.'

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 727.

To Colonel Bunbury, Under Secretary of State.

Freneda, 2nd Feb. 1813.

'I wish that on all these points, the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief would send me positive orders. I take only a limited view of them; one referable to the convenience of the army under my command, and the benefit of the service in the Peninsula. They must necessarily take a larger view; and I can only say, that what they order shall be obeyed, *coute qui coute*; but that, if they leave matters to my judgment, I shall never do any thing which, in my judgment, may be prejudicial to the service here. It would make matters much more easy, if they would send me positive orders.'

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 728.

To Colonel Torrens.

Freneda, 2nd Feb. 1813.

'His Royal Highness and I, unfortunately, take a very different view of these questions: he, one referable to the whole army and the general service of the empire: and I, one referable only to the convenience of the army under my immediate command, and the benefit of the particular service in the Peninsula, entrusted to my charge. His Royal Highness must be right, but I wish that, being so, he would give me a positive order. He may depend upon it, it shall be obeyed. But when he conveys to me his wishes and his suggestions, and leaves it to my discretion to carry them into execution, or not, he must excuse me if I take my own view of the case, however limited, and act according to my judgment of what will be best for the particular service entrusted to my charge. The services in America, the Mediterranean, or at home, are not my concern, and cannot, nor ought not, to enter into my consideration in any case; and when any thing is left to my discretion, that discretion must be guided by my view of what is best for the service here.

I am of opinion, from long experience, that it is better for the service here to have one soldier or officer, whether of cavalry or infantry, who has served one or two campaigns, than it is to have 2 or even 3 who have not. Not only the new soldiers can perform no service, but by filling the hospital they are a burthen to us. For this reason, I am so unwilling to part with the men whom I have formed into the provisional battalions; and I never will part with them, as long as it is left to my discretion.'



729.

To Général Dumouriez.

à Freneda, ce 3 Février, 1813.

‘ J’ai reçu, il y a quelques jours, votre lettre du 27 Décembre ; et comme je n’ai aucune opération militaire à vous décrire, ou à raisonner avec vous, toutes les troupes des deux côtés étant en cantonnemens, je vous écris quelques mots sur ce que vous me dites du Duc d’Orléans.

Ce Prince, que je ne connais que de réputation, et pour lequel j’ai le plus grand respect, a mal débuté en Espagne. Appelé, je crois, ou au moins encouragé de venir, par la Régence de Castaños, pour commander une armée composée la plupart de Français, que, dans leurs songes, le Gouvernement Espagnol comptait faire marcher sur la frontière de la France, il a été débarqué à Tarragona, où, on m’a dit, qu’il fut très mal reçu. Il s’est embarqué, et il est venu à Cadiz.

Il avait des personnes auprès de lui fort indignes de sa confiance, et fort indiscrettes, qui, le jour même de son arrivée, ont commencé à parler du bien que cela ferait à la nation Espagnole que le Duc d’Orléans en fut fait le Régent. Enfin “las Cortes” s’assemblaient, et leur premier acte fut d’envoyer dire au Duc de s’en aller en 24 heures ; et après, quand le Duc est allé à l’Isla à cheval, tout seul, je crois, pour leur présenter ses respects, “las Cortes” lui ont fait dire de s’en aller tout de suite ; et elles ont fait dire au ——— d’être préparé de les protéger par la force. Vous croyez que le ——— favorisait les vues de ce Prince ! Eh bien ! je vous dis qu’il s’est fait un mérite des préparatifs qu’il avait faits, ce jour-là, pour protéger et faire obéir les ordres de “las Cortes.”

Je sais très bien qu’on vous a dit, et que le Duc le croit, que tout ce que lui est arrivé, a été produit par les intrigues des Anglais. Pour moi, je ne savais pas même que le Duc était à Cadiz quand il fut renvoyé. Pour mon frère, je sais qu’il a prêté au Duc ce que lui est arrivé ; et lui a conseillé d’être sur ses gardes ; mais, à dire le vrai, on nous soupçonne de beaucoup de choses, dans lesquelles non seulement nous nous ne sommes jamais mêlés, et même dans lesquelles les Espagnols ne nous permettraient pas de nous mêler.

Mais je déclare que, si j’avais désiré perdre le Duc d’Orléans en Espagne, je n’aurais rien fait que de le laisser continuer le chemin dans lequel il était malheureusement entré ; et j’aurais cru que je ne pouvais le sauver de sa perte qu’en m’opposant, comme Anglais, à sa marche. Mon frère a fait ce qui convenait à son devoir ; il lui a prêté son malheur, et ne s’est jamais mêlé ni pour, ni contre, ses vues.

J’ai souvent regretté le malheur qui est arrivé au Duc d’Orléans. C’est un Prince estimable par son caractère, ses grands talens, et sa réputation ; qui aurait pu faire beaucoup pour cette malheureuse contrée. Mais je vous assure que la faute n’est pas la nôtre.’

730.

To Colonel Gore, 33rd regt.

Freneda, 3rd Feb. 1813.

‘ Before you receive this letter, you will have heard that H.R.H. the Prince Regent has been pleased to appoint me to be Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards, an honor entirely unexpected by me. I do not know who is to be my successor in the 33rd regt.

Although highly gratified by the honor which has been thus conferred upon me, as well as by the manner in which it has been conferred, I cannot avoid feeling a regret at one of its circumstances, viz., that I should be separated from the 33rd regt., to which I have belonged, with so much satisfaction to myself, for more than 20 years.

I beg that you will take an opportunity of informing the regiment of the sentiments with which I quit them, and that though no longer belonging to them, I shall ever feel an anxiety for their interest and honor, and shall hear whatever conduces to the latter with the most lively satisfaction.'

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 731.

To H. R. H. the Prince, Regent.

Freneda, 3rd Feb. 1813.

'I hope that your Royal Highness will permit me to avail myself of the opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your commands regarding Mr. Aston, to return your Royal Highness my warmest thanks for the numerous favors which your Royal Highness has conferred upon me. Not only have all the means, which the resources at the disposal of your Royal Highness could command, been given to support the efforts making in this country, under my directions, but I have been encouraged in every manner to act with confidence in the support of your Royal Highness; and I have been favored and rewarded to a degree not only far beyond my deserts, but far beyond what any subject has yet been by his Sovereign.

I can evince my gratitude for such favors only by devoting myself to serve and to forward the views of your Royal Highness, with the same zeal which first attracted your notice.'

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 732.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 5th Feb. 1813.

'When a complaint of the conduct of any officer or soldier is made to me, I invariably do what is my duty; which is, to put the officer or soldier in confinement, and the complaint in the course of trial. But the trial cannot go on, nor the complaint be substantiated, unless the witnesses attend the Court Martial to substantiate their complaint on oath; and I am sorry to say that, although the Portuguese authorities and people are ready enough to complain, they will never come forward as they ought, to prosecute, and prove the truth of what they have stated in their original declaration.'

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 733.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 5th Feb. 1813.

'I received some time ago an answer from Lord Bathurst, enclosing a memorandum from the Duke of York, regarding your letter on your rank. Neither was definitive: and it was obvious to me that the question was not understood in England; and as you are, to a certain degree, a party interested in the decision, although you have always considered it very fairly, I did not think it proper to send to you, nor do I now send to you what I received on the subject, which consisted in a private letter from Lord Bathurst, enclosing a memorandum from the Duke of York.

I enclose you my answer to Lord Bathurst, from which you will see the description of argument contained in the memorandum. The letter contained



nothing but expressions of apprehension (equally noticed in the memorandum) that the British Lieutenant Generals, senior to you in the army, would not serve if this point were decided in your favor. I could say nothing upon this point, though I take the notion of the gentlemen at home to be very erroneous upon it; and you will see that the course of my reasoning on the question must leave this point entirely out of the consideration. I will show you these letters when we meet, whatever may be the decision; in the mean time, it is but justice to Lord Bathurst to tell you, that he concludes his letter by saying that, in his opinion, the reasoning is entirely in your favor.

You will see that I have put the question in my letter on the ground on which you wished to place it; and it will not be easy to decide it against you. If it is decided against you, it must be by an arrangement with the Portuguese Government, to which you must always be a party.

In whatever way it may be decided, I recommend to you not to be induced to resign. What we have here is *the* army. You cannot be in any other than a distinguished situation, whatever may be the decision which the Government may come to; and I earnestly recommend to you not to relinquish it. However, there is no occasion for being in a hurry to decide. I only beg that you will not decide upon relinquishing the command, before you shall know what the decision is, and the mode in which it is brought about.'

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 734.

To Don J. de Carvajal.

Freneda, 7th Feb. 1813.

'In repeated conversations and by letter, I conceived that I had come to a clear understanding with the Government, that their orders to their army, and to every part of their army, were to be conveyed through me; and that the reports from their army were to reach them in the same channel.

Not only the orders to General Abadia to go to Cadiz have not gone through me, but I was not even informed of such a circumstance; and this General Officer, contrary to all military rule, and to the particular arrangement made with me, has been taken from the command of his division, without my knowledge, or that of his immediate superior. It is by practices of this kind that the Spanish army has been brought to the state in which all Europe laments to see it.'

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 735.

To Colonel Longa.

Freneda, 11th Feb. 1813.

'The Government have sent me some papers relating to complaints which have been forwarded to Cadiz against you, upon which I shall take another opportunity of writing to you.

There is nobody better acquainted than I am with the difficulties of the situation in which you have been placed, and with the manner in which you have conducted yourself, and the benefits which the nation has derived from your services; but I recommend to you to be very cautious and just in all your proceedings.

The country must support the troops which it is necessary to employ against the common enemy; but the country has a right to expect that the burdens imposed shall be imposed with equality, and that they shall be faith-

fully applied to the purposes for which they are imposed; and, above all, that when they have paid large contributions for the support and maintenance of troops, they shall not be harassed by additional requisitions, and by plunder, and the other consequences of the indiscipline of the troops.'

## 736.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 17th Feb. 1813.

'I doubt very much that the resources of the British Government are capable of equipping two armies for the field in the Peninsula, as they ought to be; and the attempt will only tend to cripple this army, upon which every thing depends, and which ought to be well equipped in order to be able to effect any thing, without doing much good to the other. The army on the eastern coast must necessarily be confined to the coast in its operations. It may do a great deal of good, if the army from this side can hold its ground at all in the interior of Spain. But if all the resources of Great Britain were applied to equip the army on the eastern coast, it is quite impossible that it should effect any thing, unless the army on this side is so equipped, and in such strength, as to be able to keep the field.'

## 737.

To Don J. de Carvajal.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1813.

'I repeat that officers and soldiers without discipline or subordination are worse than useless; and that discipline and subordination cannot be established in any army that is neither paid, nor fed; and that the Spanish officers cannot be paid, nor fed, unless the Government shall carry into execution the measures which were arranged with me under the decree of the Cortes of the —th of January.'

G. O.

Freneda, 22nd Feb. 1813.

'4. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be obliged to notice such repeated disobedience of Orders on every subject; it might have been expected, that, in a case in which the convenience of the officers themselves was the object of the Orders issued, they would have been obeyed; but the General Officers, and commanding officers of regiments may depend upon it, that until they enforce obedience to every Order, and see that the officers under them understand and recollect what is ordered, those subjects of complaint must exist.'

G. O.

Freneda, 1st March, 1813.

'1. The commanding officers of regiments of infantry are immediately to make requisitions on the Commissaries attached to their several brigades for tin camp kettles, to be substituted for the iron camp kettles hitherto in use with the troops.

2. The numbers are to be one for every 6 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The Commissaries are to take care that each kettle is provided with a good bag, and the kettle of each mess is to be carried on a march, alternately by the men of the mess, instead of on a mule as heretofore.

3. The Commissary General will give directions that the Commissary with each division may always have with the division a store of 50 camp kettles with bags; the Commissaries of each division are to make a weekly return of this store to the General Officer commanding the division, who is requested to see that this article of equipment is kept complete.

6. It is the intention of the Commander of the Forces that the mules, hitherto provided by the commanding officers of companies of infantry for the carriage of camp kettles, shall hereafter be applied to the carriage of tents for the non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

7. In order the better to enable the officers commanding companies to perform this service, the Commander of the Forces has ordered, that in addition to the sum of *£*4 5s. forage money, received for this purpose in the winter *bât* and forage allowance, a sum of 10*l.* *bât* money shall be received by each commanding officer of a company of infantry. The commanding officers of regiments of infantry are to send in their estimates to the

Deputy



738.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 9th March, 1813.

' In answer to your letter of the 3rd February, in regard to the detention in this country of the second battalions, and their formation into provisional battalions, I can only repeat to you what I have said to Colonel Torrens, viz., that when His Royal Highness, or the Government, shall send me an order upon any subject, they will invariably find it obeyed with the utmost celerity; but if they leave the execution of their wishes to my judgment, they must expect that I shall exercise a judgment upon the subject; and that with every desire to act as they wish, I shall not adopt a measure which is in my opinion prejudicial to the service in this country.

Every day's experience has proved to me that one soldier, who has served one or two campaigns in this country, is worth 2, if not 3, newly sent out; and it further appears, that it signifies but little from what part of the world regiments come, as those from Gibraltar, Ceuta, Cadiz, and the Mediterranean, are equally inefficient with those from England and Ireland. The second battalions, some of which have now been 4 years in this army, are

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Deputy Quarter Master General for their allowances for the winter båt and forage, now in the course of payment.

8. It is expected, however, that in consideration of the allowance granted for this service, the officers commanding companies will have an animal sufficient for the purpose. The General Officers commanding brigades are requested to attend particularly to this part of the equipment of the regiments under their command, and are to report any deficiency which they may observe.

9. Whatever may be the strength of a company, the mule provided by the captain is to carry 3 tents, with their poles, pins, &c., which tents are to be disposable under the direction of the Assistant Quarter Master General attached to the division, for the purpose, however, of only giving cover to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

10. The mule provided to carry the tents for the soldiers must be employed solely on that service, according to the Orders heretofore issued in regard to camp kettle mules.

11. The Commander of the Forces has frequently had occasion to complain, that notwithstanding he has ordered the issue of tents for the officers of the army, staff as well as regimental, they have omitted to take them from the stores; and afterwards when it has been expedient to encamp the troops, the greatest inconveniences have been experienced, as well by officers, staff and regimental, as by the soldiers.

12. The Commander of the Forces now requests that the General Officers and Staff, and the commanding officers of regiments for themselves, the regimental staff, and the officers of companies, will make requisitions on the Quarter Master General for the number of tents they require for officers during the ensuing campaign, to complete the numbers allowed, as well as in exchange for any rendered unserviceable by wear, and the Quarter Master General will apprise them where these tents will be procured. If they do not send for them they must do without tents; as those provided for non-commissioned officers, and soldiers must be applied to that purpose only.

13. The Quarter Master General will likewise apprise the commanding officers of regiments of infantry at what place they will procure the tents for the non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

14. When officers shall arrive at Lisbon from England and elsewhere, Major General Peacocke will apprise them of the necessity that they should have tents; that is to say, one for each field officer, one for the officers of each company, one for the Adjutant and the Quarter Master, one for the medical staff, and one for the paymaster; and he will authorise the issue of tents accordingly from the public stores, which must be carried by the officers themselves.'

G. O.

Freneda, 7th March, 1813.

3. Orders are likewise given for the payment of 165 days båt and forage money to the army, including the addition ordered on the 1st March, 1813, to that of captains of companies of infantry.

4. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers will see that the mule equipments of the regiments in their several brigades are completed according to those Orders.'

the best troops we have, and will render good service in the next campaign in the way in which I have organised them. It could not be expected from me that I should send away nearly 2000 of these soldiers, at a moment when every man is an object, the period of sending them away being left to my discretion. But let the orders, that they shall be sent, come from the quarter in which they ought to originate, and they shall be obeyed with alacrity; and you shall hear no complaints of their ill effects.

I hope that your Lordship and His Royal Highness will understand that I am not at all desirous of throwing any difficulties in the way of the execution of the plans formed at home for the service at large; but that when a point is left to my judgment, it can be exercised only upon the effects which the execution will have on the service in this country.'

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739.

To Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham.

Freneda, 11th March, 1813.

'I have always considered that there is no greater incentive to the performance of duty in every situation, and that nothing upholds discipline and good order in a regiment to a greater degree, than the sentiments and spirit of the officers belonging to it. No man dares to neglect his duty, or to conduct himself in a manner unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, if he knows that his brother officers will notice his misconduct with their disapprobation, or that it will be attended by the loss of their esteem; and I am convinced that I should carry into execution the intentions of the Commander in Chief in a very inadequate manner, if I did not guard myself against the notion that the existence of such sentiments, and such a spirit, is disapproved of at head quarters or by me.'

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740.

To Colonel the Hon. R. W. O'Callaghan.

Freneda, 12th March, 1813.

'It is always with very great regret that I trouble a General Court Martial; but it cannot be expected that crimes will be prevented by punishments, or discipline maintained in an army, unless the examples of the consequences attending the commission of these enormous offences should be of a nature to operate on the minds of the soldiers in general.'

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G. O.

Freneda, 13th March, 1813.

'22. The Commander of the Forces having received the Orders of H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, to form in this country 2 troops of the Staff Corps of cavalry to be employed in the duties of the police of the army, and in others of a confidential nature, directs that the commanding officers of all the regiments of cavalry in this country will report the names (to the Adjutant General) of the non-commissioned officers and privates who will volunteer to serve in this staff corps, and whose characters are of a description that their commanding officers can recommend them.

23. Serjeants in the Staff Corps of cavalry will receive each 1s. *per diem* extra pay, corporals 8d., and privates 6d.'

G. O.

Freneda, 14th March, 1813.

'2. The various Orders which have been issued at different times by the Commander of the Forces to prevent the misconduct and outrages committed by the soldiers of the army on their marches through the country, have been generally occasioned immediately by some disaster which had occurred, and by the fall of one or more soldiers in contests with the inhabitants, for the protection of that property of which the soldiers were desirous of depriving them. The Commander of the Forces therefore trusted that his repeated Orders on this subject would have been obeyed, and particularly as they contain directions for the adoption



741.

To Don J. Carvajal.

Freneda, 15th March, 1813.

‘ I repeat to your Excellency that it is quite impossible that any military establishment can go on in this manner; that it is essentially necessary that the Government should adhere to one uniform mode of proceeding, and channel of communication with the army, which has been settled by their engagements with me, as the only mode by which regularity and military efficiency can be ensured, or their own authority preserved; and I earnestly intreat them to decide finally whether they will or not adhere to those engagements.’

742.

To — — —, Esq.

Freneda, 16th March, 1813.

‘ I had the honor of receiving by the last post your letter of the 24th February, and I am very much obliged to you for the details into which you have entered regarding the means of obtaining intelligence for this army. In general we have not been deficient in that respect; but as it is always desirable to obtain as much as possible, I could have wished you had gone into still further details respecting the mode of obtaining intelligence at Paris, which is, I believe, very difficult; and respecting the execution of your plan of communicating it by a newspaper; and respecting the facilities of receiving such newspaper in this country.

In England it is not impossible to communicate intelligence by a newspaper. Indeed the contents of all the newspapers are intelligence to the enemy, upon which I know that plans of operations have been formed; and it appeared upon a trial for treason, some years ago, that very detailed information was conveyed to the enemy in this manner. But I did not see how this could be done in France, where the press is under such extraordinary restrictions. Then, if the information could be obtained, and inserted in a newspaper in France as proposed, it appears to me to be quite impossible to receive it at the head of this army, excepting by England.’

743.

To Lieut. Colonel Sherlock, 4th Dragoon Guards.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

‘ I assure you that I have not served so long without knowing the difference between soldiers who have served, and those who have not.

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If I have erred in my judgment I am sorry for it; but I must say that I am responsible to no person in this country, and to none but my superiors for what I have done on this occasion.’

744.

To the Conde de la Bisbal.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

‘ I beg leave at the same time to point out the necessity of considering well

adoption of a line of conduct applicable to every case which can occur, which, if adopted, must prove a remedy for the evil, and must prevent the outrages complained of and their consequent misfortunes.

4. The Commander of the Forces trusts however that the officers of the army will consider the object of the Orders, the neglect of which is now under consideration, and will find motives for attending to them in their desire to save the lives of their men, which might be wanting in the example now before them of the consequences of a neglect of those Orders.’

every measure that is adopted on every subject, and whether it is consistent with law and regulation.

‘ Unless we should adopt and adhere to this practice, and unless we should ourselves set the example of obeying strictly the orders of our superiors, we cannot expect that our inferiors will obey ours, and all the foundation of our hopes of restoring the service to its former state of discipline and order will vanish.’

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745.

To Don J. Carvajal.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

‘ What I should propose is, that each regiment should consist of one Colonel, one Lieutenant Colonel, one Major, and 12 companies, each of 100 men, and one Captain and 3 Subaltern officers. The regiment to be formed into 2 battalions, each battalion of 6 companies, and the Colonel and Lieut. Colonel, or Colonel and Major, to be with the first battalion; the Lieut. Colonel or Major, as the case may be, with the second battalion. In case the regiment should not consist of 1200 men complete, it should have only 10 companies; of which 6 in the first, and 4 in the second battalion.

The regiment would thus become much more manageable in manœuvre. If the commander of the army should have any occasion to leave any troops in his district, he would have the facility of leaving the least disciplined and weakly men of the regiment under his command, who would be in a state of organization to perform some service. The second battalion of a regiment left behind in cantonments would be a reserve for the first, and would furnish it with trained recruits to keep up its numbers, for which services the officers not fit for active service in the field must be deemed equal, if they are fit for any thing.’

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746.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

‘ I do not conceive that the discussion in the Cortes has done us any harm; and at all events our conduct in this instance affords another strong proof of our fair and open dealings, and of our respect and deference for the independence and feelings of our allies.’

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747.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

‘ I wish, likewise, that you would see the Cardinal de Borbon, or whoever is really at the head of affairs, and represent to him how desirous I am of carrying on the service of the army in the manner that shall be most honorable, advantageous, and agreeable to the Government; but that the engagements with me must be strictly carried into execution, if it be wished that I should retain the command. If that is not wished, it is only necessary to hint a desire that I should resign; or what is tantamount, to fail to perform the engagements entered into with me, and I will resign with much more pleasure than I ever accepted the command.’

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748.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 21st March, 1813.

‘ From what I know of the French system of Government, I entertain no



doubt of its being very oppressive; and that all thinking men in any country in which it is established must be desirous of getting rid of it. But the question amongst these must always be, in what manner, and at the expense of what exertions; and there are many, probably the majority of this class, who would prefer to trust to the chapter of accidents, to involving themselves and their country in the dangers and losses of a general insurrection; and by far the greater majority of the people in those countries, particularly those in easy circumstances, would prefer to pass their lives quietly under any system of Government, however oppressive, to making any sacrifices, or any exertions, in order to get rid of it. I believe this to be the case in Italy; and I have not seen any proof of the existence of a general desire to get rid of the French Government; nor have I ever been able to learn the names of any principal men, or ever to discover that in any particular town, there existed men of talents and influence who had any thing to say to this supposed insurrection. I cannot, therefore, think that it would be desirable, or that I ought to send from Spain the Sicilian corps, with a view to such a scheme of operations.

The question of insurrection in any country must always be one of great doubt; but it appears to me that if such a measure should be adopted by any country, at any time, it ought to be adopted by Germany at present. It appears that the people cannot be in a worse situation than they are; their enemy is humbled, and there is a formidable and victorious army on the frontier ready to give support to their efforts. But those who are about to involve their country in these troubles, must not imagine that their task is an easy one, or that the contest, or its evils, will be of short duration. They little know the character of their enemy, and have studied his conduct but little, if they do not expect a most vigorous contest, if once they draw the sword and are not prepared, as he is, to endure every thing, and to go to all extremities to attain their object.'

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749.

To Lieut. General the Hon. Sir G. L. Cole, K.B.

Freneda, 25th March, 1813.

'I cannot but observe upon ——'s complaint "that he is to be placed at the disposal of a foreign tribunal," that the notion is too common among the officers and soldiers of the army that they are not obliged to obey the laws of the country in which they are acting; or, in other words, that they may act as they please, and may commit such outrages as they think proper, provided they do not offend against the Mutiny Act and Articles of War.

I cannot, however, admit of such a doctrine; and —— will be an instance that the laws of the country must be obeyed, if the Portuguese Government shall desire that he may be delivered over to the tribunals of that country.'

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750.

To Major General Cooke.

Freneda, 28th March, 1813.

'I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know who will command the troops at Cadiz, &c., when you go to England. If that officer should be one whose discretion can be depended upon, I can have no

objection to your going, excepting that in the last paragraph of your letter you say that you would abandon all idea of the application, if there should be any idea of your being called into a more active situation. As far as I am concerned, I should consent to your going, on the ground that it is necessary for your health, which I am aware has suffered considerably, provided there is an officer to replace you, on whose discretion I can rely; but if I am to understand, by the last paragraph that you can perform the duty of a more active situation, which I do not think you can, I should then object to your quitting the important situation in which you are placed.

So far for my opinion. But I must inform you that the Government attach great interest to the command at Cadiz; and although I may recommend, I cannot allow you to quit the station without their consent, unless in a case of extreme urgency, and I should provide an officer to perform your duty in your absence, on whose discretion they, as well as I, could rely.

I have thought it best to explain myself clearly to you upon this subject, in order that if you should make your application for leave, you may receive the answer in time to get away from Cadiz before the commencement of the hot weather.'

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 751.

To the Conde de la Bisbal.

Freneda, 28th March, 1813.

'I will attend to what you state in regard to the state of discipline of the troops, when the time shall come for ordering them to move.

I am very much inclined to apprehend, however, that instead of having too few troops in a state of discipline to take the field, we shall find that we have more troops clothed, armed, and disciplined, than the means of the country can support, unless the Government should adopt, in earnest, the measures proposed to them, and arranged with me, and should give the armies the real nine tenths of the revenues fairly collected and honestly administered. It will answer no purpose to bring to the theatre of war on the Duero or the Ebro, crowds of starving soldiers. We shall only lose them by desertion, and with them our own characters, and increase our difficulties without reaping any advantage from the trouble taken in forming them.'

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 752,

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 28th March, 1813.

'I wish, and propose, to open the campaign on the 1st May, and to aid the several Spanish corps with that sum, at about that period. But from all that I hear, I am much afraid that none of them will then be ready. We shall be so, I hope, completely; and if there was money, I should entertain no doubts of the result of the next campaign in respect to the Peninsula. But the Spanish Government have so contrived their matters, that the arrangements concerted and agreed upon with me, have not yet produced a shilling, and as far as I can judge, are not likely to produce much. However, I cannot yet write decisively and officially upon this subject, as I have not the official reports; but I have certainly the most



obstinate and worst tempered people to deal with (particularly General           ) that I have yet met in my life.

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Depend upon it, that the result of the next campaign depends upon our financial resources. I shall be able, in a month, to take the field with a larger and more efficient British and Portuguese army than I have yet had; and there are more Spanish troops clothed, armed, and disciplined, than have ever been known, and we are making a daily progress towards getting out of the chaos in which I found matters. But if we cannot realise the subsidy, without falling on the resources of the British army, and can get nothing from the country, we shall end the next campaign as we did the last. That is, after we shall have consumed what we can seize of the harvest, *we* must retire; and when *we* shall retire, nobody else can remain forward. You will see, therefore, how necessary it is, to sift to the bottom the whole question regarding the money to be raised on loan, and if there should really be any, which I doubt, to ascertain what are the real objections to the certificate proposed.'

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753.

To Colonel Mark Wilks.

Freneda, 30th March, 1813.

'Having served in the East Indies during a great part of the period referred to in the memorial, and having had a perfect knowledge of the public transactions in that country of that period, of the share Major General Agnew had in them, of the trust and confidence reposed in him, and of the ability and integrity with which he fulfilled the various duties with which he was intrusted, and having always felt the greatest regard for him as an officer and a member of society, I should feel the utmost satisfaction in giving my aid to relieve the inconveniences brought on his family, in a great measure, by his virtues and by his zealous discharge of his duty to his employers, if I knew of any channel through which I could venture to address the Court of Directors, without the risk of being supposed guilty of intrusion upon them.

I entertain no doubt, however, that the Court of Directors will feel every disposition to attend to your forcible appeal to their generosity and justice; and you may depend upon it that, if you can point out to me any channel by which, without intrusion, I can venture to recommend your memorial to their attention, I will with pleasure avail myself of your suggestion.'

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754.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 31st March, 1813.

'The Minister at War is going on just as usual; and I must either resign, or throw him and the Government on their responsibility; and desire some Member of the Cortes to call for the letters. He sends orders to the troops, and so do I; and the consequence is, that neither are obeyed. I wish you would talk on the subject to the Cardinal.'

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755.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 2nd April, 1813.

'The measure will really be one of wanton insult, which will do more

harm to the cause for which we are contending than any thing that has yet been done. If the Cortes are seriously desirous that our troops should not be in their garrisons, let them say so quietly, and I will withdraw them. But while we are embarked in the same cause, and engaged in this arduous contest, do not let us insult each other by legislative measures.

It is obvious that the Spanish Regency neither have, nor can have, any power; and I do not know of any party in the Cortes with which you could connect yourself more closely, so as to have more influence over the measures in contemplation. It appears that the newspapers guide every thing, and I have often considered that it might be worth your while to have such a control over one or two of them, as to be certain that they would insert that of which you would wish the public at Cadiz to be informed. This is a matter, however, to be managed with great secrecy and discretion, and whatever you should think proper to publish, should be confined to a simple statement of facts and dates, in plain language, with the obvious reasoning resulting from them.'

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 756.

To Señor Don Andres Angel de la Vega, Infanzon.

Freneda, 3rd April, 1813.

'Before I accepted the command of the Spanish armies and went to Cadiz, I wrote a letter to the late Regency, on the 4th December, in which I apprised them of my opinion of the state of the armies, of the difficulty which I should find in exercising the command, and of the powers with which it was necessary that the Government should intrust me; and after I went to Cadiz I wrote them a second letter on the subject, on the 25th December, in which I explained, and again urged them to agree to what I had proposed in my first letter of the 4th December; and after repeated discussions they did fully agree to these proposals of mine, in a letter from the Minister at War, of the 1st January. My object in proposing these measures, was to place the armies of Spain on the same footing of subordination and discipline with the other armies of Europe; and to preclude all chance of the continuance of those intrigues, by applications to the Government which had brought the army to the state in which I found it. I could have no object, or wish of ambition, personal to myself. There are not 10 officers in the army whom I know even by sight. I can have no feeling for any but the public interest, connected as it is with the discipline of the army.

Another proof that I can have no object of that description, is to be found in my letter to the Government, of the 27th December, in which I proposed that the Captains General of the different armies, and not myself, should be the Captains General of the provinces allotted for their support; and that in their hands should be vested all the power which the military were to have in the country.

I am sorry to have to inform you, that whatever my views may have been, they have been entirely frustrated by the departure of the Government from every article of their engagements with me, as sanctioned by their letter of the 1st January.

First; They have removed officers from their stations, and have placed them in others, without any recommendation from me, or any other superior



officer ; and without even acquainting me, or the superiors of those officers, that they have made such arrangements.

Secondly ; They have appointed officers to stations without my recommendation, or that of any other superior officer ; and have given them assurances that they should remain in those stations, contrary to their engagements with me ; and to the Royal *Ordenanzas*, by which the powers and responsibility of the Captains General of the provinces are regulated.

Thirdly ; They have, without my recommendation, or sending through me their orders, and even without acquainting me with their intentions, moved corps of cavalry and infantry from the army to which they belonged, to other stations ; and this without any reason, that I am acquainted with, of a public nature. By this last measure the greatest inconvenience and confusion has been produced.

I had proposed, and the Government had consented to, a reform of the cavalry ; and they had ordered that it should be carried into execution. I sent orders in consequence, and I might have hoped that the armies would have had a tolerably well organised cavalry by the commencement of the campaign. Instead of that, I find that the Government have likewise sent orders to the same corps, different from those which I had sent ; and I am informed, but not by the Minister at War, that the cavalry which I had destined to form part of the army of Galicia, at the opening of the campaign in May, had been ordered, some of it on the 6th February, and others on the 6th March, without my knowledge, to the Isla de Leon, there to join a cavalry depôt, which has been formed at that station, likewise without my knowledge. Another corps of cavalry, ordered by me to Alicante, to receive its clothing and horse appointments at Alicante, has been ordered by the Minister at War into the province of Seville.

I have frequently remonstrated upon these breaches of agreement with me, and on the evils likely to result from them ; but I have hitherto been unable to obtain from the Government any satisfactory reply, whether they intended to conform to their agreement with me or not.

To this statement add, that owing to the delays of the Government in issuing the orders to the financial department in the provinces, to carry into execution the measures decreed by the Cortes, and arranged with me to provide for the support of the armies, that branch of the service is in the same confusion as it was in the end of last year. All the armies are in the greatest distress, for want of pay and provisions ; nothing can be realised, even from those provinces which have been longest freed from the enemy ; and the expectations of the country, and of the allies, that we should have a good Spanish army in this campaign, will certainly be disappointed.

I am fully alive to the importance which has been attached throughout Spain, as well as in England and in other parts of Europe, to the circumstance of my having been intrusted with the command of the Spanish armies ; and the officers of the Spanish Staff who are here with me will, I am convinced, do justice to the interest, the devotion, and diligence with which I have labored to place the military affairs of the country in the state in which they ought to be. But I have a character to lose ; and in proportion as expectation has been raised by my appointment, will be the extent of the disappointment and regret at finding that things are no better than they were before.

I confess that I do not feel inclined to become the object of these disagreeable sensations, either in Spain, in England, or throughout Europe; and unless some measures can be adopted to prevail upon the Government to force the Minister at War to perform the engagements of the Government with me, I must, however unwillingly, resign a situation and trust which I should not have accepted if these engagements had not been entered into, and I had not believed that they would have been adhered to.

I have written you this long story, because I believe you were principally instrumental in producing the unanimous votes of the Cortes, that the command of the army should be conferred upon me; and I wish you to communicate this letter to Señor Argüelles and the Conde de Toreno; and to Señor Ciscar, who, I believe, was the person who first moved the subject in the Cortes. I wish them to call for all my letters to the Minister at War and his answers, from the 1st December last to the present day; and they will learn from them the exact state of the case; and will be able to judge whether any, and what measures ought to be adopted. But I must tell you that, whatever may be their opinion regarding the measures to be adopted by the Cortes on this subject, I must reserve to myself the power of acting according to my own judgment; and if the agreement made with me, or something substantially the same, is not adhered to by the Regency, I must resign my situation.

I have now to tell you, that I propose to take the field at the head of the Allied British and Portuguese army, as soon as the rain shall have fallen, and the appearance of the green forage will enable me to support the cavalry of the army; but I am sorry to tell you, that, owing to the measures which are the subject of this letter, I do not believe that a single Spanish soldier will be able to take the field till after the harvest.'

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757.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 6th April, 1813.

'In regard to feeding the Spanish troops in Spain, I have invariably set my face against it, and have never consented to it, or done it, even for a day, in any instance. My reasons are:—First; that it entails upon Great Britain an expense which the country is unable to bear: Secondly; that it entails upon the departments of the army which undertake it a detail of business and a burthen in respect to transport and other means, to which the departments, if formed upon any moderate scale, must be quite unequal: Thirdly; I know from experience that, if we do not interfere, the Spanish troops, particularly if paid as your's are, and in limited numbers, will not want food in any part of Spain; whereas the best and most experienced of our departments would not be able to draw from the country resources for them.'

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G. O.

Freneda, 8th April, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces desires that in future, when any detachments shall arrive from England for any regiment in this army, a list of the men's names composing it, with a size and description roll of each man, and a state of his necessaries, and debts and credits, shall forthwith be sent to the Adjutant General of the army, by the officer in charge of the detachment, in case there should be such an officer capable of performing this duty; or by the officer in command at Belem, or at any other station, where such detachment should land, if there should be no officer in charge of it.

2. Major General Peacocke is requested to give directions that this Order may be strictly obeyed at Lisbon.

3. The



758.

To Major General the Hon. C. Colville.

Freneda, 10th April, 1813.

' I beg you will do me the favor to call before you the commanding and other officers of the — regt., and that you will communicate to them the enclosed papers and this letter. When the — regt. before formed a part of this army, I was obliged to send it to Lisbon, on account of the state to which it had been brought by its want of discipline and order; and I shall certainly send this regiment again into garrison, and shall report to the Commander in Chief my sense of its bad conduct, and unfitness for service in the field, if I should receive any more complaints such as those which have recently reached me; and should find the soldiers in such a state of insubordination, and such an absence of discipline in the regiment, that the soldiers cannot be trusted on a detachment without mutinying against the authority of the officer or non-commissioned officer commanding such detachment.

It is in the power of the commanding and other officers, in any battalion, to establish such a system of discipline and subordination in it, that the soldiers shall respect the authority of the non-commissioned officers, and shall not dare to commit the outrage of which the soldiers of the — have committed in his presence, much less mutiny against his authority; and if the — cannot be brought to such a state, they shall not serve in the field with this army.'

759.

To Colonel Stirling.

Freneda, 11th April, 1813.

' If the execution of the sentence be postponed, and the man remain in confinement, an injustice is done him by the unnecessarily lengthened duration of his confinement; and the ends and purpose of justice are weakened, if not lost, by lengthening the period between the commission and the punishment for a crime. If the execution of the sentence be postponed, and the man be allowed to return to his duty, a military irregularity is committed. No soldier should be put on duty, having hanging over him the sentence of a Court Martial.

3. The Adjutant General will regularly transmit these lists to the officer commanding the regiment, who is forthwith to take on the strength of the regiment, and post to companies, the men of whose names the list will be transmitted to him by the Adjutant General.

4. These men are to be returned "on command," till they shall join their regiment, unless they should have been reported to have been sent into any hospital, when they are to be returned accordingly.

5. The Commander of the Forces again draws the attention of the officers commanding regiments to the Orders repeatedly issued respecting the ticket to be given to soldiers on being sent to hospitals. He receives frequent complaints of the loss of arms, accoutrements, and necessaries, in the hospitals; but one moment's reflection would convince those who make these complaints, that the purveyors cannot be held responsible for these articles belonging to a soldier sent to hospital, unless a regular ticket should be sent with him.

6. The omission to make out and transmit these tickets has, besides, occasioned other inconveniences and irregularities, and it has become almost impossible to account for the soldiers supposed at their regiments to be in general hospital, owing to the frequency of the omission on the part of their officers to send tickets with them, and the men being unable from sickness to tell their own names, or the state of their necessaries, and frequently concealing both purposely.

7. The Commander of the Forces is always concerned to be obliged to occasion trouble to any officer, but the officers of the army may depend upon it, that no duty, which they are called upon to perform, can be omitted without serious inconvenience to the service, which will be felt sooner or later.'

I recommend that all the men whose punishment has been postponed may be pardoned; and that the practice of postponing punishments may be discontinued in future.'

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760.

To H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

Freneda, 12th April, 1813.

'I request permission to call the attention of your Royal Highness to the state of your troops, and of all your establishments, in consequence of the great arrear of pay which is due to them.

According to the last statements which I have received, pay is due to the army of operations from the end of last September; to the troops of the line in garrison, from the month of June; and to the militia, from February. The transports of the army have never, I believe, received any regular payment, and none whatever since June, 1812. The honor of your Royal Highness' arms may perhaps suffer greatly by these evils; and I have repeatedly called, but in vain, the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to this subject.

I am now upon the point of opening a new campaign with your Royal Highness' army, to which pay is due for a greater space of time than when the last campaign was concluded; although the subsidy from Great Britain has been hitherto regularly paid, granted especially for the payment and maintenance of a certain body of troops; and even although it has been proved within the last 3 months, that the revenue of the State has produced a sum nearer a third than a fourth larger than in any other 3 months during the whole time I have been *au fait* of this matter.

The serious consequences which may probably result from the backwardness of these payments, affecting as much the honor of your Royal Highness' arms, as the cause of the allies; and the uniform refusal of the Governors of the Kingdom to attend to any one of the measures which I have recommended, either for temporary or permanent relief, have at last obliged me to go into your Royal Highness' presence, for the purpose of stating the result of the measures which I have recommended to the Governors of the Kingdom for the reform of the Custom House, which measures have not been yet carried into full effect, in consequence of the opposition they encounter from the chief of the Treasury; although the Governors ought to have been convinced there was room for the suggestion of improvements in the several branches of the public administration of the Kingdom of Portugal. But I cannot prevail against the influence of the chief of the Treasury; this is what induces me to lay this *exposé* before your Royal Highness.

In order to improve the resources and means of the Kingdom, I have recommended the adoption of some method by which the taxes might be actually and really collected, and the merchants and capitalists really pay the tenth of their annual profits as an extraordinary contribution for the war; the effects of this system being first tried in the great cities of Lisbon and Oporto.

I can declare that no one knows better than I do, the sacrifices which have been made, and the sufferings which have been experienced by your Royal Highness' faithful subjects during the war, for there is no one who



has seen more of the country, or who, for the last 4 years, has lived so much amongst the people.

It is a fact, Sir, that the great cities, and even some of the smallest places of the Kingdom, have gained by the war; the mercantile class generally, has enriched itself by the great disbursements which the army makes in money; and there are individuals at Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense sums. The credit of your Royal Highness' Government is not in a state to be able to derive resources from these capitals, owing to remote, as also to present circumstances; and it can obtain advantage only through the means of taxes. The fact is not denied, that the tributes regularly established at Lisbon and Oporto, as also the contribution of 10 per cent. upon the profits of the mercantile class, are not really paid to the State; nor is it denied that the measures which I have proposed would, if efficaciously carried into execution in the above mentioned cities, furnish the Government with great pecuniary resources. It remains for the Government, therefore, to explain to your Royal Highness the reasons why it has not put them in practice, or some other expedient which might render the revenue of the State equal to its expences.

All I have stated to your Royal Highness respecting the arrear of payment to the troops, is equally undeniable. The only motive to which I can attribute the Government not having adopted the measures aforesaid, is the fear that they might not be popular; but the knowledge I have of the good sense and loyalty of your Royal Highness' subjects, the reliance I place therein, and my zeal for the cause in which your Royal Highness is engaged with your allies, induce me to offer myself, not only as responsible for the happy issue of the measures which I have recommended, but to take upon myself all the odium which they might create. I have, nevertheless, not been able to overcome the influence of the Treasury.

Another measure which I recommended, was the entire abolition of the *Junta de Viveres*, to put an end to a monthly expense of nearly 50 *contos* of *reis*, caused by the Junta, under the plea of paying their old debts. Never was any Sovereign in the world so ill served as your Royal Highness has been by the *Junta de Viveres*; and I do not think I have rendered a greater service to your Royal Highness than that which I did in soliciting that it might be abolished.

However, after its abolition, under the specious pretext of paying its debts, it has received monthly from the Treasury, a little more or less, 50 *contos* of *reis*. It cannot be doubted that the *Junta de Viveres* is very much in debt, and it is of great importance to your Royal Highness' Government that some method of arranging and paying these debts should be adopted. But I request that your Royal Highness will order the Governors of the Kingdom to let your Royal Highness see in detail the manner in which the above mentioned 50 *contos* of *reis*, granted monthly, have been applied.

Have all the accounts of the *Junta de Viveres* been called in and liquidated? Who has performed this operation? To what sum does their debt amount? Has it been classified? Finally, have measures been adopted to know with certainty how much is really due to those to whom something has already been paid upon account of their debt? Is any part of the 50 *contos*

of *reis*, which are issued for many months by the Treasury, applied to the payment of the salaries of the members of the *Junta de Viveres*, abolished, I believe, by your Royal Highness' orders?

I request that your Royal Highness will command that an answer be given to each of the questions aforesaid, which will enable your Royal Highness to see the state of these transactions.

But admitting that it be convenient to pay at this time the debts of the *Junta de Viveres*, it would be almost superfluous to propose the question, whether it be more important to pay those debts, or to pay the army which has to defend your Royal Highness' Kingdom and government, and to protect the honor and property of Your Royal Highness' subjects, and every thing most dear to them in life; without which, nothing could escape destruction. This army will neither be able nor willing to fight, if it be not paid.

Another measure which I have lately recommended, as a remedy capable of putting the Government in a condition to pay the army of operations for some time, in the same manner and to the same period to which their comrades in the British army are paid, is, that there be taken out of the hands of all the collectors of the revenue of the State the balances which they may owe to the Royal Treasury.

My attention was called to this subject by a communication made to me by a military officer in the province of *Tras os Montes*, relating to a large sum of money in the hands of the collector of the revenue at *Braganza*, at the time when the enemy made movements towards the *Esla*; and having inquired into this matter, I found that, according to the manner in which the Treasury manages its transactions, every one of the collectors of the revenue of the State has always in his possession the amount of the revenue he has received in the space of a month.

I recommended that the collectors should be obliged to deliver in, every 15 days, whatever they had received; but I have not been able to accomplish it.

Your Royal Highness has frequently deigned to make known to the Governors of the Kingdom your Royal desire that they should attend to my advice, and they have as frequently assured your Royal Highness that they give it every attention.

I can assure your Royal Highness, that when I devote myself to the labor of taking into consideration the affairs of the State, and giving my opinion upon them to the Governors of the Kingdom, I have no object in doing so, excepting the interest I feel in the good of the nation, and the honor and prosperity of your Royal Highness; and I am not in any degree induced to do so from objects of personal interest, for none can I have relatively to Portugal; nor can I have any with regard to individuals, for not having any relations, and being almost unacquainted with those who direct or would wish to direct the affairs of your Royal Highness.

Although the measures which I have hitherto recommended, and which have at last been adopted, such as the payment of the interest upon the national debt in paper currency, the reform of the Custom houses, the establishment of a military chest, and others which it is unnecessary to mention, have answered the ends of their adoption; and perhaps I might say, that



other measures which I could propose, would have similar results; yet I am ready to allow that I may perhaps deceive myself. Nevertheless, I request with great earnestness that your Royal Highness will deign to be persuaded that the motives which induce me to recommend these measures, and to appeal against the chief of the Treasury, are founded upon my wishes to promote and forward the benevolent intentions of your Royal Highness, as well as the best results to the cause in which your Royal Highness is engaged.

I venture to express again, in the most decided manner, my very ardent wish that your Royal Highness will be pleased to return to your Kingdom, to take charge of its government, which not only myself, but all your Royal Highness' faithful subjects desire with the greatest anxiety.

May God preserve your Royal Highness many years.'

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 761.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 13th April, 1813.

'According to the existing system, the Commissary General, whatever may be the extent of the concerns intrusted to his management, is the only person accountable to the public; and he is responsible for the acts and conduct of his deputies, for their honesty and their abilities, and their fitness for their situations and duties, although they are appointed by other authorities, over which the Commissary General has no control. I believe there is no instance of such a responsibility for the expenditure of money being imposed on any other description of officer; and it appears to me to have originated in the diminutive nature of our concerns of this description, which rendered it impossible for one man personally to superintend them; and to have been continued after their growth to their existing magnitude, notwithstanding that it must be obvious to every body that it is quite impossible for the Commissary General to exercise an efficient control over the expenditure and accounts of the numerous persons who must, under existing circumstances, be intrusted with the expenditure of the public money, and at the same time attend to the other duties of his office, more important in relation to the operations of the army to which he may be attached.

It is my opinion that the Commissary General of an army should be relieved from all responsibility for the accounts of that army. He should be, as he is at present, the head of the finance of that army; and he should give his orders for purchases, or for incurring other expenses, and should issue money from time to time to those officers whom he should employ in making purchases or in incurring expenses. But his responsibility to the public should end with the production of the receipt of the officer who should have received the money, and his justification of the order which he had issued for the purchase or expenditure; and with his return to the Account Office of the name of the officer to whom he had authorised the issue of money for a particular service.'

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 762.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 13th April, 1813.

'The crimes for which it is desirable to find means of punishment are

not generally committed by troops marching in divisions, brigades, or regiments, or battalions, but in small detachments. When a regiment or large body is marching, the soldiers are under the eye and control of their officers, and are generally prevented from committing those crimes, and at all events the commanding officer of the regiment or larger body has the power and means of assembling a regimental or other Court Martial for the trial of the offenders; and he can punish, although probably not to the full extent which might be desirable, immediately. Officers marching with smaller detachments have not such powers or means; and it is the object of this Act, as I understand, to afford them.'

## 763.

MEMORANDUM ON THE OPERATIONS TO BE CARRIED ON, ON THE  
EASTERN COAST OF THE PENINSULA.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 14th April, 1813.

' 1. It is obvious that these operations cannot be commenced with advantage, till the allied British and Portuguese army shall take the field in Castille, which is intended in the first days of the month of May.

2. The troops applicable to these operations are the allied British and Sicilian corps, and the Spanish divisions under Major General Whittingham and Major General Roche, under the command of Sir J. Murray; that part of the second army under General Elio, composed of regular troops; and the regular troops of the third army under the command of the Duque del Parque.

3. The objects for the operations of the troops on the eastern coast of Spain are first to obtain possession of the open part of the kingdom of Valencia:—secondly, to obtain an establishment on the sea coast north of the Ebro, so as to open a communication with the army of Catalonia; and eventually, thirdly, to oblige the enemy to retire from the Lower Ebro.

4. Although these objects are noticed in this order, circumstances may render expedient a departure from it, and that the one mentioned in the third instance should precede that mentioned in the second.

5. If Sir J. Murray possesses the means of embarking 10,000 infantry and artillery, or more, the first and second objects may be combined with great advantage; that is to say, that the attempt to secure the second object by a brisk attack upon Tarragona with all the British and Sicilian corps, and such part of the division of General Whittingham or General Roche, as can be transported to Tarragona, will necessarily induce Suchet to weaken his force so considerably in Valencia, as to enable General Elio and the Duque del Parque to take possession of a great part, if not of all the open country in that kingdom.

6. The first object will then be attained.

7. The second will be a question of time and means. If Suchet, notwithstanding the junction of the troops of the first army with those under Sir J. Murray, should be so strong in Catalonia as to oblige that General to raise the siege, and to embark without accomplishing his object, the first object will at least have been gained without difficulty; and the return of Sir J. Murray's corps into the kingdom of Valencia will secure it.



8. If Sir J. Murray should succeed in taking Tarragona, the first and second objects will have been attained, and a foundation will have been laid for the attainment of the third object.

9. Orders have been sent for the Duque del Parque to commence his movement from his position at Jaen, and to proceed to put himself in communication with the second army, either by posting himself at Almanza, or at Yecla.

10. As soon as the corps under the Duque del Parque arrives in communication with General Elio, the allied British and Sicilian corps, and General Whittingham's division should embark, to the number of at least 10,000 men, or more if possible, and proceed immediately to the attack of Tarragona, in which they should be aided by the first army.

11. The troops remaining in the kingdom of Valencia, that is to say, those under the Duque del Parque and General Elio, and those of General Whittingham's and General Roche's divisions, and of the allied British and Sicilian corps which should not embark, should continue on the defensive, and retire, even upon the lines at Alicante, if it should be necessary.

12. But as soon as it shall be found that Suchet begins to weaken his force in the kingdom of Valencia, they are to follow him up, and take possession of as large a part of that kingdom as it may be in their power to do.

13. It must be understood, however, by the General Officers at the head of these troops, that the success of all our endeavors in the ensuing campaign will depend upon none of the corps being beaten, of which the operating armies will be composed; and that they will be in sufficient numbers to turn the enemy, rather than attack him in a strong position; and that I shall forgive any thing, excepting that one of the corps should be beaten or dispersed.

14. Sir J. Murray will take with him to the siege of Tarragona such of the allied British and Sicilian cavalry as he may have horse transports to convey; the remainder, with the cavalry belonging to General Whittingham's division, will remain with the troops under General Elio and the Duque del Parque.

15. If General Sir J. Murray should be obliged to raise the siege of Tarragona, and embark, or, at all events, when he returns to the kingdom of Valencia, he is to land as far to the north as may be in his power, in order to join immediately on the right of the troops under General Elio and the Duque del Parque; and the mules and other equipments belonging to the allied British and Sicilian corps, which must necessarily be left behind at Alicante, are to join that corps at the place of disembarkation.

16. If Tarragona should be taken, it must be garrisoned by a part of the first army under General Copons.

17. In case Sir J. Murray should not have the means of embarking 10,000 infantry, at least, the corps of troops to undertake a serious operation on the sea coast in the rear of the enemy's left, will not be sufficient, and the plan must be altered; and the following measures must be adopted to obtain a sufficient force in rear of his right.

18. First, The regiments, as stated in the margin,\* must be detached from the second and third armies, and must be embarked. These, with

\* Voluntarios de Jean, of the first division of the second army; the regiment of Alicante, of General Roche's division; 2nd de Burgos, of General Whittingham's division.

about the same number recently ordered from Galicia, will augment the army of Catalonia sufficiently to enable them, according to the opinion of General Copons, to take the field against the enemy's troops now in Catalonia, and to force them to remain in the garrisons.

19. As soon as he shall be joined by these reinforcements, General Copons should make himself master of the open country, particularly between Tarragona and Tortosa, and that place and Lerida.

20. Secondly, the third army of the Duque del Parque should be employed to turn the right of the enemy's positions in Valencia, while the allied troops, under Sir J. Murray and General Elio, will attack them in front. I imagine that it will be necessary for the Duque del Parque to proceed, in this case, as far as Utiel and Requena, before he will be able to make any impression on the position of the Jucar.

21. In proportion as the allied troops shall gain ground, this operation will be repeated; the third army continuing to move upon the enemy's right till it shall come in communication with the first army on the left of the Ebro. With this object in view, General Copons and the Duque del Parque should keep in constant communication.

*Note.*—It would be very desirable that, if practicable, General Copons should get possession of Mequinenza.

22. When the enemy shall have been forced across the Ebro, either by the maritime operations in rear of his left, or by those just described on his right, it will rest with General Sir J. Murray to determine, in the first instance, on the line to be pursued, in a view to the local situation of affairs, in respect to the ulterior objects of the operations; whether to establish the Spanish authority in the kingdom of Valencia, by obtaining possession of Murviedro, Peñiscola, and any other fortified posts there may be within that kingdom, or to attack Tortosa or Tarragona, supposing that that place should not have fallen by the maritime operations first proposed.

23. In my opinion, the decision on this point, as far as it depends upon the state of affairs on the eastern coast, will depend much upon the practicability and facility of communicating with the shipping on the coast, without having possession of the maritime posts in Valencia.

24. If that should be practicable, it would be most desirable to attain the second and third objects of the operations, without waiting to obtain possession of the posts within the kingdom of Valencia; respecting which, it is hoped, there would be no doubt, when the operations of the first army should be connected with those of the second and third, and of the troops under Sir J. Murray.

25. The divisions composed of irregular troops attached to the second army, and commanded by Generals Duran and Villa Campa, should direct their attention to prevent all communication between the enemy's main army under the King in person, and that under Suchet.

26. The operations of these divisions should be carried on on the left of, and in communication with the Duque del Parque; and, in proportion as the third army should move towards the Ebro, the operations of these divisions should be pushed forwards likewise.

27. The division of Don Juan Martin must be kept in reserve, nearly in its present situation, and directions shall be sent to Don Juan Martin.



28. General Sir J. Murray, having under his command the largest and most efficient body of troops, upon whose movements those of the others will depend essentially, will direct the operations of all the corps of troops referred to in this memorandum, when their operations shall be connected immediately with those of the corps of troops under his command.

29. If General Sir J. Murray's allied British and Sicilian corps, and the whole or part of General Whittingham's division should embark, General the Duque del Parque will direct the operations ordered in this memorandum to be carried on in the kingdom of Valencia; but, in either case, the General Officers commanding the first, second, and third armies, and General Whittingham, must command each their separate corps.'

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764.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 16th April, 1813.

'I have received your letters of the 1st April, and I now transmit a memorandum on the operations which I wish should be carried on on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, translated copies of which are gone to the Duque del Parque, General Elio, and General Copons.

In forming a plan of operation for troops in the Peninsula, it is necessary always to bear in mind their inefficiency, notwithstanding their good inclinations, their total want of every thing which could keep them together as armies, and of the necessary equipments of cannon, &c. &c., and their repeated failures in the accomplishment even of the most trifling objects, notwithstanding the personal bravery of the individuals composing the armies. If I had had to form a plan for the operations of half the numbers, real soldiers, well equipped and prepared for the field, it would have been one of a very different description; but such a plan would not suit, and could not be executed by the instruments with which you have to work.

I beg therefore that you will set to work as soon as you may think proper, as proposed in the enclosed memorandum. I have nothing to say to the equipments or establishments of your troops, or to any thing relating to them, excepting their operations, and the occasion and period of quitting the Peninsula if there should be occasion. But if you will send me a regular report of the mules and horses you have purchased, stating the prices, and for what purpose, I will send you the regular authority for the purchase.

I still object, however, to your feeding General Roche's, or General Whittingham's, or any other Spanish troops in Spain, as occasioning an useless expense to such an amount as that Great Britain cannot bear it, and as eventually likely to break down your own departments. I am likewise certain that, if those officers take pains, your assistance, however loudly they may call for it, is not required. As long as I have served in Spain, I have never done such a thing, and never will.

Of all your wants that of artillery-men appears most extraordinary. Besides the artillery-men which came with the corps from Sicily, which, as the corps came to carry on a siege, I conclude, cannot be inconsiderable in number, you have 2 companies of British and 2 of Portuguese artillery belonging to this army; I believe the very same men, in the same numbers, that took Badajoz for us last Spring. It would, however, be very desirable, now that the communication is quite secure, if you could send me a regular

return of your force. I cannot let you have the artillery-men at Carthagená, as I have nothing else to take care of our stores, &c., there. But, if 4 companies besides those belonging to Sicily are not enough, I will try to send more from this army.'

## 765.

To Don J. de Carvajal.

Freneda, 18th April, 1813.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter (marked *mui reservado*) of the 8th instant, and I have read its enclosures with the greatest attention.

The writer of them is certainly unacquainted with the numbers, the position, or the circumstances, as affecting the efficiency of the armies of the several allied nations; and he appears to me to be equally unacquainted with the position of the enemy's armies; and not to be aware of the facilities which they possess of effecting a junction of their different corps, long before the armies of the allied nations, supposing them to be sufficiently numerous, could perform the proposed operations.

Having had a long experience in the operations of war, particularly against the French, I am induced to doubt very much the practicability of the execution of all schemes such as that proposed for the surprise of the post of Toledo; of the head quarters of one of the *corps d'armée*, &c. &c.

In order to see the fallacy of such schemes, it is only necessary to reflect upon the difficulty, nay impossibility, of moving through the enemy's posts, unperceived, such a body of troops, 1000 men, as are required to execute such a scheme. In truth, it is very frequently difficult for a single man to pass through them to carry a letter; and it is not reasonable to expect that 1000 men could pass through many leagues of country occupied by the enemy, in order to surprise the head quarters, or park of artillery, in such a town as Toledo.'

## 766.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

'I think that by these manœuvres, the existing Cortes will create an apparent necessity for their continuing to sit after the month of October, the period fixed for their dissolution and the assembly of the new Cortes. It is impossible to calculate upon the plans of such an assembly. They have no check whatever; and they are guided and governed by the most ignorant and licentious of all licentious presses,—that of Cadiz. I believe they mean

G. O.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the General Officers, and commanding officers of regiments, particularly those of the cavalry, and of brigades and troops of artillery, not to use the green corn as forage, if it can be avoided. There is nothing that will, at the present season of the year, be of such advantage to the horses, and other animals of the army, as to turn them to grass during the entire day, or at least such part of it as the animals may not be employed on duty.

2. If it should be necessary to use the green corn as forage, it should be cut, and the animals should not be turned out in the corn fields. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the attention of the officers to his Orders, regarding the mode of cutting the green corn as forage, in order to render it certain that the owners may have compensation for their property.

3. The Commander of the Forces has already received complaints from the inhabitants of inattention to his Orders on this subject; for which complaints he had hoped no cause would have been given. He trusts, however, that no cause will be given in future.'



to attack the Royal and feudal tenths, and the tithes of the church, under the pretext of encouraging agriculture; and I am sadly afraid that, finding the contributions not so productive as they imagined they would be, they will seize the rents of the estates of my friends the *Grandeos*.'  


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767.

To Major General Baron Bock.

Freneda, 22nd April, 1813.

'I have received the proceedings of the General Court Martial, at which you are President, on the trial of Lieut. ———, of the ———, and your letter of the 19th, in which you have, by desire of the General Court Martial, recommended that officer for mercy, which recommendation I am desirous that the Court should reconsider.

First; I would beg the Court to observe, that it is never thought necessary to trouble a General Court Martial with any but cases carrying on the face of them the appearance of an extraordinary degree of guilt; and it does appear a waste of the time of the public, and in itself very extraordinary, that a General Court Martial, having had proved before it the guilt of a prisoner, having convicted him by their sentence, and decreed a punishment, should then do worse than defeat all the objects of the trial, by holding up an example of impunity, procured through the means of the very tribunal appointed by the Legislature to be the principal instruments in maintaining the discipline and good order of the army.

This observation applies to recommendations by General Courts Martial in general, to which I make it a rule to pay attention; but I am quite convinced that, if I were to exercise my own judgment on these recommendations, or if General Courts Martial were to consider them as they are, the effects of a mistaken lenity, and were to be more sparing of them, the army would be in a better state of discipline, and much of the time of the public now spent in those trials, would be saved.

But, Secondly; I would beg the Court to reflect on the charge of which they have found Lieut. ——— guilty, viz., "behaving in a scandalous, infamous manner, such as is unbecoming an officer and a gentleman;" on the punishment annexed by the Articles of War to the guilt of this charge; and on the facts on which the charge is founded, as detailed in the charge itself, and which have been clearly proved before the General Court Martial.

In the whole catalogue of military crimes, it is scarcely possible to find one more enormous, or more likely in its consequences to be injurious to the service in every way in which injury can be done to it.

Then, Thirdly; I would beg the Court to reflect upon the infamy attaching to the character of Lieut. ———, after the conviction of guilt of such a charge founded on such facts. Supposing that H. R. H. the Prince Regent should attend to their recommendation, do the General Court Martial believe that the officers of the ——— would willingly associate with such a man? Is there any regiment in the army of which the officers would not deem it a disgrace to associate with him? Is there an officer upon the General Court Martial who would not consider himself disgraced, if he were seen in company with him?

If this be true, I beg the General Court Martial to consider in what a situation they will place H. R. H. the Prince Regent by their recommenda-

tion. His Royal Highness will be called upon to pardon an officer for a crime so infamous, that neither the officers of the corps to which he belongs, nor those of any other regiment in the army, will associate with him.

I intreat the Court, therefore, to feel that confidence in the justice and propriety of their sentence which it deserves; and to allow it to go before His Royal Highness without the recommendation: but if they should still desire that the recommendation should be forwarded, I shall send it to England, but without any remark on my part, as I never will be instrumental in retaining in His Majesty's service, as an officer, a person found guilty of behaving in a scandalous, infamous manner, such as is unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and in forcing him into the society of officers by whom, to associate with him, will be deemed a disgrace.'

## 768.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 3rd May, 1813.

'It is my opinion that it is my duty to see that the service is well carried on; and next, to see that it is carried on at as cheap a rate to the public as is possible; and having a large establishment of commissioned officers capable of superintending and of carrying into execution transactions of this description, I conceive that I perform my duty by the public in employing them in this manner, rather than in contracting for services with merchants, whose object is their own advantage, at what cost of money or inconvenience to the public is a matter of indifference to them.'

## 769.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 4th May, 1813.

'The line which I shall take, in case of such an event, is not at all difficult. My business is to oppose the French; and there can be very little occasion for my taking a line to decide which of the two is the rightful assembly, during the short period that such a state of things could possibly exist. Your line of conduct may be more difficult, because both parties will press for your acknowledging their authority, as the best support that it could acquire. But a diplomatic person has always the advantage of being able to ask for time to receive instructions from his employers; and while waiting for these,

G. O.

Freneda, 1st May, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General Officers, and commanding officers of regiments, to the 9th paragraph of the General Orders of the 1st March, in regard to tents.

2. He is aware that 3 tents for each company will not be sufficient to give cover to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of some of the strong regiments; but it is to be understood that all the tents are to be disposable by the Assistant Quarter Master General attached to the division in which any regiment may be, who will see that all the men are covered; and he will apply the tents to cover such part of the divisions as he may think proper.

3. He must take care, however, that the camps are so disposed as that the tents belonging to any regiment attached for the moment to the use of another, may not be removed to an inconvenient distance from the regiment to which they may belong, and the animals which are destined to carry them, and the bāt men who are to take care of them.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that it may be observed as a general rule, that the tents are to be concealed from view in the day time as far as may be practicable; but there will be no inconvenience in removing them at night to heights, or any other situation, on which it may be convenient to post the troops during the night, from which for the purpose of concealment it may be expedient to keep them in the day time.'



or pretending to wait for them, circumstances may occur to enable you to decide positively to which authority it would be expedient to give your countenance.'

## 770.

To Colonel \_\_\_\_\_.

Freneda, 10th May, 1813.

'I have received your letter of the 8th inst., and I acknowledge that I cannot understand the nature of the feelings of an officer which are to be mortified by his performance of his duty in the situation in which His Majesty and the rules of the service have placed him; and I can only say that, in the course of my military life, I have gone from the command of a brigade to that of my regiment, and from the command of an army to that of a brigade or division, as I was ordered, without feeling any mortification.

As, however, you feel mortified upon your re-assuming the command of your regiment, from the command of a brigade, of which your regiment forms a part, I trust that you will now see the propriety of my determination not to remove officers from the command of their regiments to the temporary command of brigades of which their regiments do not form a part; as it is probable that your feelings would have been mortified in a greater degree, if you had now been obliged to return to the command of your regiment from a brigade of the line.'

## 771.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 11th May, 1813.

'Having turned the enemy's position on the Duero, and established our communication across it, our next operation must depend upon circumstances. I do not know whether I am now stronger than the enemy, even including the army of Galicia; but of this I am very certain, that I shall not be stronger throughout the campaign, or more efficient, than I now am; and the enemy will not be weaker. I cannot have a better opportunity for trying the fate of a battle, which, if the enemy should be unsuccessful, must oblige him to withdraw entirely.

We have been sadly delayed by the bridge, without which it is obvious we can do nothing. The equipment is quite new, and has marched only from Abrantes; but there has already been much breakage, and I understand that the carriages are shamefully bad. The truth is, that English tradesmen, particularly contractors, are become so dishonest, that no reliance can be placed on any work, particularly in iron, done by contract. I have the same complaint of some carts made for the Commissariat; 18 out of 25 of which broke on a good road, without loads, in 80 miles.

I shall have sad work with this bridge throughout the campaign, and yet we can do nothing without it.'

## 772.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 12th May, 1813.

'Some of my brother officers, however, have expressed an anxious desire that I should continue a Knight of the Bath, into which I have admitted most of them; and all of them owe this honor to actions performed under my command. Under these circumstances, and adverting to the reasons

which induced you to wish that I should resign the Order, I would wish you to consider whether it would not be better that I should keep it.

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I feel great reluctance in suggesting that I should keep this Order, and I should not have done so, if it had not been suggested to me by some of the Knights. God knows I have plenty of Orders, and I consider myself to have been most handsomely treated by the Prince Regent and his Government, and shall not consider myself the less so, if you should not think proper that I should retain the Order of the Bath.'

773.

To Don L. Bertram.

Freneda, 15th May, 1813.

' Great Britain, owing to the misfortunes of the world, and particularly to

G. O.

Freneda, 13th May, 1813.

' 2. The Commander of the Forces receives frequent complaints of the conduct of the officers and soldiers of the army, towards the magistrates of the country, notwithstanding the repeated Orders which have been given on this subject: and it appears the more extraordinary, that ground for these complaints should be given by the officers and soldiers of the British army, as it is well known that, in their own country, no individual can venture to insult, or ill treat, the civil magistrates.

3. Circumstances, however, have increased the inconveniences resulting from such conduct, and the Commander of the Forces begs that the officers of the army will recollect, that the operations of the army are carried on within the territories of friendly powers, whose laws for the protection of the persons invested with authority, are as strict as those of Great Britain; and that any injury done, or insult given, to the civil authorities of the government, will be attended by the same consequences, as similar conduct would in Great Britain.

4. The Commander of the Forces begs that pains may be taken to communicate these Orders to the Portuguese officers and troops, as well as the British; and he trusts that the Portuguese will pay the same deference and respect to the civil authorities in Spain as all classes of persons are obliged by the laws of Portugal to pay to the civil authorities in Portugal.

5. The quartering of the Head Quarters of the army is to be in future under the superintendance of the commandant of the mounted Staff Corps, and Lieut. Colonel Scovell will appoint an officer of the corps to manage the details of that duty.'

G. O.

Freneda, 14th May, 1813.

' 2. All the inconveniences felt by the regiments in receiving men from general hospitals without clothing, necessaries, or accoutrements; and the inconveniences and delays experienced in the settlement of the accounts of soldiers to be sent home, as invalids, or in any other manner, originate in the neglect of the officers commanding companies, to the duties ordered by these Orders.

3. Measures have lately been adopted to facilitate the execution of the duties ordered by the General Orders of this army, of the 17th Dec., 1809; and the Commander of the Forces declares his intention to have a note taken of the name of any officer who may neglect the performance of this necessary duty in future, and to bring the conduct of such officer under the consideration of the Commander in Chief, upon every occasion on which his claims for promotion may be brought forward.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires, that on the receipt of this Order, the officers commanding at the hospital stations of Coimbra, Viseu, Celorico, Castello Branco, Abrantes, Santarem, and at Lisbon, will have Boards of Officers appointed to survey and report upon, and frame registers of the Purveyor's stores, as ordered by the General Orders of the 17th Dec., 1809.

5. In future, the commanding officers of the several hospital stations are to visit the depôts of arms, accoutrements, and necessaries, in charge of the Purveyors at the several hospital stations, at least once in each week, and to see that they are regularly kept; and the commanding officers at the hospital stations must take care that when soldiers are sent from the hospital to join their regiments, they take with them their own arms, accoutrements, and necessaries.

6. The officers of the Purveyor's department are reminded that, as public officers, they are personally responsible for the articles of soldiers' necessaries, accoutrements, and arms, placed in their charge; and the Commander of the Forces declares his intention of making them pay for the losses and damage which these articles may sustain, while in their charge.'



the unfortunate situation of the Spanish colonies, cannot procure specie to give the assistance which is required of her, and to defray her own expenses in the war; and it is with difficulty, and by cramping every branch of the service, that I am enabled to perform the King's engagements to his allies. I must observe, likewise, with that frankness with which I am accustomed to address the Government, that it is not reasonable to expect pecuniary sacrifices from Great Britain, when it is obvious that the country possesses resources which, if duly administered, and really applied to the object of maintaining troops in the field, would be more than sufficient for the purpose.

The campaign is about to open. The troops are all in march, and I now foretell to the Government what will be the consequence. For a short time, and while the harvest shall be on the ground, the troops will be maintained by means which it is unnecessary to detail; but which will deteriorate the discipline of the troops, and will be equally distressing to the General Officers who must sanction them, and to the inhabitants of the country who will have to bear the burthen. This resource will last, however, but a short time; and at the end of that time the Spanish troops must be dispersed, or must be sent to the rear for want of support.

What will then happen, it is impossible at this moment to foresee; but as I am not myself deceived by appearances, I am anxious that the Government should know the real situation of affairs, and that they should adopt early measures to ensure those resources for the armies, which I know the country can afford, and which it is obvious require only a due administration of them in order to be realised.

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774.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 16th May, 1813.

'The south of Italy is, for many reasons, probably the best scene of operations for a British army, excepting the Spanish Peninsula; and it is certainly a question of means whether the British Government will undertake any operations in that quarter, on the scale to which I have above referred. It may be depended upon, that if they are commenced on a smaller scale, or with any other intention than to persevere to the last, and to increase the

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G. O.

Freneda, 17th May, 1813.

4. The frequent neglect of the officers of the junior ranks of the army to perform those duties required, has been attended by the most serious and distressing consequences; and the Commander of the Forces had hoped that the Orders of the army, and the precepts and examples of their superiors, and their own reflections, would have taught them to pay more attention, and that he should not have had occasion in future to complain of these neglects.

5. The duty of reporting a detachment on its march to the commandant of every military station through which it passes, is prescribed and practised in every army wherever stationed; and it is particularly enjoined in this army for reasons to which it is not now necessary to advert, but which are sufficiently detailed in the General Orders upon the subject.

6. Inadvertency is no excuse for the neglect of this or any other duty, however frequently it may be alleged; and as the Commander of the Forces has full reason to acknowledge the zeal and good intention of all the officers of the army, he has to lament and complain of their inadvertency only, for the various neglects from which the service suffers so seriously; it is their business to make themselves masters of the Orders for the guidance of their conduct on every duty on which they may be employed; and if they will only turn their mind towards and reflect each upon his own business, they will soon find that the performance of essential duties, and the obedience to Orders, will not escape their memories.

means of opposing the French in Italy to the utmost, by raising, clothing, and feeding armies of the natives of Italy, or by enabling others to raise, clothe, and feed them, the plan will fail, and our troops would be forced to embark with loss and disgrace.'

775.

To Lieut. ———.

Freneda, 18th May, 1813.

'Every independent Government has a right to order the trial of any individual, residing in the country under its government, by the tribunals and according to the laws of the country; and it is impossible for me to interfere in any manner to prevent the Portuguese Government from bringing you to trial before a Portuguese Court for your conduct at Villa Franca.'

776.

To Earl Bathurst.

Carvajales, 31st May, 1813.

'The troops arrived at Salamanca on the 26th instant, and we found the enemy still in the town with one division of infantry, and 3 squadrons of cavalry, and some cannon of the Army of the South, under the command of General Villatte. The enemy evacuated the town on our approach, but they waited longer than they ought on the high ground in the neighbourhood, and afforded an opportunity for the cavalry, under General Fane and General V. Alten, the former of which crossed the Tormes, at the ford of S<sup>ta</sup>. Marta, and the latter at the bridge, to do them a good deal of injury in their retreat. Many were killed and wounded, and we took about 200 prisoners, 7 tumbrils of ammunition, some baggage, provisions, &c. The enemy retired by the road of Babila-fuente, and near Huerta were joined by a body of infantry and cavalry on their march from Alba. I then ordered our troops to discontinue their pursuit, our infantry not being up. Major General Long, and Don P. Morillo, in command of the Spanish division, attacked Alba, from which place the enemy retired.

In the course of the 27th and 28th, I established the troops which had marched from the Agueda and Upper Estremadura, between the Tormes and Duero, under the command of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, with the view to

G. O.

Freneda, 21st May, 1813.

'4. There is to be an officer of the General Staff at all times present in the camp or cantonment of each division of the army, who is to receive all Orders sent to the division, and who is to be responsible that the Orders are immediately communicated to the senior officer present, to be forthwith acted upon by him if necessary, in the event of the General Officer commanding the division being absent.

5. In camp, the tent, or hut, of the above mentioned Staff Officer is to be placed always in the same situation in the division, and it is to be known to the quarter guard of each regiment, so that any person arriving in the camp of the division with Orders, may be immediately conducted to it.'

G. O.

Carvajales, 31st May, 1813.

'2. The Commander of the Forces requests the several officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the commanding officers of regiments, to take means to prevent the destruction of the corn in the neighbourhood of their encampment, and the unnecessary passage of the troops across it.

3. The damage that is done by the turning of the cattle and animals of the followers of the army into the green corn, which would be better fed in the grass, and by the cutting of corn as forage by unauthorised persons, contrary to orders, is incalculable, not only to the individuals to whom the corn belongs, and who deserve the protection of the army, but to the army itself.'



their early communication and junction with the main body of the army, on the right of the Duero, and in the mean time, to their retaining possession of the Tormes, and of the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and I set off myself on the 29th to join the troops here, and arrived that day at Miranda de Douro; and here on the 30th I found the troops on the Esla, under the orders of Sir T. Graham, as I had intended, with their left at Tabara, and in communication with the Galician army, and their right at this place, and all the arrangements made for passing the Esla. The greater part passed that river this morning, the cavalry by fords, and the infantry by a bridge, which it was necessary to throw over the river, as it was so deep that some men, even of the cavalry, were lost in the passage. The English hussars, who crossed first, took an officer and 30 prisoners near Val de Perdices.

The enemy have evacuated Zamora, and our patrols have been in that town. The troops which were there have fallen back upon Toro, where I understand they have one division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry.

It appears that the enemy have joined at La Nava del Rey the troops which retired from Salamanca, Avila, &c. with those which were at Arevalo and Medina del Campo; and I imagine that as this part of the army will advance, they will retire across the Duero. The enemy's troops were still at Madrid and on the Tagus on the 22nd instant. I conclude that they will have evacuated that part of the country on hearing of our movement.'

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 777.

To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Amusco, 8th June, 1813.

'I must refer you to the General Orders for the duties and authority of Provost and his Assistants. I doubt the legality of the Provost's authority; and, in my opinion, necessity and custom are the only foundation for it; but the authority ought not to be extended farther than has been customary, unless absolutely necessary.

The Assistant Provosts, therefore, have not the power of executing capitally, even though they catch a soldier in the act of committing an outrage; nor can they, or even the Provost himself, punish, unless they do catch a soldier in the act.'

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 778.

To Major General Cooke.

Amusco, 9th June, 1813.

'Mr. ———, and the gentlemen belonging to the department under his charge, may conceive that he has, and he certainly has, reason to complain of those persons at Cadiz, who have by anonymous letters and other infamous means, traduced his character and conduct, and that of the gentlemen of his department, to his superiors. But he is mistaken if he supposes that he is the only person liable to such an evil. All those who serve the public honestly and faithfully have for their enemies and traducers those who are desirous of profiting by the public wants, inconveniences, and disasters, and by the misfortunes of the times; and Mr. ———, and the gentlemen of the department ought to have been satisfied by the result of the investigation of their conduct, and to have relied upon the justice of their superiors for their acquittal from any future anonymous charges, and ought not to have

made, what I must call, a disgraceful appeal to the doubtful result of a personal contest with persons entirely unworthy of their notice.

I feel exceedingly displeas'd with Mr. ——— and all the gentlemen of his department; but I will not consent to their removal from Cadiz. I should do them a gross injustice if, after the investigation to which they have submitted, I were to doubt the propriety of their conduct towards the public, or were to allow any anonymous accuser to induce me to act towards them, as if I at least considered there was the slightest ground for such accusations. They must therefore remain at Cadiz; but I hope that they will hereafter view these accusations, and those whom they may suspect of making them, with the contempt which they deserve; and that, above all, they will refrain from the conduct which is the subject of this letter.'

To Don Juan O'Donoju.

Castro-xeriz, 11th June, 1813.

'Having found that a large number of Spaniards, who, during the course of the contest of Spain for her independence, have taken the side of the French, are now staying with the enemy's army, I take the liberty of addressing you upon that subject.

Many of these individuals are highly meritorious, and have rendered the most essential services to the cause, even during the period in which they have been in the service of the enemy. It is also a known fact, that fear, the misery and distress which they suffered during the contest, and despair of the result, were the motives which induced many of these unfortunate persons to take the part which they have taken; and I would beg leave to suggest for consideration, whether it is expedient to involve the country in all the consequences of a rigid adherence to the existing law, in order to punish such persons.

I am the last person who will be found to diminish the merit of those Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the country during the severe

G. O.

Castro-xeriz, 11th June, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces has frequently observed, that after an action with the enemy, large numbers of soldiers lose their arms, accoutrements, and necessaries, notwithstanding that this army has invariably remained in possession of the ground on which it has fought; whereby the public and the colonel of the regiment are put to a large expense, and much inconvenience is felt by the service in a case in which the loss ought to be trifling.

2. In many cases men who are wounded are perfectly capable of taking care of their own arms, accoutrements, and necessaries, and they should be ordered to do so by the surgeon who will give them their first dressing.

3. The commanding officer of every regiment engaged with the enemy should, as soon after the engagement as possible, send an officer and 20 men over the ground over which the regiment may have marched, and on which it may have been engaged, in order to collect the arms, accoutrements, and necessaries belonging to the regiment, which when collected must be taken care of.

4. In future when any regiment shall make a claim upon the public for the loss of arms, accoutrements, and necessaries in action, it will be necessary to prove that the soldier for whom a claim is made for loss of necessaries, was so badly wounded, that he could not take care of his necessaries, and that the provisions of this Order have been obeyed.

5. The Commander of the Forces begs that it may be observed that there is nothing in this Order which authorises the detaching of more soldiers to take care of wounded in action than has been the practice hitherto. The commanding officers of regiments, and the officers and non-commissioned officers of companies, must take care that no man falls out of the ranks under pretence of taking care of the wounded, who is not ordered to fall out by the officer commanding the company, and this officer must take care that no more men are employed on this duty than are absolutely necessary to perform it.'



trial which I hope has passed, particularly of those who, having remained among the enemy without entering their service, have served their country at the risk of their lives. But, at the same time that I can appreciate the merit of those individuals, and of the nation at large, I can forgive the weakness of those who have been induced by terror, by distress, or by despair, to pursue a different line of conduct.

I entreat the Government to advert to the circumstances of the commencement and of the different stages of this eventful contest; and to the numerous occasions in which all men must have imagined that it was impossible for the Powers of the Peninsula, although aided by Great Britain, to withstand the colossal power by which they were assailed, and nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness of the country at the commencement of the contest, upon the numerous and almost invariable disasters of the armies, and upon the ruin and disorganization which followed; and then let them decide, whether those who were witnesses of these events are guilty because they could not foresee what has since occurred. The majority are certainly not guilty in any other manner; and many, as I have above stated, now deemed guilty in the eye of the law, as having served the pretended King, have, by that very act, acquired the means of serving, and have rendered important services to their country.

It is my opinion that the policy of Spain should lead the Government and the Cortes to grant a general amnesty, with certain exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in the two views of the effort now making, failing or succeeding, in freeing the country from its oppressors. If the effort should fail, the enemy will, by an amnesty, be deprived of the principal means, now in his hands, of oppressing the country in which his armies will be stationed. He will see clearly that he can place no reliance on any partisans in Spain; and he will not have even a pretence for supposing that the country is divided in opinion. If the effect should succeed, as I sincerely hope it may, the object of the Government should be to pacify the country, and to heal the divisions which the contest unavoidably must have occasioned. It is impossible that this object can be accomplished, as long as there exists a large body of the Spanish nation, some possessing the largest properties in the country, and others endowed with considerable talents, who are proscribed for their conduct during the contest; conduct which has been caused by the misfortunes to which I have above adverted. These persons, their friends and relations will, if persecuted, naturally endeavor to perpetuate the divisions in the country, in the hope, at some time, to take advantage of them; and, adverting to their number, and to that power which they must derive from their properties and connexions, it must be feared that they will be too successful. But there are other important views of this question.

First; Should the effort to free the country from its oppressors succeed at some time or other, some approaches to peace must be made between the two nations; and the amnesty to the persons above described will remove the greatest difficulty in the way of such an arrangement.

Secondly; Should ever Spain be at peace with France; and should the proscription against these persons be continued, they will remain in France a perpetual instrument in the hands of that restless Power, to disturb the

internal tranquillity of Spain ; and in case of the renewal of war, which will be their constant wish and object, they will be the most active, the most mischievous, and most inveterate enemies of their country ; of that country which, by mistaken severity, aggravates her misfortunes by casting off from her thousands of her useful subjects.

On every ground, then, it is desirable that this measure should be adopted, and that the present moment should be seized for adopting it. I am far, however, from thinking that an amnesty ought to be granted without exceptions and conditions ; and I proceed to state, first, the exceptions which, in my opinion, ought to be made ; and, secondly, the conditions on which any amnesty ought to be granted.

The amnesty ought not to extend to the ministers of King Joseph, nor to those who have been most active in his support, and by their influence and persuasions can be proved to have induced others to have espoused his interests ; nor to those who have been instrumental in shedding the blood, and in committing acts of cruelty against any Spaniard. Those likewise who have deserted any public trust or station to join the Intruder, with the exception of non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the army, ought to be liable to the legal consequences of their conduct.

All others ought to be pardoned on the following conditions : First ; that unless positive evidence should be given to the Government of their having served the public during the time they were in the service of the pretended King, they shall reside in the place appointed for their residence, and be under the inspection of the police, and shall not be employed by the public for 2 years from the date of the amnesty. After that time they should be eligible for employment, unless previously accused of some act, the proof of which would legally render them incapable of filling an office.

In bringing this subject under the consideration of the Government, I am, perhaps, intruding my opinion on a subject in which, as a stranger, I have no concern ; but having had an advantage enjoyed by few, of being acquainted with the concerns of this country since the commencement of the contest, and having been sensible, both in the last and in the present campaign, of the disadvantages suffered by Spain from the want of a measure of this description, I have thought it proper, as an individual well wisher to the cause, to bring it under the consideration of the Government ; assuring them, at the same time, that I have never had the slightest communication on the subject with the Government of my own country ; nor do I believe that they have ever turned to it their attention. What I have above stated are my own opinions, to which I may attribute more weight than they merit ; but they are formed upon experience and long reflection, and are founded upon a sincere devotion to the interests of this country.'

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780.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villadiego, 13th June, 1813.

'The army passed the Carrion on the 7th, the enemy having retired across the Pisuerga ; and on the 8th, 9th, and 10th we brought forward our left, and passed that river.

The celerity of our march up to this period, and the probable difficulties in, and the necessity of providing for the subsistence of the army in our



farther progress, induced me to make short movements on the 11th, and to halt the left on the 12th; but on the latter day I moved forward the right under Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, consisting of the 2nd British, General Morillo's Spanish, and the Conde de Amarante's Portuguese divisions of infantry; and the Light division under Major General Baron C. Alten; and Major General Fane's, Major General Long's, Major General V. Alten's, Brig. General Ponsonby's, and Colonel Grant's (hussar) brigades of cavalry, towards Burgos, with a view to reconnoitre the enemy's position and numbers near that town, and to force them to a decision whether to abandon the castle to its fate, or to protect it with all their force.

I found the enemy posted with a considerable force, commanded, as I understand, by General Reille, on the heights on the left of the Hormaza, with their right above the village of Hormaza, and their left in front of Estepar. We turned their right with the hussars and General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry and the Light division from Isar, while General V. Alten's brigade of cavalry, and Colonel the Hon. W. O'Callaghan's brigade of the 2nd division moved up the heights from Hormaza, and the remainder of the troops under the command of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill threatened the heights of Estepar.

These movements dislodged the enemy from their position immediately. The cavalry of our left and centre were entirely in the rear of the enemy, who were obliged to retire across the Arlanzon by the high road towards Burgos. Although pressed by our cavalry, and suffering considerable loss by the fire of Major Gardiner's troop of horse artillery, and obliged to make their movements at an accelerated pace, that they might not give time to our infantry to come up, they made it in admirable order; but they lost one gun and some prisoners, taken by a squadron of the 14th light dragoons, commanded by Captain Milles, and a detachment of the 3rd dragoons which charged their rear.

The enemy took post on the left of the Arlanzon and Urbel rivers, which were much swollen with rain, and in the course of the night retired their whole army through Burgos, having abandoned and destroyed as far as they were able, in the short space of time during which they were there, the works of the castle which they had constructed and improved at so large an expense; and they are now on their retreat towards the Ebro by the high road of Briviesca and Miranda. In the mean time the whole of the army of the allies has made a movement to the left this day; and the Spanish corps of Galicia under General Giron, and the left of the British and Portuguese army under Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, will, I hope, pass the Ebro tomorrow at the bridges of Rocamunde and San Martin.

In the course of the 9th, 10th, and 11th, Don Julian Sanchez was very active on the left of the enemy, and took several prisoners.

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I have had the castle of Burgos examined this day, and I am happy to inform your Lordship that I have reason to believe that it is possible to put it in a state of repair at a reasonable expense. It is a post of the greatest importance to the country, particularly during the winter; and if I should find it practicable, I shall have it put in a state of defence.

781.

To Don Juan O'Donoju.

Masa, 14th June, 1813.

' I have forwarded to the Government, from the Generals of all the armies, representations of the prevailing abuses in the finance, and of the misery suffered by the troops under their command respectively. It is at the same time obvious, that the existing system is as cruelly oppressive upon the people, as it is ruinous to the army and to the State; and is more likely to alienate the affections of the people from the Government, than a system of finance rigidly carried into execution, which should provide for the wants of the armies.

It is a fact, Sir, that the troops of Spain, in diminished numbers, are starving in rich provinces, which, only last year, maintained ten times the number of French troops in plenty. It is also a fact that this is owing to inexperience, and mal-administration, and the misapplication of the public funds.'

782.

To Earl Bathurst.

Subijana, on the Bayas, 19th June, 1813.

' The left of the army crossed the Ebro on the 14th, by the bridges of San Martin and Rocamunde, and the remainder on the 15th, by those bridges

G. O.

Quineoces, 17th June, 1813.

' 1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General Officers to his Order of the 16th March, 1811, directing that the column of march of the infantry shall be formed by sections of 3 men in front.

2. In the defiles through which the army is likely to march, it is very desirable that great attention should be paid to the march of the baggage; the hour at which it is to set off, and the order in which it is formed.

3. When more than one division of infantry, or brigade of cavalry, march upon the same road from the same camp, it is desirable that the baggage of each should follow it: and this must be the practice, unless otherwise ordered. When the country is open, two or more divisions of infantry, or brigades of cavalry, moving from the same camp, are to march half an hour after each other: when the country is close, they are to march one hour after each other.

4. The baggage is to be formed as follows, unless otherwise ordered:—

1st. Oxen for the day's provision.

2nd. Wheel carriages drawn by horses or mules.

3rd. Wheel carriages with iron axle-trees, drawn by bullocks.

4th. Mules with ammunition.

5th. The baggage of the staff of the division, or brigade of cavalry.

6th. Camp kettles or tent mules, and the baggage of the officers of regiments, in the order by regiments, in which the regiment stands in the column.

7th. The commissariat upon mules.

5. All bullock carts upon wooden axle-trees, and droves of oxen, excepting those required for the day's supply for each division, or brigade of cavalry, are to follow the whole column which will move from the same camp.

6. Officers are to take care that all the baggage is ready to start at the hour appointed for the march of the division.

7. The Commander of the Forces likewise requests the attention of the officers to the march of their several regiments, troops, and companies, in marching through a continuation of narrow roads and defiles, such as must be passed in this country: it is scarcely ever necessary for the rear to move at an accelerated pace in order to close up to the front of a column; whatever may be the distance to which the passage of a difficulty may throw any body of troops to the rear, it is almost certain that the head of the column will meet with others which will enable the rear to gain its distance without hurrying the troops, and if such difficulty should not occur, it is in the power of the commander of the column, and it is better that the head should halt than that the rear should be hurried. Officers commanding troops and companies will attend to this.

8. The Commander of the Forces likewise requests that when the names of several villages are marked in the route to be passed through, the staff officer leading the column will inquire from his guide for each of them successively.'



and that of Puente de Arenas. We continued our march on the following days towards Vitoria.

The enemy assembled on the 16th and 17th a considerable corps at Espejo, not far from the Puente Larra, composed of some of the troops which had been for some time in the Biscayan provinces in pursuit of Longa and Mina, and others detached from the main body of the army, which were still at Pancorbo. They had likewise a division of infantry and some cavalry at Frias since the 16th, for the purpose of observing our movements on the left of the Ebro. Both these detachments marched yesterday morning; that from Frias, upon San Millan, where it was found by the Light division of the Allied army, under Major General C. Alten; and that from Espejo, on Osma, where it met the 6th and 5th divisions, under Lieut. General Sir T. Graham.

Major General C. Alten drove the enemy from San Millan, and afterwards cut off the rear brigade of the division, of which he took 300 prisoners; killed and wounded many, and the brigade was dispersed in the mountains.

The corps from Espejo was considerably stronger than the Allied corps under Sir T. Graham, which had arrived nearly at the same time at Osma. The enemy moved on to the attack, but were soon obliged to retire; and they were followed to Espejo, from whence they retired through the hills to this place. It was late in the day before the other troops came up to the advanced position which those under Lieut. General Sir T. Graham had taken; and I halted the 4th division, which relieved the 5th, near Espejo.

The army moved forward this day to this river. I found the enemy's rear guard in a strong position, on the left of the river, having his right covered by Subijana, and his left by the heights in front of Pobes. We turned the enemy's left with the Light division, while the 4th division, under Lieut. General Sir L. Cole, attacked them in front; and the rear guard was driven back upon the main body of the army, which was in march from Pancorbo to Vitoria, having broken up from thence last night. I am informed that the enemy have dismantled Pancorbo. Colonel Longa's division joined the army on the 16th, on its arrival at Medina de Pomar.

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783.

To Earl Bathurst.

Salvatierra, 22nd June, 1813.

'The enemy, commanded by King Joseph, having Marshal Jourdan as the Major General of the army, took up a position, on the night of the 19th inst., in front of Vitoria; the left of which rested upon the heights which end at La Puebla de Arganzon, and extended from thence across the valley of the Zadorra, in front of the village of Ariñez. They occupied with the right of the centre a height which commanded the valley to the Zadorra. The right of their army was stationed near Vitoria, and was destined to defend the passages of the river Zadorra, in the neighbourhood of that city. They had a reserve in rear of their left, at the village of Gomecha. The nature of the country through which the army had passed since it had reached the Ebro, had necessarily extended our columns; and we halted on the 20th, in order to close them up, and moved the left to Murguia, where it was most likely it would be required. I reconnoitred the enemy's position on that

day, with a view to the attack to be made on the following morning, if they should still remain in it. We accordingly attacked the enemy yesterday, and I am happy to inform your Lordship, that the Allied army under my command gained a complete victory, having driven them from all their positions; having taken from them 151 pieces of cannon, waggons of ammunition, all their baggage, provisions, cattle, treasure, &c., and a considerable number of prisoners.

The operations of the day commenced by Lieut. General Sir R. Hill obtaining possession of the heights of La Puebla, on which the enemy's left rested, which heights they had not occupied in great strength. He detached for this service one brigade of the Spanish division under General Morillo; the other brigade being employed in keeping the communication between his main body on the high road from Miranda to Vitoria, and the troops detached to the heights. The enemy, however, soon discovered the importance of these heights, and reinforced their troops there to such an extent, that Lieut. General Sir R. Hill was obliged to detach, first, the 71st regt. and the light infantry battalion of General Walker's brigade, under the command of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan, and successively other troops to the same point; and the Allies not only gained, but maintained possession of these important heights throughout their operations, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy to retake them.

The contest here was, however, very severe, and the loss sustained considerable. General Morillo was wounded, but remained in the field; and I am concerned to have to report that Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan has died of a wound which he received. In him His Majesty has lost an officer of great merit and tried gallantry, who had already acquired the respect and regard of the whole profession, and of whom it might have been expected that, if he had lived, he would have rendered the most important services to his country. Under cover of the possession of these heights, Sir R. Hill successively passed the Zadorra, at La Puebla, and the defile formed by the heights and the river Zadorra, and attacked and gained possession of the village of Subijana de Alava, in front of the enemy's line, which the enemy made repeated attempts to regain.

The difficult nature of the country prevented the communication between our different columns moving to the attack from their stations on the river Bayas at as early an hour as I had expected; and it was late before I knew that the column, composed of the 3rd and 7th divisions, under the command of the Earl of Dalhousie, had arrived at the station appointed for them. The 4th and Light divisions, however, passed the Zadorra immediately after Sir R. Hill had possession of Subijana de Alava; the former at the bridge of Nanclares, and the latter at the bridge of Tres-puentes; and almost as soon as these had crossed, the column under the Earl of Dalhousie arrived at Mendoza; and the 3rd division, under Lieut. General Sir T. Picton, crossed at the bridge higher up, followed by the 7th division, under the Earl of Dalhousie. These 4 divisions, forming the centre of the army, were destined to attack the height on which the right of the enemy's centre was placed, while Lieut. General Sir R. Hill should move forward from Subijana de Alava to attack the left. The enemy, however, having weakened his line to strengthen his detachment on the hills, abandoned his position in the valley



as soon as he saw our disposition to attack it, and commenced his retreat in good order towards Vitoria.

Our troops continued to advance in admirable order, notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground. In the mean time, Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, who commanded the left of the army, consisting of the 1st and 5th divisions, and General Pack's and Bradford's brigades of infantry, and General Bock's and Anson's of cavalry, and who had been moved on the 20th to Murguia, moved forward from thence on Vitoria, by the high road from that town to Bilbao. He had, besides, with him the Spanish division under Colonel Longa; \* and General Giron, who had been detached to the left, under a different view of the state of affairs, and had afterwards been recalled, and had arrived on the 20th at Orduña, marched that morning from thence, so as to be in the field in readiness to support Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, if his support had been required.

The enemy had a division of infantry with some cavalry advanced on the great road from Vitoria to Bilbao, resting their right on some strong heights covering the village of Gamarra Mayor. Both Gamarra and Abechuco were strongly occupied as *têtes de pont* and the bridges over the Zadorra at these places. Brig. General Pack with his Portuguese brigade, and Colonel Longa with his Spanish division, were directed to turn and gain the heights, supported by Major General Anson's brigade of light dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry under the command of Major General Oswald, who was desired to take the command of all these troops.

Lieut. General Sir T. Graham reports, that in the execution of this service the Portuguese and Spanish troops behaved admirably. The 4th battalion of caçadores, and the 8th caçadores, particularly distinguished themselves. Colonel Longa being on the left, took possession of Gamarra Menor.

As soon as the heights were in our possession, the village of Gamarra Mayor was most gallantly stormed and carried by Major General Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, which advanced in columns of battalions, under a very heavy fire of artillery and musketry, without firing a shot, assisted by 2 guns of Major Lawson's brigade of artillery. The enemy suffered severely, and lost 3 pieces of cannon.

The Lieut. General then proceeded to attack the village of Abechuco with the 1st division, by forming a strong battery against it, consisting of Captain Dubourdieu's brigade, and Captain Ramsay's troop of horse artillery; and under cover of this fire, Colonel Halkett's brigade advanced to the attack of the village, which was carried; the light battalions having charged and taken 3 guns and a howitzer on the bridge. This attack was supported by General Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry. During the operation at Abechuco, the enemy made the greatest efforts to repossess themselves of the village of Gamarra Mayor, which were gallantly repulsed by the 5th division, under the command of Major General Oswald. The enemy had, however, on the heights on the left of the Zadorra, 2 divisions of infantry in reserve; and it was impossible to cross by the bridges till the troops which had moved upon the enemy's centre and left had driven them through

\* The advance of the column under Sir T. Graham was so effectually covered by Colonel Longa, that the enemy was not aware of any British troops being in that direction.

Vitoria. The whole then co-operated in the pursuit, which was considered by all till after it was dark.

The movement of the troops under Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, and their possession of Gamarra and Abechuco, intercepted the enemy's retreat by the high road to France. They were then obliged to turn to the road towards Pamplona ; but they were unable to hold any position for a sufficient length of time to allow their baggage and artillery to be drawn off. The whole, therefore, of the latter which had not already been taken by the troops in their attack of the successive positions taken up by the enemy in their retreat from their first position at Ariñez and on the Zadorra, and all their ammunition and baggage, and every thing they had were taken close to Vitoria. I have reason to believe that the enemy carried off with them one gun and one howitzer only.

The army under King Joseph consisted of the whole of the armies of the South, and of the Centre, and of 4 divisions and all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, and some troops of the army of the North. General Foy's division of the army of Portugal was in the neighbourhood of Bilbao ; and General Clausel, who commanded the army of the North, was near Logroño with one division of the army of Portugal commanded by General Taupin, and General Van-der-Maessen's division of the army of the North. The 6th division of the allied army under Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham was likewise absent, having been detained at Medina de Pomar for 3 days, to cover the march of our magazines and stores.

I cannot extol too highly the good conduct of all the General Officers, officers, and soldiers of the army in this action. Lieut. General Sir R. Hill speaks highly of the conduct of General Morillo and the Spanish troops under his command, and that of Lieut. General the Hon. W. Stewart, and the Conde de Amarante, who commanded divisions of infantry under his directions. He likewise mentions the conduct of Colonel the Hon. R. W. O'Callaghan, who maintained the village of Subijana de Alava against all the efforts of the enemy to regain possession of it, and that of Lieut. Colonel Rooke of the Adjutant General's department, and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercromby of the Quarter Master General's department. It was impossible for the movements of any troops to be conducted with more spirit and regularity than those of their respective divisions, by Lieut. Generals the Earl of Dalhousie, Sir T. Picton, Sir L. Cole, and Major General Baron C. Alten. The troops advanced in *échelons* of regiments in two, and occasionally 3 lines ; and the Portuguese troops in the 3rd and 4th divisions, under the command of Brig. General Power and Colonel Stubbs, led the march with steadiness and gallantry never surpassed on any occasion.

Major General the Hon. C. Colville's brigade of the 3rd division was seriously attacked in its advance by a very superior force well formed, which it drove in, supported by General Inglis' brigade of the 7th division, commanded by Colonel Grant of the 82nd. These officers and the troops under their command distinguished themselves.

Major General Vandeleur's brigade of the Light division was, during the advance upon Vitoria, detached to the support of the 7th division ; and Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie has reported most favorably of its conduct. Lieut. General Sir T. Graham particularly reports his sense of the



assistance he received from Colonel De Lancy, the Deputy Quarter Master General, and from Lieut. Colonel Bouverie, of the Adjutant General's department, and from the officers of his personal staff; and from Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Upton, A.Q.M.G., and Major Hope, A.A.G., with the 1st division; and Major General Oswald reports the same of Lieut. Colonel Berkeley of the Adjutant General's department, and Lieut. Colonel Gomm of the Quarter Master General's department.

I am particularly indebted to Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, and to Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, for the manner in which they have respectively conducted the service entrusted to them, since the commencement of the operations which have ended in the battle of the 21st; and for their conduct in that battle; as likewise to Marshal Sir W. Beresford, for the friendly advice and assistance which I have received from him upon all occasions during the late operations.

I must not omit to mention likewise the conduct of General Giron, who commands the Galician army, who made a forced march from Orduña, and was actually on the ground in readiness to support Lieut. General Sir T. Graham.

I have frequently been indebted, and have had occasion to call the attention of your Lordship to the conduct of the Quarter Master General, Sir G. Murray, who in the late operations, and in the battle of the 21st June, has again given the greatest assistance. I am likewise much indebted to Lord Aylmer, the Deputy Adjutant General, and to the officers of the departments of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General respectively; and also to Lord FitzRoy Somerset, and Lieut. Colonel Campbell and those of my personal staff; and to Lieut. Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, and the officers of the Royal Engineers.

Colonel H.S.H. the Hereditary Prince of Orange was in the field as my aide de camp, and conducted himself with his usual gallantry and intelligence.

Mariscal de Campo, Don L. Wimpffen, and the Inspector General, Don T. O'Donoju, and the officers of the staff of the Spanish army have invariably rendered me every assistance in their power in the course of these operations; and I avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my satisfaction with their conduct; as likewise with that of Mariscal de Campo, Don. M. de Alaya; and of the Brig. General Don J. O'Lawlor, who have been so long and usefully employed with me.

The artillery was most judiciously placed by Lieut. Colonel Dickson, and was well served; and the army is particularly indebted to that corps. The nature of the ground did not allow of the cavalry being generally engaged; but the General Officers, commanding the several brigades, kept the troops under their command respectively close to the infantry to support them, and they were most active in the pursuit of the enemy after they had been driven through Vitoria.

I send this dispatch by my aide de camp, Captain Fremantle, whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's protection. He will have the honor of laying at the feet of His Royal Highness the colors of the 4th batt. 100th regt., and Marshal Jourdan's bâton of a Marshal of France, taken by the 87th regt.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the late operations, and a return of the ordnance, carriages, and ammunition taken from the enemy in the action of the 21st inst.'

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784.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Salvatierra, 22nd June, 1813.

'I am much concerned to add to this account, that of the severe wound and reported death of Cadogan. He had distinguished himself early in the action, as you will see by the detailed report, a copy of which I will send you tomorrow. But he received a wound in the spine, as I am informed, and he died last night. This is Churchill's account, for which I cannot vouch; but it is certain that he was wounded, and as I have not heard from himself, I am afraid that the consequence is too true.

His private character and his worth as an individual were not greater than his merits as an officer, and I shall ever regret him. It is a curious instance of his attachment to his profession, and of the interest he felt in what was going on, that after he was wounded and was probably aware that he was dying, he desired to be carried and left in a situation from which he might be able to see all that passed. The concern which I feel upon his loss has diminished exceedingly the satisfaction I should derive from our success, as it will your's.'

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785.

To Earl Bathurst.

Irurzun, 24th June, 1813.

'The departure of Captain Fremantle having been delayed till this day, by the necessity of making up the returns, I have to report to your Lordship that we have continued to pursue the enemy, whose rear reached Pamplona this day. We have done them as much injury as has been in our power, considering the state of the weather and of the roads; and this day the advanced guard, consisting of Major General V. Alten's brigade, and the 1st and 3rd batts. of the 95th regt., and Captain Ross' troop of horse artillery, took from them the remaining gun they had. They have entered Pamplona therefore, with one howitzer only.

General Clausel, who had under his command that part of the army of the north, and one division of the army of Portugal which was not in the action of the 21st, approached Vitoria on the 22nd, where he heard of the action of the preceding day; and finding there the 6th division, which had just arrived under the command of Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham, he retired upon La Guardia, and has since marched upon Tudela de Ebro.

It is probable that the enemy will continue their retreat into France.'

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786.

To Earl Bathurst.

Orcoyen, near Pamplona, 26th June, 1813.

'The enemy continued their retreat yesterday morning from the neighbourhood of Pamplona, by the road of Roncesvalles into France, and have

G. O.

Salvatierra, 22nd June, 1813.

'1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General Officers, officers, and soldiers of the army, for their conduct in the action of yesterday. They may depend upon it that he will not fail to do them justice in the reports which he will make of their conduct to their several Sovereigns.'



been followed by our light troops. The fort of Pamplona has been invested this day; and I have made arrangements for landing and bringing up the train of artillery to attack that place.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Longa of the 22nd, stating that he has taken 6 pieces of artillery from a detachment of troops under the command of General Foy, on their retreat into France by the high road at Mondragon. I ought to have informed your Lordship in my dispatch of the 24th, that on the 23rd instant I had detached Lieut. General Sir T. Graham to the left, towards Tolosa, with a view to the operations to be carried on in that quarter. By a letter from him of the 25th, it appears that he arrived yesterday at Tolosa, having been opposed in his occupation of that town by the troops which retired under the command of General Foy. He mentions the assistance which he had received from Colonel Longa, and from 2 battalions of the army of Galicia, which General Giron had left with him in his attack upon Tolosa.

I have not received any official intelligence of the state of affairs on the eastern coast; but General Mina told me yesterday that the allied troops were certainly in possession of the lower town of Tarragona, which they had stormed, and that Lieut. General Sir J. Murray had commenced his attack upon the upper town; and that an officer belonging to one of the regiments under his command, on the frontiers of Catalonia, had reported to him on the 23rd that the fire at Tarragona had ceased entirely.'

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787.

To Earl Bathurst.

Casada, on the river Aragon, 29th June, 1813.

'It is desirable that any reinforcements of infantry which you may send to this army may come to Santander, notwithstanding that I am very apprehensive of the consequence of marching our vagabond soldiers through the province of Biscay, in that state of discipline in which they and their officers generally come out to us. It may be depended upon, that the people of this province will shoot them as they would the French, if they should misbehave.

We started with the army in the highest order, and up to the day of the battle, nothing could get on better; but that event has, as usual, totally annihilated all order and discipline. The soldiers of the army have got among them about a million sterling in money, with the exception of about 100,000 dollars, which were got for the military chest. The night of the battle, instead of being passed in getting rest and food to prepare them for the pursuit of the following day, was passed by the soldiers in looking for plunder. The consequence was, that they were incapable of marching in pursuit of the enemy, and were totally knocked up. The rain came on and increased their fatigue, and I am quite convinced that we have now out of the ranks double the amount of our loss in the battle; and that we have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy have; and have never in any one day made more than an ordinary march.

This is the consequence of the state of discipline of the British army. We may gain the greatest victories; but we shall do no good, until we shall so far alter our system, as to force all ranks to perform their duty.'

788.

To Earl Bathurst.

Casada, 29th June, 1813.

'It is difficult to advise a line of conduct under such circumstances. We and the powers of Europe are interested in the success of the war in the Peninsula; but the creatures who govern at Cadiz appear to feel no such interest. All they care about really is to hear the praise of their foolish Constitution. There is not one of them who does not feel that it cannot be put in practice; but their vanity is interested to force it down people's throats. Their feelings respecting the Inquisition are of the same description. I apprised them when at Cadiz, of the danger of hurrying on that measure; and it was repeatedly represented to them by others. But they were determined to persevere, although they knew that the abolition of the Inquisition was disagreeable to the clergy, and to the great body of the people. Then their vanity is interested in forcing this absurd measure, and the still more absurd, because insulting, mode of carrying it into execution, upon the clergy and people. The Bishops and clergy in Galicia have openly resisted this law, and I understand that the people in that province are by no means favorably disposed to the Constitution and new order of things. In Biscay the people positively refused last year to accept the Constitution, as being a breach of the privileges of their province.

I mention this subject at present, in order to draw the attention of Government towards it. Hereafter I shall bring it under your Lordship's view in a more formal manner; and it will rest with Government to determine what shall be done. It appears to me that as long as Spain shall be governed by the Cortes acting upon republican principles, we cannot hope for any permanent amelioration. To threaten that you would withdraw your assistance, without withdrawing if there were no amelioration, would only make matters worse. You must be the best judges whether you can or ought to withdraw; but I acknowledge that I do not believe that Spain will be an useful ally, or at all in alliance with England, if the Republican system is not put down.'

789.

To Lieut. General Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Huarte, 1st July, 1813.

'Sir J. Murray's misfortune will create a devil of a breeze; and, according to the information I have at present, I can form no opinion of the merits of the question, and therefore do not write any to him. I shall send his letters home without comment on my part, excepting to draw the attention of the Government to my instructions, of which they have a copy.

I do not consider Sicily to be in any danger whatever at present, and I believe that the fleet at Toulon is not manned, and in some degree dismantled. At all events, a landing on an island is a ticklish operation; and if the British troops on the island will do their duty, it would probably fail. I do not exactly know how many men you have there now, but I suppose from 10,000 to 15,000.

In regard to Italy, I entertain no doubt that its preservation is more important to the power and resources of Buonaparte than Spain; but I have always doubted the existence of such a state of affairs in Italy, that the employment of a British force there would shake the influence of Buonaparte;



or that our efforts would end in any thing but disgrace. It is an useless waste of your time and mine to enter at present into a discussion of these opinions, as your late discussions with Murat's agents have entirely altered the appearance of affairs in Italy; and I entertain no doubt that the English and Murat, or the English and any other power that could put 30,000 or 40,000 men in the field, would create a revolution in Italy.'

## 790.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Huarte, 2nd July, 1813.

'I enclose copies of the letters which I have received from the Minister at War in regard to the removal of General Castaños, and the consequent arrangements, and the copy of the draft of my answer of this day. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will call together Argüelles, Ciscar, La Vega, Toreno, and any other who may have been concerned in nominating me to the command of the Spanish army, and show them these letters; and tell them that, if I have not some satisfaction for the insult offered to me by these arrangements, in breach of all the engagements entered into with me, it will be impossible for me to continue to hold the command. I beg you will tell these gentlemen, at the same time, that I am sincerely desirous of continuing to hold the command from knowing the importance attached to my continuance in Spain, as well as in the rest of Europe; but I cannot do it under existing circumstances. I consider the gentlemen above mentioned to have been principally concerned in nominating me to the command of the army, and that they are likewise the principal supporters of the existing Government; and I wish that they should be aware of all the circumstances, and should have it in their power to interfere, if they still wish that I should retain the command. If they do not wish it, and will not interfere, it is better that I should resign; to which measure, if I am compelled, I will adopt it in a manner to do as little injury to the Government as may be in my power.

I judge, from the measures adopted, that it is intended to carry on the war against the Bishops in Galicia, for which I conclude that Castaños and Giron are not considered fit instruments. I wish that you would take the same opportunity of pointing out to these gentlemen the danger and imprudence of such measures. It will now rest with the Archbishop of Santiago whether or not we shall have a civil war in our rear. If we have, we must take leave of all our communications and our supplies of all descriptions, and we shall soon feel the consequences. To be sure, it will be droll enough if, having commenced the war in Spain, and continued it to this moment, with the clergy and people in our favor, and against the French, they and we were to change sides, and after our victories we should be compelled to withdraw by having the clergy and people against us.'

## 791.

To Don Juan O'Donoju.

Huarte, 2nd July, 1813.

'Your Excellency knows also that this is not the first time that the engagements solemnly entered into with me, after full and repeated discussions, have been broken; and nobody knows better than your Excellency the in-

convenience to the service which resulted. You are likewise aware of my disposition and desire still to serve the Spanish nation as far as is in my power. There are limits, however, to forbearance and submission to injury; and I confess that I feel that I have been most unworthily treated in these transactions by the Spanish Government, even as a gentleman.

It is not my habit, nor do I feel inclined, to make a parade of my services to the Spanish nation; but I must say that I have never abused the powers with which the Government and the Cortes have intrusted me, in any, the most trifling instance, nor have ever used them for any purpose excepting to forward the public service. For the truth of this assertion I appeal likewise even to your Excellency; and I believe it will be admitted that the circumstances, which rendered necessary the formation of those engagements, render it necessary to perform them, if it is desired that I should retain the command of the army.'

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792.

To Earl Bathurst.

Huarte, 2nd July, 1813.

'You cannot conceive the inconvenience to which we are put for want of the sea communication with Lisbon. The ships which were ready in the Tagus on the 12th May had not sailed on the 19th June; and our magazines of provisions and military stores, which I expected to find at Santander, have not yet arrived. Of some kinds of ammunition we have none left; and I have been obliged to carry French ammunition of a smaller calibre than ours in our reserve. Surely the British navy cannot be so hard run as not to be able to keep up the communication with Lisbon for this army! The same want of security on the coast affects us in other ways. Our money cannot arrive by land in much less than 2 months, and we cannot get it by sea. The captured ordnance and stores cannot be sent away; and if any accident were to happen to us, the whole would be lost.'

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793.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ostiz, 3rd July, 1813.

'I beg your Lordship to observe in what manner the blockade of the coast is kept up. I wish to make the siege of San Sebastian, which is one of quite a different description from that of Pamplona; but I cannot undertake it, till I shall know whether we are secure at sea. I really believe that this is the first time, of late years, that any British Commander on shore has had reason to entertain a doubt on this point.'

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794.

To Lieut. General Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Irurita, 8th July, 1813.

'I am perfectly aware of the inefficient state of the equipments of all the Spanish armies, but I have done every thing in my power to produce an amelioration, hitherto without effect. Neither Government nor Cortes appear to me to care much about the foreign war. The former are a mere instrument and creature of the latter. All that these care about, is the praise of their stupid Constitution; and how to carry on the war against the Bishops and priests.'



You will have seen that by the Constitution, all military regulation is in the hands of the Cortes, and they have a Board of Officers now sitting to consider of a military constitution for the army, which it is intended to republicanise. Any proposal for an alteration, therefore, is laid aside till the new military constitution shall be fixed. One of the defects in the constitution of the Spanish army, as now existing, is in the office and power of the Inspectors of cavalry and infantry, in whose hands is the nomination of all officers to commissions and for promotion.

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Matters are going on well here. There is not a Frenchman in Spain on this side, excepting within garrison. I wait to see what turn affairs take in Germany, before I determine on my line. In the mean time I have blockaded all the fortresses, and am about to attack San Sebastian, and am giving some rest to the troops, who have been a good deal fagged by their late exertions.'

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795.

To Earl Bathurst.

Zubieta, 10th July, 1813.

'I am afraid you will think me very troublesome about our want of ships of war on these coasts. I beg leave, however, just to draw your attention to the enclosed from Lieut. Colonel Bourke, mentioning the difficulties under which he labors, and the shifts to which he is put to forward our stores from Coruña to Santander. Observe also, that these stores are provisions and military stores ordered to Coruña long before I marched from Freneda, which were reported to be embarked in the Tagus, and ready to sail on the 12th May, and have been detained till lately for want of convoy. Then, when

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G. O.

Iruita, 9th July, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces is anxious to draw the attention of the officers of the army to the difference of the situation in which they have been hitherto among the people of Portugal and Spain, and that in which they may hereafter find themselves among those of the frontiers of France.

2. Every military precaution must henceforward be used to obtain intelligence and to prevent surprise. General and superior officers at the head of detached corps will take care to keep up a constant and regular communication with the corps upon their right and left, and with their rear; and the soldiers and their followers must be prevented from wandering to a distance from their camps and cantonments on any account whatever.

3. Notwithstanding that these precautions are absolutely necessary, as the country in front of the army is the enemy's, the Commander of the Forces is particularly desirous that the inhabitants should be well treated, and private property must be respected, as it has been hitherto.

4. The officers and soldiers of the army must recollect that their nations are at war with France, solely because the ruler of the French nation will not allow them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal have been occasioned by the irregularities of the soldiers, and their cruelties, authorised and encouraged by their chiefs, towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country.

5. To revenge this conduct on the peaceable inhabitants of France would be unmanly and unworthy of the nations to whom the Commander of the Forces now addresses himself, and at all events would be the occasion of similar and worse evils to the army at large, than those which the enemy's army have suffered in the Peninsula, and would eventually prove highly injurious to the public interests.

6. The rules, therefore, which have been observed hitherto in requiring, and taking, and giving receipts for supplies from the country, are to be continued in the villages on the French frontier; and the Commissaries attached to each of the armies of the several nations will receive the orders from the Commander in Chief of the army of their nations respecting the mode and period of paying for such supplies.'

ordered from Coruña to Santander, the military officer there, for want of a vessel of war of any kind, is obliged to do the best he can to give an appearance of security to 7 out of 13 vessels; which appearance is, in fact, no security at all.

I am certain that it will not be denied, that since Great Britain has been a naval power, a British army has never been left in such a situation, and that, at a moment, when it is most important to us to preserve, and to the enemy to interrupt, the communication by the coast. If they only take the ship with our shoes, we must halt for 6 weeks!

Your Lordship will have seen that the blockade of the coast is merely nominal. The enemy have reinforced *by sea* the only two posts they have on the north coast of Spain.

I hope it will not be deemed unreasonable to request to have the navigation of the coast of Spain and Portugal secured for me, without which your Lordship must not expect success.'

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796.

To Earl Bathurst.

Hernani, 12th July, 1813.

'You will see by my recent dispatches that we are in a good position here. I hope we shall soon have San Sebastian; and if we get well settled in the Pyrenees, it will take a good reinforcement to the French army to drive us from thence.

My future operations will depend a good deal upon what passes in the north of Europe; and if operations should recommence there, upon the strength and description of the reinforcement which the enemy will get in our front. However, the Government and allies may depend upon it that I will do all that I can.

In regard to my going to Germany, I am the Prince Regent's servant, and will do whatever he and his Government please. But I would beg them to recollect that the great advantages which I enjoy here consist in the confidence that every body feels that I am doing what is right, which advantage I should not enjoy, for a time at least, in Germany. Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can, both here and in Germany; but nobody would enjoy the same advantage here, and I should be no better than another in Germany. If a British army should be left in the Peninsula, therefore, it is best that I should remain with it.

You see that we have already settled the question of the Ebro for you; and by a letter from my brother of the 3rd, I see that the Spanish Government have settled for themselves the question of peace with Buonaparte. I recommend you not to give up an inch of Spanish territory. I think I can hold the Pyrenees, as easily as I can Portugal. I am quite certain I can

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G. O.

Zubieta, 11th July, 1813.

'1. The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the General Officers and commanding officers of regiments in a very particular manner to the Orders which have been given for the regulation of the march of the baggage of the army, which he begs may be attended to. He directs that the bāt-men and men attending cattle may be made to carry their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, on the march of their several regiments at all times.'



hold the position which I have got more easily than the Ebro, or any other position in Spain. I will go further; I would prefer to have Joseph as King of Spain, without any cession to France, (seeing how ready all the Buonaparte family are to separate from France, and notwithstanding that he is, I think, the least likely of any so to separate,) than to have Ferdinand with the Ebro as the frontier. In the latter case, Spain must inevitably belong to the French.

I understand that the province of Galicia is submitting quietly to the decrees of the Cortes about the Inquisition, and that the Archbishop of Santiago has removed into Portugal. I am inclined to advise the Government not to interfere in the internal concerns of Spain, at least directly. Jealousy of the interference of foreigners in their internal concerns, is the characteristic of all Spaniards; and any declaration of the British Government against the *Liberales*, would give them more weight and power than they possess already, or are likely to possess. I think it not unlikely that their violence and democratical principles will induce some of the provinces to declare against them; and then would be the time for the British Government to come forward, particularly if its support or its opinions should be asked for. But if such a crisis should not occur, I rather believe that it is best for the British Government to wait with patience for the termination of all this folly, till a regular government shall be established in Spain.'

797.

To \_\_\_\_\_.

Lesaca, 16th July, 1813.

'Which of these stories am I to believe? It is not unaccountable that you should receive intelligence at the same time, or at nearly the same time, to different purports; but it is very desirable that, when you do receive such intelligence, you should endeavor to ascertain which is true, and observe yourself, in your report, the difference of that intelligence from that which you had transmitted before, and your reason and the facts for believing one rather than the other.'

798.

To H. R. H. the Prince Regent.

Lesaca, 16th July, 1813.

'I trust your Royal Highness will receive graciously my humble acknowledgments for the honor which your Royal Highness has conferred upon me by your approbation, for the terms in which it is conveyed, and for the last distinguished mark\* of your Royal Highness' favor. Even if I had not

\* To Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

'MY DEAR LORD,

Carlton House, 3rd July, 1813.

Your glorious conduct is beyond all human praise, and far above my reward. I know no language the world affords worthy to express it. I feel I have nothing left to say, but most devoutly to offer up my prayer of gratitude to Providence, that it has, in its omnipotent bounty, blessed my country and myself with such a General. You have sent me, among the trophies of your unrivalled fame, the staff of a French Marshal, and I send you in return that of England.

The British army will hail it with rapturous enthusiasm, while the whole universe will acknowledge those valorous exploits which have so imperiously called for it.

That uninterrupted health and still increasing laurels may continue to crown you through a glorious and long career of life, are the never ceasing and most ardent wishes of, my dear Lord, your very sincere and faithful friend,

G. P. R.'

been supported and encouraged as I have been by your Royal Highness' protection and favor, the interest which I feel for the cause which your Royal Highness so powerfully supports would have induced me to make every exertion for its success. I can evince my gratitude for your Royal Highness' repeated favors only by devoting my life to your service.'

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 799.

To Colonel Torrens.

Lesaca, 18th July, 1813.

'I have received your letter of the 5th, and I am sorry that I cannot recommend ——— for promotion, because I have had him in arrest since the battle, for disobeying an order given to him by me verbally. The fact is, that, if discipline means habits of obedience to orders, as well as military instruction, we have but little of it in the army. Nobody ever thinks of obeying an order; and all the regulations of the Horse Guards, as well as of the War Office, and all the orders of the army applicable to this peculiar service, are so much waste paper.

It is, however, an unrivalled army for fighting, if the soldiers can only be kept in their ranks during the battle; but it wants some of those qualities which are indispensable to enable a General to bring them into the field in the order in which an army ought to be to meet an enemy, or to take all the advantage to be derived from a victory; and the cause of these defects is the want of habits of obedience and attention to orders by the inferior officers, and indeed, I might add, by all. They never attend to an order with an intention to obey it, or sufficiently to understand it, be it ever so clear, and therefore never obey it, when obedience becomes troublesome, or difficult, or important.'

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 800.

To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

'In regard to the storm, unless more men should be necessary than the 5th division can afford, I do not see any reason why the 1st division should be employed in it, if they have not been materially employed in the works of the siege. If they have, some of them should be in the storm.

I did not summons Badajoz or Burgos, and the reason for not doing so has been confirmed in the King's papers, viz., that French officers are ordered not to surrender a place before it has been stormed. But as I hope

G. O.

Lesaca, 17th July, 1813.

'1. The time of the Commander of the Forces is occupied very much by complaints from different parts of the country of the use of the green corn by the cavalry, without giving regular receipts. These complaints are made particularly of Major General V. Alten's brigade.

2. The Commander of the Forces again requests the General Officers, and officers commanding regiments, to attend to this point.

3. It is most desirable, as well for the inhabitants as for the army itself, that the green and unthrashed corn should not be used as forage; and considering that there is still so much grass in the country, it appears to the Commander of the Forces, that the use of green and unthrashed corn might be entirely avoided; at all events, if it is necessary to use forage of this description, it must be regularly taken, and regular receipts given for what is taken.'



the men will, on this occasion, employ themselves, when they get in, in destroying the enemy, rather than, as usual, in plunder, I think the place should be summoned. But as it is desirable that the summons should be given at a period when it will not convey notice to the enemy of our intentions, you had better send it in tomorrow morning.

I believe the storm ought to take place by daylight, particularly if the defences are effectually destroyed; and as the enemy have their retreat open to the castle, and the means of sortie from thence when they please, the officers and men ought to be particularly warned of the danger of wandering about the town in search of plunder.'

## 801.

To General Copons.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

'I think it proper to enclose to you the copy and translation of a letter which I have found among King Joseph's papers, from the Prince of Neuchâtel, which I think it desirable that you should make public to the people of Catalonia.

They will therein see the hatred which the unconquerable spirit of themselves and of their ancestors has excited in the breast of the tyrant, and his consequent desire to subdue them, in particular, to his iron yoke.

I need not point out to them that this letter affords fresh motives for their determined resistance to his usurpation; in which I beg that you will inform them, that they shall have every assistance from me which the circumstances of the war will enable me to afford them.

The Catalans will see, however, that it is necessary, not only that they should exert themselves in their own cause, but that they should endeavor to supply the wants of those armies which must be employed to assist them in driving the enemy from their country; and they must do every thing in their power to distress and destroy that enemy, during the short time which it is to be hoped that he will be able to remain.'

## 802.

To Lieut. General Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

'It is impossible for me at present to give your Lordship any further instructions. In the course of a few days I hope to have possession of San Sebastian, and I propose then either to move forward into France, or to make myself master of all the garrisons of Aragon, so as to connect myself more closely with you, still keeping the blockade of Pamplona.

Much will depend upon the state of affairs in the north of Europe. If the war should be renewed, I shall do most good by moving forward into France, and I shall probably be able to establish myself there. If not renewed, I should only go into France to be driven out again; and I shall do best to confine myself to secure what I have gained. In either case my movements will assist you; in the latter, more directly.

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I am perfectly aware also of the rapine and confusion which attends all the business of supplying a Spanish army, and the excessive and unnecessary misery and distress which their demands, and their mode of enforcing

them, occasion to the country. But there is no remedy for these evils at present.

The great want of this nation is of men capable of conducting public business of any description; and the Revolution, as it is called, instead of having caused an improvement in this respect, has rather augmented the evil, by bringing forward into public employment of importance, more inexperienced people, and by giving to men in general, false notions, entirely incompatible with the nature of their business; then all real improvements in the mode of governing and of transacting business are despised by the Government and Cortes, and never thought of.'

## 803.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

'I request you to lay these papers before the Portuguese Government. I have already frequently, particularly recently, had occasion to draw the attention of the Portuguese Government to the conduct of the Portuguese magistrates; and of this person more than once, who, to say the least of him, has not conducted himself in a very conciliatory manner. I do not know whether it is consistent with the laws of Portugal, but it is certainly not so with the courtesy due from one nation to another, or from the civil authorities of one nation to the military authorities of the other, that a person should be seized in this manner and imprisoned, without cause assigned, or even notice given; and I hope that the Government will feel disposed to give me some satisfaction on this subject, otherwise I beg you to lay these papers before His Majesty's Government.

I likewise beg to draw your attention to the miserable condition of all persons who are prisoners in the gaols in Portugal; they literally starve for want of food, and the buildings in which they are kept are incapable of sheltering them from the weather, and in such a state of filth as to occasion disease. I leave it to you to decide upon the measures to be taken to protect His Majesty's subjects employed in his service for the protection of Portugal from the common enemy, from such oppression and its consequent evils, as that to which they are liable from the conduct of such a man as this magistrate.

I must say, that the British army which I have the honor to command have met with nothing but ingratitude from the Government and authorities in Portugal for their services; and that every thing that could be done has been done by the civil authorities, lately, to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the last of Portugal.'

## 804.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 24th July, 1813.

'I have this morning received your letters of the 15th and 16th. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will explain from me to the Government, the Minister at War, and Señor Argüelles, that, although I think the conduct of Government towards General Castaños and General Giron is harsh and unjust, I do not complain of it as a breach of engagement with me; nor does that conduct occasion my desire to be satisfied respecting the



breach of engagement. Señor Argüelles will see, therefore, that I have not put the Cortes and Government in the dilemma of choosing to keep General Castaños in his employment or of losing my services.

Neither do I complain of the refusal of Government to promote the officers whom I had recommended after the battle as a breach of engagement. It was ungracious; but there is no engagement to me that either all I recommend shall be promoted, or that none shall be removed. It would have been unreasonable to ask such an engagement, and improper to make it. What I complain of is, that, Government having made an engagement with me, without which I neither can nor will hold the command of the army, they have broken it, not in one, but in an hundred instances; and that they appear to do it wantonly, because they know my disinclination to relinquish the command, on account of the bad effect which such relinquishment will have on the cause, as well in Spain as throughout Europe. Their conduct is therefore injurious as an indignity, as well as because it deprives me of the only power which I can have over the army; and I must have some satisfaction on the subject.

Nobody knows better than I do the miserable state to which authority is reduced in Spain; and the Government will do me the justice to acknowledge that, whenever they have called upon me to support their authority, I have done it, and efficaciously. But they know well the inefficiency of the *Ordenanza* to punish any officer: it is, in this respect, a dead letter. Authority can be maintained only by influence; and, I thank God! I possess a sufficient degree of influence over the officers of the army to induce them to do their duty; and I believe that, if I were to lose the command tomorrow, they would act with me as cordially for the public service, as they did before I was appointed to the command. But I should lose all influence and authority over them, if I were to submit to these indignities without complaint; and therefore it is that I complain, and that I must insist upon the Government satisfying me upon this point.

I do think the cause of Spain is materially involved in my retaining the command, both externally and internally. One advantage resulting from it is, that the army is directed to repel the common enemy, and is kept clear of all interference in the disputes of the parties of the day. This would not be the case, if the command were in the hands of any person who could feel an interest in these parties.

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805.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Lesaca, 25th July, 1813.

‘Buonaparte sent off Soult from Dresden on the 4th, upon hearing of our having passed the Ebro. He did not hear of the battle till the 6th.

Your Lordship is aware that we must continue our efforts against the enemy in order to establish ourselves well on this frontier; and I shall soon be able to decide whether the effort ought to be directed to France itself, or to Catalonia, during the remainder of the campaign. Much will depend upon what will be going forward in the north of Europe.

I do not think we could successfully apply to this frontier of Spain the system on which we fortified the country between the Tagus and the sea.

That line is a very short one, and the communication easiest and shortest on our side. The Pyrenees are a very long line; there are not fewer than 70 passes through the mountains, and the communication, as far as I have been able to learn hitherto, is on the side of the enemy. We may facilitate the defence by fortifying some of the passes; but we can never make the Pyrenees what we made between the Tagus and the sea.

The Spanish troops are now useful, and will be still more so than they are, in defending those passes; and there is no doubt but that the Spanish armies may be very considerably augmented by recruits from the provinces mentioned by your Lordship, although they have already furnished considerable numbers of men to Longa's, Mina's, and Porlier's divisions, and to the troops serving under the command of Mendizabal. But when I tell your Lordship that the Spanish army does not consist of much less than 160,000 men at present, you will probably be of opinion that we do not want men to defend such positions as the Pyrenees, but means to pay, feed, and clothe these men, and to keep them in that state of efficiency and discipline in the field, in which soldiers ought to be to render any effectual service to the country which employs them. Your Lordship will see this, when I tell you that of those 160,000 men, we have not much more than between a quarter and a third of the numbers employed against the enemy; and those are not in the state of discipline and efficiency in which they ought to be, or might be. Our efforts, therefore, should be directed to improve the financial resources of Spain, rather than increase the number of men at present in the Spanish armies. I have only this day had a proposition from Longa to go to the rear, as he can get neither pay nor food in front. The wants of all are of the same description; and, as far as I have any knowledge, there are no troops paid in Spain at present, excepting those to whom I have been enabled to spare money out of our military chest in payment of the Spanish subsidy.

Your Lordship must have seen enough of the Spanish character, during the contest and our connexion with them, to be aware that it will not answer to press any measure upon them which they do not like. I have not seen among them the slightest inclination to employ English officers to discipline their troops to such an extent as would answer any useful purpose; and I believe that one of the reasons for which they like me so well is that, contrary to their expectations, I have not pressed them to take English officers. Besides, as I have above stated to your Lordship, the Spanish troops do not want discipline, if by discipline is meant instruction, so much as they do a system of order, which can be founded only on regular pay and food, and good care and clothing. These British officers could not give them; and, notwithstanding that the Portuguese are now the *fighting cocks* of the army, I believe we owe their merits more to the care we have taken of their pockets and bellies, than to the instruction we have given them. In the end of last campaign they behaved in many instances exceedingly ill, because they were in extreme misery, the Portuguese Government having neglected to pay them. I have forced the Portuguese Government to make arrangements to pay them regularly this year, and every body knows how they behave. Our own troops always fight, but the influence of regular pay



is seriously felt on their conduct, their health, and their efficiency; and as for the French troops, it is notorious that they will do nothing unless regularly paid and fed.

If your Lordship will do me the favor to look at the letter which I wrote to you in 1809, in regard to the defence of Portugal, and to look over the morning states which I send every week to the Secretary of State, you will see that we have seldom had in the ranks of Portuguese and British troops the full numbers therein pointed out. Till the other day, I have never had 60,000 men in the field; and I have them not now, if Lord W. Bentinck's corps is not reckoned, as it ought not to be. It is my opinion that you ought not to have less than 60,000 British and Portuguese troops in the field, as long you maintain the war in the Peninsula, let the Spanish armies have what they may.

One of the results of the operations of this summer upon which you may rely, is a great reduction of the expense, at least of the British army. As soon as I shall get possession of San Sebastian I shall commence, and as soon as I shall have Pamplona I shall complete, the reduction of all our expenses in Portugal; not to incur others upon the northern coast of Spain; but I hope that I shall be able to have all our principal magazines in England, our hospitals in England, and that the expense of the transport of the army at least will be very much reduced. I hope likewise that we shall now get more money; and your Lordship may depend upon it that every sum that we can spend in purchases in the country will save the Government enormously.'

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806.

PROCLAMATION OF MARSHAL SOULT.

*(To be read at the heads of companies in each regiment.)*

23rd July, 1813.

'SOLDIERS;—The recent events of the war have induced His Majesty the Emperor to invest me, by an Imperial Decree of the 1st instant, with the command of the armies of Spain, and to honor me with the flattering title of his "Lieutenant." This high distinction cannot but convey to my mind sensations of gratitude and joy; but they are not unalloyed with regret at the train of events which have, in the opinion of His Majesty, rendered such an appointment necessary in Spain.

It is known to you, Soldiers, that the enmity of Russia, roused into active hostility by the eternal enemy of the Continent, made it incumbent that numerous armies should be assembled in Germany early in the spring. For this purpose were many of your comrades withdrawn. The Emperor himself assumed the command; and the arms of France, guided by his powerful and commanding genius, achieved a succession of as brilliant victories as any that adorn the annals of our country. The presumptuous hopes of aggrandizement entertained by the enemy were confounded. Pacific overtures were made; and the Emperor, always inclined to consult the welfare of his subjects, by following moderate councils, listened to the proposals that were made.

While Germany was thus the theatre of great events, that enemy, who, under pretence of succouring the inhabitants of the Peninsula, has in reality devoted them to ruin, was not inactive. He assembled the whole of his disposable force—English, Spaniards, and Portuguese—under his most experienced officers; and

relying upon the superiority of his numbers, advanced in 3 divisions against the French force assembled upon the Duero. With well provided fortresses in his front and rear, a skilful General, enjoying the confidence of his troops, might, by selecting good positions, have braved and discomfited this motley levy. But, unhappily, at this critical period, timorous and pusillanimous councils were followed. The fortresses were abandoned and blown up: hasty and disorderly marches gave confidence to the enemy; and a veteran army, small indeed in number, but great in all that constitutes the military character, which had fought, bled, and triumphed in every province of Spain, beheld with indignation its laurels tarnished, and itself compelled to abandon all its acquisitions—the trophies of many a well fought and bloody day. When at length the indignant voice of the troops arrested this disgraceful flight, and its Commander, touched with shame, yielded to the general desire, and determined upon giving battle near Vitoria, who can doubt—from this generous enthusiasm—this fine sense of honor—what would have been the result had the General been worthy of his troops? had he, in short, made those dispositions and movements which would have secured to one part of his army the co-operation and support of the other?

Let us not, however, defraud the enemy of the praise which is due to him. The dispositions and arrangements of their General have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive. The valor and steadiness of his troops have been praiseworthy. Yet do not forget that it is to the benefit of your example they owe their present military character; and that whenever the relative duties of a French General and his troops have been ably fulfilled, their enemies have commonly had no other resource than flight.

Soldiers! I partake of your chagrin, your grief, your indignation. I know that the blame of the present situation of the army is imputable to others,—be the merit of repairing it yours. I have borne testimony to the Emperor of your bravery and zeal. His instructions are to drive the enemy from those lofty heights which enable him proudly to survey our fertile valleys, and chase them across the Ebro. It is on the Spanish soil that your tents must next be pitched, and from thence your resources drawn. No difficulties can be insurmountable to your valor and devotion. Let us, then, exert ourselves with mutual ardor: and be assured, that nothing can give greater felicity to the paternal heart of the Emperor, than the knowledge of the triumphs of his army—of its increasing glory—of its having rendered itself worthy of him, and of our dear country.

Extensive but combined movements for the relief of the fortresses are upon the eve of taking place. They will be completed in a few days. Let the account of our success be dated from Vitoria,—and the birth of his Imperial Majesty be celebrated in that city: so shall we render memorable an epoch deservedly dear to all Frenchmen.

SOULT, Duc de Dalmatie,  
Lieutenant de l'Empereur.

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807.

To Earl Bathurst.

San Estevan, 1st Aug. 1813.

‘Two practicable breaches having been effected at San Sebastian on the 24th July, orders were given that they should be attacked on the morning of the 25th. I am concerned to have to report that this attempt to obtain possession of the place failed, and that our loss was very considerable.

I went to the siege on the 25th, and having conferred with Lieut. General Sir T. Graham and the officers of the engineers and artillery, it appeared to me that it would be necessary to increase the facilities of the attack before



it should be repeated. But, upon advertng to the state of our ammunition, I found that we had not a sufficiency to do any thing effectual till that should arrive for which I had written on the 26th June, which I had reason to believe was embarked at Portsmouth, and to expect every hour. I therefore desired that the siege should for the moment be converted into a blockade, a measure which I found to be the more desirable, when I returned to Lesaca in the evening.

Marshal Soult had been appointed *Lieutenant de l'Empereur*, and Commander in Chief of the French armies in Spain and the southern provinces of France, by a *Décret Impérial* on the 1st July; and he joined and took the command of the army on the 13th July, which having been joined nearly about the same time by the corps which had been in Spain under the command of General Clausel, and by other reinforcements, was called *L'armée d'Espagne*, and re-formed into 9 divisions of infantry, forming the right, centre, and left, under the command of General Reille, the Comte d'Erlon, and General Clausel, as Lieut. Generals, and a reserve under General Villatte, and 2 divisions of dragoons and one of light cavalry, the two former under the command of Generals Treillard and Tilly, and the latter under the command of General Pierre Soult. There was besides allotted to the army a large proportion of artillery, and a considerable number of guns had already joined.

The allied army was posted, as I have already informed your Lordship, in the passes of the mountains, with a view to cover the blockade of Pampelona, and the siege of San Sebastian. Major General Byng's brigade of British infantry, and General Morillo's division of Spanish infantry were on the right in the pass of Roncesvalles; Lieut. General Sir L. Cole was posted at Viscarret to support those troops, and Lieut. General Sir T. Picton, with the 3rd division, at Olague in reserve. Lieut. General Sir R. Hill occupied the valley of Baztan with the remainder of the 2nd division, and the Portuguese division under the Conde de Amarante, detaching General Campbell's Portuguese brigade to Les Aldudes, within the French territory. The Light and 7th occupied the heights of Santa Barbara and the town of Vera, and the Puerto de Echalar, and kept the communication with the valley of Baztan; and the 6th division was in reserve at San Estevan. General Longa's division kept the communication between the troops at Vera and those under Lieut. General Sir T. Graham and Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron on the great road. The Conde de la Bisbal blockaded Pamplona.

The defect of this position was that the communication between the several divisions was very tedious and difficult, while the communications of the enemy in front of the passes was easy and short; and in case of attack those in the front line could not support each other, and could look for support only from their rear.

On the 24th Marshal Soult collected the right and left wings of his army, with one division of the centre and 2 divisions of cavalry at St. Jean Pied de Port, and, on the 25th, attacked, with between 30,000 and 40,000 men, General Byng's post at Roncesvalles. Lieut. General Sir L. Cole moved up to his support with the 4th division, and these officers were enabled to maintain their post throughout the day; but the enemy turned it in the afternoon, and Lieut. General Sir L. Cole considered it to be necessary to

withdraw in the night; and he marched to the neighbourhood of Zubiri. In the actions which took place on this day the 20th regt. distinguished themselves.

Two divisions of the centre of the enemy's army attacked Sir R. Hill's position in the Puerto de Maya at the head of the valley of Baztan, in the afternoon of the same day. The brunt of the action fell upon Major General Pringle's and Major General Walker's brigades, in the 2nd division, under the command of Lieut. General the Hon. W. Stewart. These troops were at first obliged to give way, but having been supported by Major General Barnes' brigade of the 7th division, they regained that part of their post which was the key of the whole, and which would have enabled them to re-assume it if circumstances had permitted it. But Sir R. Hill having been apprised of the necessity that Sir L. Cole should retire, deemed it expedient to withdraw his troops likewise to Irurita, and the enemy did not advance on the following day beyond the Puerto de Maya.

Notwithstanding the enemy's superiority of numbers, they acquired but little advantage over these brave troops during the 7 hours they were engaged. All the regiments charged with the bayonet. The conduct of the 82nd regt., which moved up with Major General Barnes' brigade, is particularly reported. Lieut. General the Hon. W. Stewart was slightly wounded.

I was not apprised of these events till late in the night of the 25th and 26th; and I adopted immediate measures to concentrate the army to the right, still providing for the siege of San Sebastian, and for the blockade of Pamplona.

This would have been effected early on the 27th, only that Lieut. General Sir L. Cole and Lieut. General Sir T. Picton concurred in thinking their post at Zubiri not tenable for the time during which it would have been necessary for them to wait in it. They therefore retired early on the 27th, and took up a position to cover the blockade of Pamplona, having the right, consisting of the 3rd division, in front of Huarte, and extending to the hills beyond Olaz; the left, consisting of the 4th division, Major General Byng's brigade of the 2nd division, and Brig. General Campbell's (Portuguese) brigade of the Conde de Amarante's Portuguese division, on the heights in front of Villalba, having their left at a chapel behind Sorauren, on the high road from Ostiz to Pamplona, and their right resting upon a height which defended the high road from Zubiri and Roncesvalles. General Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, and that part of the Conde de la Bisbal's corps not engaged in the blockade, were in reserve. From the latter the regiment of Pravia and that of El Principe were detached to occupy part of the hill on the right of the 4th division, by which the road from Zubiri was defended.

The British cavalry under Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton were placed near Huarte on the right, being the only ground on which it was possible to use the cavalry.

The river Lanz runs in the valley which was on the left of the allied, and on the right of the French army along the road to Ostiz; beyond this river there is another range of mountains connected with Lizaso and Marcalain, by which places it was now necessary to communicate with the rest of the army.



I joined the 3rd and 4th divisions just as they were taking up their ground on the 27th, and shortly afterwards the enemy formed their army on a mountain, the front of which extends from the high road to Ostiz to the high road to Zubiri; and they placed one division on the left of that road on a height, and in some villages in front of the 3rd division; they had here also a large body of cavalry.

In a short time after they had taken up their ground, the enemy attacked the hill on the right of the 4th division, which was then occupied by one battalion of the 4th Portuguese regt., and by the Spanish regt. of Pravia. These troops defended their ground, and drove the enemy from it with the bayonet. Seeing the importance of this hill to our position, I re-inforced it with the 40th regt., and this regiment, with the Spanish regts., El Principe and Pravia, held it from this time, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the enemy during the 27th and 28th to obtain possession of it. Nearly at the same time that the enemy attacked this height on the 27th, they took possession of the village of Sorauren on the road to Ostiz, by which they acquired the communication by that road, and they kept up a fire of musketry along the line till it was dark.

We were joined on the morning of the 28th by the 6th division of infantry, and I directed that the heights should be occupied on the left of the valley of the Lanz, and that the 6th division should form across the valley in rear of the left of the 4th division, resting their right on Oricain, and their left on the heights above mentioned. The 6th division had scarcely taken their position, when they were attacked by a very large force of the enemy which had been assembled in the village of Sorauren. Their front was however so well defended by the fire of their own light troops from the heights on their left, and by the fire from the heights occupied by the 4th division and Brig. General Campbell's Portuguese brigade, that the enemy were soon driven back with immense loss from a fire on their front, both flanks and rear.

In order to extricate their troops from the difficulty in which they found themselves in their situation in the valley of the Lanz, the enemy now attacked the height on which the left of the 4th division stood, which was occupied by the 7th caçadores, of which they obtained a momentary possession. They were attacked, however, again by the 7th caçadores, supported by Major General Ross with his brigade of the 4th division, and were driven down with great loss.

The battle now became general along the whole front of the heights occupied by the 4th division, and in every part in our favor, excepting where one battalion of the 10th Portuguese regt. of Major General Campbell's brigade was posted. This battalion having been overpowered, and having been obliged to give way immediately on the right of Major General Ross' brigade, the enemy established themselves on our line, and Major General Ross was obliged to withdraw from his post.

I, however, ordered the 27th and 48th regts. to charge, first, that body of the enemy which had first established themselves on the height, and next, those on the left. Both attacks succeeded, and the enemy were driven down with immense loss; and the 6th division, having moved forward at the same time to a situation in the valley nearer to the left of the 4th, the attack upon

this front ceased entirely, and was continued but faintly on other points of our line.

In the course of this contest, the gallant 4th division, which had so frequently been distinguished in this army, surpassed their former good conduct. Every regiment charged with the bayonet, and the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23rd, four different times. Their officers set them the example, and Major General Ross had 2 horses shot under him. The Portuguese troops likewise behaved admirably; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Spanish regiments *El Principe* and *Pravia*.

I had ordered Lieut. General Sir R. Hill to march by Lanz upon Lizaso, as soon as I found that Lieut. Generals Sir T. Picton and Sir L. Cole had moved from Zubiri, and Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie from San Estevan to the same place, where both arrived on the 28th, and the 7th division came to Marcalain.

The enemy's force, which had been in front of Sir R. Hill, followed his march, and arrived at Ostiz on the 29th. The enemy thus reinforced, and occupying a position on the mountains which appeared little liable to attack, and finding that they could make no impression on our front, determined to endeavor to turn our left by an attack on Sir R. Hill's corps. They re-inforced, with one division, the troops which had been already opposed to him, still occupying the same points in the mountain on which was formed their principal force; but they drew in to their left the troops which occupied the heights opposite the 3rd division; and they had, during the night of the 29th and 30th, occupied in strength the crest of the mountain on our left of the Lanz opposite to the 6th and 7th divisions; thus connecting their right in their position with the divisions detached to attack Lieut. General Sir R. Hill.

I, however, determined to attack their position, and ordered Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie to possess himself of the top of the mountain in his front, by which the enemy's right would be turned; and Lieut. General Sir T. Picton to cross the heights on which the enemy's left had stood, and to turn their left by the road to Roncesvalles. All the arrangements were made to attack the front of the enemy's position, as soon as the effect of these movements on their flanks should begin to appear. Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham, whom I had sent to take the command of the 6th division, Major General Pack having been wounded, turned the village of Sorauraen as soon as the Earl of Dalhousie had driven the enemy from the mountain by which that flank was defended; and the 6th division, and Major General Byng's brigade, which had relieved the 4th division on the left of our position on the road to Ostiz, instantly attacked and carried that village. Lieut. General Sir L. Cole likewise attacked the front of the enemy's main position with the 7th *caçadores*, supported by the 11th Portuguese regt., the 40th, and the battalion under Colonel Bingham, consisting of the 53rd and Queen's regts. All these operations obliged the enemy to abandon a position which is one of the strongest and most difficult of access that I have yet seen occupied by troops. In their retreat from this position, the enemy lost a great number of prisoners.

I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of all the General Officers, officers, and troops, throughout these operations. The attack made by Lieut.



General the Earl of Dalhousie was admirably conducted by his Lordship, and executed by Major General Inglis and the troops composing his brigade; and that by Major General the Hon. E. Pakenham, and Major General Byng, and that by Lieut. General Sir L. Cole; and the movement made by Sir T. Picton merited my highest commendation. The latter officer co-operated in the attack of the mountain, by detaching troops to his left, in which Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Trench was wounded, but I hope not seriously.

While these operations were going on, and in proportion as I observed their success, I detached troops to the support of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill. The enemy appeared in his front late in the morning, and immediately commenced an extended manœuvre upon his left flank, which obliged him to withdraw from the height which he occupied behind Lizaso to the next range. He there, however, maintained himself; and I enclose his report of the conduct of the troops.

I continued the pursuit of the enemy after their retreat from the mountain to Olague, where I was at sunset immediately in the rear of their attack upon Lieut. General Sir R. Hill. They withdrew from his front in the night; and yesterday took up a strong position with 2 divisions to cover their rear on the Pass of Dona Maria.

Lieut. General Sir R. Hill and the Earl of Dalhousie attacked and carried the Pass, notwithstanding the vigorous resistance of the enemy, and the strength of their position. I am concerned to add that Lieut. General the Hon. W. Stewart was wounded upon this occasion.

I enclose Lieut. General Sir R. Hill's report.

In the mean time, I moved with Major General Byng's brigade, and the 4th division, under Lieut. General the Hon. Sir L. Cole, by the Pass of Velate, upon Irurita, in order to turn the enemy's position on Dona Maria. Major General Byng took in Elizondo a large convoy going to the enemy, and made many prisoners. We have this day continued the pursuit of the enemy in the valley of the Bidasoa, and many prisoners and much baggage have been taken. Major General Byng has possessed himself of the valley of Baztan, and of the position on the Puerto de Maya, and the army will be this night nearly in the same position which they occupied on the 25th July.

I trust that H.R.H. the Prince Regent will be satisfied with the conduct of the troops of His Majesty, and of his allies on this occasion. The enemy having been considerably re-inforced and re-equipped, after their late defeat, made a most formidable attempt to relieve the blockade of Pamplona, with the whole of their forces, excepting the reserve under General Villatte, which remained in front of our troops on the great road from Irun. This attempt has been entirely frustrated by the operations of a part only of the allied army; and the enemy has sustained a defeat, and suffered a severe loss in officers and men.

The enemy's expectations of success beyond the point of raising the blockade of Pamplona, were certainly very sanguine. They brought into Spain a large body of cavalry, and a great number of guns; neither of which arms could be used to any great extent by either party in the battle which took place. They sent off the guns to St. Jean Pied de Port, on the evening of the 28th, which have thus returned to France in safety.

The detail of the operations will show your Lordship how much reason I have to be satisfied with the conduct of all the General Officers, officers, and troops. It is impossible to describe the enthusiastic bravery of the 4th division; and I was much indebted to Lieut. General Sir L. Cole for the manner in which he directed their operations; to Major General Ross, Major General Anson, Major General Byng, and Brig. General Campbell, of the Portuguese service. All the officers commanding, and the officers of the regiments, were remarkable for their gallantry; but I particularly observed Lieut. Colonel O'Toole, of the 7th caçadores, in the charge upon the enemy on our left on the 28th; and Captain Joaquim Telles Jurdaõ, of the 11th Portuguese regt., in the attack of the mountain on the 30th.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention likewise to the valuable assistance I received throughout these operations from Lieut. General Sir R. Hill; and from Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie, and Lieut. General Sir T. Picton, in those of the 30th and 31st July. To the Conde de la Bisbal likewise, I am indebted for every assistance it was in his power to give, consistently with his attention to the blockade. I have already mentioned the conduct of the regiments of Pravia and El Principe, belonging to the army of reserve of Andalusia, in a most trying situation; and the whole corps appeared animated by the same zealous spirit which pervaded all the troops in that position.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford was with me throughout these operations; and I received from him all the assistance which his talents so well qualify him to afford me. The good conduct of the Portuguese officers and troops in all the operations of the present campaign, and the spirit which they show on every occasion, are not less honorable to that nation than they are to the military character of the officer, who, by his judicious measures, has re-established discipline, and renewed a military spirit in the army.

I have again to draw your Lordship's attention to the valuable assistance I received throughout these operations from the Quarter Master General, Major General Murray, and Major General Pakenham, the Adjutant General, and the officers of those departments respectively; from Lord FitzRoy Somerset, Lieut. Colonel Campbell, and the officers of my personal Staff.

Although our wounded are numerous, I am happy to say that the cases in general are slight; and I have great pleasure in reporting to your Lordship, that the utmost attention has been paid to them by the Inspector General, Dr. M'Grigor, and by the officers of the department under his direction.

Adverting to the extent and nature of our operations, and the difficulties of our communications at all times, I have reason to be extremely well satisfied with the zeal and exertions of Sir R. Kennedy, the Commissary General, and the officers of his department, throughout the campaign; which, upon the whole, have been more successful in supplying the troops than could have been expected.

I transmit this dispatch to your Lordship by H.S.H. the Hereditary Prince of Orange, who is perfectly acquainted with all that has passed, and with the situation of the army; and will be able to inform your Lordship of many details relating to this species of operations, for which a dispatch does not afford scope. His Highness had a horse shot under him in the battle near Sorauren, on the 28th July.



P.S. I have omitted to inform your Lordship in the body of the dispatch, that the troops in the Puerto de Maya lost there 4 Portuguese guns on the 25th July. Major General Pringle, who commanded when the attack commenced, had ordered them to retire towards Maya; and when Lieut. General Stewart came up, he ordered that they might return, and retire by the mountain road to Elizondo. In the mean time, the enemy were in possession of the Pass, and the communication with that road was lost, and they could not reach it.

I enclose returns of the loss before San Sebastian, from the 7th to the 27th July; and returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the operations from the 25th ultimo to the 1st. instant.'

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808.

To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

'I have received your letters to the 3rd instant, which I have been

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G. O.

Lesaca, 3rd Aug. 1813.

1. The paymasters of regiments are to wait upon the Paymaster General to receive the balances due upon their several estimates to the 24th February, and to the 24th March last, at Tolosa.

2. Under the orders of the Commander of the Forces of the 24th Jan. 1810, the balances due to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers on the face of their accounts to the 24th Jan., and to the 24th Feb., would now be to be paid; but the Commander of the Forces being desirous of establishing the system of giving the soldier a day's pay on every day, desires that the amount of the balances may be settled as follows:

3. The balance due to each corporal, trumpeter, and private man of the 2 regiments of Life Guards, on the 24th Jan. and on the 24th Feb., is to be consolidated, and the non-commissioned officers, trumpeters, and privates, are to receive in hand whatever the total may amount to beyond the sum of 45s. for each corporal and trumpeter, and 30s. for each private man.

4. The sums of 45s. for each corporal and trumpeter, and of 30s. for each private, are to remain in the hands of the captain, from which he is to give the corporals and trumpeter each 1s. 6d., and the privates each 1s. a day, till the whole sum shall be paid.

5. The balance due to each corporal, trumpeter, and private, of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards, on the 24th Jan. and 24th Feb., is to be consolidated, and the corporals, trumpeters, and privates, are to receive in hand whatever the total may amount to beyond the sum of 37s. 6d. for each corporal, and of 22s. 6d. for each trumpeter and private man. The sums of 37s. 6d. for each corporal, and of 22s. 6d. for each trumpeter and private, are to remain in the hands of the captain, from which he is to give the corporal 1s. 3d., and the trumpeter and private 9d. per day, till the whole sum shall be paid.

6. The balance due to each non-commissioned officer and soldier of the cavalry, and of the Foot Guards and other regiments of infantry, on the 24th Jan. and on the 24th Feb., is also to be consolidated, and the non-commissioned officers and soldiers are to receive in hand whatever the total may amount to beyond the sums of 30s. for each serjeant, 20s. for each corporal, trumpeter, or drummer, and 15s. for each private. The sums of 30s. for each serjeant, 20s. for each corporal, trumpeter, or drummer, and 15s. for each private, are to remain in the hands of the captain, from which he is to give the serjeants each 1s., the corporals, and the trumpeter, or drummer, 8d., and the soldiers 6d. a day each, until the whole sum shall be paid.

7. In case the balances due to any non-commissioned officer or soldier, on their accounts to the 24th Jan. and 24th Feb., should not amount to 30s. for each serjeant, 20s. for each corporal, trumpeter, or drummer, and 15s. for each private, the officer commanding the troop or company is to divide whatever sum the balance to any non-commissioned officer or soldier may amount to by 30, and is to give such non-commissioned officer or soldier on each day the proportion of whatever the balance may be.

8. It must be observed, that in case any soldier wants necessaries, the captain must take care to stop their price from the daily payment above ordered to be made to the soldier, either by stopping the whole sum ordered to be paid daily, or a proportion, as may be settled by the officer commanding the regiment.

9. The soldiers will see, however, what an interest they have in taking care of their necessaries, and it is to be hoped there will be but little occasion for stoppages on this account.'

obliged to delay acknowledging till this moment. The troops are of course a good deal fatigued, and we have suffered very considerably, particularly the English troops in the 2nd division, in the affair in the Puerto de Maya, which, with the existing want of shoes and of musket ammunition, induces me to delay for a day or two any forward movement, and to doubt the expediency of making one at all. I keep every thing in readiness, however. I am perfectly aware of the objections to our positions in the Pyrenees; but if we should not be able to advance from them without incurring more loss than we ought, or than we can well afford, I am afraid that we cannot well retire from them.

Many events turned out unfortunately for us on the 1st instant, each of which ought to have been in our favor; and we should have done the enemy a great deal more mischief than we did in his passage down this valley. But as it is, I hope that Soult will not feel an inclination to renew his expedition, on this side at least. The French army must have suffered terribly. Between the 25th of last month and 2nd of this, they were engaged seriously not less than ten times; on many occasions in attacking very strong positions, in others beat from them or pursued. I understand that the officers say they have lost 15,000 men. I thought so, but as they say so, I now think more. I believe we have about 4000 prisoners. It is strange enough that our diminution of strength to the 31st does not exceed 1500 men; although I believe our casualties are 6000.

I propose to resume the operations of the siege as soon as the train and stores shall arrive from England. And I gave orders to the Commissary General to give compensation, as is proposed, for the loss of boats, and to have the boats repaired.'

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809.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

'The Prince of Orange having been detained till this day for the returns, I have to inform your Lordship that the enemy still continued posted on the morning of the 2nd, with a force of 2 divisions, in the Puerto de Echalar, and nearly the whole army behind the Puerto, when the 4th, 7th, and Light divisions advanced by the valley of the Bidasoa to the frontier; and I had determined to dislodge them by a combined attack and movement of the 3 divisions.

The 7th division, however, having crossed the mountains from Sumbilla, and having necessarily preceded the arrival of the 4th, Major General Barnes' brigade was formed for the attack, and advanced before the 4th and Light divisions could co-operate, with a regularity and gallantry, which I have seldom seen equalled, and actually drove 2 divisions of the enemy from the formidable heights, notwithstanding the resistance opposed to them.

It is impossible that I can extol too highly the conduct of Major General Barnes, and of these brave troops, which was the admiration of all who were witnesses of it.

Major General Kempt's brigade of the Light division likewise drove a very considerable force from the rock which forms the left of the Puerto.

There is now no enemy in the field within this part of the Spanish frontier.'



## 810.

To the Archbishop of Santiago.

Lesaca, 6th Aug. 1813.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th July, and it has given me the greatest concern to see that any circumstance had occasioned a difference of opinion among the Spanish nation, whose only view and object ought to have been to drive the common enemy from their country.

Although interested in every thing which can affect the Spanish nation, as a stranger I can have no concern in the question on which this difference of opinion exists ; and I never interfere in any thing which is not my particular business. I am desirous, therefore, to avoid giving any opinion on the subject to which your letter relates.’

## 811.

To His Excellency the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 7th Aug. 1813.

‘ It is useless now to trouble your Excellency with the motives which induced me to ask the late Regency to enter into certain engagements with me, previous to my taking upon myself the command of the Spanish army, to which I had been appointed by the Cortes ; these reasons are to be found fully detailed in my addresses of the 4th December, 1812, and every day’s experience has convinced me of the expediency of what I asked, in order to enable me to perform my duty. The existing Government have broken the engagements into which, it appears by your Excellency’s letter, they do not consider they ever entered ; and it further appears by your Excellency’s letter, that they are dissatisfied with that part of the arrangement made with the former Regency, which relates to the communication between the Government and the army.

I have above explained myself upon this point, in a manner which will, I hope, prove satisfactory to the Regency. But having before been mistaken respecting the intentions of the Regency, in regard to the engagements with me as explained by the late Minister at War, I trust that your Excellency will now be pleased to explain their intentions in language that cannot be misunderstood.

I am sincerely desirous of serving the Spanish nation, to which I am indebted for so much favor and kindness, in every way that may be in my power, and I will continue to serve them at the head of the allied British and Portuguese army, whatever may be the decision of the Regency on what is now brought before them. I shall be much concerned, for many reasons, into which it is not necessary to enter, if I should be obliged to relinquish the command of the Spanish army, which the Cortes and the late Regency had confided to me in consequence of the decision of the existing Regency ; but if I should, I can only assure your Excellency, that I will do it at the period, and in the mode which may be most convenient and agreeable to the Regency ; and that I will at all times act most cordially with, and assist to the utmost of my power, any officer who may be named to succeed me.

It must appear to your Excellency to be very desirable to the Government, for the welfare of the army, and to myself, to receive their early decision on the contents of this letter.’

812.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 8th Aug. 1813.

‘It is a very common error, among those unacquainted with military affairs, to believe that there are no limits to military success. After having driven the French from the frontiers of Portugal and Madrid to the frontiers of France, it is generally expected that we shall immediately invade France; and some even here expect that we shall be at Paris in a month. None appear to have taken a correct view of our situation on the frontier, of which the enemy still possess all the strongholds within Spain itself; of which strongholds, or at least some of them, we must get possession before the season closes, or we shall have no communication whatever with the interior of Spain. Then in France, on the same great communications, there are other strongholds, of which we must likewise get possession.

An army which has made such marches, and has fought such battles, as that under my command has, is necessarily much deteriorated. Independently of the actual loss of numbers by death, wounds, and sickness, many men and officers are out of the ranks for various causes. The equipment of the army, their ammunition, the soldiers’ shoes, &c., require renewal; the magazines for the new operations require to be collected and formed, and many arrangements to be made, without which the army could not exist a day, but which are not generally understood by those who have not had the direction of such concerns in their hands. Then observe, that this new operation is only the invasion of France, in which country every body is a soldier, where the whole population is armed and organised, under persons, not, as in other countries, inexperienced in arms, but men who, in the course of the last 25 years, in which France has been engaged in war with all Europe, must, the majority of them, at least, have served somewhere.

I entertain no doubt that I could to-morrow enter France, and establish the army on the Adour, but I could go no farther certainly. If peace should be made by the Powers of the North, I must necessarily withdraw into Spain; and the retreat, however short, would be difficult, on account of the hostility and the warlike disposition of the inhabitants, particularly of this part of the country, and the military direction they would receive from the gentry their leaders. To this add, that the difficulty of all that must be done to set the army to rights, after its late severe battles and victories, will be much increased by its removal into France at an early period; and that it must stop short in the autumn, if it now moves at too early a period.

So far for the immediate invasion of France, which, from what I have seen of the state of the negotiations in the north of Europe, I have determined to consider only in reference to the convenience of my own operations.

The next point for consideration is the proposal of the Duc de Berri to join this army, taking the command of the 20,000 men who he says are ready, organised, and even armed, in order to act with us. My opinion is, that the interests of the House of Bourbon and of all Europe are the same, viz., in some manner or other, to get the better and rid of Buonaparte.

Although, therefore, the allies in the north of Europe, and even Great Britain and Spain, might not be prepared to go the length of declaring that they would not lay down their arms till Buonaparte should be dethroned, they would be justified in taking this assistance from the House of Bourbon,



and their French party who are dissatisfied with the Government of Buonaparte. It might be a question with the House of Bourbon, whether they would involve their partisans in France upon any thing short of such a declaration, but none with the allies whether they would receive such assistance. Indeed, there would scarcely be a question for the Princes of the House of Bourbon, if they are acquainted with the real nature and extent of Buonaparte's power. He rests internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of corruption that was ever established in any country, and externally upon his military power, which is supported almost exclusively by foreign contributions. If he can be confined to the limits of France by any means, his system must fall. He cannot bear the expense of his internal Government and of his army; and the reduction of either would be fatal to him. Any measures, therefore, which should go only to confine him to France would forward, and ultimately attain, the objects of the House of Bourbon and of their partisans.

If the House of Bourbon and the Allies, however, do not concur in this reasoning, we must then, before the Duc de Berri is allowed to join the army, get from the Allies in the north of Europe a declaration how far they will persevere in the contest with a view to dethrone Buonaparte; and the British Government must make up their minds on the question, and come to an understanding upon it with those of the Peninsula.'

## 813.

To Colonel Torrens.

Lesaca, 8th Aug. 1813.

'I entertain a very high opinion of ——'s talents; but he always appeared to me to want what is better than abilities, viz., sound sense. There is always some mistaken principle in what he does.

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The best of the story is, that all parties ran away. Maurice Mathieu ran away; Sir John Murray ran away; and so did Suchet.'

## 814.

To Lieut. General Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 9th Aug. 1813.

'Generally speaking, my dear Lord, it is very desirable, and it will save us both a good deal of trouble, if you will keep yourself clear of the details of the Spanish service. The Spaniards will not allow either of us to interfere much in their concerns, and will adopt but unwillingly any suggestions which we may make for their improvement. It is besides probable that, with the best intentions, you and I may not take the same view of a subject, and we shall only create confusion by working both at the same point.'

G. O.

Lesaca, 10th Aug. 1813.

'1. The Commander of the Forces has desired the Commissary General to direct the Commissaries with the several brigades of infantry and regiments of cavalry, to make issues of bread, in the manner usual in all armies, for 3 days at a time. It will be necessary, however, that the commanding officers of regiments, and of companies, should particularly attend to their men on this subject, and should inspect the bread twice a day, and see that the soldiers do not consume in one day what is given them to last 3. The Commander of the Forces requests the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades to give orders on this subject.

2. The state of the ammunition of the soldiers likewise requires the constant attention of the officers, and the Commander of the Forces begs that the General Order on this subject may be particularly attended to.'

815.

To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 13th Aug. 1813.

'The accounts of the battle of Vitoria had been received at the Austrian head quarters at Brandeiss, from Dresden, on the 8th July. The news had been kept secret at Dresden, even from the Duc de Bassano; but Count Bubna had discovered it, and sent it off on the 7th. Lord Cathcart says, it was likely to have great effect on the tone of the negotiations about to be commenced at Brandeiss. Mr. Thornton appears to think that, in consequence of the affairs in Spain, Buonaparte may be induced to agree to the Austrian basis, which will divide Austria from the Allies, as it appears that they have not agreed to the basis of a peace proposed by Austria. The Allies appear to be well together, and I think the Austrians show a disposition to join in the war, if Buonaparte should not agree to the terms they had proposed as the basis of a peace. The renewal of the armistice also was agreed to by the Emperor of Russia, avowedly because it was convenient to Austria.

But they have not agreed on the basis, much less the peace of which they are entering on the negotiations; nor is there, in any of the documents sent to me, the slightest trace of their making common cause with England and Spain, by which alone the peace of the world can be restored, excepting an article in the convention on the mediation between Austria and Buonaparte, in which the latter accepts the offer of the mediation of the former for a general peace, or for a continental peace, if a maritime peace cannot be obtained.

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The season is wearing away fast, and every point to give protection to our shipping becomes of importance.

It is to be hoped that the British Government will at last discover the nature of the element by which they are surrounded; and will, in future, have their preparations made in time, particularly when the earliest notice is given to them.'

816.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 14th Aug. 1813.

'I confess that I am not satisfied with the state of affairs in the north of Germany, which, however, is probably owing to my not knowing what has passed between the King's Government and the Allies on the Continent, in regard either to peace, or to carrying on the war.

It appears to me that Buonaparte has the Allies, including Austria, exactly in the state in which he would wish to have them. In regard to peace, it appears that the Austrians propose a basis to which the Russians and Prussians do not agree; and that these powers do not make common cause with England and Spain, as to peace: and as to the Prince Royal of Sweden, he

G. O.

Lesaca, 14th Aug. 1813.

'1. The Commander of the Forces desires, that with the morning state of the 20th inst., the several regiments should send in a nominal list of the men returned in that state, "Sick Absent," specifying the name of the captain, and the letter of the company to which each man belongs, and the man's number; and as far as may be possible, the general or detachment hospital at which the men are supposed to be.'



appears to stand alone likewise, and that his hopes of the peace, for which he wishes, are confined to an engagement by the Emperor of Russia that he will not guarantee the dominions of Denmark in the negotiations about to be entered upon.

There may therefore be fairly counted 4 parties among the Allies, by concessions to any one of which, Buonaparte would gain such an advantage as would place the game in his hands, if the accounts given of the relative force of the French and the Allies be correct: or it would require great firmness and conduct to carry on the war, supposing Mr. Thornton's notion to be correct, that there would still remain a sufficient force for the contest, even if the Austrians were to be satisfied, and to withdraw their assistance. In this notion, however, I should doubt Mr. Thornton's having taken into consideration the possibility that the concession to the Austrians should be such as to induce them to take part in the war against the Allies to compel them to a peace, which would not be inconsistent with the Austrian character of mediator; or, what is more probable, should adopt a system of neutrality hostile to the Allies, and friendly to France.

There appears, therefore, no concert or common cause in the negotiations for peace; and as for the operations of the war, there may be something better, as Lord Cathcart has not gone into details at all; but there does not appear to exist any thing, in writing or any where, excepting in loose conversations among Princes. For my part, I would not march even a corporal's guard upon such a system.

Probably what I am about to write has already occurred to the King's Government, and that matters are not ripe for such a scheme; or that the notions and claims of some of the Allies are so wild and unreasonable, or so selfish, that they cannot be reconciled to the general interest, at the same time that the forces and resources, particularly of the greater powers, cannot be spared,

There are some leading principles, however, in the political state of Europe on which the interests of all parties would coincide, such as the independence of Spain, Germany, Italy, and Holland, of France; the restoration of Hanover to the King's family; the re-establishment of the Prussian frontier, and of the Prussian influence over Saxony and Hesse; a frontier for the Austrian monarchy, and influence in Germany to balance that of Prussia; the re-establishment of the independence of the Hanse Towns, &c.; an understanding between England and Russia; and the powers less immediately interested might bring the others to take a general view of the common interests, without which, all may depend upon it that they cannot make peace with security, or war with honor or advantage.

The object of each should be to diminish the power and influence of France, by which alone the peace of the world can be restored and maintained: and although the aggrandisement and security of the power of one's own country is the duty of every man, all nations may depend upon it that the best security for power, and for every advantage now possessed, or to be acquired, is to be found in the reduction of the power and influence of the grand disturber; and in the adoption of some scheme for that object, to be acted upon by the Allies in concert, whether in the negotiation for peace, or in the operations of war. For my part, I repeat what I told you before, I shall

enter France, or not, (unless I should be ordered,) according to what I think best for my own operations, as I have no reliance whatever upon what is doing in the north.'

## 817.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Lesaca, 15th Aug. 1813.

'I never entertained the slightest doubt of the advantage which the country derived from the presence of the army in Portugal; I only hope that it will not suffer so much from its absence as that the revenue will fail.

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The accounts of the battle of Vitoria were received at Brandeiss from Dresden on the 8th July. Buonaparte knew of the battle only on the 6th, and it was kept secret even from Maret; but Count Bubna discovered it on the 7th. The last battles, however, are more important; and I am only afraid that they will lead to concessions by Buonaparte to Austria and to Russia and Prussia which may lead to a peace with those powers, to the exclusion of England and the powers of the Peninsula.'

## 818.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 18th Aug. 1813.

'We hear from France that peace is concluded. All that I am apprehensive of is, that the Allies may be induced to consent to a renewal of the armistice for a lengthened period of time, in order to finish the negotiations for peace, by which Buonaparte may be enabled to detach a large force against us. I hope they understand that if he should do so, and we should by accident be overpowered, which I do not think likely, he will not fulfil any expectations of favorable terms which he may have held out to them.'

## 819.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813.

'I learn from Sir T. Graham, that the *Sparrow* arrived from England at Pasages last night, having sailed on the 10th. She spoke the *President* in the offing with a convoy of ordnance store ships; but there are no accounts of any increase of the naval force on this coast; and Sir T. Graham informs me, that Lord Keith had told him that he had recommended that a line of battle ship might be sent to this coast, but had received no answer, and that nothing was left to his discretion. I beg leave again to bring under your Lordship's view, in an official form, a representation of the inconveniences and disadvantages under which the army is carrying on its operations, in consequence of the want of an adequate naval force on this coast.

The supplies of all kinds from Lisbon and other ports in Portugal, and from Coruña, are delayed for want of convoy; the maritime blockade of San Sebastian is not kept at all; the enemy have a constant communication with San Sebastian from St. Jean de Luz and Bayonne; and they have introduced, besides supplies of different kinds, reinforcements to the garrison of artillerymen and *sapeurs*, and some officers belonging to the medical department.



The fact of the communication between San Sebastian and the ports of France is notorious to the whole world; as General Rey's report of the assault of the 25th July has been published in the French newspapers.

In the attack of a maritime place, some assistance has generally been received by the army from the navy; but the naval force on this coast is too weak to give us any of the description we require; and for the want of which, we shall now be much distressed. The soldiers are obliged to work in the transports to unload the vessels, because no seamen can be furnished; and we have been obliged to use the harbour boats of Pasages, navigated by women, in landing the ordnance and stores, because there was no naval force to supply us with the assistance which we should have required in boats. These harbour boats being light, and of a weak construction, have many of them been destroyed; and we shall be put to much inconvenience, and there will be great delay, from the want of boats in the further operations of the siege; and the soldiers are obliged to load and unload the boats, the women who navigate them being unequal to the labor.

It is my opinion, that if we had a sufficient naval force, we might, if the weather permitted, make an attack from the sea at the same time that we should make the attack upon the breaches in the walls. This attack would, at all events, divide the enemy's attention; and would probably prevent much of the loss in the assault of the breaches, if it did not tend to insure the success of the assault.

I also beg to draw your Lordship's attention to an official communication of my opinion that material advantage would be gained by impeding the coasting trade called *cabotage*, between the Garonne and Bayonne, and St. Jean de Luz. The enemy would then be obliged to use the land transport of the country in collecting his magazines on the Adour, by which the collection of store magazines would be much delayed, if their collection to any great extent could be at all effected; and the distress occasioned by the war, and its consequent unpopularity in France, would be considerably increased. But the naval force off this coast, being unequal even to the blockade of San Sebastian, cannot be supposed equal to the effectual blockade of the coast between the Garonne and Bayonne.

I have never been in the habit of troubling Government with requisitions for force, but have always carried on the service to the best of my ability with that which has been placed at my disposal; and if the navy of Great Britain cannot afford more than one frigate and a few brigs and cutters, fit and used only to carry dispatches, to co-operate with this army in the siege of a maritime place, the possession of which, before the bad season commences, is important to the army as well as to the navy, I must be satisfied, and do the best I can without such assistance; but I hope your Lordship will let me know positively whether I am, or not, to have any further assistance in naval means.'

'I have just received your note of half-past 6 P.M., of last night. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will represent to Captain Otway the

state of the naval blockade of San Sebastian. The enemy have a daily intercourse with the place. This is obvious, not only from the information which I have, but from the publication in the Paris papers of Rey's account of the assault of the 25th of last month. I hear that besides supplies they have sent into the place artillery men, *sapeurs*, and officers of the medical staff; and in fact they may send what they please.

But besides the blockade, the navy in general give some assistance in the attack of a maritime place in those parts of the labor of the service to which seamen are more accustomed; such as in loading and unloading boats, and in the boats themselves. The assistance of a naval force in the siege of San Sebastian is most important. But it must be obvious, that with all Sir G. Collier's zeal, one frigate can do nothing in those ways.

I say nothing about the relative state of the enemy's naval force and that of His Majesty on this coast; but I believe that the enemy are superior, and can drive off Sir George whenever they please; nor do I advert to other services, which it is most desirable should be performed by the navy in aid of the army; but I must say we have not the assistance we ought to have, and which every other army has had, in the attack of this place, which it is most important to the army and navy to get possession of before the bad season commences. I believe you concur with me in thinking that if we had sufficient naval means, and the weather should be fair when the assault would be made, great assistance would be derived from an attack on the sea front of the castle. But this attack cannot be made without great naval assistance. Under these circumstances, Captain Otway will judge whether he ought or can stay. I think it but fair, however, to inform him, that for the last year I have represented to Government the inadequacy of the naval force on the coasts of Spain and Portugal; and that, since I crossed the Ebro, and particularly in the last 8 months, not an opportunity has been missed of bringing the subject distinctly under the view of the Secretary of State.'

## 821.

To Viscount Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Lesaca, 21st Aug. 1813.

'I complain of an actual want of necessary naval assistance and co-operation with the army, of which I believe no man will entertain a doubt who reads the facts stated in my reports to Government. I know nothing about the cause of the evil; it may be owing to a general deficiency of naval force for all the objects to which it is necessary to attend in an extended system of war. It may be owing to a proper preference of other services over this, or it may be owing to the inapplication of the force intrusted to their command by the Admirals and Captains. I state the fact, which nobody will deny; and leave it to Government to apply a remedy or not, as they may think proper, hoping only that they will let me know whether they propose to apply a remedy or not.'

## 822.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 23rd Aug. 1813.

'Your Lordship may depend upon it that I am by no means tired of success; and that I shall do every thing in my power to draw the attention



of the enemy to this quarter, as soon as I shall know that hostilities are really renewed in Germany.'

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823.

To \_\_\_\_\_.

Lesaca, 27th Aug. 1813.

'I have received your letter of the 25th instant, to which it is so difficult for me to give you an answer, that I should refrain from doing it altogether, if such omission was not likely to be misinterpreted.

I do not know of any officer of the British army, excepting myself, on whom the Spanish Government have thought proper to confer the marks of distinction to which you refer; and, as I am entirely unacquainted with the motives, or causes, for which they have been conferred upon me, excepting so far as they are expressed in the instruments conveying them, I cannot assign a reason why they have not been conferred upon yourself and others. I can safely say, however, that it has not been owing to any omission of mine to report my sense of the merits of all the officers who have been employed in this army.

In regard to the Portuguese Government, I may safely say that the omission of your name among those on whom H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal has been pleased to confer a mark of his favor, is not to be attributed to any want of a sense of your services and merits. I do not think that it would be quite proper in me to answer any question regarding the disposal of his favors by His Royal Highness; but if you will look over the list, I think you will find that your name could not have been included in it, without a departure from the principle on which it was made, which would have made the list much longer than it ought to have been.

I have only to add, that I shall not fail to take every opportunity of reporting my sense of your merits; and I sincerely hope that they will meet with the reward which will be most agreeable to yourself.'

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824.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 2nd Sept. 1813.

'The fire against the fort of San Sebastian was opened on the 26th August, and directed against the towers which flanked the bastion on the eastern face; against the demi-bastion on the south east angle, and the termination of the curtain of the south face.

Lieut. General Sir T. Graham had directed that an establishment should be formed on the island of S<sup>ta</sup> Clara, which was effected on the night of the 26th, and the enemy's detachment on the island were made prisoners. Captain Cameron of the 9th had the command of the detachment which effected this operation, and Lieut. General Sir T. Graham particularly applauds his conduct, and that of Lieut. Chadwick of the Royal Engineers. The conduct of Lieut. the Hon. J. Arbuthnot, of the Royal Navy, who commanded the boats, was highly meritorious, as likewise that of Lieut. Bell, of the Royal Marines.

All that was deemed practicable to carry into execution in order to facilitate the approach to the breaches before made in the wall of San Sebastian, having been effected on the 30th August, and the breach having been made

at the termination of the bastion ; the place was stormed at 11 o'clock in the day on the 31st, and carried.

The loss on our side has been severe. Lieut. General Sir J. Leith, who had joined the army only 2 days before, and Major Generals Oswald and Robinson, were unfortunately wounded in the breach ; and Colonel Sir R. Fletcher was killed by a musket ball at the mouth of the trenches. In this officer, and in Lieut. Colonel Craufurd of the 9th regt., His Majesty's service has sustained a serious loss.

I have the honor to enclose Lieut. General Sir T. Graham's report of this operation, in which your Lordship will observe with pleasure another distinguished instance of the gallantry and perseverance of His Majesty's officers and troops under the most trying difficulties.

All reports concur in praise of the conduct of the detachment from the 10th Portuguese brigade, under Major Snodgrass, which crossed the river Urumea, and stormed the breach on the right under all the fire which could be directed upon them from the castle and town.

The garrison retired to the castle, leaving about 270 prisoners in our hands ; and I hope that I shall soon have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that we have possession of that post.

Since the fire against San Sebastian had been re-commenced, the enemy had drawn the greatest part of their force to the camp of Urrugne ; and there was every reason to believe that they would make an attempt to relieve the place. Three divisions of the 4th Spanish army, commanded by General Don M. Freyre, occupied the heights of San Marcial and the town of Irun, by which the approach to San Sebastian by the high road was covered and protected ; and they were supported by the 1st division of British infantry under General Howard, and Lord Aylmer's brigade, on their left and in the rear of Irun ; and by General Longa's division, encamped near the Sierra de Aya, in rear of their right. In order to secure them still further, I moved 2 brigades of the 4th division, on the 30th, to the convent of San Antonio, one of which (General Ross'), under Lieut. General Sir L. Cole, the same day, afterwards moved up to the Sierra de Aya, and the other on the morning of the 31st ; leaving the 9th Portuguese brigade on the heights between the convent of Vera and Lesaca. Major General Inglis' brigade of the 7th division was moved on the 30th to the bridge of Lesaca ; and I gave orders for the troops in the Puertos of Echalar, Zugarramurdi, and Maya, to attack the enemy's weakened posts in front of these positions.

The enemy crossed the Bidasoa by the fords between Andarra and the destroyed bridge on the high road, before daylight on the morning of the 30th, with a very large force, with which they made a most desperate attack along the whole front of the position of the Spanish troops on the heights of San Marcial. They were beat back, some of them even across the river, in the most gallant style by the Spanish troops, whose conduct was equal to that of any troops that I have ever seen engaged ; and the attack, having been frequently repeated, was upon every occasion defeated with the same gallantry and determination. The course of the river being immediately under the heights on the French side, on which the enemy had placed a considerable quantity of cannon, they were enabled to throw a bridge across the river three quarters of a mile above the high road, over which, in the afternoon, they



marched again a considerable body, who, with those who had crossed the fords, again made a desperate attack upon the Spanish positions. This was equally beat back; and at length, finding all their efforts on that side fruitless, the enemy took advantage of the darkness of a violent storm to retire their troops from this front entirely.

Notwithstanding that, as I have above informed your Lordship, I had a British division on each flank of the 4th Spanish army, I am happy to be able to report that the conduct of the latter was so conspicuously good, and they were so capable of defending their post without assistance, in spite of the desperate efforts of the enemy to carry it, that, finding that the ground did not allow of my making use of the 1st or 4th divisions on the flanks of the enemy's attacking corps, neither of them were in the least engaged during the action.

Nearly at the same time that the enemy crossed the Bidasoa in front of the heights of San Marcial, they likewise crossed that river with about 3 divisions of infantry in 2 columns, by the fords below Salin, in front of the position occupied by the 9th Portuguese brigade. I ordered General Inglis to support this brigade with that of the 7th division under his command; and as soon as I was informed of the course of the enemy's attack, I sent to Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie, to request that he would likewise move towards the Bidasoa with the 7th division; and to the Light division to support Major General Inglis by every means in their power. Major General Inglis found it impossible to maintain the heights between Lesaca and the Bidasoa, and he withdrew to those in front of the Convent of San Antonio, which he maintained. In the mean time Major General Kempt moved one brigade of the Light division to Lesaca; by which he kept the enemy in check, and covered the march of the Earl of Dalhousie to join General Inglis.

The enemy, however, having completely failed in their attempt upon the position of the Spanish army on the heights of San Marcial, and finding that Major General Inglis had taken a position, from which they could not drive him, at the same time that it covered and protected the right of the Spanish army, and the approaches to San Sebastian by Oyarzun, and that their situation on the left of the Bidasoa was becoming at every moment more critical, retired during the night.

The fall of rain during the evening and night had so swollen the Bidasoa that the rear of their column was obliged to cross the bridge of Vera. In order to effect this object, they attacked the posts of Major General Skerrett's brigade of the Light division, at about 3 in the morning, both from the Puerto de Vera, and from the left of the Bidasoa. Although the nature of the ground rendered it impossible to prevent entirely the passage of the bridge after daylight, it was made under the fire of a great part of Major General Skerrett's brigade, and the enemy's loss in the operation must have been very considerable.

While this was going on upon the left of the army, Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron attacked the enemy's posts in front of the Pass of Echalar on the 30th and 31st. Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie made General Le Cor attack those in front of Zugarramurdi with the 6th Portuguese brigade on the 31st, and Major General the Hon. C. Colville made Colonel Douglas attack the enemy's posts in front of the Pass of Maya on the same

day, with the 7th Portuguese brigade. All these troops conducted themselves well.

The attack made by the Earl of Dalhousie delayed his march till late in the afternoon of the 31st; but he was in the evening in a favorable situation for his further progress; and in the morning of the 1st in that allotted for him.

In these operations, in which a second attempt by the enemy to prevent the establishment of the allies upon the frontier has been defeated by the operations of a part only of the allied army, at the very moment at which the fort of San Sebastian was taken by storm, I have had great satisfaction in observing the zeal and ability of the officers, and the gallantry and discipline of the troops.

The different reports which I have transmitted to your Lordship, from Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, will have shown the ability and perseverance with which he has conducted the arduous enterprise intrusted to his direction, and the zeal and exertion of all the officers employed under him.'

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To Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

'MY LORD,

Oyarzun, 1st Sept. 1813.

In obedience to your Lordship's orders of the preceding day, to attack and form a lodgment on the breach of San Sebastian, which now extended to the left, so as to embrace the outermost tower, the end and front of the curtain immediately over the left bastion, as well as the faces of the bastion itself, the assault took place at 11 o'clock, A.M., yesterday; and I have the honor to report to your Lordship, that the heroic perseverance of all the troops concerned was at last crowned with success.

The column of attack was formed of the 2nd brigade of the 5th division, commanded by Major General Robinson, with an immediate support of detachments as per margin,\* and having in reserve the remainder of the 5th division, consisting of Major General Spry's Portuguese brigade, and the 1st brigade under Major General Hay, as also the 5th battalion of caçadores of General Bradford's brigade, under Major Hill; the whole under the direction of Lieut. General Sir J. Leith, commanding the 5th division.

Having arranged every thing with Sir J. Leith, I crossed the Urumea to the batteries of the right attack, where every thing could be most distinctly seen, and from whence the orders for the fire of the batteries, according to circumstances, could be immediately given.

The column in filing out of the right of the trenches was as before exposed to a heavy fire of shells and grape shot, and a mine was exploded in the left angle of the counterscarp of the hornwork, which did great damage, but did not check the ardor of the troops in advancing to the attack. There never was any thing so fallacious as the external appearance of the breach; without some description, the almost insuperable difficulties of the breach cannot be estimated. Notwithstanding its great extent, there was but one point where it was possible to enter, and there by single files. All the inside of the wall to the right of the curtain formed a perpendicular scarp of at least 20 feet to the level of the streets; so that the narrow ridge of the curtain itself, formed by the breaching of its end and front,

\* 150 volunteers of the Light division, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Hunt, of the 52nd regt.; 400 of the first division (consisting of 200 of the brigades of Guards, under Lieut. Colonel Cook; of 100 of the Light battalion, and 100 of the line battalions of the King's German Legion), under Major Robertson; and 200 volunteers of the 4th division, under Major Rose, of the 20th foot.



was the only accessible point. During the suspension of the operations of the siege, from want of ammunition, the enemy had prepared every means of defence which art could devise, so that great numbers of men were covered by intrenchments and traverses, in the hornwork, on the ramparts of the curtain, and inside of the town opposite to the breach, and ready to pour a most destructive fire of musketry on both flanks of the approach to the top of the narrow ridge of the curtain.

Every thing that the most determined bravery could attempt was repeatedly tried in vain by the troops, who were brought forward from the trenches in succession. No man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge: and though the slope of the breach afforded shelter from the enemy's musketry, yet still the nature of the stone rubbish prevented the great exertions of the engineers and working parties from being able to form a lodgment for the troops, exposed to the shells and grape from the batteries of the castle, as was particularly directed, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions; and, at all events, a secure lodgment could never have been obtained without occupying a part of the curtain.

In this almost desperate state of the attack, after consulting with Colonel Dickson, commanding the Royal Artillery, I ventured to order the guns to be turned against the curtain. A heavy fire of artillery was directed against it; passing a few feet only over the heads of our troops on the breach, and was kept up with a precision of practice beyond all example. Meanwhile I accepted the offer of a part of Major General Bradford's Portuguese Brigade to ford the river near its mouth. The advance of the 1st batt., 13th regt., under Major Snodgrass, over the open beach, and across the river; and of a detachment of the 24th regt., under Lieut. Colonel MacBean, in support, was made in the handsomest style, under a very severe fire of grape. Major Snodgrass attacked, and finally carried, the small breach on the right of the great one, and Lieut. Colonel MacBean's detachment occupied the right of the great breach. I ought not to omit to mention, that a similar offer was made by the 1st Portuguese regt. of Brig. General Wilson's brigade, under Lieut. Colonel Fearon; and that both Major General Bradford, and Brig. General Wilson, had, from the beginning, urged most anxiously the employment of their respective brigades in the attack, as they had had so large a share in the labor and fatigues of the right attack.

Observing now the effect of the admirable fire of the batteries against the curtain, though the enemy was so much covered, a great effort was ordered to be made to gain the high ridge at all hazards, at the same time that an attempt should be made to storm the hornwork.

It fell to the lot of the 2nd brigade of the 5th division, under the command of Colonel the Hon. C. Greville, to move out of the trenches for this purpose, and the 3rd battalion of the Royal Scots, under Lieut. Colonel Barns, supported by the 38th, under Lieut. Colonel Miles, fortunately arrived to assault the breach of the curtain about the time when an explosion on the rampart of the curtain, (occasioned by the fire of the artillery) created some confusion among the enemy. The narrow pass was gained, and was maintained, after a severe conflict, and the troops on the right of the breach having about this time succeeded in forcing the barricades on the top of the narrow line wall, found their way into the houses that joined it. Thus, after an assault which lasted above 2 hours, under the most trying circumstances, a firm footing was obtained.

It was impossible to restrain the impetuosity of the troops, and in an hour more the enemy were driven from all the complication of defences prepared in the streets, suffering a severe loss on their retreat to the castle, and leaving the whole town in our possession.

Though it must be evident to your Lordship that the troops were all animated with the most enthusiastic and devoted gallantry, and that all are entitled to the highest commendation, yet, I am sure, your Lordship will wish to be informed

more particularly concerning those, who from their situations, had opportunities of gaining peculiar distinction; and, as the distance I was at myself does not enable me to perform this act of justice from personal observation, I have taken every pains to collect information from the superior officers. Lieut. General Sir J. Leith justified, in the fullest manner, the confidence reposed in his tried judgment and distinguished gallantry, conducting and directing the attack, till obliged to be reluctantly carried off, after receiving a most severe contusion on the breast, and having his left arm broken.

Major General Hay succeeded to the command, and ably conducted the attack to the last. Lieut. General Sir J. Leith expresses his great obligations to Major Generals Hay and Robinson (the latter was obliged to leave the field from a severe wound in the face), and to Lieut. Colonels Berkeley and Gomm, Assistant Adjutant General, and Assistant Quarter Master General of the 5th division, for their zealous services, during this arduous contest. He warmly recommends to your Lordship's notice his aide de camp, Captain Belches, of the 59th foot; and, in conjunction with Major General Hay, he bears testimony to the highly meritorious conduct of Captain J. Stewart, of the 3rd batt. Royal Scots, aide de camp to Major General Hay; and he recommends to your Lordship's notice Major General Robinson's aide de camp, Captain Wood, 4th foot, as also Captains Williamson and Jones of that regiment; the former was severely wounded in the command of the 4th, following the forlorn hope in the best style, and remaining long after his wound. Captain Jones succeeded to the command of the brigade, and conducted it with great ability.

Sir J. Leith likewise particularises Captain Taylor, 48th regt., Brigade Major to the 1st brigade, and Lieut. Le Blanc, of the 4th foot, who led the light infantry company of the regiment, immediately after the forlorn hope, and is the only surviving officer of the advance.

Major General Robinson unites his testimony of praise of Captains Williamson and Jones, and Lieut. Le Blanc, above mentioned. He likewise commends highly Captain Livesay, who succeeded to the command of the 47th foot, on Major Kelly being killed, and kept it till wounded, when the command devolved on Lieut. Power, who ably performed the duty, as also Captain Pilkington, who succeeded to the command of the 59th on Captain Scott being killed, and retained it till wounded, when the command of that battalion fell to Captain Halford, who led it with great credit, and also Brevet Major Anwyll, Brigade Major of the 2nd brigade.

Major General Hay having now the command of the 5th division, mentions in terms of great praise the excellent conduct of Major General Spry, commanding the Portuguese brigade, and the very distinguished gallantry of Colonel de Rego, and the 15th Portuguese regt., under his command, and of Colonel M'Crae, with the 3rd Portuguese regt.; and Major General Spry mentions in terms of high praise, Lieut. Colonel Hill, commanding the 8th caçadores, and Major C. Stewart Campbell, commanding the 3rd Portuguese regiment in Colonel M'Crae's absence on general duty; and he expresses his great obligations to Captain Brackenbury, of the 61st regt., his aide de camp, and to Brigade Major Fitzgerald. Major General Hay speaks most highly of the services of Colonel, the Hon. C. Greville, of the 38th, in command of the 2nd brigade, and of the conspicuous gallantry of Lieut. Colonel Barns, in the successful assault of the curtain, with the brave battalion of the Royal Scots, and also of the exemplary conduct of Lieut. Colonel Cameron, of the 9th foot, and Lieut. Colonels Miles and Dean, of the 38th, and all the officers and troops engaged; and he expresses himself as most particularly indebted to the zeal, intelligence, and intrepidity of Brigade Major Taylor, and Captain Stewart, of the Royal Scots, acting as his aide de camp, formerly mentioned.

Major General Hay likewise expresses his great satisfaction with the gallant and judicious conduct of Lieut. Colonel Cooke, commanding the detachment of



Guards; of Lieut. Colonel Hunt, commanding the detachment of the Light division, who was severely wounded; and of all the other officers and troops of the detachments.

Major General Hay conducted the division along the ramparts himself, with the judgment and gallantry that has so often marked his conduct.

I have now only to repeat the expressions of my highest satisfaction with the conduct of the officers of the Royal Artillery and Engineers, as formerly particularised in the report of the first attack. Every branch of the Artillery service has been conducted by Colonel Dickson with the greatest ability, as was that of the Engineer department by Lieut. Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, until the moment of his much lamented fall at the mouth of the trenches. Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne succeeded to the command, and is anxious that I should convey to your Lordship Sir R. Fletcher's sense of the great merit and gallantry of Captain Henderson, in the attack of the island, on the morning of the 27th ult.; and of the persevering exertions of Majors Ellicombe and Smith, in pushing forward the operations of the two attacks; the latter officer having had the merit of the first arrangements for the attack on the right.

Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne was himself wounded, and only quitted the field from loss of blood; but I am happy to say he is able to carry on the duty of the department.

The conduct of the Navy has been continued on the same principle of zealous co-operation by Sir G. Collier; and the services of Lieut. O'Reilly, with the seamen employed in the batteries, have been equally conspicuous as before.

Your Lordship will now permit me to call your attention to the conduct of that distinguished officer, Major General Oswald, who has had the temporary command of the 5th division in Lieut. General Sir J. Leith's absence, during the whole of the campaign, and who resigned the command of the division on Sir J. Leith's arrival on the 30th ult.

Having carried on with indefatigable attention all the laborious duties of the left attack, no person was more able to give Sir J. Leith the best information and assistance. This, Sir J. Leith acknowledges he did with a liberality and zeal for the service in the highest degree praiseworthy, and he continued his valuable services to the last, by acting as a volunteer, and accompanying Lieut. General Sir J. Leith to the trenches on the occasion of the assault. I have infinite satisfaction in assuring your Lordship of my perfect approbation of Major General Oswald's conduct, ever since the 5th division formed a part of the left column of the army.

I beg to assure your Lordship that Colonel de Lancy, Deputy Quarter Master General, and Lieut. Colonel Bouverie, Assistant Adjutant General, attached to the left column, have continued to render me the most valuable assistance, and that the zeal of Captain Calvert, of the 29th regt., my first aide de camp, as well as that of the rest of the officers of my personal Staff, entitle them all to my warmest and perfect approbation.

Your Lordship has, with an attention extremely grateful to me, permitted me to name an officer to be the bearer of your Lordship's dispatches home; and I beg to recommend for that commission Major Hare, of the 12th foot, a gallant soldier of fortune, who has on many former occasions served on my Staff, and is now attached to it as Assistant Adjutant General.

I have the honor to be, &c.

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S. No return of artillery and stores has yet been sent in, and I fear the returns of the severe losses of the troops may not be quite correct.

I have omitted to mention the gallant conduct of Lieut. Gethin, 11th regt., acting Engineer, who conducted a Portuguese column to the attack, and took the enemy's colors from the cavalier.

825.

To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 3rd Sept. 1813.

'In these moonlight nights, particularly, there is nothing to prevent horsemen from going at all hours of the night; and any man on horseback can come from Oyarzun here in 3 hours, without fatiguing his horse. Footmen could not do it in twice the time. But the truth is, that our officers do not take care to make the dragoon understand clearly where he is going, and the importance that he should arrive to his time, before he sets out; and I have never yet seen communications by letter parties, upon which any reliance whatever could be placed, for that reason only. If the dragoon, instead of having a letter simply given into his hand, received detailed directions where to go, from the Staff Officer, and was told the time it was expected he should be on the road, and the arrival was noted, and any irregularity in the time was strictly inquired into, this duty would be done like every other.'

826.

To Lieut. General Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

'I have received your letter of the 27th. My letter of the 9th would have explained to your Lordship, I hoped, the reason for which I thought it expedient not to ask that the system established for the government of the provinces, and for obtaining supplies for the several armies, should be altered in the manner appearing to you to be best. I can only assure you, that I have no prejudice in favor of this or any other system, and that I have acted according to the best of my judgment.

You may depend upon it, also, that all the Spanish armies are equally *hors de combat* in point of supplies, pay, &c. &c., and that they always have been so. Just to show you how these things are here, I enclose an extract and copy of two letters I recently wrote to the Minister at War, and the copy of one to General Freyre, who commands the 4th Spanish army. But you will say, if things are so bad, why not alter them? I answer, because I know they would be worse.

There is no man better aware than I am of the state of every officer's reputation who has to command troops with such miserable means of support as these have; particularly in these days in which such extravagant expectations are excited by that excessively wise and useful class of people, the editors of newspapers. If I had been at any time capable of doing what these gentlemen expected, I should now, I believe, have been in the moon.

They have long ago expected me at Bordeaux; nay, I understand that there are many of their wise readers (amateurs of the military art) who are waiting to join the army till head quarters shall arrive in that city; and when they shall hear of the late Spanish battle, I conclude that they will defer their voyage till I shall arrive at Paris. But you may depend upon this; first, that I shall neither myself form, nor encourage in others, extravagant expectations; secondly, that you shall have my full support in any measure that you think proper to adopt under your instructions; and thirdly, that if you do your own duty (as I am sure you will) according to the best of your judg-



ment, and satisfy yourself, you will satisfy your employers, and eventually the British public.

I earnestly recommend to you, however, to be most scrupulous in the observance of the article of my instructions of the 14th April, in regard to the commands of the several officers. The Spaniards are excessively jealous upon this subject, more particularly so with us; as in every instance in which I have detached British troops to be under the command of Spanish officers, such as to Cadiz and Carthagena, and Tarifa, and with Ballesteros, I have insisted upon the same condition. I can only tell you, that for many years before I commanded the Spanish army, I have acted in co-operation with the Spanish Generals, and I have always found them ready to act in every respect as I wished, as much so as I have since I have commanded their army; but I have invariably attended to and respected the order and subordination of their army.

I mention this subject again, because General Copons has sent me his correspondence with you, which renders it quite clear to me, that the difficulties you have met with in your transactions with him are to be attributed to his jealousy of your communications with Baron de Eroles and Manso; and you may depend upon it, that you will derive equal advantage from the service of both by directing them in the regular manner through their chief.

You will have heard probably before you will receive this, that the armistice was *denounced* on the 10th August; and hostilities were consequently to re-commence the 16th; the Austrians taking part with the other allies.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have heard so many debates, that I never read one; more especially as I know, that unless a gentleman takes the trouble of writing his speech, the report of it in the newspapers is not very accurate.'

827.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

'I recommend to the British Government then, as I recently recommended to my brother, to take no part either for or against the Princess of Brazil; to discountenance by every means in their power the democratical principles and measures of the Cortes; and if their opinion be asked regarding the formation of a Regency, to recommend; first, the establishment of a system which is to give some authority to the executive Government, whether in the hands of a Regent or of a King, by the alteration of those parts of the Constitution which have lodged all power in the Cortes; and next, the selection of that person of the Royal family to fill the office of Regent, who should unite the strongest claim from birth with the best capacity; and if one cannot be found with sufficient capacity, then that Spaniard who should be deemed most deserving the situation.

Our character is involved in a greater degree than we are aware of in the democratical transactions of the Cortes, in the opinion of all moderate, well thinking Spaniards, and, I am afraid, with the rest of Europe; and if the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads from shoulders, as the newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the Assembly seize upon landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more than discountenance them.

The question is, how we shall discountenance them. It is not easy, possibly, for the persons composing the King's Government to do so in public; and you may depend upon it that no public remonstrance uncalled for, upon that or any other subject, will ever have the smallest effect upon the Spanish Government. But something may be done to save our character at least by the British Embassy at Cadiz, and by the British subjects in Spain in general, to bring democracy into discredit; and by taking every opportunity to point out to the Spanish nation the inconvenience and danger of the principle on which the Government are acting; and by encouragement and countenance to the opposite party.

You have seen lately how the *Liberales* defeated the measure of removing the Government from Cadiz. They defeated the Princess in the same way in the winter; and although she had a majority in the Assembly, not a soul dared to mention her name. They destroyed the Duque del Infantado's Government (supposed, by the bye, to have been established by our influence) in the same way, and the Duque has assured me that they had a majority in the assembly at the time; and they recently defeated, in the same way, Castaños' friends, likewise the majority, who, if they had had any spirit, would have saved him, and would have turned out the Government. But Solano's ghost was staring them in the face, and they were afraid of the mob of Cadiz.

It is quite impossible that such a system can last. What I regret is, that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of Generals who would overturn it. Ballesteros positively intended it; and I am much mistaken if O'Donnell, and even Castaños, and probably others, are not equally ready. If the King should return, he also will overturn the whole fabric, if he has any spirit; but things have gone so far, and the gentlemen at Cadiz are so completely masters of their trade of managing that assembly, that I am afraid there must be another convulsion: and I earnestly recommend to the British Government to keep themselves clear of the democracy, and to interfere in nothing while the government is in their hands, excepting in carrying on the war, and keeping out the foreign enemy.

I wish you would let me know, whether, if I should find a fair opportunity of striking at the democracy, the Government would approve of my doing it.

I sent you some time ago a letter which I had received from La Vega. I now send you the copy of that which I wrote to him, which contains my opinion of the state of the Spanish Government, and what it ought to be; and I recommend to the British Government, if they interfere at all, to recommend something of the same kind.'

G. O.

Losaca, 7th Sept. 1813.

'2. The balances due to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers on the face of their several accounts, closed to the 24th March, are to be paid to them according to the mode pointed out in the General Orders of the 3rd Aug. 1813, that is to say, the sum due to each man is to be divided by 30, and the soldiers are to receive on every day the thirtieth.

3. It is to be understood that the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Life Guards, Horse Guards, the Dragoons, Artillery, and Foot Guards, are to receive the full amount of their daily subsistence as fixed by the regulations, if the balances due should be sufficient to cover the daily issue to that amount for the month.'



828.

To \_\_\_\_\_.

Lesaca, 10th Sept. 1813.

' I received last night your letters of the 22nd July and 9th September, and I acknowledge that I wish you had followed the advice of \_\_\_\_\_, and had omitted to send me either; and I will detain both till I shall have received your answer upon what I am now about to state to you.

I have never interfered directly to procure for any officer, serving under my command, those marks of His Majesty's favor by which many have been honored; nor do I believe that any have ever applied for them, or have hinted through any other quarter, their desire to obtain them. They have been conferred, as far as I have any knowledge, spontaneously, in the only mode, in my opinion, in which favors can be acceptable, or honors and distinction can be received with satisfaction. The only share which I have had in these transactions has been by bringing the merits and services of the several officers of the army distinctly under the view of the Sovereign and the public, in my reports to the Secretary of State; and I am happy to state, that no General in this army has more frequently than yourself deserved and obtained this favorable report of your services and conduct.

It is impossible for me even to guess what are the shades of distinction by which those are guided who advise the Prince Regent in the bestowing those honorable marks of distinction, and you will not expect that I should enter upon such a discussion. What I would recommend to you is, to express neither disappointment nor wishes upon the subject, even to an intimate friend, much less to the Government. Continue, as you have done hitherto, to deserve the honorable distinction to which you aspire, and you may be certain that if the Government is wise, you will obtain it. If you should not obtain it, you may depend upon it that there is no person of whose good opinion you would be solicitous, who will think the worse of you on that account.

The comparison between myself, who have been the most favored of His Majesty's subjects, and you, will not be deemed quite correct; and I advert to my own situation only to tell you, that I recommend to you conduct which I have always followed. Notwithstanding the numerous favors that I have received from the Crown, I have never solicited one; and I have never hinted, nor would any one of my friends or relations venture to hint for me, a desire to receive even one; and much as I have been favored, the consciousness that it has been spontaneously by the King and Regent, gives me more satisfaction than any thing else.

I recommend to you the same conduct, and patience; and, above all, resignation, if, after all, you should not succeed in acquiring what you wish; and I-beg you to recall your letters, which you may be certain will be of no use to you.'

829.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 10th Sept. 1813.

' I beg leave again to draw your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, and of the General Officers and troops under

his command in the arduous undertaking of which I am now reporting the successful close.

Under the *Ordonnance* recently issued by the French Government, the difficulties of the operations of a siege, and the length of time it must take, are greatly increased; and they can be brought to a conclusion only by the storm of the breach of the body of the place. The merit of success, therefore, is proportionally increased; and if that time is subtracted from the duration of the operations against San Sebastian, during which the besiegers waited for ammunition, viz., from the 25th July to the 26th August, it will be found that the operations did not last longer than has been usually required for a place which possessed 3 lines of defence, including the convent of San Bartolomeo.'

## 830.

To Major General the Hon. E. Stopford.

Lesaca, 20th Sept. 1813.

'I cannot but consider the transaction which has been the subject of this Court Martial to be simply a private quarrel, which has as little connexion with the public service, and with the discipline and subordination of the army, as any that has ever come under my notice.

It is certainly true, that private quarrels between officers are proper subjects for the investigation of a Court Martial; but the complainant, in order to obtain a decision in his favor, must come with a fair case; he must not himself have been guilty of a breach of the General Orders of the army, and of discipline; and his authority as a superior officer must not have been exerted against his inferior, against whom he complains, in order to enjoy the advantage of this improper conduct; and above all, he must have refrained from the use of abusive and improper language and gestures.'

## 831.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 24th Sept. 1813.

'I am not very capable of giving you an opinion on the subject of your letter of the 11th, having never had under my command more than one regiment of English militia. I found that, however, to be so entirely divested

G. O.

Lesaca, 16th Sept. 1813.

'2. General Officers commanding brigades must not give leave of absence to any officer or soldier to be sent from his corps or station for more than one night; General Officers commanding divisions must not give leave of absence for a greater length of time than 8 days.'

G. O.

Lesaca, 17th Sept. 1813.

'3. The Commander of the Forces cannot avoid observing, upon the perusal of the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial of Lieut. and Adjutant —, that Captain — having been present on the parade on the night of the 4th Aug. when the transactions occurred, which form the subject of the 2nd charge against Lieut. and Adjutant —, ought to have interfered, as a superior officer of the regiment, to protect Lieut. and Adjutant — in the performance of his duty as adjutant, as prescribed by the regulations of His Majesty's service, and the standing orders of the regiment; and that it must be understood in the 1st Life Guards, as well as in the army in general, that the possession of rank in the service is attended by the necessity for the performance of duty, and for attention to the maintenance of good order and discipline; and that it is not in the power of an officer to lay aside or assume his rank in the service at his pleasure, but most particularly not, when he is on a parade on which troops are formed for duty.'



of interior economy, and real discipline and subordination, that, however well the soldiers may be disciplined, as far as regards their exercise and movements, I should very much doubt that a large militia army would be very useful in the field, for more than a momentary exertion. My notion of them is, that the officers have all the faults of those of the line to an aggravated degree, and some peculiarly their own.'

## 832.

To His Excellency the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 26th Sept. 1813.

'I acknowledge that what I have above recommended is not exactly what I could wish; but it is the best remedy that I can devise for an evil which existed before I took the command of the army, which is one of those which grew out of the state of affairs in Spain during the last 5 years, and for which it is necessary to be satisfied with remedies which, under other circumstances, would, with truth, be considered very inadequate.'

## 833.

To Captain Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 3rd Oct. 1813.

'It is very desirable that the officer who goes in command of a *cartel* should be very cautious in his communications with the enemy, and should confine himself strictly to the objects for which he is sent.'

## 834.

To Major General Barnes.

Lesaca, 6th Oct. 1813.

'In a late instance the Adjutant of the 15th Portuguese regt. was killed by some British soldiers for attempting to restrain them from plundering San Sebastian; and in another recent instance some of the soldiers of the infantry fired upon an officer and party of the 14th dragoons, endeavoring

G. O.

Lesaca, 4th Oct. 1813.

3. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have observed the number of soldiers who have lately attempted to desert to the enemy, which he cannot but attribute to the arts and misrepresentations of the enemy to induce them to quit their colors.

4. An extract of the Order of the 10th Nov. 1810 is to be published again, and read with this Order, at the head of every regiment, at 3 different parades, and the description roll therein called for of all deserters may be forthwith sent to the Adjutant General's Office.

5. It is impossible that the soldiers of the army can have forgotten the miserable state in which those of their comrades, who had before been guilty of the crime of deserting to the enemies of their country, have been found by them when they have fallen into their hands again.

6. It is well known, that nobody can trust men guilty of so base a crime; and, notwithstanding the enemy's promises, those who have been guilty of it are employed only in services of the lowest and most laborious description, they are despised and shunned by all, even by those who profit by their crime, and that the soldiers who are prisoners of war will hold no communication with them.

7. It is known to the Commander of the Forces that some soldiers, who, in an unguarded moment, have been induced to quit their colors, have found themselves in so miserable and degraded a state as to be desirous of being considered prisoners of war, and have preferred to remain in it to incur the risk of the punishment which awaits them, if ever they should come under the power of any British authority.

8. The Commander of the Forces hopes that this warning will prevent the commission of a crime become but too common, and which till late was unknown in the British army.'

to get them out of a wine house, when the troops were retiring from Roncesvalles. They succeeded in beating off the dragoons, and were afterwards taken by the enemy. If this is to go on, if a soldier is to be allowed any excuse for raising his hand against his officer, or non-commissioned officer, in the execution of his duty, that duty becomes impracticable, there is an end to all subordination, and indeed to the military profession, among us who allow of such conduct.

I wish the Court would consider this; and would observe that they are not punishing the individual, but in him the crime of which he has been guilty, which is one absolutely fatal to the military profession, and but too common in this army; and moreover, that it can be got the better of only by the certainty and terror of the punishment.

What is most extraordinary in this case is, that the serjeant does not deny that he struck the officer, for which no provocation can be deemed a justification.'

## 835.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Hope, K.B.

Lesaca, 8th Oct. 1813.

'I do not think you could push your posts farther forward along the ridge on the high road, without advancing your line, or a part of it, which would be found disadvantageous in case the enemy should attack your position. Indeed your posts are now fully as forward as they ought to be; and, considering that two great roads pass on the two flanks of the ground on which I stood yesterday, a post there ought probably to be supported by another at the end of the ridge immediately behind it; for you will observe that that ground is separated from the tongue which connects it with the ground on which your line stands.

I entirely concur with Lieut. Colonel Burgoyne in his choice of the spot he proposed for a work in rear of the fort on the left. It would be very desirable if cover was thrown up for the guns at any places fixed on farther along the line. This precaution will save many men in case you should be attacked; and this cover may be hereafter turned to any thing you please.

I have sad accounts of the plunder of the soldiers yesterday, and I propose again to call the attention of the officers to the subject. I saw yesterday many men coming in from Olague, drunk, and loaded with plunder; and it cannot be prevented, unless the General and other officers exert themselves. If we were five times stronger than we are, we could not venture to enter France, if we cannot prevent our soldiers from plundering.'

G. O.

Lesaca, 8th Oct. 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be under the necessity of publishing over again his Orders of the 9th July last [see page 710], as they have been unattended to by the officers and troops which entered France yesterday.

2. According to all the information which the Commander of the Forces has received, outrages of all descriptions were committed by the troops in presence even of their officers, who took no pains whatever to prevent them.

3. The Commander of the Forces has already determined that some officers, so grossly negligent of their duty, shall be sent to England, that their names may be brought under the attention of the Prince Regent, and that His Royal Highness may give such directions respecting them as he may think proper, as the Commander of the Forces is determined not to command officers who will not obey his orders.'



836.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 9th Oct. 1813.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from the Minister at War, of the 28th September, in which he has enclosed the copy of one of the 5th September from the Conde de Villa Fuentes, the *Xefe Politico* of the province of Guipuzcoa, complaining of the conduct of the allied British and Portuguese army in the storm of the town of San Sebastian; and, as I received at the same time the enclosed newspaper,\* which contains the same charges against that army in a more amplified style, and both appear to proceed from the same authority, I shall proceed to reply to both complaints; and I trouble your Excellency on this subject, as it is one upon which your Excellency will recollect that I have orders to correspond with His Majesty’s Minister alone.

I should have wished to adopt another mode of justifying the officers concerned on this occasion; but as there is no redress by the law for a libel, I must be satisfied with that which is in my hands.

I shall begin with that charge which the enclosed newspaper contains, and which is not made in direct terms in the letter from the *Xefe Politico*, though it is directly charged against Lieut. General Sir T. Graham that he intended to burn the town; viz., that the town of San Sebastian was thus ill treated, because its former trade had been exclusively with the French nation, and to the disadvantage of Great Britain.

This charge cannot be intended to apply to the common soldiers, who cannot be supposed to know, or to reflect, much upon what passed before they attacked the place. This infamous charge applies exclusively to the principal officers, who, from motives, not of commercial policy, but of commercial revenge, are supposed so far to have forgotten their duty as to have ordered or suffered the sack of this unfortunate town, and thus to have risked the loss of all they had acquired by their labors and their gallantry; and you will more readily conceive, than I can venture to describe, the feelings of indignation with which I proceed to justify the General and other officers of this army from a charge officially made by a person in a high office, that they designed to plunder and burn the town of San Sebastian.

I need not assure you that this charge is most positively untrue. Every thing was done that was in my power to suggest to save the town. Several persons urged me, in the strongest manner, to allow it to be bombarded, as the most certain mode of forcing the enemy to give it up. This I positively would not allow, for the same reasons as I did not allow Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz be bombarded; and yet if I had harbored so infamous a wish as to destroy this town from motives of commercial revenge, or any other, I could not have adopted a more certain method than to allow it to be bombarded.

Neither is it true that the town was set on fire by the English and Portuguese troops. To set fire to the town was part of the enemy’s defence. It was set on fire by the enemy on the 22nd July, before the final attempt was made to take it by storm; and it is a fact that the fire was so violent on the

\* The *Duende*. Published also in the ‘*Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de la Revolution d’Espagne, par Nellerto*’ (*Llorente*), which is referred to by the Abbé de Montgaillard in his ‘*Histoire de France*,’ as authority on this subject.

24th July, that the storm, which was to have taken place on that day, was necessarily deferred till the 25th, and, as it is well known, failed.

I was at the siege of San Sebastian on the 30th August, and I aver that the town was then on fire. It must have been set on fire by the enemy, as I repeat that our batteries, by positive order, threw no shells into the town; and I saw the town on fire on the morning of the 31st August before the storm took place.

It is well known that the enemy had prepared for a serious resistance, not only on the ramparts, but in the streets of the town; that traverses were established in the streets, formed of combustibles, with the intention of setting fire to and exploding them during the contest with the assailants. It is equally known that there was a most severe contest in the streets of the town between the assailants and the garrison; that many of these traverses were exploded, by which many lives on both sides were lost; and it is a fact that these explosions set fire to many of the houses.

The *Xefe Politico*, the author of these complaints, must have been as well aware of these facts as I am; and he ought not to have concealed them. In truth, the fire in the town was the greatest evil that could befall the assailants, who did every thing in their power to get the better of it; and it is a fact that, owing to the difficulty and danger of communicating, through the fire, with the advanced posts in the town, it had very nearly become necessary at one time to withdraw those posts entirely.

In regard to the plunder of the town by the soldiers, I am the last man who will deny it, because I know that it is true. It has fallen to my lot to take many towns by storm; and I am concerned to add that I never saw or heard of one so taken, by any troops, that it was not plundered. It is one of the evil consequences attending the necessity of storming a town, which every officer laments, not only on account of the evil thereby inflicted on the unfortunate inhabitants, but on account of the injury it does to discipline, and the risk which is incurred of the loss of all the advantages of victory, at the very moment they are gained.

It is hard that I and my General Officers are to be so treated, as we have been, by the *Xefe Politico*, and unrestrained libellers, because an unavoidable evil has occurred in the accomplishment of a great service, and in the acquirement of a great advantage. The fault does not lie with us; it is with those who lost the fort, and obliged us at great risk and loss to regain it for the Spanish nation by storm.

Notwithstanding that I am convinced it is impossible to prevent a town in such a situation from being plundered, I can prove that upon this occasion particular pains were taken to prevent it. I gave most positive orders upon the subject, and desired that the officers might be warned of the peculiar situation of the place, the garrison having the castle to retire to, and of the danger that they would attempt to re-take the town, if they found the assailants were engaged in plunder.

If it had not been for the fire, which certainly augmented the confusion, and afforded greater facilities for irregularity; and if by far the greatest proportion of the officers and non-commissioned officers, particularly of the principal officers who stormed the breach, had not been killed or wounded in the performance of their duty in the service of Spain, to the number of



170 out of about 250, I believe that the plunder would have been in a great measure, though not entirely, prevented.

Indeed, one of the subjects of complaint, that sentries were placed on every house, shows the desire at least, of the officers, to preserve order. These sentries must have been placed by order; and unless it is supposed, as charged, that the officers intended that the town should be plundered and burned, and placed the sentries to secure that object, it must be admitted that their intention in placing these sentries was good.

It likewise most unfortunately happened that it was impossible to relieve the troops which stormed the town till the 2nd instant, instead of immediately after the town was in our possession. Those who make these complaints forget that on the 31st August, the day this town was stormed, the whole of the left of the army was attacked by the enemy.

I do not believe that I should have been congratulated and thanked for having successfully done my duty on that occasion, if I had either risked the blockade of Pamplona, or the loss of the battle fought on the 31st August, by keeping at San Sebastian troops to relieve those which had stormed, in order that the inhabitants of San Sebastian might suffer rather less by their irregularities. In fact, it was not possible to allot troops to relieve them till the 2nd; at which time I assert that all irregularity had ceased, as I was at San Sebastian on that day.

In regard to the injuries done to the inhabitants by the soldiers with their fire arms and bayonets, in return for their applause and congratulations, it appears to me extraordinary that it did not occur to the complainants that these injuries, if they were really done, were done by accident, during the contest in the streets with the enemy, and not by design.

In regard to the charge of kindness to the enemy, I am afraid it is but too well founded; and that till it is positively ordered by authority, in return for the *Ordonnance* of the French Government, adverted to in my dispatch of the 10th September,\* that all enemy's troops in a place taken by storm shall be put to death, it will be difficult to prevail upon British officers and soldiers to treat an enemy, when their prisoners, otherwise than well.

I wish that the *Xefe Politico* had not made the charge against so respectable a character as Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, that he omitted to apply for his assistance to extinguish the fire in the town till it was entirely destroyed, leaving the inference to be drawn that he therefore wished that the town should be destroyed; as it would have saved me the pain of observing, that the total neglect of the Spanish authorities to furnish any assistance whatever that was required from them, to carry on the operations against San Sebastian, did not encourage Sir Thomas to apply for the assistance of the *Xefe Politico* in any shape. In fact, every thing was done that could be done to extinguish the fire by our own soldiers; and I believe that the truth is, that the assistance was asked by me, not only to endeavor to extinguish the fire, but to bury the dead bodies lying about the town and ramparts; and it was not made sooner, because the want of it was not felt at an earlier period.

I certainly lament, as much as any man can, the evils sustained by this unfortunate town, and those who have reason to complain of their fate, and

\* See 829.

deserve the relief of Government; but a person in the situation of a *Xefe Politico* should take care, in forwarding these complaints, not to attack the characters of honorable and brave men, who are as incapable of entertaining a design to injure the peaceable inhabitants of any town, as they are of allowing their conduct to be influenced by the infamous motives attributed to them in the enclosed libel.

I hear frequently of the union of the two nations; but I am quite certain that nothing is so little likely to promote that union as the encouragement given to such unfounded charges, and the allowing such infamous libels to pass unpunished.

I have only to add, to what I have already stated in this letter, in answer to the Minister at War's inquiries regarding the punishment of the offenders on this occasion, that several soldiers were punished. How many, it is not in my power at present to state.'

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837.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 9th Oct. 1813.

'Having deemed it expedient to cross the Bidasoa with the left of the army, I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that that object was effected on the 7th instant.

Lieut. General Sir T. Graham directed the 1st and 5th divisions, and the 1st Portuguese brigade under Brig. General Wilson, to cross that river in 3 columns below, and in one above, the site of the bridge, under the command of Major General Hay, Colonel the Hon. C. Greville, Major General the Hon. E. Stopford, and Major General Howard; and Lieut. General Don M. Freyre directed that part of the 4th Spanish army, under his immediate command, to cross in 3 columns at fords above those at which the allied British and Portuguese troops passed. The former were destined to carry the enemy's entrenchments about and above Andaye; while the latter should carry those on the Montagne Verte, and on the height of Mandale, by which they were to turn the enemy's left.

The operations of both bodies of troops succeeded in every point; the British and Portuguese troops took 7 pieces of cannon in the redoubts and batteries which they carried, and the Spanish troops one piece of cannon in those carried by them.

I had particular satisfaction in observing the steadiness and gallantry of all the troops. The 9th British regt. were very strongly opposed, charged with bayonets more than once, and have suffered; but I am happy to add, that in other parts of these corps our loss has not been severe. The Spanish troops, under Lieut. General Don M. Freyre, behaved admirably, and turned and carried the enemy's entrenchments in the hills with great dexterity and gallantry; and I am much indebted to the Lieut. General, and to Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, and to the General and Staff Officers of both corps, for the execution of the arrangements for this operation.

Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, having thus established within the French territory the troops of the allied British and Portuguese army, which had been so frequently distinguished under his command, resigned the command to Lieut. General Sir J. Hope, who had arrived from Ireland on the preceding day.



While this was going on upon the left, Major General C. Baron Alten attacked, with the Light division, the enemy's entrenchments in the Puerto de Vera, supported by the Spanish division under Brigadier Longa; and the Mariscal de Campo, Don. P. A. Giron, attacked the enemy's entrenchments and posts on the mountain called Le Rhune, immediately on the right of the Light division, with the army of reserve of Andalusia.

Colonel Colborne, of the 52nd regt., who commanded Major General Skerrett's brigade in the absence of the Major General on account of his health, attacked the enemy's right, in a camp which they had strongly entrenched. The 52nd regt., under the command of Major Mein, charged, in a most gallant style, and carried the entrenchment with the bayonet. The 1st and 3rd caçadores, and the 2nd batt. 95th regt., as well as the 52nd regt., distinguished themselves in this attack. Major General Kempt's brigade attacked by the Puerto, where the opposition was not so severe; and Major General C. Alten has reported his sense of the judgment displayed both by the Major General and by Colonel Colborne in these attacks.

The Light division took 22 officers, and 400 prisoners, and 3 pieces of cannon; and I am particularly indebted to Major General C. Baron Alten for the manner in which he executed this service.

On the right, the troops of the Army of Reserve of Andalusia, under the command of Don P. A. Giron, attacked the enemy's posts and entrenchments on the mountain of La Rhune in 2 columns, under the command of Spaniards only.

These troops carried every thing before them in the most gallant style, till they arrived at the foot of the rock on which the hermitage stands; and they made repeated attempts to take even that post by storm; but it was impossible to get up; and the enemy remained during the night in possession of the hermitage, and on a rock on the same range of the mountain with the right of the Spanish troops. Some time elapsed yesterday morning before the fog cleared away sufficiently to enable me to reconnoitre the mountain, which I found to be least inaccessible by its right, and that the attack of it might be connected with advantage with the attack of the enemy's works in front of the camp of Sarre. I accordingly ordered the army of reserve to concentrate to their right, and as soon as the concentration commenced, Mariscal de Campo, Don P. A. Giron, ordered the battalion *de Las Ordenes* to attack the enemy's post on the rock, on the right of the position occupied by his troops, which was instantly carried in the most gallant style. These troops followed up their success, and carried an entrenchment on a hill, which protected the right of the camp of Sarre; and the enemy immediately evacuated all their works to defend the approaches to the camp, which were taken possession of by detachments from the 7th division, sent by Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie through the Puerto de Echalar for this purpose. Don P. A. Giron then established the battalion of *Las Ordenes* on the enemy's left, on the rock of the hermitage. It was too late to proceed farther last night; and the enemy withdrew from their post at the hermitage, and from the camp of Sarre, during the night.

It gives me singular satisfaction to report the good conduct of the officers and troops of the Army of Reserve of Andalusia, as well in the operations of the 7th instant, as in those of yesterday. The attack made by the battalion

of *Les Ordenes*, under the command of Colonel Hore, yesterday, was made in as good order and with as much spirit as any that I have seen made by any troops; and I was much satisfied with the spirit and discipline of the whole of this corps. I cannot applaud too highly the execution of the arrangements for these attacks, by the Mariscal de Campo, Don P. A. Giron, and the General and Staff Officers under his directions.

I omitted to report to your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 4th instant, that when on my way to Roncesvalles, on the 1st instant, I directed Brig. General Campbell to endeavor to carry off the enemy's piquets in his front, which he attacked on that night; and completely succeeded, with the Portuguese troops under his command, in carrying the whole of one piquet, consisting of 70 men. A fortified post, on the mountain of Airola, was likewise stormed, and the whole garrison put to the sword.'

## 838.

To Major General the Hon. C. Colville.

Vera, 10th Oct. 1813.

'I am sorry to be obliged to express my disapprobation of the conduct of an officer of whom I have always entertained a good opinion; but I must say, that it is unworthy of one of his reputation to get his brigade into scrapes, for the sake of the little *gloriole* of driving in a few piquets, knowing, as he must do, that it is not intended he should engage in a serious affair; and that, wherever he becomes engaged with a body of any strength, to retreat with honor is difficult, and without loss is impossible.

I hope that ——— will reflect upon what has passed, and to observe in future that what he can do that is best, is to obey the orders, and execute strictly the designs, of his commander.'

## 839.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Vera, 11th Oct. 1813.

'Our newspapers do us plenty of harm by that which they insert; but I never suspected that they could do us the injury of alienating from us a Government and nation, with which, on every account, we ought to be on the best of terms, by that which they omit. I, who have been in public life in England, know well that there is nothing more different from a debate in Parliament than the representation of that debate in the newspapers. The fault which I find with our newspapers is, that they so seldom state an event or transaction as it really occurred (unless when they absolutely copy what is written for them), and their observations wander so far from the text, even when they have a dispatch or other writing before them, that they appear to be absolutely incapable of understanding, much less of stating, the truth on any subject.

The Portuguese Government and nation, therefore, should be very cautious how they allow themselves to judge of the estimation in which they are held by the Prince Regent and his Ministers, and by the British nation, by the newspaper statements. They may depend upon it that here the Portuguese army and nation are rising in estimation every day, and I recommend to them to despise every insinuation to the contrary.

Dom M. Forjaz is the ablest statesman and man of business that I have



seen in the Peninsula ; but I hope that he will not be induced, by such folly as the contents and omissions of our newspapers, to venture upon the alteration of a system which, up to the present day, has answered admirably, has contributed in a principal degree to our great and astonishing success, and has enabled the Portuguese Government and nation to render such services to the cause, and has raised their reputation to the point at which it now stands.

I have not leisure, nor inclination, now to enter upon all that I have to say upon this subject. I believe, however, that I may claim the credit of understanding something about the organization of an army, at least of that part of it which goes to the subsistence of the troops. If Dom M. Forjaz will give me that credit, you may tell him from me, that, if the Portuguese troops were separated from the British divisions, nay, more, if the British departments did not assist the Portuguese troops, and they were not considered, as they are considered to all intents and purposes, part of ourselves, they could not keep the field in a respectable state, even though the Portuguese Government were to incur ten times the expense they now incur.

Let Dom M. Forjaz bear this in mind ; let him understand that if he has not his troops in the best order, in the best state of equipment, fully found in every thing they want, and managed with intelligence, not only they can acquire no honor in, but cannot come out of the contest without dishonor ; and he will see the necessity of keeping matters as they are.

At all events, let us keep clear of the disputes in which I see that, notwithstanding the temper with which things have been managed in Spain, we are getting more deep daily with the democratic party. All that I can say is, that if we are to begin to disagree about such nonsense as the contents or the omissions of the newspapers, I quit the Peninsula for ever.'

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840.

To Don Miguel de Alava.

Vera, 14th Oct. 1813.

'It is unfortunate, that my time and attention, and yours, should be occupied by such trifles ; and I must say, that it is only lately, and in this part of Spain, that I have met with difficulties in carrying on the service ; which, however trifling each in itself, become, in the aggregate, of a magnitude to be of importance ; and, moreover, their existence manifests a temper in the people, which I have not observed in any other part of Spain.'

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841.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Vera, 16th Oct. 1813.

'There is no end of the calumnies against me and the army, and I should have no time to do any thing else, if I were to begin either to refute or even

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G. O.

Vera, 15th Oct. 1813.

5. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers and commanding officers of regiments will give directions that neither officers nor soldiers may be allowed to pass the advanced piquets either for forage or other purposes.

6. Any non-commissioned officers or soldiers who do pass the advanced posts, and may fall into the enemy's hands, are to be considered as deserters in every respect, will forfeit all back pay, if ever they should be released, and their length of service will not be counted.'

to notice them. Very lately they took the occasion of a libel in an *Irish* newspaper, reporting a supposed conversation between C<sup>à</sup>stañ<sup>o</sup>s and me, (in which I am supposed to have consented to change my religion to become King of Spain, and he to have promised the consent of the *Grandeos*,) to accuse me of this intention; and then those fools the *Duques de* ——— and de \* \* \*, and the *Viscomte de* ———, protest formally that they are not of the number of the *Grandeos* who had given their consent to such an arrangement!!! What can be done with such libels and such people, excepting despise them, and continuing one's road without noticing them?

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It is quite clear to me that if we do not beat down the democracy at Cadiz, the cause is lost: how that is to be done, God knows!'

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842.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Vera, 23rd Oct. 1813.

'In the course of the inquiry upon this subject, a fact has come out, which I acknowledge that I had not heard of before, and as little suspected; but it is sufficiently the cause of the groundless complaints upon this subject, of the aggravation with which they have been brought before the public, and of the channel in which they have been conveyed to the public notice; viz., that the inhabitants of the town of San Sebastian co-operated with the enemy in the defence of the town, and actually fired upon the allies. This appears, not only from the statement of the officers, but is fully corroborated by that of the Chevalier de Songeon, and the officers of the French garrison, who signed the enclosed certificate of his conduct.

It is not astonishing that the inhabitants, *from whom* the town was taken for the nation, should complain of those who took it from them.

The enclosed papers, and my former letter, will fully prove, that, whatever may have been the conduct of the inhabitants of the town, the destruction of it was not to be attributed to the officers and soldiers of the allied army; although it is certain that the soldiers, like other soldiers who storm a town, did plunder it.'

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843.

AUX FRANÇAIS.

Par le Feld Maréchal Marquis de Wellington, Général en Chef des Armées Alliées.

Au Quartier Général, ce 1 Nov. 1813.

'En entrant dans votre pays, je vous annonce que j'ai donné les ordres les plus positifs, dont il y a ci-dessous traduction, pour prévenir les malheurs qui sont ordinairement la suite de l'invasion d'une armée ennemie (invasion

G. O.

Vera, 22nd Oct. 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that attention may be paid to the General Orders of the army regarding the taking of quarters.

2. Houses must not be taken under the authority of individuals, whether for the purposes of hospitals, or for quartering officers or soldiers; in every case in which it is possible, an officer of the Quarter Master General's department must distribute and allot the quarters; and wherever there is a magistrate he must apply to the magistrate, and either obtain billets, or make the allotment in common with him.'



que vous connaissez être la conséquence de celle que votre gouvernement, avait fait de l'Espagne), et des succès des Armées Alliées sous mes ordres.

Vous pouvez être assurés que je mettrai à exécution ces ordres ; et je vous prie de faire arrêter et conduire à mon quartier général tous ceux qui, contre ces provisions, vous font du mal. Mais il faut que vous restiez chez vous, et que vous ne preniez aucune part dans les opérations de la guerre dont votre pays va devenir le théâtre.'

844.

To Earl Bathurst.

Vera, 1st Nov. 1813.

I beg leave once more to impress upon your Lordship the absolute necessity that we should have the maritime communication constant and secure, notwithstanding the inconvenience, the difficulty, and the danger, if it is intended by His Majesty's Government that I should maintain a large army upon this frontier ; and it is obvious, from what I have above stated, that stinted naval means will not answer.'

845.

To the Magistrates of San Sebastian.

Vera, 2nd Nov. 1813.

'The course of the operations of the war rendered necessary the attack of that town, in order to expel the enemy from the Spanish territory ; and it was a subject of the utmost concern to me to see that the enemy wantonly destroyed it.

The infamous libels which have been circulated upon this subject, in which the destruction of the town has been attributed to the troops under my command, *by order of their officers* (notwithstanding that it was in great part burned, and was on fire in 6 places before they entered it by storm), render it a matter of delicacy for me to interfere in any manner in this affair ; and I am very desirous not to be applied to again, and not again to have occasion to write upon it.'

846.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Vera, 8th Nov. 1813.

'I was prejudiced in favor of General ———, and I believe I was the cause of his being employed with the army in this campaign. My opinion of him is very much altered. He possesses no one military quality ; and he has been repeatedly guilty of that worst of all tricks, which invariably defeats its own ends ; viz., courting popularity with the common soldiers, by flattering their vices, and by impunity for their misconduct. Such a man will not do in this army.'

847.

To Earl Bathurst.

St. Pé, 13th Nov. 1813.

'The enemy had since the beginning of August occupied a position with

G. O.

St. Pé, 11th Nov. 1813.

'1. The General Officers and commanding officers of regiments are requested to save the dry forage as much as possible, and to use the green, while the state of the weather may admit the use of it ; they will find the necessity of attending to this caution in the course of the winter, and if it is not attended to, the Commander of the Forces declares his intention not to allow any claims for animals lost for want of food to go before the Board.'

their right upon the sea in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the left of the Nivelle, their centre on La Petite Rhune, and on the heights behind that village; and their left consisting of two divisions of infantry under the Comte d'Erlon on the right of that river, on a strong height in rear of Ainhoüé, and on the mountain of Mondarrain, which protected the approach to that village. They had had one division under General Foy at St. Jean Pied de Port, which was joined by one of the army of Aragon under General Paris, at the time the left of the allied army crossed the Bidasoa. General Foy's division joined those on the heights behind Ainhoüé, when Sir R. Hill moved into the valley of Baztan: The enemy, not satisfied with the natural strength of this position, had the whole of it fortified; and their right in particular had been made so strong that I did not deem it expedient to attack it in front.

Pamplona having surrendered on the 31st October, and the right of the army having been disengaged from covering the blockade of that place, I moved Lieut. General Sir R. Hill on the 6th and 7th into the valley of Baztan, as soon as the state of the roads, after the recent rains, would permit, intending to attack the enemy on the 8th; but the rain which fell on the 7th having again rendered the roads impracticable, I was obliged to defer the attack till the 10th, when we completely succeeded in carrying all the positions on the enemy's left and centre, in separating the former from the latter, and by these means turning the enemy's strong positions occupied by their right on the lower Nivelle, which they were obliged to evacuate during the night; having taken 51 pieces of cannon, and 1400 prisoners.

The object of the attack being to force the enemy's centre, and to establish our army in rear of their right, the attack was made in columns of divisions, each led by the General Officer commanding it, and each forming its own reserve. Lieut. General Sir R. Hill directed the movements of the right, consisting of the 2nd division, under Lieut. General the Hon. Sir W. Stewart; the 6th division, under Lieut. General Sir H. Clinton; a Portuguese division, under Lieut. General Sir J. Hamilton, and a Spanish division, under General Morillo, and Colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry, and a brigade of Portuguese artillery, under Lieut. Colonel Tulloh, and 3 mountain guns under Lieut. Robe, which attacked the positions of the enemy behind Ainhoüé.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford directed the movements of the right of the centre, consisting of the 3rd division, under Major General the Hon. C. Colville, the 7th division, under Mariscal de Campo Le Cor, and the 4th division, under Lieut. General the Hon. Sir L. Cole.

The latter attacked the redoubts in front of Sarre, that village, and the heights behind it, supported on their left by the Army of Reserve of Andalusia, under the command of Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron, which attacked the enemy's positions on the right of Sarre, on the slopes of La Petite Rhune, and the heights behind the village on the left of the 4th division.

Major General C. Baron Alten attacked, with the Light division and General Longa's Spanish division, the enemy's positions on La Petite Rhune; and, having carried them, co-operated with the right of the centre in the attack of the heights behind Sarre.



General V. Alten's brigade of cavalry, under the direction of Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, followed the movements of the centre; and there were 3 brigades of British artillery with this part of the army, and 3 mountain guns with General Giron, and 3 with Major General C. Alten.

Lieut. General Don M. Freyre moved in two columns from the heights of Mandale towards Ascain, in order to take advantage of any movement the enemy might make from the right of their position towards their centre; and Lieut. General Sir J. Hope with the left of the army drove in the enemy's outposts in front of their intrenchments on the lower Nivelle, carried the redoubt above Urrugne, and established himself on the heights immediately opposite Siboure, in readiness to take advantage of any movement made by the enemy's right.

The attack began at daylight; and Lieut. General Sir L. Cole having obliged the enemy to evacuate the redoubt on their right in front of Sarre by a cannonade, and that in front of the left of the village having been likewise evacuated on the approach of the 7th division, under General Le Cor, to attack it. Lieut. General Sir L. Cole attacked and possessed himself of the village, which was turned on its left by the 3rd division, under Major General the Hon. C. Colville; and on its right, by the Reserve of Andalusia, under Don P. A. Giron; and Major General C. Baron Alten carried the positions on La Petite Rhune. The whole then co-operated in the attack of the enemy's main position behind the village. The 3rd and 7th divisions immediately carried the redoubts on the left of the enemy's centre, and the Light division those on the right, while the 4th division, with the Reserve of Andalusia on their left, attacked their positions in their centre. By these attacks the enemy were obliged to abandon their strong positions which they had fortified with much care and labor; and they left in the principal redoubt on the height the 1st batt. 88th regt., which immediately surrendered.

While these operations were going on in the centre, I had the pleasure of seeing the 6th division, under Lieut. General Sir H. Clinton, after having crossed the Nivelle, and having driven in the enemy's piquets on both banks, and having covered the passage of the Portuguese division under Lieut. General Sir J. Hamilton on its right, make a most handsome attack upon the right of the enemy's position behind Ainhoüé, and on the right of the Nivelle, and carry all the intrenchments, and the redoubt on that flank. Lieut. General Sir J. Hamilton supported, with the Portuguese division, the 6th division on its right; and both co-operated in the attack of the second redoubt, which was immediately carried.

Major General Pringle's brigade of the 2nd division, under the command of Lieut. General Sir W. Stewart, drove in the enemy's piquets on the Nivelle and in front of Ainhoüé, and Major General Byng's brigade of the 2nd division carried the intrenchments and a redoubt further on the enemy's left: in which attack, the Major General and these troops distinguished themselves. Major General Morillo covered the advance of the whole to the heights behind Ainhoüé, by attacking the enemy's posts on the slopes of Mondarrain, and following them towards Itsassu. The troops on the heights behind Ainhoüé were, by these operations, under the direction of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, forced to retire towards the bridge of Cambo,

on the Nive, with the exception of the division on Mondarrain, which, by the march of a part of the 2nd division, under Lieut. General Sir W. Stewart, was pushed into the mountains towards Baygorry.

As soon as the heights were carried on both banks of the Nivelle, I directed the 3rd and 7th divisions, being the right of our centre, to move by the left of that river upon St. Pé, and the 6th division by the right of the river on the same place, while the 4th and Light divisions, and General Giron's Reserve, held the heights above Ascain, and covered this movement on that side, and Lieut. General Sir R. Hill covered it on the other. A part of the enemy's troops had retired from their centre, and had crossed the Nivelle at St. Pé; and as soon as the 6th division approached, the 3rd division, under Major General the Hon. C. Colville, and the 7th division, under General Le Cor, crossed that river, and attacked, and immediately gained possession of, the heights beyond it. We were thus established in the rear of the enemy's right; but so much of the day was now spent, that it was impossible to make any further movement; and I was obliged to defer our further operations till the following morning.

The enemy evacuated Ascain in the afternoon, of which village Lieut. General Don M. Freyre took possession, and quitted all their works and positions in front of St. Jean de Luz during the night, and retired upon Bidart, destroying all the bridges on the lower Nivelle. Lieut. General Sir J. Hope followed them with the left of the army as soon as he could cross the river; and Marshal Sir W. Beresford moved the centre of the army as far as the state of the roads, after a violent fall of rain, would allow; and the enemy retired again on the night of the 11th into an intrenched camp in front of Bayonne.

In the course of the operations, of which I have given your Lordship an outline, in which we have driven the enemy from positions which they had been fortifying with great labor for 3 months, in which we have taken 51 pieces of cannon and 6 tumbrils of ammunition, and 1400 prisoners, I have great satisfaction in reporting the good conduct of all the officers and troops. The report itself will show how much reason I had to be satisfied with the conduct of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, and of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, who directed the attacks of the centre and right of the army; and with that of Lieut. Generals Sir L. Cole, Sir W. Stewart, Sir J. Hamilton, and Sir H. Clinton; Major Generals the Hon. C. Colville, and C. Baron Alten; Mariscal de Campo F. Le Cor, and Mariscal de Campo Don P. Morillo, commanding divisions of infantry; and with that of Don P. A. Giron, commanding the reserve of Andalusia.

Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, and Marshal Sir W. Beresford, and these General Officers, have reported their sense of the conduct of the Generals and troops under their command respectively; and I particularly request your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Major General Byng, and of Major General Lambert, who conducted the attack of the 6th division. I likewise particularly observed the gallant conduct of the 51st and 68th regts., under the command of Major Rice and Lieut. Colonel Hawkins, in Major General Inglis' brigade, in the attack of the heights above St. Pé, in the afternoon of the 30th. The 8th Portuguese brigade, in the 3rd division, under Major General Power, likewise distinguished themselves in the



attack of the left of the enemy's centre; and Major General Anson's brigade of the 4th division, in the village of Sarre and the centre of the heights.

Although the most brilliant part of this service did not fall to the lot of Lieut. General Sir J. Hope and Lieut. General Don M. Freyre, I had every reason to be satisfied with the mode in which these General Officers conducted the service of which they had the direction.

Our loss, although severe, has not been so great as might have been expected, considering the strength of the positions attacked, and the length of time, from daylight in the morning till night, during which the troops were engaged; but I am concerned to add that Colonel Barnard, of the 95th, has been severely, though I hope not dangerously, wounded; and that we have lost in Lieut. Colonel Lloyd, of the 94th, an officer who had frequently distinguished himself, and was of great promise.

I received the greatest assistance in forming the plan for this attack, and throughout the operations, from the Quarter Master General, Sir G. Murray, and the Adjutant General, the Hon. Sir E. Pakenham; and from Lieut. Colonels Lord FitzRoy Somerset and Campbell, and all the officers of my personal Staff, and H.S.H. the Prince of Orange.

The artillery, which was in the field, was of great use to us; and I cannot sufficiently acknowledge the intelligence and activity with which it was brought to the point of attack under the directions of Colonel Dickson, over the bad roads through the mountains in this season of the year.'

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848.

To General Don M. Freyre.

à St. Pé, ce 14 Nov. 1813.

'J'ai reçu votre lettre du 13, et je suis bien fâché que vous croyiez que les ordres que je vous ai fait passer par le Général O'Lawlor, le 12, étaient causés par aucune doute que vous, les Officiers Généraux, et les officiers de l'armée en général, eussent fait leur devoir; ou que j'aie cru que l'indiscipline était générale dans le corps d'armée que vous commandez. Il n'y a nulle doute qu'il y a eu des desordres assez graves dans la nuit du 11, et dans la matinée et la journée du 12, et que des soldats de toutes les nations y ont participé.

Je ne viens pas en France pour la piller; je n'ai pas fait tuer et blesser des milliers d'officiers et de soldats, pour que les restes des derniers puissent piller les Français. Au contraire, il est de mon devoir, et le devoir de nous tous d'empêcher le pillage, surtout si nous voulons faire vivre nos armées au dépens du pays.

J'ai vécu assez long temps parmi les soldats, et j'ai commandé assez long temps les armées, pour savoir que le seul moyen efficace d'empêcher le pillage, surtout dans des armées composées de différentes nations, est de faire

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G. O.

St. Pé, 14th Nov. 1813.

'2. The Commander of the Forces cannot sufficiently express his disapprobation of the conduct of Lieut. ———. The duties required from the junior ranks of the officers in the army, however easy of execution, are highly important to the welfare of the soldier, and are essential to the public interests, and they cannot be neglected without injury to both.

3. The Commander of the Forces trusts, that what has happened to Lieut. ——— will be a warning to others, to consider their professional duty their first object, and not to allow any idle pursuit to induce them to stay away from their regiment and neglect their duty.'

mettre la troupe sous les armes. La punition ne fait rien ; et d'ailleurs, les soldats savent bien que, pour cent qui pillent, un est puni ; au lieu, qu'en tenant la troupe rassemblée, le pillage est empêché ; et tout le monde est intéressé à le prévenir.

Si vous voulez avoir la bonté de demander à vos voisins les Portugais et les Anglais, vous trouverez que je les ai tenus sous les armes des journées entières ; que je l'ai fait cinq cent fois, non seulement pour empêcher le pillage, mais pour faire découvrir par leurs camarades ceux qui ont commis des fautes graves, qui sont toujours connus au reste de la troupe. Même dans la journée du 12, plusieurs divisions étaient sous les armes ; et dans toutes, l'appel était fait à toute heure de la journée pour la même raison, et avec les mêmes vues. Jamais je n'ai cru que cette disposition était d'aucune manière offensante aux Généraux ou aux officiers de l'armée ; jamais, jusqu'à présent, elle n'a été censée telle ; et je vous prie de croire que, si j'avais raison de censurer la conduite ou des Généraux ou des officiers, je le ferais avec la même franchise que j'ai donné ces ordres que je crois les meilleurs pour empêcher le pillage.

Je n'ai pas donné de tels ordres aux troupes Espagnoles en Espagne, parceque c'était leur pays ; et je connaissais bien la nécessité où était tout le monde. Mais je le faisais tous les jours avec les autres ; et si vous demandez, vous trouverez que non seulement des divisions entières, mas des brigades, des regimens, et quelque fois une compagnie, étaient mises sous les armes pour empêcher le mal, ou pour découvrir ceux qui l'avaient commis, ce qui rarement manquait.

Après cette explication, que je vous prie de faire connaître aux Généraux de l'armée Espagnole, j'espère qu'on ne croira pas désormais que j'aie l'intention d'offenser qui que ce soit ; mais il faut que je vous dise que, si vous voulez que votre armée fasse des grandes choses, il faut bien se soumettre à la discipline, sans laquelle rien ne peut se faire ; et il ne faut pas croire que chaque disposition est une offense.

J'ai aussi à accuser la réception de votre lettre, dans laquelle vous demandez que je mette à la disposition de l'intendant de votre armée 200 mulets pour 15 jours. Je crois que l'ordre que je vous ai envoyé hier de cantonner l'armée prévient la nécessité de cette demande ; et je vous prie de me faire dire si je me trompe. Il me paraît aussi qu'il serait bien plus facile au Commissaire Général de vous donner des vivres que de vous transférer 200 mulets.

'I disapproved of Mr. ———'s conduct, not only on the military principle of which it was a breach, but because he conveyed to you an erroneous notion of the situation and wants of this army ; and he omitted that most essential part of his duty to apprise his principal in office of the nature of his communication to you. For my part, I cannot see the use of forming the Commissariat on a military principle, with a regular gradation of ranks and rules, prescribing periods of service before officers can attain those ranks, which rules are not without their inconvenience, if an inferior abroad is to



take upon himself, even by orders, to give information to the superior at home, without the knowledge of the superior abroad.

I would likewise beg to observe to you, that the rules for the correspondence of inferiors through the superiors are not matters of mere military form and etiquette. They are intended to give the superiors a knowledge of what passes, and to throw the responsibility where it ought to rest. It would have been hard upon Sir R. Kennedy to have made him responsible for the errors and failures which would have been the consequence of your acting upon the erroneous information transmitted to you by Mr. ———; and yet, neither the public nor His Majesty's Ministers would have been satisfied with the excuse that the fault was to be attributed to the erroneous information transmitted by Mr. ———.

I entertain a very high opinion of Mr. ———; he was promoted at my recommendation: but my good opinion of any individual cannot prevent me from censuring him, when he deserves it, on a point in which his conduct might have been most injurious to the public service.'

850.

To Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, Bart., K.B.

St. Pé, 16th Nov. 1813.

' In no one instance has it ever occurred to me to apply for a medal for

G. O.

St. Pé, 15th Nov. 1813.

' 1. The great abuses and waste which are the consequences of the existing mode of foraging for the army, and the inconvenience resulting therefrom, has induced the Commander of the Forces to issue the following Orders.

2. Under the orders of the late Commander of the Forces, Lieut. General Sir J. Moore, a horse or mule was allowed to each captain of a company of infantry, and a horse or a mule among the subalterns of the company, and under the orders of the late Commander of the Forces, Lieut. General Sir J. Cradock, which have been the rule with this army, the subalterns of a company of infantry were allowed a horse or mule between two.

3. The Commander of the Forces now desires that the captain of a company may be allowed to keep two horses or mules, besides one horse or mule to carry the tents of the company, and that every subaltern of infantry may be allowed to keep one horse or mule; but it is to be clearly understood that no more *bât-men* servants are to be taken from the ranks than there were under the former Orders.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires also that throughout the army, the officers commanding regiments, heads of departments, &c. will take measures to prevent horses, mules, or other animals, from being kept in the regiments, &c. which are not allowed by the General Order.

5. All foraging parties from regiments of cavalry, or infantry, or brigades of artillery, when it is necessary to send any, are to go out regularly under the charge of an officer, the officer of the Quarter Master General's Department of the division, in concert with the officer of the Commissariat, pointing out where the foraging is to be made, and the Orders of the 25th Aug., 1809, and of the 20th March, 1811, regarding the attendance of the officer of the Commissariat being attended to.

6. The staff of the brigade or division will forage with one of the regiments of the brigade or division, according to the selection of the General Officer commanding, and no persons are to be allowed to go separately in search of forage.

7. The officer in charge of a foraging party is to take care that a regular receipt is given to the owner for what is taken, and a list of the officers sent out with foraging parties is to be kept in each regiment of cavalry or infantry, brigade of artillery, and department, specifying the name, and place where sent to, in order that in case of complaint, it may be discovered who has neglected to attend to this Order.

8. When the forage will be brought in, it is to be taken to the Commissary attached to the brigade or division, and is to be delivered out in regular rations to the several persons entitled to it under the General Orders of the army.

9. If the forage in any district can be collected in magazine, the foraging by the troops is to cease entirely, and all are to draw from the magazine.

10. Notwithstanding these Orders, the Commander of the Forces requests, that the green forage may be used as long as may be possible, and that the dry may be saved.'

any service by the troops. I report the services which they perform, in what I think the clearest and the fairest manner to all concerned; and it rests with Government, and not with me, to notice them as they may think proper.'

## 851.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

St. Jean de Luz, 19th Nov. 1813.

'I received yesterday your letter of the 11th. I agree very much with the British Government about these Spanish libels, and think that, being written by the most insignificant of the human race, and having no circulation excepting in Spain, and that which the English newspapers give them, they are quite undeserving our attention.

The only reason why I noticed the libel in the *Duende* was, that it affected Sir T. Graham and the officers of the army; and I was convinced that it was written under the direction of that greatest of all blackguards, the Minister at War. If it had not been so, I should have wished it to have passed unnoticed.

I think also that there is much reason in what is stated by the Minister of State in the enclosed papers regarding the libels in our newspapers. It is true that they are very different from the Spanish libels; and that the English law of libel is founded on a different principle, and will afford redress in instances in which the Spanish law would afford none to individuals or foreigners. But foreign Governments are very harshly treated in our newspapers; their feelings are much hurt, and their dignity in the eyes of their own subjects much lowered, by the vulgar discussions in our newspapers, in many instances in which our laws will afford no redress. The ground of our discussion with the Spanish Government on this subject should be an alteration of their law; and, considering that one of the causes of the existing war is, that we would not alter our law at the call of Buonaparte, we should be cautious how we called upon the Spaniards to alter their's. I would therefore strongly recommend to you to drop these discussions, unless you should receive orders from Government to continue them. You might draw the attention of both Governments to the libels as they might appear; and possibly prosecute some in the court appointed by the law. But, considering that our object is an alteration of the law, founded upon the denial of justice under the existing system, the expediency of using the redress allowed by that law may be doubted. Our conduct, however, in this respect must depend upon circumstances.'

## 852.

To Earl Bathurst.

St. Jean de Luz, 21st Nov. 1813.

'I have received your letter of the 5th, enclosing one from Lord Aberdeen, containing his Lordship's opinion of the sentiments of the Austrian Court respecting the house of Bourbon.

I enclose you the Proclamation\* which I have issued since I have been in France, which will show you that I have acted exactly according to your wishes and sentiments contained in His Royal Highness' speech from the

\* See p. 843.



throne, which I have since received. I am happy to add that the conduct of the Portuguese and British troops has been exactly what I wished; and that the natives of this part of the country are not only reconciled to the invasion, but wish us success, afford us all the supplies in their power, and exert themselves to get for us intelligence. In no part of Spain have we been better, I might say so well, received; because we really draw more supply from the country than we ever did from any part of Spain. The inhabitants, who had at first left their habitations, have in general returned to them, many of them at the risk of their lives, having been fired at by the French sentries at the outposts; and they are living very comfortably and quietly with our soldiers cantoned in their houses.

The Spaniards plundered a good deal, and did a good deal of mischief, in the first 2 days; but even this misfortune has been of service to us. Some were executed, and many punished; and I sent all the Spanish troops back into Spain to be cantoned, which has convinced the French of our desire not to injure individuals.

I have had a good deal of conversation with people here, and at St. Pé, regarding the sentiments of the people of France in general respecting Buonaparte and his Government; and I have found it to be exactly what might be supposed from all that we have heard and know of his system. They all agree in one opinion, viz., that the sentiment throughout France is the same as I have found it here, an earnest desire to get rid of him, from a conviction that as long as he governs they will have no peace.

The language common to all is, that although the grievous hardships and oppression under which they suffer are intolerable, they dare not have the satisfaction even of complaining; that, on the contrary, they are obliged to pretend to rejoice, and that they are allowed only to lament in secret and in silence their hard fate.

I enclose you an original address which has been presented to me by the constituted authorities and notables here (which I hope your Lordship will do me the favor not to make public), which will show the strong sentiment here respecting the war; the same prevailed at St. Pé, and I hear of the same opinions in all parts of the country.

I have not myself heard any opinion in favor of the House of Bourbon. The opinion stated to me upon that point is, that 20 years have elapsed since the Princes of that House have quitted France; and they are equally, if not more, unknown to France than the Princes of any other Royal House in Europe; but that the Allies ought to agree to propose a Sovereign to France instead of Napoleon, who must be got rid of, if it is hoped or intended that Europe should ever enjoy peace; and that it was not material whether it was of the House of Bourbon or of any other Royal Family.

I have taken measures to open correspondence with the interior, by which I hope to know what passes, and the sentiments of the people, and I will take care to keep your Lordship acquainted with all that I may learn. In the mean time, I am convinced more than ever that Napoleon's power stands upon corruption, that he has no adherents in France but the principal officers of his army, and the *employés civils* of the Government, and possibly some of the new proprietors; but even these last I consider doubtful.

Notwithstanding this state of things, I recommend to your Lordship to

make peace with him, if you can acquire all the objects which you have a right to expect. All the powers of Europe require peace, possibly more than France; and it would not do to found a new system of war upon the speculations of any individual on what he sees and learns in one corner of France. If Buonaparté becomes moderate, he is probably as good a Sovereign as we can desire in France; if he does not, we shall have another war in a few years; but if my speculations are well founded, we shall have all France against him; time will have been given for the supposed disaffection to his Government to produce its effect; his diminished resources will have decreased his means of corruption, and it may be hoped that he will be engaged single handed against insurgent France and all Europe.

There is another view of this subject, however, and that is, the continuance of the existing war, and the line to be adopted in that case. At the present moment it is quite impossible for me to move at all: although the army was never in such health, heart, and condition as at present, and it is probable the most complete machine for its numbers now existing in Europe, the rain has so completely destroyed the roads that I cannot move; and, at all events, it is desirable, before I go farther forward, that I should know what the Allies propose to do in the winter, which I conclude I shall learn from your Lordship as soon as the King's Government shall be made acquainted with their intentions by the King's diplomatic servants abroad. As I shall move forward, whether in the winter or the spring, I can inquire and ascertain more fully the sentiments of the people, and the Government can either empower me to decide to raise the Bourbon standard, or can decide the question hereafter themselves, after they shall have all the information before them which I can send them of the sentiments and wishes of the people.

I can only tell you that, if I were a Prince of the House of Bourbon, nothing should prevent me from now coming forward, not in a good house in London, but in the field in France; and if Great Britain should stand by him, I am certain he would succeed. The success would be much more certain in a month or more hence, when Napoleon commences to carry into execution the oppressive measures, which he must adopt in order to try to retrieve his fortunes.

I must tell your Lordship, however, that our success, and every thing, depends upon our moderation and justice, and upon the good conduct and discipline of our troops. Hitherto these have behaved well, and there appears a new spirit among the officers, which I hope will continue, to keep the troops in order. But I despair of the Spaniards. They are in so miserable a state, that it is really hardly fair to expect that they will refrain from plundering a beautiful country, into which they enter as conquerors; particularly adverting to the miseries which their own country has suffered from its invaders. I cannot, therefore, venture to bring them back into France, unless I can feed and pay them; and the official letter which will go to your Lordship, by this post, will show you the state of our finances, and our prospects. If I could now bring forward 20,000 good Spaniards, paid and fed, I should have Bayonne. If I could bring forward 40,000, I do not know where I should stop. Now I have both the 20,000 and the 40,000 at my command, upon this frontier, but I cannot venture to bring forward any for want of means of paying and supporting them. Without pay and food, they must plunder; and if they plunder, they will ruin us all.



I think I can make an arrangement of the subsidy to cover the expense of 20,000 Spaniards ; but all these arrangements are easily settled, if we could get the money. Where we are to get the money, excepting from England, it is impossible for me to devise ; as the patriotic gentlemen at Lisbon, now that they can buy no Commissariat debts, will give us no money, or very little, for the drafts on the Treasury, and the yellow fever has put a stop to the communication with Cadiz and Gibraltar ; and if we had millions at all three, we could not get a shilling for want of ships to bring it.'

853.

To General Dumouriez.

à St. Jean de Luz, ce 22 Nov. 1813.

' Il y a long-temps que je ne vous ai écrit, et j'ai devant moi vos lettres jusqu'au 1 Novembre, aux quelles je n'ai pas encore répondu. Je vous suis bien obligé pour vos nouvelles d'Allemagne et vos réflexions sur les événemens de ce côté-là. J'ai les nouvelles du Général Stewart jusqu'au 19 Octobre, et celles de Buonaparte jusqu'à son arrivée sur le Rhin. Je respecte la facilité et l'habitude de marcher qu'ont les troupes Françaises ; mais je ne peux pas croire que les troupes battues à Leipsig, qui avaient quittés Erfurt le 25, ayent pu arriver en assez grand nombre pour se battre contre 70,000 Autrichiens et Bavaois sous le Général Wrede à Hanau le 30. Ainsi je crois que Buonaparte est arrivé avec sa Garde, quelque cavalerie et artillerie, et les plus forts du reste de son infanterie, les autres ayant été abandonnés comme en poste, n'étant peut-être pas suivis de très près, et que le Général Wrede lui a donné un pont d'or, n'ayant pas cru possible de lui faire une résistance de fer. Voilà mes spéculations sur les dernières affaires en Allemagne. Mais il est possible que le bulletin sur les affaires du 29 et 30 soit entièrement faux, et que l'armée Française est, comme on le dit, entièrement détruite.

Vous aurez vu les rapports sur nos dernières affaires ici, depuis lesquelles nous sommes entièrement arrêtés par les pluies, et absolument embourbés. D'ailleurs les torrens sont remplis d'eau ; et j'ai été bien aise de pouvoir cantonner l'armée, qui avec exception des Espagnols, est plus en état de faire une campagne d'hiver qu'aucune armée que j'aie jamais vu.

La Catalogne m'a donné bien des mauvais momens pendant l'automne, et j'ai bien souvent pensé à y aller.

Peut-être que, si je regardais seulement l'Espagne, ou même si je voyais les affaires sous un aspect militaire seulement, j'aurais du y aller, parcequ'il n'y a pas de doute que Buonaparte tient en Catalogne et tiendra les facilités pour rentrer en Espagne. Je dis *peut-être*, parceque, dans ce diable de pays, où j'ai fait la guerre pendant cinq ans, j'ai toujours trouvé, comme votre Henri Quatre, " qu'avec des petites armées on ne faisait rien, et qu'avec des grandes armées on mourait de faim ;" et je sens, qu'avec les moyens que j'ai, et le tems que je pourrais y donner, je ne pourrais pas établir les choses en Catalogne comme elles devraient être pour tenir en campagne les forces que nous y avons, et que nous pourrions y introduire. D'ailleurs il faut que la vue purement militaire cède à la politique. J'ai vu la marche des affaires en Allemagne, et, malgré les revers très graves qui sont arrivés, j'ai cru voir les germes des succès très considerables qui sont depuis arrivés.

Si je ne me suis pas trompé, il est bien plus important aux alliés, et à l'Espagne même, que je me porte en avant en France, au lieu de faire une guerre de forteresses en Catalogne. Même en vue militaire pure, je dirai que, s'il est vrai que Buonaparte soit pressé du côté du Rhin, comme il le parait, et que je le presse aussi du côté des Pyrénées occidentales, il n'a pas les moyens de se renforcer en Catalogne; et les forteresses tomberont d'elles mêmes par suite des opérations ici, et ailleurs, et des blocus qui y sont établis. Ainsi, tout considéré, je me suis déterminé à porter la guerre en France de ce côté-ci; et j'ai en mon pouvoir de la rendre vigoureuse autant que les circonstances le permettront. Je crois et j'espère que je ne me suis pas trompé.

Je vous envoie la proclamation que j'ai faite en entrant. Le pays ne nous est pas contraire, les paysans ne nous font pas la guerre; ils vivent très contents avec nos soldats dans leur maisons; et les propriétés sont respectées; et à l'exception des Espagnols, que j'ai envoyés cantonner en Espagne, on n'a pas fait de mal.

Je crois que nous approchons de la fin de la tyrannie la plus atroce et dégoûtante qui ait jamais affligée le monde; et que, si nous avons une autre campagne, il y aura des révolutions plus importantes pour le monde qu'aucune des celles qui sont arrivées.'

854.

To Major General Lambert.

St. Jean de Luz, 28th Nov. 1813.

'I consider all punishments to be for the sake of example, and the punishment of military men in particular is expedient only in cases where the prevalence of any crime, or the evils resulting from it, are likely to be injurious to the public interests.'

I beg the Court to consider their recommendation in this light, and to apply it to the existing circumstances and situation of the army, and to what is notorious in regard to this crime.

\* \* \* \* \*

I beg to inform the Court Martial that a very common, and a most alarming crime in this army is that of striking and otherwise resisting, sometimes even by firing at, non-commissioned officers, and even officers, in the execution of their duty. It will not be disputed that there is no crime so fatal to the very existence of an army, and no crime which officers, sworn as the members of a General Court Martial are, should feel so anxious to punish, as that of which this soldier has been guilty.

It is very unpleasant to me to be obliged to resist the inclination of the General Court Martial, to save the life of this soldier; but I would wish the Court to observe, that if the impunity with which this offence, clearly proved, shall have been committed, should, as is probable, occasion resistance to authority in other instances, the supposed mercy will turn out to be extreme cruelty, and will occasion the loss of some valuable men to the service.'

G. O.

St. Jean de Luz, 29th Nov. 1813.

'2. The Commander of the Forces fully concurs in the sentence of the General Court Martial on the trial of Lieut. —, and he conceives that Lieut. — acted very improperly in refusing to take charge of the detachment at Toro, when ordered to do so by the commandant, and in quitting Toro without leave.

He is at the same time convinced, from the perusal of the proceedings of the General Court Martial,



## 855.

To His Excellency the Minister at War, Cadiz.

St. Jean de Luz, 7th Dec. 1813.

'In regard to means of transport in the service of the allied army under my command, I cannot answer for those on the East coast, but I can answer for those here, that there are none employed permanently with the army under requisition; and that there are very few employed in that manner at all.

The greater number of the muleteers with this army have been with us from 2 to 5 campaigns. They came voluntarily to be hired; and they stay, not because they are well paid, for I am sorry to say that the debt due to them is very large, but because their accounts are regularly kept; they are worked with regularity, they are well treated and taken care of; justice is done them; and they know that the debt due to them, however large, will be paid.'

## 856.

To Earl Bathurst.

St. Jean de Luz, 14th Dec. 1813.

'Since the enemy's retreat from the Nivelle they had occupied a position in front of Bayonne, which had been intrenched with great labor since the battle fought at Vitoria in June last. It appears to be under the fire of the works of the place: the right rests upon the Adour; and the front in this part is covered by a morass occasioned by a rivulet which falls into the Adour. The right of the centre rests upon this same morass, and its left upon the river Nive; the left is between the Nive and the Adour, on which river the left rests. They had their advanced posts from their right in front of Anglet and towards Biaritz. With their left they defended the river Nive, and communicated with General Paris' division of the army of Catalonia, which was at St. Jean Pied de Port; and they had a considerable corps cantoned in Ville Franque and Mouguerre.

It was impossible to attack the enemy in this position, as long as they remained in force in it, without the certainty of great loss, at the same time that success was not very probable, as the camp is so immediately protected by the works of the place. It appeared to me, therefore, that the best mode

Martial, that Lieut. — was really unable, from recent sickness, to take such a charge, and that his conduct is to be attributed wholly to that ignorance of his duty, and of the regulations of the service, and of the Orders of the Army, of which too many are guilty.

3. If Lieut. — had made himself acquainted with the Orders of the Army, he would have known that all officers at an hospital station are liable to do duty with the dépôt, and under the orders of the commandant, and consequently cannot quit the hospital station without his leave or order: he would likewise have known, that if his health was not in a state to allow of his undertaking the charge of a detachment of convalescents on the march, he ought to have appeared before a Board of Medical Officers, who would have decided upon his case.

Being ignorant of these Orders, an attention to which it is obvious is necessary for carrying on the service, Lieut. — has got himself into these difficulties and disgrace; and the Commander of the Forces trusts that he has not mistaken the character of Lieut. —, in believing that the fault was involuntary, that he was really so unwell as to be unable to take charge of the detachment, although desirous of joining his regiment, and that this reprimand will be sufficient to induce him and others to read with attention, and attend more strictly to the duties and conduct required from them by the standing regulations of the service, and the Orders of the Army.

4. With this hope the Commander of the Forces is induced to remit the sentence on Lieut. —, and he desires that he may be released from his arrest, and may join his regiment.'

of obliging the enemy either to abandon the position altogether, or at least so to weaken his force in it as to offer a more favorable opportunity of attacking it, was to pass the Nive, and to place our right upon the Adour; by which operation, the enemy, already distressed for provisions, would lose the means of communication with the interior afforded by that river, and would become still more distressed. The passage of the Nive was likewise calculated to give us other advantages; to open to us a communication with the interior of France for intelligence, &c., and to enable us to draw some supplies from the country.

I had determined to pass the Nive immediately after the passage of the Nivelle, but was prevented by the bad state of the roads, and the swelling of all the rivulets occasioned by the fall of rain in the beginning of that month; but the state of the weather and roads having at length enabled me to collect the materials, and make the preparations for forming bridges for the passage of that river, I moved the troops out of their cantonments on the 8th, and ordered that the right of the army, under Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, should pass on the 9th at and in the neighbourhood of Cambo, while Marshal Sir W. Beresford should favor and support his operation by passing the 6th division, under Lieut. General Sir H. Clinton, at Ustaritz. Both operations succeeded completely. The enemy were immediately driven from the right bank of the river, and retired towards Bayonne by the great road of St. Jean Pied de Port. Those posted opposite Cambo were nearly intercepted by the 6th division; and one regiment was driven from the road and obliged to march across the country.

The enemy assembled in considerable force on a range of heights running parallel with the Adour, and still keeping Ville Franque by their right. The 8th Portuguese regt., under Colonel Douglas, and the 9th caçadores, under Colonel Brown, and the British light infantry battalion of the 6th division, carried this village and the heights in the neighbourhood. The rain which had fallen the preceding night, and on the morning of the 8th, had so destroyed the road, that the day had nearly elapsed before Sir R. Hill's corps had come up; and I was therefore satisfied with the possession of the ground which we occupied.

On the same day Lieut. General Sir J. Hope, with the left of the army under his command, moved forward by the great road from St. Jean de Luz towards Bayonne, and reconnoitred the right of the intrenched camp under Bayonne, and the course of the Adour below the town, after driving in the enemy's posts from the neighbourhood of Biaritz and Anglet. The Light division, under Major General C. Alten, likewise moved forward from Basusarry, and reconnoitred that part of the enemy's intrenchments.

Sir J. Hope and Major General Alten retired in the evening to the ground they had before occupied.

On the morning of the 10th, Lieut. General Sir R. Hill found that the enemy had retired from the position which they had occupied the day before on the heights, into the intrenched camp on that side of the Nive; and he therefore occupied the position intended for him, with his right towards the Adour, and his left at Ville Franque, and communicating with the centre of the army under Marshal Sir W. Beresford by a bridge laid over the Nive; and the troops under the Marshal were again drawn to the left of the Nive.



General Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, which had remained with Sir R. Hill when the other Spanish troops went into cantonments within the Spanish frontier, was placed at Urcuray with Colonel Vivian's brigade of light dragoons at Hasparren, in order to observe the movements of the enemy's division under General Paris, which upon our passage of the Nive had retired towards St. Palais.

On the 10th in the morning the enemy moved out of the intrenched camp with their whole army, with the exception only of what occupied the works opposite to Sir R. Hill's position, and drove in the piquets of the Light division and of Sir J. Hope's corps, and made a most desperate attack upon the post of the former at the chateau and church of Arcangues, and upon the advanced posts of the latter on the high road from Bayonne to St. Jean de Luz, near the Mayor's house of Biaritz. Both attacks were repulsed in the most gallant style by the troops, and Sir J. Hope's corps took about 500 prisoners. The brunt of the action with Sir J. Hope's advanced post fell upon the 1st Portuguese brigade, under Major General Arch. Campbell, which were on duty, and upon Major General Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, which moved up to their support.

Lieut. General Sir J. Hope reports most favorably of the conduct of these, and of all the other troops engaged; and I had great satisfaction in finding that this attempt made by the enemy upon our left, in order to oblige us to draw in our right, was completely defeated by a comparatively small part of our force.

I cannot sufficiently applaud the ability, coolness, and judgment of Lieut. General Sir J. Hope, who, with the General and Staff Officers under his command, showed the troops an example of gallantry which must have tended to produce the favorable result of the day. Sir J. Hope received a severe contusion, which, however, I am happy to say, has not deprived me for a moment of the benefit of his assistance.

After the action was over, the regiments of Nassau and Francfort, under the command of Colonel Krüse, came over to the posts of Major General Ross' brigade of the 4th division, which were formed for the support of the centre.

When the night closed the enemy were still in large force in front of our posts, on the ground from which they had driven the piquets. They retired, however, during the night, from Lieut. General Sir J. Hope's front, leaving small posts, which were immediately driven in. They still occupied in force the bridge on which the piquets of the Light division had stood, and it was obvious that the whole army was still in front of our left; and about 3 in the afternoon they again drove in Lieut. General Sir J. Hope's piquets, and attacked his post. They were again repulsed with considerable loss. The attack was re-commenced on the morning of the 12th, with the same want of success. The 1st division, under Major General Howard, having relieved the 5th division, the enemy discontinued it in the afternoon, and retired entirely within the intrenched camp on that night. They never renewed the attack on the posts of the Light division after the 10th.

Lieut. General Sir J. Hope reports most favorably of the conduct of all the officers and troops, particularly of the Portuguese brigade under General Arch. Campbell, and of General Robinson's and General Hay's brigades of the 5th division, under the command of Colonel the Hon. C. Greville. He

mentions particularly Major General Hay, commanding the 5th division; Major Generals Robinson and Bradford, Brig. General Campbell, Colonels do Rego and Greville, commanding the several brigades; Lieut. Colonel Lloyd, of the 84th, who was unfortunately killed; Lieut. Colonels Barnes of the Royals, and Cameron of the 9th; Captain Ramsay, of the Royal Horse Artillery; Colonel de Lancey, the Deputy Quarter Master General; Lieut. Colonel Macdonald, the Assistant Adjutant General attached to Sir J. Hope's corps; and the officers of his personal Staff.

The 1st division, under Major General Howard, were not engaged till the 12th, when the enemy's attack was more feeble; but the Guards conducted themselves with their usual spirit.

The enemy, having thus failed in all their attacks with their whole force upon our left, withdrew into their intrenchments on the night of the 12th, and passed a large force through Bayonne; with which, on the morning of the 13th, they made a most desperate attack upon Lieut. General Sir R. Hill.

In expectation of this attack, I had requested Marshal Sir W. Beresford to re-inforce the Lieut. General with the 6th division, which crossed the Nive at daylight in the morning; and I further reinforced him by the 4th division, and 2 brigades of the 3rd.

The expected arrival of the 6th division gave the Lieut. General great facility in making his movements; but the troops under his own immediate command had defeated and repulsed the enemy with immense loss before their arrival. The principal attack having been made along the high road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port, Major General Barnes' brigade of British infantry, and the 5th brigade of Portuguese infantry, under Brig. General Ashworth, were particularly engaged in the contest with the enemy on that point; and these troops conducted themselves admirably. The Portuguese division of infantry, under the command of Mariscal de Campo F. Le Cor, moved to their support on their left in a very gallant style, and regained an important position between those troops and Major General Pringle's brigade engaged with the enemy in front of Ville Franque. I had great satisfaction also in observing the conduct of Major General Byng's brigade of British infantry, supported by the Portuguese brigade under the command of Major General Buchan, in carrying an important height from the enemy on the right of our position, and maintaining it against all their efforts to regain it.

Two guns and some prisoners were taken from the enemy, who, being beat in all points, and having suffered considerable loss, were obliged to retire upon their intrenchments.

It gives me the greatest satisfaction to have another opportunity of reporting my sense of the services and merits of Lieut. General Sir R. Hill upon this occasion, as well as of those of Lieut. General the Hon. Sir W. Stewart, commanding the 2nd division of infantry, Major Generals Barnes, Byng, and Pringle, Mariscal de Campo F. Le Cor, Major Generals Buchan and Da Costa, and Brig. General Ashworth. The British artillery under Lieut. Colonel Ross, and the Portuguese artillery under Colonel Tulloh, distinguished themselves; and Lieut. General Sir R. Hill reports particularly the assistance he received from Lieut. Colonels Bouverie and Jackson, the



Assistant Adjutant General and Assistant Quarter Master General attached to his corps, Lieut. Colonel Goldfinch of the Royal Engineers, and from the officers of his personal Staff.

The enemy marched a large body of cavalry across the bridge of the Adour yesterday evening, and retired their force opposite to Sir R. Hill this morning towards Bayonne.

Throughout these various operations I have received every assistance from the Quarter Master General Sir G. Murray, and the Adjutant General Sir E. Pakenham, and Lord FitzRoy Somerset, Lieut. Colonel Campbell, and the officers of my personal Staff.'

857.

To Colonel Torrens.

St. Jean de Luz, 15th Dec. 1813.

'I have long entertained the highest opinion of Sir J. Hope, in common, I believe, with the whole world, but every day's experience convinces me of his worth. We shall lose him, however, if he continues to expose himself in fire as he did in the last 3 days; indeed his escape was then wonderful. His hat and coat were shot through in many places, besides the wound in his leg. He places himself among the sharpshooters, without, as they do, sheltering himself from the enemy's fire. This will not answer; and I hope that his friends will give him a hint on the subject. I have spoken to Macdonald about it, and I will to Sir J. Hope himself, if I should find a favorable opportunity; but it is a delicate subject.'

858.

To the Conde de Montezuma.

St. Jean de Luz, 16th Dec. 1813.

'I am perfectly aware of the nature of the evils with which Spain is afflicted, and I feel them strongly; but I am a stranger, and I have no right to interfere in the internal concerns of that country; and I am equally sensible that all interference on my part would be unwelcome.

I propose to confine myself, therefore, to keeping out the common and foreign enemy; wishing most earnestly that the Spanish nation may have a Government suited to the genius and inclinations of the people, and which will promote their happiness.'

G. O.

St. Jean de Luz, 17th Dec. 1813.

'4. The Commander of the Forces begs to observe, however, that he is not satisfied with the excuse made for his conduct by Lieut. —, that he imagined that Mr. — was an inferior person in the department; whatever might be his rank or situation, he ought to have been treated with mildness and civility.'

G. O.

St. Jean de Luz, 18th Dec. 1813.

'1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the standing rules of the Service, and the General Orders of the Army, in regard to the cleanliness of the troops in their cantonments, may be attended to as far as may be possible.

2. Every house or other building inhabited by the troops should be visited constantly by the officers of the company to which they belong, and care should be taken that all wet straw and other dirt is removed; that the fern or other materials which the soldiers have collected to lay upon is rolled up, and the floor swept; and that whenever the weather is dry the blankets, &c. are put out to dry.

3. The officers also should see that the men do not cut down or otherwise injure the floors or staircases, the doors or windows of the houses, or the gates of the farms, and should particularly inquire from the inhabitants of the houses whether they have any complaints.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that the mules and other animals belonging to the

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859.

To the Comte de Grammont.\*

20th Dec. 1813.

' M. de Mailhos having arrived from the interior of France, and having expressed a strong opinion of the wishes of the people of France to see one of the Princes of the House of Bourbon in the field with this army, and an earnest desire that the Comte de Grammont should go to England, in order to make the Princes of that House acquainted with the situation of affairs, and with this opinion, and the Comte being in this neighbourhood with his regiment, I have consented to his going, and think it desirable that he should go on this mission.

I recommended, however, what follows to his attention :

First ; that the object of his voyage to England should be an inviolable secret ; and should be known only to His Majesty's Ministers, to whom I shall of course report it, and to the Princes of the House of Bourbon.

Secondly ; no public demonstration of the wishes of the people of France in favor of the House of Bourbon having yet been made, and there being no proof (although I think, from what I have experienced, seen, and heard, a great probability) of the truth of the assertions of M. de Mailhos ; and as the Allies have always declared the object of their military operations to be peace with Buonaparte, and reports of negotiations are in circulation ; I recommend to the Comte de Grammont to advise the Princes of the House of Bourbon to consider the subject well, and to be aware of all the consequences before they take the step proposed to them.

Under the circumstances above referred to, nor indeed under any circumstances, could they expect the Powers of Europe to make a declaration in their favor, unless they should be able to show that they had a strong party in their favor in France willing to go all lengths for them ; and unless all hopes of a reasonable peace with the existing French Government should be at an end.

I mention this in order that these Princes may have clearly under their view the state of the question, and that they may see the risk to which they expose their friends and adherents ; and that, in case the step proposed to them should be taken by one of the family, it may be clearly understood that it is their own act, and that I, at least, on the part of the British Government, pointed out the chances that a successful negotiation for a general peace might expose the safety of all their adherents in France.

By the time that the Comte de Grammont will have arrived in England, some events may have occurred to show whether the war will be continued, and with what success, or whether there is any probability of peace : and the Princes may have more data than I can afford them to enable them to decide on the line which they ought to take.'

\* Now Duc de Grammont.

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the army may not be turned to graze in the vineyards, or in the grounds which were last year under cultivation ; these grounds can now afford no sustenance to the animals, and their being turned into them is very injurious to the proprietors, and will prevent their cultivation.

5. The Commander of the Forces requests the General and commanding officers of regiments will each in their cantonnements give every encouragement and assistance to the inhabitants to continue their peaceable occupations, and will attend to and redress all their complaints.'



860.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Leith, K.B.

St. Jean de Luz, 21st Dec. 1813.

‘I received yesterday your letter of the 7th, and I assure you that nothing can at any time give me more satisfaction than to find that the Government attend to the claims and interests of the officers of this army; and I am quite delighted that they have given you the appointment which you mention.\* Nobody could expect you to decline to accept it, in order to return to your division with this army; and if I could have advised you before you accepted the offer, my advice would have been by all means to accept; and I now most sincerely congratulate you.

I have frequently heretofore given you a hint upon a subject, which I hope you will forgive me for taking the liberty of mentioning to you again. You have now been appointed to one of the most lucrative situations in the service; and I hope you will put your establishment on such a scale as that your holding it will be a permanent advantage to yourself and your family. You have always told me that you were a *good manager*, of which I do not entertain the smallest doubt; but you may depend upon it that no management will make an income, however large, give a surplus, if the possessor of it does not take care to fix his expenses on the lowest scale that the nature of his situation will permit.’

861.

To Earl Bathurst.

St. Jean de Luz, 21st Dec. 1813.

‘I have received your Lordship’s letter of the 10th instant, and I beg you will assure the Russian Ambassador that there is nothing that I can do with the force under my command to forward the general interests that I will not do. I am already farther advanced on the French territory than any of the Allied Powers; and I believe I am better prepared than any of them to take advantage of any opportunities which may offer of annoying the enemy, either in consequence of my own situation, or of the operations of the armies of the Allies.

Your Lordship is acquainted, by my last dispatches, with the nature and objects of my recent operations, and with the position in which we were at their close. The enemy have since considerably weakened their force in Bayonne, and they occupy the right of the Adour as far as Dax. I cannot tell yet what force they have in Bayonne, or whether their force is so reduced as that I can attack their entrenched camp.

In military operations there are some things which cannot be done; one of these is to move troops in this country during or immediately after a violent fall of rain. I believe I shall lose many more men than I shall ever replace, by putting any troops in camp in this bad weather; but I should be guilty of an useless waste of men, if I were to attempt an operation during the violent falls of rain which we have here. Our operations, then, must necessarily be slow, but they shall not be discontinued.

In regard to the scene of the operations of the army, it is a question for the Government and not for me. By having kept in the field about 30,000 men in the Peninsula, the British Government have now, for 5 years, given employment to at least 200,000 French troops of the best

\* The command in the West Indies.

Napoleon had, as it is ridiculous to suppose that either the Spaniards or Portuguese could have resisted for a moment, if the British force had been withdrawn. The armies now employed against us cannot be less than 100,000 men, indeed more, including garrisons; and I see in the French newspapers that orders have been given for the formation at Bordeaux of an army of reserve of 100,000 men. Is there any man weak enough to suppose that one third of the numbers first mentioned would be employed against the Spaniards and Portuguese, if we were withdrawn? They would, if it were still an object to Buonaparte to conquer the Peninsula. And he would succeed in his object: but it is much more likely that he would make peace with the powers of the Peninsula, and then have it in his power to turn against the allied armies the 200,000 men, of which 100,000 men are such troops as those armies have not yet had to deal with.

Another observation which I have to submit is, that, in a war in which every day offers a crisis, the result of which may affect the world for ages, the change of the scene of the operations of the British army would put that army entirely *hors de combat* for 4 months at least, even if the new scene were Holland; and they would not then be such a machine as this army is.

Your Lordship very reasonably, however, asks what objects we propose to ourselves here which are to induce Napoleon to make peace? I am now in a commanding situation on the most vulnerable frontier of France, probably the only vulnerable frontier. If I could put 20,000 Spaniards into the field, which I could do if I had money and was properly supported by the fleet, I must have the only fortress there is on this frontier, if it can be called a fortress, and that in a very short space of time. If I could put 40,000 Spaniards into the field, I should most probably have my posts on the Garonne. Does any man believe that Napoleon would not feel an army in such a position more than he would feel 30 or 40,000 British troops laying siege to one of his fortresses in Holland? If it be only the resource of men and money, of which he will be deprived, and the reputation he will lose by our being in this position, it will do ten times more to procure peace than ten armies on the side of Flanders. But, if I am right in believing that there is a strong Bourbon party in France, and that that party is the preponderating one in the South of France, what mischief must not our army do him in the position I have supposed, and what sacrifices would he not make to get rid of us!

It is the business of the Government, and not my business, to dispose of the resources of the nation; and I have no right to give an opinion on the subject. I wish, however, to impress upon your Lordship's mind, that you cannot maintain military operations in the Peninsula and in Holland with British troops; you must give up either the one or the other, as, if I am not mistaken, the British establishment is not equal to the maintenance of two armies in the field. I began last campaign with 70,000 British and Portuguese troops; and taking away from me the German troops, and adding to me what could be got from the militia, and by enabling me to bring up the Portuguese recruits, I expected this year to take the field with 80,000 men; but this is now quite out of the question. If you should form the Hanoverian army, which is in my opinion the most reasonable plan to go upon, I shall not take the field with much more than 50,000 men, unless I



shall receive real and efficient assistance to bring up the Portuguese recruits ; and it will then be about 55,000, or if our wounded recover well, and we have no more actions, about 60,000 men.

Then I beg you to observe that, whenever you extend your assistance to any country, unless at the same time fresh means are put in action, the service is necessarily stinted in all its branches on the old stage. I do not wish to make complaints, but if you will look at every branch of the service here now, you will find it stinted, particularly the naval branch, and those supplies which necessarily come from England. I lately sent you a return of the supply of clothing received for the Spanish army for the year 1813, from which you will see how that branch stands ; and I have not heard of the arrival at Plymouth of the 25,000 suits to be lodged in store there, which will still leave a deficiency of 3000 suits for 1813 ; 7800 suits having lately arrived at Coruña. Nearly all the great coats are deficient. The reason of this is, that the inferior departments do not observe, that when British exertion is to be made on a new scene, the old means are not sufficient. New engines must be set at work, otherwise the service must be stinted in one or both scenes, and there must be complaints.

The different reports which I have sent your Lordship will show how we stand for want of naval means ; and I beg you to take the state and condition of the ships *on the stations*, striking out those coming out and going home, which the Admiralty will insert on the 1st and 15th of every month since June last, and you will see whether or not there is reason to complain. But whatever may be the numbers employed, I complain that there are not enough, because they do not perform the service. This is certainly not the intention of the Admiralty.

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Your Lordship is also acquainted with the state of our financial resources. We are overwhelmed with debts, and I can scarcely stir out of my house on account of the public creditors waiting to demand payment of what is due to them. Some of the muleteers are 26 months in arrears ; and only yesterday I was obliged to give them bills upon the Treasury for a part of their demands, or lose their services ; which bills they will, I know, sell at a depreciated rate of exchange to the *sharks* who are waiting at Pasages, and in this town, to take advantage of the public distresses. I have reason to suspect that they became thus clamorous at the instigation of British merchants.

I draw your Lordship's attention to these facts just to show that Great Britain cannot extend her operations by British troops, or even her pecuniary or other assistance, without starving the service here, unless additional means and exertion should be used to procure what is wanted.'

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862.

To General Morillo.

St. Jean de Luz, 23rd Dec. 1813.

' Before I gave the orders of the —th, of which you and the officers under your command have made such repeated complaints, I warned you repeatedly of the misconduct of your troops, in direct disobedience of my orders, which I told you I could not permit ; and I desired you to take measures to prevent it. I have sent orders to countermand those which I gave on the 18th ; but

I give you notice that, whatever may be the consequence, I shall repeat those orders, if your troops are not made, by their officers, to conduct themselves as well disciplined soldiers ought.

I did not lose thousands of men to bring the army under my command into the French territory, in order that the soldiers might plunder and ill treat the French peasantry, in positive disobedience to my orders; and I beg that you, and your officers, will understand that I prefer to have a small army that will obey my orders, and preserve discipline, to a large one that is disobedient and undisciplined; and that, if the measures which I am obliged to adopt to enforce obedience and good order occasion the loss of men, and the reduction of my force, it is totally indifferent to me; and the fault rests with those who, by the neglect of their duty, suffer their soldiers to commit disorders which must be prejudicial to their country.

I cannot be satisfied with professions of obedience. My orders must be really obeyed, and strictly carried into execution; and if I cannot obtain obedience in one way, I will in another, or I will not command the troops which disobey me.

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863.

To General Don M. Freyre.

à St. Jean de Luz, ce 24 Dec. 1813.

‘ J’ai reçu votre lettre d’aujourd’hui; et j’avais déjà donné ordre le 22 de rappeler celui que j’avais donné le 18 à la division du Général Morillo de se tenir sous les armes.

La question entre ces Messieurs et moi est, s’ils pilleront ou non les paysans Français. J’ai écrit, et j’ai fait écrire, plusieurs fois au Général Morillo pour lui marquer ma désapprobation sur ce sujet, mais en vain; et enfin j’ai été obligé de prendre des mesures pour m’assurer que les troupes sous ses ordres ne feraient plus de dégâts dans le pays. Je suis fâché que ces mesures soient de nature à déplaire à ces Messieurs; mais je vous avoue que je trouve que la conduite, qui les a rendus nécessaires, est bien plus déshonorante que les mesures qui en sont la conséquence.

Je vous prie de croire que je ne peux avoir aucun sentiment sur votre lettre que celui de la reconnaissance; et aussitôt que j’aurai lu toutes celles incluses dans votre lettre officielle, je vous enverrai réponse. En attendant je vous dis que je suis, et de toute ma vie ai été, trop accoutumé aux libelles pour ne pas les mépriser; et si je ne les avais pas méprisés, non seulement je ne serais pas où je suis, mais le Portugal au moins, et peut-être l’Espagne, serait sous la domination Française. Je ne crois pas que l’union des deux nations dépend des libellistes; mais si elle en dépend, pour moi, je déclare que je ne désire pas un commandement, ni l’union des nations, si l’un ou l’autre doit être fondé sur le pillage. J’ai perdu 20,000 hommes dans cette campagne, et ce n’est pas pour que le Général Morillo, ni qui que ce soit, puisse venir piller les paysans Français; et, où je commande, je déclare hautement que je ne le permettrai pas. Si on veut piller, qu’on nomme un autre à commander; parceque, moi, je déclare que, si on est sous mes ordres, il ne faut pas piller.

Vous avez des grandes armées en Espagne; et si on veut piller les paysans Français, on n’a qu’à m’ôter le commandement, et entrer en France. Je couvrirai l’Espagne contre les malheurs qui en seront le résultat; c’est à



dire, que vos armées, quelques grandes qu'elles puissent être, ne pourront pas rester en France pendant 15 jours.

Vous savez bien que vous n'avez ni argent, ni magasins, ni rien de ce qu'il vous faut pour tenir une armée en campagne ; et que le pays où vous avez passé la campagne dernière est incapable de vous soutenir l'année prochaine.

Si j'étais assez scélérat pour permettre le pillage, vous ne pouvez pas croire que la France (toute riche qu'elle est) puisse soutenir votre armée, si le pays est pillé. Pour ceux qui désirent vivre des contributions du pays (ce qui je crois est votre objet dans la campagne prochaine), il paraît essentiel que les troupes ne soient pas autorisées à piller. Mais, malgré tout cela, on croirait que je suis l'ennemi, au lieu d'être le meilleur ami de l'armée, en prenant des mesures décisives pour empêcher le pillage, et que ces mesures la déshonorent ! !

Je pourrais dire quelque chose aussi en justification de ce que j'ai fait, qui regarderait la politique ; mais j'ai assez dit, et je vous répète, qu'il m'est absolument indifférent que je commande une grande ou une petite armée ; mais que, qu'elle soit grande ou petite, il faut qu'elle m'obéisse, et surtout qu'elle ne pille pas.

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En vérité je ne peux pas m'empêcher de me moquer des plaintes du Général Morillo. Le jour que je lui ordonnai de se mettre sous les armes, il entreprit de lui-même (sans mes ordres, ni ceux d'aucun autre) une reconnaissance sur l'ennemi ; les routes étant en tel état qu'il ne pouvait faire marcher son infanterie ; et le résultat a été que la cavalerie Anglaise, qui l'a accompagné, et faisait son avant garde, a beaucoup souffert. Puis il vient me dire qu'il n'a pas de souliers ! Comment a-t-il pu faire cette reconnaissance sans souliers ? Et puis la malheureuse troupe, sans souliers et sans vivres, pour se tenir sous les armes, comment le Général Morillo a-t-il pu la faire marcher ?

Demandez au Général Alava, et au Général O'Lawlor, combien de fois j'ai mis les troupes Anglaises et Portugaises sous les armes en Espagne pour sauver les villes et campagnes Espagnoles, et vous verrez que je suis au moins impartial.'

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864.

To Lieut. General W. Clinton.

St. Jean de Luz, 25th Dec. 1813.

' I have received this morning your letter of the 19th, marked private. I had made known to Government your desire to quit the command of the troops in Catalonia ; and I have reason to believe that Government have endeavored to send an officer to relieve you. Lieut. General Sir T. Picton lately rejoined this army, and I believe it was the intention of the Secretary of State that I should send him into Catalonia ; although this intention has not been announced to me. But, from the conversations which I have had with the General, it appears that he prefers to resume the command of his division in this army, and he has declined to go into Catalonia.

I do not know how I can request you to continue to hold a command for which you state that your health renders you unequal ; but if an expression of the entire satisfaction I have had in all my communications with you, and of my confidence in all your arrangements, can be an inducement to you to

continue to exercise your command, or can be any gratification to you upon quitting it, it is but justice to you to express it.'

## 865.

To General Don M. Freyre.

St. Jean de Luz, 25th Dec. 1813.

'In consequence of repeated complaints of the conduct of the troops under the command of General Morillo, it appears, by the papers enclosed, that I took measures to call his attention to the subject, and I desired that he and his officers would prevent his men from plundering the country.

Finding that all my remonstrances were vain, that the disorder complained of still continued, and that I received warning from various quarters of the danger to General Morillo and others from their continuance, I directed that General Morillo's troops should be kept under arms during the day, till further orders, in order to insure good order in future.

Notwithstanding the doubts of General Morillo that I have a right to give such orders, I believe he will find that every officer in command has not only a right, but that it is his duty, to order the troops under his command under arms whenever he thinks it proper or necessary; and it is the first time I have heard that it is disgraceful to officers and soldiers to be ordered under arms.

General Morillo is mistaken in supposing that the same orders have never been given to the soldiers of the other allied nations. If he will inquire he will find that it has been done constantly; and if he reflects a little, he will discover that the disgrace does not consist in having received those orders, but in the conduct which has rendered them necessary.

General Morillo's letter appears to me to be a complaint of me, which he certainly has every right to make if he thinks proper, and of his situation in the army in general, which I had understood, till now, was the object of his choice, which complaints he has undoubtedly forwarded through the proper channel; and it is my duty to transmit it to be laid before the Government.

As, however, the letter shows that it was written in a moment of irritation, that it contains some matters not very relevant to the subject, and others which I should imagine that, upon consideration, General Morillo would not wish to insert in a letter complaining of my conduct in a single act, I detain the letter, till I shall learn from you that it is his wish that it should be forwarded as it is, or that it should be altered, and confined to the simple case of complaint of my order.

In the mean time, I have sent orders that the troops under General Morillo may be moved nearer to the magazine. When I gave orders that they should be supplied from the British magazines, I was in hopes that, with the means of transport in my power, and those they had themselves, the supply would have been regular. But their own means of transport are so very few, and the roads are now so bad, that I find it impossible to supply them where they are; and they are therefore ordered to be cantoned nearer to the magazine.'

## 866.

To General Don M. Freyre.

à St. Jean de Luz, ce 26 Déc. 1813.

'Je viens de recevoir votre lettre du 26. Il parait, par les lettres du Général Morillo que vous m'avez envoyées, que j'avais averti le Général



Morillo par différentes manières, pas moins que quatre fois, des plaintes que j'avais reçues contre ses troupes; et malgré que le Général nie que ses troupes aient fait du mal, il a dit lui-même au Général Hill que "c'était impossible de l'empêcher, parcequ'il n'y avait pas un soldat ni un officier qui ne reçut des lettres de sa famille en Espagne, pour lui dire que, se trouvant en France, il devait faire fortune." Cela étant, il reste à moi de tâcher de l'empêcher.

Ce n'est pas de la demande de rations dont je me plains, tant que du pillage et des désordres des soldats, malgré que, quand je donnai ordre au Général Morillo de prendre des rations dans les magasins, je lui aie défendu de les demander au pays.

Sur ces désordres j'ai reçu toutes les preuves que je pouvais avoir; et je vous dis que dans trois différens endroits j'ai reçu l'avertissement que je devais prendre garde à la division du Général Morillo, parceque les paysans Basques commençaient à parler de vengeance; et que, si une fois ils prenaient les armes en main, il serait difficile de leur faire mettre bas. C'est à dire, à Ustaritz, à Herauritz, et St. Jean de Luz.

Il était donc de mon devoir d'arrêter ces désordres; et tout ce que je regrette est que ces Messieurs ne sentent pas que sûrement je ne l'aurais pas fait d'une manière à eux désagréable si ce n'avait pas été nécessaire.'

## 867.

To Lieut. Colonel Bromhead, 77th regt.

St. Jean de Luz, 30th Dec. 1813.

'I likewise recommend to the Court to omit the remark at the conclusion of their sentence, as it conveys a notion that their sentence, for the offences of which they have found Mr. — guilty, has been lenient, because the conduct of that gentleman has been excusable, as he had shown a disposition to obey the orders he had received, by ordering an inferior officer to attend the wounded.

This remark has nothing to say to the guilt or innocence of Mr. —, upon which the Court have already pronounced, and in which, with the exception above stated, I concur, and does not appear necessary to the justification of the General Court Martial for their lenient sentence. They have a right to pass the sentence they think proper, and they may safely keep their justification till called upon for it.

This appears more particularly desirable, as the paragraph in question contains a principle, in my opinion, very erroneous, and highly detrimental to the service. Every officer in the army, be his rank what it may, is directly and personally responsible for the execution of the orders he receives from his superiors, and I am responsible for the whole; and the general principle is, that it is no excuse for me, or for any other officer who receives an order, to state that he ordered an inferior to carry it into execution. There are undoubtedly limitations to this principle; and instances may occur in which an officer receiving an order may be under the necessity, or it may be his duty, to intrust the execution of it to another; and the guilt or innocence of the omission will depend upon the proof of the necessity, or of the case of duty; and in every instance upon the party accused of the neglect or disobedience having brought to punishment the person who neglected or disobeyed his orders.

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It is the duty of a Court Martial to prevent such neglects and disobedience, and the chance of such sufferings by the soldiers, by the example of the punishment which they will inflict on the prisoner whom they have found guilty; and the Court will judge whether they have performed that duty by their sentence.'

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868.

To Earl Bathurst.

St. Jean de Luz, 1st Jan. 1814.

'I return Lord Castlereagh's papers. As well as I can judge from Buonaparte's speech to the Legislative body, and the contents of the Paris papers to the 25th December, you will have no peace now.

I do not like the Austrian movement upon Switzerland: it will give them possession of Italy, and probably Murat will join them; but I should think their line would be too extended.

Every day's experience here shows the desire of the people to shake off the yoke of Napoleon. It is a curious circumstance that we are the protectors of the property of the inhabitants against the plunder of their own armies; and their cattle, property, &c., are driven into our lines for protection.'

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869.

To General Don M. Freyre.

St. Jean de Luz, 8th Jan. 1814.

'I had repeatedly sent to General Morillo, through Sir R. Hill and by other channels, to request he would keep his troops in order; in answer to which the General stated to Sir R. Hill that it was impossible, *as the officers and soldiers received by every post letters from their friends congratulating them upon their good fortune in being in France, and urging them to take advantage of their situation to make their fortunes.* This Sir R. Hill told me; and I therefore saw there was no remedy but a strong one.

I can assure you that, in my opinion, it was essentially necessary to put an effectual stop to the evils complained of; and I can equally assure you, that neither in the measure adopted, nor in the orders given to carry that measure into execution, had I the most distant intention to insult or injure the officers. I considered what General Morillo told General Hill as an acknowledgment that neither he nor his officers could stop the evil; and I acted accordingly.

I might satisfy myself with this answer to General Morillo's complaints, and justify myself as the Commander in Chief of the British army to those who have a right to call upon me for such justification.

General Morillo is, however, entirely mistaken in his assertions respecting the measures adopted to preserve discipline among the British troops; and, instead of asserting, as he has, that they may commit what crimes they please with impunity, he ought, if informed, to say that no crime ever goes

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G. O.

St. Jean de Luz, 1st Jan. 1814.

'1. Lieut. General the Hon. W. Stewart is requested to put Mr. Assistant Surgeon — in arrest, for having sent out a bât-man to forage contrary to orders, giving into his possession an irregular receipt, the consequence of which conduct on the part of the officers of the army is great irregularity in the country, and inconvenience to the public service.'



unpunished when the criminal can be discovered. Hundreds of times in Spain and in Portugal whole corps and divisions have been placed and kept under arms, not only to prevent disorder, but to obtain the discovery of criminals; and in no instance has a criminal been discovered that he has not been tried, and the sentence of the Court Martial put into execution. I defy General Morillo, I defy any man, to show an instance in which injury has been done to any individual, of which proof could be adduced, that the officer or soldier doing it has not been punished. Let him inquire how many soldiers have been hanged in Spain for plundering, and how many more have been otherwise punished and made to pay for the damage done, and he will find that there is no reason to complain on this ground.

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The British officers and soldiers, like others, require to be kept in order, and, till I read General Morillo's letter, I imagined that the last accusation that could be made against me was, that I neglected this duty. But, however I may endeavor to perform it, I must admit that, in a large and widely extended army, evils and injuries may be committed without my knowing it; but with this admission, I must say, that it is quite groundless to assert or suppose that British officers and soldiers are allowed to do what they please with impunity.

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I hope this letter will show the General that there is no foundation for either complaint, and that he will withdraw them, as made in a moment of irritation, to which every man is liable. If he does not do so, I hope that he is prepared to prove them.

I feel the same respect and regard for General Morillo and his troops that I do for all the other troops under my command, and I do every thing in my power for them. This very regard must prevent me from allowing these charges of injustice to remain unrefuted; and they must be proved or formally withdrawn.'

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870.

To Earl Bathurst.

St. Jean de Luz, 8th Jan. 1814.

'According to the wish expressed by Government, I am prepared in every respect, excepting with money, to push the enemy to the Garonne during the winter; and I am convinced that the greatest advantage to the cause would result from such an operation; but I cannot move at all. My posts are already so far distant, that the transport of the army is daily destroyed in supplying the troops; but there is not in the military chest a shilling to pay for any thing that the country could afford, and our credit is already gone in this country.

It does not form any part of my duty to suggest the measures for our relief. It is obvious that an immediate and large supply of money from England is necessary; and that some measures should be adopted to enable the Admiral commanding at Lisbon to convey to Pasages, or elsewhere, without loss of time, the money which may from time to time be raised by bills upon the treasury at Gibraltar, Cadiz, or Lisbon, for the use of the army.'

871.

To Earl Bathurst.

St. Jean de Luz, 10th Jan. 1814.

‘ I have long suspected that Buonaparte would adopt this expedient ; and if he had had less pride, and more common sense, and could have carried his measure into execution as he ought to have done, it would have succeeded. I am not certain that it will not succeed now : that is to say, so much of the misery felt in Spain is justly attributed to the vices and constitution of the Government, that I think there must be many who would desire to put an end to them, even by the sanction of this treaty of peace. If Buonaparte had at once withdrawn his garrisons from Catalonia and Valencia (which in all probability he must lose at all events), and had sent Ferdinand to the frontier, or into Spain (and he must be as useless a personage in France as he would probably be in Spain), I think it can scarcely be doubted that the peace would have been made, or, at all events, the prosecution of the war would have been so difficult as to render it almost impracticable, and great success hopeless.

I cannot now guess what will be the decision of the Cortes regarding this treaty, supposing the aristocratic party to be the majority. The only bar to their accepting it is their treaty with the English ; and possibly the provision for Charles IV. is greater than the finances will bear. The discussion on the subject at all, however, will give strength to the democratic party.

From this treaty, your Lordship will see that Buonaparte is of the same opinion with me regarding the importance of our operations here ; and I see that you also entertain the same opinion. But if it should be the opinion in England, or of the Allies, that it is most desirable, notwithstanding all the disadvantages attending the removal of this army to Holland, that it should go there, you will see that this treaty gives you an opportunity of removing it, without a breach of faith.

I concur in opinion with your Lordship, that England cannot be at her ease if Buonaparte has a large naval establishment in the Scheldt. The question is, can he have that large naval establishment, if the Dutch frontier is established as it was previous to 1792 ? Can he even navigate the Scheldt at all, under such circumstances ? I believe not. I mention this, not in order to urge His Majesty’s Ministers to bear light upon Napoleon in a treaty of peace ; but in order to induce them not to separate themselves or their interests from those of the Allies, in order to obtain an object, the benefit to be expected from which would be obtained by securing an ally. It may be desirable that Holland should have Antwerp on other grounds ; but, seeing what use can be made of the Scheldt to annoy England, I am not quite certain that it would not be best for us that one bank should be in the hands of one power ; the other, Antwerp, and the upper part of the river, in the hands of the other.

In regard to the operations on the Rhine, I confess that I feel no confidence in any thing that is doing. The Allies are not strong enough, nor sufficiently prepared, to invade France at all, or to do more than cross the Rhine in one great corps, and there blockade some one, two, or three fortresses, by taking their cantonments for the winter. By the hesitation and delays of their Generals, I think they are sensible of the truth of this observation ; but they have not strength to resist the cry of all the foolish people



who, without knowing what they are talking about, are perpetually writing and talking of invading France.

Then I think the operation which they should have performed is the reverse of that which they have commenced. They should have operated from Mayence down, instead of by Switzerland. The revolution in Holland, and the advantages acquired in that country, would have turned the left of the enemy for them; and the natural course of events would by this time have placed them in possession of the course of the Rhine from Mayence into the Dutch frontier, and probably of all the new departments of France on the left bank, including the Austrian Netherlands. We and the Austrians in Italy would have been equally forward.

I suspect that Prince Schwarzenberg did not think himself strong enough even for this plan; and that he has come into Switzerland with a view to acquire his Italian objects; and, at all events, if he cannot advance into France, to have a good position for his army in Switzerland. But if I am mistaken, and he should be able to advance, what are our hopes for the future? Is it possible that any man can hope that the operations of Prince Schwarzenberg, even when joined with Bellegarde's Italian army, can connect with mine from hence? Supposing Schwarzenberg and Bellegarde to be superior separately now to Ney and the Viceroy respectively, it cannot be believed they will be so when their armies will be in France.

The Allies do not appear to me to have reflected that every thing was lost in Europe by the loss of one or two great battles, and that every thing has been restored to its present state by their military success.

It has always occurred to me, however, upon the battle of Leipsic, that if Buonaparte had not placed himself in a position that every other officer would have avoided, and had not remained in it longer than was consistent with any notions of prudence, he would have retired in such a state, that the Allies could not have ventured to approach the Rhine. They must not expect battles of Leipsic every day; and that which experience shows them is, that they ought, above all things, to avoid any great military disaster. Their object is peace, upon a certain basis, upon which they have agreed. Although I am quite certain that Buonaparte has no intention to make peace, notwithstanding his speeches and declarations, I am equally certain that the people of France will force him to peace, if the Allies suffer no disaster. This is clear, not only from his public language, but from every thing that he does, from the reports circulated, &c. &c. (one of which, by the by, was, that Lord Castlereagh had landed at Morlaix); and it is obvious that if the Allies can only continue some operation during the winter, till the garrisons behind them shall fall, and their reinforcements shall reach them, and that they are so connected as that they cannot be beat, they must attain their object.

I agree very much with your Lordship about Louis XVIII., in the exist-

G. O.

St. Jean de Luz, 14th Jan. 1814.

7. The Commander of the Forces is apprehensive from the complaints which he has received of damage done in the cantonments occupied by some of the troops, that the General Orders of the 18th Dec, last, No. 2, 3, and 4, have not been attended to.

8. He particularly requests the attention of the General Officers to those Orders, and he begs them to ride through the cantonments occupied by their several brigades, and to inquire from the inhabitants whether there are any complaints and of whom, and at what time they occurred; in order that justice may be done them.

ing situation of affairs. But if you cannot make peace with Buonaparte in the winter, we must *run* at him in the spring; and it would be advisable to put one of the Bourbons forward in that case.'

## 872.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

St. Jean de Luz, 14th Jan. 1814.

'There is no doubt that the authorities of Santander have been seeking for opportunities to avoid having a military hospital in their town, and for the mode of removing it, since the hospital has been established there. At their desire, for several months past, one of the physicians of the town has regularly visited the hospitals; and, at last, he has discovered that there are symptoms of a dangerous malady.

It is certainly impossible to dispute upon such an opinion, as the dispute would be as endless as one upon the beauty of colors, or as one upon any other abstract opinion. I can only say that, during 5 years that I have commanded the army, I have never known it so healthy as it is, and has been ever since the month of May last; that there is but little sickness, and the men in the hospitals are generally wounded; and that in this very hospital at Santander only 6 men have died of fevers out of 236 sick with fevers; and, that not only there is no epidemical disorder, according to the opinion of the medical Staff Officers, but no contagion whatever in the hospital at Santander.

It is quite impossible for a large army to carry on extended operations without military hospitals. We have had nearly 30,000 wounded upon this frontier since the month of June last, besides the sick which there must be among so many men kept in a constant state of exertion; yet I am certain that no individual has been put to the slightest inconvenience for which he has not received compensation; and I must add, that the inconvenience of having hospitals at all has been much relieved by my having provided portable buildings, brought from England purposely to be constructed into hospitals.

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It will certainly appear extraordinary to the world, that the British troops, after having rendered such services to the Spanish nation, should be obliged to go to England to look for hospitals; but it must be obvious to your Excellency, that it is impossible that I can any longer expose our establishments to the capricious treatment they have met with at Santander.'

## 873.

To Earl Bathurst.

St. Jean de Luz, 16th Jan. 1814.

'I send by this occasion the treaty concluded with King Ferdinand, and other papers upon that subject, contained in dispatches from my brother. Napoleon will certainly endeavor to avail himself of this treaty in the general arrangement, if there should be such a one; to which pretension certainly the confinement of Ferdinand may be considered a conclusive answer. But it will be necessary that the Allies should be prepared to protect Spain against the demands, contained particularly in the 9th and the 13th articles, relating to the partisans of King Joseph, and the provision for King Charles.



The Spanish Government will be at the feet of Buonaparte, if he is allowed to interfere in favor of his partisans in Spain. The finances cannot bear the provision made for King Charles; and this is equally a point upon which no foreign influence can be admitted.

I have written to my brother to urge the Spanish Government to declare themselves positively on all the parts of the treaty to which they object, in order that the Allies may be prepared to support them in what is reasonable.'

## 874.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

St. Jean de Luz, 19th Jan. 1814.

'These are the consequences of the system by which these provinces are governed. Duties of the highest description, military operations, political interests, and the salvation of the state, are made to depend upon the caprice of a few ignorant individuals, who have adopted a measure, at least, at present, unnecessary and harsh, without adverting to its objects or consequences, and merely with a view to their personal interests and convenience. Then they have carried the measure into execution in a manner as harsh, as capricious, and unjust, as it is possible to conceive.'

## 875.

To the Board of Health at Santander.

St. Jean de Luz, 22nd Jan. 1814.

'It is certainly greatly inconvenient to any country to have an army operating within it; and it is not one of the least inconveniences attending such an evil, that it is necessary that the sick and wounded soldiers should be taken care of in hospitals.

When it became necessary, in order to drive the enemy from the Spanish territory, to carry on the operations of the war in the Biscayan provinces, the hospitals of the army were established on the coast; and the town of Santander was allotted principally to the British army, as it possessed more extensive means of maritime transport than the others.

Great as the inconvenience must ever be to any town, of establishing a military hospital within it, I am happy to be able to assert that it has been alleviated (in respect to Santander) as far as has been in my power, that I have had buildings brought purposely from England for the hospitals, and that all expenses of the hospitals have been regularly paid; but I am concerned to add that the inhabitants of the town have always manifested an extreme sensibility to the inconvenience which was the natural result of the fortunate circumstances of the war, and have made many indirect efforts to remove the hospitals.

In the recent instance of placing the British hospitals under quarantine

G. O.

St. Jean de Luz, 20th Jan. 1814.

'2. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General and other officers of the army, to the 5 following numbers of the General Orders of the 1st Aug. 1810, regarding communications with the enemy; and he particularly requests that these Orders may be strictly attended to, and that no communication whatever may originate with the allied army, which is not ordered from Head Quarters: all communications from the enemy must be sent to Head Quarters, as the Commander of the Forces alone can give an answer. The Commander of the Forces requests that these orders may be communicated to the Portuguese army.'

that is to say, not only those sick of the supposed epidemic disease, but those sick of other diseases; the wounded, those recovering from their wounds and sickness, those not sick at all; such as the officers of the medical department, and the military officers superintending the hospital, and all the British attendants upon it; I am afraid that both the *Junta de Sanidad*, and the authorities of the town, have not been so considerate as they ought to have been, either towards the unfortunate objects of the measure they adopted, or of the interests of their country. In your letter of the 14th you state that the Commandant of the British hospitals, and the gentlemen of the British medical department, concurred with you in the measures which you adopted. They have certainly deceived me most grossly, if there was such a concurrence of opinion; and I enclose you the copy of a paper transmitted to me by those gentlemen of the same date with your letter, from which it appears that the British and Portuguese medical gentlemen thought so lightly of the disorder which had induced you to put the British hospitals under quarantine in so extraordinary a manner, that they were about to send the convalescents to join their regiments in the army.

But supposing that the danger of infectious disease, and not extreme sensibility to the inconvenience of having the hospital at Santander, and the desire to remove it, was the cause of your recent measure of putting the whole British hospital in quarantine, it cannot afford a ground for the desire which you have expressed, that I should no longer make use of the harbour of Santander, either by sending there sick soldiers, or soldiers in health, or effects.

I beg to observe to you that the harbour of Santander belongs to the Spanish nation, and not to any particular set of individuals of that nation. The British army are serving the Spanish nation, and the soldiers and effects brought to Santander, whether for the service of the Spanish, the British, or the Portuguese army, are for the service of the nation; and till the Government shall desire that I shall refrain from using the port of Santander, I hope the town will forgive me for thus declaring that I shall use it as long as it shall be convenient to the service of the cause.

It is probable that the measure which the town of Santander have adopted of declaring the British hospitals in quarantine, unnecessarily, as appears from the enclosed paper, and indeed from your own letter, followed as it has been by orders to the different ports on the coast from the *Xefe Politico* of Guipuzcoa, to place all ships in quarantine coming from Santander, will have the effect of putting the whole of the northern coast of Spain and the army in quarantine, in respect to the rest of the world. If it has not that effect, it certainly will have the effect of obliging the army to fall back from the position which it now occupies towards countries in the interior of Spain capable of maintaining it.

The measure adopted by the town of Santander, and its consequences, have cut off the communication between the army and its magazines, certainly without necessity; and it cannot be expected that the army will maintain its position if, notwithstanding the plenty that has been provided for it, it should starve.

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876.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

St. Jean de Luz, 26th Jan. 1814.

‘ Nothing can be more satisfactory than the whole conduct of the Spanish Government regarding the negotiations for peace ; and I entertain serious doubts whether it is advisable that the British Government should be in any way parties to a change under existing circumstances. I am certain that no Government would act better than they have in this most important of all concerns ; and I doubt that any Regency, under the existing constitution, would have power to act better in other matters more peculiarly of internal concern. The Minister at War being dismissed makes a great alteration in the state of the question as affecting us.

The mob of Madrid will be just as bad as the mob of Cadiz in a short time. Both are set in motion by the same machine, the press, in the hands, I believe, of the same people. The mercantile class will not have quite so much influence at Madrid, although they will not want partisans when they desire to carry a question by violence. The Grandes had formerly a good deal of influence at Madrid ; but they are too poor at present, and their situation is too degraded for them to be able to do much under existing circumstances.’

877.

To Lieut. Colonel Barns, Royal regt.\*

St. Jean de Luz, 9th Feb. 1814.

‘ It is extraordinary that resistance to authority should be so frequent as it is by the British officers and soldiers of the army, as it is certain that neither would dare to resist authority in their own country ; but it has lately been so frequent, and the instances attended by such serious consequences, that it is necessary that I should endeavor to prevail upon General Courts Martial to mark their disapprobation of such conduct more forcibly.’

878.

To Earl Bathurst.

St. Jean de Luz, 20th Feb. 1814.

‘ In conformity with the intention which I communicated to your Lordship in my last dispatch, I moved the right of the army, under Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, on the 14th. He drove in the enemy’s piquets on the Joyeuse river, and attacked their position at Hellette, from which he obliged General Harispe to retire with some loss towards St. Martin. I made the detachment of General Mina’s troops in the valley of Baztan advance on the same day upon Baygorry and Bidarry ; and the direct communication of the enemy with St. Jean Pied de Port being cut off by Lieut. General Sir R. Hill’s success at Hellette, that fort has been blockaded by the Spanish troops above mentioned.

On the following morning (the 15th), the troops under Lieut. General Sir R. Hill continued the pursuit of the enemy, who had retired to a strong

\* Lieut. General Sir J. S. Barns, K.C.B.

G. O.

St. Jean de Luz, 28th Jan. 1814.

‘ 1. The great number of foraging parties which have been lost lately, afford too strong proofs of the little attention paid to the General Orders of the army.

2. The Commander of the Forces again calls the attention of the officers to the following Orders, No. 5 of the 15th Oct., and No. 5 of the 15th Nov.’

position in front of Garris; where General Harrispe was joined by General Paris' division, which had been recalled from the march it had commenced for the interior of France; and by other troops from the enemy's centre.

General Morillo's Spanish division, after driving in the enemy's advanced posts, was ordered to move towards St. Palais, by a ridge parallel to that on which was the enemy's position, in order to turn their left, and cut off their retreat by that road; while the 2nd division, under Lieut. General Sir W. Stewart, should attack in front. Those troops made a most gallant attack upon the enemy's position, which was remarkably strong, but which was carried without very considerable loss. Much of the day had elapsed before the attack could be commenced; and the action lasted till after dark, the enemy having made repeated attempts to regain the position, particularly in two attacks, which were most gallantly received and repulsed by the 39th regt., under the command of the Hon. Colonel O'Callaghan, in Major General Pringle's brigade. The Major General, and Lieut. Colonel Bruce of the 39th, were unfortunately wounded. We took 10 officers and about 200 prisoners.

The right of the centre of the army made a corresponding movement with the right on these days; and our posts were on the Bidouze river on the evening of the 15th.

The enemy retired across the river at St. Palais, in the night, destroying the bridges; which, however, were repaired, so that the troops under Lieut. General Sir R. Hill crossed on the 16th; and on the 17th the enemy were driven across the Gave de Mauleon, &c. They attempted to destroy the bridge at Arriverete, but they had not time to complete its destruction; and a ford having been discovered above the bridge, the 92nd regt., under the command of Colonel Cameron, supported by the fire of Captain Bean's troop of horse artillery, crossed the ford, and made a most gallant attack upon two battalions of French infantry posted in the village, from which the latter were driven with considerable loss. The enemy retired in the night across the Gave d'Oleron, and took up a strong position in the neighbourhood of Sauveterre, in which they were joined by other troops.

On the 18th our posts were established on the Gave d'Oleron, and measures are in preparation to enable Lieut. General Sir R. Hill to cross that river as soon as the pontoon train shall arrive.

In all the actions which I have above detailed to your Lordship, the troops have conducted themselves remarkably well; and I had great satisfaction in observing the good conduct of those under General Morillo, in the attack of Hellette, on the 14th, and in driving in the enemy's advanced posts in front of their position at Garris, on the 15th.

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879.

To Earl Bathurst.

Garris, 22nd Feb. 1814.

'In answer to the first, I have to inform your Lordship that I have turned my mind but little to American affairs; that I have but little knowledge of the topography of that country, and I have no means here of obtaining information to enable me to form an opinion on which I could at all rely.

I believe that the defence of Canada, and the co-operation of the Indians, depends upon the navigation of the lakes; and I see that both Sir G. Prevost



and Commodore Barclay complain of the want of the crews of 2 sloops of war. Any offensive operation founded upon Canada must be preceded by the establishment of a naval superiority on the lakes.

But even if we had that superiority, I should doubt our being able to do more than secure the points on those lakes at which the Americans could have access. In such countries as America, very extensive, thinly peopled, and producing but little food in proportion to their extent, military operations by large bodies are impracticable, unless the party carrying them on has the uninterrupted use of a navigable river, or very extensive means of land transport, which such a country can rarely supply.

I conceive, therefore, that were your army larger even than the proposed augmentation would make it, you could not quit the lakes; and, indeed, you would be tied to them the more necessarily in proportion as your army would be large.

Then, as to landings upon the coast, they are liable to the same objections, though to a greater degree, than an offensive operation founded upon Canada. You may go to a certain extent, as far as a navigable river or your means of transport will enable you to subsist, provided your force is sufficiently large compared with that which the enemy will oppose to you. But I do not know where you could carry on such an operation which would be so injurious to the Americans as to force them to sue for peace, which is what one would wish to see.

The prospect in regard to America is not consoling. That power will always hang on the skirts of Great Britain, unless there should be some change in her own situation; or the state of the Spanish colonies should make an alteration, not only in America in general, but in the colonial system of the world; or our own colonies in America should grow so fast, as that, with very little assistance from the mother country, they shall be equal to their own defence.

I am quite certain that Buonaparte will begin the war again, if he can, by interfering, as a neutral, in our dispute with America.

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I am very much obliged to your Lordship for the answer you have given regarding reports. There would be no end to reports if I were to send all I receive; and it would be no easy matter to make out what happened on any occasion. The best of it is, that I was on the field myself, before the action was over, and before the attack with General Byng's brigade. In the same manner, I was present in all Sir J. Hope's actions; and when I am there, although I may choose to say that another commands, I suppose I command myself. I know that I am responsible, and your Lordship would not be satisfied if I did not make the report.

I am sure I always mean to do justice to the officers under my command, and I hope their friends will be convinced that I have not held back their reports in order to do them an injury.

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Upon recollection of Sir R. Hill's report, I think mine was the most detailed of the two. I recollect writing mine first, and waiting to have the dispatch copied till his arrived; and I did not alter mine, as I found it the most detailed.

There was a very long report from ——— of the same action, but I could neither send it, or insert the substance in mine, nor mention the names of all the officers he mentions, without doing injustice to others.'

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880.

PROCLAMATION.

Au Quartier Général, ce 23 Février, 1814.

' 1. Les habitans qui désirent former une garde pour la conversation de l'ordre public, et pour la protection de leurs biens, sont invités à faire savoir leurs intentions au Commandant en Chef; et en même tems à lui notifier la force de la garde communale qu'ils proposent former dans leurs communes respectives.

2. Cette garde communale sera sous les ordres du maire, qui sera tenu responsable pour sa conduite.

3. MM. les Maires sont invités à faire arrêter par cette garde communale les traîneurs, muletiers, et autres des armées alliées, qui font aucun mal ou dégât; et de les conduire au quartier général, ou à l'officier qui commande des troupes alliées dans les environs. Chaque plainte doit être accompagnée d'un procès verbal des circonstances de l'arrestation, pour que les coupables soient punis et forcés à payer pour ce qu'ils ont pris ou détruit.'

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881.

To Earl Bathurst.

St. Sever, 1st March, 1814.

' The sense which I had of the difficulties attending the movement of the army by its right, across so many rivers as must have been and as have lately been passed in its progress, induced me to determine to pass the Adour below the town of Bayonne, notwithstanding the difficulties which opposed this operation; and I was the more induced to adopt this plan, as, whatever might be the mode in which I should eventually move upon the enemy, it was obvious that I could depend upon no communication with Spain and the seaports of that Kingdom and with St. Jean de Luz, excepting that alone which is practicable in the winter, viz., by the high roads leading to and from Bayonne. I likewise hoped that the establishment of a bridge below Bayonne would give me the use of the Adour as a harbour.

The movements of the right of the army, which I detailed to your Lordship in my last dispatch, were intended to divert the enemy's attention from the preparations at St. Jean de Luz and Pasages for the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, and to induce the enemy to move his force to his left, in which objects they succeeded completely; but upon my return to St. Jean de Luz, on the 19th, I found the weather so unfavorable at sea and so un-

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G. O.

Garris, 24th Feb. 1814.

' 2. The Commander of the Forces cannot but feel that his time and that of the officers composing the General Court Martial, is occupied in a manner very little to the advantage of the public service in considering such subjects as the unbecoming and ungentlemanlike behaviour of officers towards each other.

The Orders of the army, the articles of war, and the rules of society forbid such conduct; and the Commander of the Forces is astonished that any man claiming the character of a gentleman could be provoked to use such language as that proved to have been used by Lieut. ———, and Lieut. ———, of the ———th regt., on the 9th Jan.'



certain, that I determined to push forward my operations on the right, notwithstanding that I had still the Gave d'Oleron, the Gave de Pau, and the Adour to pass.

Accordingly, I returned to Garris on the 21st, and ordered the 6th and Light divisions to break from the blockade of Bayonne; and General Don M. Freyre to close up the cantonments of his corps towards Irun, and to be prepared to move when the left of the army should cross the Adour. I found the pontoons collected at Garris, and they were moved forward on the following days to and across the Gave de Mauleon, and the troops of the centre of the army arrived.

On the 24th, Lieut. General Sir R. Hill passed the Gave d'Oleron at Villenave, with the Light, 2nd, and Portuguese divisions, under the command of Major General Baron C. Alten, Lieut. General Sir W. Stewart, and Mariscal de Campo Le Cor; while Lieut. General Sir H. Clinton passed with the 6th division between Monfort and Laas; and Lieut. General Sir T. Picton made demonstrations, with the 3rd division, of an intention to attack the enemy's position at the bridge of Sauveterre, which induced the enemy to blow up the bridge.

Mariscal de Campo Don P. Morillo drove in the enemy's posts near Navarreins, and blockaded that place.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford likewise, who, since the movement of Sir R. Hill on the 14th and 15th, had remained with the 4th and 7th divisions, and Colonel Vivian's brigade, in observation on the Lower Bidouze, attacked the enemy on the 23rd in their fortified posts at Hastings and Oeyregave, on the left of the Gave de Pau, and obliged them to retire within the tête de pont at Peyrehorade.

Immediately after the passage of the Gave d'Oleron was effected, Sir R. Hill and Sir H. Clinton moved towards Orthez and the great road leading from Sauveterre to that town; and the enemy retired in the night from Sauveterre across the Gave de Pau, and assembled their army near Orthez on the 25th, having destroyed all the bridges on the river.

The right, and right of the centre of the army assembled opposite Orthez, Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton, with Lord E. Somerset's brigade of cavalry, and the 3rd division, under Lieut. General Sir T. Picton, were near the destroyed bridge of Berenx; and Field Marshal Sir W. Beresford, with the 4th and 7th divisions, under Lieut. General Sir L. Cole and Major General Walker, and Colonel Vivian's brigade, towards the junction of the Gave de Pau with the Gave d'Oleron.

The troops opposed to the Marshal having moved on the 25th, he crossed the Gave de Pau below the junction of the Gave d'Oleron on the morning of the 26th, and moved along the high road from Peyrehorade towards Orthez, on the enemy's right. As he approached, Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton crossed with the cavalry, and Lieut. General Sir T. Picton with the 3rd division, below the bridge of Berenx; and I moved the 6th and Light divisions to the same point; and Lieut. General Sir R. Hill occupied the heights opposite Orthez and the high road leading to Sauveterre.

The 6th and Light divisions crossed in the morning of the 27th at daylight, and we found the enemy in a strong position near Orthez, with his right on a height on the high road to Dax, and occupying the village of St.

Boés, and his left on the heights above Orthez and that town, and opposing the passage of the river by Sir R. Hill.

The course of the heights on which the enemy had placed his army necessarily retired his centre, while the strength of the position gave extraordinary advantages to the flanks.

I ordered Marshal Sir W. Beresford to turn and attack the enemy's right with the 4th division under Lieut. General Sir L. Cole, and the 7th division under Major General Walker and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry; while Lieut. General Sir T. Picton should move along the great road leading from Peyrehorade to Orthez, and attack the heights on which the enemy's centre and left stood, with the 3rd and 6th divisions under Lieut. General Sir H. Clinton, supported by Sir S. Cotton, with Lord E. Somerset's brigade of cavalry. Major General Baron C. Alten, with the Light division, kept the communication, and was in reserve between these two attacks. I likewise desired Lieut. General Sir R. Hill to cross the Gave, and to turn and attack the enemy's left.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford carried the village of St. Boés with the 4th division, under the command of Lieut. General Sir L. Cole, after an obstinate resistance by the enemy; but the ground was so narrow that the troops could not deploy to attack the heights, notwithstanding the repeated attempts of Major General Ross' and Brig. General Vasconcellos' Portuguese brigade; and it was impossible to turn them by the enemy's right without an excessive extension of our line. I therefore so far altered the plan of the action as to order the immediate advance of the 3rd and 6th divisions, and I moved forward Colonel Barnard's brigade of the Light division to attack the left of the height on which the enemy's right stood.

This attack, led by the 52nd regt. under Lieut. Colonel Colborne, and supported on their right by Major General Brisbane's and Colonel Keane's brigades of the 3rd division, and by simultaneous attacks on the left by Major General Anson's brigade of the 4th division, and on the right by Lieut. General Sir T. Picton, with the remainder of the 3rd division and the 6th division, under Lieut. General Sir H. Clinton, dislodged the enemy from the heights, and gave us the victory.

In the mean time, Lieut. General Sir R. Hill had forced the passage of the Gave above Orthez, and seeing the state of the action he moved immediately, with the 2nd division of infantry under Lieut. General Sir W. Stewart and Major General Fane's brigade of cavalry, direct for the great road from Orthez to St. Sever, thus keeping upon the enemy's left.

The enemy retired at first in admirable order, taking every advantage of the numerous good positions which the country afforded him. The losses, however, which he sustained in the continued attacks of our troops, and the danger with which he was threatened by Lieut. General Sir R. Hill's movement, soon accelerated his movements, and the retreat at last became a flight, and the troops were in the utmost confusion.

Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton took advantage of the only opportunity which offered to charge with Major General Lord E. Somerset's brigade, in the neighbourhood of Sault de Navailles, where the enemy had been driven from the high road by Lieut. General Sir R. Hill. The 7th hussars distinguished themselves upon this occasion, and made many prisoners.



We continued the pursuit till it was dusk ; and I halted the army in the neighbourhood of Sault de Navailles. I cannot estimate the extent of the enemy's loss ; we have taken 6 pieces of cannon and a great many prisoners, the numbers I cannot at present report. The whole country is covered by their dead. The army was in the utmost confusion when I last saw it passing the heights near Sault de Navailles, and many soldiers had thrown away their arms. The desertion has since been immense.

We followed the enemy on the following day to this place ; and we this day passed the Adour. Marshal Sir W. Beresford marched with the Light division and General Vivian's brigade upon Mont de Marsan, where he has taken a very large magazine of provisions. Lieut. General Sir R. Hill has moved upon Aire, and the advanced posts of the centre are at Cazères.

The enemy are apparently retiring upon Agen, and have left open the direct road towards Bordeaux.

While the operations of which I have above given the report were carrying on on the right of the army, Lieut. General Sir J. Hope, in concert with Rear Admiral Penrose, availed himself of an opportunity which offered on the 23rd February to cross the Adour below Bayonne, and to take possession of both banks of the river at its mouth. The vessels destined to form the bridge could not get in till the 24th, when the difficult, and at this season of the year dangerous, operation of bringing them in was effected with a degree of gallantry and skill seldom equalled. Lieut. General Sir J. Hope particularly mentions Captain O'Reilly, Lieut. Cheshire, Lieut. Douglas, and Lieut. Collins, of the navy, and also Lieut. Debenham, Agent of Transports ; and I am infinitely indebted to Rear Admiral Penrose for the cordial assistance I received from him in preparing for this plan, and for that which he gave Lieut. General Sir J. Hope in carrying it into execution.

The enemy, conceiving that the means of crossing the river which Lieut. General Sir J. Hope had at his command, viz., rafts made of pontoons, had not enabled him to cross a large force in the course of the 23rd, attacked the corps which he had sent over on that evening. This corps consisted of 600 men of the 2nd brigade of Guards under the command of Major General the Hon. E. Stopford, who repulsed the enemy immediately. The Rocket brigade was of great use upon this occasion.

Three of the enemy's gun boats were destroyed this day ; and a frigate lying in the Adour received considerable damage from the fire of a battery of 18 pounders, and was obliged to go higher up the river to the neighbourhood of the bridge.

Lieut. General Sir J. Hope invested the citadel of Bayonne on the 25th ; and Lieut. General Don M. Freyre moved forward with the 4th Spanish army, in consequence of directions which I had left for him.

On the 27th, the bridge having been completed, Lieut. General Sir J. Hope deemed it expedient to invest the citadel of Bayonne more closely than he had done before ; and he attacked the village of St. Etienne, which he carried, having taken a gun and some prisoners from the enemy, and his posts are now within 900 yards of the outworks of the place.

The result of the operations which I have detailed to your Lordship is, that Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, and Navarreins, are invested ; and the army, having passed the Adour, are in possession of all the great communi-

cations across that river, after having beaten the enemy, and taken their magazines.

I have ordered forward the Spanish troops under General Freyre, and the heavy British cavalry and artillery, and the Portuguese artillery.

Your Lordship will have observed with satisfaction the able assistance which I have received in these operations from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, Lieut. Generals Sir R. Hill, Sir J. Hope, and Sir S. Cotton; and from all the General Officers, officers, and troops acting under their orders respectively. It is impossible for me sufficiently to express my sense of their merits, or of the degree in which the country is indebted to their zeal and ability for the situation in which the army now finds itself.

All the troops distinguished themselves; the 4th division, under Lieut. General Sir L. Cole, in the attack of St. Boés, and the subsequent endeavors to carry the right of the heights; the 3rd, 6th, and Light divisions, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir T. Picton, Sir H. Clinton, and Major General C. Baron Alten, in the attack of the enemy's position on the heights; and these, and the 7th division under Major General Walker, in the various operations and attacks on the enemy's retreat. The charge made by the 7th hussars under Lord E. Somerset was highly meritorious. The conduct of the artillery throughout the day deserved my highest approbation.

I am likewise much indebted to the Quarter Master General Sir G. Murray, and the Adjutant General Sir E. Pakenham, for the assistance I have received from them; and to Lord FitzRoy Somerset, and the officers of my personal Staff; and to the Mariscal de Campo Don M. de Alava.'

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882.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

St. Sever, 4th March, 1814.

'I write just one line to let you know that, in proportion as we advance, I find the sentiment in the country still more strong against the Buonaparte dynasty, and in favor of the Bourbons; but I am quite certain there will be no declaration on the part of the people, if the Allies do not in some manner declare themselves, or, at all events, as long as they are negotiating with Buonaparte. Any declaration from us would, I am convinced, raise such a flame in the country as would soon spread from one end of it to the other, and would infallibly overturn him.

I cannot discover the policy of not hitting one's enemy as hard as one can, and in the most vulnerable place. I am certain that he would not so act by us, if he had the opportunity. He would certainly overturn the British authority in Ireland if it was in his power.'

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883.

To General Don M. Freyre.

St. Sever, 5th March, 1814.

'I am concerned to have to inform your Excellency that I receive from all quarters complaints of the conduct of the troops under the command of your Excellency; and I beg to draw your serious attention to the following observations.



However France may be reduced, there is no doubt that the army which I am enabled to lead into the country is not sufficiently strong to make any progress, if the inhabitants should take part in the war against us. What has occurred in the last 6 years in the Peninsula should be an example to all military men on this point, and should induce them to take especial care to endeavor to conciliate the country which is the seat of war, by preserving the most strict discipline among the troops, by mitigating as much as possible the evils which are inseparable from war, and by that demeanor in the officers in particular towards the inhabitants which will show them that they, at least, do not encourage the evils which they suffer from the soldiers, and will afford the inhabitants some hope that the evils will be redressed, and will be of short duration.

All soldiers are inclined to plunder, and can be prevented only by the constant attention and exertion of the officers; and I earnestly entreat you to urge those of the army under your command to attend to these circumstances. It will be highly disgraceful to the Spanish army, if the conduct complained of should be continued; and I anxiously hope that, as I have taken measures to provide for the regular pay and food of the officers and troops, the most energetic measures will be adopted to prevent these constant complaints.

I recommend the following regulations to your consideration:—

First; that in all cases as many safe-guards should be given as may be possible, and as may be required.

Secondly; that when the troops are cantoned, an officer, if possible, or a non-commissioned officer, should be cantoned in the house with the troops; whose duty it should be to see that they conduct themselves as they ought, and that no soldier takes his arms or accoutrements away from his cantonment, or leaves it at all after dark.

Thirdly; that an officer should visit the cantonments of his company after the troops are placed in them, and again in the morning before the troops quit them, in order to inquire whether there is any cause of complaint.

Fourthly; when the troops are *en bivouac*, the rolls should be called constantly, in order to prevent the soldiers from wandering from their companies; and no soldier should be allowed, on any account, by day or night, to take his arms from the piles of arms of his company.

By these measures, by punishing those who shall deserve it, by conciliatory conduct on the part of the officers, the distressing complaints which I receive every day of the conduct of the army will be put an end to.

To these considerations I beg leave to add an observation, the truth of which I have learnt from long experience; viz., that no reliance can be placed on the conduct of troops in action with the enemy who have been accustomed to plunder; and that those officers alone can expect to derive honor in the day of battle from the conduct of the troops under their command, who shall have forced them, by their attention and exertions, to behave as good soldiers ought in their cantonments, their quarters, and their camps.'

G. O.

St. Sever, 5th March, 1814.

'1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General Officers, and of the officers commanding regiments to the following translation of a proclamation which he has issued to the country, directing the magistrates to form a guard in each parish, for the preservation of peace and of property within the district of each, and he requests that every assistance may be given to the magistrates to carry into execution the objects of this proclamation.'

884.

To Marshal Sir W. Beresford, K.B.

St. Sever, 7th March, 1814.

‘The Quarter Master General will have sent you orders for the march of a body of troops under your command, towards Bordeaux, to-morrow morning. Upon your arrival at Langon, you will be able to form a judgment with what body of troops it will be expedient that you should move upon Bordeaux, and you will act accordingly, taking care always to observe what passes in your front along the Garonne, and towards Agen.

The object in sending a body of troops to Bordeaux is to establish there the authority of the army, and eventually, if possible, to acquire the navigation of the Garonne, and the use of the port for the army. On your approach to that city, therefore, I request you to communicate to the authorities the different proclamations which have been issued for the civil government of the country in which the army is established; and you will call upon the mayor, and other authorities, to declare whether they will or not continue to perform the duties of their offices respectively under existing circumstances. If they should not be so disposed, I beg you to inform them that it is necessary that they should withdraw from the territory occupied by the army; and I beg you to desire the principal inhabitants to name the persons to whom they wish the principal civil authorities should be intrusted. I beg you to give orders that the persons so selected may act provisionally, and to let me know their names, in order that I may appoint them as usual by proclamation.

If the existing magistrates should be willing to remain in office, I beg you to allow them to continue, and to let me know their names.

There is a large party at Bordeaux in favor of the House of Bourbon; and I beg you to adhere to the following instructions in regard to this party and their views.

If they should ask for your consent to proclaim Louis XVIII., to hoist the white standard, &c., you will state that the British nation and their Allies wish well to Louis XVIII.; and as long as the public peace is preserved where our troops are stationed, we shall not interfere to prevent that party from doing what may be deemed most for its interest: nay, farther, that I am prepared to assist any party that may show itself inclined to aid us in getting the better of Buonaparte.

That the object of the Allies, however, in the war, and, above all, in entering France, is, as is stated in my proclamation, *Peace*; and that it is well known the Allies are now engaged in negotiating a treaty of peace with

G. O.

St. Sever, 7th March, 1814.

‘1. The Commander of the Forces begs to call the attention of the General Officers of the army, and the commanding officers of regiments, to the orders repeatedly given respecting requisitions, respecting receipts, and respecting foraging.

2. The greatest abuses and outrages are committed daily, in consequence of the inattention of the officers of the army to these Orders, to the loss and injury of the inhabitants of the country, and to the disgrace of the character of the army.

4. The Commander of the Forces again desires that the churches may not be used by the troops without permission of the inhabitants and clergy, and that when they are used, the utmost care should be taken of the sacred vessels, and of every article that serves for religious purposes.

5. Neither horses, nor other animals, are to be put into the churches on any account whatever.’



Buonaparte. That, however I might be inclined to aid and support any set of people against Buonaparte while at war, I could give them no farther aid when peace should be concluded ; and I beg the inhabitants will weigh this matter well before they raise a standard against the government of Buonaparte, and involve themselves in hostilities.

If, however, notwithstanding this warning, the town should think proper to hoist the white standard, and should proclaim Louis XVIII., or adopt any other measure of that description, you will not oppose them ; and you will arrange with the authorities the means of drawing, without loss of time, for all the arms, ammunition, &c., which are at Dax, which you will deliver to them.

If the municipality should state that they will not proclaim Louis XVIII. without your orders, you will decline to give such orders, for the reasons above stated.

I have reasons to believe that Lord Keith has sent some vessels to cruise off the port, and I beg you to endeavor to communicate with the officer commanding them. I request you likewise to endeavor to ascertain what are the impediments in the way of fortification, garrisoned by the enemy, or ships of war, to the entrance and navigation of the river, particularly on the left bank ; and if you should be of opinion that you can detach troops without inconvenience to obtain possession of those works, you will do so.'

885.

To Earl Bathurst.

Aire, 11th March, 1814.

'I have received your Lordship's letter of the 1st instant, with the draught of the proposed preliminary treaty. If Napoleon is to continue as a sovereign, I should be glad to see him reduced to make such a treaty : but I confess that I never thought he was so reduced ; and, if I can give any credit to the facts stated in the French papers to the 1st instant, he certainly is not so. Indeed things were in such a state, that I hope the treaty will not have been proposed ; as, if it is, Buonaparte will certainly publish it ; and the interest of Spain, the only country which it appears has had an opportunity, and has refused, to make a separate treaty, are entirely forgotten ; and when every fortress in Germany is to be given up by the preliminary treaty, the enemy is to remain in possession of the fortresses in Spain till the definitive treaty shall be signed. It is very desirable that the King's Ministers should be instructed what to say upon this point at Madrid.

I am not sufficiently informed of the state of affairs and of opinions at the

G. O.

St. Sever, 8th March, 1814.

1. The Commander of the Forces wishes the officers of the army to observe that the orders of the army uniformly require that requisitions, whether for forage or other articles, should be made by a Commissary on a magistrate.

2. Those of the 4th May and 17th June, 1809, are positive on this point, and the Commander of the Forces particularly requests that they may be attended to in all requisitions in future.

3. Articles of any kind are to be taken from individuals on requisition only when the magistrate is absent and cannot be found.

4. The General Officers commanding divisions of infantry, and brigades of cavalry, are requested to direct the Commissaries attached to their several divisions and brigades, to settle with the magistrates of the places in which they may be cantoned or encamped, where the horses and other animals attached to the division or brigade may be turned to grass, and at what rate of expense.'

Imperial head quarters in the middle of February, or of the real facts of the misfortunes upon the Seine and Marne, and of the causes of the subsequent movements, to be able to form any judgment of the state of affairs. I should think that the armies are falling back to concentrate a little; and it is possible that Augereau's movement from Lyons, the object of which is certainly to bring the Viceroy out of Italy, may have had some influence over them. In this case, more particularly if what M. de Viel Castel says of the Prince Royal's movement be true, the Allies may still be able to hold their ground within the French territory; and Napoleon may be confined to a small space round Paris.

Whenever the Congress at Chatillon is broken up, we have a fine Royalist game in our hands here, if the Allies can hold their ground within the French territory, and if I can in any manner get rid of M. Viel Castel. With strong professions in favor of the Bourbons, he has contrived to circulate a whisper that Monsieur was not received at the Imperial head quarters, and had been desired to remain in Switzerland; and, between the misfortunes of the Allies and this secret, the stability of Napoleon's throne seems to be very sufficiently provided for. In the mean time, Marshal Beresford has marched with 2 divisions upon Bordeaux, and I wait the result of that movement, and the arrival of my cavalry and cannon.

I beg your Lordship's attention to the enclosed state of the army. I take it, there are not much less than 7000 Portuguese, and double the number of British, destined to join us, some of whom ought to have joined long ago.

In the mean time, however, if Suchet joins Soult with his whole force, we shall be very weak, particularly in British troops, which must be the foundation of every thing. I can bring more Spaniards into the field, but I have not the means of maintaining both them and the additional British and Portuguese. Necessity has no law, however, and I must bring them forward, if the expected British and Portuguese troops should not soon arrive.'

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886.

To His Excellency the Minister at War, at Madrid.\*

Aire, 14th March, 1814.

'In reference to my report of yesterday, in which I informed your Excellency that Marshal Sir W. Beresford had entered Bordeaux, I have now the honor to inform you that the magistrates and people of that city immediately adopted the emblems of the House of Bourbon, and proclaimed Louis XVIII. as King of France. Upon my entry into France in the month of November, I received satisfactory proofs of the hatred of the people to the yoke of Buonaparte, of their earnest desire to get rid of it, and of the attachment of a very large majority to the family of Bourbon.

These sentiments, however, were chastened and moderated by the desire by all means to avoid a civil contention. With this knowledge of the sentiments and wishes of the people, I earnestly recommended to the Duc d'Angoulême, when he arrived at head quarters, in the beginning of February, that he should continue *incognito*; and that, particularly as the Allies were engaged in negotiations for a treaty of peace with Buonaparte, he should not urge the people to declare themselves, but should leave to the

\* A copy of this letter, addressed to the Minister at War, at Lisbon.



people themselves, who were the most interested, the choice of the time and mode in which they should proceed, in order to attain their object.

In all the conversations which I have held with the friends of the House of Bourbon in this country, I have never failed to remind them that the Allies, including those who had been pleased to confide to me the command of their armies, entered France in search for peace; that they were at the moment engaged in negotiations for peace; and that if peace should be made with Napoleon, as a Sovereign, all assistance to the friends of the House of Bourbon in France must be discontinued.

I enclose the copy of the instructions which I gave to Marshal Sir W. Beresford upon the same point; and the Marshal informs me that, on the day before he entered Bordeaux, understanding what was likely to occur, he distinctly informed the authorities of the views and intentions of the Allies, as stated in the instructions which I had given him.

Your Excellency will see therefore that the magistrates and people of Bordeaux have taken this step with a full knowledge of their situation. I earnestly hope for the sake of the world, as well as of themselves, that their cause will triumph; but, confided in as I have been by the allied nations, it was my duty not to mislead the French people, whatever advantage the operations under my guidance might derive from their conduct; and I have thought it proper to enter into these details with your Excellency, in order that the Regency may know exactly on what grounds, in reference to the Allies, the people of Bordeaux are proceeding.'

887.

To H. R. H. the Duc d'Angoulême.

à Aire, ce 16 Mars, 1814.

'J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Altesse Royale du 15, et je me ressouviens parfaitement de la conversation que j'ai eue l'honneur de tenir avec votre Altesse Royale.

Je ne sais pas quels ordres votre Altesse Royale veut que je donne aux

G. O.

Aire, 16th March, 1814.

3. The Commander of the Forces has given orders, which are at all the post houses, that neither officers, soldiers, nor horses, should be billeted at post houses, which orders are to be attended to.

4. The Commander of the Forces intreats the attention of the officers of the army to his orders.

5. Orders have been repeatedly given that bät-men and others proceeding with baggage, cattle guards, and other escorts, shall march regularly with their arms in their hands, and that they shall by no means be put on the mules.

6. From the constant inattention to these Orders, a detachment of the 7th division, consisting of an officer and 70 men were taken by a small party of the enemy near Roquefort.

7. A detachment of the Portuguese brigade of the 7th division, consisting of an officer and 35 men, were likewise from similar inattention to Orders, and neglect of duty, and of all military precaution, taken a few days ago in the town of Pau, by an officer and 4 French dragoons.

8. Very little attention to order, and to the common principles of military duty, would prevent such accidents which are disgraceful to the character of the army, and very injurious to the service, and the Commander of the Forces requests the General Officers to attend to these matters.

9. If Orders are not obeyed upon all occasions, it is impossible to be certain that such misfortunes will not happen. The inconvenience of disobedience of Orders, and inattention to duty will certainly be experienced sooner or later.

10. The Commander of the Forces desires that every officer going with a foraging party, or with any detachment whatever, may have a copy of the Order for the march of detachments.'

troupes à Bordeaux. Sa Majesté Louis XVIII. y a été proclamé, et je ne crois pas que M. le Maréchal Beresford se soit mêlé d'aucune manière du Gouvernement. J'espère que votre Altesse Royale me fera savoir ses volontés.

Pour ce qui regarde le pays où a passé l'armée, votre Altesse Royale me permettra de lui dire que, jusqu'à ce que je croie l'opinion de Bordeaux plus prononcée qu'elle n'a été jusqu'à présent, et que l'adhésion y soit faite par d'autres villes, je ne peux pas, selon les idées de mes devoirs envers ceux que je sers et dont je possède la confiance, faire des démarches pour forcer la soumission à l'autorité de votre Altesse Royale. Je ne me refuserai pas à ce qu'on proclame le Roi ; mais je prie votre Altesse Royale de m'excuser, au moment actuel, d'y prendre une part quelconque.

J'avoue à votre Altesse Royale que, si je n'étais pas porté à cette décision par mes devoirs envers les Souverains dont je commande les armées, je le serais par la proclamation de M. le Maire de Bordeaux, du 12, faite je l'espère sans le consentement de votre Altesse Royale, comme elle l'a été sans même la connaissance du Maréchal Beresford. Il n'est pas vrai que les Anglais, les Espagnols, et les Portugais "*se soyent réunis dans le midi de la France, comme d'autres peuples au nord, pour remplacer le fléau des nations par un monarque, père du peuple.*" Il n'est pas vrai "*que ce n'est que par lui que les Français peuvent apaiser le ressentiment d'une nation voisine contre laquelle les a lancés le despotisme le plus perfide.*" Il n'est pas vrai, non plus dans le sens énoncé dans la proclamation que "*les Bourbons aient été conduits par leurs généreux alliés.*"

Je suis sûr que votre Altesse Royale n'a pas donné son consentement à cette proclamation, parceque c'est contraire à tout ce que j'ai eu l'honneur bien souvent de lui assurer ; et pour montrer à votre Altesse Royale combien peu je dois avoir confiance dans les actes du Maire de Bordeaux, d'après ce que je vois dans cette proclamation, j'ai eu l'honneur de lui envoyer copie des instructions que j'ai envoyées au Maréchal Beresford, et copie de son rapport, qui feront voir à votre Altesse Royale que j'ai agi avec la même franchise envers le Maire de Bordeaux qu'envers votre Altesse Royale et les autorités de la France ; et que le Maire de Bordeaux savait la vérité le 11, quoiqu'il ait émis sa proclamation le 12.

Monseigneur, j'espère que les Souverains dont je commande les armées, et les peuples dont je possède la confiance, me croiront, et non le Maire de

G. O.

Viella, 18th March, 1814.

1. The officers in charge of the baggage of the 74th, 83rd, 87th, 88th, 91st, and the paymaster of the 88th regt., are to be put in arrest for neglect of duty in allowing the bāt-men attached to the baggage of their several regiments to put their arms on the mules, contrary to Orders to which their attention was again called only 2 days ago.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests the General Officers commanding the divisions, to march their divisions in columns of 3 men abreast upon all occasions when practicable, excepting when forming to attack an enemy.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests that the following measures may be taken to prevent the baggage from filling and impeding the roads.

4. The General Officers commanding divisions are requested to order one man of the Staff corps to attend to baggage on the march.

5. The officer who will be with the baggage of the leading brigade is to march on one side of the road, and all the baggage is to follow him.

6. The soldiers of the Staff corps are to keep clear on the opposite side of the road a sufficient space for a carriage to pass ; this must be done whether the baggage is moving or halting.



Bordeaux ; et que je ne serai pas obligé de publier les papiers que je mets à présent sous les yeux de votre Altesse Royale, mais votre Altesse Royale me permettra de lui dire que je désire me tenir à l'écart d'une cause qui n'est pas guidée par l'exacte vérité.'

888.

To Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie, K.B.

Tournay, 21st March 1814.

' I beg you to tell the Mayor that, till I can get so forward as to protect the navigation of the Garonne, it is obvious that I cannot accomplish any objects of his application. He should have considered this matter before he proclaimed Louis XVIII.

You will do well to keep your troops as clear of the town and as much collected as possible. If you cannot get them under cover in a suburb, or in some place in which they are well connected, put them in camp if the weather is at all favorable. I mention this, because if the Mayor's account be strictly true there will be most probably a counter revolution in the town, unless I should get on much faster than I believe I shall; or unless the town should be relieved by the navy entering the river, which I do not think they will. This is between ourselves.

Your answer to the Duc d'Angoulême was quite correct. Prevent riot if you can; but you are not strong enough to master the town of Bordeaux, and therefore do not attempt it. On the other hand, they can do you no harm if you do not extend yourself too much, and you are not in the midst of them.'

G. O.

Boulogne, 23rd March, 1814.

1. The Commander of the Forces observes that bullock carts are following many of regiments of the army, as well of cavalry, as of infantry, unattended by their owners, or their servants, and driven by soldiers.

2. It is obvious that these carts have been detained in the service contrary to orders, and the owners have abandoned them rather than to continue to follow the army.

3. The officers of the army must be aware how injurious this system is not only to the country, but to the army itself; the means of transport in the country must be thus destroyed, and probably when the army will be most in want of these means they will fail entirely.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that immediately after the receipt of this order, the Commissaries attached to the divisions, and brigades of infantry, and to regiments of cavalry, will take measures to ascertain what carts there are following the brigades and regiments to which they are attached respectively.

5. If the owners or their servants should be with the carts, they are forthwith to be paid their hire, and sent to their homes. If the owners or their servants are not with the carts, the Commissary attached to the brigade or regiment, is to do every thing in his power to discover at what place, and on what day they were taken into the service, and he is to deliver over to the mayor of the nearest village all the carts with their bullocks not attended by the owners, or their servants, taking his receipt for them, and specifying as far as may be in his power to what village each belongs.

6. The Commissary will by letter apprise the mayor of the village to which any carts belong, at what place, and in whose possession it will be found when sent for.

7. In future the Commander of the Forces desires that the Commissaries attached to brigades of infantry, and regiments of cavalry, will make their requisitions on the mayors of the villages, for any number of carts they may require for a movement, if possible on the preceding day, and he holds them and the commanding officers of regiments responsible that no cart is kept longer than for the day's march, and that the owner is forthwith paid and discharged.

8. If a cart owner or his servant should at any time abandon his cart, it is not to be detained by the regiment and driven by a soldier, but is to be delivered over to the nearest mayor by the Commissary attached to the brigade, or regiment, taking his receipt for the same, and apprising him to what village it belongs.

9. The

889.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

St. Lys, 27th March, 1814.

' Since I have entered France I have had more business than usual; and the Duc d'Angoulême and the emigrants, and an agent who was here from the Prince Royal of Sweden, occupied much more of my leisure than was quite fair to others. I am generally on horseback all day, and when I do write, it is after dinner. I do not write, therefore, more than is absolutely necessary; and if I did not write to you, it was because I had nothing to tell you that you would not see in the dispatches.'

890.

To H. R. H. the Duc d'Angoulême.

Seysse, 29th March, 1814.

' I had only this day the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' commands of the 18th and 24th instant; and as they relate to several points on which I wish to express myself with precision, and as I write with most facility in English, I take the liberty of addressing your Royal Highness in that language.

I am much concerned to find that the statement which I had repeatedly the honor of making to your Royal Highness of the principles on which I was determined to act in regard to the cause of your Royal Highness' family in France, had made so little impression on your Royal Highness' mind, as that your Royal Highness did not perceive, till you had read my letter of the 16th, that the proclamation of the mayor of Bordeaux was not consistent with what I had declared to your Royal Highness. This circumstance renders caution on my part more than ever necessary. I am not acting as an individual; I am at the head of the army, and the confidential agent of three independent nations; and supposing that, as an individual, I could submit to have my views and intentions in such a case misrepresented, as the General of the Allied army, I cannot.

I enclose to your Royal Highness the copy of a paper given, I believe, by your Royal Highness to Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie, which shows the consequences of these misrepresentations. I occupied Bordeaux with a detachment of the army in the course of my operations, and certain persons in the city of Bordeaux, contrary to my advice and opinion, thought proper to proclaim King Louis XVIII. These persons have made no exertion whatever; they have not subscribed a shilling for the support of the cause, and they have not raised a single soldier; and then, because I do not extend the posts of the army under my command beyond what I think proper and convenient, and their properties and families are exposed, not on account of their exertions in the cause (for they have made none), but on account of their premature declaration contrary to my advice, I am to be blamed, and, in a manner, called to account.

9. The Commander of the Forces desires that the Commissaries attached to brigades of infantry, and regiments of cavalry, will report to the Commissary General for the information of the Commander of the Forces, in detail the measures which they will have adopted in consequence of this Order, specifying what number of carts they have given up, belonging to what villages, when taken, and to the mayor of what village given up.

10. The Commander of the Forces expects this report by the 26th instant.

11. This Order is to be attended to by the Portuguese, as well as by the British troops.



My experience of revolutionary wars taught me what I had to expect, and induced me to warn your Royal Highness not to be in a hurry.

I beg your Royal Highness to tell the writer of this paper, and all such persons, that no power on earth shall induce me to depart from what I conceive to be my duty towards the Sovereigns whom I am serving; and that I will not risk even a company of infantry to save properties and families, placed in a state of danger, contrary to my advice and opinion.

In reply to your Royal Highness' letter of the 24th instant, and upon the whole of this subject, I have to state that I earnestly hope your Royal Highness will shape your conduct, and your Royal Highness' counsellors will advise you to draw your proclamations and declarations in such manner, as that I may not be under the necessity of declaring, by proclamation, what my opinions and principles have invariably been, and what I have repeatedly declared to your Royal Highness.

1st. I consider your Royal Highness free to act exactly as your Royal Highness may think proper, without consulting my opinion in any manner. All that I ask is, that neither my name, nor the name, nor the authority of the allied Governments, may be adduced, more particularly when I am not consulted; or, if consulted, when I have given my opinion against the measure adopted.

2nd. I told your Royal Highness that, if any great town or extensive district should declare itself in favor of your Royal Highness' family, I would interfere in no manner with the government of that town or district; and that, if there was a general declaration throughout the country in favor of your House, I should deliver into your hands the government of the whole country which should have been overrun by our armies. The fact is, that the declaration even at Bordeaux is not unanimous; that the spirit has not spread elsewhere, not even into La Vendée, nor in any part that I know of occupied by the army. The events in my contemplation, therefore, have not occurred; and I should be guilty of a gross breach of my duty to the allied Sovereigns, and of cruelty to the inhabitants of the country, if I were to deliver them over to your Royal Highness prematurely or contrary to their inclinations.

I have never interfered in any manner with the government of the town of Bordeaux; and I recommend it to your Royal Highness to withdraw M. de Carrère from the department des Landes. I wish that it had not been necessary for me to write as I did to M. de Tholozé; and it will be very disagreeable to me to take any step which shall mark more strongly a want of understanding between your Royal Highness and me; but I cannot allow the honor and character of the allied Sovereigns, or my own, to be doubted even for a moment.

3rd. I entertain no doubt whatever, that when once there is any declaration in favor of the cause of your Royal Highness' family, it is important that it should be general; and I sincerely wish it was so. But I can interfere in no manner to produce this general declaration; nay, more, I must, as an honest man, acquaint all those who shall talk to me upon the subject with the state of affairs between the Allies and the existing Government of France, as I have done to this moment.

I do not recollect any particular conversation between M. de Viel Castel

and me in relation to Pau, excepting to the purport and on the principles above recited.

It is not in my power, under existing circumstances, to make your Royal Highness the advance of money you desire; and indeed, after what has passed, I doubt whether I do not exceed the line of my duty in affording your cause any countenance or support whatever.

In answer to the note enclosed by your Royal Highness, drawn by your Royal Highness' council in the name of your Royal Highness, it appears to me to be written in the same erroneous view with the proclamation of the Mayor of Bordeaux.

The object of the note is to show that I am bound to support the operations of your Royal Highness' Government by the military power of the army, because your Royal Highness entered the country with the army, and I have been the passive spectator of the declaration of a part of the city of Bordeaux in favor of your Royal Highness' family. If I am to be bound by such means to employ the army in this manner, it is still more incumbent upon me, than it was before, to be cautious as to the degree of encouragement (and to speak plainly, permission) I shall give to the measures taken by your Royal Highness' adherents, to induce the people in any district occupied by the army to declare in your Royal Highness' favor.

I must say also that it is a curious demand to make upon me, who, in any light, can only be considered as an ally, to furnish troops to support the operations of your Royal Highness' civil Government; when I ought to have a right to expect military assistance from your Royal Highness against the common enemy.

In answer to this note I must tell your Royal Highness that, until I shall see a general and free declaration of the people in favor of your Royal Highness' family, such as I know they are disposed and pant for an opportunity to make, I will not give the assistance of the troops under my command to support any system of taxation or of civil government which your Royal Highness may attempt to establish; and I hope your Royal Highness will not attempt to establish such a system beyond Bordeaux.

In regard to the notes upon tobacco, salt, and colonial produce, I will consider of them, and will give your Royal Highness an answer by an early opportunity.'

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891.

To H. R. H. the Duc d'Angoulême.

Seysse, 30th March, 1814.

' Since I had the honor of addressing your Royal Highness last night, I have received the enclosed letters from the Mayor and *Sous Préfet* of Dax, which will show your Royal Highness the effect produced in the country by the proclamation of the Mayor of Bordeaux, and the other measures since adopted by your Royal Highness.

It appears plainly by these papers that it was generally understood throughout the country that the Allies were pledged to give protection to those who should declare in favor of your Royal Highness' family, an understanding directly inconsistent with the fact; and which I must take the earliest opportunity of setting right.

I am not able to do much to forward your Royal Highness' views, and



am very desirous of avoiding to do any thing to injure them ; and I wish to leave to your Royal Highness to determine the mode in which the truth shall be made known, as it must be made known to the public. I must inform your Royal Highness, however, that, if I am not acquainted, in 10 days, that some mode has been adopted by your Royal Highness of contradicting the objectionable parts of the proclamation of the Mayor of Bordeaux, I must publicly contradict them myself.

Your Royal Highness will, I hope, do me the justice to believe that I should not have pressed this matter so seriously upon your attention if I did not think it necessary ; and that it is not probable I should ever have had a difference of opinion with your Royal Highness if I had been treated with common fairness, or with truth, by the Mayor of Bordeaux.’

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892.

PROCLAMATION.

Au Quartier Général, ce 1 Avril, 1814.

1°. Les maires, ayant sous leurs ordres les gardes communales, sont responsables envers le Commandant en Chef pour la tranquillité de leurs communes respectives ; et ils feront désarmer tous ceux qu'ils suspecteront avoir l'intention de l'interrompre.

2°. Le Commandant en Chef fait savoir aux habitans du pays que les loix de la guerre ne permettent pas que l'habitant, demeurant dans son village, fasse en même temps le métier de soldat. Il faut que ceux qui désirent être soldats aillent servir dans les rangs ennemis ; et que ceux qui désirent vivre tranquillement chez eux, sous la protection du Commandant en Chef, ne portent pas les armes.

3°. Le Commandant en Chef ne permettra à qui que ce soit de faire les deux métiers ; et toute personne non militaire qui sera trouvée en armes sur les derrières de l'armée (excepté ceux dans les gardes communales employées sous les ordres du maire de la commune, par la permission du Commandant en Chef, énoncée de la manière dite en sa proclamation du 23 Février, No. 18) sera jugée selon les loix militaires, et traitée de la manière que les Généraux ennemis ont traité les Espagnols et les Portugais.

4°. Le Commandant en Chef espère que, comme jusqu'à présent, la tranquillité publique ne sera pas interrompue ; et que la droiture et l'activité des magistrats, et le bon sens des gentilhommes et des citoyens du pays, l'aideront à diminuer les maux de la guerre, malgré les efforts des malveillans et des intéressés à les augmenter. Mais il fait savoir que, s'il vient à être dans le cas de faire avancer des troupes pour conserver la tranquillité publique sur les derrières de l'armée, les frais de l'entretien et de la subsistance de telles troupes seront à la charge du district qui les aura rendu nécessaires.’

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893.

To Earl Bathurst.

Grenade, 7th April, 1814.

‘ Under these circumstances, I beg leave again to draw your Lordship's attention to the state of this army, particularly to that of that most important branch of it, the British infantry. Your Lordship has been informed by my dispatch of the 20th ultimo what troops are employed at Bayonne and

what at Bordeaux; and you will see what remains to be opposed to the united armies of Marshals Soult and Suchet if the garrisons should be set free.

Adverting to the state in which this army took the field in May last, to the number of actions in which it has been engaged, and to the small reinforcements it has received, it is a matter of astonishment that it should now be so strong. But there are limits to the numbers with which it can contend; and I am convinced your Lordship would not wish to see the safety and honor of this handful of brave men depend upon the doubtful exertions and discipline of an undue proportion of Spanish troops.

I draw your Lordship's attention particularly to this subject, from observing in the newspapers that not only the militia battalions had been sent to Holland, as announced by your Lordship, but that battalions of detachments had been formed of the recruits belonging to regiments in this army, and were likewise destined for the same service.

The service in Holland may doubtless be more important to the national interests than that in this country; but I hope it will be considered that that which is most important of all is, not to lose the brave army which has struggled through its difficulties for nearly 6 years.'

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894.

To Earl Bathurst.

Toulouse, 12th April, 1814.

'I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that I entered this town this morning, which the enemy evacuated during the night, retiring by the road of Carcassone.

The continued fall of rain and the state of the river prevented me from laying the bridge till the morning of the 8th, when the Spanish corps and the Portuguese artillery, under the immediate orders of Lieut. General Don M. Freyre, and the head quarters, crossed the Garonne.

We immediately moved forward to the neighbourhood of the town; and the 18th hussars, under the immediate command of Colonel Vivian, had an opportunity of making a most gallant attack upon a superior body of the enemy's cavalry, which they drove through the village of Croix d'Orade, and took about 100 prisoners, and gave us possession of an important bridge over the river Ers, by which it was necessary to pass, in order to attack the enemy's position. Colonel Vivian was unfortunately wounded upon this occasion; and I am afraid that I shall lose the benefit of his assistance for some time.

The town of Toulouse is surrounded on three sides by the canal of Languedoc and the Garonne. On the left of that river, the suburb, which the enemy had fortified with strong field works in front of the ancient wall, formed a good *tête de pont*. They had likewise formed a *tête de pont* at each bridge of the canal, which was besides defended by the fire in some places of musketry, and in all of artillery from the ancient wall of the town. Beyond the canal to the eastward, and between that and the river Ers, is a height which extends as far as Montaudran, and over which pass all the approaches to the canal and town to the eastward, which it defends; and the enemy, in addition to the *têtes de pont* on the bridges of the canal, had for-



tified this height with 5 redoubts, connected by lines of entrenchments and had, with extraordinary diligence, made every preparation for defence. They had likewise broken all the bridges over the Ers within our reach, by which the right of their position could be approached. The roads, however, from the Arriège to Toulouse being impracticable for cavalry or artillery, and nearly so for infantry, as reported in my dispatch to your Lordship of the 1st instant, I had no alternative, excepting to attack the enemy in this formidable position.

It was necessary to move the pontoon bridge higher up the Garonne, in order to shorten the communication with Lieut. General Sir R. Hill's corps, as soon as the Spanish corps had passed; and this operation was not effected till so late an hour on the 9th as to induce me to defer the attack till the following morning.

The plan, according to which I determined to attack the enemy, was for Marshal Sir W. Beresford, who was on the right of the Ers with the 4th and 6th divisions, to cross that river at the bridge of Croix d'Orade, to gain possession of Montblanc, and to march up the left of the Ers to turn the enemy's right, while Lieut. General Don M. Freyre, with the Spanish corps under his command, supported by the British cavalry, should attack the front. Lieut. General Sir S. Cotton was to follow the Marshal's movement with Major General Lord E. Somerset's brigade of hussars; and Colonel Vivian's brigade, under the command of Colonel Arentschildt, was to observe the movements of the enemy's cavalry on both banks of the Ers beyond our left.

The 3rd and Light divisions, under the command of Lieut. General Sir T. Picton and Major General C. Baron Alten, and the brigade of German cavalry, were to observe the enemy on the lower part of the canal, and to draw their attention to that quarter by threatening the *têtes de pont*, while Lieut. General Sir R. Hill was to do the same on the suburb on the left of the Garonne.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford crossed the Ers, and formed his corps in 3 columns of lines in the village of Croix d'Orade, the 4th division leading, with which he immediately carried Montblanc. He then moved up the Ers in the same order, over most difficult ground, in a direction parallel to the enemy's fortified position; and as soon as he reached the point at which he turned it, he formed his lines and moved to the attack. During these operations, Lieut. General Don M. Freyre moved along the left of the Ers to the front of Croix d'Orade, where he formed his corps in 2 lines with a reserve on a height in front of the left of the enemy's position, on which height the Portuguese artillery was placed; and Major General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry in reserve in the rear.

As soon as formed, and that it was seen that Marshal Sir W. Beresford was ready, Lieut. General Don M. Freyre moved forward to the attack. The troops marched in good order, under a very heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and showed great spirit, the General and all his Staff being at their head; and the 2 lines were soon lodged under some banks immediately under the enemy's entrenchments; the reserve and Portuguese artillery, and British cavalry, continuing on the height on which the troops had first formed. The enemy, however, repulsed the movement of the right of General Freyre's

line round their left flank ; and having followed up their success, and turned our right by both sides of the high road leading from Toulouse to Croix d'Orade, they soon compelled the whole corps to retire. It gave me great satisfaction to see that, although they suffered considerably in retiring, the troops rallied again as soon as the Light division, which was immediately on their right, moved up ; and I cannot sufficiently applaud the exertions of Lieut. General Don M. Freyre, the officers of the Staff of the 4th Spanish army, and of the officers of the General Staff, to rally and form them again.

Lieut. General Mendizabal, who was in the field as a volunteer, General Ezpeleta, and several officers and chiefs of corps, were wounded upon this occasion ; but General Mendizabal continued in the field. The regiment de *Tiradores de Cantabria*, under the command of Colonel Leon de Sicilia, kept its position, under the enemy's entrenchments, until I ordered it to retire.

In the mean time, Marshal Sir W. Beresford, with the 4th division, under the command of Lieut. General Sir L. Cole, and the 6th division, under the command of Lieut. General Sir H. Clinton, attacked and carried the heights on the enemy's right, and the redoubt which covered and protected that flank ; and he lodged those troops on the same height with the enemy ; who were, however, still in possession of 4 redoubts, and of the entrenchments and fortified houses.

The badness of the roads had induced the Marshal to leave his artillery in the village of Montblanc ; and some time elapsed before it could be brought to him, and before Lieut. General Don M. Freyre's corps could be re-formed and brought back to the attack. As soon as this was effected, the Marshal continued his movement along the ridge, and carried, with General Pack's brigade of the 6th division, the two principal redoubts and fortified houses in the enemy's centre. The enemy made a desperate effort from the canal to regain these redoubts, but they were repulsed with considerable loss ; and the 6th division continuing its movements along the ridge of the height, and the Spanish troops continuing a corresponding movement upon the front, the enemy were driven from the two redoubts and entrenchments on the left ; and the whole range of heights were in our possession. We did not gain this advantage, however, without severe loss ; particularly in the brave 6th division. Lieut. Colonel Coghlan of the 61st, an officer of great merit and promise, was unfortunately killed in the attack of the heights. Major General Pack was wounded, but was enabled to remain in the field ; and Colonel Douglas, of the 8th Portuguese regt., lost his leg ; and I am afraid that I shall be deprived for a considerable time of his assistance.

The 36th, 42nd, 79th, and 61st, lost considerable numbers, and were highly distinguished throughout the day.

I cannot sufficiently applaud the ability and conduct of Marshal Sir W. Beresford throughout the operations of the day ; nor that of Lieut. Generals Sir L. Cole, Sir H. Clinton, Major Generals Pack and Lambert, and the troops under their command. Marshal Sir W. Beresford particularly reports the good conduct of Brig. General d'Urban, the Quarter Master General, and General Brito Mozinho, the Adjutant General to the Portuguese army.



The 4th division, although exposed on their march along the enemy's front to a galling fire, were not so much engaged as the 6th, and did not suffer so much; but they conducted themselves with their usual gallantry.

I had also every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Lieut. General Don M. Freyre, Lieut. General Don G. Mendizabal, Marisco de Campo Don P. Bárcenas, Brig. Don J. de Ezpeleta, Mariscal de Campo Don A. Garces de Marcilla, and the Chief of the Staff, Don E. S. Salvador, and the officers of the Staff of the 4th army. The officers and troops conducted themselves well in all the attacks which they made subsequent to their being re-formed.

The ground not having admitted of the operations of the cavalry, they had no opportunity of charging.

While the operations above detailed were going on, on the left of the army, Lieut. General Sir R. Hill drove the enemy from their exterior works in the suburb, on the left of the Garonne, within the ancient wall. Lieut. General Sir T. Picton likewise, with the 3rd division, drove the enemy within the *tête de pont* on the bridge of the canal nearest to the Garonne; but the troops having made an effort to carry it they were repulsed, and some loss was sustained. Major General Brisbane was wounded; but I hope not so as to deprive me for any length of time of his assistance; and Lieut. Colonel Forbes, of the 45th, an officer of great merit, was killed.

The army being thus established on 3 sides of Toulouse, I immediately detached our light cavalry to cut off the communication, by the only road practicable for carriages which remained to the enemy, till I should be enabled to make arrangements to establish the troops between the canal and the Garonne.

The enemy, however, retired last night, leaving in our hands General Harispe, General Burot, General St. Hilaire, and 1600 prisoners. One piece of cannon was taken on the field of battle; and others, and large quantities of stores of all descriptions, in the town.

Since I sent my last report, I have received an account from Rear Admiral Penrose of the successes in the Gironde of the boats of the squadron under his command.

Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie crossed the Garonne nearly about the time that Admiral Penrose entered the river, and pushed the enemy's parties under General Lhuillier beyond the Dordogne. He then crossed the Dordogne on the 4th, near St. André de Cubzac, with a detachment of the troops under his command, with a view to the attack of the fort of Blaye. His Lordship found General Lhuillier and General Desbreaux posted near Etauliers, and made his disposition to attack them, when they retired, leaving about 300 prisoners in his hands. I enclose the Earl of Dalhousie's report of this affair.

In the operations which I have now reported, I have had every reason to be satisfied with the assistance I received from the Quarter Master and Adjutant General, and the officers of those departments respectively; from Mariscal de Campo Don L. Wimpffen and the officers of the Spanish Staff, and from Mariscal de Campo Don M. de Alava; from Colonel Dickson, commanding the allied artillery; and from Lieut. Colonel Lord FitzRoy Somerset and the officers of my personal Staff.

895.

To E. Cooke Esq., Under Secretary of State.

Toulouse, 16th April, 1814.

'I have received your letter of the 23rd March, and you will have seen that matters have galloped in France exactly as I said they would, if the allies would declare in favor of the Bourbons.

In regard to my proceedings here, I was bound by my instructions, and cramped by the total ignorance in which I was of the state of the negotiation at Chatillon. You in England gallop very fast, and you think that every thing ought to go on as it appears to you. You forget, however, now and then, that your officers are very strictly instructed, and that those who mean to serve their country well must obey their instructions, however fearless they may be of responsibility. Indeed, I attribute this fearlessness very much to the determination never to disobey, as long as the circumstances exist under which an order is given.'

896.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Toulouse, 30th April, 1814.

'I have likewise to inform you that Lord Castlereagh has expressed a

G. O.

Toulouse, 16th April, 1814.

'1. The General commanding the French troops at Montauban, having announced his submission to the Provisional Government established at Paris, till the arrival of His Majesty Louis XVIII., the Commander of the Forces has agreed to suspend hostilities with the said General; the allied troops, therefore, are not to pass the Tarn below Ville Brumier, or to approach nearer to Montauban than that place, or than three quarters of a league from Montauban on the road to Toulouse.

2. The communication through Montauban is, however, open for couriers, &c. &c. to Paris and Bordeaux.

3. The Commander of the Forces in publishing in the General Orders of the army the following letter from H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, written in consequence of the complaints which the Commander of the Forces forwarded of the conduct of Colonel ———, and of Colonel ———, takes this opportunity of expressing his approbation of the conduct of the army in general, since the troops have passed the French frontier, and of returning his thanks to the General Officers of the army in particular, and to the officers for the attention they have paid to the discipline of the troops.

4. There have been some exceptions, certainly, which the Commander of the Forces has been obliged to notice, but they are principally among those whose experience of the evils to be apprehended from allowing the troops to ill treat and plunder the inhabitants, and from want of attention to the Orders of the army, is more limited than that of others.

5. The Commander of the Forces trusts that the officers of the army are aware of the advantages which have been derived from the good conduct of the troops; and that they will never forget that it is as much their duty towards their own country, and the troops under their command, to prevent them from injuring and ill treating the people inhabiting the country become the theatre of the operations of the war, as it is to set them the example of courage and conduct, to lead, animate, and direct them when opposed to the enemy in the field.'

G. O.

Toulouse, 21st April, 1814.

'1. The Commander of the Forces has the pleasure to inform the army that he has agreed upon the following convention for the suspension of hostilities between the Allied Armies under his command, and the French armies opposed to them, and hostilities are forthwith to be suspended accordingly.

2. Upon congratulating the army upon this prospect of an honorable termination of their labors, the Commander of the Forces avails himself of the opportunity of returning the General Officers, officers, and troops, his best thanks for their uniform discipline, and gallantry in the field, and for their conciliating conduct towards the inhabitants of the country, which, almost in an equal degree with their discipline and gallantry in the field, have produced the fortunate circumstances which now hold forth to the world, the prospect of genuine and permanent peace.

3. The Commander of the Forces trusts that they will continue the same good conduct while it may be necessary to detain them in this country, and that they will leave it with a lasting reputation, not less creditable to their gallantry and spirit in the field, than to their regularity and good conduct in quarters and in camp.'



desire that I should accept the embassy to Paris, which I have not declined. I must serve the public in some manner or other; and, as under existing circumstances I could not well do so at home, I must do so abroad.'

## 897.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Paris, 9th May, 1814.

'I have received your Lordship's letter of the 3rd, and I beg that you will lay before H. R. H. the Prince Regent my grateful acknowledgments for the fresh marks which your Lordship has announced to me of His Royal Highness' grace and favor.\* Nothing can be more satisfactory to me than that His Royal Highness should have rewarded the services and merits of my gallant coadjutors, who, I am sure, feel equally grateful with me for His Royal Highness' favors, and are equally desirous of aiding by every means in their power to forward His Royal Highness' views for the prosperity of his Kingdom.† I beg your Lordship also to accept my thanks for your favorable recommendation of my services to His Royal Highness.

I return to the army to-morrow, in order to carry into execution the convention with the French Government, and the orders of the Government for the expedition.

I propose to go to Madrid in order to try whether I cannot prevail upon all parties to be more moderate, and to adopt a constitution more likely to be practicable and to contribute to the peace and happiness of the nation. I am afraid that I shall not be in England till the end of June; but I hope I shall be able to do much good by this journey. A very short time in England will enable me to settle all that I have to do there.'

## 898.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Paris, 9th May, 1814.

'I have been informed only since I arrived here of the Prince Regent's kindness to my mother last year, upon the occasion of the battle of Vitoria; and I am afraid that I shall have appeared insensible of it in not taking an earlier opportunity of making my grateful acknowledgments for it.

I beg that you will inform His Royal Highness that, strange as it may appear, I was not aware till within these few days of this mark of his favor, for which I am equally grateful as for the many others with which he has honored me.'

## 899.

To General C. de Lameth, commanding at Santoña.

Toulouse, 15th May, 1814.

'I beg leave to observe to you, however, that misrepresentation of facts is the common practice of the writers for newspapers, particularly of those who, when they happen to get an authentic document into their possession, prefer to give to their readers an abstract, or what they conceive the sense of the document, instead of the document itself.

I have long learnt to despise this description of misrepresentation; and I beg leave to recommend to you to take no notice of that respecting yourself, or, if you do notice it, to confine yourself to the republication of the convention between yourself and General San Llorente.'

\* Advancement to a Dukedom.

† Peerages to Sir J. Hope, Sir T. Graham, Sir S. Cotton, Sir R. Hill, and Sir W. C. Beresford.

900.

## MEMORANDUM.

To His Most Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII., King of Spain.

The Spanish nation having been engaged for 6 years in one of the most terrible and disastrous contests by which any nation was ever afflicted, its territory having been entirely occupied by the enemy, the country torn to pieces by internal divisions, its ancient constitution having been destroyed, and vain attempts made to establish a new one; its marine, its commerce, and revenue entirely annihilated: its colonies in a state of rebellion, and nearly lost to the mother country; it becomes a question for serious consideration, what line of policy should be adopted by His Majesty upon his happy restoration to his throne and authority.

In considering this question, I shall lay aside all national partialities and prejudices; and I shall go so far as to admit what neither His Majesty nor the people of Spain will be disposed to admit, that the conduct which Great Britain has held during the war is to be put entirely out of the question; and that His Majesty has the right, not only in fact, but in justice, to choose between the lines of policy and alliance which may be offered to his acceptance.

The restoration of the ancient Government in France is certainly a new feature in the political situation of the whole world; and it is but fair to give due weight to this event in a consideration of the affairs of Spain.

Spain, like Great Britain, is essentially confined within what may be called its natural limits. His Majesty cannot hope to hold a dominion beyond those limits for any length of time, or to possess an influence which the natural strength of his government would not otherwise give him. In the last century, by a particular chain of circumstances, Spain was enabled to establish a part of the Royal family in Italy. But, however close the relationship still existing between the reigning House in Spain and those branches of it, they have been of but little use to Spain in the various wars which have occurred since that period in the last and present centuries. Those powers, like others, have necessarily followed the system which best suited their own interests; and have adhered to Spain only in the instances in which this adhesion was likely to be beneficial to themselves. This is owing to the peninsular situation of Spain, and affords the strongest practical proof, how little it suits the interests of Spain to push political objects beyond the boundary of her natural limits. If this were not true, it will be admitted that the first object for every rational government to attend to is the internal interests of the country under its charge; and this object is to be preferred doubly when, as it happens, the state of Europe at the moment renders probable a long peace.

There is no doubt, then, that the objects of His Majesty will be the amelioration of the internal situation of his Kingdom, the restoration of its marine, its commerce, and revenue, and the settlement of its colonies.

Supposing France, under its new government, to be more capable or better disposed than Great Britain to forward His Majesty's objects abroad, which may be doubted, it remains to be seen which of the powers is most likely to forward the objects of his internal government, and to enable him to restore



his monarchy to its ancient splendor. France, like all the other nations of Europe, has suffered considerably by the war, and is now but little capable of giving His Majesty the assistance which he requires for the attainment of any of the objects for which assistance is wanted.

Notwithstanding the restoration of the ancient government in France, this country will not easily forget the injuries which it has received from the French armies; and the unpopularity which will attend an alliance with France, connected, as it probably will be, with a dereliction of the alliance with Great Britain, will greatly increase the difficulties of His Majesty's situation.

The revival of the commerce of Spain is an object of the utmost importance, not only for the people, but for the Government itself; but there is no doubt that the commerce with the richer country (Great Britain) will be far more profitable than that with the poorer; particularly in those articles in which consist principally the riches of Spain. The cheapness also, and goodness, in respect to their price, of all the manufactures of Great Britain, are an additional inducement to prefer them, as they will bear on importation larger duties than those of any other country. It must besides be observed that some commercial arrangement with Great Britain is most desirable to Spain; as till such a one is made, it will be impossible to prevent the contraband trade which is now carried on so much to the prejudice of that country.

But the principal object for the attention of the King's Government at the present moment is the settlement of the colonies. The only mode of effecting any desirable arrangement is, that the Spanish Government should open themselves entirely upon the question, and come to a clear understanding with Great Britain. It may be depended upon that, if Spain is cordially and intimately connected with Great Britain, the British Ministers are too well acquainted with the interests of their country to think of risking their connexion with Spain for a little more of the trade to the Spanish colonies in America. They may be of opinion that, under existing circumstances, it is desirable for Spain to alter the nature of her connexion with her colonies, and to hold them as dependent or federated states, rather than as colonies; and they may wish that the King's subjects should participate in the supposed benefits of this commerce; but they cannot oppose the right which the Spanish Government have to make such arrangements upon those points as they may think most beneficial to their own interests; and a good understanding once established, Great Britain will cordially support those arrangements to the utmost of her power.

But besides those difficulties which must occur in the settlement with the colonies, from the want of a firm alliance and good understanding with the British Government on that subject, which may be attributed to His Majesty's subjects, there are others of far greater magnitude, which are to be attributed to the United States. It will not be denied that, in the existing state of the finances of Spain and of her marine, His Majesty could not hope to coerce the government of the United States, either to do His Majesty justice in regard to parts of his territories in America which they have unjustifiably seized, or to refrain from aiding and abetting the rebellion of his subjects in the colonies. These objects can be effected only by the

interference of the British Government ; and it may be depended upon, that, however interested Great Britain may be to prevent the growth of the power of the United States, the British Ministers will not increase the difficulties of their peace with that power by introducing into the negotiations questions on Spanish interests, if there should not be a clear and decided understanding between His Majesty and the Prince Regent on all points, not only regarding America, but Europe ; and that they should be quite certain that under no circumstances will Great Britain again see Spain in alliance with her rivals in Europe, or in the ranks of her enemies.

It appears, then, that all the domestic interests of Spain are most likely to be promoted by a good understanding and cementing the alliance with Great Britain ; and the more minutely this part of the subject is viewed, the more clearly will it appear that such understanding is desirable, if not necessary to Spain.

The finances of Spain are in the utmost disorder, the revenue is unproductive, if not nearly destroyed, and is, at all events, quite unequal to the expenses. But, before those expenses can even be reduced by the reduction of the military establishments, money must be found to pay the arrears of the army. The various political events which have occurred must have shaken the credit of the Spanish Government ; and, even if the Government had credit, there is but little money in the country which could be borrowed as a resource. England alone can be looked to for assistance in this respect.

It cannot be expected, however, that the British Government will come forward with the resources of the British nation to aid His Majesty, if they are not certain of the line of policy which His Majesty will adopt both in America and in Europe ; neither will it be in their power to give that aid which every well wisher of His Majesty would wish to see afforded, if His Majesty should not at an early period carry into execution his gracious promises made to his subjects in his decree of the 4th May ; and if some steps should not be taken to prove to the world the necessity and justice of the numerous arrests which attended His Majesty's restoration to his throne, or for the release of the innocent and the judicial trial of the guilty.

All nations are interested in these measures, but Great Britain in particular ; and the nature of the British constitution, and the necessity which the Government are under of guiding their measures in a great degree by the wishes and sentiments of the people, must prevent them from giving aid to His Majesty in money, or from giving countenance to the endeavors which may be made to raise money by loan in England, at least till the world shall be convinced by experience of the sincerity of His Majesty's professions in regard to his own subjects, and of his desire to unite his interests with those of the British Government.

Great Britain is materially interested in the prosperity and greatness of Spain, and a good understanding and close alliance with Spain is highly important to her ; and she will make sacrifices to obtain it ; and there is no act of kindness which may not be expected from such an ally. But it cannot be expected from Great Britain, that she will take any steps for the firm establishment of a government which she shall see in a fair way of connecting itself with her rival, and of eventually becoming her enemy ; like other nations, she must by prudence and foresight provide for her own interests by other modes, if circumstances should prevent His Majesty from



connecting himself with Great Britain, as it appears by the reasoning in this memorandum is desirable to him.'

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901.

To His Excellency the Minister at War, Madrid.

Madrid, 2nd June, 1814.

'In my dispatch of the 17th March last, I recommended that the infantry should be formed into regiments, each regiment being of 2 battalions, and each battalion of 6 companies, of from 100 to 150 men. It would be a more economical arrangement, and would suit better the political situation of Spain and its relations with its colonies, if the Spanish infantry were formed into regiments, each consisting of 3, or even 4 battalions, and each battalion of 6 companies; the regiment to be commanded by a Colonel, and each of the battalions by a Lieut. Colonel or Major; and this system might afford the best means of settling the questions about the rank and commissions of the officers adverted to in my dispatch of October or November, written from Vera.

The Government would then have it in their power to send upon service either 1, 2, or 3 battalions of each regiment; keeping at the dépôt, for the formation of recruits, one; and those of the others not employed on service would conduct from the dépôt to the battalions in the field such of the recruits as might be destined for them.'

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902.

To H. M. C. M. the King of Spain.

à Bordeaux, ce 13 Juin, 1814.

'Les troupes de votre Majesté ayant passé la frontière, et la paix ayant été signée à Paris, le temps est arrivé où je peux mettre aux pieds de votre Majesté ma démission de ma charge de Commandant en Chef de vos armées, sans inconvénient pour votre service.

J'occuperais inutilement le temps et l'attention de votre Majesté si j'entrais dans aucun détail de la situation où j'ai trouvé, ou de celle où je laisse les armées. L'honneur que votre Majesté m'a fait par sa réception gracieuse récemment à Madrid, démontre qu'elle la connaît, et je prie votre Majesté de croire que je suis sensible à toutes ses bontés, et qu'en même temps que je désire très ardemment qu'elle n'ait plus besoin de mes services, je la prie de m'en donner le commandement quand bon lui semblera.

Je ne peux pas finir cependant sans recommander aux bontés et aux grâces de votre Majesté les Généraux, officiers, et soldats de son armée. Quoiqu'étranger, j'ai toujours reçu des premiers toute l'aide qu'il était en leur pouvoir de me donner; et je me trouverai toujours heureux de donner mon témoignage aux vertus militaires des soldats Espagnols.'

G. O.

Bordeaux, 14th June, 1814.

1. The Commander of the Forces being upon the point of returning to England, again takes this opportunity of congratulating the army upon the recent events which have restored peace to their country, and to the world.

2. The share which the British army have had in producing those events, and the high character with which the army will quit this country, must be equally satisfactory to every individual belonging to it, as they are to the Commander of the Forces, and he trusts that the troops will continue the same good conduct to the last.

3. The Commander of the Forces once more requests the army to accept his thanks.

4. Although circumstances may alter the relations in which he has stood towards them for some years so much to his satisfaction, he assures them he will never cease to feel the warmest interest in their welfare and honor, and that he will be at all times happy to be of any service to those, to whose conduct, discipline, and gallantry, their country is so much indebted.'

## 903.

The *Annual Register* and the *Annals of Parliament* give the following details of the proceedings which took place on the Duke of Wellington taking his seat in the House of Peers :\*—

‘ On the 28th June, shortly after 3 o’clock, the Lord Chancellor having taken his seat, the Duke of Wellington was introduced, supported by the Dukes of Richmond and Beaufort, in military uniform, and in their ducal robes. Being arrived in the body of the House, the Duke made the usual obeisance to the Lord Chancellor, and showed his patent and right of summons : these noblemen then approached the table, where his Grace’s various patents, as Baron and Viscount, Earl, Marquis, and lastly as Duke, were each read by the clerks. The oaths were then administered, and the Test Rolls were signed by him. He then, accompanied by his noble supporters, took his seat on the Dukes’ bench, and saluted the House in the usual manner, by rising, taking off his hat, and bowing respectfully.

The Lord Chancellor then rose, and, pursuant to their Lordships’ order, addressed his Grace.

“ MY LORD DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

I have received the commands of this House, which, I am persuaded, has witnessed with infinite satisfaction your Grace’s personal introduction into this august assembly, to return your Grace the thanks and acknowledgments of this House, for your great and eminent services to your King and country.

In the execution of these commands, I cannot forbear to call the especial attention of all who hear me to a fact in your Grace’s life, singular, I believe, in the history of the country, and infinitely honorable to your Grace, that you have manifested, upon your first entrance into this House, your right, under various grants, to all the dignities in the Peerage of this realm which the Crown can confer. These dignities have been conferred at various periods, but in the short compass of little more than 4 years, for great public services, occurring in rapid succession, claiming the favor of the Crown, influenced by its sense of justice to your Grace and the country ; and on no one occasion in which the Crown has thus rewarded your merits have the Houses of Parliament been inattentive to your demands upon the gratitude of the country. Upon all such occasions they have offered to your Grace their acknowledgments and thanks, the highest honors they could bestow.

I decline all attempts to state your Grace’s eminent merits in your military character ; to represent those brilliant actions, those illustrious achievements, which have attached immortality to the name of Wellington, and which have given to this country a degree of glory unexampled in the annals of this Kingdom. In thus acting, I believe I best consult the feelings which evince your Grace’s title to the character of a truly great and illustrious man.

\* The Duke of Wellington quitted Bordeaux for London, where he arrived on the 23rd June, when, finding that his H.R.H. the Prince Regent was at Portsmouth with the Emperor of Russia, King of Prussia, &c., to review the fleet, he proceeded there on the 24th, to pay his respects to His Royal Highness.

The enthusiastic and grateful acclamations with which His Grace was greeted whenever he appeared in public, are mentioned by those who were witnesses to them, and by the periodical writers of the day, as being beyond description.



My duty to this House cannot but make me most anxious not to fall short of the expectation which the House may have formed as to the execution of what may have been committed to me on this great occasion; but the most anxious consideration which I have given to the nature of that duty has convinced me that I cannot more effectually do justice to the judgment of the House, than by referring your Grace to the terms and language in which the House has so repeatedly expressed its own sense of the distinguished and consummate wisdom and judgment, the skill and ability, the prompt energy, the indefatigable exertion, the perseverance, the fortitude, and the valor, by which the victories of Vimeiro, Talavera, Salamanca, and Vitoria were achieved; by which the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz were gloriously terminated; by which the deliverance of Portugal was effectuated; by which the ever memorable establishment of the allied armies on the frontiers of France was accomplished; armies pushing forward, in the glory of victory at Orthez, to the occupation of Bordeaux.

These achievements, in their immediate consequence infinitely beneficial to the common cause, have, in their final results, secured the peace, prosperity, and glory of this country; whilst your Grace's example has animated to great exertions the other nations of Europe, exertions rescuing them from tyranny, and restoring them to independence, by which there has been ultimately established among all the nations of Europe that balance of power which, giving sufficient strength to every nation, provides that no nation shall be too strong.

I presume not to trespass upon the House by representing the personal satisfaction which I have derived from being the honored instrument of conveying to your Grace the acknowledgments and thanks of this House upon every occasion upon which they have been offered to your Grace, or by endeavoring to represent the infinite gratification which I enjoy in thus offering, on the behalf of the House, on this day, to your Grace in person, those acknowledgments and those thanks. Your Grace is now called to aid hereafter, by your wisdom and judgment, the great council of that nation, to the peace, prosperity, and glory of which your Grace has already so essentially contributed; and I tender your Grace, now taking your seat in this House, in obedience to its commands, the thanks of the House in the words of its resolution:—That the thanks of this House be given to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, on his return from his command abroad, for his eminent and unremitting service to His Majesty and to the public."

The Duke answered the address to the following effect:—

"My Lords; I have to perform a duty to which I feel myself very inadequate, to return your Lordships my thanks for the fresh mark of your approbation of my conduct and of your favor.

I assure your Lordships that I am entirely overcome by the honors which have been conferred upon me; and by the favor with which I have been received in this country by the Prince Regent, by your Lordships, and by the public.

In truth, my Lords, when I reflect upon the advantages which I enjoyed in the confidence reposed in me, and the support afforded by the Government, and by H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, in the cordial assistance which I invariably received upon all occasions from my gallant friends the General

Officers of the army, who are an honor to their country, the gallantry and discipline of the troops, and in the manner in which I was encouraged and excited to exertion by the protection and gracious favor of the Prince, I cannot but consider that, however great the difficulties with which I had to contend, the means to contend with them were equal to overcome them; and I am apprehensive that I shall not be found so deserving of your favor as I wish.

If, however, my merit is not great, my gratitude is unbounded; and I can only assure your Lordships that you will always find me ready to serve His Majesty to the utmost of my ability in any capacity in which my services can be at all useful to this great country."

His Grace then retired to unrobe. He wore a Field Marshal's uniform, with his insignia of the Garter. On his return into the House, he sat for a few minutes on the extremity of one of the benches, and then retired for the evening.

In addition to the pecuniary remuneration voted by Parliament to the Duke of Wellington for his distinguished services,\* the House of Commons resolved to pay him the highest tribute of respect and applause that it was possible to bestow on a subject, that of its thanks, accompanied with a deputation of its members to congratulate him on his return to this country. Lord Castlereagh rose in the House on the 27th June, to make a motion for this purpose, which was unanimously agreed to; and a committee was appointed to wait on His Grace, to know what time he would name for receiving the congratulations of the House. Lord Castlereagh having reported from the Committee that it was the Duke's desire to express to the House his answer in person, the following day, July 1st, was appointed for the solemnity.

At about a quarter before five, the Speaker being dressed in his official robes, and the House being crowded with members, some of them in military and naval uniforms, and many in the Court dresses in which they had been attending the Speaker with an address to the Prince Regent on the peace, the House was acquainted that the Duke of Wellington was in waiting. His admission being resolved, and a chair being set for him on the left hand of the bar towards the middle of the House, His Grace entered, making his obeisances, while all the members rose from their seats. The Speaker then

\* 'On May 10th, a message from the Prince Regent was communicated to the House of Commons, the purpose of which was to inform the House that His Royal Highness had conferred upon that victorious commander the rank and title of a Duke and Marquis of the United Kingdom, and recommending the grant to him and his successors of such an annuity as might support the high dignity of the title conferred, and prove a lasting memorial of the gratitude and munificence of the nation.

The message being taken into consideration on the 12th, the Chancellor of the Exchequer rose to call the attention of the House to the distinguished services of the Duke of Wellington, and the Speaker moved the resolution, "That the sum of £10,000 be paid annually out of the consolidated fund for the use of the Duke of Wellington, to be at any time commuted for the sum of £300,000, to be laid out in the purchase of an estate."

Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Ponsonby, and Mr. Canning, who followed, all agreed in the high merits of the noble Duke, and objected to the grant as too small, especially since a large sum would be necessary for a mansion suitable to the dignity conferred upon him. A motion was in consequence made for an additional £100,000, making in all the sum of half a million granted to the Duke, which passed *nem. con.*

A similar message from the Prince Regent being communicated to the House of Lords, an equal unanimity took place in the proceedings upon it. On this occasion Lord Liverpool moved the same grants to the Duke which were first proposed in the other House.

At the same time, in consequence of messages from the Prince Regent, pecuniary grants were made by parliament to Lord Wellington's associates in victory, Generals Hope, Graham, Cotton, Hill, and Beresford, now raised to the peerage.'



informing him that a chair was placed for his repose, he sat down in it for some time covered, the Serjeant standing on his right hand with the mace grounded,\* and the members resumed their seats. He then rose, and spoke, uncovered, to the following effect :

“ Mr. Speaker ; I was anxious to be permitted to attend this House, in order to return my thanks in person for the honor they have done me in deputing a committee of their members to congratulate me on my return to this country ; and this, after the House had animated my exertions by their applause upon every occasion which appeared to merit their approbation, and after they had filled up the measure of their favors by conferring upon me, at the recommendation of the Prince Regent, the noblest gift that any subject had ever received.

I hope it will not be deemed presumptuous in me to take this opportunity of expressing my admiration of the great efforts made by this House and the country at a moment of unexampled pressure and difficulty, in order to support the great scale of operations by which the contest was brought to so fortunate a termination. By the wise policy of parliament, the Government was enabled to give the necessary support to the operations which were carried on under my direction ; and I was encouraged, by the confidence reposed in me by His Majesty’s Ministers, and by the Commander in Chief, by the gracious favor of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, and by the reliance which I had on the support of my gallant friends, the General Officers of the army, and on the bravery of the officers and troops, to carry on the operations in such a manner as to acquire for me those marks of the approbation of this House, for which I have now the honor to make my humble acknowledgments.

Sir, it is impossible for me to express the gratitude which I feel ; I can only assure the House that I shall always be ready to serve His Majesty in any capacity in which my services can be deemed useful, with the same zeal for my country which has already acquired for me the approbation of this House.”

This speech was received with loud cheers, at the end of which the Speaker, who had sat covered during its delivery, rose, and thus addressed His Grace :

“ My Lord ; since last I had the honor of addressing you from this place, a series of eventful years has elapsed ; but none without some mark and note of your rising glory.

The military triumphs which your valor has achieved upon the banks of the Douro and the Tagus, of the Ebro and the Garonne, have called forth the spontaneous shouts of admiring nations. Those triumphs it is needless on this day to recount. Their names have been written by your conquering sword in the annals of Europe, and we shall hand them down with exultation to our children’s children.

It is not, however, the grandeur of military success which has alone fixed our admiration, or commanded our applause ; it has been that generous and lofty spirit which inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and taught them to know that the day of battle was always a day of victory ; that moral courage and enduring fortitude, which, in perilous times, when gloom and

\* See Southey’s History, vol. vi. p. 468, 8vo. ed.

doubt had beset ordinary minds, stood nevertheless unshaken; and that ascendancy of character, which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled you to wield at will the fate and fortunes of mighty empires.

For the repeated thanks and grants bestowed upon you by this House, in gratitude for your many and eminent services, you have thought fit this day to offer us your acknowledgments: but this nation well knows that it is still largely your debtor. It owes to you the proud satisfaction, that, amidst the constellation of great and illustrious warriors who have recently visited our country, we could present to them a leader of our own, to whom all, by common acclamation, conceded the pre-eminence; and when the will of Heaven, and the common destinies of our nature, shall have swept away the present generation, you will have left your great name and example as an imperishable monument, exciting others to like deeds of glory, and serving at once to adorn, defend, and perpetuate the existence of this country amongst the ruling nations of the earth.

It now remains only that we congratulate your Grace upon the high and important mission on which you are about to proceed, and we doubt not that the same splendid talents, so conspicuous in war, will maintain, with equal authority, firmness, and temper, our national honor and interests in peace."

His Grace then withdrew, making the same obeisances as when he entered; and all the members rising again, he was reconducted by the Serjeant to the door of the House. After he was gone, Lord Castlereagh moved, that what the Duke had said on returning thanks to the House, together with the Speaker's answer, be printed in the votes, which was agreed to *nem. con* '.

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904.

To Major General ———.

London, 11th July, 1814.

' I received your letter of the 12th May, conveying a complaint of one written to you by Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie; and, having called upon his Lordship and received his explanation of the circumstances which had occurred, and had induced his Lordship to write that letter, I wished to omit taking any further notice of the transaction, and should now refrain from noticing it, if you had not again expressed an urgent desire that I should.

There is no doubt that the regular and usual channel for the conveyance of all orders from a Lieutenant General to the troops under his command, whether of general direction or of detail, is through the General Officer immediately in command of them; and that the orders for the march of the ———, commanded by ———, on the 2nd and 3rd May, ought, according to all the rules, to have been sent through you. It appears that the Lieutenant General was not unmindful, as he could not have been ignorant, of this the commonest rule of all services, as he did send you on the 1st May the order for the march of that battalion through the Assistant Adjutant General attached to him.

But, although this is the rule of the service, and it is generally observed, the convenience of the service occasionally requires a departure from it; and it frequently happens that a superior is under the necessity of sending his orders direct to the troops which are to execute them, without passing through the channel of the General Officer who immediately commands them.



The Lieutenant General and the Deputy Quarter Master General declare that they believed this was the case in the instance under consideration. The situation of your quarters was not exactly known to them, and they were supposed to be much more distant from the cantonments of ——'s battalion than they really were; and the desire that the order should reach the battalion in time to enable the men to commence their march at an early hour on the 2nd was the real, and, in fact, a good reason for departing from the ordinary rule in that instance.

I now come to consider your letter to the Lieutenant General of the 1st May, which drew from him that of which you complain. It is evidently not written in that spirit of good temper and conciliation in which alone officers of high rank, in particular, can carry on His Majesty's service with advantage. It contains a complaint against the conduct of a Staff Officer, when, as I have above shown, there was no foundation for any; and I am sorry to observe that it states your intention to withhold your assistance and superintendence over the execution of an order which you could not doubt came from your superior, Lieut. General the Earl of Dalhousie, only because the order did not reach the Colonel who was to execute it through yourself.

I am not astonished that the Lieutenant General, who must have been accustomed to a very different mode of carrying on the public service, should have disapproved, and should have expressed his disapprobation, of your letter and of your conduct. It appears from the terms of his letter that it was written on the 2nd, before the troops arrived; and that his Lordship believed that, owing to the want of your superintendence, and by your refusal to "warrant" the execution of his order, the troops had not marched as he had directed. To this conduct his Lordship applies the term "disobedience;" and, although it is not correctly applied, I cannot conceive that, considering all that passed, and that there is really matter for censure both in your letter and in your conduct, it is desirable to carry the matter farther.'

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 905.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

London, 20th July, 1814.

' I was not aware till I had been some time here, and am unable to describe to you, the degree of frenzy existing here about the slave trade. People in general appear to think that it would suit the policy of the nation to go to war to put an end to that *abominable* traffic, and many wish that we should take the field on this new crusade. All agree that no favor can be shown to a slave trading country; and as Spain, next to Portugal, is supposed to be the country which gives most protection to this trade, the interests and wishes of Spain are but little attended to here. Besides, it is not easy to describe the unpopularity attached to the King's name, from the occurrences at his return to Madrid. The newspapers afford some specimen of it; but at a late dinner at Guildhall I recommended to the Lord Mayor to drink the King of Spain's health, and he told me that he was become so unpopular in the city, he was afraid that, if the toast were not positively refused, it would at least be received with so much disgust as to render it very disagreeable to me and to every well wisher to the Spanish Government.'

## F R A N C E.

906.

To Viscount Castlereagh, K. G.

Paris, 25th Aug. 1814.

‘ Having spoken to the Prince de Bénévent on the subject of the slave trade, in a conversation which I had with him on the night of the 23rd instant, and having expressed a desire that His Majesty should give me a private audience, in order that I might deliver to His Majesty a letter from the Prince Regent, and lay before him the papers intrusted to me for that purpose, and make those representations on that subject which your Lordship directed me to make, I was appointed to wait upon His Majesty last night.

His Majesty received me with his usual complacency, and, having perused the Prince Regent’s letter on the subject of the slave trade, he expressed his determination to perform the stipulations of the treaty, and all that he had promised upon that subject.

I then laid before His Majesty the addresses of both Houses of Parliament, and apprised His Majesty of the earnestness with which the Prince Regent and his Government, the Parliament and the nation, wished that His Majesty would concur in immediately abolishing this traffic by his subjects, and would co-operate with the British Government in inducing the Powers of Europe to put an end to it entirely; and I urged all those arguments suggested in your Lordship’s dispatch, No. 2, and such others as occurred to me.

His Majesty said that he should be happy to be able to do any thing to gratify the Prince Regent and the British nation, and that he would undoubtedly perform his engagements; but that he must attend to the opinions and wishes of his own people. That the opinions in France were by no means what they were in England upon this subject; that many years had elapsed, and much discussion had taken place, and great pains had been taken by many individuals and by societies, before the opinions in England had been brought to that state of unanimity upon this subject in which they were at present, and it could not be expected that opinions in France should immediately agree upon it.

I then urged His Majesty to adopt measures to restrict the trade as much as possible, as directed by your Lordship; and particularly to prevent its revival on that part of the coast of Africa on which it has been put an end to during the war; and His Majesty said that these were points of detail which he wished that I should bring under his consideration in the official form, by note to his Minister; and that he was perfectly disposed to adopt any measure which he could adopt consistently with the due attention to the opinions of his people to co-operate with the Prince Regent in Congress, as well as elsewhere, to restrict the trade as much as possible, and finally to put an end to it at the period specified.

In the conversations which I had had with the Prince de Bénévent, both previous to and since my seeing the King, His Highness told me that there would be no objection to adopt measures to prevent the revival of the trade in those parts in which it had been put a stop to during the war; and he



said last night that orders had already been given to the Minister of Marine upon the subject, which he promised to communicate to me.

In the mean time I propose to present a note, in which I will detail all the measures suggested by your Lordship, so as to bring them all to a decision before the Prince de Bénévent shall go to the Congress.

From what I learn here, I have reason to believe that the opinions in the legislative body, and particularly in the House of Peers, are very much against the abolition of the slave trade; and that several ships are now fitting out in Nantes and Bordeaux, with the aid of British capital, to carry on the trade on the coast of Africa.'

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 907.

To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers.

Paris, 31st Aug. 1814.

'Your letter of the 7th followed me to Bruxelles, and thence here; and I am very much obliged to you for the perusal of the paper which you enclosed. The contents are, however, more fit for the discussion of the Congress than for this Government; which, however well disposed to go hand in hand with us in getting rid of the traffic in slaves, is necessarily obliged to attend to the prejudices of its own subjects.

The truth is, there is no general knowledge, and therefore no general opinion, in France upon the slave trade. Those who know any thing upon the subject are proprietors of estates in the West Indies, or slave traders, ship owners, or trading politicians; and the opinions of all these are strongly in favor of the continuance of the trade; and the efforts of Great Britain to put an end to it are not attributed to good motives, but to commercial jealousy, and a desire to keep the monopoly of colonial produce in our own hands. The King therefore feels, and very justly, in my opinion, that he must proceed with caution. He is determined to perform his engagement, but he will not commit himself with his own subjects.

I think that I have prevailed upon them to go now as far as we have practically; as far as relates to the coast of Africa. That is to say, I hope that I shall have, in a day or two, a note and copies of positive orders to prohibit all trade in slaves north of the Line. The difficulty and delay consist in the desire we have to secure this prohibition by the employment of our ships at war to execute it; which proposition is now under discussion.

What is wanting here is the support of some public opinion to the measure which it is wished to carry; upon which point I have seen Mr. Clarkson, who appears to me to have been principally instrumental in creating that which exists in England.'

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 908.

To H. H. the Prince de Bénévent.

Paris, 11th Sept. 1814.

'Your Highness is mistaken regarding the mode in which the British troops entered Bordeaux. There had been in that town a considerable division of French cavalry and infantry, against which a *corps d'armée*, under the command of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, was detached. In point of fact, there was an affair of cavalry close to the town on either the day of, or on the day immediately previous to, the entry of the allied troops into the town; and the French troops retired only on account of the superiority of the force sent against them.

Immediately on the arrival of the allied troops, the inhabitants hoisted the white flag, and appeared in the white cockade; and the government of the town and district was, by the previous instruction of the Commander in Chief, made over to H. R. H. the Duc d'Angoulême. But although the objects of the war had ceased to exist as far as regarded the town of Bordeaux, the war itself had not ceased. The distinction between the state in which the Allies were at Bordeaux on, and subsequent to, the 12th March, and a state of peace, will be clear enough to your Highness, if you will advert to the circumstances which occurred here afterwards in the months of April and May; in which your Highness took so distinguished a part.

Before the government of Bordeaux could pass to H. R. H. the Duc d'Angoulême it must have passed through the hands of the Commander in Chief of the allied armies, who kept possession as a right of war of that property usually considered as a right of war, which had thus fallen into his hands.

I beg your Highness to observe that the right of war which thus accrued to the Commander in Chief of the allied army, was of the same description as those rights which have accrued to His Majesty between the period of his happy restoration and the treaty of peace; and as some even since the treaty of peace.

That part of the property which was sequestered as a right of war, belonging to individuals, was afterwards restored to them by the authority of the Commander in Chief, very probably for the reasons so honorable to the inhabitants of Bordeaux, urged by your Highness; and the public property of the Government was delivered over to the officers appointed by the Duc d'Angoulême, but on the condition that it should be forthcoming for the use of the army.

The property which thus remained under sequestration, although in the possession of the officers of the Duc d'Angoulême's Government, consisted, first, in certain tobacco, the property of Government, and certain articles of merchandise which had been confiscated; secondly, of certain quantities of salt, and of colonial produce, kept in the Government stores as security for the payment of the Government duties; and thirdly, of certain quantities of wine, likewise kept in the Government stores as a security for the repayment by the individual proprietors of certain loans of money made to them by the late French Government.

In regard to the claims of the allied army upon all these articles, which your Highness will observe is confined to the amount belonging to the late French Government, and in respect to the salt and colonial produce, as reduced from that amount to the amount of the duties as fixed by the Provisional Government of France, it is perhaps sufficient to remind your Highness of the engagement and understanding between the Duc d'Angoulême and the Commander in Chief.

On the day the allied army entered Bordeaux, all the moveable property belonging to the late French Government became theirs as a right of war; and the Commander in Chief would have been equally justified in directing the sale of the tobacco and confiscated goods, and of so much of the salt and colonial produce, and of the wine, as should have satisfied the claim of the late French Government upon those articles respectively, as he was in directing the consumption or sale of the various magazines of forage and corn belonging to the late French Government, which fell into his hands at Bor-



deaux and elsewhere. That he did not do so is to be attributed to the same motives which guided his conduct upon other occasions; but when it was clearly understood between the Duc d'Angoulême and him that the rights of war attached to all those articles to the amount of the property which the late French Government had in them respectively, advantage cannot now be fairly taken of his forbearance, and it cannot now be argued with justice, that to claim the amount of the interest of the late French Government in these several articles, a claim which it will be observed has never for a moment been abandoned, is tantamount to the assertion of the rights of war during a period of peace.

This property belonging, as I believe, justly to the allied army, is in the power of His Most Christian Majesty from a particular chain of circumstances, of which the forbearance of the Commander in Chief, and his desire to conciliate all parties, forms the principal features. No individual has any interest in it, and it rests with His Majesty to determine what shall be done with it.'

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909.

To the Earl of Liverpool, K.G.

Paris, 12th Sept. 1814.

'I have received your letter of the 7th, regarding a cession of some kind or other, in order to obtain the immediate abolition of the slave trade. I have inquired upon the subject, and have not found any such idea here, and so I told Mr. Clarkson yesterday; but as I find Talleyrand's name mentioned, I shall see him to-night, and will talk to him on the subject.

I did not tell Mr. Clarkson that it was a question of national vanity. It is one of profit; and those interested in carrying on the trade, who are the only persons who have any information on the subject, with very few exceptions, operate upon the national vanity by representing the question, not only as one purely English, but as one of English profit and monopoly.

Money might do a great deal with this class of persons; certainly more than the island of Trinidad; and I concur entirely in opinion with your Lordship, on the impolicy of offering to make any territorial cession, with a view to obtain this object, which you should not be quite sure would be accepted.'

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910.

To W. Wilberforce, Esq., M.P.

Paris, 15th Sept. 1814.

'You do me justice in believing that I will pursue, with all the zeal of which I am capable, the object of the abolition of the slave trade by France. I really believe that the King and his principal Minister are sincere in their professions to us, and in their intentions to perform their engagement to abolish the trade entirely in 5 years, and in the mean time to prevent the trade on the northern coast of Africa, and to restrict it generally by the subjects of France as much as possible. I have not yet, however, received an answer in writing to the note I gave in about 3 weeks ago upon these subjects, which I am assured is to be attributed to the severe illness and death of the Minister of Marine, to whose department what I proposed had been necessarily referred.

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These impressions can be overcome only by time and perseverance; but till they are overcome, I acknowledge that I do not think the King has the

power to do more than prevent the trade of his subjects on that part of the coast from which we have expelled it.

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I must first get a clear acknowledgment of the principle of this treaty in an official note, which I have not yet obtained, and I will then work upon the details. If I were to begin with the details, such are the suspicions in the offices here of our views, and the difficulties thrown in our way upon every point, that I should fail entirely.'

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911.

To W. Wilberforce, Esq., M.P.

Paris, 8th Oct. 1814.

' You judge most correctly regarding the state of the public mind here upon this question. Not only is there no information, but, because England takes an interest in the question, it is impossible to convey any through the only channel which would be at all effectual, viz., the daily press. Nobody reads any thing but the newspapers; but it is impossible to get any thing inserted in any French newspaper in Paris in favor of the abolition, or even to show that the trade was abolished in England from motives of humanity. The extracts made from English newspapers upon this, or any other subject, are selected with a view either to turn our principles and conduct into ridicule, or to exasperate against us still more the people of this country, and therefore the evil cannot be remedied by good publications in the daily press in England, with a view to their being copied into the newspapers here.

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I must say that the daily press in England do us a good deal of harm in this as well as in other questions. We are sure of the King and his Government, if he could rely upon the opinion of his people. But, as long as our press teems with writings drawn with a view to irritate persons here, we shall never be able to exercise the influence which we ought to have upon this question, and which we really possess.'

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912.

To Lord Holland.

Paris, 10th Oct. 1814.

' I had already seen M. Sismondi's pamphlet; had bought up all the copies here in order to distribute them among the Members of the Houses of Peers and of the Deputies of the Departments, as the most certain mode of drawing attention to the pamphlet; and had employed a person to write to Geneva for more copies. I think that I have observed in some of the paragraphs recently published in the newspapers here, although strongly against us and our objects, in favor of the negroes, as well as in some conversations I have had, particularly with the Minister of Finance here, some of the principles of M. Sismondi.

Your Lordship may depend upon my doing every thing in my power to carry an object which Great Britain has so much at heart as the abolition of the slave trade; but the task is a most difficult one; and the more so, because the object is really felt by every Englishman, and is urged by our newspapers and other publications with all the earnestness, not to say violence, with which we are accustomed to urge such objects, without consideration for the prejudices and feelings of others.

In regard to the Spanish patriots, I will suggest what your Lordship has mentioned to Lord Castlereagh. I confess, however, that I am inclined to doubt the success of the interference of the Powers of Europe in their favor,



and the prudence of such interference. When I interceded for them, it was as a Spaniard, and as an actor in the scenes in which their conduct was blamed, and as a person capable of giving testimony in their favor. I do not think the King of Spain could allow of the interference of any foreign Power in favor of persons whom he supposed (rightfully, or otherwise, is not now the question) guilty of political offences against himself. There is certainly some difference in the interference being on the part of all the Powers of Europe, that is to say, that its result would not give to one Power the party in Spain which should have been relieved by its interference; but it would have all the effect, and even greater, upon the dignity and authority of the King which the interference of a single Power would have. Then, if the success of the interference is doubtful, the attempt would be imprudent, as it probably would injure the persons in whose favor it should be made.'

## 913.

To the Right Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Paris, 20th Oct. 1814.

'Depend upon it that the real power in Spain is in the clergy. They kept the people right against France; they re-established the authority of the King, enabling him to overthrow the Cortes; they are the authors and advisers of the measures of the day; and they concurred in the English alliance. But if they find the King is involved in pecuniary difficulties, and that we will not relieve him, they will depart from the English alliance, and adopt that of France; and the people, as they are called, will follow them in the new scheme as blindly as they have in the others.'

## 914.

To H. M. C. M. the King of Spain.

à Paris, ce 22 Oct. 1814.

'Nous gémissions sur beaucoup des actes de *las Cortes*; et votre Majesté a connaissance des opinions que j'ai données à ces Messieurs sur ce qu'ils faisaient, opinions que le Général Alava partageait avec moi.

Mais c'était notre devoir de nous soumettre entièrement à l'autorité de *las Cortes*; et si nous eussions commis la faute grave de nous y opposer, ou d'encourager, ou même de permettre l'opposition des autres, nous aurions augmenté les malheurs et les difficultés du moment, et aurions peut-être occasionné, avec la perte de la plus belle cause du monde, la cause de l'Europe entière, celle de la couronne de votre Majesté.'

## 915.

To Viscount Castlereagh.

Paris, 3rd Nov. 1814.

'It is to be hoped that the public can confide in the zeal of those persons who are intrusted with the management of this concern; and that an object of such importance as the saving of a great part of the continent of Africa from the renewal of the horrors of the slave trade will not be impeded by unnecessary disclosures and discussion.'

## 916.

To General Dumouriez.

à Paris, ce 26 Nov. 1814.

'J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 16, et je vous suis bien obligé, et me trouve bien flatté, de votre souvenir constant. Je regrette beaucoup que les circonstances extraordinaires, dans lesquelles je me trouvais pendant mon court séjour à Londres, m'aient empêché de m'entretenir avec vous.

Je vois souvent votre aide de camp, qui est un homme bien intéressant, quoique je croye qu'il prend une vue tant soit peu exagérée de l'état des affaires. Tout est neuf ici, et vous savez que les choses neuves, surtout quand elles sont compliquées, ne vont pas bien. Les observateurs voyent cela; et ils oublient, ou ne savent pas, combien elles vont mal quelquefois ailleurs. Il y a aussi du véritable mal; mais les intentions surtout du Roi sont vraies et bonnes; et il faut se tenir ferme.

Ce qu'il y a de pis c'est le mécontentement général, et la pauvreté universelle. Cette malheureuse révolution et ses suites ont ruiné le pays de fond en comble. Tout le monde est pauvre, et, ce qui est pis, leurs institutions empêchent qu'aucune famille devienne riche et puissante. Tous doivent donc nécessairement viser à remplir des emplois publics, non comme autrefois pour l'honneur de les remplir, mais pour avoir de quoi vivre. Tout le monde donc cherche de l'emploi public.

Buonaparte laissa une armée d'un million d'hommes en France, outre les officiers prisonniers en Angleterre et en Russie. Le Roi ne peut pas en maintenir le quart. Tous ceux non employés sont mécontents. Buonaparte gouvernait directement la moitié de l'Europe, et indirectement presque l'autre moitié. Pour des causes à présent bien développées et connues il employait une quantité infinie de personnes dans ses administrations; et tous ceux employés ou dans les administrations extérieures, civiles, ou dans les administrations militaires des armées, sont renvoyés, et beaucoup de ceux employés dans les administrations intérieures; à cette classe nombreuse ajoutez la quantité d'émigrés et de personnes rentrés, tous mourant de faim, et tous convoitant de l'emploi public afin de pouvoir vivre, et vous trouverez que plus des trois quarts de la classe de la société, non employée à la main-d'œuvre ou à labourer la terre, sont en état d'indigence, et, par conséquence, mécontents. Si vous considérez bien ce tableau, qui est la stricte vérité, vous y verrez la cause et la nature du danger du jour. L'armée, les officiers surtout, sont mécontents. Ils le sont pour plusieurs raisons inutiles à détailler ici, mais ce mécontentement pourra se vaincre en adoptant des mesures sages pour améliorer l'esprit.

Je vous ai écrit une longue lettre, mon cher Général, qu'il est temps de finir.'

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917.

To the Earl of Liverpool, K.G.

Paris, 26th Nov. 1814.

'Sir R. Kennedy has already given your Lordship so many testimonies of his merits, that I have nothing more to say upon the subject. It appears that he has given in all his accounts; and I beg to observe, that the period of their being passed does not depend upon him; and that it would be hard upon him if his rewards were to be withholden, when all objections to him by his superiors were at an end, because a defective public arrangement prevents his accounts from being passed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer does not persist in his objection to Sir R. Kennedy. If he did I should say the objection ought to be made to me, who gave Sir Robert the orders under which he acted, and to Lord Bathurst, who approved of those orders. I hope, therefore, that your Lordship will extend your protection to this deserving public servant.'



## 918.

To — — —, Esq.

Paris, 1st Dec. 1814.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st November, and I am happy to find that you do me the justice to believe that I should always be happy to forward the wishes and interests of the brave officers who have served under my command, and to serve the families of those who have fallen in the service. But you must be aware that the patronage of Government is not at my disposal; and, even if it were, the application of it, even to reward services so well deserving of reward, must be guided by other considerations besides those of the merits and services of the officers in question.

Before I can take upon me to recommend the family of Lieut. Colonel ——— for a provision from the public, I must be certain that such provision is necessary to them, and that the necessity has been occasioned by the loss of their relation; and I cannot apply for an office for any body without being certain that the person applying for the office is fit to fill it.’

## 919.

To General ———, in the service of the King of Spain.

Paris, 2nd Dec. 1814.

‘ I did not recommend you to the King of Spain for promotion, not from any doubt of your zeal and gallantry in His Majesty’s service and cause, of which I had witnessed so many instances, but from having known that you had not made the military profession your study, and from having observed that you paid but little attention to the discipline and good order of the troops, which are those qualities of which His Majesty’s troops are most in want.

If I had now any thing to say to the Spanish army (excepting in the interest I feel for its honor) I should consider it my duty for the same reasons still to be silent regarding your promotion. Zeal and gallantry are indispensable qualities for an officer, and you possess both, and activity and intelligence to an extraordinary and exemplary degree; but it is my opinion, and I have always acted on that opinion, that an officer appointed to command others should have other qualities; and I cannot with propriety recommend for promotion one who, in my opinion, does not possess them.

In regard to your complaint that your name was not mentioned in my dispatches, it appears extraordinary, as you are aware that you happened not to fill any ostensible situation in the army. It is certainly true that your conduct was most gallant upon both these occasions you mention; but it is impossible for me to report the name of every individual who puts himself at the head of the troops.’

## 920.

To Marshal Lord Beresford, K.B.

Paris, 11th Dec. 1814.

‘ Dom M. Forjaz is much mistaken about my sentiments if he supposes I espoused his cause on any other ground, excepting that I thought him more likely than any other person in Portugal to carry into execution the measures which you wished should be carried into execution, and to support your views. I think he will be glad to be reconciled.’

## V I E N N A.

921.

To Earl Bathurst.

Vienna, 5th Feb. 1815.

‘ I enclose letters, &c., from — — of the —, and — — of the —, upon their not being appointed Knights Commanders of the Order of the Bath. The letter of the former is somewhat imprudent, upon which I will communicate to him a piece of my mind ; but that shall not prevent me from assuring you that these two officers are of the most respectable in the army ; and that, if I had been desired to recommend those, or rather had seen the list of those, belonging to the army lately under my command, on whom it was intended to confer this honor, I certainly should have mentioned their names in preference to those of many, upon whom I see it has been conferred.

I am afraid that nothing can now be done for them ; but justice to them induces me to enclose their letters.’

922.

To — —, — regt.

Vienna, 5th Feb. 1815.

‘ I received your letter of the 8th January this morning, and I have transmitted it to the Secretary of State, with my recommendation of you.

The Government fixed the occasions on which medals should be granted to the army, and framed the rules, according to which I was bound to make the lists of those to whom they were to be granted ; and not having received their orders to recommend for medals for the service at Arroyo Molinos, Alba de Tormes, or at Beja, or at Aire, or at Arriverete, it was impossible for me to recommend you for a medal for your services on those occasions ; neither was it possible for me to recommend you for a medal at Fuentes de Oñoro, or in the Pyrenees, according to the rules by which I was ordered and bound to make out the lists of those I recommended.

I have not an accurate recollection of the lists for Bayonne, the Nivelle, Orthez, and Toulouse ; but of this I am very certain, that I have never failed to do justice to your services, as it was my earnest desire to render it to every officer and soldier I had the honor of commanding.

I have had nothing to say to the selection of the officers recently appointed Knights Commanders of the Order of the Bath. I did not know their names, till I saw the list of them in the *Gazette*.

If you had known these facts, I hope that the same spirit of justice, by which I have always been animated, would have induced you to spare me the pain of reading the reproaches, and charges of injustice, contained in your letter, and that you would have defended me with the —nd regiment ; and would have shown them that the regulation, and not I, deprived you of those marks of honor which they wished to see you obtain.

As these facts are in the knowledge of every body, it is scarcely possible to believe that you were not aware of them ; and I attribute the harshness of



your letter solely to the irritation which you naturally feel in considering your own case. However, the expression of this irritation, however unjust towards me, and unpleasant to my feelings, has not made me forget the services which you and your brave corps rendered upon every occasion on which you were called upon; and, although I am afraid it is too late, I have recommended you in the strongest terms to the Secretary of State.'

## 923.

To \_\_\_\_\_, — regt.

Vienna, 5th Feb. 1815.

'I have received your letter of the 13th January, and the copy of your memorial, in answer to which I can only inform you, that I had no concern whatever in the selection of the officers of the army lately under my command to be Knights Commanders of the Order of the Bath; and as I see that the number limited is filled, I am quite certain that no application I can make will answer any purpose. I will, however, forward your memorial, with my recommendation of your services.

I will inquire about your claim to a medal for Fuentes de Oñoro. I have recommended you for the Portuguese Order of the Tower and Sword.'

## 924.

To Viscount Castlereagh, K.G.

Vienna, 12th March, 1815.

'I received here on the 7th instant a dispatch from Lord Burghersh, of the 1st, giving an account that Buonaparte had quitted the island of Elba, with all his civil and military officers, and about 1200 troops, on the 26th February. I immediately communicated this account to the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and to the King of Prussia, and to the Ministers of the different Powers, and I found among all one prevailing sentiment, of a determination to unite their efforts to support the system established by the peace at Paris.

As it was uncertain to what quarter Buonaparte had gone, whether he would not return to Elba, or would even land on any part of the Continent, it was agreed that it was best to postpone the adoption of any measure till his farther progress should be ascertained; and we have since received accounts from Genoa, stating that he had landed in France, near Cannes, on the 1st March; had attempted to get possession of Antibes, and had been repulsed, and that he was on his march towards Grasse.

No accounts had been received at Paris as late as the middle of the day of the 5th of his having quitted Elba, nor any accounts from any quarter of his farther progress.

In the mean time the Sovereigns, and all persons assembled here, are impressed with the importance of the crisis which this circumstance occasions in the affairs of the world. All are desirous of bringing to an early conclusion the business of the Congress, in order that the whole and undivided attention and exertion of all may be directed against the common enemy; and I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, even if Buonaparte should be able to form a party for himself in France, capable of making head against the legitimate Government of that country, such a force will be assembled by the Powers of Europe, directed by such a spirit in their councils, as must get the better of him.

The Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia have dispatched letters to the King of France, to place at His Majesty's disposal all their respective forces; and Austrian and Prussian officers are dispatched with the letters, with powers to order the movement of the troops of their respective countries placed on the French frontiers, at the suggestion of the King of France.

The Plenipotentiaries of the 8 Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris assembled this evening, and have resolved to publish a declaration, in which they will, in the name of their Sovereigns, declare their firm resolution to maintain the peace and all its articles with all their force, if necessary. I enclose the draught of what is proposed to be published, which, with the alteration of some expressions and the omission of one or two paragraphs, will, I believe, be adopted.

Upon the whole, I assure your Lordship that I am perfectly satisfied with the spirit which prevails here upon this occasion; and I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, if unfortunately it should be possible for Buonaparte to hold at all against the King of France, he must fall under the cordially united efforts of the Sovereigns of Europe.'

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 925.

To Viscount Castlereagh, K.G.

Vienna, 12th March, 1815.

'I have but little to add to my dispatch regarding Buonaparte's invasion of France. The intention is, as soon as it shall be ascertained that he can make head against the King, to assemble 3 large corps; one in Italy, solely Austrian, which will consist of 150,000 men; one on the Upper Rhine, Austrian, Bavarian, troops of Baden and Wurtemberg, which will eventually consist of 200,000 men, but will at first consist of only the troops of Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg; the third on the Lower Rhine, consisting of the Prussian corps of Kleist, the Austrian garrison of Mayence, and other troops on the Moselle, to be joined to the British and Hanoverians in Flanders. Of this corps they wish me to take the command. The Russian army, 200,000 men, is to be formed in reserve at Wurtzburg, &c. &c.; the remainder of the Prussian army, in reserve, on the Lower Rhine.

The Emperor of Russia seems reconciled to the notion of the old system, of managing the great concern in a council, consisting of himself, the King of Prussia, and Schwarzenberg. He expressed a wish that I should be with him, but not a very strong one; and, as I should have neither character nor occupation in such a situation, I should prefer to carry a musket.

The Emperor intimated to me this day that, in case the movement of his troops became necessary, he could do nothing without the assistance of money from England. I told him I should write to your Lordship upon the subject by this courier; and that, in my opinion, the first measure to be adopted was, one something of the nature of the treaty of Chaumont, in which he agreed; and afterwards to think of subsidy, if England could grant such a thing.

It is my opinion that Buonaparte has acted upon false or no information, and that the King will destroy him without difficulty, and in a short time. If he does not, the affair will be a serious one, and a great and immediate



effort must be made, which will doubtless be successful. All the measures above stated to be in contemplation tend to this effort; and it will remain for the British Government to determine how far they will act themselves, and how far second the effort of the Continent.

I now recommend to you to put all your force in the Netherlands at the disposition of the King of France. I will go and join it if you like it, or do any thing else that Government choose. I think we shall have settled our concerns here, and signed the treaty, if the Spaniard does not impede us, by the end of the month. We shall have finished every thing that is important much sooner, so that I shall be ready whenever you please to call for me.'

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 926.

To Viscount Castlereagh, K.G.

Vienna, 18th March, 1815.

'I have but little to add to my public dispatches. I should have waited for orders to go into the Netherlands, if I had not been so pressed by the Allies, and had not thought it necessary myself, and most satisfactory to Government. I shall not go, however, I think, till I shall receive your first instructions from London.

I recommend you to reinforce the army in the Netherlands as much as you can, particularly in cavalry and artillery.

In the conference this morning, the Allies pressed very strongly for an increase of subsidy, which I told them I was quite certain could not be given.'

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 927.

To Viscount Castlereagh, K.G.

Vienna, 25th March, 1815.

'I likewise enclose the protocol of what passed at the conclusion of the treaty this night, in which you will see the urgency with which they all desire to be assisted by subsidies. I believe your Lordship is perfectly aware that it will be quite impossible for these Powers to make an effort adequate to the occasion, unless they should obtain this aid. With such a force as they will bring into the field, there is every reason to hope that, if there should be any resistance at all to Napoleon on the part of the Royalist party in France, the contest will be a very short one, and decidedly successful. Nothing can be done with a small or inefficient force; the war will linger on, and will end to our disadvantage. Motives of economy, then, should induce the British Government to take measures to bring the largest possible force into action at the earliest and the same period of time.'

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 928.

To Viscount Castlereagh, K.G.

Vienna, 26th March, 1815.

'I entirely concur in opinion with His Majesty's Government; and it is the decided opinion of the Sovereigns and Ministers here, that no measure of war ought to be adopted in regard to France, whatever may be our strength, excepting on the invitation of the King.

Your Lordship, however, may depend upon it that, whatever may be the determination and strength of the Allies, and however their declarations may

be construed, Buonaparte and the French nation will not allow them to remain at peace, and they must be prepared either to give up all their conquests to the Rhine, or for active hostilities.

It is the desire for war, particularly in the army, which has brought Buonaparte back, and has formed for him any party, and has given him any success; and all my observations, when at Paris, convinced me that it was the King alone who kept Europe at peace, and that the danger which most immediately threatened His Majesty was to be attributed to his desire to maintain the peace, contrary to the wishes, not only of the army, but of the majority of his subjects, of some of his Ministers, and even of some of his family.

Your Lordship will then judge what chance there is of maintaining the peace if Buonaparte should be entirely successful, considering his disposition for war, adverting to the opinions he has delivered and entertains upon the peace, and to the necessity under which he labors to cultivate his popularity with the army, and to endeavor, at least, to flatter the vanity of the nation by military success. Depend upon it, my Lord, that if he succeeds in establishing himself, we have no chance of peace, except by resigning all our conquests to the Rhine at least; and our chance then depends upon his moderation.

However, His Majesty's Government may rely upon it that I shall continue to act precisely according to their wishes, as far as I shall be acquainted with them.'



## THE LOW COUNTRIES.

929.

MEMORANDUM.

12th April, 1815.

‘ The object of the operations proposed in my letter to the Earl of Clancarty, of the 10th, to be undertaken by the corps of the Allies, which will probably be assembled in Flanders and on the Rhine in the end of the month of April, is, that by their rapidity they might be beforehand with the plans and measures of Buonaparte.

His power now rests upon no foundation but the army; and if we can introduce into the country such a force as is capable either to defeat the army in the field, or to keep it in check, so that the various parties interested in the defeat of Buonaparte’s views may have the power of acting, our object will be accomplished.

The Allies have no views of conquest; there is no territory which requires in particular to be covered by the course of their operations; their object is to defeat the army, and to destroy the power of one individual; and the only military points to be considered are; 1st, to throw into France, at the earliest possible period, the largest body of men that can be assembled; 2ndly, to perform this operation in such a manner that it can be supported by the forces of the Allies, which are known to be following immediately; 3rdly, that the troops which shall enter France shall be secure of a retreat upon the supporting armies, in case of misfortune.

The troops to be employed in this operation should be the Allied British, Hanoverian, and Dutch troops, under the command of the Duke of Wellington; the Prussian troops, as reinforced, under the command of Comte Gneisenau; the allied Austrian, Bavarian, Wurtemberg, and Baden troops, to be assembled on the Upper Rhine, under Prince Schwarzenberg. The two former should enter France between the Sambre and the Meuse; the Duke of Wellington endeavoring to get possession of Maubeuge, or, at all events, of Avesnes; and General Gneisenau directing his march upon Rocroy and Chimay.

The Duke of Wellington, besides the garrisons in the places in Flanders and Brabant, should leave a corps of troops in observation on the frontiers.

Prince Schwarzenberg should collect his corps in the province of Luxembourg; and, while his left should observe the French fortresses of Longwy, Thionville, and Metz, he should possess himself of the forts of Sedan, Stenay, and Dun, and cross the Meuse.

G. O.

Bruxelles, 11th April, 1815.

‘ 1. H. R. H. the Prince Regent having appointed Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, to be Commander of His Majesty’s Forces on the Continent of Europe, all reports are in future to be made to his Grace.

55. Notwithstanding this amalgamation, every thing which regards the discipline of the officers and soldiers, of each nation; the provisioning, the clothing, the equipping, the means of transport, &c. &c., will be under the officers civil and military of each nation. The General commanding each corps d’armée will give orders for all other matters.

The first object would then be accomplished, and we should have in France a larger body of troops than it is probable the enemy can assemble.

It is expected that the British and Dutch army would be followed in the course of a fortnight by about 40,000 men, and the Prussian army in the same period by 90,000 men; and that the allied Austrian and Bavarian army would be followed by a Russian army of 180,000. Supposing, then, that the enemy should have the facility of attacking the line of communication of the English, Hanoverian, and Dutch army, by Maubeuge, and that of the allied Austrian army from their fortresses on the Upper Moselle and Upper Meuse, they could not prevent the junction of those troops. It must, besides, be observed, that the enemy could not venture to leave their fortresses entirely without garrisons of troops of the line, on account of the disgust which the usurpation of Buonaparte has occasioned universally; and the operations upon our communications will therefore necessarily be carried on by a diminished body of troops.

However inconvenient, then, they may be to those troops which will have advanced, they can neither prevent the junction of the armies which will be following the first that will enter France, nor can they prevent the retreat of these upon those which are moving to their support.

According to this scheme, then, we should have in the centre of France a body of above 200,000 men, to be followed up by nearly 300,000 more, and their operations would be directed upon Paris, between the Meuse and the Oise.'

## 930.

To H. R. H. the Duke of Kent.

Bruxelles, 13th April, 1815.

'I wish it was in my power to answer your Royal Highness in an equally satisfactory manner respecting the promotion of the officers you mention, and who, I have reason to believe, are highly meritorious. Brevet promotion cannot be extended to all who may be deserving of it, and I was necessarily obliged to confine it to a small number of each division which had distinguished itself upon any particular occasion; and it frequently happened that seniors were out of the way, sometimes on account of their wounds, and juniors were promoted on account of any distinguished conduct which had occurred.'

## 931.

To H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

Bruxelles, 16th April, 1815.

'Your Royal Highness will have learned that I signed, on the 25th March last, with the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as the Plenipotentiary of His Majesty, a treaty of alliance and co-operation, applicable to the circumstances of the moment in Europe, occasioned by the return of Buonaparte to France, and of the usurpation of the supreme authority in

G. O.

Bruxelles, 13th April, 1815.

'3. The orders of H.R.H. the late Commander of the Forces, have already directed that all baggage belonging to the officers, and soldiers of the army, with the exception of that belonging to the General Officers and the heads of departments, shall be carried on horses; and the Commander of the Forces requests that the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades, will report forthwith to the Adjutant General whether His Royal Highness' Orders have been obeyed, and provision has been made accordingly for the several individuals concerned; and particularly whether the regimental surgeons have provided themselves with the means of carrying the medical panniers, and the paymasters with the means of carrying the regimental books.'



that country. All the Powers of Europe are invited to accede to that treaty; and I imagine that the Plenipotentiaries of your Royal Highness consider themselves authorised to accede to it on the part of your Royal Highness.

The object of the treaty is to put in operation against Buonaparte the largest force which the contracting or acceding parties can bring into the field; and that upon which I wish to trouble your Royal Highness is the seat to be chosen for the operation of your Royal Highness' troops.

The natural seat for the operations would be the frontiers of Spain, but I am very apprehensive that the financial resources of His Catholic Majesty are not of a nature, nor in a situation, to enable him to equip and maintain an army to co-operate actively with that of your Royal Highness; and yet, without that co-operation, and the assistance which your Royal Highness would expect to derive from the country, it does not appear that your Royal Highness' army could carry on their operations with their accustomed credit in that quarter.

Under these circumstances, it has appeared to me that it would be expedient, and I have recommended to your Royal Highness' Ministers at Vienna, and have requested His Majesty's Ministers to recommend to the Regency at Lisbon, that your Royal Highness' troops should be employed with the allied army assembling in Flanders, and destined to act, under my command, against the common enemy.

I need not point out to your Royal Highness' penetration the advantages to your Royal Highness' reputation of appearing in the field in this part of Europe; but, as your troops cannot serve actively in the natural seat for their operations, and they will serve here with their old companions and under their old commanders, it appears to me that this measure is to be recommended, if only as one of military expediency. I trust, then, that your Royal Highness will approve of my having recommended it to your Ministers and to the Regency.'

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932.

To Major General Darling.

Bruxelles, 2nd May, 1815.

'I have nothing to say to any appointment to the Staff of this army of any rank.

However flattered I may be, and however I may applaud the desire of an officer to serve under my command in the field, it is impossible for me to

G. O.

Bruxelles, 22nd April, 1815.

'2. The Commander of the Forces having observed that some of the camp kettles in possession of the soldiers are too small for 6 men, as they contain only 7 pints, desires that the commanding officers of the regiments to which the kettles of that size have been issued, will make a requisition upon the Quarter Master General, for a sufficient number to complete their men to one camp kettle for 4 men.

3. The kettles which hold 12 pints or more, are to be considered sufficient for 6 men, and are to be accounted for accordingly, and in future, in all returns of camp equipments, there are to be 2 columns for camp kettles, one of the number for 4 men, and one of the number for 6.'

G. O.

Bruxelles, 30th April, 1815.

'3. It is absolutely necessary that the soldiers of the cavalry should be kept with their regiments; accordingly, the Commander of the Forces desires, that none but the General Officers commanding corps, and divisions of infantry of the army, shall have orderlies from the cavalry to attend them, and of these but two for the latter; the General Officers of the infantry are to have their orderlies from the cavalry serving with the corps to which they belong, if that cavalry should be British or German.'

recommend officers for employment with whose merits I am not acquainted, in preference to those to whose services I am so much indebted, particularly if the latter desire to serve again. But, as I before stated, I have no choice; and I beg you to apply in the quarter in which you will certainly succeed, without reference to my wishes, whenever there shall be a command vacant for you, which there is not at present.'

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933.

To the Right Hon. W. Wellesley Pole.

Bruxelles, 5th May, 1815.

'The mode of attacking a servant of the public absent on the public service, day after day, in speeches in Parliament, which has lately been adopted by ——, appears to me most extraordinary and unprecedented.

If I have done any thing wrong or unbecoming my own character, or that of the station I filled, I ought to be prosecuted, or at least censured for it, in consequence of a specific motion on the subject; but it is not fair to give to the act of any individual a construction it will not fairly bear, a construction which no man breathing believes it was intended to bear; and to charge him home with being an assassin day after day in speeches, and never in form.

I say, first, that the Declaration has never been accurately translated; and the meaning of the words *vindictæ publicæ* is not "public vengeance," but "public justice." But, even if the meaning was "public vengeance," the Declaration does not deliver Buonaparte over to the dagger of the assassin. When did the dagger of the assassin execute the vengeance of the public?

In regard to his being declared "hors la loi;" first, it must be recollected at what period and under what circumstances he was so declared. The period was the 13th March; and, although we knew Buonaparte had landed and had made progress in France sufficient to create a contest there, we were not aware that he could be established without firing a shot. The object then of this part of the publication was to strengthen the hands of the King of France by the opinion of the Congress.

Secondly, was he not "hors la loi?" and had he, or not, broken all the ties which connected him with the world? The only treaty by which he was connected with the world was that of Fontainebleau: that he broke. Having quitted his asylum, he landed in France with such a force as showed that he relied solely upon treachery and rebellion, not only for success, but for safety. He incurred all risks in order to gain the greatest prize in Europe, one which he had abandoned only 10 months before, under a treaty with the Allied Powers; and is it possible that it can be gravely asserted that Buonaparte, an individual like any other, should have been guilty by this act of only a breach of treaty? If he was guilty of more, of which there can be no doubt, it was of the crime of rebellion and treason, with a view to usurp the sovereign authority of France; a crime which has always been deemed "hors la loi" so far as this, that all Sovereigns have in all times called upon their subjects to raise their arms to protect them from him

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G. O.

Bruxelles, 3rd May, 1815.

'3. The Commander of the Forces has given directions to the Commissary General, to deliver to the care of the quarter masters of each of the battalions of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th divisions, 4 days' biscuit for the men of these battalions respectively, which are to be issued to the men under the directions of the General Officer commanding the division, whenever the Orders for a march shall be received.'



who was guilty of it. The Declaration does no more. This is my reasoning upon the subject. I am perfectly satisfied with what you said on the night of the 28th April; but I only hope that ——— may not go off with the notion that I acted without reflection upon this occasion.

I never knew any paper so discussed as the Declaration was; and I believe there never was a public paper so successful, particularly in Italy and France.'

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934.

To Lieut. General Lord Stewart, G.C.B.

Bruxelles, 8th May, 1815.

'I say nothing about our defensive operations, because I am inclined to believe that Blücher and I are so well united, and so strong, that the enemy cannot do us much mischief. I am at the advanced post of the whole; the greatest part of the enemy's force is in my front; and, if I am satisfied, others need be under no apprehension. In regard to offensive operations, my opinion is, that, however strong we shall be in reference to the enemy, we should not extend ourselves, further than is absolutely necessary in order to facilitate the subsistence of the troops. I do not approve of an extension from the Channel to the Alps; and I am convinced that it will be found not only fatal, but that the troops at such a distance on the left of our line, will be entirely out of the line of the operations.

We are now, or shall be shortly, placed on the French frontier in the form of an *échelon*, of which the right, placed here, is the most advanced of the *échelon*, and the left, upon the Upper Rhine, is the most retired.

Paris is our object, and the greatest force and greatest military difficulties are opposed to the movements of the right, which is the most advanced part of our general line. Indeed, such force and difficulties are opposed to us in this part, that I should think that Blücher and I cannot move, till the movements of others of the allied corps shall have relieved us from part of the enemy's force opposed to us. Then, it must be observed, that we cannot be relieved by movements through Luxembourg.

In my opinion, then, the movement of the Allies should begin with the left, which should cross the Rhine between Basle and Strasbourg. The centre collected upon the Sarre should cross the Meuse on the day the left should be expected to be at Langres. If these movements should not relieve the right, they should be continued; that is to say, the left should continue its movement on both banks of the Marne, while the centre should cross the Aisne; and the distance between the two bodies, and between each and Paris, should be shortened daily.

But this last hypothesis is not probable; the enemy would certainly move from this front upon the earliest alarm of the movements on the Upper Rhine; and the moment he did move, or that the operation should be practicable, Blücher's corps and mine should move forward, and the former make the siege of Givet, the latter of Maubeuge; and the former likewise to aid the movement of the centre across the Meuse.

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G. O.

Bruxelles, 8th May, 1815.

'1. Daily states of all the troops are to be sent to the Adjutant General, commencing from the receipt of this Order, and according to forms which are transmitted to the Assistant Adjutants General of divisions, majors of brigades, &c. of detached brigades and corps.

2. These states are to be made out whether the army is in motion or not, and scarcely any circumstance can arise which ought to preclude their regularity of transmission.'

If the enemy should fall upon the centre, it should either retire upon Luxembourg or fight, according to the relative strength; and in either case Blücher should act upon the enemy's communication upon the Aisne.

But the most probable result of these first movements would be the concentration of the enemy's forces upon the Aisne; and accordingly we hear of the fortifications of Soissons and Laon, of an intrenched camp at Beauvais, &c. &c. We must, in this case, after the first operation, throw our whole left across the Marne, and strengthen it if necessary from the centre, and let it march upon Paris, between the Seine and the Marne, while the right and the centre should either attack the enemy's position upon the Aisne, or endeavor to turn its left; or the whole should co-operate in one general attack upon the enemy's position.

I come now to consider the strength required for these operations. The greatest strength the enemy is supposed to have is 200,000 effective men, besides national guards for his garrisons. Of this number it can hardly be believed that he can bring 150,000 to bear upon any one point.

Upon this statement let our proceedings be founded. Let us have 150,000 men upon the left, and 150,000 men upon the right; and all the rest, whatever they may be, in the centre, or after a sufficient centre is formed, let the remainder be in reserve for the right, left, or centre, as may be most convenient for their march and subsistence, and I will engage for the result, as they may be thrown where we please. Let us begin when we shall have 450,000 men. Before the Austrians upon the left shall be at Langres, the Russians will have passed the Rhine, and the whole Prussian army will be in line.

These are my general ideas, which I do not think differ much from Knesebeck's. Mind, when I think of the siege of Givet and Maubeuge, I do not mean by the whole of the two armies of the right, but to be carried on by detachments from them. The centre should seize Sedan, which is not strong or garrisoned, and observe Longwy, Thionville, and Metz. The left will have to observe Huningue and the fortresses in Alsace.

In regard to the force in Piedmont, I confess that I wish that the whole Austrian army in Italy was actively employed against Murat, with the exception of the garrisons. Murat must be destroyed early, or he will hang heavily upon us. If any force should be employed from Piedmont, its operations should be separate from those of the great confederacy. They cannot be connected without disconnecting those of what I have hitherto considered the left from the remainder of our great line, however they may be calculated to aid that left, particularly by being directed upon Chambery, or by keeping that post in check. Their basis is, however, different, and cannot easily be made otherwise.

These opinions are for yourself; God knows whether they can be acted upon, or whether the Allies will allow their forces to be divided as I suppose; and particularly when the Prussians will act in 2 corps, one under Blücher here, and another from Luxembourg with the centre; or whether the other Allies will like to commence till the whole Russian army is *en mesure*. But I am convinced that what I have proposed is so clearly the plan of operations, that I do not doubt it will be adopted, with but little variation.'



935.

To Lieut. General Lord Hill, G.C.B.

Bruxelles, 9th May, 1815.

' I return Sir W. Stewart's letter of the 30th April. I perfectly recollect the letter to which he refers. It appeared to me to be written in the anguish of mind occasioned by the loss he had sustained in his action, and by his own sufferings; and that it did not do justice to himself or to his troops, and I did not send it home, or communicate it, I believe, to any body, certainly not to Mr. Philippart, or to any other person calling himself an author. Indeed, I have invariably refused to communicate to any person documents to enable him to write a history of the late war; as I consider the transactions too recent for any person to write a true history, without hurting the feelings of nations, and of some individuals.'

936.

To Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg.

à Bruxelles, ce 9 Mai, 1815.

' J'ai reçu ce matin la lettre de votre Altesse du 29 Avril, et j'avais déjà lu le mémoire que votre Altesse avait donné à Lord Stewart avec toute l'attention qu'il mérite.

Je crois que nous devrions baser nos opérations sur la position où se trouvent les troupes en Allemagne et dans ce pays-ci dans ce moment; c'est-à-dire, la droite sur ce pays-ci; le centre sur les forteresses de Mayence et de Luxembourg; la gauche, qui devrait passer le Rhin entre Strasbourg et la Suisse, sur la Suisse.

Il est très à propos de faire opérer un corps du côté du Piémont, si on en a les moyens en Italie après avoir pourvu pour la destruction du pouvoir de Murat, qui est la chose la plus essentielle dans ce moment; et les opérations de ce corps deviendraient très utiles pour la gauche de la grande armée d'opérations; mais, si nous les lions cette gauche avec celles de ce corps, nous étendrions la gauche à telle distance que ses opérations ne marcheraient plus dans la même sphère que celles des autres parties de l'armée.

Ayant posé nos opérations sur cette base, dans mon opinion les mouvemens doivent commencer par la gauche: 1°, parcequ'elle est la plus éloignée de notre objet final, qui est Paris, et de la ligne de défense de l'ennemi; 2°, parceque la moindre force de l'ennemi lui est à présent opposée; 3°, parceque, sur la frontière ennemie, vis-à-vis de la droite, il se trouve tant de force

G. O.

Bruxelles, 9th May, 1815.

' 1. The light infantry companies belonging to each brigade of infantry, are to act together as a battalion of light infantry, under the command of a field officer or captain to be selected for the occasion by the General Officer commanding the brigade, upon all occasions on which the brigade may be formed in line or column, whether for a march, or to oppose the enemy.

2. On all other occasions, the light infantry companies are to be considered as attached to their battalions, with which they are to be quartered or encamped, and solely under the command of the commanding officer of the battalion to which they belong.

3. The Commander of the Forces wishes that some of the light infantry battalions of each brigade should be practised in the manœuvres of the light infantry, and if possible in firing at a mark.

4. The Commander of the Forces is desirous that the General Officers commanding divisions, and brigades, should exercise the infantry in marching in column of as large numbers as can be conveniently collected, at half, and quarter distances, with a front of one company on the high road, from the distance of 5 or 6 miles from the point of collecting, and returning in the same order, twice or 3 times a week.'

materielle en forteresses et la force physique que l'ennemi y a rassemblé, il me parait difficile que la droite (déjà, il faut observer, plus près de moitié chemin de Paris que la gauche,) puisse se mettre en mouvement avant qu'elle ne soit un peu dégagée.

Le mouvement serait donc, comme il suit, en trois grands corps de 150,000 hommes chacun au moins : La gauche passer le Rhin, et marcher sur Langres, observant les forteresses de l'Alsace avec un petit corps pris de sa droite ; le centre passer la Meuse, et s'emparer de Sedan, observant Metz, Thionville, &c., avec un petit corps de sa gauche, le jour que la gauche arrivera à Langres ; la droite faire le siège de Maubeuge et de Givet au moment que les mouvemens du centre et de la gauche auraient fait marcher l'ennemi ; la gauche de cette droite devrait longer la Meuse pour appuyer et aider les mouvemens du centre.

Les réserves devraient suivre les mouvemens ou du centre ou des autres parties de l'armée, comme il conviendrait à leur position lors de leur arrivée sur le Rhin.

Arrivée à Langres, la gauche devrait suivre son mouvement sur les deux rives de la Marne, le centre et la droite sur l'Aisne, laissant des corps pour continuer les sièges.

Les mouvemens qui s'ensuivraient dépendraient de la défense de l'ennemi. S'il prend position, comme je le crois, sur l'Aisne (car il fortifie Soissons et Laon), il faut ou attaquer cette position avec toute notre force, ou la tourner par sa droite en reforçant la gauche, et la faisant passer la Marne, et marcher sur Paris entre Seine et Marne.

Voilà mes idées générales, basées sur notre force, notre position, et la force de l'ennemi. Cependant je suis prêt à faire tout ce qu'on voudra, si on n'approuve pas ce que je propose.

On compte la force de l'ennemi à 280,000 hommes ; dont 80,000 gardes nationales, selon quelques uns, et 110,000 gardes nationales et gendarmes selon les autres, laissant 200,000 hommes de troupes, selon l'hypothèse des uns, et seulement 170,000 selon les autres. Croyons la force 200,000 hommes de troupes ; et vous verrez que l'ennemi ne pourrait pas mettre plus que 150,000 hommes en bataille sur aucun point.'

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937.

To H.R.H. the Prince of Orange, G.C.B.

Bruxelles, 11th May, 1815.

' In the situation in which we are placed at present, neither at war nor at peace, unable on that account to patrol up to the enemy and ascertain his position by view, or to act offensively upon any part of his line, it is difficult, if not impossible, to combine an operation, because there are no data on which to found any combination. All we can do is to put our troops in such a situation, as, in case of a sudden attack by the enemy, to render it easy to assemble, and to provide against the chance of any being cut off from the rest.

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They should delay the advance of the enemy upon that road as much as may be in their power. There is a position for a small body at Arquennes ; and the town of Nivelles would probably afford some means of defence for a short time. But whether the enemy is to be attacked by the 3rd British division, or by the Prussians when advancing upon that road, must depend upon circumstances of which it is impossible now to form a notion ; and un-



less a clear notion can be formed, any orders which I might give with a view to such combination would only create confusion.'

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938.

To the Earl of Clancarty, G.C.B.

Bruxelles, 14th May, 1815.

'I cannot, however, conclude upon this subject, without expressing my regret that the discussion of it should have occasioned so much warmth, and that such a paper as M. de Stein's should have been produced by the Prussian Legation. In a crisis of the affairs of the world, the Powers of Europe are about to embark in a great contest; and Great Britain, interested only in a secondary degree in the crisis, that can be injured only in the injury which others will suffer, comes forward with all her resources, and not only puts forth all the strength which circumstances and her situation enable her to collect, but assists with money all the Powers of Europe, small as well as great, in proportion to their several exertions, and this at a moment of unparalleled financial difficulty, occasioned by her exertions in a similar manner in the last years of the late war.

I should be sorry that public men in England ever became disgusted with the affairs of the Continent, and that the interest felt in its concerns should be diminished; and in this sense it is, and adverting to the impression which M. de Stein's paper has made upon my mind, that I regret that such a document was ever allowed to be brought forward.'

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939.

To the Comte de Blacas.

à Bruxelles, ce 16 Mai, 1815.

'En général, cependant, je vous dirai qu'il me serait bien difficile de détacher même 3 ou 4 bataillons. J'espère que mon armée fera son devoir; mais elle est composée de troupes de diverses nations, dont quelques unes sont bien jeunes. Le fond de tout c'est les Anglais; et les circonstances, où se trouvait le Gouvernement Britannique au moment que Buonaparte est arrivé en France, ont empêché que j'aie autant de ceux-là que je devrais avoir.

Je n'oserais pas vous offrir d'autres troupes, et je ne peux pas vous offrir de celles-là, à moins que ce ne soit pour un service qui ne les détacherait pas trop loin.

Je vous prie de réfléchir bien sur le principe que je vais vous énoncer. La puissance de Buonaparte en France est fondée sur le militaire et sur rien autre; et il faut ou détruire ou contenir le militaire avant que le peuple puisse, ou même ose, parler. Pour opérer contre le militaire Français en France, avec effet, il faut des armées nombreuses, qui ne laissent pas la chose long-tems en doute. Alors le peuple pourra parler et agir sans courir risque d'être détruit, et avec effet.

Si pour favoriser une insurrection dans les communes, ou même dans les provinces, dont vous faites mention, j'entrais en France dans ce moment, même soutenu et aidé par l'armée Prussienne, j'aurais tout de suite sur les mains quatre corps d'armée, peut-être cinq, et la Garde; c'est-à-dire, une force évaluée de 110,000 à 120,000 hommes, outre les Gardes nationales.

Nos progrès, si nous pouvions en faire, seraient extrêmement lents; le pays où les troupes seraient obligées de rester serait nécessairement grevé et vexé du poids de leurs subsistances, qu'il faudrait lui imposer; et vous

trouveriez le désir de s'insurger affaibli, non seulement parcequ'on verrait la force armée insuffisante pour vaincre les premières difficultés, mais parcequ'on trouverait qu'il vaudrait mieux ne pas avoir des armées à nourrir chez soi.

Ainsi, croyez moi, pour faire l'affaire du Roi, il lui faut non seulement les vœux et les bras de son peuple ; mais encore pour avoir ceux-la, toute la force que l'Europe Alliée peut faire marcher à son secours.'

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940.

To H. H. Prince Metternich.

Bruxelles, 20th May, 1815.

I beg leave to congratulate your Highness upon the success of your operations in Italy, which promise to bring the affairs in that country to a happy conclusion in a short period of time. Their prosperous state will likewise materially forward our ulterior views in another quarter.

From all that I hear and see, I hope that there exists no doubt of our military success. With the force which is assembling in all quarters, it appears to me impossible that with common prudence and arrangement, we should fail in our military operations ; but I imagine that our difficulties will commence on the day that we shall have completely succeeded in them, and shall have attained the object which we propose to ourselves in our treaty.

Your Highness will receive from other quarters the accounts of the state of affairs in France and at Ghent, and the effect produced by the opinions supposed to prevail at Vienna. There are certainly some things to be regretted in the conduct of the Government and of the Princes in the last fortnight of the month of March ; but upon the whole, I wish that our Government and yours had found themselves in a situation to let their people know for what they were to fight ; and that we had not been induced to hold out to their imaginations the possibility that the people of France, having had a fair opportunity of choosing whom they pleased for their governor, under what form they pleased, in the year 1814, might perform the same ceremony again in the year 1815. However, I cannot judge so well upon this point as those upon the spot ; and probably neither you nor we could venture to depart, although only in words, from the principle on which we had acted in the former war.

But, although we have departed in words from our principle, I trust we shall both adhere to it in reality. I have frequently told your Highness, and every day's experience shows me that I am right, that the only chance of peace for Europe consists in the establishment in France of the legitimate Bourbons. The establishment of any other government, whether in the person of ———, or in a Regency in the name of young Napoleon, or in any other individual, or in a republic, must lead to the maintenance of large military establishments to the ruin of all the Governments of Europe, till it shall suit the convenience of the French Government to commence a contest which can be directed only against you, or others for whom we are interested. In this contest we shall feel the additional difficulty, that those who are now

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G. O.

Bruxelles, 19th May, 1815.

' 1. Officers are not to be permitted to quit their regiments for the purpose of appearing before a Medical Board, without a previous application being made to the Adjutant General, and the Commander of the Forces' leave obtained. A certificate of the officer's case, signed by the surgeon of the regiment to which he belongs must accompany the application, and directions will be given to the Inspector of Hospitals, to assemble a Medical Board accordingly. Without such directions, no officer is to be examined by a Medical Board.'



on our side will then be against us, and you will again find yourself surrounded by enemies.

I am convinced that the penetration of your Highness will have shown you the danger of all these schemes to the interests of the Emperor; and that you will defeat them all, by adhering firmly to that line of conduct (in which you will find us likewise) which will finally lead to the establishment in France of the legitimate Government, from which alone Europe can expect any genuine peace.

I will not trouble your Highness farther upon this subject; but, as I was writing to congratulate you upon your successes in Italy, I could not avoid to advert to that which is the object of all our anxieties here.'

## 941.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, G.C.B.

Bruxelles, 30th May, 1815.

'I had already received a complaint from the inhabitants of some villages on the Yperlee, of the consequences of the inundations of that river, and I sent officers to ascertain the facts, and to see how far they could be remedied; and every thing shall be done to remedy the evils complained of, which is not inconsistent with the general safety.

It is very obvious, however, that no country, particularly one which has at its command the means of inundation, can make an exertion for its defence against a foreign enemy, without individual inconvenience and injury; and that complaints of this description must be expected, if it is intended to defend the country.

For this reason, the last person from whom I should have expected an exaggerated statement of such complaints, and of the injuries resulting from the measures adopted for the defence of His Majesty's dominions, is one of His Majesty's Ministers; and, in considering the substance of this complaint, I cannot avoid noticing the tone in which it is made.

The order for forming the inundations was given at the moment it was expected, from the intelligence received, that the enemy was about to attack this country; and the order was given the sooner, because it was known that time

G. O.

Bruxelles, 24th May, 1815.

24. The Commander of the Forces is concerned that his sense of duty obliged him to bring Lieut. — to trial before a General Court Martial, for the neglect of which he has been found guilty, and for which he is now to receive a reprimand.

25. The Commander of the Forces wishes to impress upon the minds of the officers of the army, that the most minute parts of their duty are not trifles, and that the omission to perform any of them, must be attended by the most serious public inconveniences, and even misfortunes.

26. Lieut. — having charge of a party of troops, ought not to have quitted it on any account, and ought not to have delegated to a corporal, a trust reposed in him.'

G. O.

Bruxelles, 28th May, 1815.

1. The Commander of the Forces was sorry to observe the number of carriages attending the march of the British troops into Bruxelles, contrary to his Orders.

2. He requests the General Officers commanding brigades and divisions, will see that the Orders upon this subject are obeyed.

3. It is much better that the officers of the army should at once get rid of their useless baggage, as they may depend upon it, that even if the Commander of the Forces were disposed to allow of their being followed by the number of carts, which accompanied the troops into Bruxelles this day, they will more frequently find themselves in situations in which wheel carriages cannot reach them, than they are aware of, and they will lose the whole.

4. The Commander of the Forces trusts that he shall not have occasion to name in General Orders the regiments by which his Orders on this subject are disobeyed.

would be required to form the inundations of fresh water, and it was determined not to do the country the permanent injury of letting in the salt water.

The order was executed by the military officers in command of the posts necessarily, because the people, and particularly every person connected with the civil departments, opposed themselves, in some instances with violence, to the formation of the inundations, and they have since done every thing in their power to draw them off. This was to be expected; but I acknowledge that I did not expect that such conduct would be encouraged by the language used in a report by a Minister of State.

However, I am disposed to do every thing in my power to diminish the individual injury which must result from these measures. I had already manifested this disposition before I had received your letter; and I shall now order an officer to communicate with the person named by the \_\_\_\_\_, in order to carry into execution all the measures his Excellency proposes, which shall not be inconsistent with the safety of the country.'

942.

To Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg.

à Bruxelles, ce 2 Juin, 1815.

'Sous ces circonstances il est très important que je sache, aussitôt que possible, quand vous pourrez commencer vos opérations; et de quelle nature elles seront, et vers quel tems nous pouvons attendre que vous serez arrivé à

G. O.

Bruxelles, 31st May, 1815.

1. The Commander of the Forces is very desirous of relieving the infantry soldiers of the British army from a part of the weight which they now carry, and he therefore desires that the name, and number of each man, and the letter of his company, may be marked upon his great coat, with a view to its being taken into store, and that the great coats may be packed in packages, each containing 20 great coats.

2. The packages must be marked each, with the number of the regiment, the letter of the company, and the words, "Great Coats belonging to Captain \_\_\_\_\_'s Company."

3. This must be completed throughout the army by the 4th June, on which day the Commissaries attached to brigades are to send the great coats to the stores at Ostend.

4. The Commissaries attached to brigades of infantry are to supply the regiments upon their requisition, with the means of packing the great coats as above ordered.

5. The Commissary of Stores is to take charge of the great coats.

6. These Orders are to be communicated to, and obeyed by, all regiments on their landing.

7. The Commander of the Forces begs the attention of the General Officers commanding divisions, and brigades, and of the commanding officers of regiments, to the same object of relieving the soldiers from a part of the weight which they carry, and that no soldier may have more than 3 shirts, of which 2 only in his knapsack.

8. He likewise desires that some arrangement of distribution may be made by the officers commanding companies, so that the number of brushes which each soldier of the infantry carries may be diminished, and that every soldier may not carry the total number which are necessary for his use.

9. 30 tents for each battalion of British infantry, and of infantry K. G. L., and 60 tents for each brigade of Hanoverian infantry, will be sent by the Commissary of Stores and the Commissary General to each division of infantry.

10. The Commissary General will send with the tents the means of moving them; that is, one waggon with 2 horses and a driver for the tents of each battalion of British infantry, and of the infantry of the legion, and 2 waggons with 4 horses, and 2 drivers for the tents of each brigade of Hanoverian infantry.

11. The waggons and drivers are to be under the particular care of the quarter masters of the regiments, who will see that the tents are properly packed in the waggons for a march.

12. The tents are to be under the direction of the Assistant Quarter Master General attached to divisions, who will apply them as they may think proper, observing always to have the means of moving them from the place at which any of them may be used.

13. Notwithstanding that tents will be sent to the regiments, measures must be taken to render the blankets the soldiers have applicable as tents in case it should be necessary.'



une hauteur quelconque, afin que je puisse commencer de ce côté-ci de manière à avoir l'appui de vos opérations.

Le Maréchal Blücher est préparé et très impatient de commencer ; mais je lui ai fait dire aujourd'hui qu'il me paraissait que nous ne pouvions rien faire jusqu'à ce que nous fussions certain du jour que vous commenceriez, et en général de vos idées sur vos opérations.'

## 943.

To ———.

à Bruxelles, ce 4 Juin, 1815.

'Je suis bien flatté de la confiance que vous avez témoigné par votre lettre du 1, à laquelle je vais répondre avec la même franchise que celle vous avez eue en m'écrivant.

Le principe sur lequel vous vous fondez est généralement vrai et bon ; un galant homme ne peut pas servir dans les rangs des ennemis de sa patrie ; mais je ne crois pas que le cas existe. La France n'a pas d'ennemis que je connaisse, et, à ce que je sache, n'en mérite pas. Nous sommes les ennemis d'un seul homme, et de ses adhérens, qui s'est servi de son influence sur l'armée Française pour renverser le trône du Roi, afin de subjuguier la France, et puis de faire revivre pour nous tous les jours de malheur que nous croyions avoir échappé. Nous sommes en guerre avec lui, parceque nous sentons tous que nous ne pouvons pas être en paix. C'est un malheur pour la France qu'elle devienne le théâtre de la guerre que cet homme nécessite, et dont il est la cause et le but ; mais il ne faut pas croire que cette guerre soit dirigée contre elle. Au contraire, le Roi de France, celui que vous désirez voir restauré au trône, et de servir, est l'allié de toute l'Europe dans cette lutte, dans laquelle je le crois aussi le vrai représentant des sentimens et des souhaits de sa nation.

La situation dans laquelle nous allons nous trouver ne peut pas donc s'appeler un état de guerre contre la France, mais bien une guerre de la part de toute l'Europe, y inclus la France, contre Buonaparte, et contre son armée, dont la mauvaise conduite a donné occasion aux malheurs qui vont arriver, et que nous déplorons tous.

Mais, quoique j'envisage l'état où nous allons nous trouver sous un point de vue différent de celui où vous l'avez envisagé, je ne suis pas certain que je n'agirais pas dans ce moment comme vous proposez d'agir. Je n'étais pas à Paris quand le malheur que nous regrettons tous est arrivé. Je n'en

G. O.

Bruxelles 3rd June, 1815.

'5. So much benefit was felt during the late war, particularly by the soldiers of the army, from the system then adopted of paying them every day, that the Commander of the Forces has determined to adopt it again.

6. Accordingly he desires that the balances which shall appear to be due on the face of the accounts to the 24th May last, of each serjeant, trumpeter, drummer, and rank and file, shall be paid him by daily issues, to the amount of his daily subsistence.

7. The paymasters of regiments are in future to send in their estimates for the month's pay for their regiments on the 12th of the month, so that the warrants may be signed, and an issue may be made upon them by the 25th of each month.

8. They will thus be provided with means to issue to the captains of companies the daily subsistence of their men, which after the balances due on the 24th of the month, will have been paid as above ordered in No. 6, is to be paid entire every day.

9. In case any soldier should now be in debt, or should at any time hereafter require necessaries, the captain is to make arrangements for stopping the payment of his daily subsistence, till the debt will be discharged, or the necessaries will be paid for.'

connais pas tous les détails ; et je n'en peux pas juger exactement. Je suis tenté de croire que la cause du mal était que le Roi n'était pas, et n'avait jamais été, maître de l'armée dite la sienne ; et qu'avec les meilleures précautions les mêmes événemens seraient arrivés, un peu plutôt ou un peu plus tard, avec très peu de différence dans leurs détails. Mais un homme comme vous, connaissant les affaires, et capable d'en juger, peut avoir raison de se plaindre, si ses conseils sont négligés dans le moment de crise, et surtout si les malheurs qu'il a prévus arrivent ; et le dégoût de sa part, et sa retraite, doivent être attendus comme la conséquence naturelle d'un manque d'égard pour ses conseils.

J'ajouterai aussi que dans ce moment je ne vois pas que le Roi aie les moyens de vous employer d'une manière qui soit convenable à votre rang ou à vos talens ; ou qui vous donne la facilité de rendre à votre patrie les services dont vous êtes capable.

Mais, quoique je convienne avec vous que vous faites bien de vous éloigner pour le moment, je vous conseille très fort de ne pas le faire trop longtemps.

Quand les Alliés entreront en France, la France ne peut pas rester neutre entre Buonaparte et l'armée et elles. Tout donne lieu de croire que la partie saine de la nation se rangera sous les drapeaux du Roi, du côté des bons principes ; et si cette espérance s'accomplit, et qu'un grand effort se fasse, c'est alors le moment où un homme comme vous devrait se mettre en avant pour lever, organiser, former, et commander l'armée Française, qui doit remettre et soutenir le Roi sur son trône.

Malgré donc que j'ai demandé permission au Roi des Pays Bays pour que votre Excellence passe et se rende en Hollande, je vous conseille de ne pas quitter Aix la Chapelle ; et de ne pas annoncer l'intention de faire votre retraite, jusqu'à ce que vous ayez des nouvelles positives de ce qui se passera en France après l'entrée des Alliés.

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 944.

To H.S.H. the Duc d'Orleans.

Bruxelles, 6th June, 1815.

'I received your Highness' letter in due course, and I should have answered it sooner, if I had not wished to give to the subject to which it relates all the consideration which it deserves.

In my opinion, the King was driven from his throne because he never had the real command over his army. This is a fact with which your Highness and I were well acquainted, and which we have frequently lamented ; and even if the trivial faults, or rather follies, of his civil administration had not been committed, I believe the same results would have been produced.

We must consider the King, then, as the victim of a successful revolt of his army, and of his army only ; for, whatever may be the opinions and feelings of some who took a prominent part in the revolution, and whatever the apathy of the great mass of the population of France, we may, I think, set it down as certain that even the first do not like the existing order of things, and that the last would, if they dared, oppose it in arms.

Now, then, this being the case, what ought to be the conduct of the King ? First, he ought to call for his allies to enable him to oppose



himself to his rebellious army; and he ought, by his personal countenance, and the activity of his servants and adherents, to do every thing in his power to facilitate their operations, and to diminish, by good order and management, the burdens of the war upon his faithful subjects, and to induce them to receive his allies as friends and deliverers. The King should give an interest to the Allies to support his cause; and this can be done only by his coming forward himself in it.

So far your Highness will see that I differ in opinion with you regarding the conduct of the King.

In regard to your Highness, I confess that I do not see how far your Highness could have acted in a different manner up to the present period. It is not necessary that I should recite the different reasons you had for keeping at a distance from the Court since it has been at Ghent; but I feel them all, and I believe the King is not insensible of the weight of some of them.

But if, as may be expected, the entrance and first successes of the Allies in France should induce the people to come forward, and a great party should appear in favor of the King in different parts of the Kingdom, surely your Highness would then consider it your duty to come forward in His Majesty's service. I venture to suggest this conduct to your Highness, telling you at the same time that I have not had any conversation with the King upon it.

Your Highness will have read with pleasure the accounts of the Austrian successes in Italy, upon which I beg leave to congratulate you. That affair has turned out, in all its details, nearly as we expected; and I hope we shall be equally successful in the other still greater which we are about to undertake.

I beg your Highness to present my most respectful compliments to Madame la Duchesse d'Orleans and to Mademoiselle.'

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945.

To the Duc de Feltré.

à Bruxelles, ce 14 Juin, 1814.

'Les malheurs du Roi ont été occasionnés par la défection de l'armée Française, qui est le seul soutien du pouvoir de Buonaparte. La restauration se devra à la défaite de l'armée Française; et je connais assez cette armée pour être bien convaincu que, pour accomplir cet objet, il faut non seulement la force suffisante, mais que cette force soit sagement dirigée vers un seul but; et il ne faut pas que nous courrions après des curiosités telles qu'elles soient.'

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946.

To H. H. Prince Metternich.

Bruxelles, 14th June, 1815.

'Baron Vincent has communicated to me the instructions which he has received from your Highness of the 4th instant, regarding the commissioners appointed by the King of France for providing for the subsistence of the armies when in France, of which he has informed me that the other Ministers of the Allies at the Court of the King of France will receive from their several Sovereigns the counterpart; and I have now the honor to inform your Highness that I am directed by my own Government (and my sense of duty towards the Allies, whose troops I am commanding by common consent,

would induce me) to act in every respect on this subject in the same manner with the other Allies.

Therefore this subject, like every other, may be considered as one of general concern, in which all the Allies are equally interested; and it will, I doubt not, be decided with a view to the common interest.

On the same day that your Highness dispatched your messenger to General Baron Vincent, one was dispatched from hence with the draught of a convention which it was proposed to conclude with the King of France, for regulating this matter of subsistence according to what is stipulated in the article of the treaty of the 25th March.

It was I who suggested this convention to the Ministers of the Allies; and when I did so, I considered that I was acting on the principles likewise suggested by me, and, as I imagined, universally concurred in, in a conversation which we had upon this subject in presence of Prince Talleyrand, in a conference at your Highness' house at Vienna.

I then recommended that we should make over the French districts which should fall into the hands of the Allies to officers to be appointed by the King of France. That the intendants or principal Commissaries of the several armies should be put in communication with these officers to be appointed by the King of France, and should make upon them the requisitions for the several supplies they should require for their armies respectively; that the King of France's officers should enforce these requisitions upon the country, taking care to give to the owners proper receipts and vouchers for the property taken from them; and that these receipts and vouchers should be taken up, and should be a charge upon the French Government, to be hereafter established.

I conceived this system to have been entirely concurred in by your Highness and by the other Ministers of the Allies; and that the 5th article of the treaty of the 25th March was framed with a view to its eventual adoption; and, therefore, when the subject lately came under discussion here, I proposed that it should be embodied in a convention.

As the Ministers of the Allies here think it proper to refer this subject for further consideration, I think it proper to trouble your Highness with a few lines, to make you acquainted with my reason for preferring it.

First; It provides for taking that with regularity, and without loss to individuals, from the country, which the country, however unwillingly, must provide; and affords the best chance of tranquillity in the rear of the several armies.

Secondly; It tends to make partisans instead of enemies of those who shall have given their property for the subsistence of the several armies. Every man who shall have in his possession a voucher or receipt on the part of the officers of Louis XVIII. will feel an interest in the success of the cause, in proportion as he shall value the property taken from him.

Thirdly; It will put an end to very disagreeable discussions between the Commanders of the several armies, myself particularly, and Louis XVIII. His Majesty, being an acceding party to the treaty of alliance, will naturally claim to take possession of the country which shall fall into the hands of the Allies. If this system should not be adopted, both parties, that is, His Majesty Louis XVIII. and the Allies, will appoint officers to govern that coun-



try; and disputes will arise, not very creditable to the Allies or encouraging to the loyal party in France, or beneficial to the operations of the Allies.

Fourthly; By adopting this system, which is the most simple, and, as I have above shown, the most beneficial to the allied armies, we should at the same time hold out something to France to which the public opinion might attach itself; and without, in any degree, pledging the Allies to any thing, we should give the King's party, which I believe we all prefer, a fair chance of success.

Fifthly; We should avoid the evil of seizing the public treasures in France; an evil which it will be very difficult to avoid under any other system, and which will be fatal to the discipline and reputation of the allied armies, and will give but too much reason for the French people to believe that the Allies have forgotten, or have omitted to act upon, the system laid down in their public declarations and their treaties.

On these grounds I recommended the system embodied in the convention of which you have the draught, which I understood had been approved of; and I hope that upon reconsideration of the subject, and of the dispatch received from England upon it, of which your Ministers have the copy, that the convention will be approved of.

If it should not, however, I repeat to your Highness that I am ready to act upon any system which may be adopted by common accord.'

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947.

To the Emperor of ———.

à Bruxelles, ce 15 Juin, 1815.

'Je suis bien flatté de la lettre que votre Majesté m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire, et je ferai tous mes efforts pour mériter la bonne opinion que votre Majesté me témoigne.

J'ai lu avec la plus grande attention les pièces sur les opérations que votre Majesté m'a envoyées par le Général Toll; et je vois avec la plus grande satisfaction que nous sommes tous d'accord sur les bases générales du plan d'opérations: c'est-à-dire, de limiter notre extension par la nécessité de trouver les subsistances pour des armées si vastes; que l'armée Autrichienne d'Italie doit coopérer avec les autres, mais sur une base différente; et que le centre de la grande armée d'opérations, celle qui s'étendra depuis la mer jusqu'à la Suisse, doit appuyer ou la droite ou la gauche, selon les circonstances. Ce centre sera composé des troupes de votre Majesté en entier; la droite de l'armée du Maréchal Blücher et de celle sous mes ordres; la gauche de celle sous les ordres immédiats du Prince de Schwarzenberg.

Je ne vois pas grand inconvénient à l'extension qu'on donne à la gauche jusqu'à la Suisse, à laquelle je vois que les officiers Autrichiens tiennent très fortement. Je crois que toutes les parties de l'armée sont assez fortes pour résister, chacune toute seule, à tous les efforts de l'ennemi; et ainsi cette extension n'a pas les inconvénients ordinaires d'une telle mesure; en même tems qu'elle nous facilitera les moyens de subsistance, et nous donnera plus de sécurité sur notre gauche, et occupera un rayon plus étendu du pays ennemi.

Pour ce qui regarde le centre, l'idée, que j'avais, était que cette partie de l'armée serait, ainsi que la droite et la gauche, composé de 150,000 hommes; et j'ai cru que sa marche devait être dirigée sur la Meuse, entre Verdun et

Sedan. Le centre aurait été là en mesure d'appuyer ou la droite ou la gauche ; et aurait eu l'appui de la première pour son passage de la Meuse, et pour ses opérations sur l'Oise et la Haute Aisné.

Mais, comme chacune de ces parties de la grande armée va entrer en campagne avec de 50,000 à 60,000 hommes de plus que je ne comptais, c'est-à-dire, de 200,000 à 210,000 hommes chacune, le centre peut être dirigé avec des vues différentes. Il faut observer cependant que, quand je parle de la force de ces différentes parties de la grande armée, je n'ai de connaissance positive que sur la droite. S'il est vrai que chacune des trois parties soit assez forte pour se soutenir toute seule, alors je dirais que la marche du centre devrait être dirigée de Treves dans la vue des opérations qu'on voudra entreprendre contre la position que l'ennemi prendra sûrement sur l'Aisne. Si nous voulons tourner cette position par sa gauche, et opérer par les provinces du Nord, qui offrent bien d'autres ressources, et dans lesquelles les dispositions du peuple sont bien autrement favorables qu'en Champagne, le centre devrait alors s'appuyer sur la droite ; et la marche des troupes de votre Majesté devrait être dirigée de Treves à Luxembourg, et de Luxembourg sur Stenay et Sedan. Si, au contraire, la position sur l'Aisne doit être tournée par sa droite, et surtout, si la gauche n'est pas si forte que je la crois, alors la marche de l'armée de votre Majesté devrait être droit de Treves sur St. Dizier. Le centre et la gauche seront alors en mesure de suivre les opérations sur la Marne, tandis que la droite serait en force suffisante pour se soutenir sur l'Aisne ; mais les deux parties, premièrement nommées, seront assez concentrées dans un pays bien mauvais et beaucoup épuisé.

Cependant cette ligne est la plus droite à notre but, elle est la plus naturelle pour chacune des armées, et elle me paraît être celle que les officiers de l'armée Autrichienne adopteront le plus volontiers. Ainsi donc la marche directe de Treves sur St. Dizier, passant la Meuse au-dessus, plutôt qu'en dessous de Verdun, et laissant Luxembourg tout à fait à côté, serait celle préférée par votre Majesté.

Pour ce qui nous regarde ici, je crois que nous serons obligés de faire, au moins, le siège de Maubeuge. Le Maréchal Blücher croit que la place de Givet ne lui serait d'aucune utilité ; mais je crois que nous avons des moyens suffisans pour tout ce qu'il faudrait que nous fissions.'

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948.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, G.C.B.

Waterloo, 18th June, 1815.

'I enclose 2 letters, which I beg you to peruse and forward without loss of time. You will see in the letter to the Duc de Berri the real state of our case and the only risk we run. The Prussians will be ready again in the morning for any thing.

Pray keep the English quiet, if you can. Let them all prepare to move, but neither be in a hurry or a fright, as all will yet turn out well.

I have given the directions to the Governor of Antwerp to meet the *crotchets* which I find in the heads of the King's Governors upon every turn.

The post horses are embargoed in my name, I conclude, to prevent people from running away with them ; but give the man orders to allow any body to have them who goes with an order from you.'

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949.

To H.R.H. the Duc de Berri.

à Waterloo, ce 18 Juin, 1815.

‘ Je n’ai pas écrit à votre Altesse Royale, ni à M. le Duc de Feltre, depuis Jeudi, parceque je n’ai rien eu à lui communiquer, ni à votre Altesse Royale, et j’ai eu beaucoup à faire.

Nous avons eu une bataille très sanglante Vendredi, auprès de la ferme des Quatre Bras, moi ; et auprès de Sombref, les Prussiens. J’avais très peu de monde avec moi, et point de cavalerie, et cependant j’ai repoussé l’ennemi, et j’ai eu des succès. Les Prussiens ont souffert beaucoup ; et se sont retirés dans la nuit ; et j’ai donc été dans le cas de faire la même chose hier dans la journée. J’ai vu hier très peu de l’ennemi qui nous a suivi mollement, et les Prussiens pas du tout. Ces derniers ont été joints hier par leur 4<sup>me</sup> corps, de plus de 30,000 hommes ; et moi, j’ai presque tout mon monde.

Il se peut que l’ennemi nous tourne par Hal, quoique le temps soit terrible et les chemins détestables, et malgré que j’aie le corps du Prince Frederic en position entre Hal et Enghien. Si cela arrive, je prie votre Altesse Royale de marcher sur Anvers, et de vous cantonner dans le voisinage, et de faire dire à Sa Majesté que je la prie de passer de Gand à Anvers par la gauche de l’Escaut. Il ne trouvera pas de difficultés au passage de la Tête de Flandres. Ayez la bonté d’en oyer cette lettre au Duc de Feltre.

J’approuve entièrement ce que Son Excellence dit à votre Altesse Royale dans sa lettre du 16, à 3 heures de l’après midi ; et je prie votre Altesse Royale d’envoyer par l’Escaut à Anvers tout ce que vous avez à Termonde, ou à Alost, de magasins, qui ne vous sont pas absolument nécessaires dans le moment.

J’espère, et plus, j’ai toute raison de croire, que tout ira bien ; mais il faut prévoir tout ; et on ne veut pas faire de grandes pertes. C’est pour cela que je prie votre Altesse Royale de faire ce qui est écrit dans cette lettre ; et Sa Majesté de partir pour Anvers, non sur des faux bruits, mais sur la nouvelle certaine, que l’ennemi est entré à Bruxelles, malgré moi, en me tournant par Hal. Sa Majesté en aura toujours le temps en passant par la Tête de Flandres.’

950.

To the Governor of Antwerp.

à Waterloo, ce 18 Juin, 1815.

‘ Je reçois votre lettre du ; et je vous prévien que vous devez considérer Anvers comme en état de siège, et que vous devez former les inondations tout de suite. Pour ce qui regarde les provisions des habitans, ce n’est pas nécessaire à présent d’y faire grande attention.

Je vous prie d’observer que, malgré que la place soit en état de siège, vous y laisserez entrer le Roi de France et sa suite, s’il se présente ; et que vous ferez cantonner sa garde, si elle y vient, auprès de la place.

Vous laisserez aussi entrer et sortir librement toutes les familles, ou Anglaises ou d’autre nation, qui se présenteront, ayant été dans le cas de quitter Bruxelles pour le moment.

Nous avons eu Vendredi une bataille très sanglante auprès de la ferme des Quatre Bras, moi ; et auprès de Sombref, les Prussiens. J’ai repoussé l’ennemi, et j’ai eu des succès de mon côté ; mais les Prussiens ayant beau-

coup souffert dans la bataille, ils se sont retirés dans la nuit pour se joindre à leurs renforts ; et j'ai donc été dans le cas de faire la même chose hier dans la journée.

J'ai vu hier très peu de l'ennemi.'

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951.

To Earl Bathurst.

Waterloo, 19th June, 1815.

'Buonaparte, having collected the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th corps of the French army, and the Imperial Guards, and nearly all the cavalry, on the Sambre, and between that river and the Meuse, between the 10th and 14th of the month, advanced on the 15th and attacked the Prussian posts at Thuin and Lobbes, on the Sambre, at daylight in the morning.

I did not hear of these events till in the evening of the 15th ; and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march, and afterwards to march to their left, as soon as I had intelligence from other quarters to prove that the enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack.

The enemy drove the Prussian posts from the Sambre on that day ; and General Ziethen, who commanded the corps which had been at Charleroi, retired upon Fleurus ; and Marshal Prince Blücher concentrated the Prussian army upon Sombref, holding the villages in front of his position of St. Amand and Ligny.

The enemy continued his march along the road from Charleroi towards Bruxelles ; and, on the same evening, the 15th, attacked a brigade of the army of the Netherlands, under the Prince de Weimar, posted at Frasné, and forced it back to the farm house, on the same road, called Les Quatre Bras.

The Prince of Orange immediately reinforced this brigade with another of the same division, under General Perponcher, and, in the morning early, regained part of the ground which had been lost, so as to have the command of the communication leading from Nivelles and Bruxelles with Marshal Blücher's position.

In the mean time, I had directed the whole army to march upon Les Quatre Bras ; and the 5th division, under Lieut. General Sir T. Picton, arrived at about half past 2 in the day, followed by the corps of troops under the Duke of Brunswick, and afterwards by the contingent of Nassau.

At this time the enemy commenced an attack upon Prince Blücher with his whole force, excepting the 1st and 2nd corps, and a corps of cavalry under General Kellermann, with which he attacked our post at Les Quatre Bras.

The Prussian army maintained their position with their usual gallantry and perseverance against a great disparity of numbers, as the 4th corps of their army, under General Bülow, had not joined ; and I was not able to assist them as I wished, as I was attacked myself, and the troops, the cavalry in particular, which had a long distance to march, had not arrived.

We maintained our position also, and completely defeated and repulsed all the enemy's attempts to get possession of it. The enemy repeatedly attacked us with a large body of infantry and cavalry, supported by a numerous and powerful artillery. He made several charges with the cavalry upon our infantry, but all were repulsed in the steadiest manner.



In this affair, H.R.H. the Prince of Orange, the Duke of Brunswick, and Lieut. General Sir T. Picton, and Major Generals Sir J. Kempt and Sir Denis Pack, who were engaged from the commencement of the enemy's attack, highly distinguished themselves, as well as Lieut. General C. Baron Alten, Major General Sir C. Halkett, Lieut. General Cooke, and Major Generals Maitland and Byng, as they successively arrived. The troops of the 5th division, and those of the Brunswick corps, were long and severely engaged, and conducted themselves with the utmost gallantry. I must particularly mention the 28th, 42nd, 79th, and 92nd regts., and the battalion of Hanoverians.

Our loss was great, as your Lordship will perceive by the enclosed return; and I have particularly to regret H.S.H. the Duke of Brunswick, who fell fighting gallantly at the head of his troops.

Although Marshal Blücher had maintained his position at Sombref, he still found himself much weakened by the severity of the contest in which he had been engaged, and, as the 4th corps had not arrived, he determined to fall back and to concentrate his army upon Wavre; and he marched in the night, after the action was over.

This movement of the Marshal rendered necessary a corresponding one upon my part; and I retired from the farm of Quatre Bras upon Genappe, and thence upon Waterloo, the next morning, the 17th, at 10 o'clock.

The enemy made no effort to pursue Marshal Blücher. On the contrary, a patrol which I sent to Sombref in the morning found all quiet;\* and the enemy's vedettes fell back as the patrol advanced. Neither did he attempt to molest our march to the rear, although made in the middle of the day, excepting by following, with a large body of cavalry brought from his right, the cavalry under the Earl of Uxbridge.

This gave Lord Uxbridge an opportunity of charging them with the 1st Life Guards, upon their *débouché* from the village of Genappe, upon which occasion his Lordship has declared himself to be well satisfied with that regiment.

The position which I took up in front of Waterloo crossed the high roads from Charleroi and Nivelles, and had its right thrown back to a ravine near Merke Braine, which was occupied, and its left extended to a height above the hamlet Ter la Haye, which was likewise occupied. In front of the right centre, and near the Nivelles road, we occupied the house and gardens of Hougomont, which covered the return of that flank; and in front of the left centre we occupied the farm of La Haye Sainte. By our left we communicated with Marshal Prince Blücher at Wavre, through Ohain; and the Marshal had promised me that, in case we should be attacked, he would support me with one or more corps, as might be necessary.

The enemy collected his army, with the exception of the 3rd corps, which had been sent to observe Marshal Blücher, on a range of heights in our front, in the course of the night of the 17th and yesterday morning, and at about 10 o'clock he commenced a furious attack upon our post at Hougomont. I had occupied that post with a detachment from General Byng's

\* Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Gordon was sent, escorted by a squadron of the 10th hussars, to communicate with the Prussian head quarters, as to co-operation with the British army ordered to retire to the position in front of Waterloo.

brigade of Guards, which was in position in its rear; and it was for some time under the command of Lieut. Colonel Macdonell, and afterwards of Colonel Homé; and I am happy to add, that it was maintained throughout the day with the utmost gallantry by these brave troops, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of large bodies of the enemy to obtain possession of it.

This attack upon the right of our centre was accompanied by a very heavy cannonade upon our whole line, which was destined to support the repeated attacks of cavalry and infantry, occasionally mixed, but sometimes separate, which were made upon it. In one of these the enemy carried the farm house of La Haye Sainte, as the detachment of the light battalion of the German Legion, which occupied it, had expended all its ammunition; and the enemy occupied the only communication there was with them.

The enemy repeatedly charged our infantry with his cavalry, but these attacks were uniformly unsuccessful; and they afforded opportunities to our cavalry to charge, in one of which Lord E. Somerset's brigade, consisting of the Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards, and 1st dragoon guards, highly distinguished themselves, as did that of Major General Sir W. Ponsonby, having taken many prisoners and an eagle.

These attacks were repeated till about 7 in the evening, when the enemy made a desperate effort with cavalry and infantry, supported by the fire of artillery, to force our left centre, near the farm of La Haye Sainte, which, after a severe contest, was defeated; and, having observed that the troops retired from this attack in great confusion, and that the march of General Bülow's corps, by Frischermont, upon Planchenois and La Belle Alliance, had begun to take effect, and as I could perceive the fire of his cannon, and as Marshal Prince Blücher had joined in person with a corps of his army to the left of our line by Ohain, I determined to attack the enemy, and immediately advanced the whole line of infantry, supported by the cavalry and artillery. The attack succeeded in every point: the enemy was forced from his positions on the heights, and fled in the utmost confusion, leaving behind him, as far as I could judge, 150 pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, which fell into our hands.

I continued the pursuit till long after dark, and then discontinued it only on account of the fatigue of our troops, who had been engaged during 12 hours, and because I found myself on the same road with Marshal Blücher, who assured me of his intention to follow the enemy throughout the night. He has sent me word this morning that he had taken 60 pieces of cannon belonging to the Imperial Guard, and several carriages, baggage, &c., belonging to Buonaparte, in Genappe.

I propose to move this morning upon Nivelles, and not to discontinue my operations.

Your Lordship will observe that such a desperate action could not be fought, and such advantages could not be gained, without great loss; and I am sorry to add that ours has been immense. In Lieut. General Sir T. Picton, His Majesty has sustained the loss of an officer who has frequently distinguished himself in his service; and he fell gloriously leading his division to a charge with bayonets, by which one of the most serious attacks made by the enemy on our position was repulsed. The Earl of Uxbridge, after having successfully got through this arduous day, received a wound by



almost the last shot fired, which will, I am afraid, deprive His Majesty for some time of his services.

H.R.H. the Prince of Orange distinguished himself by his gallantry and conduct, till he received a wound from a musket ball through the shoulder, which obliged him to quit the field.

It gives me the greatest satisfaction to assure your Lordship that the army never, upon any occasion, conducted itself better. The division of Guards, under Lieut. General Cooke, who is severely wounded, Major General Maitland, and Major General Byng, set an example which was followed by all; and there is no officer nor description of troops that did not behave well.

I must, however, particularly mention, for His Royal Highness' approbation, Lieut. General Sir H. Clinton, Major General Adam, Lieut. General C. Baron Alten (severely wounded), Major General Sir C. Halkett (severely wounded), Colonel Ompteda, Colonel Mitchell (commanding a brigade of the 4th division), Major Generals Sir J. Kempt and Sir D. Pack, Major General Lambert, Major General Lord E. Somerset, Major General Sir W. Ponsonby, Major General Sir C. Grant, and Major General Sir H. Vivian, Major General Sir J. O. Vandeleur, and Major General Count Dornberg.

I am also particularly indebted to General Lord Hill for his assistance and conduct upon this, as upon all former occasions.

The artillery and engineer departments were conducted much to my satisfaction by Colonel Sir G. Wood and Colonel Smyth; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Adjutant General, Major General Barnes, who was wounded, and of the Quarter Master General, Colonel De Lancey, who was killed by a cannon shot in the middle of the action. This officer is a serious loss to His Majesty's service, and to me at this moment.

I was likewise much indebted to the assistance of Lieut. Colonel Lord FitzRoy Somerset, who was severely wounded, and of the officers composing my personal Staff, who have suffered severely in this action. Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Sir A. Gordon, who has died of his wounds, was a most promising officer, and is a serious loss to His Majesty's service.

General Krüse, of the Nassau service, likewise conducted himself much to my satisfaction; as did General Trip, commanding the heavy brigade of cavalry, and General Vanhope, commanding a brigade of infantry in the service of the King of the Netherlands.

General Pozzo di Borgo, General Baron Vincent, General Müffling, and General Alava, were in the field during the action, and rendered me every assistance in their power. Baron Vincent is wounded, but I hope not severely; and General Pozzo di Borgo received a contusion.

I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them. The operation of General Bülow upon the enemy's flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded.

Since writing the above, I have received a report that Major General Sir

W. Ponsonby is killed; and, in announcing this intelligence to your Lordship, I have to add the expression of my grief for the fate of an officer who had already rendered very brilliant and important services, and was an ornament to his profession.

I send with this dispatch 3 eagles, taken by the troops in this action, which Major Percy will have the honor of laying at the feet of His Royal Highness. I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship's protection.'

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the British and Hanoverian Army under the command of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K.G., in the battle fought at Quatre Bras on the 16th June, 1815.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank & File.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	British.	Hanoverians.	Horses.
Killed . . .	29	19	302	350	316	34	19
Wounded .	126	111	2143	2380	2156	224	14
Missing . .	4	6	171	181	32	149	1

On the retreat from Quatre Bras to Waterloo on the 17th June, 1815.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank & File.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	British.	Hanoverians.	Horses.
Killed . . .	1	1	33	35	26	9	45
Wounded .	7	13	112	132	52	80	20
Missing . .	4	3	64	71	30	32	33

In the battle fought at Waterloo on the 18th June, 1815.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank & File.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	British.	Hanoverians.	Horses.
Killed . . .	116	109	1822	2047	1759	288	1495
Wounded .	504	364	6148	7016	5892	1124	891
Missing . .	20	29	1574	1623	807	816	773

Killed.                  Wounded.                  Missing.  
Total . . . 2432                  9528                  1875

The greater number of the men returned missing had gone to the rear with wounded officers and soldiers, and joined afterwards. The officers are supposed killed.









## 952.

To the Earl of Aberdeen, K.T.

Bruxelles, 19th June, 1815.

'You will readily give credit to the existence of the extreme grief with which I announce to you the death of your gallant brother, in consequence of a wound received in our great battle of yesterday. He had served me most zealously and usefully for many years, and on many trying occasions; but he had never rendered himself more useful, and had never distinguished himself more, than in our late actions. He received the wound which occasioned his death when rallying one of the Brunswick battalions which was shaking a little; and he lived long enough to be informed by myself of the glorious result of our actions, to which he had so much contributed by his active and zealous assistance.

I cannot express to you the regret and sorrow with which I look round me, and contemplate the loss which I have sustained, particularly in your brother. The glory resulting from such actions, so dearly bought, is no consolation to me, and I cannot suggest it as any to you and his friends; but I hope that it may be expected that this last one has been so decisive, as that no doubt remains that our exertions and our individual losses will be rewarded by the early attainment of our just object. It is then that the glory of the actions in which our friends and relations have fallen will be some consolation for their loss.

Your brother had a black horse, given to him, I believe, by Lord Ashburnham, which I will keep till I hear from you what you wish should be done with it.'

## 953.

To the Duke of Beaufort, K.G.

Bruxelles, 19th June, 1815.

'I am very sorry to have to acquaint you that your brother FitzRoy is very severely wounded, and has lost his right arm. I have just seen him, and he is perfectly free from fever, and as well as any body could be under such circumstances. You are aware how useful he has always been to me; and how much I shall feel the want of his assistance, and what a regard and affection I feel for him; and you will readily believe how much concerned I am for his misfortune. Indeed, the losses I have sustained have quite broken me down; and I have no feeling for the advantages we have acquired. I hope, however, that your brother will soon be able to join me again; and that he will long live to be, as he is likely to become, an honor to his country, as he is a satisfaction to his family and friends.'

## 954.

To Earl Bathurst.

Bruxelles, 19th June, 1815.

'I have to inform your Lordship, in addition to my dispatch of this morning, that we have already got here 5000 prisoners, taken in the action of yesterday, and that there are above 2000 more coming in tomorrow. There will probably be many more. Amongst the prisoners are the Comte de Lobau, who commanded the 6th corps, and General Cambrone, who commanded a division of the Guards. I propose to send the whole to England, by Ostend.'

955.

To General Dumouriez.

à Nivelles, ce 20 Juin, 1815.

‘J’avais commencé cette lettre le 14, et, comme ce n’était pas jour de poste, je ne l’avais pas finie; et j’étais engagé avec l’ennemi le Vendredi, qui était jour de poste. J’ai depuis reçu votre lettre du 15, pour laquelle je vous suis bien obligé.

Vous aurez vu ce que j’ai fait, et j’espère que vous en serez content. Jamais je n’ai vu une telle bataille que celle d’avant hier, ni n’ai remporté une telle victoire; et j’espère que c’est fini de Buonaparte. Nous le poursuivons vivement.’

956.

To Earl Bathurst.

Nivelles, 20th June, 1815.

‘I have received your letter of the 13th, and I see from one from Lord Castlereagh that the Portuguese Government have finally refused to employ their troops in the war at all. It is not worth while, therefore, to discuss Beresford’s notion of attacking Bayonne. He should, in going to Bordeaux, attack Blaye, so as to have his communication with the sea secure, and then he should found his operations on Bordeaux itself.

The Duc d’Angoulême will do no good with the Spanish troops. I consider the operations by emigrants, whether old or new, to be nonsense.’

G. O.

Nivelles, 20th June, 1815.

1. As the army is about to enter the French territory, the troops of the nations which are at present under the command of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, are desired to recollect that their respective Sovereigns are the allies of His Majesty the King of France, and that France ought, therefore, to be treated as a friendly country. It is therefore required that nothing should be taken either by officers or soldiers, for which payment be not made. The Commissaries of the army will provide for the wants of the troops in the usual manner, and it is not permitted either to soldiers or officers to extort contributions. The Commissaries will be authorised, either by the Field Marshal or by the Generals who command the troops of the respective nations, in cases where their provisions are not supplied by an English Commissary, to make the proper requisitions, for which regular receipts will be given; and it must be strictly understood, that they will themselves be held responsible for whatever they obtain in way of requisition from the inhabitants of France, in the same manner in which they would be esteemed accountable for purchases made for their own Government in the several dominions to which they belong.

2. The Field Marshal takes this opportunity of returning to the army his thanks for their conduct in the glorious action fought on the 18th instant, and he will not fail to report his sense of their conduct, in the terms which it deserves, to their several Sovereigns.

3. The Field Marshal has observed, that several soldiers, and even officers, have quitted their ranks without leave and have gone to Bruxelles, and even some to Antwerp, where, and in the country through which they have passed, they have spread a false alarm, in a manner highly unilitary, and derogatory to the character of soldiers.

4. The Field Marshal requests the General Officers commanding divisions in the British army, and the General Officers commanding the corps of each nation of which the army is composed, to report to him in writing what officers and men, (the former by name,) are now, or have been, absent without leave since the 16th inst.

5. The Field Marshal desires that the 14th article of the 14th section of the Articles of War, may be inserted in every orderly book of the British army, in order to remind officers and soldiers of the punishment affixed by law to the crime of creating false alarms.

6. As the army is about to enter the French territory, the Field Marshal desires it may be understood by the troops of the several nations composing the army which he has the honor to command, that their Sovereigns are in alliance with the King of France; and that France therefore must be considered as a friendly country.

7. No article is to be taken from any individual, by any officer, or soldier, without payment for the same. The Commissaries of the army will supply the troops with all that they require in the usual manner, and no requisition is to be made direct on the country, or its magistrates, by any officer or soldier.

S. The



957.

## PROCLAMATION.

‘Je fais savoir aux Français que j’entre dans leur pays à la tête d’une armée déjà victorieuse, non en ennemi (excepté de l’usurpateur, prononcé ’ennemi du genre humain, avec lequel on ne peut avoir ni paix ni trêve), mais pour les aider à secouer le joug de fer sous lequel ils sont opprimés.

En conséquence j’ai donné les ordres ci-joints à mon armée, et je demande qu’on me fasse connaître tout infracteur.

Les Français savent cependant que j’ai le droit d’exiger qu’ils se conduisent de manière que je puisse les protéger contre ceux qui voudraient leur faire du mal.

Il faut donc qu’ils fournissent aux réquisitions qui leur seront faites de la part des personnes autorisées à les faire, en échange des reçus en forme et ordre; et qu’ils se tiennent chez eux paisiblement, et qu’ils n’aient aucune correspondance ou communication avec l’usurpateur ennemi, ni avec ses adhérens.

Tous ceux qui s’absenteront de leur domicile après l’entrée en France, et tous ceux qui se trouveront absens au service de l’usurpateur, seront consi-

8. The Commissaries will receive directions, either from the Field Marshal or from the Generals commanding the troops of the several nations, (if these troops should not be supplied with provisions by the British Commissariat,) to make such requisitions as may be necessary for the supply of the troops, for which they will give the usual voucher and receipt, and they will understand that they will be responsible to issue and account for what they will thus receive from the country in France, in the same manner as they would if they purchased supplies for the troops in their own country respectively.

9. In order to preserve order, and to provide for attendance on the hospitals at Bruxelles, the Commander of the Forces desires that one officer, one non-commissioned officer, and 3 private men, for 100 men sent to the hospital, wounded in the late actions of the 16th and 18th instant, may be sent from the several regiments to Bruxelles tomorrow, and place themselves under the order of the commandant there.

10. No regiment need send officers and men for more than 100 men, and in case any regiment has not sent more than 50 men to the hospitals, such regiment will send only one non-commissioned officer, and 2 men to take charge of them.

11. This non-commissioned officer and 2 men must be under the charge and direction of the officer who will go from one of the other regiments of the brigade, which officer the officer commanding the brigade will fix upon.

12. As soon as the officers, non-commissioned officers, and private men shall arrive at Bruxelles, they will send to the commandant a nominal list of the officers and men of their several regiments, who are there in hospitals, or on the duty of attending the hospitals.

13. The commandant at Bruxelles is hereby positively forbid to allow a billet, or the issue of rations, to any officer or soldier, who shall be at Bruxelles, whose name is not in the list abovementioned, or who does not proceed thither by route from the Quarter Master General, or order from the Field Marshal.

G. O.

Malplaquet, 21st June. 1815.

‘1. With a view to preserve order in the army, it is essentially necessary that a corps of gendarmerie should be formed, who will be employed under the directions of the Field Marshal.

2. This corps shall be formed of 3 men from each regiment of cavalry in the army; and the Generals commanding the troops of the several nations, are requested to select the best and steadiest men for this service, and if possible those who can speak French.

3. When selected they are to be sent to Head Quarters with their horses, where they will receive rations for themselves and their horses, and the additional pay of one franc *per diem* while so employed, which will be paid to them by the Field Marshal.

4. He requests the Commanding Officers of the regiments of cavalry of the British army, and of the German Legion, to select such men for this service, as may have served before in the Staff corps.’

dérés comme ses adhérens et comme ennemis; et leurs propriétés seront affectées à la subsistance de l'armée.

Donné au Quartier Général, à Malplaquet, ce 22 Juin, 1815.'

## 958.

To Lieut. General the Earl of Uxbridge, G.C.B.

Le Cateau, 23rd June, 1815.

' I may be wrong, but my opinion is, that we have given Napoleon his death blow; from all I hear, his army is totally destroyed, the men are deserting in parties, even the Generals are withdrawing from him. The infantry throw away their arms, and the cavalry and artillery sell their horses to the people of the country and desert to their homes. Allowing for much exaggeration in this account, and knowing that Buonaparte can still collect, in addition to what he has brought back with him, the 5th corps d'armée, under Rapp, which is near Strasbourg, and the 3rd corps, which was at Wavre during the battle, and has not suffered so much as the others, and probably some troops from La Vendée, I am still of opinion that he can make no head against us,—*qu'il n'a qu'à se pendre.*'

## 959.

To H. H. Prince de Talleyrand.

Le Cateau, 24th June, 1815.

' The King has arrived here, and has, as I expected, been received with the utmost demonstrations of joy by all his subjects, and I only regret that your Highness did not accompany His Majesty. It was I who recommended to the King to enter France at present, because I was aware of the extent of our success in the battle of the 18th, and because I was desirous of having the influence of His Majesty's name to give to that success all the advantages which it could derive; and because I was aware that it would occasion a crisis in the King's affairs, particularly at Paris, to take advantage of which I wished His Majesty should be on the spot, or as near it as circumstances would permit.

I flatter myself, if I could have seen you, or if you could have known the exact state of affairs when you advised the King at Mons not to enter France, you would have given His Majesty different advice, and would have followed His Majesty. As things are now, I can only enclose you, in confirmation of my opinion of the extent of our success, the *Journal de l'Empire*, of the 22nd, in which you will find Buonaparte's account of the action, the truth of which, as far as it goes against himself, cannot be doubted.

You will see in the same paper the proceedings in the Assembly of the

## G. O.

Joncourt, 25th June, 1815.

6. The Commander of the Forces has observed the greatest irregularity among the baggage; private baggage and women are put upon the carts destined to carry tents and hospital stores, and the consequence is that they cannot get on, and delay every thing else. If the Commander of the Forces should observe such a practice again, he will order the private baggage to be burnt, and will bring the officer to whom it belongs to a Court Martial for disobedience of orders.

7. The women must not be allowed to get upon the public carts.

8. The Commander of the Forces begs that the divisions will start from their ground at the hour ordered, particularly the cavalry, and that they will march in the order fixed in the route, the baggage must be kept well closed up in the rear of each division or corps, according to the Order given upon the subject through the Quarter Master General.'



Deputies regarding this action; and I enclose you copies of letters just received from Prince Frederick of Orange, who is before Valenciennes, in which you will see that Buonaparte has determined in consequence to abdicate the government in favor of his son, and what persons are appointed to the provisional government of France.

Having this information before you, I conclude that you can have no scruple about joining the King forthwith, a measure which I earnestly entreat you and the other members of the King's council to adopt without loss of time.'

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960.

To Earl Bathurst.

Joncourt, 25th June, 1815.

'The advanced posts of Marshal Prince Blücher's army, and those of H. R. H. Prince Frederick of the Netherlands towards Valenciennes, yesterday received a proposition to suspend hostilities, as it was stated that Buonaparte had abdicated in favor of his son, and has appointed a provisional government, consisting of Fouché, Carnot, Caulincourt, General Grenier, and Quinette; that these persons had sent Commissioners to the Allied Powers to treat for peace. It appeared both to Prince Blücher and to me that these measures were a trick; and, at all events, were not calculated to satisfy the just pretensions of the Allies, and therefore that we ought not to discontinue our operations.

The object of the alliance of the Powers of Europe is declared by the 1st article of the treaty of the 25th March to be, to force Napoleon Buonaparte to desist from his projects, and to place him in a situation in which he shall no longer have it in his power to disturb the peace of the world; and by the 3rd article the Powers of Europe have agreed not to lay down their arms till the object held out in the first article should be attained, and till it shall have been rendered impossible for Buonaparte to excite fresh troubles, and to renew his attempts to acquire supreme power in France.

I could not consider his abdication of an usurped power in favor of his son, and his handing over the government provisionally to 5 persons named by himself, to be that description of security which the Allies had in view, which should induce them to lay down their arms, and therefore I continue my operations. All accounts concur in stating that it is impossible for the enemy to collect an army to make head against us.'

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961.

To Earl Bathurst.

Joncourt, 25th June, 1815.

'I hope we are going on well, and that what we are doing will bring matters to the earliest and best conclusion, as we are in a very bad way.

We have not one quarter of the ammunition which we ought to have, on account of the deficiency of our drivers and carriages; and I really believe that, with the exception of my old Spanish infantry, I have got not only the worst troops, but the worst equipped army, with the worst Staff, that was ever brought together.

— knows no more of his business than a child, and I am obliged to do it for him; and, after all, I cannot get him to do what I order him. Some

of the regiments (the new ones I mean) are reduced to nothing ; but I must keep them as regiments, to the great inconvenience of the service, at great expense ; or I must send them home, and part with the few British soldiers I have.

I never was so disgusted with any concern as I am with this ; and I only hope that I am going the right way to bring it to an early conclusion in some way or other.'

## 962.

To Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg.

à Joncourt, ce 26 Juin, 1815.

' Je vous suis bien obligé de votre lettre du 21, que j'ai reçue dans la nuit. Notre bataille du 18 a été une de géans ; et notre succès a été complet, comme vous voyez. Que Dieu me favorise assez pour que je n'en aie plus, parceque je suis désolé de la perte de mes anciens amis et camarades.

Mon voisin et collaborateur\* est en bonne santé, quoique un peu souffrant d'une chute qu'il a faite d'un cheval blessé sous lui dans la bataille du 16.'

## 963.

To the French Commissioners.

Head Quarters, 26th June, 1815.

' As Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington has only at this moment returned to his quarters, he has only now received from Marshal Prince Blücher the letter of their Excellencies, and which their Excellencies had sent to the Prussian outposts.

When the Field Marshal last heard from the head quarters of the Allied Sovereigns, the 21st instant, their Majesties were at Heidelberg, and they must still be in that direction. It must be obvious to their Excellencies that the Field Marshal can neither prevent nor aid their Excellencies in reaching their Majesties ; but if he has it in his power, or if their Excellencies think proper to pass through the countries in which the troops are under his command, the Field Marshal begs they will let him know in what manner he can facilitate their journey.

The Field Marshal was not aware that any officer commanding an advanced post had agreed verbally, or in any other manner, to a suspension of hostilities.

Since the 15th instant, when Napoleon Buonaparte, at the head of the French armies, invaded the dominions of the King of the Netherlands, and attacked the Prussian army, the Field Marshal has considered his Sovereign, and those Powers whose armies he commands, in a state of war with the Government of France ; and he does not consider the abdication of Napoleon Buonaparte of his usurped authority, under all the circumstances which have preceded and attended that measure, as the attainment of the object held out in the declarations and treaties of the Allies, which should induce them to lay down their arms.

\* Marshal Prince Blücher.

G. O.

Nesle, 27th June, 1815.

' I. The officers commanding companies are held responsible that the soldiers do not fall out on the march. It is scandalous to see the number that straggle from many of the regiments of the army, solely for the sake of plunder.'



The Field Marshal cannot consent therefore to any suspension of hostilities, however desirous he is of preventing the farther effusion of blood.

As the only object upon which their Excellencies desired to converse with the Field Marshal was the proposed suspension of hostilities, they will probably, after the perusal of his sentiments and intentions as above declared, consider any interview with him an useless waste of their time; but, if their Excellencies should still do him the honor to desire to have an interview with him, the Field Marshal will be ready to meet them at the time and place they shall appoint.

The Field Marshal begs their Excellencies will receive the assurance of his high consideration.'

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964.

To the French Commissioners.

Head Quarters, 28th June, 1815.

'The Field Marshal has no authority from his Government, or from the Allies, to give any answer to the demand of a passport and assurances of safety for Napoleon Buonaparte and his family to pass to the United States of America.'

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965.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, G.C.B.

Orvillé, 28th June, 1815.

'General —— has been here this day to negotiate for Napoleon's passing to America, to which proposition I have answered, that I have no authority. The Prussians think the Jacobins wish to give him over to me, believing that I will save his life. —— wishes to kill him; but I have told him that I shall remonstrate, and shall insist upon his being disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction; and that he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to become executioners and that I was determined that, if the Sovereigns wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, which should not be me.'

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966.

To Earl Bathurst.

Orvillé, 28th June, 1815.

'The citadel of Cambrai surrendered on the evening of the 25th instant; and the King of France proceeded there, with his court and his troops, on the 26th. I have given that fort over entirely to His Majesty.

I attacked Peronne with the 1st brigade of British Guards, under Major General Maitland, on the 26th, in the afternoon. The troops took the horn-work which covers the suburb on the left of the Somme by storm, with but small loss; and the town immediately afterwards surrendered, on condition that the garrison should lay down their arms, and be allowed to return to their homes.

The troops upon this occasion behaved remarkably well; and I have great pleasure in reporting the good conduct of a battery of artillery of the troops of the Netherlands.

I have placed in garrison there 2 battalions of the troops of the King of the Netherlands.

The armies under Marshal Blücher and myself have continued their operations since I last wrote to your Lordship. The necessity which I was

under of halting at Le Cateau to allow the pontoons and certain stores to reach me, and to take Cambrai and Peronne, had placed the Marshal one march before me; but I conceive there is no danger in this separation between the two armies.

He has one corps this day at Crespy, with detachments at Villers Cotte-rets, and La Fertè Milon; another at Senlis; and the 4th corps, under General Bülow, towards Paris. He will have his advanced guard tomorrow at St. Denis and Gonesse.

The army under my command has this day its right behind St. Just, and its left behind La Taulle, where the high road from Compiègne joins the high road from Roye to Paris. The reserve is at Roye. We shall be upon the Oise tomorrow.

It appears by all accounts, that the enemy's corps collected at Soissons, and under Marshal Grouchy, have not yet retired upon Paris; and Marshal Blücher's troops are already between them and that city.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of an official note which I received the night before last from certain commissioners appointed by the Provisional Government to treat for peace with the Allied Sovereigns, and the copy of my answer, which I hope will meet with the approbation of the Prince Regent. Marshal Blücher received a letter to the same purport, to which he returned a verbal answer, that he should suspend hostilities when he should arrive at Paris, provided Buonaparte was given up to him, and the Château de Vincennes, and various territories and forts on the frontiers; and provided I should agree to what was proposed. I propose to adhere to the answer which I have given.'

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967.

To the Earl of Liverpool, K.G.

Orville, 28th June, 1815.

'I have received your Lordship's letter of the 23rd, in which you have announced to me a fresh mark of the approbation and favor of the Prince Regent; and I beg you to return His Royal Highness my best thanks, and to assure him of my eternal gratitude for his most gracious reception of my services, and for all the favors which I have received from him. I likewise beg leave to return to your Lordship, and your colleagues, my best thanks for your recommendation of my best services to His Royal Highness.

You will see in my letter to Lord Bathurst the account of the state of things here; which I hope we shall bring to the conclusion we all wish for without firing another shot. I hope to be at Paris on the 1st July.'

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968.

To H.R.H. the Duke of York.

Orville, 28th June, 1815.

'I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letter of the 23rd instant, and I am highly flattered by your Royal Highness' approbation, and gratified by your attention to this army.

Your Royal Highness will see, from what happens every day, that our victory is decisive, and I hope we shall bring the concerns of this country to a satisfactory close without striking another blow.

I will immediately recommend to your Royal Highness certain officers for the third class of the Order of the Bath. At the same time, I wish to



suggest what follows for your Royal Highness' consideration. We have now 240 Orders, that is, of the first and second class, of the Order of the Bath for Admirals and General Officers; and, putting the navy out of the question, excepting to consider them as entitled to half of the number, the remainder will be for General Officers, or 120 Orders for officers of that rank. Now I would ask your Royal Highness, whether there are now, or, considering the size of the British army, or the other calls there are upon that army for officers for other armies, it is possible that there can ever be in the British army 120 General Officers, so distinguished, as to merit the first and second class of the Order of the Bath? We cannot expect again to have so long or so extensive a system of warfare as we have had for the last 22 years; yet even now, if Colonels and Lieut. Colonels with 5 medals, had not got the second class of the Order, your Royal Highness would have found it difficult to fill your 90 vacancies of that class.

That which I would propose is, that the second class, instead of being 180, should be reduced to 80; and the mode in which I would make the reduction should be by appointing only to the vacancies occasioned by the death or promotion of the original number of Admirals and General Officers.

I would then give only the third class, not as third class, but as Knights Companions. I would form another third class hereafter, to be composed of Colonels in the army, Post Captains in the navy, and Lieut. Colonels in the army, of more than 3 years' standing; the two last having already been Knights Companions, and the Knights Companions should be the fourth class. The new third class might be limited or not, as your Royal Highness might think proper. But I think the formation of it might be delayed till some future period.

I confess that I do not concur in the limitation of the Order to Field Officers. Many Captains in the army conduct themselves in a very meritorious manner, and deserve it; and I never could see the reason for excluding them either from the Order or the medal.

I would likewise beg leave to suggest to your Royal Highness the expediency of giving to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers engaged in the battle of Waterloo, a medal. I am convinced it would have the best effect in the army; and, if that battle should settle our concerns, they will well deserve it.'

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969.

To Comte de Blacas.

à Orville, ce 28 Juin, 1815.

' J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 24, et je ne peux qu'applaudir à la résolution que vous avez prise de vous séparer du Roi. Je sais mieux que personne que les préventions qui existent contre vous sont très peu fondées, ou plutôt pas du tout.

Vous avez servi le Roi avec zèle, talent, et fidélité; mais, malheureusement pour vous, vous possédiez seul sa confiance; et on ne veut pas attribuer à la vraie cause, mais on attribue à vous, les malheurs inouis qui lui sont arrivés, et que tout le monde, tout l'Europe je veux dire, est intéressé de prévenir à l'avenir.

Voilà la vraie cause des préjugés contre vous, que vous ne pouviez vain-

cre qu'en quittant le Roi ; et je ne veux pas vous dire une malhonnêteté en vous assurant que, dans le moment, vous ne pouviez lui rendre un plus grand service qu'en vous sacrifiant en le quittant.

Excepté dans les derniers jours, j'ai vu et j'ai connu tout ce qui s'est passé à Paris depuis l'arrivée du Roi, et je serai toujours prêt à témoigner que ni le Roi ni aucun autre souverain ait jamais eu un Ministre qui l'ait servi avec plus de fidélité, plus de zèle, ou plus de talent.'

## 970.

To Marshal Prince Blücher.

Gonesse, 2nd July, 1815.

' I requested General Müffling to write to your Highness yesterday, upon the subject of the propositions which had been made to me by the French

G. O.

Gonesse, 2nd July, 1815.

' The Field Marshal has great pleasure in publishing in General Orders the following letters from the Commander in Chief, and the Secretary of State, expressing the approbation of H.R.H. the Prince Regent of the conduct of the army, in the late actions with the enemy.

MY LORD DUKE,

Horse Guards, 21st June, 1815.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's dispatch of the 19th instant, conveying a report of the military operations up to that date.

Marked and distinguished as these operations have been by the glorious and important victory gained over the French army on the 18th inst., I have infinite pleasure in communicating to your Grace, the high feeling of satisfaction and approbation with which the Prince Regent has viewed the conduct of the troops upon this memorable occasion. No language can do justice to the sense His Royal Highness entertains of that distinguished merit, which has even surpassed all former instances of their characteristic firmness and discipline ; allow me to desire, that your Grace will also accept yourself, and convey, in my name, to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and troops under your command, the thanks of His Royal Highness for the great and important services which they have rendered their grateful country.

From my partiality and well known opinion of the Prussian nation and their troops, your Grace will readily believe, that I also concur in those expressions of admiration, and thanks which have emanated from the Prince Regent for the important services rendered to the common cause by Prince Blücher, and the brave army under his command.

The triumph of success cannot lessen the regret which must be felt by all for the loss of the many valuable lives, which has unavoidably attended the accomplishment of this great achievement ; and I particularly deplore the fall of Lieut. General Sir T. Picton, and Major General Sir W. Ponsobny.

FREDERICK, Commander in Chief.

MY LORD,

War Department, London, 24th June, 1815.

Your Grace will be pleased to convey to General H. R. H. the Prince of Orange, the satisfaction the Prince Regent has experienced in observing that in the actions of the 16th and 18th instant, His Royal Highness has given an early promise of those military talents for which his ancestors have been so renowned ; and that by freely shedding his blood in the defence of the Netherlands, he has cemented an union of the people with the House of Orange, which, it is to be hoped, will thereby become indissoluble.

The Prince Regent is fully sensible of the meritorious services performed by the Earl of Uxbridge, who had the command of the cavalry in the battle of the 18th, and commands me to desire you will communicate to his Lordship His Royal Highness' most gracious acceptance of them.

The judicious conduct and determined courage displayed by General Lord Hill and by the other General Officers in command of His Majesty's forces upon this glorious occasion, have obtained the high approbation of the Prince Regent. Your Grace will be pleased to communicate to the General Officers this gracious approval of their exertions ; and your Grace will also be pleased to make known to the army at large, the high approbation with which the Prince Regent has viewed the excellent conduct and invincible valor manifested by all ranks and descriptions of the troops, serving under your Grace's command.

His Royal Highness commands me on no account to omit expressing his deep regret on receiving so long a list of officers and men, who have either fallen or been severely wounded in the actions of the 16th and 18th instant : and the Prince Regent particularly laments



Commissioners for a suspension of hostilities, upon which I have not yet had a positive answer from your Highness.

It appears to me that, with the force which you and I have under our command at present, the attack of Paris is a matter of great risk. I am convinced it cannot be made on this side with any hope of success. The army under my command must then cross the Seine twice, and get into the Bois de Boulogne before the attack can be made; and even then, if we should succeed, the loss would be very severe.

We must incur a severe loss, if it is necessary, in any case. But in this case it is not necessary. By the delay of a few days we shall have here the army under Marshal Prince Wrede, and the Allied Sovereigns with it, who will decide upon the measures to be adopted, and success will then be certain, with a comparatively trifling loss; or, if we choose it, we can settle all our matters by agreeing to the proposed armistice.

The terms on which I think this armistice can be made, and on which alone I will consent to make it, are these:

First; that we shall remain in the positions we now occupy.

Secondly; that the French army shall retire from Paris across the Loire.

Thirdly; that Paris shall be given over to the care of the national guard till the King shall order otherwise.

Fourthly; the time to be fixed for notice to break off this armistice.

By adopting this measure, we provide for the quiet restoration of His Majesty to his throne; which is that result of the war which the Sovereigns of all of us have always considered the most beneficial for us all, and the most likely to lead to permanent peace in Europe.

It is true we shall not have the vain triumph of entering Paris at the head of our victorious troops; but, as I have already explained to your Highness, I doubt our having the means at present of succeeding in an attack upon Paris; and, if we are to wait till the arrival of Marshal Prince Wrede to make the attack, I think we shall find the Sovereigns disposed, as they were last year, to spare the capital of their ally, and either not to enter the town at all, or enter it under an armistice, such as it is in your power and mine to sign this day.

I earnestly urge your Highness, then, to consider the reasoning which I have submitted to you on this occasion; and to let me have your decision whether you will agree to any armistice or not; and, if you will, I beg you

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the loss of such highly distinguished officers as Lieut. General Sir T. Picton, and Major General Sir W. Ponsonby.

It cannot be expected that such desperate conflicts should be encountered, and so transcendent a victory be obtained, without considerable loss. The chance of war must at times expose armies under the ablest commanders to great casualties, without any adequate advantage to be derived in return. But whoever contemplates the immediate effects, and the probable results, of the battles fought upon the 16th and 18th instant, cannot but think that although on the lists of killed and wounded, several of His Majesty's most approved officers are unfortunately inscribed, many endeared to your Grace, and whose names have become familiar to the country, by their distinguished services in the Peninsula, the loss, however severe, and however to be lamented, bears but a small proportion to the magnitude of the victory which has been achieved, and which has exalted the military glory of the country, has protected from invasion and spoil the territory of His Majesty's ally, the King of the Netherlands, and has opened the fairest prospect of placing on a lasting foundation the peace and liberties of Europe.

I have the honor to be, &c.

BATHURST.

to name a person to treat in your name with the French Commissioners. If you will not, my conduct will be guided by your decision.'

## 971.

To the French Commissioners.

à Gonesse, ce 2 Juillet, 1815.

' Il est de mon devoir de prévenir vos Excellences que je viens de recevoir une lettre du Maréchal Prince Blücher, qui me témoigne la plus grande répugnance à conclure un armistice, qui est fondée en grande mesure sur ce qui se passe journellement à Paris.

Je lui ai écrit encore une fois, ayant le plus grand désir de sauver cette capitale du danger qui la menace, et j'attends sa réponse dans la nuit. Vos Excellences jugeront si elles veulent attendre jusqu'à demain matin ; mais je dois les prévenir du vrai état des choses, et leur dire que, si elles insistent sur une réponse ce soir, il faut qu'elle soit dans la négative.'

## 972.

To Marshal Lord Beresford, G.C.B.

Gonesse, 2nd July, 1815.

' You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such a pounding match. Both were what the boxers call "gluttons." Napoleon did not manoeuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style. The only difference was, that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an enormous quantity of artillery.

I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had the French cavalry walking about us as if they had been our own. I never saw the British infantry behave so well.'

## 973.

To H.R.H. the Prince Regent.

Gonesse, 2nd July, 1815.

' I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' most gracious letter of the 22nd June ; and, if any thing could augment my gratitude for the favor with which your Royal Highness has uniformly, and particularly on this occasion, received my services, it is the honor which you have done me in writing to me.

Your Royal Highness will see, in my report of this date to the Secretary of State, the strong grounds we have for hoping that we shall bring affairs here to the conclusion most wished for by your Royal Highness, without a further effusion of blood ; and, if that should be the case, your Royal Highness will again have saved the world.'

## 974.

To Earl Bathurst.

Gonesse, 2nd July, 1815.

' The enemy attacked the advanced guard of Marshal Prince Blücher's corps at Villers Cotterets on the 28th, but, the main body coming up, they were driven off, with the loss of 6 pieces of cannon and about 1000 prisoners.

It appears that these troops were on the march from Soissons to Paris, and, having been driven off that road by the Prussian troops at Villers Cotterets, they got upon that of Meaux. They were attacked again upon this



road by General Bülow, who took from them 500 prisoners, and drove them across the Marne. They have, however, got into Paris.

The advanced guard of the allied army under my command crossed the Oise on the 29th, and the whole on the 30th, and we yesterday took up a position, with the right upon the height of Richebourg, the left upon the Bois de Bondy.

Field Marshal Prince Blücher, having taken the village of Aubevilliers, or Vertus, on the morning of the 30th June, moved to his right, and crossed the Seine at St. Germain's as I advanced; and he will, this day, have his right at Plessis Piquet, his left at St. Cloud, and the reserve at Versailles.

The enemy have fortified the heights of Montmartre and the town of St. Denis strongly; and, by means of the little rivers, Rouillon and la Vieille Mer, they have inundated the ground on the north side of that town; and water having been introduced into the canal de l'Ourcq, and the bank formed into a parapet and batteries, they have a strong position on this side of Paris. The heights of Belleville are likewise strongly fortified, but I am not aware that any defensive works have been thrown up on the left of the Seine.

Having collected in Paris all the troops remaining after the battle of the 18th, and all the depôts of the whole army, it is supposed the enemy have there about 40,000 or 50,000 troops of the line and guards, besides the national guards, a new levy called *les tirailleurs de la garde*, and the *Fédérés*.

Under these circumstances I am inclined to doubt the expediency of our attacking the enemy in their fortified position; more particularly as, having reason to believe that Marshal Prince Wrede's corps was at Nancy on the 26th, we suppose it is this day at Châlons, and it may be here in 4 or 5 days.

On the day after I last wrote to your Lordship, viz., on the 29th, I had an interview at Etrées with 5 Commissioners, ———, ———, the ——— de ———, ———, and ———, who had been sent from Paris to negotiate with me a suspension of hostilities.

I told them that I had already written to the other Commissioners upon this subject, and that I had nothing to say in addition to what I had written in that letter; that it was impossible for me to consider the whole transaction of the abdication in any other light than as a trick; and that I could not stop my operations with a view to any benefit likely to result from such an arrangement to the object the Allies had in view in the war.

The Commissioners then said that they had every reason to believe that Napoleon had quitted Paris; and, in case he had not, various schemes were proposed, in order to get rid of him, of which one was to send him to England, another to hand him over to his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria. To which I answered, that I had no authority to talk of such schemes; that I was quite certain that, if he was sent to England, the Prince Regent would keep him to be disposed of by the Allies by common accord, and I had no reason to doubt that the Emperor of Austria would do the same; and that, if they intended really to dispose of him in that way, they had much better send him to Marshal Blücher or me at once.

They then said that it was probable he was gone to Rochefort to embark for America, or that he would go as soon as he should hear of the near approach of the armies, and before they could send to Paris; and they asked

whether in that case I would stop my operations. I told them that, besides Napoleon, there were his adherents, who were the declared enemies of the Allies; and that, before I could stop my operations, I must see some steps taken to re-establish a government in France which should afford the Allies some chance of peace.

After some hesitation, they begged I would tell them what would satisfy the Allies upon this point. I answered that I had no authority to talk upon the subject, even from my own Government, much less from the Allies; and that all I could do was to give them my private opinion, which, unless otherwise instructed by my own Government, I should certainly urge upon the Allies with all the influence which I might be supposed to possess.

I then told them that I conceived the best security for Europe was the restoration of the King, and that the establishment of any other government than the King's in France must inevitably lead to new and endless wars; that Buonaparte and the army having overturned the King's Government, the natural and simple measure, after Buonaparte was prisoner, or out of the way, and the army defeated, was to recall the King to his authority, and that it was a much more dignified proceeding to recall him without conditions, and to trust to the energy of their constitution for any reforms they wished to make either in the government or the constitution, than now to make conditions with their Sovereign; and that, above all, it was important that they should recall the King without loss of time, as it would not then appear that the measure had been forced upon them by the Allies.

The Commissioners professed, individually and collectively, their earnest desire to see the King restored in the manner I had mentioned, which they said was likewise the desire of the Provisional Government. — — — was, however, of opinion that the two Chambers could not be brought to recall the King, without conditions; and he mentioned, as those upon which they would probably insist, and upon which it was desirable the King should give way, the responsibility of the administration, and the alteration of the constitution, so far as that the initiative in making the laws should be vested in the assemblies, and not in the King.

I told, them, regarding the first point, that I had every reason to believe that the King had determined to form a ministry which should be individually and collectively responsible for all the acts of the Government; and that I did not doubt that His Majesty would not oppose himself to the wishes of the French people, if it was desired that the initiative in framing the laws should be vested in the assemblies: that, however, I had no authority to speak on this subject, and recommended to them not to look after little points of difference, and, if they really wished to restore the Government of their King, to do it at once and without any condition.

In the course of this conversation they stated that the assemblies had proclaimed Napoleon II. as Emperor, only to conciliate the officers and soldiers of the army, who had come into Paris in such numbers after the battle, that they had been apprehensive of a civil war in Paris, if this measure had not been adopted.

While we were discussing the conditions to be proposed to the King, and the evils and inconveniences which the mode of making the laws, and the want of responsibility and power in the Ministers had occasioned, I received



from Sir C. Stuart the King's declaration of the 28th, countersigned by M. de Talleyrand, which I immediately communicated to the French Commissioners, and pointed out to them the King's promise to make the alteration in his administration which they had proposed, and the probability that His Majesty would not object to that proposed to be made in the constitution.

They objected to certain paragraphs in the declaration referable to the exclusion of certain persons from the King's presence, to the intention announced to punish some of those concerned in the plot which had brought back Buonaparte, and to that of calling together the old houses of the legislature, upon which, at their desire, I wrote to M. de Talleyrand a letter, of which Sir C. Stuart will probably have sent to England a copy, which I communicated to the Commissioners before I sent it.

I then told them that I could not talk more upon the suspension of our operations, which they urged in the most earnest manner, in order to give them time to take their measures to recall the King, until I should see Marshal Blücher, to whose head quarters I promised to go that evening.

Before I set off, the Commissioners asked me whether the appointment of a Regency to conduct the affairs of the Government in the name of Napoleon II. was likely to satisfy the Allies, and would be such an arrangement as would induce me to stop my operations. I answered, certainly not; that I conceived the Allies, after their declaration, could never treat with Napoleon, or any of his family; that the appointment of Napoleon II. was to be attributed to Napoleon I., and the acknowledgment of him to the desire to conciliate the army, and that I should not stop my operations in consequence of such an arrangement.

They then asked me what would be the case if any other Prince of a Royal house were called to the throne of France; to which I said that it was impossible for me to answer such loose questions; that, as an individual, I had made them acquainted with my opinion of what it was best for them to do, and it rested with them either to follow this opinion or not.

One of the Commissioners, before I went away, took occasion to tell me that he wished I had given a more positive answer to this last question; and I determined to take another opportunity of doing so before the Commissioners should report this conversation to Paris.

I left them at Etrées, and went to the head quarters at Le Plessis to give the orders for the movement of the troops in the morning, and I overtook them again in the night at Louvres. I then told them that I had considered their last question since I had seen them, and that I felt no objection to give them my opinion upon it, still as an individual; that, in my opinion, Europe had no hope of peace, if any person excepting the King were called to the throne of France; that any person so called must be considered an usurper, whatever his rank and quality; that he must act as an usurper, and must endeavor to turn the attention of the country from the defects of his title towards war and foreign conquests; that the Powers of Europe must, in such a case, guard themselves against this evil; and that I could only assure them that, unless otherwise ordered by my Government, I would exert any influence I might possess over the Allied Sovereigns to induce them to insist upon securities for the preservation of peace, besides the treaty itself, if such an arrangement as they had stated were adopted.

The Commissioners replied that they perfectly understood me, and some of them added, "*Et vous avez raison.*"

I went on to Marshal Prince Blücher, who was at the time upon the point of attacking the French post at Vertus, and who for that reason could not consent to a suspension of hostilities; and he agreed in opinion with me, that, as long as Napoleon remained at Paris, we could not stop our operations without insisting upon his being delivered over to us.

I wrote accordingly, in concert with the Marshal, to the French Commissioners a letter, of which I enclose the copy; and they reported to their Government that night.

In consequence, however, of Marshal Blücher's attack upon Vertus, or for some other cause, the officer they sent with their letter was not received at, and was fired upon by, the French outposts, and he did not reach Paris by Bondy till a late hour in the evening of the 30th, and returned only yesterday morning with the report that Napoleon had quitted Paris to embark for the United States at 4 o'clock on the 29th.

They called upon me yesterday morning with this report, and I told them that, the great obstacle to the armistice being removed, there remained only a question about the terms, which appeared to me should be, that we should halt in our positions, and not advance farther; that the French army should retire from Paris across the Loire, and that Paris should be held by the national guards of the town, until the King should order otherwise.

I told them that, if they agreed to these terms, I would immediately send to prevail upon Marshal Blücher to halt, and to send here an officer to settle the details.

They contended against sending away the army, notwithstanding that they had admitted in the conversation of the 29th that Napoleon II. had been proclaimed by the Assemblies solely to conciliate the army; but I told them that I would not consent to suspend hostilities as long as a soldier remained in Paris.

In fact, if they were to restore the King, and His Majesty were to return to Paris, the troops remaining there, His Majesty would be entirely in the hands of the Assemblies and of the army, who cannot be considered in any other light than as the creatures and instruments of Napoleon. We must get rid of the army, therefore, and we may then hope that the King will be recalled without conditions, and that he will have it in his power to carry on his Government without the assistance of foreign Powers.

In the course of this meeting I read to the Commissioners the letter from Prince Metternich and Count Nesselrode, of the 26th, which I had just received, and of which I enclose the copy.

I likewise enclose the copy of a letter which I received yesterday from the Prince d'Eckmühl, and the copy of my answer regarding a suspension of hostilities; and your Lordship may depend upon it that, if Prince Blücher consents to suspend his operations, which I imagine he is as sensible as I am of the necessity of doing, till joined by Prince Wrede, I shall urge him to adopt the terms which I propose, without which I will not consent to any suspension.

In consequence of the conversation I had with the Commissioners on the 29th, I recommended to the King to come on to Roye, where His Majesty arrived on the 30th.



I have great pleasure in informing your Lordship that Le Quesnoi surrendered to H.R.H. Prince Frederick of the Netherlands on the 29th June. I enclose the copy of His Royal Highness' report upon this subject, in which your Lordship will observe, with satisfaction, the intelligence and spirit with which this young Prince conducted this affair.

I likewise understand that Bapaume has surrendered to the officer sent there by the King of France to take possession of that town.'

## 975.

To Earl Bathurst.

Gonesse, 4th July, 1815.

'Field Marshal Prince Blücher was strongly opposed by the enemy in taking the position on the left of the Seine, which I reported in my dispatch of the 2nd instant that he intended to take up on that day, particularly on the heights of St. Cloud and Meudon; but the gallantry of the Prussian troops, under General Ziethen, surmounted every obstacle, and they succeeded finally in establishing themselves upon the heights of Meudon, and in the village of Issy. The French attacked them again in Issy, at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 3rd, but were repulsed with considerable loss; and, finding that Paris was then open on its vulnerable side, that a communication was opened between the 2 Allied Armies by a bridge which I had had established at Argenteuil, and that a British corps was likewise moving upon the left of the Seine, towards the Pont de Neuilly; the enemy sent to desire that the firing might cease on both sides of the Seine, with a view to the negotiation at the palace of St. Cloud of a military convention between the armies, under which the French army should evacuate Paris.

Officers accordingly met on both sides at St. Cloud, and I enclose the copy of the military convention which was agreed to last night, which has been ratified by Marshal Prince Blücher and me, and by the Prince d'Eckmühl on the part of the French army.

This convention decides all the military questions of this moment existing here, and touches nothing political.

General Lord Hill has marched to take possession of the posts evacuated by agreement this day; and I propose tomorrow to take possession of Montmartre.'

## 976.

## CONVENTION OF PARIS.

Paris, ce 3 Juillet, 1815.

'Ce jour d'hui, 3 Juillet, mil huit cent quinze, les Commissaires, nommés par les Commandans en Chef des Armées respectives, savoir, M. le Baron Bignon, Chargé de Portefeuille des Affaires Etrangères; M. le Comte Guilleminot, Chef de l'Etat Major Général de l'Armée Française; M. le

G. O.

Gonesse, 4th July, 1815.

'1. The Field Marshal has great satisfaction in announcing to the troops under his command, that he has, in concert with Field Marshal Prince Blücher, concluded a military convention with the Commander in Chief of the French army in Paris, by which the enemy are to evacuate St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly this day at noon; the heights of Montmartre tomorrow at noon; and Paris next day.

2. The Field Marshal congratulates the army upon this result of their glorious victory. He desires that the troops may employ the leisure of this day, and tomorrow, to clean their arms, clothes, and appointments, as it is his intention that they should pass him in review.

Comte de Bondy, Préfet du Département de la Seine ; munis des pleins pouvoirs de Son Excellence le Maréchal Prince d'Eckmuhl, Commandant en Chef l'Armée Française, d'une part : et M. le Major Général Baron Müffling, muni des pleins pouvoirs de Son Altesse le Feld Maréchal Prince Blücher, Commandant en Chef l'Armée Prussienne ; M. le Colonel Hervey, muni des pleins pouvoirs de Son Excellence le Duc de Wellington, Commandant en Chef l'Armée Anglaise, de l'autre ; sont convenus des Articles suivans :

ARTICLE 1. Il y aura une suspension d'armes entre les Armées Alliées commandées par Son Altesse le Feld Maréchal Prince Blücher, Son Excellence le Duc de Wellington, et l'armée Française sous les murs de Paris.

ARTICLE 2. Demain l'armée Française commencera à se mettre en marche pour se porter derrière la Loire. L'évacuation totale de Paris sera effectuée en 3 jours, et son mouvement pour se porter derrière la Loire sera terminé en 8 jours.

ARTICLE 3. L'armée Française emmenera avec elle tout son matériel, artillerie de campagne, caisse militaire, chevaux, et propriétés des régimens, sans aucune exception. Il en fera de même pour le personnel des dépôts, et pour le personnel des diverses branches d'administration qui appartiennent à l'armée.

ARTICLE 4. Les malades, et les blessés, ainsi que les officiers de santé, qu'il sera nécessaires de laisser près d'eux, sont mis sous la protection spéciale de MM. les Commandans en Chef des Armées Anglaises et Prussiennes.

ARTICLE 5. Les militaires et employés, dont il est question dans l'article précédent, pourront, aussitôt après leur rétablissement, rejoindre les corps auxquels ils appartiennent.

ARTICLE 6. Les femmes et les enfans de tous les individus qui appartiennent à l'armée Française auront la liberté de rester à Paris : ces femmes pourront sans difficulté quitter Paris pour rejoindre l'armée, et emporter avec elles leurs propriétés, et ce de leurs maris.

ARTICLE 7. Les officiers de ligne employés avec les Fédérés, ou avec les Tirailleurs de la Garde Nationale, pourront ou se réunir à l'armée, ou dans leurs domiciles, ou dans le lieu de leur naissance.

ARTICLE 8. Demain, 4 Juillet, à midi, on remettra St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, et Neuilly. Après demain, 5 Juillet, à la même heure, on remettra Montmartre : le troisième jour, 6 Juillet, toutes les barrières seront remises.

ARTICLE 9. Le service intérieur de la ville de Paris continuera à être fait par la Garde Nationale, et par corps de Gendarmerie Municipale.

ARTICLE 10. Les Commandans en Chef des Armées Anglaises et Prussiennes s'engagent à respecter, et à faire respecter par leurs subordonnés, les autorités actuelles tant qu'elles existeront.

ARTICLE 11. Les propriétés publiques, à l'exception de celles qui ont rapport à la guerre, soit qu'elles appartiennent au Gouvernement, soit qu'elles dependent de l'autorité municipale, seront respectées, et les Puissances Alliées n'interviendront en aucune manière dans leur administration et gestion.

ARTICLE 12. Seront pareillement respectées les personnes et les propriétés particulières : les habitans, et, en général, tous les individus qui se trouvent dans la capitale continueront à jouir de leurs droits et libertés, sans pouvoir être inquiétés, ni recherchés en rien relativement aux fonctions qu'ils occu-



pent, ou auraient occupées, ou à leurs conduites et à leurs opinions politiques.

ARTICLE 13. Les troupes étrangères n'apporteront aucun obstacle à l'approvisionnement de la capitale, et protégeront, au contraire, l'arrivée et la libre circulation des objets qui y sont destinés.

ARTICLE 14. La présente Convention sera observée, et servira de règle pour les rapports mutuels jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix.

En cas de rupture, elle devra être dénoncée dans les formes usitées au moins 10 jours à l'avance.

ARTICLE 15. S'il s'élevaient des difficultés sur l'exécution de quelqu'un des Articles de la présente Convention, l'interprétation en sera fait en faveur de l'armée Française, et de la ville de Paris.

ARTICLE 16. La présente Convention est déclarée commune à toutes les armées alliées, sauf en ratification des Puissances dont ces armées dépendent.

ARTICLE 17. Les ratifications en seront échangées demain, 4 Juillet, à 6 heures du matin, au Pont de Neuilly.

ARTICLE 18. Il sera nommé des Commissaires par les parties respectives, pour veiller à l'exécution de la présente Convention.

Fait et signé à St. Cloud, en triple expédition, par les Commissaires sus-nommés, les jours et an que dessus.

LE BARON BIGNON.

LE COMTE GUILLEMINOT.

LE COMTE DE BONDY.

LE BARON DE MÜFFLING.

F. B. HERVEY, COLONEL.

Approuvé et ratifié la présente suspension d'armes.

A Paris, le 3 Juillet, 1815.

Approuvé

LE MARÉCHAL PRINCE D'ECKMUHL.

Afterwards approved by Prince Blücher and the Duke of Wellington; and the ratifications exchanged on the 4th July.'

977.

To General Baron Mülling.

à Paris, ce 8 Juillet, 1815.

Je viens de recevoir votre lettre d'aujourd'hui sur la contribution que vous allez imposer sur la ville de Paris, par ordre du Maréchal Blücher.

Dans mon opinion cette mesure devrait être adoptée d'un commun accord avec tous les Souverains Alliés; comme ils sont près, et qu'on peut les attendre dans peu de jours, il n'y aura pas d'inconvénient à attendre leur arrivée avant de commencer à lever cette contribution.

Je vous prie de faire savoir cette opinion au Maréchal.'

978.

To Marshal Prince Blücher.

Paris, 8th July, 1815.

'Several reports have been brought to me during the evening and night, and some from the Government, in consequence of the work carrying on by

G. O.

Neuilly, 5th July, 1815.

'I. The Commander of the Forces has the greatest satisfaction in communicating to the army, the thanks of the Houses of Lords and Commons, for their conduct in the battle fought on the 18th June.'

your Highness on one of the bridges over the Seine, which it is supposed to be your intention to destroy.

As this measure will certainly create a good deal of disturbance in the town, and as the Sovereigns, when they were here before, left all these bridges, &c., standing, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to delay the destruction of the bridge, at least, till they should arrive; or, at all events, till I can have the pleasure of seeing you tomorrow morning.'

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979.

To Earl Bathurst.

Paris, 8th July, 1815.

' Among other persons at Paris with whom I have had communication on the march of the army from the Netherlands to this place is the Duc d'Otrante, through a person by the name of ———, who had been introduced to him by Mr. \* \* \* \* .

M. ——— came to the head quarters at Gonesse on the 4th instant, having been sent out from Paris on the 3rd with a message from the Duc d'Otrante to request that I would state what I wished, or recommended, should be done. This message was delivered in presence of the Prince de Talleyrand, Sir C. Stuart, and General Pozzo di Borgo, and, as well as I recollect, the Comte de Goltz; and, in order to avoid mistakes, I wrote a memorandum, of which Sir C. Stuart transmitted a copy to Lord Castlereagh in his dispatch of the 4th inst., in which I stated that, as the Allies considered Buonaparte, and all authority that emanated from him, an usurpation, the best thing the Provisional Government and the Assemblies could do would be to dissolve themselves, and to make the King acquainted with this act in an address or declaration, in which they might justify their own conduct, and might recommend to His Majesty such measures as they might think proper for the benefit of the country.

The Prince de Talleyrand, at the same time, gave M. ——— a note of the constitutional measures which the King was ready to adopt, of which Sir C. Stuart has likewise transmitted Lord Castlereagh the substance; and M. ——— was sent back to Paris, and was directed to inform the Duc d'Otrante that I should be the next day at Neuilly, and would meet him at any hour he pleased.

The head quarters moved on the 5th to Neuilly, and the Duc d'Otrante came there in the evening, bringing with him M. ———, M. ———, and M. ———. There were, besides these, the Prince de Talleyrand, General Pozzo di Borgo, the Comte de Goltz, General ———, and Sir C. Stuart.

I asked the Duc d'Otrante whether he had taken into consideration the measures proposed in the memorandum which I had sent him on the preceding day, and stated that it was impossible to do any thing till the French army was at a distance; and then he entered into a long discourse to prove the expediency of the King's issuing a new proclamation, first, to pardon every body concerned in the late transactions, and next, to declare that His Majesty would adopt the three colored flag as the national flag of France.

The discussion on these points continued till 4 o'clock in the morning, when all these persons went away, the Duc d'Otrante promising that he would ascertain, in the course of the morning, what could be done in the



Assemblies in favor of the King; and that he would dine with me on that day, to meet the Prince de Talleyrand, and decide upon his measures.

When he came on the 6th, he informed me that the arrival at Paris of the Commissioners, who had been sent to the Allied Sovereigns, had created fresh difficulties, as they had made a report which gave ground for a belief that the Allies did not wish to see Louis XVIII. restored to his throne; and he read to me the report of the Commissioners, which appeared to me to be a very false representation of what had passed, both with Field Marshal Prince Blücher's aide de camp at Laon, and with the persons employed by the Allied Sovereigns to confer with the Commissioners.

I informed the Duc d'Otrante of this opinion; and, while I was talking to him upon the subject, the Prince de Talleyrand, General Pozzo di Borgo, and Sir C. Stuart arrived, and the conversation turned upon no other subject before dinner.

After dinner, Lord Castlereagh arrived, and the conversation turned upon the same subject, in presence of the same persons; and I gave the Duc d'Otrante the original letter I had received from Lord Stewart, containing the account of what had passed with the French Commissioners, and the *note verbale* which had been delivered to them; and likewise the original letters of the 26th June, which I had received from Prince Metternich and Count Nesselrode, in order that he might convince his colleagues of the falsehood of the report made by the French Commissioners, who had been sent to the head quarters of the Allied Sovereigns.

After perusing this statement of all that passed between me and the Duc d'Otrante, your Lordship will judge of my surprise at reading the letter of the Provisional Government to the two Chambers of the 7th instant, the contents of which can be accounted for only by the recollection that, at all periods of the French Revolution, the actors in it have not scrupled to resort to falsehood, either to give a color to, or palliate their adoption or abandonment of any line of policy; and that they think that, provided the falsehood answers the purpose of the moment, it is fully justified.'

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980.

To Marshal Prince Blücher.

Paris, 9th July, 1815.

'The subjects on which Lord Castlereagh and I conversed with your Highness and General Comte Gneisenau this morning, viz., the destruction of the bridge of Jena and the levy of the contribution of 100 millions of francs upon the city of Paris, appear to me to be so important to the Allies in general, that I cannot allow myself to omit to draw your Highness' attention to them again in this shape.

The destruction of the bridge of Jena is highly disagreeable to the King and to the people, and may occasion disturbance in the city. It is not merely a military measure, but is one likely to attach to the character of our operations, and is of political importance. It is adopted solely because the bridge is considered a monument of the battle of Jena, notwithstanding that the Government are willing to change the name of the bridge.

Considering the bridge as a monument, I beg leave to observe that its immediate destruction is inconsistent with the promise made to the Commissioners on the part of the French army, during the negotiation of the

Convention, viz., that the monuments, museums, &c., should be reserved for the decision of the Allied Sovereigns.

All that I ask is, that the execution of the orders given for the destruction of the bridge may be suspended till the Sovereigns shall arrive here, when, if it should be agreed by common accord that the bridge ought to be destroyed, I shall have no objection.

In regard to the contribution laid on the city of Paris, I am convinced that your Highness will acquit me of any desire to dispute the claim of the Prussian army to any advantage which can be derived from its bravery and exertions, and services to the cause; but it appears to me that the Allies will contend that one party to a general alliance ought not to derive all the benefit resulting from the operations of the armies. Even supposing the Allies should be inclined to concede this point to the Prussian army, they will contend for the right of considering the question whether France ought, or not, to be called upon to make this pecuniary sacrifice, and for that of making the concession to the Prussian army, if it should be expedient to make it.

The levy and application of this contribution ought then to be a matter for the consideration and decision of all the Allies; and in this point of view it is that I intreat your Highness to defer the measures for the levy of it, till the Sovereigns shall have arrived.

Since I have had the happiness of acting in concert with your Highness and the brave army under your command, all matters have been carried on by common accord, and with a degree of harmony unparalleled in similar circumstances, much to the public advantage. What I now ask is, not the dereliction of your measures, but the delay of them for the day, or at most two days, which will elapse before the Sovereigns will arrive, which cannot be deemed unreasonable, and will, I hope, be granted on account of the motive for making the request.'

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981.

To M. ——— ———.

à Paris, ce 13 Juillet, 1815.

'Je reçois votre lettre du 10. Peut-être, si vous aviez pris la peine de vous informer des circonstances qui ont occasionné les travaux de l'armée Prussienne au Pont de Jena, et de la part que j'y ai eue, vous auriez cru que je ne méritais pas les reproches que vous, en signant votre nom, et d'autres par des écrits anonymes, m'ont faits sur ce sujet.

Mais je les attribue à la légèreté avec laquelle sont faites les impressions qui ensuite guident les actions et les mesures les plus importantes dans ce pays-ci; et si l'injustice que vous m'avez faite par votre lettre a l'effet de vous faire faire des perquisitions et quelques réflexions avant d'accuser un homme public à une autre occasion qui s'offrira, je vous la pardonne.'

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982.

To the Sous Préfet de Pontoise.

à Paris, ce 13 Juillet, 1815.

'J'ai ordonné qu'on vous fasse prisonnier, parceque, ayant envoyé une réquisition à Pontoise pour des vivres, vous avez répondu que vous ne les donneriez pas, sans qu'on envoie une force militaire assez forte pour les prendre.



Vous vous êtes donc mis dans le cas des militaires, et je vous fais prisonnier de guerre, et je vous envoie en Angleterre.

Si je vous traitais comme l'usurpateur et ses adhérens ont traité les habitans des pays où ils ont fait la guerre, je vous ferais fusiller ; mais, comme vous vous êtes constitué guerrier, je vous fais prisonnier de guerre.'

983.

To Earl Bathurst.

Paris, 13th July, 1815.

'The Convention binds nobody excepting the parties to it; viz., the French army on one side, and the allied armies under Marshal Prince Blücher and myself on the other; and the 12th article cannot be considered, and never was intended, to bind any other persons or authorities whatever, unless they should become parties to the Convention.'

984.

To the Rev. John Norcross.

Paris, 31st July, 1815.

'I have had the satisfaction of receiving your letter of the 19th instant, and I will take an early opportunity of making you acquainted with the name of the soldier whom, upon inquiry, I shall find to be most deserving of your bounty.

I cannot resist, however, to trouble you for another moment to express my sense of your conduct. It is the patriotic spirit which has induced you

G. O.

Paris, 18th July, 1815.

'8. The Field Marshal has been informed that the officers of the army force the door-keepers of the theatres to open the doors of the private boxes, which is contrary to rule, and to the good order so creditable to the British army, of which it is the example.

9. The boxes of the theatres are in general private property; and nobody can enter those thus situated, or those which are hired, excepting the proprietors, or those who have hired them.

10. The Field Marshal is convinced that it is only necessary to give this information to the officers of the army, to induce them to refrain from conduct which cannot be justified.'

G. O.

Paris, 23rd July, 1815.

'1. The Field Marshal begs that the troops may march from their several camps at such hour tomorrow morning as to be formed on the ground allotted to them at 9 o'clock. (*To be reviewed by the Emperor of Russia.*)

2. When the infantry shall move from their ground, in order to march past, they must move in columns at quarter distances, till they arrive at a place which will be pointed out to them.

3. They are there to take their regular distances, and the officers commanding companies must take care to take them up accurately, recollecting that it is from the front rank of the company, or division, preceding them, that the distance is to be preserved.'

G. O.

Paris, 28th July, 1815.

'1. The Field Marshal begs that the officers of the army, when they appear in the city of Paris with any part of their regimental dress, may be properly dressed, and with their side arms.

2. He also requests, that the officers of the army will not resist the search made at the barriers of Paris, for contraband articles on the postillions, and others who drive the carriages coming into the town.

3. The Field Marshal is desirous of giving every assistance in his power to reap the harvest, and accordingly authorises the commanding officers of regiments to allow the soldiers to assist in reaping it, upon the application of the inhabitants.

4. The owners of the harvest will make their own bargains with the soldiers, for the payment they are to give them; but the commanding officers of regiments are not to allow any soldiers to go to work at the harvest, excepting the application is signed by the Mayor of the district in which the inhabitants may reside.

5. The commanding officer must likewise know exactly where to find the soldier, and he must return to his regiment every night if possible, or at all events twice a week.'

to make this sacrifice, and which so generally prevails in England, which has given so much encouragement to the discipline and courage of the troops, and to this spirit that we owe the advantages we have acquired in the field, and I beg leave to return you my best thanks in the name of the brave officers and soldiers whom I have had the happiness of commanding.'

985.

To Marshal Lord Beresford, G.C.B.

Paris, 7th Aug. 1815.

'The battle of Waterloo was certainly the hardest fought that has been for many years, I believe, and has placed in the power of the Allies the most important results. We are throwing them away, however, by the infamous conduct of some of us; and I am sorry to add that our own Government also are taking up a little too much the tone of their rascally newspapers. They are shifting their objects; and, having got their cake, they want both to eat it and keep it.

As for your Portuguese concerns, I recommend to you to resign and come away immediately. It is impossible for the British Government to maintain British officers for the Portuguese army, at an expense even so trifling as it is, if the Portuguese Government are to refuse to give the service of the army in the cause of Europe in any manner. Pitch them to the Devil, then, in the mode which will be most dignified for yourself, and that which will have the best effect in opening the Prince's eyes to the conduct of his servants in Portugal; and let the matter work its own way. Depend upon it, the British Government must and will recall the British officers.'

986.

To ———, Esq.

Paris, 8th Aug. 1815.

'I have received your letter of the 2nd, regarding the battle of Waterloo. The object which you propose to yourself is very difficult of attainment, and, if really attained, is not a little invidious. The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost; but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance.

Then the faults or the misbehavior of some gave occasion for the distinction of others, and perhaps were the cause of material losses; and you cannot write a true history of a battle without including the faults and misbehavior of part at least of those engaged.

Believe me that every man you see in a military uniform is not a hero; and that, although in the account given of a general action, such as that of Waterloo, many instances of individual heroism must be passed over un-

G. O.

Paris, 5th Aug. 1815.

6. The Field Marshal hoped that his Orders of the 20th June last, regarding the mode of drawing subsistence from the country, were sufficiently clear, and that it would be unnecessary to repeat them.

7. The military commanding officers have nothing to say to the requisitions made by the Commissaries, and the Field Marshal again forbids those under his command to give any orders whatever upon the subject, either by way of preventing provisions from passing, or from leaving a certain district, or with any other view.'



related, it is better for the general interests to leave those parts of the story untold, than to tell the whole truth.

If, however, you should still think it right to turn your attention to this subject, I am most ready to give you every assistance and information in my power.'

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987.

To Viscount Castlereagh, K.G.

Paris, 11th Aug. 1815.

'I have perused with attention the memorandum which you have sent me, and have considered well the contents of those written by the Ministers of other Powers.

My opinion is, that the French Revolution and the treaty of Paris have left France in too great strength for the rest of Europe, weakened as all the Powers of Europe have been by the wars in which they have been engaged with France, by the destruction of all the fortresses and strongholds in the Low Countries and Germany, principally by the French, and by the ruin of the finances of all the Continental Powers.

Notwithstanding that this opinion is as strongly, if not more strongly, impressed upon my mind than upon that of any of those whose papers have lately come under my consideration, I doubt its being in our power now to make such an alteration in the relations of France with other Powers as will be of material benefit.

First; I conceive that our declarations, and our treaties, and the accession, although irregular in form, which we allowed Louis XVIII. to make to that of the 25th March, must prevent us from making any very material inroad upon the state of possession of the treaty of Paris. I do not concur in ————'s reasoning, either that the guarantee in the treaty of the 25th March was intended to apply only to ourselves, or that the conduct of the French people, since the 20th March, ought to deprive them of the benefit of that guarantee. The French people submitted to Buonaparte; but it would be ridiculous to suppose that the Allies would have been in possession of Paris in a fortnight after one battle fought, if the French people in general had not been favorably disposed to the cause which the Allies were supposed to favor.

In the north of France they certainly were so disposed, and there is no doubt they were so in the south, and indeed throughout France, excepting in Champagne, Alsace, parts of Burgundy, Lorraine, and Dauphiné. The assistance which the King and his party in France gave to the cause was undoubtedly of a passive description; but the result of the operations of the Allies has been very different from what it would have been, if the disposition of the inhabitants of the country had led them to oppose the Allies.

In my opinion, therefore, the Allies have no just right to make any material inroad on the treaty of Paris, although that treaty leaves France too strong, in relation to other Powers; but I think I can show that the real interests of the Allies should lead them to adopt the measures which justice, in this instance, requires from them.

There is such an appearance of moderation in all that has been written upon this subject, that we might hope there would be no material difference of opinion on the disposal of what should be taken from France, supposing

that it should be decided that France is to make a cession; and therefore I do no more than advert to that objection to the demand.

But my objection to the demand of a great cession from France upon this occasion is, that it will defeat the object which the Allies have held out to themselves in the present and the preceding wars.

That which has been their object has been to put an end to the French Revolution, to obtain peace for themselves and their people, to have the power of reducing their overgrown military establishments, and the leisure to attend to the internal concerns of their several nations, and to improve the situation of their people. The Allies took up arms against Buonaparte, because it was certain that the world could not be at peace as long as he should possess, or should be in a situation to attain, supreme power in France; and care must be taken, in making the arrangements consequent upon our success, that we do not leave the world in the same unfortunate situation, respecting France, that it would have been in if Buonaparte had continued in possession of his power.

It is impossible to surmise what would be the line of conduct of the King and his Government, upon the demand of any considerable cession from France upon the present occasion. It is certain, however, that, whether the cession should be agreed to, or not, by the King, the situation of the Allies would be very embarrassing.

If the King were to refuse to agree to the cession, and were to throw himself upon his people, there can be no doubt that those divisions would cease which have hitherto occasioned the weakness of France. The Allies might take the fortresses and provinces which might suit them, but there would be no genuine peace for the world, no nation could disarm, no Sovereign could turn his attention from the affairs of this country.

If the King were to agree to make the cession, which, from all that one hears, is an event by no means probable, the Allies must be satisfied, and must retire; but I would appeal to the experience of the transactions of last year for a statement of the situation in which we should find ourselves.

Last year, after France had been reduced to her limits of 1792, by the cession of the Low Countries, the left bank of the Rhine, Italy, &c., the Allies were obliged to maintain each in the field half of the war establishment stipulated in the treaty of Chaumont, in order to guard their conquests, and what had been ceded to them; and there is nobody acquainted with what passed in France, during that period, who does not know that the general topic of conversation was the recovery of the left bank of the Rhine as the frontier of France, and that the unpopularity of the Government, in the army, was to be attributed to their supposed disinclination to war to recover these possessions.

There is no statesman who, with these facts before his eyes, with the knowledge that the justice of the demand of a great cession from France, under existing circumstances, is at least doubtful; and that the cession would be made against the inclination of the Sovereign and all descriptions of his people, would venture to recommend to his Sovereign to consider himself at peace, and to place his armies upon a peace establishment. We must, on the contrary, if we take this large cession, consider the operations of the war as deferred, till France shall find a suitable opportunity of endeavoring to re-



gain what she has lost ; and, after having wasted our resources in the maintenance of overgrown military establishments in time of peace, we shall find how little useful the cessions we shall have acquired will be against a national effort to regain them.

In my opinion, then, we ought to continue to keep our great object, the genuine peace and tranquillity of the world, in our view, and shape our arrangement so as to provide for it.

Revolutionary France is more likely to distress the world, than France, however strong in her frontier, under a regular Government ; and that is the situation in which we ought to endeavor to place her.

With this view I prefer the temporary occupation of some of the strong places, and to maintain, for a time, a strong force in France, both at the expense of the French Government, and under strict regulation, to the permanent cession of even all the places which in my opinion ought to be occupied for a time. These measures will not only give us, during the period of occupation, all the military security which could be expected from the permanent cession, but, if carried into execution in the spirit in which they are conceived, they are in themselves the bond of peace.

There is no doubt that the troops of the Allies, stationed in France, will give strength and security to the Government of the King, and that their presence will give the King leisure to form his army in such manner as he may think proper. The expectation also of the arrival of the period at which the several points occupied should be evacuated would tend to the preservation of peace, while the engagement to restore them to the King, or his legitimate heirs or successors, would have the effect of giving additional stability to his throne.

In answer to the objections to a temporary occupation, contained in \_\_\_\_\_'s paper, drawn from the state of things in \_\_\_\_\_, I observe that the temporary occupation, by the troops of the Allies, of part of France will be with views entirely different from those which dictated the temporary occupation of \_\_\_\_\_ by the French troops ; and if the measure is carried into execution on the principle of supporting the King's Government and of peace, instead of as in \_\_\_\_\_, with views of immediate plunder and ultimate war, the same results cannot be expected.

I am likewise aware of the objection to this measure, that it will not alone eventually apply a remedy to the state of weakness, in relation to France, in which the Powers of Europe have been left by the treaty of Paris ; but it will completely for a term of years. This term of years, besides the advantage of introducing into France a system and habits of peace, after 25 years of war, will enable the Powers of Europe to restore their finances ; it will give them time and means to reconstruct the great artificial bulwarks of their several countries, to settle their governments, and to consolidate their means of defence. France, it is true, will still be powerful, probably more powerful than she ought to be in relation to her neighbours ; but, if the Allies do not waste their time and their means, the state of security of each and of the whole, in relation to France, will, at the end of the period, be materially improved, and will probably leave but little to desire.

Upon the whole, then, I entirely concur with you in thinking a temporary occupation the most desirable.'

988.

To Viscount Castlereagh, K.G.

Paris, Aug. 1815.

'As it appears to be the intention of the Allied Powers to demand from France certain securities for the performance of the treaty of peace, by which the existing state of things will be closed, and for the existence of the system which will be established in France, as well as in Europe; and as various considerations induce the Allies to prefer to maintain a force in France for a year, and to hold in their hands certain strongholds for a limited number of years, either to the destruction of those strongholds, or to the cession of the provinces in which they are situated, it appears to me that what follows will be the best mode of effecting their object.

First; that an army should be formed, consisting of ——— men, which shall be left within the French territory for the space of — years; this army to be maintained in every respect at the expense of France.

It is supposed that this army will be sufficient to occupy the garrisons, the occupation of which the Allies propose to demand; to give countenance and support to the Government of the King of France, till his own army shall be formed against the discontented and factious in France; to defend themselves against any attack which might be made upon them till supported by the allied troops which it must always be supposed will be maintained in the Netherlands, and in the Prussian territories on the left of the Rhine.

Secondly; that the Allies should demand from France to occupy the following fortresses for — years at the expense of France:—

\* \* \* \* \*

In carrying this system into execution, care should be taken to adopt those measures which, at the same time that the great object of security to the Allies and to the internal government of France shall be attained, shall render it most palatable to the French Government, and shall make it most evident to them and to the nation that, at the expiration of the period, the allied troops will be withdrawn, and the fortresses will be delivered over to the troops of His Most Catholic Majesty. The civil government, therefore, of all the places should be left in the hands of the King of France's officers, and the troops should be considered to be there to hold them for him, as much as for the Allies.

The troops of those Sovereigns should be selected for this service who would have the least inclination to remain in possession of the fortresses at the termination of the period.'

989.

To the Mayor of Bruxelles.

à Paris, ce 13 Août, 1815.

'Je prends cette occasion de vous écrire pour vous remercier, et pour vous prier de faire connaître ma reconnaissance aux habitans de la ville de Bruxelles, et des environs, pour les soins et la bonté qu'ils ont eu pour les officiers et soldats blessés de l'armée sous mon commandement.

Le service que nous avons eu en notre pouvoir de rendre à la ville de Bruxelles, en la sauvant des mains d'un ennemi cruel par les efforts qui ont été faits et la bravoure des troupes, presque sous ses murs, nous donnaient lieu d'espérer que les habitans soulageraient, autant qu'il était en leur pouvoir,



ceux qui en étaient devenus les victimes ; mais je ne m'attendais pas aux tendres soins et aux bontés que les habitans ont eu pour nous ; et je vous prie de croire, et de leur faire savoir, que leur conduite a fait sur nous tous une impression qui ne s'effacera jamais de notre mémoire.

Je sais bien de quel prix en pareille occasion est l'exemple du magistrat ; et je vous prie de croire, M. le Maire, que j'apprécie celui que vous avez donné.'

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990.

To ———, Esq.

Paris, 17th Aug. 1815.

' I have received your letter of the 11th, and I regret much that I have not been able to prevail upon you to relinquish your plan. You may depend upon it you will never make it a satisfactory work.

I will get you the list of the French army, Generals, &c.

Just to show you how little reliance can be placed, even on what are supposed the best accounts of a battle, I mention that there are some circumstances mentioned in General ———'s account which did not occur as he relates them. He was not on the field during the whole battle, particularly not during the latter part of it.

The battle began, I believe, at 11. It is impossible to say when each important occurrence took place, nor in what order. We were attacked first with infantry only ; then with cavalry only ; lastly and principally with cavalry and infantry mixed.

No houses were possessed by the enemy in Mont St. Jean, excepting the farm in front of the left of our centre, on the road to Genappe, can be called one. This they got, I think, at about 2 o'clock, and got it from a circumstance which is to be attributed to the neglect of the officer commanding on the spot.

The French cavalry were on the plateau in the centre between the two high roads for nearly three quarters of an hour, riding about among our squares of infantry, all firing having ceased on both sides. I moved our squares forward to the guns ; and our cavalry, which had been detached by Lord Uxbridge to the flanks, was brought back to the centre. The French cavalry were then driven off. After that circumstance, repeated attacks were made along the whole front of the centre of the position by cavalry and infantry till 7 at night. How many I cannot tell.

When the enemy attacked Sir T. Picton I was there, and they got as far as the hedge on the cross road, behind which the ——— ——— had been formed. The latter had run away, and our troops were on our side of the hedge. The French were driven off with immense loss. This was the first principal attack. At about 2 in the afternoon, as I have above said, they got possession of the farm house on the high road, which defended this part of the position ; and they then took possession of a small mound on the left of the high road going from Bruxelles, immediately opposite the gate of the farm ; and they were never removed from thence till I commenced the attack in the evening ; but they never advanced farther on that side.

These are answers to all your queries ; but remember, I recommend to you to leave the battle of Waterloo as it is.'

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991.

## MEMORANDUM

*On the temporary Occupation of part of France.*

To Viscount Castlereagh, K.G.

Paris, 31st Aug. 1815.

'The principal points of difference between the scheme proposed by \_\_\_\_\_, and that proposed by the Ministers of the other Courts for the settlement with France consists, first, in the Prince's desire that certain French fortresses should be ceded to the Allies, and others rased; and, secondly, in the difficulties which exist, according to the Prince's notion, in the execution of the measure of temporary occupation, and in His Highness' notion of its inefficiency to effect its object. In regard to the first point, it is a political rather than a military question, and it is not my intention to say much upon it. I wish, however, that some principle should be fixed regarding the right and expediency of demanding from France the cession of several separate fortresses, distributed on the line from the sea to the Alps. I have already taken an opportunity of discussing the right of demanding these cessions, which must be founded upon the clear omission in the declarations and treaties of the Allies of any thing to preclude the demand. The expediency of making the demand will depend upon a variety of political and military considerations, among which will be the following: whether the possession of the fortresses named is that which gives France the formidable strength complained of, or if transferred to the Allies would give them severally the wished for strength; whether it is not a combination of population, pecuniary resources, and artificial strength, which makes France so formidable; and whether the transfer of the last only to certain of the Allies, leaving the two first unimpaired in the possession of France, that is to say, to give the Allies fortresses without additional resources in men to form garrisons and armies to defend them, and resources in money to maintain those garrisons and armies, would not tend to their weakness rather than to their strength, at the same time that the measure would afford to France a just pretence for war, and all the means which injured national pride could give for carrying it on.

If the policy of the united powers of Europe is to weaken France, let them do so in reality. Let them take from that country its population and resources, as well as a few fortresses. If they are not prepared for that decisive measure, if peace and tranquillity for a few years is their object, they must make an arrangement which will suit the interests of all the parties to it, and of which the justice and expediency will be so evident that they will tend to carry it into execution.

All persons appear to agree that the maintenance of the authority of the King is essential to the interests of the other powers of Europe; and, notwithstanding the difference of opinion, regarding the extent of the force which ought to be maintained for a time in France, and regarding the difficulties of executing this measure, and after all that has been said of its inefficiency in affording security to the Allies in general, it appears to be generally admitted that it is necessary to adopt it. It is necessary to adopt it with different objects in view; first, to give security to the government of the King, and to afford him time to form a force of his own, with which he can carry



on his Government, and take his fair share in the concerns of Europe; secondly, to give the Allies some security against a second revolutionary convulsion and re-action; and, thirdly, to enable the Allies to enforce the payment of those contributions, which they deem it just towards their own subjects to lay on France, in payment of the expenses of the war.

I have enumerated the objects of this military occupation in this order as being that of their several relative importance. In discussing them, I shall consider that first which I have adverted to in the second instance, viz., the security to the Allies.

It cannot be doubted that the position of a large army, in the centre of France, will give security to the Allies, particularly in Germany. The history of all the wars in Germany shows that the French have never been able to cross the Rhine unless in possession of the Netherlands, or having that country friendly to them. Much less would they be able to cross the Rhine with a view to the attack of the powers in the south of Germany, as long as an allied army should be in a position in the centre of France.

That army must necessarily be strong enough to maintain itself for a time; but, considering that it will be the army of Europe, that those who shall attack it must expect thereafter to defend themselves against all the armies of Europe, and that it would forthwith be reinforced by at least 50,000 men from the Low Countries, the Prussian territories on the left of the Rhine, and England, I cannot conceive that an army of 150,000 men would be exposed to risk in such a situation.

There is no doubt likewise that the temporary position of an allied army in France is necessary, in order to secure the payment of the contributions which the Allies will impose upon France. The principal object of all, however, is to give security and stability to the King's government; and this object should be borne in mind in determining the principles of all the arrangements respecting this force, and in carrying them into execution.

First, then, the force ought to be applicable not only to the defence of the fortresses, ceded temporarily to the Allies, and to the occupation of the military position, but, upon the demand of the King, and at the discretion of the commanding officer, to the support of His Majesty's authority.

Secondly; it should be paid, fed, and clothed at the expense of the King of France.

Thirdly; this payment, which, including every expense, should be founded on estimates, should be secured; first, by an article of the treaty; secondly, by the allotment of certain districts, viz., the departments of the North, Pas de Calais, Ardennes, Meuse, Moselle, and Upper Rhine, the revenues of which should be liable to be seized in case the payments should fall in arrear. The seizure of these districts, in consequence of non-payment, should not prevent the Allies from exercising the other rights which they would have under the treaty in the case of non-performance.

Fourthly; a district should be assigned to be occupied in ordinary times by the European force, into which no French force should be allowed to enter. The civil administration of this district should be allotted to the King of France, and the officers of the Allies should exercise no authority within it, excepting that usually exercised by military officers.

Fifthly; the expenses of provisioning, arming, and keeping in repair the

fortresses to be occupied by the Allies, to be provided for by the King of France upon the requisition of the commanding officer of the European force. The omission to provide for the expense to be considered a breach of treaty, equally with the omission to provide for the expense of the pay, clothing, and food for the troops.

Sixthly; the power of the Governor and officers in the several forts to be the same as that of the Governor and military officers on ordinary occasions. The civil administration to be in the hands of the officers of the King.

According to this system, really put in execution on the principles on which it is adopted, it appears that it would be possible to maintain a force in France, and that the measure would not be liable to the difficulties supposed.'

992.

To General Dumouriez.

à Paris, ce 5 Sept. 1815.

'J'espère toujours que les choses iront bien pour le Roi. Mais il se trouve tant de partis en France, et si peu de vrais patriotes, et encore moins de bonnes têtes, qu'on ne peut pas être sans crainte.'

993.

To H.R.H. the Duke of York.

Paris, 12th Sept. 1815.

'The inquiries I have made are only private, and I am not certain that all this could be proved upon a trial, but I should think it would be best not to bring him to trial, but to desire him privately to retire from the service. I confess that I feel very strong objections to discuss, before a General Court Martial, the conduct of any individual in such a battle as Waterloo. It generally brings before the public circumstances which might as well not be published; and the effect is equally produced by obliging him who has behaved ill to withdraw from the service.'

994.

To ———.

Paris, 13th Sept. 1815.

'I have just received your letter of the 13th, in which you express a desire to return the insignia of the ———, which I had sent you by desire of the ———; and, having expressed that desire, it is quite impossible for me to wish that you should retain them.

I think, however, that you, and those of your friends you have consulted, are mistaken in some of the facts which have induced you to come to this determination. The ——— is one of those sent to me to be given to General Officers. The insignia of that class, and of the fourth class of the same Order, are worn by many General Officers in the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian services, to my certain knowledge; and I am not aware that I have been the means of giving any ——— Order of a higher rank or estimation to a junior officer.

When I sent you the decoration which you now decline to accept, I certainly intended, as far as was at that moment in my power, to mark the sense which I entertained of your distinguished services. If more had been in



my power, or if I could have conveyed to you an honor of a higher description, I should have been happy to avail myself of the opportunity of doing so; but I cannot think that, when a General Officer is selected among many to receive an honor which must be necessarily limited to a few, it can be the intention of his Commander to do otherwise than distinguish him.

I may be wrong, however, in my notions upon this subject, and you and your friends whom you have consulted may be right; and I may not satisfy you with the reasons which I have adduced to induce you to be better satisfied with the Order which has been conferred upon you. In that case I beg you to return the insignia, but to believe that I am fully sensible of your services, and that my intention was to mark a sense of them.'

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 995.

To ———.

Paris, 14th Sept. 1815.

'I have received your letter of this morning, and I am much gratified to find that what I wrote to you yesterday has had the effect of inducing you to alter your mind regarding the Order of ———.

When the Emperor of Austria sent me a number of crosses of the Order of Maria Theresa, they were destined in proportions for General Officers, and for others of inferior ranks; and I selected those of the several ranks, who, not only in my opinion, but in the general opinion of the army, ought to have been selected. Many more of all ranks deserved this or any other mark of favor and distinction that I could obtain for them, but the number to receive this particular mark was necessarily limited in each rank; and so it was disposed.

The ——— then sent me a limited number of crosses of his Orders, of which some for General Officers, others for officers of inferior ranks. I should not have done justice to His Majesty, or his intentions, if I had excluded from this distribution those of the several ranks whom I had thought deserving a mark of distinction from the Emperor of Austria, and they therefore have two Orders, while others have only one, because I had fewer Austrian crosses to give.

In my opinion, the way in which this matter ought to be considered by each individual, without adverting to what Order he gets, is this, "When my Commander-in-Chief had 6 or 8 marks of distinction to give to the officers of my rank in the army, he gave me one; and therefore I may be certain that he thinks me deserving." If officers will take this view of the case, they will take the fair and true one, as respects both themselves and me. If they do not, they will suffer a good deal in their own feelings; and the kind intentions of their Imperial Majesties, and other Sovereigns, towards me and the officers of the army, will have placed me in a more invidious situation, and will have done me more mischief, than could have been done me in any other manner.'

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 G. O.

Paris, 18th Sept. 1815

1. The Field Marshal begs that the mounted officers of the several regiments may be practised to take up ground, in order to make it certain that they do so with precision.

2. He likewise begs that the several regiments may be practised to march at quarter distances, the officers being obliged to keep their distances exactly.'

996.

To Lieut. General Sir J. Lyon, K.C.B.\*

Paris, 23rd Sept. 1815.

'I have received your letter of the 21st, regarding the desertion from the Hanoverian army and the situation of the officers. The latter subject had already had a good deal of my attention, and I have been endeavoring to find a remedy. The Hanoverian officers will find, when they come to wind up their affairs, that their Sovereign is not disposed to treat them more hardly than others: they must have a little patience, however.

In regard to the soldiers of the Hanoverian army, I declare that I know of no difference between them and other soldiers, excepting in their favor. Neither is the desertion among them extraordinarily great, or greater than among other troops, particularly among the Prussians, to whom you compare them, and the King's German Legion. I observe likewise that it is greatest and is almost exclusively among the troops of the line; and I attribute it, therefore, to the bad quality of the men, rather than to their feeling their situation to be worse than that of other troops.

However, if it is bad, I do not see how it can be improved without destruction to the Hanoverian army. It is very easy to talk of the advantages of imitating the French and the Prussian systems, but it is not so easy for a power with a small army to put that imitation in practice. The inevitable effect is the relaxation of discipline and the loss of the military spirit of the army, without which large numbers may still continue to get on tolerably well, and the diminution of numbers, upon all occasions when numbers are wanted, and particularly by *desertion*. I acknowledge, therefore, that I do not see how the situation of the Hanoverian soldier can be improved, excepting by an increase of pay, to which I believe the Hanoverian Government would never consent.'

997.

To Viscount Castlereagh, K.G.

Paris, 23rd Sept. 1815.

'There has been a good deal of discussion here lately respecting the measures which I have been under the necessity of adopting in order to get for the King of the Netherlands his pictures, &c., from the museums; and, lest these reports should reach the Prince Regent, I wish to trouble you, for His Royal Highness' information, with the following statement of what has passed.

Shortly after the arrival of the Sovereigns at Paris, the Minister of the King of the Netherlands claimed the pictures, &c., belonging to his Sovereign equally with those of other powers; and, as far as I could learn, never could get any satisfactory reply from the French Government. After several conversations with me, he addressed your Lordship in an official note, which was laid before the Ministers of the Allied Sovereigns assembled in Conference; and the subject was taken into consideration repeatedly, with a view to discover a mode of doing justice to the claimants of the specimens of the arts in the museums, without hurting the feelings of the King of France. In the mean time the Prussians had obtained from His Majesty not only all the really Prussian pictures, but those belonging to the Prussian territories on the left of the Rhine, and the pictures, &c., belonging to all the allies of

\* Major General Sir J. Lyon held the rank of Lieutenant General in the Hanoverian service.



His Prussian Majesty; and the subject pressed for an early decision; and your Lordship wrote your note of the 11th instant, in which it was fully discussed.

The Minister of the King of the Netherlands, still having no satisfactory answer from the French Government, appealed to me, as the Commander in Chief of the army of the King of the Netherlands, to know whether I had any objection to employ His Majesty's troops to obtain possession of what was his undoubted property. I referred this application again to the Ministers of the Allied Courts, and, no objection having been stated, I considered it my duty to take the necessary measures to obtain what was his right.

I accordingly spoke to the Prince de Talleyrand upon the subject, explained to him what had passed in Conference, and the grounds I had for thinking that the King of the Netherlands had a right to the pictures; and begged him to state the case to the King, and to ask His Majesty to do me the favor to point out the mode of effecting the object of the King of the Netherlands, which should be least offensive to His Majesty.

The Prince de Talleyrand promised me an answer on the following evening; which not having received, I called upon him at night, and had another discussion with him upon the subject, in which he informed me that the King could give no orders upon it; that I might act as I thought proper; and that I might communicate with M. Denon.

I sent my aide de camp, Lieut. Colonel Fremantle, to M. Denon, in the morning, who informed him that he had no orders to give any pictures out of the gallery, and that he could give none without the use of force.

I then sent Colonel Fremantle to the Prince de Talleyrand to inform him of this answer, and to acquaint him that the troops would go the next morning at 12 o'clock to take possession of the King of the Netherlands' pictures; and to point out that, if any disturbance resulted from this measure, the King's Ministers, and not I, were responsible. Colonel Fremantle likewise informed M. Denon that the same measure would be adopted.

It was not necessary, however, to send the troops, as a Prussian guard had always remained in possession of the gallery, and the pictures were taken, without the necessity of calling for those of the army under my command, excepting as a working party to assist in taking them down and packing them.

It has been stated that, in being the instrument of removing the pictures belonging to the King of the Netherlands from the Gallery of the Tuileries, I had been guilty of a breach of a treaty which I had myself made; and, as there is no mention of the museums in the treaty of the 25th March, and it now appears that the treaty meant is the military Convention of Paris, it is necessary to show how that Convention affects the Museum.

It is not now necessary to discuss the question whether the Allies were, or not, at war with France. There is no doubt whatever that their armies entered Paris under a military Convention, concluded with an officer of the Government, the Prefect of the department of the Seine, and an officer of the army, being a representative of each of the authorities existing at Paris at the moment, and authorised by those authorities to treat and conclude for them.

The article of the Convention, which it is supposed has been broken, is

the eleventh, which relates to public property. I positively deny that this article referred at all to the museums, or galleries of pictures.

The French commissioners, in the original project, proposed an article to provide for the security of this description of property. Prince Blücher would not consent to it, as he said there were pictures in the gallery which had been taken from Prussia, which His Majesty Louis XVIII. had promised to restore, but which had never been restored. I stated this circumstance to the French commissioners, and they then offered to adopt the article with an exception of the Prussian pictures. To this offer I answered that I stood there as the ally of all the nations in Europe, and any thing that was granted to Prussia, I must claim for other nations. I added that I had no instructions regarding the Museum, nor any grounds on which to form a judgment how the Sovereigns would act; that they certainly would insist upon the King's performing his engagements, and that I recommended that the article should be omitted altogether, and that the question should be reserved for the decision of the Sovereigns when they should arrive.

Thus the question regarding the Museum stands under the treaties. The Convention of Paris is silent upon it, and there was a communication upon the subject which reserved the decision for the Sovereigns.

Supposing the silence of the Treaty of Paris of May, 1814, regarding the Museum, gave the French Government an undisputed claim to its contents upon all future occasions, it will not be denied that this claim was shaken by this transaction.

Those who acted for the French Government, at the time, considered that the successful army had a right to, and would, touch the contents of the Museum, and they made an attempt to save them by an article in the military Convention. This article was rejected, and the claim of the Allies to their pictures was broadly advanced by the negotiators on their part; and this was stated as the ground for rejecting the article. Not only, then, the military Convention did not in itself guarantee the possession, but the transaction above recited tended to weaken the claim to the possession by the French Government, which is founded upon the silence of the Treaty of Paris of May, 1814.

The Allies then, having the contents of the Museum justly in their power, could not do otherwise than restore them to the countries from which, contrary to the practice of civilised warfare, they had been torn during the disastrous period of the French revolution and the tyranny of Buonaparte.

The conduct of the Allies regarding the Museum, at the period of the Treaty of Paris, might be fairly attributed to their desire to conciliate the French army, and to consolidate the reconciliation with Europe, which the army at that period manifested a disposition to effect.

But the circumstances are now entirely different. The army disappointed the reasonable expectation of the world, and seized the earliest opportunity of rebelling against their Sovereign, and of giving their services to the common enemy of mankind, with a view to the revival of the disastrous period which had passed, and of the scenes of plunder which the world had made such gigantic efforts to get rid of.

This army having been defeated by the armies of Europe, they have been disbanded by the united counsel of the Sovereigns, and no reason can



exist why the powers of Europe should do injustice to their own subjects with a view to conciliate them again. Neither has it ever appeared to me to be necessary that the Allied Sovereigns should omit this opportunity to do justice and to gratify their own subjects, in order to gratify the people of France.

The feeling of the people of France upon this subject must be one of national vanity only. It must be a desire to retain these specimens of the arts, not because Paris is the fittest depository for them, as, upon that subject, artists, connoisseurs, and all who have written upon it, agree that the whole ought to be removed to their ancient seat, but because they were obtained by military concessions, of which they are the trophies.

The same feelings which induce the people of France to wish to retain the pictures and statues of other nations would naturally induce other nations to wish, now that success is on their side, that the property should be returned to their rightful owners; and the Allied Sovereigns must feel a desire to gratify them.

It is, besides, on many accounts, desirable, as well for their own happiness as for that of the world, that the people of France, if they do not already feel that Europe is too strong for them, should be made sensible of it; and that, whatever may be the extent, at any time, of their momentary and partial success against any one, or any number of individual powers in Europe, the day of retribution must come.

Not only, then, would it, in my opinion, be unjust in the Sovereigns to gratify the people of France on this subject, at the expense of their own people, but the sacrifice they would make would be impolitic, as it would deprive them of the opportunity of giving the people of France a great moral lesson.

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998.

To General Dumouriez.

à Paris, ce 26 Sept. 1815.

‘ J’ai reçu votre lettre du 18, à laquelle je vais répondre. En général je n’aime pas les discussions de questions politiques, parceque, puisqu’on ne peut guère s’entendre sur les bases, et même sur les termes, dont on se sert en les discutant, il est très difficile de s’entendre sur les conclusions, et encore plus dans le temps où nous vivons.

Avant mon arrivée à Paris au mois de Juillet, je n’avais jamais vu Fouché, ni eu avec lui communication quelconque, ni avec aucun de ceux qui sont liés avec lui. Je ne pouvais donc avoir aucun intérêt à son sort.

Le fait est, que toutes les Puissances, entre autres l’Angleterre, avaient tâché, pendant le printemps et l’été, de persuader au Roi de prendre Fouché à son service, comme moyen de concilier à Sa Majesté un grand nombre de personnes; et, malgré que je n’aie jamais vu qu’il avait l’influence qu’on lui donnait, j’ai exécuté ce que les autres ont voulu.

Les crises de la politique, en temps de révolution, ressemblent beaucoup à celles d’une bataille; et on est souvent dans la nécessité d’y appliquer des remèdes violens, qui ont, peut-être, des suites fâcheuses, pour remédier au grand mal existant. Voici l’histoire de la nomination de Fouché. A mon arrivée près de Paris, je savais que les Alliés n’étaient pas du tout déterminés en faveur du Roi; que les ——— surtout ne voulaient pas la restauration; que

l'armée et les Assemblées ne voulaient pas de lui ; qu'il se trouvait quatre provinces du Royaume en rébellion ouverte, et des autres, y incluse la ville de Paris, très froides ; et il était très clair pour moi que si je n'intéressait, pas Fouché à la restauration du Roi, Sa Majesté aurait été obligée de rester à St. Denis, au moins jusqu'à l'arrivée des Souverains, ce qui aurait, en tout cas, nui à son autorité et à sa dignité, s'il eut jamais remonté sur son trône.

Donc j'ai conseillé à Sa Majesté de prendre Fouché à son service, afin de pouvoir rentrer avec dignité, et sans effort de la part des Alliés ; et je suis parfaitement certain qu'il doit sa restauration tranquille et dignifiée à ce conseil.

Je crois aussi que les courtisans étaient satisfaits, et ont autant applaudi l'arrangement le jour qu'il a été adopté, qu'ils l'ont blâmé aussitôt qu'ils ont joui des effets.

Ils ont tout de suite commencé à intriguer contre Fouché et contre tout le ministère. J'ai prédit au Roi ce qui arriverait ; mais nous n'en sommes pas encore à toutes les conséquences. Fouché s'est, peut-être, mal conduit en quelques circonstances, mais pas la moitié si mal qu'on le dit et le croit ; au contraire, je sais que ce sont les courtisans qui ont publié son dernier rapport au Roi ; et enfin vous en voyez le résultat dans le renvoi de tout le ministère, formé avec l'approbation de toutes les Puissances de l'Europe, et dans le moment le plus critique de la négociation.

Voilà donc l'histoire de cette transaction. Le Roi, et même Monsieur, par les conseils duquel je parlais au Roi, étaient persuadés que la nomination de Fouché était nécessaire dans le moment.

Je crois que le Roi était content de Fouché. Mais l'arrivée de ———, qui n'avait pas vu la crise qui avait occasionné sa nomination, et les intrigues des courtisans, devenus plus hardis après l'arrivée de ———, ont changé tout.'

999.

To Major General Sir H. Torrens, K.C.B.

Paris, 14th Oct. 1815.

'We had better, however, adhere to the rule, as we have it, that none shall have the Order but those who actually commanded.

My own opinion is, that the best mode of disposing of these honors is arbitrary ; that is to say, without any rule excepting a sense of merit in the persons receiving them. But this principle excludes all rule, neither can you introduce it where there is a rule. I am perfectly aware, however, of the inconveniences, particularly in a country and in an army like ours, of disposing of honors of this description without rule ; and I am now suffering them all, from having disposed, by selection, of the Orders placed at my disposition by the Sovereigns, without attending to any rule, excepting that of taking those I thought most deserving.'

1000.

To Earl Bathurst.

Paris, 23rd Oct. 1815.

'My opinion is, that the best troops we have, probably the best in the world, are the British infantry, particularly the old infantry that has served in Spain. This is what we ought to keep up ; and what I wish above all others to retain.



The cavalry, that which is the expensive branch of the cavalry, the horses, may be put down in peace ; and, upon the renewal of war, it is more easy to recruit them, or even horses for the artillery, than it is to get together a good body of infantry. For this reason I would recommend to you not to lose your good infantry, if you can keep it ; and to reform rather the horses of your cavalry and artillery to the utmost, and all the expensive parts of your establishments.'

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1001.

MEMORANDUM.

For the Deputy Quarter Master General, to be communicated to the General Officers Commanding Corps and Divisions.

Paris, 29th Oct. 1815.

' The circumstances attending the present situation of the army render it expedient that Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington should call the attention of the officers under your command to the necessity of the strictest discipline, and most exact regularity of the troops in the cantonments which they are about to occupy ; and, in order to insure the uniform conduct of the service, His Grace desires that the following points may be attended to.

Billets are to be made by the Mayors, or persons acting for them. They are to be applied for by officers of the Quarter Master General's department of divisions ; or, if there are no officers of the Quarter Master General's department, by Staff Officers of divisions or brigades ; or, if there are no Staff Officers, by Quarter Masters.

Where there are no Mayors, or persons having authority to issue billets, then billets are to be arranged and portioned by the officers of the Quarter Master General's department of the divisions ; or, if there are no officers of the Quarter Master General's department, by Staff Officers of divisions or brigades ; or, if there are no Staff Officers, by Quarter Masters.

All billets, when granted, are to be made use of.

If the owner of a house refuses a billet, it is to be made good, if necessary, by force ; but this measure must be sanctioned by the officer of the Quarter Master General's department of divisions ; or, if there are no officers of the Quarter Master General's department, by the Staff Officers of divisions or brigades ; or, if there is no Staff Officer, by the Quarter Master authorised to arrange the billets.

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G. O.

Paris, 28th Oct. 1815.

' 4. Before the troops go into barracks or cantonments, an officer of each troop or company is to visit the barracks or cantonments, which the soldiers are to occupy, and to ascertain the state in which they are.

5. The name of the owner of the house in which the troops will be cantoned, and the names of the soldiers cantoned in the house must be kept.

6. On marching days the barracks and cantonments of each company are to be visited by an officer once, if possible, after the troops shall have arrived, and once before they shall march, and upon halting days the barracks and cantonments of the soldiers must be visited twice every day by the officer of the company or troop to which they belong ; these visiting officers will observe whether any article has been broken or taken away, if the troops are in cantonments, and will inquire whether the owner of the house has any complaint to make of the men.

7. The non-commissioned officers must be cantoned with the squads to which they belong, and the officers as near as possible to their companies ; the field officers with their regiments ; the Generals and Staff as near as possible to their brigades and divisions.'

If the owner of a house takes away his furniture, or by other means endeavors to deter officers from entering the billet, the Commanding Officer is to place soldiers in the house.

No inhabitant is to be required to accommodate persons who are not entitled to billets; and it is particularly desired that officers will not give grounds for complaint, by taking their wives or families into billets, without having the consent of the owners of the house so to do.

Officers are to be warned against shooting over the country, without having permission of the proprietors. The General Orders of the army have already given sufficient caution upon this subject.

The situation of the troops will require that military precaution should be attended to.

Alarm posts are to be established, guards and piquets are to be posted, and sufficient measures taken for the security of the communications, and for the safety and tranquillity of the cantonments.

The most efficient steps are to be taken for the prompt and certain circulation of orders, so that the whole, or any part, of the troops may be collected at the shortest notice.

Attention must be paid in the billets of soldiers to the ammunition, to its security against accident or robbery: for this the frequent inspection by commanding officers of companies will be a precaution.

The parks of artillery are to be formed where they can be protected. They are never to be without guards; and troops should be sufficiently near to afford them support.

If any *atroupement*, or mutinous assembly of the inhabitants, against the military takes place, the troops are to be under arms, and the *atroupement* is to be fired upon.

Any act of violence by the inhabitants against the soldiers is to be immediately noticed, and the offenders are to be secured. The service must be respected. The General Officers are to take care that the discipline and good conduct of the troops merit the respect demanded. The Mayors are to be informed of the measures that will be taken, and are to be desired to warn the inhabitants against taking part in the disturbances that may subject them to military punishment.<sup>2</sup>

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1002.

To Major General Sir H. Torrens, K.C.B.

Paris, 4th Nov. 1815.

‘ I received last night your letter of October 28th, and that of His Royal Highness of the 27th. I did not understand from Lord Bathurst that Government objected to give more than 20,000 British troops for the army of occupation, but that His Royal Highness could not give more. What I imagine is, that Government think they can get foreign troops cheaper than they can British; and they prefer to employ them, forgetting the number of years required to form the army they have got, and that, if they disband it, they will destroy the military profession in England. My opinion upon the whole transaction is, that, now that we have toiled like slaves here to make the arrangement which has been made, Government do not like it because



some newspaper writer or some friend in Parliament dislikes it, and they will not carry it into execution.'

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1003.

To General Comte de Vaubois.

à Paris, ce 10 Nov. 1815.

' Vous, cependant, M. le Général, qui avez servi, devez bien sentir qu'il n'est pas possible de donner compensation pour le montant de tous les dommages qu'une armée peut faire dans un pays, ou par les irrégularités des soldats, ou par les suites inévitables d'une occupation militaire. Il est vrai que je suis dans l'habitude de faire payer les dommages que font les troupes par leurs irrégularités chez les habitans, surtout les troupes Anglaises. Mais c'est plutôt un moyen de discipline que de dédommagement entier à l'habitant ; et je ne peux pas adopter, dans tous les cas, les mêmes moyens avec les troupes étrangères, qui ne sont ni si bien, ni si régulièrement, payées.

Le fait est, M. le Général, que la France, en portant ses armes chez l'étranger, y a porté le malheur, la dévastation et la ruine : j'ai moi-même été témoin de la destruction des propriétés des provinces entières, qui n'ont pas voulu se soumettre au joug du tyran, et qu'on avait été obligé d'abandonner en conséquence des opérations de la guerre.

Malgré que la vengeance particulière ne doit jamais être le mobile de l'homme, et qu'elle ne l'est sûrement pas des Souverains Alliés, on ne peut guère s'attendre à ce que des soldats, des hommes de la classe la plus pauvre et laborieuse de la société, ayant vu bruler, saccager, et détruire leurs propriétés, ou celles de leurs parens, par les Français, ayent grand égard pour les propriétés des Français, quand par suite des événemens de la guerre, ils se trouvent en France.

C'est notre devoir, c'est l'intérêt de nous tous, même je crois plus que ce n'est le devoir du Gouvernement Français, d'empêcher ces actes de dévastation ; et je crois qu'il ne se trouve personne qui ait tâché, autant que moi, de remplir ce devoir. Mais, M. le Général, vous connaissez les armées, et j'en appelle à votre jugement s'il est possible de les empêcher entièrement dans une armée telle que celle que je commande ; surtout quand le soldat y est excité par le souvenir des maux que lui et sa famille ont soufferts de la part des armées Françaises.

J'ai cru devoir vous écrire sur ce sujet plus longuement que les circonstances n'exigeaient peut-être, parceque je désire vous montrer que je ne suis pas insensible aux maux que vous avez soufferts, malgré qu'il ne soit pas en mon pouvoir d'y remédier.'

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1004.

To Lieut. General Sir G. Nugent, G.C.B

Paris, 14th Nov. 1815.

' In general I am very averse to bringing forward instances of misconduct, after such a battle as that of Waterloo. Many a brave man, and I believe

G. O.

Paris, 5th Nov. 1815.

1. The Field Marshal is concerned to find that his desire, repeatedly stated in Orders, that the officers of the army would not hunt or shoot, without the permission of the owners of the property on which they should wish to hunt or shoot, has been unattended to, and that several have destroyed the game in the King's forests and on his estates.

2. He now requests the General Officers to take measures to prevent any future disobedience of these Orders.'

even some very great men, have been found a little terrified by such a battle as that, and have behaved afterwards extremely well. If, therefore, the case had come before me in the first instance, or if I had heard of it at all, I should have taken measures to put a stop to it: as it is, I must act as I shall be ordered.

From what I have heard of the case, since I received your letter, it appears that ——— having left the field as wounded, the surgeon of the regiment could not return him in the list of wounded. It will turn, first, upon whether the surgeon was right or wrong; and, secondly, whether he was not so stunned as to be obliged to quit the field, although not in such a state afterwards as that the surgeon ought to have returned him as wounded.\*

1005.

To the Earl of Liverpool, K.G.

Paris, 14th Nov. 1815.

'I know that you learn the state of affairs here from other quarters, and therefore I do not trouble you. My own opinion is, that the King and his Government are in a better situation now than they were this time last year, because there is no head against them; because there is no confidence in any body, nor is there any body who has talents to become a head; because the real danger, the disaffection of the army, is felt and acknowledged; and because measures are taking to form a loyal army, if possible. There is plenty of discontent, and talk, and reports, and opinions, but nothing that shows any thing like a serious conspiracy; and my own opinion is, that the King will hold his ground, if the courtiers and his family do not force him to take some step which will give serious alarm to the holders of national property.'

1006.

To ———.

Paris, 15th Nov. 1815.

'If the Sovereigns, who did me the honor of sending me their Orders to give away in this army, intended to do me an injury, they have certainly succeeded, as, notwithstanding that I did the best I could under the circumstances, nobody is pleased.

If I had all the Orders before me at the same moment, or had known that I should have them, I should probably have made a different distribu-

\* Since the publication of the 12th volume of the Dispatches, from which the above extract is made, the following letter has been sent to the compiler, written by the General Officer commanding the brigade, in which the officer in question served:—

"Sir, I now take the earliest opportunity of assuring you that it has afforded me sincere pleasure to learn that the statement of your conduct on the 18th June has proved so entirely satisfactory to His Royal Highness, as to induce him to express his approbation by recommending you to the Prince Regent for promotion. The explanation you have given, and the proof you have adduced of the contusion you have received, are a sufficient contradiction of the reports circulated to your disadvantage, and will, no doubt, silence any aspersions that may have been thrown upon your character. Should it be necessary, I shall be happy to testify my conviction of the propriety of your behaviour on that memorable day.

\* \* \* \* Major General.

And also the following certificate:—

"SIR,

———, near Paris, July, 1815.

When we attended you in consequence of the injury you received on your head in action on the 18th, we were of opinion that medical treatment was required, and we did report you slightly wounded.

↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ } Surgeons — regt.  
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ }



tion of them ; but, from what I have seen, I think it probable not one that would have given more satisfaction, as the taste for Orders is like that for colors, it is impossible to know what will suit every individual.'

1007.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING MARÉCHAL NEY.

Paris, 19th Nov. 1815.

'It is extraordinary that Madame la Maréchale Ney should have thought proper to publish, in print, parts of a conversation which she is supposed to have had with the Duke of Wellington ; and that she has omitted to publish that which is a much better record of the Duke's opinion on the subject to which the conversation related ; viz., the Duke's letter to the Maréchal Prince de la Moskwa, in answer to the Maréchal's note to His Grace. That letter was as follows\* :—

"I have had the honor of receiving the note which you addressed to me on the 13th November, relating to the operation of the capitulation of Paris on your case. The capitulation of Paris of the 3rd July was made between the Commanders in Chief of the Allied British and Prussian armies on the one part, and the Prince d'Eckmuhl, Commander in Chief of the French army, on the other ; and related exclusively to the military occupation of Paris.

"The object of the 12th article was to prevent the adoption of any measures of severity, under the military authority of those who made it, towards any persons in Paris on account of the offices which they had filled, or their conduct, or their political opinions. But it was never intended, and could not be intended, to prevent either the existing French Government, under whose authority the French Commander in Chief must have acted, or any French Government which should succeed to it, from acting in this respect as it might deem fit."

It is obvious from this letter that the Duke of Wellington, one of the parties to the capitulation of Paris, considers that that instrument contains nothing which can prevent the King from bringing Marshal Ney to trial in such manner as His Majesty may think proper. †

The contents of the capitulation fully confirm the justice of the Duke's opinion. It is made between the Commanders in Chief of the contending armies respectively ; and the first 9 articles relate solely to the mode and time of the evacuation of Paris by the French army, and of the occupation by the British and Prussian armies.

The 10th article provides that the existing authorities shall be respected by the two Commanders in Chief of the Allies ; the 11th that public property shall be respected, and that the Allies shall not interfere "en aucune manière dans leur administration, et dans leur gestion ;" and the 12th article states, "seront pareillement respectées les personnes et les propriétés particulières ; les habitans, et en général tout les individus qui se trouvent

\* This letter, to the Prince de la Moskwa, dated the 14th November, was not inserted according to date, it being repeated in this paper.

† See the Proclamation of Louis XVIII. to the French people, dated Cambrai, the 28th June, 1815.

dans la capitale, continueront à jouir de leur droits et libertés sans pouvoir être inquiétés, ou recherchés en rien, relativement aux fonctions qu'ils occupent ou auraient occupées, à leur conduite, et à leurs opinions politiques."

By whom were these private properties and persons to be respected? By the Allied Generals and their troops mentioned in the 10th and 11th articles; and not by other parties, to whom the Convention did not relate in any manner.

The 13th article provides that "les troupes étrangères" shall not obstruct the carriage of provisions by land or water to the capital.

Thus it appears that every article in the Convention relates exclusively to the operations of the different armies, or to the conduct of the Allies and that of their Generals, when they should enter Paris; and, as the Duke of Wellington states in his dispatch of the 4th July, with which he transmitted the Convention to England, it "decided all the military points then existing at Paris, and touched nothing political." \*

But it appears clearly that, not only was this the Duke's opinion of the Convention at the time it was signed, but likewise the opinion of Carnot, of Marshal Ney, and of every other person who had an interest in considering the subject.

Carnot says, in the *Exposé de la conduite politique de M. Carnot* (page 43), "Il fut résolu d'envoyer aux Généraux Anglais et Prussiens une Commission spéciale chargée de leur proposer une convention purement militaire, pour la remise de la ville de Paris entre leurs mains, en écartant toute question politique, puisqu'on ne pouvait préjuger quelles seraient les intentions des Alliés, lorsqu'ils seraient réunis."

It appears that Marshal Ney fled from Paris in disguise, with a passport given to him by the Duc d'Otrante, under a feigned name, on the 6th July. He could not be supposed to be ignorant of the tenor of the 12th article of the Convention; and he must then have known whether it was the intention of the parties who made it that it should protect him from the measures which the King, then at St. Denis, should think proper to adopt against him.

But if Marshal Ney could be supposed ignorant of the intention of the 12th article, the Duc d'Otrante could not, as he was at the head of the Provisional Government, under whose authority the Prince d'Eckmühl must have acted when he signed the Convention. †

Would the Duc d'Otrante have given a passport under a feigned name to Marshal Ney, if he had understood the 12th article as giving the Marshal any protection, excepting against measures of severity by the two Commanders in Chief?

Another proof of what was the opinion of the Duc d'Otrante, of the King's Ministers, and of all the persons most interested in establishing the meaning now attempted to be given to the 12th article of the Convention of the 3rd July, is the King's Proclamation of the 24th July, by which 19 persons are ordered for trial, and 38 persons are ordered to quit Paris, and

\* 'See Lord Bathurst's Dispatch of the 7th July, and the Duke's answer of the 13th. (Selection 983.)'

† 'See the Duke of Wellington's Dispatch to Lord Bathurst of the 8th July (Selection 979), detailing a conversation which took place with the Duc d'Otrante at Neuilly, on the night of the 5th July; the whole of which turned upon a recommendation given by the Duc d'Otrante, that the King should give a "General Amnesty."'



to reside in particular parts of France, under the observation and superintendence of the police, till the Chambers should decide upon their fate.\*

Did the Duc d'Otrante, did any of the persons who are the objects of this Proclamation, did any person on their behalf, even then, or now, claim for them the protection of the 12th article of the Convention? Certainly the Convention was then understood, as it ought to be understood now, viz., that it was exclusively military, and was never intended to bind the then existing Government of France, or any Government which should succeed it.'

1008.

To ———.

Paris, 24th Nov. 1815.

'My name is frequently mentioned in your newspaper, and, as it is a sort of privilege of modern Englishmen to read, in the daily newspapers, lies respecting those who serve them; and I have been so long accustomed to be so treated, I should not have thought it necessary to trouble you on the subject, if you had not thought proper to contradict, as from authority, in a late paper, certain reports which you had before published, respecting differences between the Duc de Berri and me.

This formal contradiction of certain reports tends to give the appearance of truth to certain others which remain uncontradicted, which have still less foundation, in fact, than those which you have been authorised to contradict. I mean, for instance, those reports which you have more than once published respecting a supposed intercourse between a certain Madame Hamelin and me. I should be justified in calling upon you to name the person who gave you the information upon this subject; nay, I believe nobody could blame me if I were to go farther; but I feel no resentment upon the subject, nor any desire to injure you. All I beg is, that you will contradict these reports; and your own desire to publish only what is true respecting an individual will probably induce you in future to be more cautious in selecting the channel of your intelligence respecting me, when I assure you that not only I never had any intercourse or even acquaintance with Madame Hamelin, but that I never even saw her.

Other circumstances respecting me have been published in your paper, which are equally false with those to which I have above referred; but I will not trouble you upon them; nor should I have written to you at all, as I am really quite indifferent respecting what is read of me in the newspapers, if you had not given an appearance of truth to some reports, by the formal contradiction which you have published of others.'

\* 'As well as the Duke of Wellington recollects, there is in the War Department a letter from the Prince d'Eckmuhl to Marshal St. Cyr on this subject, in which he urges every argument against the Proclamation of the 28th July, excepting the 12th article of the Convention of Paris.'

G. O.

Paris, 30th Nov. 1815.

'48. Upon breaking up the army, which the Field Marshal has had the honor of commanding, he begs leave again to return thanks to the General Officers, and the officers and troops, for their uniform good conduct.

49. In the late short but memorable campaign, they have given proofs to the world that they possess, in an eminent degree, all the good qualities of soldiers; and the Field Marshal is happy to be able to applaud their regular good conduct in their camps and cantonments, not less than when engaged with the enemy in the field.

50. Whatever may be the future destination of those brave troops, of which the Field Marshal now takes his leave, he trusts that every individual will believe that he will ever feel the deepest interest in their honor and welfare, and will always be happy to promote either.'

## ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

1009.

### INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING BRIGADES OF CAVALRY IN THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

‘ It is so desirable that a reserve should be kept in all cases in which the cavalry is employed to charge, that it appears to be a matter of necessity ;

G. O.

Paris, 28th June, 1816.

‘ 1. The Field Marshal desires that as soon as the regiments shall be encamped, or whenever they can be assembled for exercise, they should be rendered perfect in the following movements :—

1st. Marching in columns on an alignment at full, half, and quarter distances ; officers keeping accurately the exact distance ordered.

2nd. Deployments of close columns into line.

3rd. Wheeling a close column, or one at quarter distance, into a new direction.

4th. Formation into line from open columns by the *echelon* march of divisions.

5th. Formation of the square from columns at half and quarter distances and at close order.’

G. O.

Cambrai, 3rd Sept. 1816.

‘ 1. The Field Marshal begs that the officers of the British army, including those of the departments attached to it, will wear their side arms, and the hats or caps ordered for them, respectively, by the regulations of the service, or by the orders of their regiments, whenever they appear out of their quarters or tents.’

G. O.

Cambrai, 29th Sept. 1816.

‘ 1. As His Majesty’s Regulations do not contain Orders respecting the order of review for the infantry in column, the following Orders are to be obeyed in this army.

2. When the troops are ordered to be formed in columns, the original formation is to be in columns of battalions, if possible, at quarter distances, in one or more lines, as may be ordered.

3. The columns of the several battalions are to be at the distance from each other which is ordered to be between 2 battalions when formed in line.

4. When the reviewing General arrives on the ground, the officers and colors are to form in one line 2 paces in front of the column, the colors being in the centre, the mounted officers 2 paces in front of the line of officers, and the commanding officer in front of the whole ; the surgeon and quarter master to be in the rear of the battalions, and the Staff surgeons in their rear.

5. The band and drums to be formed in several ranks in line with the front rank of the battalions, and on its right.

6. The pioneers in one rank in rear of the drums.

7. The General Officers commanding divisions and brigades to be stationed, in respect to the troops under their command, as they would be if their troops were in line.

8. The General Officer is to be saluted according to His Majesty’s Regulations, without opening ranks, and then the troops are to stand shouldered in the order above ordered while the General will go down the line.

9. In passing in review at quarter distances, the interval between the battalions is to be that prescribed by His Majesty’s Regulations between 2 battalions in column at ordinary distances.

10. In this interval are to march the band and drums and pioneers, and those mounted officers, who, according to His Majesty’s Regulations, precede a battalion on its march in column, and those which follow that which moves before it.

11. In passing in review in column at quarter distances in quick time, the mounted officers are alone to salute ; the others and the colors march in their places, as fixed by His Majesty’s Regulations.

12. There is to be no additional interval left for the colors.

13. When



and the officers and troops should be accustomed to form and conduct this reserve and exercise.

The reserve of a body of cavalry charging is intended to answer two purposes—1st, to improve and complete the success of the charge; 2ndly, to protect the retreat of the troops retiring, supposing those who charge are unsuccessful, or possibly to acquire success after their failure.

The proportion of the body of cavalry to be kept in reserve must depend upon the nature of the ground, and of the body of troops to be attacked. It should not be less than half of the body formed for the operation, nor should it exceed two-thirds. It follows, therefore, that every body of cavalry should be formed in 2 or 3 lines. The second line should be in line, the third might be in columns, of such a size as that they could be readily formed into line.

The next point for consideration is the distance at which these lines should be placed, and should preserve from each other; and it will be observed that this must depend upon the nature of the enemy to be attacked, and in some degree upon the nature of the ground which may be the scene of

13. When the artillery is in line with the infantry formed in columns, the officer commanding the artillery must take care to occupy the space with his guns which he will occupy in marching in column, so that no time may be lost in marching off the ground.

14. In passing in review, and in all movements with the troops in close columns, the artillery will move with 6 carriages in front if possible, if not, with 3.'

G. O.

Cambrai, 6th Oct. 1816.

'1. The Field Marshal begs that the Staff Officers of the army and the aides de camp of General Officers, particularly his own, will appear dressed and equipped according to His Majesty's Orders and Regulations, upon all occasions in which they appear in uniform.

2. All ornaments not ordered by His Majesty are to be discontinued, and the Staff Officers and aides de camp must appear in blue or white pantaloons, and black boots.'

G. O.

Cambrai, 30th Oct. 1816.

'8. The chaplains of the army are forbidden to marry any persons without the permission, in writing, of the Field Marshal.'

G. O.

Cambrai, 18th July. 1817.

'1. The Field Marshal desires it to be understood that nothing in the General Orders from the Horse Guards of the 1st of this month is to be considered as affecting his Order of the 30th Oct. 1816, No. 8.'

G. O.

Cambrai, 14th Aug. 1817.

'1. In addition to the movements ordered by the General Orders of the 25th June and 29th Sept. 1816, the Field Marshal desires that the following mode of changing the front of a column may be practised by the regiments of infantry.

2. The battalion standing in close column, or at quarter or any other distance, is required to change its front within the space of its own breadth.

3. The column will change its front:

—Sub-divisions right about face:

The whole—shoulders forward.

{ On the caution being given, a point should be placed in the reverse flank of the leading division, and the sub-divisions in that flank be ordered to face to the right about; the whole will then be cautioned to bring up their left shoulders if the column has its right in front, and *vice versa* if the left is in front.

{ On the word *March*, the whole will step off together, the leading pivot sub-division wheeling a half circle and halting, and the others moving round necessarily in the rear of it, and of each other, and halting with their proper distance; whilst at the same time the reverse sub-divisions wheel round and follow along the ground formerly occupied by the pivot sub-divisions, pass on to the rear, halt and front as they come opposite to their respective pivot sub-divisions.

4. Quick march.

5. The regiments must also be practised to perform this movement on the march, by the reverse sub-divisions turning to the right about, and the whole continuing to move as before described.'

operation: It has been already stated that one of the objects of the reserve is to protect the retreat of the body charging which has failed; or possibly to turn the fortune of the day by a fresh attack upon the enemy engaged in his pursuit; and it is therefore obvious that the reserve or second line of the cavalry should not be so near the first, as to be at all affected by the confusion in which the first will naturally fall in its retreat from the charge.

It is supposed that from 400 to 500 yards is distance sufficient to enable the retreating body to retire through the intervals of the second line, without throwing that body into confusion: on the other hand, as that space can be passed in something more than a minute of time, at the ordinary pace at which horses gallop, the distance is not too great to enable the second line to secure and improve any success which might be obtained by the first. For the same reason that the second line should be from 400 to 500 yards distance from the first; the third line, if there is one, ought to be at the same distance from the second. The distance of about 450 yards then should be the distance between the different lines of cavalry in the attack of cavalry.

In the attack of infantry and artillery, however, the circumstances are different, and the distances between the lines should be altered accordingly. In this case, the object should be for the second line to strike its blow as soon as possible after the first should have failed; and as there is no chance

G. O.

Cambrai, 14th Aug. 1817.

'6. The Field Marshal desires that the soldiers may not be permitted to quit their camp or quarters without being properly dressed with their side arms on, unless on fatigue, when they should be attended by a non-commissioned officer.'

G. O.

Cambrai, 23rd Sept. 1817.

1. The Field Marshal has frequent complaints of the conduct of the officers of the army in striking individuals with their fists, which is quite inconsistent with their duty and with their character, as British officers.

2. He has repeatedly given orders that the officers of the army may not quit their quarters without their side arms, an obedience to which would certainly preclude the supposed provocation for making use of fists, if any thing can be a provocation for a British officer so far to forget himself.

3. The Field Marshal is sorry to observe however that his orders upon this point have not been obeyed; and he has ever seen the Staff Officers of the army, whose special business it is to notice the disobedience of others, in the streets of Cambrai, without their side arms.

4. The Field Marshal is determined to enforce obedience to his Orders; and, upon any occasion of disobedience in future, he will be under the necessity of adopting measures which will be very disagreeable to him, as well as to those who will be the object of them.'

G. O.

Cambrai 26th Nov. 1817.

1. The Field Marshal desires that the commanding officers of regiments of cavalry, battalions of infantry, and troops of artillery, will make a daily report to the General Officers commanding brigades, of any event of consequence which occurs in the cantonments occupied by the troops under their command respectively, which reports they are to forward with the daily state.

2. If any communication has been made with the magistrates of the country, either in the way of complaint on their parts of the military, or in the way of complaint of the inhabitants, it must be particularly noticed in this report, as well as any occurrence, in the cantonments or town in which the troops may be in barracks, which the commanding officers of regiments may think deserving the attention of their superiors.

3. These reports the General Officers commanding brigades will forward to the Adjutant General at head quarters, through the General Officers commanding divisions, with such observations upon them as occur to them.

4. In case there should be nothing to report, the report must contain the words "Nothing extraordinary."

5. The officers commanding brigades of artillery will make similar reports to the General Officers commanding divisions of infantry; and the officers commanding the Royal Sappers and Miners, infantry staff corps, and cavalry staff corps, will send similar reports direct to head quarters.'



of either the infantry or the artillery pursuing a line of cavalry whose attack it might have repulsed, there appears no reason for approaching so cautiously against the confusion into which the second line might be thrown by the retreat of the first. Two hundred yards might then be the distance between lines of cavalry, attacking bodies of infantry or artillery.

Having thus ascertained the distance at which the lines of cavalry ought to be from each other, the first point to be considered is some simple general rule for the preservation of it in all cases. In ordinary operations this would be left to the eye of the leader of the second line. But so much in the cavalry depends upon the preservation of order in the second line or reserve, where the *first* charges, that more precautions ought to be taken to secure it. The rule should be, then, for the second line invariably to pull up to a walk when the first line charges, and in case of the failure of the charge, to continue at that pace till the first line will have passed through the intervals. In case the charge should be successful, the second line would then preserve its pace, and its settled distance of 450 yards from the first. If there should be a third line, it should follow the movement of the second, keeping its distance from it, till the second should become *first*, by the retreat of the *first*, and it should then act as above detailed for the *second* line.'

G. O.

Paris, 10th April, 1818.

'1. The Field Marshal has received such repeated complaints of the irregularity of the troops in their cantonments, that he is again compelled to call the attention of the officers of the army to the conduct of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers under their command.

2. The establishment of good order among soldiers, and the prevention of crimes, are chiefly to be effected by the attention and superintendence of the officers and non-commissioned officers.

3. These measures will be much facilitated by a division of the several companies into squads, and the judicious distribution of the officers and non-commissioned officers.

4. The several squads should be cantoned as nearly as possible together; the officers and non-commissioned officers (who should be quartered with their respective squads) should be required to visit their men's quarters at irregular hours after dark, to see that they are present in their quarters at proper hours, and orderly.

4. But what most astonishes and concerns the Field Marshal is to have observed in so many recent instances of robbery and disorder, that the non-commissioned officers themselves have either been accomplices in the offences committed or privy thereto. It therefore behoves the officers commanding regiments to require a more strict attention from the officers.

6. Patroles should take place in the several villages, &c. during the whole of the night, and the officers commanding should concert measures with the different mayors that the public houses may be closed at proper hours.'

G. O.

Cambrai, 31st May, 1818.

'1. The Field Marshal requests the attention of General Officers and officers commanding regiments to the General Orders, 28th June, 29th Sept. 1816, and 14th Aug. 1817; and also desires that the troops may be practised in the movements to a flank in column at quarter distance, upon the principle laid down in sections 164 and 165 of the Rules and Regulations for Field Movements.'

G. O.

Cambrai, 10th Nov. 1818.

'6. Upon the return to England of the troops which have so long served under the command of the Field Marshal, he again returns his thanks for their uniform good conduct, during the period in which they have formed part of the army of occupation.

7. The Field Marshal has in another order, addressed to the Army of Occupation at large, expressed his sentiments regarding the conduct of, and his obligation to, the General Officers and officers of that army. These are especially due to the General Officers and officers of the British contingent; and he begs them to accept of his best acknowledgments for the example they have given to others by their own good conduct, and for the support and assistance they have invariably afforded him to maintain the discipline of the army.

8. After a service of 10 years' duration, almost without interruption, with the same officers and troops, the Field Marshal separates from them with regret: but he trusts that they will believe that he will never cease to feel a concern for their honor and interest.'

### THREE INSTRUCTIONS OR ORDERS, ISSUED IN 1827.

NOTE.—The three following Instructions or Orders were issued by Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, when Commander in Chief in 1827.

1010.

#### COMPARATIVE RANK OF MILITARY AND CIVIL OFFICERS.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th January, together with its enclosures, regarding a question of comparative rank arising in the pretensions of the surgeon of the — regt. to take precedence as a President of a Board of Survey, upon the plea of seniority in the date of his relative commission.

Upon a careful consideration of all the documents transmitted by you on this occasion, the Commander in Chief is of opinion, that this whole subject is misunderstood; and that the late Commander in Chief could not have had the question in all its bearings brought under his view, when His Royal Highness authorised the reply, upon the claim of Mr. T——, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, communicated in the Adjutant General’s letter of the 11th December, 1823.

The General Regulations, which define the relative rank of all the civil officers of the army, were framed for the express purpose of regulating their corresponding claim to quarters, allowances, prize money, &c.; and it is clearly stated that such relative rank is not to extend to “the exercise of any military authority or command whatever.” It would be quite inconsistent with the letter and spirit of this regulation, to permit officers of the civil departments to assume any control at mixed boards; and it is quite clear that the late Commander in Chief never contemplated that they should assume the station of a President at such boards. Such a pretension on the part of a surgeon of a regiment, as assumed by Mr. G——, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals in his departmental order, renders it quite necessary that the exercise of this relative rank, on the part of the civil officers of the army, should be strictly confined to the letter of the King’s Regulations.

His Grace is aware that it is essential to the interests of the public service that certain boards should, according to the object of their inquiry, have the advantage of the information which the officers of the civil departments can best afford; and they are employed upon such boards for the express purpose of giving the assistance which comes within the limits of their departments; but it would be an anomaly to invest them with the control which must attach to the situation of a President, who must have a general, and not a departmental, view of the object on which a board is assembled. It is the military officer alone who can have this view, and he only can be the President of a board; his claim to which must not be disturbed by any pretensions as arising in the relative rank of civil officers of the army, granted for other and express purposes.



This principle may be fully illustrated with reference to the claim of Mr T—, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals in 1823, to the rights of his relative rank in a board assembled to decide on a proper situation for a lunatic asylum. His opinion on this point could only be departmentally professional: but there were many other objects for consideration, which could only be under the view of the military officer, and which gives the latter an undoubted claim to precedence and the control belonging to it, which, if assumed by a departmental civil officer, the King's Regulations would be violated.

Impressed with the considerations arising out of this view of the subject, and with the necessity of putting this question at rest, in conformity with the spirit, as well as the letter, of the King's Regulations, I have received the Commander in Chief's commands, to desire that you will be pleased to cancel your General Order of the 11th January, which gives to the officers of the civil departments of the army the advantages of their relative ranks; and likewise that of the 19th January, dispensing with the nomination of President, in cases where such officers are employed in the formation of boards.

I am, at the same time, to desire you will convey to Mr. G—, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, the expression of the Commander in Chief's displeasure at the extreme irregularity of issuing his departmental order, which has a reference to points affecting the general service; and further, that you will admonish Mr. G— not to issue any such order in future, and particularly without the knowledge of the Commander of the Forces.'

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 1011.

## OCTOBER MINUTE.

Remarks of the Duke of Wellington, when Commander in Chief, on the interference of Officers, and on the responsibility of General Officers for the Officers of the Staff employed under them.

October, 1827.

' This affair originated in a dispute between the respective officers of the Ordnance and the barrack master at —, which it fell to my lot to settle, when I was Master General, by dismissing the barrack master from the service. It now comes before me in another shape, that of the interference of Major General —, commanding at the station, in the original dispute; the mode of interference; and the letters written by the Major General, and by Colonel —, the senior officer of Ordnance, to the Commander of the Forces in the West Indies. I cannot but disapprove of the original interference of the Major General. The question between the respective officers of Ordnance and the barrack master was upon mere official details, as between the respective officers and the barrack master, with which the Major General had nothing to do. They were referable to a distinct authority, responsible for the expenditure of money and stores, which authority settled the matter without reference to the Major General's authority or opinion; and, I must here add, that no other authority could have settled it.

It is very desirable that General Officers should consider these matters maturely before they interfere in them. They should study their instructions, and the rules and regulations of the service. They would therein find

the limits of their authority; and, by acting accordingly, they would save themselves, and those placed over them, a great deal of useless trouble and correspondence.

In respect to the mode of interference, I regret that the Major General should have forgotten that the officers of the Ordnance, although not commissioned by His Majesty, are considered as officers; and that he ought not to have ordered a court of inquiry to investigate their conduct without previous report to, and sanction from, superior authority. In respect to the correspondence between the Major General and the Colonel respectively, with the Commander of the Forces, I cannot but find fault with the whole of it. It contains the assertion, on both sides, of principles and pretensions, for which there is no authority, either in the regulations or practice of the service; and is written in a tone quite unbecoming officers of rank corresponding with the commanding officer, on the conduct of others, vested with authority independent of the writer.

The service cannot be benefited by such correspondence; and I would recommend to officers in authority not to allow themselves to be made the receivers and transmitters of such correspondence.

I cannot, however, avoid observing upon one point, viz., the charge of Colonel — against Lieut. —, the Staff officer of the Major General. Every Staff officer must be considered as acting under the direct orders and superintendence of the superior officer, for whose assistance he is employed, and who must be considered responsible for his acts. To consider the relative situation of General Officer and Staff in any other light would tend to alter the nature of the service; and, in fact, to give the command of the troops to the subaltern Staff officer instead of to the General Officer. If Lieut. — has conducted himself improperly, Major General — is responsible; and Colonel — has no more right to notice the deficiencies of Lieut. —, in the performance of his duty towards Major General —, than the Major General had to interfere in a matter of detail between the respective officers and the barrack master at —.

I have only one more point to notice, and that is, the voluminous nature of this correspondence. If officers abroad will have no mercy upon each other in a correspondence of this nature, I entreat them to have some upon me; to confine themselves to the strict facts of the case, and to write no more than is necessary for the elucidation of their meaning and intentions. An attention to this request, and abstinence from interference, in which those who interfere have no authority, and in which they are not called upon to interfere by duty, will save the officers in command or authority abroad, and those placed over them at home, a great deal of unnecessary trouble; and leave much valuable time disposable for other purposes.<sup>2</sup>

1012.

BARRACKS.

‘The Master General of the Ordnance having represented to me the difficulties which have been experienced by the officers of his department at several of the foreign stations, in carrying on the duties of the barrack master, I deem it my duty to call your serious attention to this subject.



The orders for the regulation of barracks proceeded from His Majesty. They are the regulations of the service equally with those regulating discipline, or any of its branches, and must be obeyed by all in His Majesty's service. No deviation from them can be allowed, excepting in cases of emergency, which must be reported forthwith, for His Majesty's most gracious approbation, and for which the officer commanding in chief on the spot may think proper to take upon himself the authority; trusting that the circumstances under which he assumed such authority, which must be stated, will justify such assumption and the deviation from order and regulation.

This is the view which I have taken of these orders and regulations: and I must add, that unless the service is conducted according to this view—unless the barrack master is supported by the Officer commanding in chief, in carrying on his duties, under the direction and superintendence of the principal officers of the Ordnance—and unless the officers and troops are obliged by their superiors to obey the orders and regulations, to limit their occupation and use of the barrack and barrack furniture to what is allowed by regulation, and what is directed by the barrack master, under the authority vested in him—great as the expense of this department is, it must be vastly increased; and that, after all, the inconvenience to all must be immense, in order that a few may be able to enjoy advantages to which the regulations of the service do not entitle them.

As an example of the truth of these general observations, I see that the deficiency of stores, at one of the principal garrisons occupied by the troops upon the last general survey, arising chiefly from an undue and unnecessary interference with the duties of the barrack master, contrary to regulation, and an improper use and application of stores, amounts to £3000.!

Having written thus much upon the subject in general, I will not enter into the detail of the different discussions which have been brought under my view; but I must say, that in all the Ordnance have been in the right.

The officers and troops must not have, at any station, more accommodation than the regulations allow them. The use of single iron bedsteads has diminished the number, in almost every barrack, which the same space would have accommodated under other circumstances; and it will not answer still further to diminish the number accommodated, after the diminution already caused by this arrangement.

The regulations of the service have fixed the number to be accommodated in each room; these numbers must be accommodated accordingly; and the surplus room and furniture must be at the disposition and under the care of the barrack master.

In like manner, officers' quarters and stables, not occupied by the officers entitled to them under the regulations, must, under the regulations, be given over to the care, and be at the disposition of the barrack master: and I beg to observe, that my experience of the service, as well as in the office of Master General of the Ordnance for 8 years, has convinced me, that the officers of the army in general suffer much more from these deviations from order and regulation, than is at all compensated by any temporary convenience which any individual may thereby enjoy.

I have therefore to desire that His Majesty's orders and regulations, in respect to barracks, may be strictly carried into execution in your command;

and that the barrack master may be allowed to take possession and charge of his barracks and stores, and allot them according to regulation, and without the interference of any body.

There is one part of this subject, however, to which I am desirous of drawing your attention more particularly; and that is, the order which several officers holding a foreign command have given, that they should be furnished with the reports which the barrack master made to his immediate superiors, the respective officers of the ordnance.

The intention in framing the regulations under which the duties of the barrack department are conducted was, that its officers should be guided by those rules and regulations alone; and that they should be responsible for an obedience thereto, and for the care and expenditure of stores and money, to the Master General and Board of Ordnance alone; being the department of the state which is responsible to His Majesty and the Parliament for the due administration of the affairs of the barrack department, and the expenditure of the money granted by Parliament for its service.

The barrack master, as well as the respective officers of the Ordnance, and every other authority in the station, are under the general superintendence and orders of the Officer commanding in chief on each station, whose duty it is to see that they obey the orders and regulations for the conduct of the service entrusted to them: and the barrack regulations direct that the barrack master should produce to the officer commanding the troops, when required, all instructions or orders relating to the allowances or accommodation of the military. *Other subjects not belonging to the troops need not be produced.*

But the regulations do not contain a word respecting *the reports to the Master General and Board, or respective officers from the barrack master*; and I am convinced that you will see that such reports ought not to be called for.

If they are unfounded, if they are calumnious, it is not to be supposed that officers in such high stations as the Master General and Board of Ordnance would not reject them; or even communicate them to the Officer commanding the troops, in order that he might take the steps he might think fit to punish the falsehood or the calumny. But it is quite obvious that the barrack master cannot perform his duty in the independent manner in which the regulations require he should perform it, and that the responsibility of the Master General and Board is not secure, if there is not security that the reports of the barrack master reach them. It cannot be expected that these reports will contain his real view of the transactions to which they relate, if they are liable to be called for by any other authority whatever.'

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## 1013.

## SELECTIONS FROM THE MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSED PLAN FOR ALTERING THE DISCIPLINE OF THE ARMY.

22nd April, 1829.

‘ I have perused the papers respecting the discipline of the army. It is most tempting to adopt something on the principle recommended by the Secretary at War ; but I think that I may say, that “ I know the British army, and I dare not.” I shall first consider what the Prussian army is, and point out how *the system*, as established, works in that body, as compared with our system in our army.

The Prussian army is considered as the honor of the country : to maintain it in its efficient and honorable state, appears to be the first object of the whole country ; and the only occupation of the greatest number of the inhabitants, from the King to the peasant. It is the great, if not the only road to honor and distinction, for that numerous and powerful class of society which consider honor and distinction as their pursuit, and the attainment of these advantages as the reward of the labors of their lives.

All the inhabitants of the country are required to serve in this army for a limited period of time. Men of all ranks serve as soldiers. When in the ranks, the good, not only by their example and their precept, but by physical means, keep the bad in order, and maintain discipline. Their service, however short, is an honor to them in the eyes of their countrymen ; and conveys to them, after it is over, a variety of civil privileges and advantages.

All that I have described is the power of the country, acting in a particular direction to maintain the discipline and efficiency of the army. If any man will read with attention Baron Bulow’s account of the discipline of this army—of the principle on which it is established, and of the mode in which it is carried into execution—he will see that there must be something peculiar in the composition of the army, in the nature of the people of whom the soldiers are composed, and even of the constitution of the country itself, or that such a system could not work.

We know that the service of the Prussian army is, in peace, confined to Prussia itself ; and, in war, to the continent of Europe, and of that to the most fertile, the most populous, and the richest parts.

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Let us now consider what the British army is. It is an exotic in England—unknown to the old constitution of the country ; required, or supposed to be required only for the defence of its foreign possessions ; disliked by the inhabitants, particularly by the higher orders, some of whom never allow one of their family to serve in it. Even the common people will make an exertion to find means to purchase the discharge of a relation who may have enlisted, notwithstanding the advantages of pay, &c., which a soldier enjoys, compared with a common labourer.

In the moments of the greatest distress in the country, recruits cannot be obtained for the army. Service in the army is an advantage to none. The

officers and soldiers of the army are an object of dislike and suspicion to the inhabitants, while serving with their regiments, and of jealousy afterwards, and they are always ill treated.

It was the object of Mr. Wyndham's measure to render the army a popular service in England, by rendering service therein profitable, as well as honorable, but these measures totally failed.

Then the man who enlists into the British Army is, in general, the most drunken, and probably the worst man of the trade or profession to which he belongs, or of the village or town in which he lives. There is not one in a hundred of them who, when enlisted, ought not to be put in the second or degraded class of any society or body into which they may be introduced; and they can be brought to be fit for what is to be called the first class, only by discipline, and the precept and example of the old soldiers of the company who, if not themselves in that same second or degraded class, deserve to be placed there for some action or other twenty times in every week.

Then let us see how this army thus composed are employed. They are constantly, and for their lives, on service in all parts and climates of the world. They do not march out of their barracks and cantonments into the rich plains of southern Germany, of Flanders, or of France, to enjoy the best fruits of the earth; but, go where they will, they commence their service in a transport in which all this discipline, of honor, of secret remonstrances and reprimand, and the distinction and separation of classes is impracticable.

Let us see then what the effect even of our discipline is in these situations, and consider what it would be, if we were heedlessly to adopt the system of Prussia.

Let us only refer to our orderly books in the Peninsula. Let us remember the horrors committed by small detachments on their marches to join the army, notwithstanding the anxious care taken to prevent them. Let us only reflect upon the consequences of the Prussian system, or any part of it, or any relaxation in the severity of our own system, upon the conduct of our men, and the consequences of that conduct not only upon the honor of the army and the public interests, but upon the safety of these very men themselves.

Let my correspondence with Lord Bathurst upon this subject be referred to, and it will be seen what reforms I proposed, and what were proposed to, and adopted by, Parliament, to meet this evil of the first magnitude.

I confess that I have always considered this desire to alter the system of discipline of the army as one of the morbid symptoms of the times. It is like the notion that thieves ought not to be punished, which has, at last, peopled London and its neighbourhood with thieves in thousands, who will now be driven forth, and, after plundering the country, will fall victims to the law.

We forget what the army is, and what it may become, if not kept in order; and how ready the people of the country are to cry out if, by accident, they should suffer by any act of its indiscipline; or if, for want of discipline, the army should fail in obtaining success, as it certainly will fail, as it always has failed, if not in a state of discipline and good order.

It is curious enough that those should be the persons who propose to relax



the severity of the system who would have to answer for any act of discipline, or outrage, which may occur, or any failure.

I know that an army, even a British army, can be kept in order without the *infliction* of corporal punishment, probably, at all. But it is by the most rigorous system of police, equally inconsistent with the spirit of the institutions of the country, and with the satisfaction and contentment of the officers and soldiers.

I have myself kept whole divisions of the army under arms for days: no crime could then be committed. In the same manner I can have half hourly or hourly roll calls or parades. I can confine men to barrack yards; I can send them out to walk in a town, in squads, in charge of a non-commissioned officer: in short, I may torment them into regularity, but corporal punishment, unlimited, at least to the extent to which it exists at present, must be the foundation of that or any other system established in the British army.

I wish those who consider this subject would read over all the proceedings on Major ——'s case. He was anxious to have his battalion in good order, and no corporal punishment. But he inflicted misery and torture of every other description, and corporal punishment into the bargain; and the affair ended by the battalion firing their buttons at him when at exercise.

We may rely upon it that we cannot relax the severity of our system at all, and that we cannot even diminish the number of our corporal punishments, without augmenting our preventive or police system.

Upon this point we ought to consider a little the nature of our officer, and compare him with the Prussian officer. Our officer is a gentleman. We require that he should be one, and above all that he should conduct himself as such; and most particularly in reference to the soldier, and to his intercourse with the non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Indeed we carry this principle of the gentleman, and the absence of intercourse with those under his command, so far, as that, in my opinion, the duty of a subaltern officer, as done in a foreign army, is not done at all in the cavalry, or the British infantry of the line. It is done in the Guards by the serjeants. Then our gentleman officer, however admirable his conduct on a field of battle, however honorable to himself, however glorious and advantageous to his country, is but a poor creature in disciplining his company in camp, quarters, or cantonments.

The name, the character, the conduct, the family and relations, the fortune, the situation, the mental acquirements of each of the men of his company are not the sole objects of his thoughts, as the same of his men are of the Prussian officer in the same situation, who carries into execution this same discipline in the company to which he belongs, with the men of which he lives as a companion, friend, and adviser.

We must then observe that the army of Prussia, besides the advantage of its state of ordinary repose, to enable it to carry into execution this system of discipline, is at all times regularly organised, each battalion in its regiment, each regiment in its brigade, each brigade in its division, each division in its *corps d'armée*—the whole under the personal inspection of the King; so that there is not a corps, division, brigade, regiment, battalion, company, or individual, whose conduct is not checked and controlled by his superior, as well as by the view and knowledge of the whole of the profession.

Compare this state of things with the British army—with our detachments in Ireland and the West Indies, Honduras, &c. &c.,—with our detachments in transports, guarding convicts to New South Wales—with our total want of inspection and control over either officers or men, in nearly all parts of the world, and we shall see cause for astonishment that there is any discipline in the army at all, notwithstanding the severity of the system of which we complain.

I recommend that we should stand firm upon the establishment of our discipline, as it is.

If we can, let us make our officers do their duty and see that the non-commissioned officers do their's. But mind! this is a system of prevention. We shall thus avoid punishment in the best way, by preventing irregularity and crime. But I earnestly recommend not, by law or order, to say that Courts Martial are not to judge of the nature and degree of the offence or irregularity; or that, if there should be irregularity or offence, it should not be punished with severity according to its *nature and degree*: in which words must of course be included the consideration of time, circumstances, &c. &c.'

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## SELECTIONS FROM THE EVIDENCE

OF

FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

GIVEN BEFORE THE ROYAL COMMISSION FOR INQUIRING INTO MILITARY PUNISHMENTS.

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1014.

'In what year did your Grace enter the Army?—In 1787.

Did you continue to do regimental duty for several years afterwards?—I did: I was abroad at first for some time after I entered the Army, and then I joined the 12th light dragoons, and I was an aide de camp to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. I was absent occasionally, but I was generally with my regiment the greatest part of every year; then I was a captain of the 58th regt. of foot, with which I did duty; and then I was a captain in the 18th light dragoons, in which I did duty; I was then major in the 33rd regt.; and I may say that from the time I became major in the 33rd regt., until I quitted India, I commanded the regiment, for I commanded it even when I was otherwise employed, and even on the staff. In short, I believe I have done as much regimental duty, I was as much and as constantly with the regiment, particularly from the time I became major in the 33rd regt., as any officer that ever was in His Majesty's service.

And in the command of that regiment?—Actually in the command of that regiment: I was otherwise employed on general service, but from the



time I became major of the 33rd regt. I never took my hand off that regiment. I commanded them even while I was on the staff and in the field, sometimes nearer, and sometimes at a greater distance; but I was in the actual command of that regiment up to the moment at which I left India.

At that time were not corporal punishments much more frequent in the Army than they are at present?—I cannot exactly say how the thing stands at present, for since I resigned the command of the army in the year 1828, when I was appointed to be First Lord of the Treasury, and by desire of my colleagues resigned the command of the Army, I have not interfered in any regimental concern whatever. I was at that time, and am still, colonel of the Grenadier Guards, but I never interfere in the detail of the Grenadier Guards. I did not interfere in the detail of the Grenadier Guards, particularly in respect of this matter of punishment, because I know that I differ in opinion upon that subject from the commanding officer of that regiment, Colonel Woodford, and, therefore, knowing that the opinion of the public is that these corporal punishments ought to be discontinued, and knowing, besides, that it was the desire of the Government that they should be discontinued as much as possible, I have considered it my duty to refrain from even giving an opinion upon the subject. I have allowed him to do that which he thought proper for maintaining the discipline of the regiment, and from the year 1828 downwards, I cannot say that I have an official knowledge of any thing. I have the knowledge which every body has who lives in society, but I have no official knowledge upon the subject. I am inclined to believe that there is less corporal punishment; but then, on the other hand, I am inclined to believe that there is a great deal more crime. I have called upon Colonel Woodford repeatedly, more in the way of conversation than officially, but I have called upon him repeatedly to give me a statement of the defaulters' list in the 3 years that the Grenadier Guards were commanded by Colonel Townshend, when I was first appointed their colonel, as compared with the 3 years during which they were under his command, and I have never been able to procure that return; I conclude that that return would show that he was wrong in his system. Very likely this Commission may have got that return, or may have got some information that I have not got upon that subject; but I have no information from 1828 upon any military point of that description. Up to the year 1828, in the last years previous to that year, I should say that corporal punishment, in general, had been discontinued to a great degree in the Army, in comparison with what it was formerly. A great variety of other punishments had been invented, and I certainly thought that that system had not been very successful. I remember, in the papers which I have written upon the subject, which I believe have been before the Board, a very curious case is mentioned of an officer commanding a battalion, in which he carried into execution those different modes of punishment, and undoubtedly he contrived to excite a mutiny, and I was obliged to treat him a little harshly upon that subject, for he had inflicted all sorts of punishments, and the affair ended by the battalion firing their buttons upon him. This created a degree of alarm at the time at which the affair came before me at the Horse Guards, and I was obliged to check all those new-invented modes of punishment, which harassed the soldiers a great deal. There was no diminution of crime. Crime continued

just the same as ever, but there was an alteration of punishment, from corporal punishment to those other new-invented modes, which certainly did not answer the end of preventing crime.

While your Grace commanded the army, was it your wish, and did you endeavour, to diminish the frequency of corporal punishment as much as you could?—As much as possible. From the time I entered the Army, it has been the desire of every commanding officer that ever I have seen, who knew what his duty was, to diminish corporal punishment as much as possible. There is one very remarkable circumstance, which I beg the Board will never lose sight of, that is, that this punishment is always inflicted in public; that, supposing the commanding officer himself had no feeling in respect to the punishment which is inflicted on the individual, he must know there are many present who do feel it in a very extraordinary degree; officers and soldiers both, who are excessively annoyed at this punishment. But it is inflicted because it is a matter of necessity. It is done in public, and there is a security that it will not go to any excess.

At the time when your Grace commanded the Army, had the punishments of solitary confinement and imprisonment with hard labor been adopted?—To a certain degree.

What had been the effect of that substitution?—I don't think that it produced any effect. I have seen solitary confinement inflicted in the garrison of Fort William in Bengal—solitary confinement with what they call *congee*, that is, the soldier is fed upon *congee*, *congee* being the water in which the rice is boiled. I must say that that punishment never had any effect upon the men at large. The punished soldier was reduced a little in his strength by it, and in all probability he was saved from a fever by being upon this regimen, and kept in confinement and out of the sun for a few days after the irregularity which had occasioned the confinement; but I never knew that it produced any effect upon the men at large, at least to make them more sober. They always got drunk whenever they had an opportunity of doing so.

Is drunkenness the great parent of all crime in the British Army, in your opinion?—Invariably.

If you could by any means check the practice of drunkenness, are you of opinion that the British soldier would be a difficult person to manage?—I should say a difficult person to manage always to a certain degree, because there are a good number of irregularities besides drunkenness. He has a great number of habits that must be broken through; he joins his regiment excessively undisciplined, with habits of different kinds that certainly must be broken through, and he must be brought to a certain degree of training before you can say that he is a person that you can depend upon so that he will not misbehave.

Do you imagine that the British soldier would be more difficult to bring into a proper state of discipline, provided that the habit of drunkenness could be cured, than the persons that compose the other Armies in Europe?—I should say, yes; because, in the first place, the British soldiers are taken entirely from the lowest orders of society. Other Armies are composed of men of all classes; they are drawn by conscription, and men of all classes are liable thereto, and are serving in the ranks in the French Army, the



Prussian Army, the Austrian Army, and the Russian Army—in the Russian Army rather less than the others.

Has any mode ever suggested itself to you, by which a better class of persons might be induced to enter into the Army under the present mode of voluntary enlistment?—I should say not. The objection to entering into the Army, in my opinion, is the severity and regularity of the duty, the regularity of the discipline, and the life which the soldier is obliged to lead, and which you must oblige him to lead, the climates to which he is exposed, and the constancy of the service in those climates. I do not think that a better description of persons would be induced to enlist than at present, voluntarily, not even for any bounty, because the amount of the bounty is no consideration. The large bounty would be taken, and they would walk off upon the first opportunity. I do not think any bounty would procure the service of a better description of men than is enlisted at present.

Supposing corporal punishment to be entirely abolished, and that certain civil privileges were given to persons who had served in the army, do you think that might have the effect of producing a better class of persons in the army?—I do not think it would. I do not see how you can have an army at all, unless you preserve it in a state of discipline; nor how you can have a state of discipline, unless you have some punishment. I confess that that is the worst of what I see going forward. There is no punishment which makes an impression upon any body except corporal punishment. You send a man into solitary confinement; nobody sees him in solitary confinement, and nobody knows what he is suffering while he is in solitary confinement; and therefore this punishment is no example to the thousand men who are there upon the parade at the same time. The man may suffer so much in solitary confinement, as that he will not be guilty of the offence again; but that is not the principle of punishment—that is not the intention of punishment. The real meaning of punishment, if it means any thing, is example,—it is to prevent others, by the example of what they see the criminal suffer, from committing the same or a similar offence. If that is not the intention of punishment—if the intention is to punish, or even to improve the conduct of the individual only—you may find other punishments; but you will have hundreds of others guilty of the offence, and you will have the whole regiment, by degrees, in a state of punishment. There is another question, again, which is—What is to enforce these punishments? For instance, I understand that, in some of these battalions of Guards, they have 80 or 100 men *billed-up*. As long as the commanding officer can punish by means of corporal punishment, this *billing-up* can be enforced; but if corporal punishment should be discontinued, who is to enforce the *billing-up*? It is quite out of the question; and therefore I say, if it is intended that punishment should be an example, you must have something or other that other men will feel that it is better for them that they should not have inflicted upon them; and also, you must have something which shall be an ultimate resource in case they should not submit to the minor description of punishment, which circumstances might enable the commanding officer to inflict upon them. That is my idea of the necessity of corporal punishment. Then there is this further observation, (which I entreat the Board to bear in mind,) that the regularity, and order, and discipline of the

corps, is not merely a public affair ; it is not only that the regiment may be fit to do its service for the public, but I say that it is a positive breach of faith with the good man, if discipline should not be enforced. I will suppose that there are 100 men in a company, 80 of whom behave exceedingly well, and submit to all your regulations—and I apprehend that will be found to be pretty nearly the usual proportion—there will be 80 of them who never incur a fault of any description ; they lead a quiet life in the barracks, and do every thing that you require from them ; but there are 20 that will not do so. What happens ? These 20 are constantly disturbing the peace and the comfort of the 80, and there is perpetual riot and disorder going on in the barracks besides. These men are perpetually in a state of punishment ; they are either *billed-up*, or they are in confinement in the guard house, or they are in confinement in gaol, or in some way or other. The consequence is, that those 80 are obliged to do their duty for them ; so that, by not enforcing your discipline, and not enforcing your own orders, and not punishing when those orders are not obeyed, you are doing the grossest injustice to those who do obey your orders. That is a view of the case which is not generally taken ; but it is a true view, and ought to be brought before the public.

But supposing that the punishment of solitary confinement could be made such a one as to be a terror to the soldiers in general, might not that be resorted to as an ultimate punishment instead of corporal punishment ?—There is a great deal to be said about solitary confinement. In the first place, I do not believe that it could be enforced as a military punishment ; you must have recourse to the civil power to enforce that punishment. Supposing that you were to build, in all the barracks, a certain number of solitary cells, the men must be watched and guarded in those solitary cells by their comrades. The consequence is, that they get into constant conversation. That was the course at Fort William. The sentry does not do his duty ; he gets into conversation with the man in the cell ; the solitary part of the confinement is lost. As a military punishment, I do not think it could be carried into execution. And, moreover, you would still require something to prevent what I should call the knocking down system,—the knocking down the sentry or the non-commissioned officer who is taking the man to the place of solitary confinement. All this must be provided for, there must still be something behind as a resource. One officer with whom I am acquainted, who is a great advocate for this description of punishment, had a scheme of this sort ; he proposed that there should be a civil establishment formed, which should have the charge of those military gaols, and not the military officers and troops. The object was that, as there must be some further punishment in order to keep those in order who should be in the gaols, this punishment should be inflicted by the civil and not by the military power ; that is the meaning of that proposition. I confess that I cannot see my way through such a system, without incurring such an enormous expense that I am convinced the public would not entertain the proposition, if it were fairly brought forward ; and, after all, there must be, as a final resource, some other system of punishment. I am aware that lately, in the gaols of this country in general, a system of solitary confinement has been adopted, and silence enforced. I do not know how far this



has answered, or what is the resource to be adopted, if the man does not submit to the regulations of the prison. I understand that they deprive him of his food, and that in some instances that has been found to answer. That may answer; but I understand that, in America for instance, at Sing-sing, and some other places, the resource is corporal punishment. In some instances stopping the food might answer, in others it certainly would not. The consequences of having such a vast body of men in a state of punishment must not be lost sight of. There are at this moment in one battalion of the Coldstream Guards, I am told, not less than 100 men out of 600 under punishment, which number would be absent.

Of course, a small proportion of those 100 men would be liable to solitary confinement, supposing that solitary confinement to be inflicted only by sentence of a court martial?—I cannot say the proportion.

Is it your Grace's opinion that it would be impossible, even in barracks, to erect cells that would be effectual for the purpose of solitary confinement?—They must always be under a sentry.

Supposing that sentry to be so placed as to be at such a distance from the solitary cells that no communication could take place between him and the prisoners?—I do not mean to say that that is impossible; I only state what I have seen at Calcutta, in the *Congee-house*, and there it could not be prevented.

Supposing that some scheme should be devised, which should make those punishments of solitary confinement, or imprisonment with hard labor, effectual and real punishments, is it still your Grace's opinion that it might not be made to supersede corporal punishment by the lash?—There would still be the absence of the example; the battalion would not know that this man was suffering for having committed such an offence; they would know that he was in solitary confinement, but till the man had been in solitary confinement for a week or ten days, or a fortnight, he would not know the consequences to himself; and how much he suffered in this solitary confinement, of course the battalion could not be acquainted with.

Supposing a man to be so solitarily confined, is it your opinion that his representation, when he comes out of that confinement, would not answer the purpose of example to the rest of his comrades?—I should think not.

Are you of opinion, then, that the infliction of a certain number of lashes, after the reading of a court martial in the front of the regiment, would have more effect as an example, than any representation he might make of his sufferings in prison?—I have no doubt of that whatever.

Have you known instances in which the infliction of corporal punishment has had the immediate effect required, namely, the putting a stop to the prevalence of such crimes as the man was punished for?—Certainly.

In cases of insubordinate conduct and refusal to march, and so forth, would it be possible to substitute any other punishment which would be so summary and so effectual as that of the lash?—I have no idea of any great effect being produced by any thing but the fear of immediate corporal punishment. I must say, that in hundreds of instances, the very threat of the lash has prevented very serious crimes. It is well known that I have hundreds of times prevented the most serious offences by ordering the men to appear with their side arms. When I found any great disorder going on the first thing I did, was to order that all the men must appear, if they ap-

peared in the street at all, in their side arms, that was the first thing. I then ordered that the rolls be called every hour; and all those restraints were enforced by the fear of the lash. If it were not for the fear of the lash, who would appear in his side arms? Then, after that, if this did not do, I ordered them all under arms, and kept them standing near their arms. It is well known that I have done that very thing frequently. All those things were ordered to prevent the mischief in the first place; and in the next place, I was quite sure that no man would venture to disobey it, because he knew that if he ventured to disobey it he would come to corporal punishment.

Supposing the power of corporal punishment had not been in your hands at that time, could you by any other means have established that discipline in the Army?—No, it is out of the question.

You are now speaking of circumstances upon actual service?—Yes.

Must not a certain time elapse before corporal punishment can be inflicted, on account of the proceedings of the court martial?—There was a very summary proceeding, which is now discontinued, which is called a drum-head court martial; but the man is brought to a court martial as soon as possible. A court martial is ordered; the forms take a certain time, but the man is sure of being tried, and, if convicted, of being punished. But, besides this punishment by court martial, there is, in all Armies, the provost. I do not mean to say that the provost could be used for the purpose of enforcing an order of that description, but the provost is always liable to be used to prevent any irregularity; for instance, if there is a system of plunder going on, the provost is ordered to prevent it, and he punishes those taken in the fact upon the spot.

Are drum-head courts martial upon service entirely discontinued?—I do not think they were very common. We did not want them.

Supposing the wish to abolish corporal punishment to be as strong and as general as can be conceived, not only among the public, but among the officers, can you point out any possible means of doing without corporal punishment while the Army is in the field?—I have not an idea of any possible means. Having had this subject in contemplation for 6 or 7 years, I have turned it over in my mind in every possible way; and I declare that I have not an idea what can be substituted for it. You may have an army without discipline, or you may have no army at all; but if you are to have an army in a state of discipline, and in a state of efficiency, and I must say in a state of decent comfort, I have not a notion how you are to go on without having some punishment that shall make an impression upon the minds of those who are serving. I assure the Board that I have turned my mind to the subject in every possible way, with a view of discovering some mode of solving the difficulty.

Supposing it were found that the punishment of solitary confinement, or imprisonment with hard labor, was effectual for those purposes at home, would it be possible to establish a system of that sort when the Army was serving in the field?—Absolutely impossible.

Your Grace is aware, that by the regulations of the French Army, no man is to be corporally punished, or struck. How do the French, when they are in the field and upon service, manage to keep up the discipline of their



Army?—The French soldier is quite a different person from the soldier in the British army; he is enlisted by conscription. There are men of all classes in the French army; the good keep the bad to a certain degree in order; besides that, the whole system of the French Army is a good deal more loose than ours ever can be. Their numbers are infinitely greater; they can bear a looseness and want of discipline much better than we can upon that account; they can subsist much more easily for that reason; and, besides that, I am rather inclined to believe, that, notwithstanding that there is no regulated system of corporal punishment, there is a good deal of severe punishment in the French Army, and they put people to death to a much greater degree than we do; and I fancy that among the soldiers themselves they strike a great deal.

Had you an opportunity of ascertaining the fact, that the discipline of the French Army is by no means so strict as the discipline of the British Army?—I should say, that it is not so strict, certainly. In the first place, they are entirely a different class of people. The officers of the French Army live with the men a great deal more than ours do; they are of the same class of persons to a greater degree than ours are. At different times I have had French guards of honor attending me; and I have sometimes found the officer playing at billiards with the men of the guard, and familiarities of that sort going on that were never heard of in the British service, and could not be allowed. Therefore, the whole of the system is much more loose than ours is, on account of the description of men we have for soldiers, and the description of gentlemen we have for the officers, and the relative number of which our Army is composed compared with the Armies of the Continent.

Upon service, do you conceive that the discipline of the Army which you had under your command in the Peninsula, was superior to the discipline of the French troops opposed to you?—I have not the most distant doubt of it, infinitely superior.

Superior in respect to the treatment of the country in which they were serving?—Not to be compared with it, even their own country; an enemy's country to us, and to them their own country.

And even there the discipline of the English Army was superior to that of the French?—Infinitely.

In what respect was the discipline of the French Army so inferior to ours?—A general system of plunder, great looseness in the performance of the duty, great irregularity; in short, irregularity of which we could not venture to risk the existence even.

Was it not the fact, that the people came home to their houses when the English were to occupy them, having left them when the French were to occupy them?—Yes, that was the case.

Comparing the discipline of our Army with that of the Prussians, do you conceive that our discipline for all purposes in the field is the more effectual, or theirs?—Not to be compared.

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You attribute the different proportions to the good discipline of the one Army, and the inferior discipline of the other?—To the efficient discipline

for service of our Army, and the deficient discipline for service of the Prussian Army.

Have you had occasion to observe the discipline of the other Armies of Europe, such as the Austrian, the Bavarian, and the Russian; and does your Grace's experience lead to the same result with respect to all those Armies as compared with ours?—I should think so. I have never had immediate experience of the effect of the discipline of the two Armies in so striking an instance as of the Prussians. \* \* \* \* \* I cannot say that I have seen the same result in other Armies, because I was never engaged in a course of operations so near them.

Towards the latter time of your service in the Peninsula, was corporal punishment very frequent in the army, or more frequent than it had been in the beginning?—I cannot say that I know exactly how it was in the regiments. I rather believe it was not so frequent. I am positively certain that crime had most enormously diminished; that there was not one crime for one hundred that there were in the beginning of the time. I think my orders show it. There was a man convicted of robbery, and I pardoned him, because the crime had become so rare. There are things of that sort that show clearly, that by discipline, and by care and attention, the Army was brought into such a state of discipline, that every description of punishment was almost discontinued altogether.

Do you conceive that the Army, when it left France from the Pyrenees, was in as efficient state for service as an Army can well be brought to?—I always thought that I could have gone any where and done any thing with that Army. It was impossible to have a machine more highly mounted and in better order, and in a better state of discipline than that Army was. When I quitted that Army upon the Garonne, I do not think it was possible to see any thing in a higher state of discipline: and I believe there was a total discontinuance of all punishment.

Was it ever represented to you, or did you ever observe that a soldier who had been corporally punished was a worse or a better soldier in the field from having received that punishment?—I never heard of it.

Did you ever understand that a man was degraded by the infliction of that punishment in the eyes of his companions with whom he was serving?—No, I should not say that he was. I think they were just as good comrades as ever. I think it may affect his claim to be a non-commissioned officer in some regiments; the commanding officer may feel this man has been punished once, or if he has been punished twice in a still stronger degree, "I cannot make him a non-commissioned officer." There may be a feeling of that description; but I have myself made some, that have been punished, non-commissioned officers, who are at this moment officers, that I have tied up at the halberds and pardoned, and they are officers and even field-officers at this moment.

Then, in your judgment, those men were not degraded in the eyes of the public with whom they lived?—No, certainly not.

But supposing a soldier to be punished for a degrading crime, such as theft or crime of that description, is he then degraded in the eyes of his comrades?—The crime degrades him, certainly; but I must say that you must receive that opinion with a certain degree of qualification; there is a



margin even there. One of those persons that I mentioned just now, whom I had promoted to be a non-commissioned officer, and afterwards to be an officer, and if he is alive now he is a field officer—this man was a serjeant, and he expended the company's money and deserted. Now, all that have been engaged in regimental service know that that is pretty nearly as great a crime as a man can be guilty of. That man was brought back; I had him to the halberds, but I did not punish him; he was a good man otherwise, and I pardoned him, and I afterwards made him a non-commissioned officer, and afterwards I recommended him to be made an officer, and he was with the Army in the Peninsula as a field officer. This man was led to commit the offence by women. There are things of that kind that a man may be led into, and yet he may be a very good man; and a commanding officer must exercise a judgment and a certain discretion in doing a thing of the kind. I do not mean to say that it is an example to be followed. There are some of those crimes for which they must be punished, although it may be in the power of the commanding officer afterwards to save the man.

Did you know instances of the infliction of corporal punishment so cowing the spirit as to make a man unfit for a soldier afterwards in the field?—I never heard of such a thing.

And you do not believe such a feeling to exist?—I do not.

Have you served in the Colonies with a regiment?—I served at the Cape, and I served in the East Indies.

Do you think that in the Colonies this system of solitary confinement and imprisonment with hard labor, which has been so much recommended, could by possibility be introduced?—I think not.

In Great Britain and Ireland would it not be possible to have military prisons and solitary cells in the barracks, so as to get rid of a great proportion, at all events, of the corporal punishments, if not entirely?—It might be possible to build military prisons, and it might be possible to build solitary cells in the barracks, but at a great expense; and the solitary confinement I still think would not have the effect, as an example, of preventing crime, so much as a punishment which every body must see and feel that the man suffers from, and which it would not be very agreeable to undergo. A vast expense would attend that description of punishment, and great inconvenience, on account of the number of men it would take out of the regiment constantly; and, besides all that, I believe that it would not have the effect of an example.

So that if the country did determine to go to the expense of building these places, and so forth, you still are very doubtful whether the expense which was gone to would be found to have produced a system as effectual as the present for preserving discipline?—Certainly not.

Is it your opinion, however, that supposing those places to be built, the frequency of corporal punishment might not be diminished by these means?—It would depend, in a great degree, on the effect the measure should have in the way of example. If it should be found that solitary confinement would produce the effect, the commanding officers would use solitary confinement instead of corporal punishment; but if it did not produce the effect, of course they must have recourse to corporal punishment, supposing that the law allowed that it should be inflicted.

Supposing the effect of those punishments was such that it was thought

that corporal punishment might, without danger, be abolished in England, would it be possible to form such a military code as that corporal punishment should be permitted upon service and in the Colonies, and entirely prohibited in Great Britain and Ireland?—I think it would be possible to form such a code, but I do not think it would be advisable; for this reason, that the great object of those commanding His Majesty's troops, and of the officers at the head of His Majesty's Army, has invariably been to consider and represent service abroad as an honor and an advantage,—not one service abroad only, but every service abroad,—and it would be a very unfortunate circumstance if a punishment, pronounced by the Government and Parliament to be an improper punishment, should be inflicted upon those who are to perform the service abroad, which it has been the object and duty of those at the head of the Army to represent as a service of honor and advantage. Now, I have gone so far upon this subject of considering service abroad as an advantage, that I can mention more than one instance in which, when regiments have misbehaved, and it has been proposed to send them abroad, I have said, "No, by no means; do any thing rather than that:" because when you send a regiment abroad, you must represent it, and you must endeavor to have it felt, as being an honor, and particularly in time of war. If it should ever unfortunately be deemed any thing like a disgrace, it would be the greatest misfortune that could happen to the Army and to the public.

Would it not be exceedingly prejudicial to the discipline of a regiment, if it was known to the soldiers of that regiment that during their remaining in Great Britain and Ireland they were not subject to corporal punishment, but that from the moment they set foot on board ship to proceed either to the Colonies or to actual service, they would then become subject to a punishment which had been considered so degrading in England as to be abolished?—I should think so; but there is one thing which should always be borne in mind, and that is, that in reality the Army think but little of this punishment. If it was abolished entirely in England and kept up in the Colonies, the effect would be very injurious. Going to the Colonies, say what we will, is never very agreeable. We consider it and represent it a matter of honor—we are going abroad—and there is among the commanding and other officers of the regiment a desire that it should be reckoned a good thing. But if it was to be attended by corporal punishment being revived, having been put down in England and in Ireland, I do not mean to say that there might not be an additional motive for feeling an objection to go, and that there might not be some instances of mutiny and difficulty in getting the soldier abroad, from the fear of having, or under the pretext of the fear of having, this punishment inflicted.

So that supposing those prisons, and so forth, which have been alluded to, were to be established in these islands, the same expense to provide the means of carrying those punishments into execution must be incurred in all the Colonies?—Yes.

And still there would remain service in the field to which that regulation could not be made to apply?—Certainly.

It has been suggested to the Commission that a system of ensuring a certain number of officers' commissions to the privates and non-commissioned officers of the Army, would be a means of inducing persons of a more re-



spectable class of life to enter into the Army ; is that your Grace's opinion ? —That is more a civil and political question than it is a military one. I should say, very possibly some young men in the country might. I believe now there is a great want of employment for young men of education in the country, and some young men in the country might be induced to enlist as privates, with a view to obtain commissions ; but, at the same time, I beg the Commission to observe there are here the Life Guards, the Horse Guards, who are called gentlemen of the Life Guards and Horse Guards ; and I believe that they do not get many of that class of men among them, even though they are gentlemen, and they have a certain chance from that circumstance. It is possible, I think, that you might get a few gentlemen to come into the service, a few persons of better education and of a better description, but I do not think in large numbers.

You do not think it would be a sufficient inducement to enable you to count upon the class of men who compose the Army being raised in station ? —No, I should think not. The real truth is, there are very few commissions to be given away. The General Commanding in Chief would be better able to state more of this than I can ; but I believe that he would tell you that the number of commissions he has is scarcely sufficient to enable him to provide for those well reported of from the Military College ; at the present moment, I do not believe he has a sufficient number to provide for all those well reported of in their studies at Sandhurst. Now, if that is the case, although 30 or 40 commissions a-year might be to be given in this way, it would hardly produce any effect upon the number in the army.

In point of fact, did you recommend many persons for commissions, during the service in the Peninsula ?—A great number ; it is a circumstance that I have not attended to a great deal, but I should wish that that point should be investigated. I believe that in the Peninsula I gave every commission I had to give away, either to gentlemen volunteers with the Army, or to non-commissioned officers. I gave commissions to a great number of non-commissioned officers, and those that were not given away to non-commissioned officers were given away to volunteers serving with the Army at the time. I gave none in this country at all.

With respect to those non-commissioned officers that were so raised to the rank of officers, have they generally remained in the Army, or have they retired ?—A great number have retired. In truth, they do not make good officers ; it does not answer. They are brought into society to the manners of which they are unaccustomed ; they cannot bear being at all heated with wine or liquor. I have known them when I was serving in the ranks of the Army, and I think, in general, they are quarrelsome, they are addicted to quarrel a little in their cups, and they are not persons that can be borne in the society of the officers of the Army ; they are men of different manners altogether.

Does that make them feel uncomfortable in the new situation in which they are placed ?—I think so—punctilious and uncomfortable. There are very few indeed that stop any time, or that ever rise beyond the subaltern ranks of the Army.

Are they generally of the same age as those persons with whom they are to mix, the other subalterns in the regiment ?—Generally older.

And that makes their situation still more difficult and unpleasant?—Still more so.

Do they find any difficulty in providing the means for their own equipment, and their living afterwards?—I think, in general, they can do that pretty well. They live upon their pay, if they have saved any little money. In general, there is care taken to assist them, when they are promoted, in providing their clothes and their equipment, and I think that in that respect they are well off; but they cannot live in the society of gentlemen; they are not accustomed to the manners of gentlemen.

But they can live better upon their pay and so forth when upon service, than they can in garrison when at home?—I should think so.

Since the peace, have there been a considerable number of commissions of adjutants and quarter masters given to non-commissioned officers in the Army?—I cannot speak to this so much since the peace, for I was only in command of the Army a couple of years, and at that time we gave some; but I think, in general, the wish of the commanding officers of regiments is to get an officer that has purchased regularly into the service; he is a gentleman of education, and he manages much better than those non-commissioned officers.

In foreign Armies, for instance, the French, you are aware that a certain number of commissions in every regiment are devoted to non-commissioned officers and soldiers?—Yes.

Do those non-commissioned officers and soldiers who have got those commissions, live at the mess with the rest of the officers, or do they live separately, and do they break off all connexion with the soldiers with whom they had been comrades heretofore?—From what I have mentioned already respecting the constitution of the French Army being levied by conscription, and there being men of all classes of society in the ranks, it stands to reason that there must be men of all classes of society in the ranks of the officers likewise; and I have seen, as I mentioned before, in my own guard, an officer playing at billiards with the drummer of the guard, and even with privates of the guard, in my own room, although this officer dined with me, by the bye, every day; but he was amusing himself all the morning playing at billiards with the men, which we never hear of in the British Army. And, of course, when some of those soldiers come to be promoted to be officers, they live with the others who have been promoted before, and I believe that that class of men all live together. They very often do not mess together; they mess in threes or fours in some of the French regiments. Sometimes, I believe, they mess together as we do, but in some cases, I believe, they do not do so, and then of course the men live according to their habits and manners together, as people do in clubs here, and in other societies in England. But I rather believe that this regulation of the French Army, which grants to soldiers and non-commissioned officers, commissions, has not prevented the man of education, and manners and information, from rising; I believe that that sort of person has been the man selected in general, for they select for those commissions, but they select from the ranks, and they generally take the man of family, of education and manners, in preference to a mere non-commissioned officer, and that is one of the great difficulties of the French Army at the present moment, that there is, as I understand,



throughout the French Army, a very strong non-commissioned officers' party, which creates great uneasiness to the Government, and has a considerable influence in the regiments as against the power and influence of the officers.

Supposing such a system could be established in the British Army, and that the officers, instead of messing together, lived more with the men than they do at present, do you think the discipline of the British Army, composed as it is, could be maintained?—I do not think it could.

For instance, supposing such a circumstance took place in a guard of the British Army, as you stated to have taken place in the guard of honor attending upon you, of the French Army, do you think such a circumstance as that could happen, and the discipline of the Army be maintained?—It is quite out of the question.

Then are the Commissioners to conclude that the relation between the French soldier and his officer is an entirely different one from that between the English soldier and the English officer?—Quite different.

Is that the case also in the Prussian Army?—The Prussian Army rise very much in the same way; indeed I am not quite sure that all the commissions do not go among the non-commissioned officers and soldiers, but then the partiality of the selection is still greater; I believe that the gentleman and the man of education is taken more frequently even than he is in the French service.

Has your Grace ever turned in your mind whether there might not be a system of rewards, either of honors or of increase of pay, that might tend to maintain the discipline of the Army, and thereby render corporal punishment less frequent?—With respect to a system of reward, I should be very sorry that it should be supposed that the British soldier was not sensible of rewards and honors to him. I think he is; but at the same time, it must not be supposed that those rewards and honors would prevent a great deal of irregularity and crime which must be prevented. You could not expect it, at least without such an expense and such a profusion of rewards as would be absolutely out of the question.

Does your Grace see any objection to making the experiment of an order of merit in the Army, which shall extend from the private soldier up to the highest rank; first for gallantry in the field, and secondly for good behaviour?—No, I should see no objection; on the contrary, I am certain it would produce a good effect; and it has been tried. I have known it exist in several regiments. I never had it in any regiment under my immediate command. In the 33rd regt. it never existed, and therefore I could not exactly say what the effect was, but I am sure that the soldier is as sensible of such a reward, and of his merits being considered, as any other individual is. But, at the same time, it must not be supposed that there would not still be a great deal of irregularity and disorder.

But as an assistant to discipline you would think it desirable?—Certainly.

Have you ever considered how far the giving greater facilities to the soldiers when in quarters, in the way of games and recreations of different sorts, might tend to take them out of those habits of drunkenness and vice in which they indulge?—Every thing that can tend to amuse them and employ them is good. In the East Indies we do all we can to amuse and employ them, and to occupy their time. At the same time you must never

forget that irregularity comes after all ; but every thing of that sort is of advantage.

With regard to pensions, can you suggest any alteration with respect to pensions that might be an inducement either to a better class of persons to enter the Army, or that, when in the Army, the forfeiture of those pensions should be a still more powerful means of promoting discipline?—I should think that the great thing of all about pensions is to keep faith. There have been different changes of pensions, and claims have been admitted and not admitted, and so on. I should say that the great thing is to keep faith ; and I think that whenever there is an opportunity of introducing the forfeiture of a pension—but that goes into a very large question—but whenever it is possible to introduce a forfeiture of pension upon a crime, it would be a good thing to do it. But I do not think still that that would preclude the necessity of having recourse to those punishments at times. I should say also, that in some of the barracks, for instance some of the barracks in London, and likewise in some of the large garrisons, it might be possible to put them under stoppages when they have been in confinement during the period of their confinement. That might render confinement a stronger punishment. For instance, that when a man is in confinement he shall forfeit that part of his pay that would go into his own pocket ; or that when he was absent from his duty that that part of his pay should be forfeited. I think that things of that sort might have a certain effect in preventing crime, but still you must have the other punishment. This must be borne in mind, however, that one of the great offences they are guilty of is the sale of necessaries, and that the very moment you touch the pay, you immediately, to a certain degree, occasion the crime of selling necessaries. The way that I put a stop to the sale of necessaries was by having them paid every day, which I did in the Peninsula. It totally put a stop to that description of offence. The man got his money every day, and his necessaries also were examined every day ; and the moment that his necessaries were not complete his pay was stopped, so that he had every inducement to keep his necessaries complete, and not to sell them. Whenever you touch the pay you give occasion for that description of crime, which is the most common and the most inconvenient among the many crimes of which they can be guilty—that of selling their necessaries.

Penal companies, that is to say, companies to which men who are in the habit of bad behaviour in the regiment could be sent, have been recommended to the Commission. What is your Grace's opinion upon that subject?—I never saw it in any service, and I do not very well understand how it could be adopted ; I do not know how the penal company is to be kept in order.

When that has been recommended, it has been proposed that the men in the regiment serving upon that station should not be liable to corporal punishment till they have been placed in a penal company ; and that from the moment of their joining the penal company they should become subject to that punishment, of course being kept in a station separate from the rest of the Army?—I do not see how that punishment is to be carried into execution ; I am afraid it would be found not to answer, at all events as an example. It would never be before the eyes of the men. The man is sent



away to a penal company, and there punished; whereas the great object is that his suffering, whatever it is, should be in the presence of the whole; and that they should all feel—"if I do this I shall be liable to punishment, "not only if I do this, but if I commit any of those irregularities which I "am forbidden to commit; and therefore I will not commit them."

You are aware that in the Prussian Army there are two classes; that a man is originally enrolled in the first class, and that for great misconduct he is put into the second class, and that his dress in some respects is different; for instance, that the cockade is of a different description, and so forth. Is your Grace of opinion that that would have any effect as a mode of enforcing discipline?—I wrote a paper upon that subject some time ago, and I there stated my opinion upon it. I do not think it is applicable to the state of our service at all. I believe that in the first instance nearly every man would begin in the second class; but I must say that I do not think we have got to the bottom of the punishment in the Prussian service. I know what that punishment is. In reviewing the Prussian Army you will see, out of a regiment of 2000 or 3000 men, one or two men in this situation. Now it is absolutely impossible that there should not be more than one or two who deserve to be in the second class; but I have gone down the ranks with the King of Prussia, and it is easily perceived who are the individuals. They wear feathers of a certain color, and all the others wear white feathers; and I saw that one man, or perhaps two, in a regiment might be so marked. I must say that I have known enough of the Prussian Army to be quite certain that there were many more men who deserved to be in the second class than those two; therefore I think there must be more in it than we are informed of. But I am quite certain that it would not answer for our service. When the men first enter into our Army, they would be put into the second class at once.

There has been a constant change in the power left to commanding officers with respect to punishments and to trials, and there has been a diminution in the power of regimental courts martial with respect to punishments, and so forth; are you of opinion that the commanding officer's power has been too much abridged, or that those regulations are correct?—I would go very far back. As far back as 30 years ago there was a very important alteration made, which I do not think was a desirable alteration either for the soldiers or the discipline of the Army, which was swearing courts martial,—swearing the witnesses, and swearing the members, and so on. I think it made a very important alteration. It altered the court from what it was before, a court of discipline and honor, into a court with regular evidence, and a great deal of perjury; the proof of crime being exceedingly difficult, instead of being in the hands of the commanding officer, for which the commanding officer was in a great degree responsible. That alteration was made while I was in the service as commanding officer of a regiment. Then I think that every alteration that has been made since that, which has taken away the power of the commanding officer, has rather been a disadvantage, not only to the discipline, but to the soldier himself; for I believe the soldier himself is as much interested in maintaining this discipline as the public is, for the reason I have stated.

You are aware that an order was given out by Lord W. Bentinck before

leaving India, which abolished the infliction of corporal punishment upon the native Armies in all the three Presidencies? As your Grace has been in India, the Commissioners will be glad to learn your opinion upon that subject. You will observe that the principle upon which that has been done, has been explained to the Commission as being, that it stood in the way of obtaining the best description of recruits from the native population into the Armies of those Presidencies; and that the discharge from the service is in itself a sufficient punishment to preserve the discipline?—The punishment of discharge would apply, I believe, to the service in Bengal. In Bengal they have a very superior description of man for the sepoy; and they have, at least they had, very great facility in procuring the service of those men; and, indeed, I understood that, at one time, some of the regiments that had served a long time in the northern provinces in the distant stations of the Army, had a vast number of supernumeraries always following them, ready to enter. It stands to reason, therefore, that the discharge of men from these regiments would be, to a certain degree, a punishment; and a punishment that would have an effect as an example. But when you come to apply that punishment to the King's Army, to the Army of Fort St. George, or to the Army at Bombay, I should say it would be no punishment at all. The sepoy upon the coast of Coromandel, in the Army of Fort St. George, is a man of a very low caste and description in general. There are some high caste men, there are some brahmins, and men of the military classes, among them, and some Mussulmen; but none of the regiments, that ever I saw, were ever entirely complete in number. They all wanted men; they had none of those people following them; and therefore I should say that the discharge of men of that description would no more be considered a punishment than it would be considered a punishment in our service; on the contrary, in many cases, it would rather be considered a benefit. Then it is the same thing on the Malabar coast. I never saw a Bombay battalion at all complete in its numbers; they generally want 100 men or 150 men, and it is very difficult to get recruits; and a discharge would be desirable rather than otherwise. So that you must not consider this question solely with reference to the Presidency of Bengal; but when you come to apply it to the Army of Fort St. George, which was the efficient acting Army, and the Army of Bombay, it will not apply at all.

Does your Grace think that dismissal from the service would be an effectual substitute for corporal punishment in the Army of Bengal?—It always wants, to a great degree, the effect of example; but it would be a more effectual means in the Army of Bengal than in the other two Presidencies, as I rather believe they used to have a number of men always following them, ready and desirous of enlisting.

And the soldier is of a better description?—The soldier is a man of high caste; he is a man of large size, a high caste man, and generally a man of the military class.

Upon a view of the Madras soldier and of the Bengal soldier together, should not you say there is a superiority in the very look of the Bengal soldier?—Yes; he is quite a superior description of man.

In your Grace's time in India were there any grants of land given to the



private soldiers in the Bengal Army for having served a certain time?—There is a pension fund.

Was there not, at a former period, also land granted?—I rather believe that instead of the pension they were settled upon certain lands.

Therefore the loss of that was part of the punishment of dismissal?—Yes, the loss of that.

What, in your opinion, will be the effect of abolishing corporal punishment in the native Army, as a degrading punishment, and still retaining it in the European part of the Company's Army, and in the King's troops in India, upon the discipline of those latter troops?—I do not think they will inquire much about it. What they call among them, "an attorney," may now and then make some noise about it; but I do not think the troops in general will. The truth is that the King's troops in the East Indies are in a very peculiar situation; they are generally in barracks by themselves, excepting when they are assembled in the field; they have not a great deal of intercourse with the natives. Sometimes there may be a native battalion in cantonments with them; but they have not a great deal of intercourse with the native troops. They are kept very much separate.

So that you do not fear much bad effect from that?—No. There may be, here and there, a question about it; but I do not think it will have any effect in general, they are so far asunder; the Europeans are generally in cantonments alone. If they are in any place with the natives, there is generally only one native battalion, or something of that sort.'

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1015.

To the Officers, calling themselves the remnant of the Captains and Subalterns of the Peninsula, who have sent a Memorial and printed paper to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Strathfield Saye, 7th January, 1840.

'Gentlemen,—I have received the memorial which you have sent me, and the printed paper referred to therein.

You and I do not consider in the same light the situation in which I have stood in relation to the Army—to yourselves as its officers, and to the Government; and that in which I stand at present, in relation to the same parties. I was the Commander in Chief of the Army in the field, and it was my duty faithfully to report the services of its officers, whether as an Army or as individuals, to the Secretary of State, to be laid before the Sovereign, and to my superior officer as well as your's, the Commander in Chief of the Army.

It was the duty of the Government to settle whether any, and what reward should be conferred upon those whose services and merits were reported by me, whether in the way of honorary distinction or otherwise. It was no part of my duty to interfere in such discussions, unless my opinion was required.

I was frequently commanded by the Sovereign to recommend corps, battalions, and individual officers, upon which and whom honorary distinctions, and upon the latter of whom brevet rank should be conferred. I have re-

ceived similar commands in respect to distinctions for individuals from the Sovereigns in alliance with our Sovereign, whose Armies were likewise under my command. I obeyed these orders, and performed all these duties, to the best of my judgment, according to the intention of the Sovereign. But, excepting when thus ordered, I have not considered it any part of my duty to interfere in such matters. I stood in precisely the same relations towards the Army of which I was the Commander in Chief in the Netherlands and France, and towards the Government; and I, invariably, acted accordingly.

My relations with you ceased in the year 1814; and with the Army which I had the honor to command in the Netherlands and in France, in the year 1818-19.

I recommended various individuals for their services in the Army in the Netherlands and France in the year 1815, when so required. I likewise recommended many for honorary distinctions from the Sovereigns in alliance with our Sovereign, when so required by those illustrious personages. But I never interfered in such affairs till required. I have since been called upon, by authority, at different times to state my opinion upon individual claims, and I have answered the call to the best of my judgment.

After the death of his late Royal Highness the Duke of York, I was appointed Commander in Chief of the Army. There was no question, at that time, of a desire that the honorary rewards of the Army should be revised.

I resigned the office of Commander in Chief early in 1828, by desire of my colleagues in office; and from that time forward I have never interfered in any military affair whatever, unless my opinion or assistance was required by the General Commanding the Army in Chief, by the Sovereign, or by the Ministers of the Sovereign.

In the year 1830 I retired from political office, and, excepting for a short period in 1834 and 1835, when I was called upon by the late King William IV. to give him my assistance in the formation of an Administration, I have had neither patronage, power, nor influence, nor relation with those who had. That is the position and relation in which I stand towards the Army and towards the Government of the country, at the present moment.

I have been the Commander in Chief of many armies; I am not the Commander in Chief of the British Army. I cannot, I must not interfere in the duties of that officer, unless my opinions or assistance should be required. I have neither influence nor power to enable me to interfere upon any question with the Government; above all, not upon one which must have been considered and decided, from 20 to 25 years ago, by the Government of those days.

Under these circumstances, I lament that you should have applied to me. I had no power over those questions, as I have shown, in those distant days: I can have none now. If you think yourselves aggrieved, the usual channel of the General Commanding the Army is open to you, and is the one which you should follow, if you should think proper to lay before the Government your appeal. I must decline to interfere in any manner, until my opinion is required by authority.



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